But there are other instances, in which the event of things is not expressly revealed; as when God has only discovered to us what is the rule of our duty. Nevertheless, since it is natural for man, when any duty is commanded, to pass some judgment concerning the event thereof; and, inasmuch as we suppose the event not expressly revealed, it follows, that the judgment, which we pass concerning it, is only what appears to us, or what, according to our rule of judging, seems to be the probable event of things. In this case we are not infallibly assured concerning it; and when we pass a judgment relating thereunto, we may conclude that some consequences may attend our present duty, which, perhaps, will never come to pass. As if a general of an army gives forth a command to his soldiers, to march towards the enemy, they will readily conclude, that he designs, by this command, that they should enter on some action, which, had he expressly told them, he must either change his purpose, or else the event must certainly happen; but, inasmuch as he has not discovered this to them, all the judgment that they can form, at present, concerning it, is only such, as is founded on the appearance of things, and the event might probably afterwards shew, without any impeachment of his veracity or conduct herein,that his only design was to try whether his soldiers would obey the word of command, or not. Or if a king should order a number of malefactors to the place of execution, without discovering the event thereof, the apparent event is their immediate death; but if, pursuant to his secret purpose, he resolved, there to give forth a pardon to them, it cannot be supposed that he changed his purpose; but the event makes it appear, that his purpose was not then known; whatever the apparent event might be, his real design was to humble them for their crimes, and afterwards to pardon them.
It is only in such-like instances as these, that we apply this distinction to the doctrine that we are maintaining; and therefore it must be a very great stretch, of malicious insinuation, for any one to suppose, that hereby we charge God with insincerity in those declarations of his revealed will, by which we pass a probable judgment concerning the event of things. But to apply this to particular instances. God commanded Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, Gen. xxii. 2. whereas it is certain, unless we suppose that he altered his purpose, that he intended, not that he should lay his hand upon him, but, when Isaac was upon the altar, to forbid him to do it. Here was a great and a difficult duty, which Abraham was to perform pursuant to God’s revealed will, which was the rule of his obedience; had Abraham known, before this, that God designed to hold his hand, and prevent him from striking the fatal blow, it had been no trial of his faith; for it would have been no difficult matter for him to have done every thing else. The holy patriarch knew well enough that God could prevent him from doing it; but this he had no ground to conclude, because he had no divine intimation concerning it; therefore that which appeared to him to be the event, was the loss of his son, and he reconciled this with the truth of the promise before given him, thatin Isaac his seed should be called, by supposing that God, at some time or other, wouldraise him from the dead, as the apostle observes, Heb. xi. 19. therefore that which Abraham concluded as judging, not by an express revelation, but by the voice of providence, was, that Isaac must be slain by his hand: But this was contrary to the real event, as is evident, from the account thereof in scripture; and, consequently since the real event was agreeable to the divine determination, as all events are, it follows, that there is a difference between the will of God, determining the event of things, which shall certainly come to pass accordingly; and the revelation of his will, relating to what is the creatures present duty, which may, at the same time, appear to them, when judging only by the command, which is the rule of duty, and some circumstances that attend it, to be contrary to what will afterwards appear to have beenthe real design of God therein. God’s real design was to try Abraham’s faith, and to prevent him from slaying his son, when he had given a proof of his readiness to obey him; but this remained, at first, a secret to Abraham, and the apparent design was, that he should slay him. Therefore there is a foundation for this distinction, as thus explained, concerning the secret and revealed will of God; the former belongs not to us, nor are we to take our measures from it, as being unknown: and, when the latter appears contrary to it, we must distinguish between two things, that are contrary in the same, and different respects; or between the judgment which we pass concerning events, which are apparent to us, and, at most, are only probable and conjectural, as we judge of the consequence of a duty commanded; and those events, which, though they are infallibly certain, yet are not revealed, nor can be known, till they come to pass. In this sense we understand the distinction between God’s secret and revealed will, when they seem to oppose each other; which it was necessary for us thus to explain, inasmuch as we shall frequently have occasion to mention, and apply it, when we account for the difference that there seems to be, between the purpose of God, relating to the event of things, and our present views thereof, whereby we may understand and account for the difficulties contained in several scriptures, which I would have mentioned in this place, for the farther illustration hereof, had it been necessary. But this is sufficient to explain and vindicate it from the prejudices entertained against it, by those who are disposed to misrepresent what is said in defence of this doctrine.
From what has been said, concerning God’s secret and revealed will, we may infer,
1st, That it is a great boldness, and unwarrantable instance of presumption, for any one to enter into, or judge of God’s secret purpose, so as peremptorily to determine, beyond the present appearance of things, that this or that shall certainly come to pass, till he makes them known; forsecret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong unto us, and to our children forever, Deut. xxiv. 29. Therefore no one ought to determine that he is elected to salvation, before the work of grace is wrought, and, some way or other, made visible to him; or, on the other hand, to determine that he is rejected or reprobated, when he has no other ground to go upon, but uncertain conjecture, which would be a means to drive him to despair: that some are, indeed, elected, and others rejected, is no secret because God has revealed this in his word; so that we may assert it as a proposition, undoubtedly true, when we do not apply it to particular persons; and therefore this doctrine has not that pernicious tendency, which many pretend that it has.
2dly, The first act of saving faith does not consist in our believing that we are elected; neither is it the duty of unregenerate persons, as such to apply this privilege to themselves any more than to conclude themselves rejected: But our business, is, so long as the purpose of God remains a secret to us, to attend on the means of grace, hoping and waiting for the display of divine power, in effectually calling us; and afterwards for the Spirit’s testimony, or seal, to be set to it, whereby he discovers his own work; and then it may, in some measure, be reckoned a branch of his revealed will and will afford us matter of thanksgiving and praise to him, and a foundation of peace and comfort in our own souls. But this may be farther insisted on, when we come to consider the improvement we ought to make of this doctrine. We proceed to consider the next property of election.
4. It is free, and sovereign, or absolute, and unconditional; for that which would be a reflection on the divine perfections, if applied to God’s method of working, is, by no means, to be said concerning his purpose to work, or, (which is the same) his decree of election; therefore if there are no obligations laid on him by his creatures, to display or perform any of his works of grace, but they are all free and sovereign, then it follows, that the fore-sight of any thing that shall be done by them, in time, could not be the motive, or reason of his purpose, or decree, to save them, or of his choosing them to salvation.
This may be farther argued, from the independence of the divine nature: if his nature and perfections are independent, his will must be so. But more particularly,
(1.) The displays of God’s grace, in time, are expressly resolved into his sovereign pleasure, in scripture, in Rom. ix. 15.He saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion.And there are many other scriptures, which might be referred to, where all merit, or motives, taken from the creature, which might be supposed to induce him to bestow spiritual and saving blessings, are entirely excluded, and the whole is resolved in to the glory of his own name, and in particular, of those perfections which he designed herein to illustrate. This is applied, even to the common blessings of providence;Nevertheless, he saved them for his name’s sake, that he might make his mighty power to be known, Psal. cvi. 8. and it is also applied to sparing mercy, or the exercise of God’s patience,For my name’s sake will I defer mine anger, and for my praise will I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not off, Isa. xlviii. 9. and to pardoning mercy,For thy name’s sake, O Lord, pardon mine iniquity, for it is great, Psal. xxv. 11. And when he is represented as doing great things for his people, he putsthem in mind, at the same time, of their own vileness and unworthiness, that the freeness and sovereignty of his grace, to them, might be more conspicuous: Thus, when he tells them how he delivered Israel out of Egypt, he puts them in mind of their idolatry in that land; therefore no motive could be taken, from their behaviour towards him, which could induce him to do this for them; as it is said,But they rebelled against me, and would not hearken unto me; they did not every man cast away the abominations of their eyes, neither did they forsake the idols of Egypt; then I said, I will pour out my fury upon them, to accomplish my anger against them, in the midst of the land of Egypt. But I wrought, for my name’s sake, that it should not be polluted before the heathen, among whom they were, in whose sight I made myself known unto them, in bringing them forth out of the land of Egypt, Ezek. xx. 8, 9.
(2.) If the grace of God, and consequently his purpose relating thereunto, were not absolute, free, and sovereign, then all the glory thereof could not be attributed to him, neither would boasting be excluded; but as the creature might be said to be a worker together with God, so he would lay claim to a share, if not to the greatest part of the honour, that will redound to him from it; which is directly contrary to the divine perfections, and the great design of the gospel. This will farther appear, if we consider,
1st.That a conditional purpose to bestow a benefit, cannot take effect till the condition be performed, and accordingly it is said to depend on it. This is obvious, from the known idea affixed to the wordcondition, and the common signification thereof; it follows therefore,
2dly.That the performance of the condition is the next, or immediate cause of a conditional purpose’s taking effect; and, to apply this to the case before us,
3dly.If, on our performing the condition of God’s purpose to save us, it be rendered effectual, which otherwise it would not have been, (agreeably to the nature of a conditional purpose) then we are more beholden to our own conduct, than the divine purpose, and so the glory thereof will be due to ourselves; which would not only cast the highest dishonour on the divine perfections, but it is contrary to the design of the gospel, which is to stain the pride of all flesh, and take away all occasions of glorying, from the creature. Thus the prophet Isaiah, fore-telling the glory of the gospel-state, considers its tendency to humble the pride of man, when he says,The loftiness of man shall be bowed down, and the haughtiness of men shall be made low, and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day, Isa. ii. 17. and the apostle, describing the nature of faith, considers its tendencyto exclude boasting; Rom. iii. 27. andour Saviour, speaking concerning the discriminating grace of God, that appears in election, either in his purpose relating to it, or in the execution thereof, says,Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, John xv. 16. that is, you have done nothing that has laid any obligation on me to choose you by that act of faith, whereby you are inclined to prefer me to all others; for this is the consequence and result of my discriminating grace.
We shall now proceed to consider those arguments, which are generally made use of by those, who are in the other way of thinking, to support the conditionality of God’s purpose, as well as of his works of grace, in opposition to what has been said concerning the freeness and sovereignty thereof. They generally allege those scriptures for that purpose, that are laid down in a conditional form; as when the apostle speaks of such a confession of Christwith the mouth, as is attended withbelieving in the heart, that God raised him from the dead, andcalling on the name of the Lord, as connected with salvation, Rom. x. 9, 13. and our Saviour says, thatwhosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life, John iii. 15. and thathe that believeth shall be saved, Mark xvi. 16. and elsewhere,Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish, Luke xiii. 3. and many other scriptures of the like nature; from whence they argue, that since the dispensations of God’s providence, the gifts of his grace, and the execution of his purpose are all conditional, the purpose itself must be so. Were it but allowed that election is conditional whether it respects the purpose or providence of God, we should meet with no opposition from those who are on the other side of the question; but as such a purpose to save, as is not absolute, peremptory, or independent on the will of man, has many absurd consequences attending it, which are derogatory to the glory of the divine sovereignty, as has been already considered; so this cannot be the sense of those scriptures, that are laid down in a conditional form, as those and such-like are, that we have but now mentioned; for no sense of scripture can be true or just, that has the least tendency to militate against any of the divine perfections; so that there may without any strain or violence offered to the sense of words, be another sense put upon these, and all other scriptures, in which we have the like mode of speaking, whereby they may be explained, agreeably to the analogy of faith; therefore let us consider,
1. That all such scriptures are to be understood as importing the necessary connexion of things, so that one shall not be brought about without the other; accordingly, repentance, faith, and all other graces, are herein no otherwise considered, than as inseparably connected with salvation; which depends upon one of those propositions, which was before laid down,viz.thatGod having chosen to the end has also chosen to the means. We are far from denying that faith and repentance are necessary to salvation, as God never gives one without the other, and consequently they are inseparably connected in his eternal purpose relating thereunto. If nothing else were intended by a conditional purpose than this, we would not offer any thing against it; but certainly this would be to use words without their known or proper ideas; and the wordcondition, as applicable to other things, is never to be understood in this sense. There is a necessary connection between God’s creating the world, and his upholding it, or between his creating an intelligent creature, and his giving laws to him; but none ever supposed one to be properly a condition of the other: so a king’s determining to pardon a malefactor, is inseparably connected with his pardoning him, and his pardon given forth, with his having a right to his forfeited life; but it is not proper to say, one is a condition of the other; so a person’s seeing is inseparably connected with his opening his eyes; and speaking, with the motion of his lips; but we do not say, when he determines to do both of them, that one is a condition of the other. A condition, properly speaking is that which is not only connected with the privilege that follows upon the performance thereof, but it must be performed by a subject acting independently on him who made the conditional overture, or promise.
If it be said, that a duty, which we are enabled to perform by God, who promised the blessing connected with it, is properly a condition, we will not contend about the propriety, or impropriety, of the word; but inasmuch as it is taken by many, when applied to divine things, in the same sense as in matters of a lower nature, and so used to signify the dependence of the blessings promised, or the efficacy of the divine purpose, relating thereunto, on our performance of the condition, which is supposed to be in our own power, whereby we come to have a right and title to eternal life; it is this that we principally militate against, when we assert the absoluteness of God’s purpose.
2. Whatever ideas there may be contained in those scriptures, which are brought to support the doctrine we are opposing, that contain in them the nature of a condition, nothing more is intended thereby, but that what is connected with salvation is a condition of our claim to it, or expectation of it: In this sense, we will not deny faith and repentance to be conditions of salvation, inasmuch as it would be an unwarrantable instance of presumption, for impenitent and unbelieving sinners, to pretend that they have a right to it, or to expect the end without the means, since these are inseparably connected in God’s purpose, as well as in all his dispensations of grace. This being laid down, as a general rule for our understandingall those scriptures, which are usually brought to prove that God’s purposes are sometimes conditional, we shall farther illustrate it, by applying it to three or four other scriptures, that are often brought in defence thereof, which we shall endeavour to explain, consistently with the doctrine we are maintaining.
One is taken from Gen. xix. 22. where the angel bade Lotescape to Zoar, telling him, thathe could not do any thing till he came thither. If we suppose this to have been a created angel, as most divines do, yet he must be considered as fulfilling the purpose of God, or acting pursuant to his commission; and therefore it is all one, to our present argument, as though God had told Lot, that he could do nothing till he was gone from that place. It is plain, that he had given him to understand, that he should be preserved from the flames of Sodom, and that, in order thereunto, he must flee for his life; and adds, that he could do nothing, that is, he could not destroy Sodom, consistently with the divine purpose to save him, till he was escaped out of the place; for God did not design to preserve him alive (as he did the three Hebrew captives, in Daniel) in the fire, but by his escaping from it; one was as much fore-ordained as the other, or was designed as a means conducive to it; and therefore the meaning of the text is, not that God’s purpose, relating to Sodom’s destruction, was founded on Lot’s escape, as an uncertain and dubious condition, depending on his own will, abstracted from the divine determination relating to it; but he designed that those two things should be connected together, and that one should be antecedent to the other; and both of them, as well as their respective connection, were the object of God’s absolute and peremptory determination.
There is another scripture, sometimes brought to the same purpose, in Gen. xxxii. 26. where the angel says to Jacob,Let me go, for the day breaketh; and Jacob replies,I will not let thee go, except thou bless me, which does not infer, that God’s determinations were dependent on Jacob’s endeavour to detain him, or his willingness to let him depart; but we must consider Jacob as an humble, yet importunate suppliant, as it is said elsewhere,Weeping and making supplication, Hos. xii. 4.Let me go, says God, appearing in the form of an angel, and speaking after the manner of men, that he might give occasion to Jacob to express a more ardent desire of his presence and blessing, as well as to signify how unworthy he was of it; not as though he was undetermined before-hand what to do, but since the grace which Jacob exercised, as well as the blessing which he received, was God’s gift, and both were connected in the execution of his purpose, we must conclude that the purpose itself was free, sovereign, and unconditional.
Again, there is another scripture, in which God condescendsto use a mode of speaking, not much unlike to the other, in which he says to Moses, speaking concerning Israel, in Exod. xxxii. 10.This is a stiff-necked people; now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them; we are not to suppose that the whole event was to turn upon Moses’s prayer, as though God’s purposing to save his people were dependent on it; or that that grace, which inclined him to be importunate with God, did not take its rise from him. Moses, indeed, when first he began to plead with God, knew not whether his prayer would be prevalent or no; however, he addresses himself, with an uncommon degree of importunity, for sparing mercy; and, when God says,Let me alone, it signifies, that his people were unworthy that any one should plead their cause; and, if God should mark iniquity, then Moses’s intercession would be altogether in vain, and so he might as well let him alone, in that respect, as ask for his mercy. He does not, indeed, at first, tell him what he designed to do, that he might aggravate their crime, but afterwards he answers his prayer in Israel’s favour, and signifies that he would work, not for their sakes, but for his own name’s sake; so that he takes occasion, on the one hand, to set forth the people’s desert of punishment; and, on the other, the freeness of his own grace.
There is but one scripture more that I shall mention, among many that might have been brought, and that is what is said concerning our Saviour, in Matt. xiii. 58. thathe could not do many mighty works there, at that time, in his own country,because of their unbelief? where he speaks either of their not having a faith of miracles that was sometimes required, in those for whom they were wrought: or else of the unaccountable stupidity of that people, who were not convinced, by many others that he had wrought before them; therefore he resolves to put a stop to his hand, and not, for the present, to work so many miracles amongst them, as otherways might have been expected: If we suppose that their want of faith prevented his working them, this is not to be considered as an unforeseen event. And as he had determined not to confer this privilege upon them, or to continue to work miracles amongst them, if those, which he had already wrought, were disregarded and despised by their unbelief, we must conclude that he had a perfect knowledge of this before-hand, and that his determinations were not dependent on uncertain conditions, though he had resolved to act in such a way, as was most for his own glory; and that there should be an inseparable connexion between that faith, which was their duty, and his continuing to exert divine power, as an ordinance adapted to excite it.
5. God’s purpose concerning election is unchangeable; thisis the result of his being infinitely perfect. Mutability is an imperfection that belongs only to creatures: As it would be an instance of imperfection, if there were the least change in God’s understanding, so as to know more or less than he did from all eternity; the same must be said with respect to his will, which cannot admit of any new determinations. There are, indeed, many changes in the external dispensations of his providence, which are the result of his will, as well as the effects of his power; yet there is not the least appearance of mutability in his purpose. We have before considered, in speaking concerning the immutability of the divine nature[207], that whatever may be a reason obliging men to alter their purposes, it cannot, in the least, take place, so that God hereby should be obliged to alter his: No unforeseen occurrence can render it expedient for him to change his mind, nor can any superior power oblige him to do it; nor can any defect of power, to bring about what he had designed, induce him to alter his purpose.
If it be objected to this, that the obstinacy of man’s will may do it; that is to suppose his will exempted from the governing influence of divine providence, and the contrary force, that offers resistance, superior to it, which cannot be supposed, without detracting from the glory of the divine perfections. It would be a very unworthy thought for any one to conclude that God is one day of one mind, and another day forced to be of the contrary; how far this is a necessary consequence from that scheme of doctrine that we are opposing, let any one judge. It will be very hard to clear it of this entanglement, which they are obliged to do, or else all the absurdities that they fasten on the doctrine of election, which are far from being unanswerable, will not be sufficient to justify their prejudices against it.
They who are on the other side of the question, are sensible that they have one difficulty to conflict with, namely, the inconsistency of God’s infallible knowledge of future events, with a mutability of will relating thereunto; or how the independency of the divine fore-knowledge is consistent with the dependence and mutability of his will. To fence against this, some have ventured to deny the divine prescience; but that is to split against one rock, whilst endeavouring to avoid another. Therefore others distinguish concerning the objects of the divine prescience, and consider them, either as they are necessary or contingent, and accordingly suppose that God has a certain foreknowledge of the former; but his knowledge of the latter, (from the nature of the things known) is uncertain, and consequently the determination of his will is not unalterable. But this is to set bounds to the fore-knowledge of God, with respect to its object, and, indeed, to exclude the free actions of the creaturefrom being the objects thereof, which is a limiting and lessening of this perfection, and is directly contrary to the idea of omniscience; and therefore we must insist on their proving this to be consistent with the infinite perfection of God, which they will find it very difficult to do; and to suppose, on the other hand, that any thing is the object of God’s certain fore-knowledge, about which his will is no way conversant, or only so, in such a way, as that it is subject to change, according to the mutability of things, is altogether as indefensible, and equally subversive of the independency, wisdom, and sovereignty thereof.
Object.The most material objection against this doctrine, is take from some scriptures, which seem to represent God as repenting, and therein, as it is supposed, changing his purpose. Thus he is sometimes said to repent, that he had bestowed some blessings upon men, when he perceives how they have been abused by them, and accordingly he purposes to bring evil on them; as we read, in Gen. vi. 6, 7.It repented the Lord that he had made man, and it grieved him at his heart; and the Lord said, I will destroy man, whom I have created; and, at other times he is said to repent of the evil that he designed to bring upon them, and alter his purpose in their favour; thus it is said, in Deut. xxxii. 36.The Lord shall judge his people, and repent himself for his servants; when he seeth that their power is gone, and there is none shut up, or left; and in Joel ii. 13.Rend your hearts, and not your garments, and turn unto the Lord your God; for he is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth him of the evil; and in Psal. xc. 13,Return, O Lord, how long? and let it repent thee concerning thy servants; and in Jer. xviii. 8.If that nation, against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I have thought to do unto them.And we have a very remarkable instance of this, in God’s sparing Nineveh, on their repentance, after he had threatened, by the prophet Jonah, thatwithin forty days they should be destroyed.
Answ.It is true, there are many scriptures, in which repentance is ascribed to God, which, if we consider nothing else but the grammatical sense of the words, seem to favour the objection; but we are bound to conclude, that such a sense of repentance, as that on which it is founded, is inconsistent with the divine perfections, and therefore those scriptures, referred to therein, cannot imply a change in God’s purpose. And, indeed, there are other scriptures, which assert what is directly contrary thereunto; as when it is said, in Numb, xxiii. 19.God is not a man, that he should lye, neither the son of man, that he should repent; hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?And elsewhere, in 1Sam. xv. 29. it is said,The strength of Israel will not lye, nor repent; for he is not a man that he should repent.
But we must have recourse to some methods to reconcile this seeming contradiction, and so consider the sense thereof, in different respects, as applicable to them both; in some scriptures, God is said to repent; in others, it is said that he cannot repent. That these may not appear inconsistent with one another, nor either of them infer any imperfection in God, let it be considered, that God is sometimes represented, in scripture, in condescension to our common mode of speaking, as though he had human passions, as in others, he is described, as though he had a body, or bodily parts: But such expressions are always to be taken in a metaphorical sense, without the least supposition, that he is subject to any such imperfections; and particularly we must not conclude, that repentance is ever ascribed to God in the same sense as it is to men,viz.as implying a change in his purpose, occasioned by an unforeseen occurrence, which is the sense contained in the objection. Such a repentance, as this, is a passion peculiarly belonging to the creature, and therefore in this sense we must understand those words;God is not a man, that he should lye, nor the son of man, that he should repent; accordingly, he is said to repent, not by changing his purpose, but by changing his work. Thus when it is said, thathe repented that he had made man, nothing is meant by it, but that he determined to destroy him, as he did afterwards by the flood. And this was no new determination arising from any thing in the creature, which God did not foresee; he knew before-hand that all flesh would corrupt their way, and therefore his determination to punish them for it, was not a new resolve of the divine will, after the sin was committed; but God determined things in their respective order, first to permit sin, and then knowing what would be the consequence thereof, namely, that they would rebel against him, he determined to punish it, or to destroy the old world, which is, in effect, the same, as though he had repented that he made it. He cannot be said to repent as we do, by wishing that he had not done that which he is said to repent of, but by denying us the advantage, which we might have otherwise expected from it. In this sense we are to understand all those scriptures that speak of God, as repenting of the good that he had bestowed on man.
And, on the other hand, when he is said to repent of the evil which he threatened to bring on men, as in the case of Nineveh, this does not argue any change in his purpose; for he determined that Nineveh should be destroyed, provided they did not repent, and it was not uncertain to him whether they would repent or no; for, at the same time, he determined to give themrepentance, as appears by the event, and so not to inflict the judgment threatened; and therefore when Jonah was sent to make a public proclamation to the people, that in forty days they should be destroyed, it is plain that they understood the threatening in this sense, that they had no ground to expect any thing else, except they repented, which accordingly they did, and so were spared, without having any reason to conclude that God changed his purpose relating thereunto.
If it be objected hereunto, that this is nothing less than to establish a conditional purpose in God, and so overthrows the argument that we are maintaining; the reply that may be made to it, is, that we distinguish between a conditional purpose, in God’s secret will, and a conditional proposition, which was to be the subject of the prophet’s ministry: The prophet, it is plain, was not told, when he received his commission to go to Nineveh, that God would give them repentance, but only, that, without repentance, they should be destroyed; whereas God, as the event makes it appear, determined that they should repent, and therefore that they should not be destroyed; and, consequently, we must not suppose, that, when God sent him, he was undetermined, in his own purpose, whether to destroy them or not, or that there was any thing conditional in the divine mind, that rendered the event uncertain to God, though there was a condition contained in the subject-matter of the prophet’s message, which the Ninevites very well understood, namely, that they had no ground to expect deliverance without repentance, and therefore they repented, in hope of obtaining mercy, which they supposed would be connected with their repentance; and it is evident, that Jonah himself suspected that this might be the event, though God had not told him that it would be so, and therefore says, in chap. iv. 2.For I knew that thou art a gracious God, and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repentest thee of the evil.
6. The purpose of God, in choosing men to eternal life, renders their salvation necessary; so that nothing shall defeat, or disannul it. What God says concerning Israel’s deliverance from the Babylonish captivity, may be applied to all his other determinations, and particularly to what relates to the eternal salvation of his people;My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure; yea, I have spoken it, I will also bring it to pass; I have purposed it, I will also do it, Isa. xlvi. 10, 11. The purposes of God, indeed, are distinguished from his bringing them to pass; it is one thing to design to bring his people to glory, and another thing to bring them to it. It is not to be supposed that the decree of God has, in itself, a proper efficiency to produce the thing decreed:[208]for then there would be no differencebetween an eternal decree, and an eternal production of things; whereas the apostle plainly distinguishes between man’s being predestinated to glory, and brought to it, when he says,Those whom he predestinated, them he glorified, Rom. viii. 30.
The purpose of God, is, indeed, the internal moving cause, or the first ground and reason of the salvation of those who are elected to it; but his power is the more immediate cause of it, so that his purpose is the reason of his exerting this power, and both concurring to the salvation of men, render it certain and necessary. Therefore some distinguish, for the explaining of this, between the determining and powerful will of God; the latter of which, is sometimes called the word of his power, and renders the former effectual; this it must certainly do, otherwise God would be said to will the existence of things, that shall never have a being. In this respect, the purpose of God renders things necessary, which are in themselves contingent, or arbitrary, and would otherwise never come to pass.[209]
This is a great encouragement to those who are enabled to make their calling and election sure; for their perseverance in grace, notwithstanding all the opposition that they meet with, is the necessary consequence of their election to eternal life. Thus, as we before distinguished predestination into election and reprobation, we have considered the former of these, and we proceed,
Secondly, To speak concerning the doctrine of reprobation;[210]which is become obnoxious to those on the other side of the question, almost to a proverb; so that if any doctrine is considered as shocking, and to be answered no otherwise than by testifying their abhorrence of it, it is compared to this of reprobation; and, indeed, if it were not a consequence from the doctrine of election to eternal life, that doctrine would not be so much opposed by them. How far some unguarded expressions, or exceptionable methods of explication, may have givenoccasion for this prejudice, it is not to our present purpose to enquire; but we shall take occasion, from thence, to explain it in such a way, as that a fair and unprejudiced disputant will not see just reason to except against it, at least to reproach it, as though it were a doctrine subversive of the divine glory, and to be defended by none but those who seem to have a design to raise prejudices, in the minds of men, against religion in general.
And here we shall take occasion to consider the meaning of the word, as it is contained in, or deduced from scripture, where the same word that is used to signify the execution of this decree, may be applied to express the decree itself. Thus we read of God’s rejecting, or disregarding men, as a punishment of their rebellion against him: and these are compared by the prophet Jeremiah, chap. vi. 30.To reprobate silver, because the Lord hath rejected them; or, as it is in the margin,The refuse of silver; and, in the New Testament, the same word[212]is sometimes translated reprobates; at other times, disapproved or rejected, 1 Cor. iv. 27. 2 Cor. xiii. 5. Heb. vi. 8. and when this disapprobation, or rejection, respects not only their actions, as contrary to the holy nature of God, but their persons, as punished for their iniquities; and when this punishment is considered as what respects their eternal state, as the objects of vindictive justice, the purpose of God, relating hereunto, is what we call reprobation.
But, that we may more particularly consider the sense of the word, it seems, in scripture, to contain in it two ideas.
1. God’s determining to leave a part of the world in that state of sin and misery, which he from all eternity, fore-knew that they would bring themselves into, or his decreeing not to save them; and, since all will allow that a part of mankind shall not be saved, it cannot reasonably be denied that this was determined by him before-hand; and this is what divines generally call preterition.
2. There is another idea in the wordreprobation, which is also contained in scripture, or deducible from it, and that respects the purpose of God to punish those for their iniquities, whom he will not save. Not to be saved, is the same as to bepunished with everlasting destruction, from the presence of the Lord, and the glory of his power. And God’s purpose, relating hereunto, is expressed in scripture by hisappointing them to wrath, 1 Thess. v. 9. for those sins which he fore-saw they would commit. This is what some callpre-damnation, as taken from that expression of the apostle, Jude, ver. 4, 13. concerning some who hadcrept into the church unawares, whom he describes asungodly men, that is, notoriously so,who turnedthe grace of God into lasciviousness, for whomis reserved the blackness of darkness forever; of these he says, that they werebefore of old, ordained to this condemnation, where God is represented as punishing sinners, in proportion to their crimes; and this is considered as the result of that eternal purpose, which was founded on his fore-sight of their contracting that guilt whereby they would render themselves liable to it.
If this doctrine be thus explained, it will appear agreeable, not only to scripture, but to the divine perfections, and therefore too great a truth to be treated with that abhorrence, with which it generally is, without explaining, distinguishing or fairly entering into the merits of the cause. It is a very easy matter to render any doctrine odious, by misrepresentation, as they on the other side of the question, have done this of reprobation, which we shall briefly consider, and therein take leave to explain it in a different manner, whereby it will appear not only worthy to be defended, as redounding to the glory of God, but a plain and evident truth, founded on scripture.
If this doctrine were to be considered no otherwise, than as it is often represented by them, we should dislike it, as much as they do; for when they pretend that we herein suppose God to be severe and cruel to his creatures, delighting himself in, and triumphing over them, in their misery: and that he decreed, from all eternity, to damn the greatest part of mankind, without any consideration of their sin, as the result of his arbitrary will, or dominion, as he has a right to dispose of his creatures, according to his pleasure, and that as a means to attain this end, as though it were in itself desirable, he leaves them to themselves, blinds their minds, and hardens their hearts, and offers these occasions of, and inducements to sin, which are as stumbling-blocks in their way, and that he determined that his providence should be so conversant about the will of man, as that it should be under a natural necessity, or kind of compulsion, to what is evil, without considering the corruption and depravity of nature, as a vicious habit, which they had contracted; and that all this is done in pursuance of this decree of reprobation.
It is very probable that many who give this account of this doctrine, have no other foundation for it, but the popular outcry of those who are not apprised of the methods that are generally taken to explain and defend it; or else they suppose that it cannot be defended, without being exposed to those exceptions which are contained in the account they give of it. But we shall take no farther notice of this, but proceed to explain and defend it another way. And,
1. As to the former branch thereof, namely, preterition, or God’s passing by, or rejecting those whom he hath not chosento salvation, let it be premised; that God, in his eternal purpose, considered all mankind as fallen, which must be supposed to have been foreknown by him, otherwise he would not be said to be omniscient, and the result of his fore-knowledge is his determining to leave a part of them in their fallen state, in which he might have left the whole world to perish without being liable to the least charge of injustice. This is what we call his rejecting them, and accordingly it is opposed to his having chosen the rest to eternal life. These terms of opposition are plainly contained in scripture: thus it is said,The election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded, Rom. xi. 7. not by God’s leading them into mistakes, or giving them false ideas of things, but they were left to the blindness of their minds, which was the result of their apostasy from God; and elsewhere our Saviour says,Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes, Matt. xi. 25. Thou hast hid, that is, not revealed them; and that either objectively, as respecting those who are destitute of the light of the gospel; or subjectively, as he did not effectually, or savingly enlighten them with the light of life, byrevealing Christ in them, as the apostle calls it, Gal. i. 16. and therefore it is as though he had said, thou hast determined not to give to some the means of grace, nor to others the saving efficacy thereof, such as they are partakers of, who are chosen to salvation. Accordingly, he is saidto have suffered all nations to walk in their own ways, Acts xiv. 16. that is, not to restrain or prevent the breaking forth of corruption, as he might have done; and elsewhere, to havewinked at, chap. xvii. 30. that is, as it may be rendered,over-lookedthe greatest part of the world, which is no other than his rejecting or passing them by; and in this sense we are to understand that difficult mode of speaking used by the apostle,Whom he will he hardeneth, Rom. ix. 18. by which nothing else is intended but his purposing to leave many to the hardness of their own hearts. God forbid that any one should think that there is a positive act contained in those words, as though God infused hardness into the hearts of any; for the meaning is only this, that he determined to deny heart-softening grace to that part of mankind, whom he had not fore-ordained to eternal life. That there was such a purpose relating hereunto, is evident, because whatever God does in the methods of his providence, is the result of an eternal purpose. This no one, who observes the dispensations of God’s providence, and allows as every one must do, that all that he does was pre-concerted by him, can justly deny.
But that which must be farther enquired into, as to this matter, is, whether God’s determining to pass by a part of mankind, be an act of sovereignty or of justice. And this may also be judged of, by the external dispensation of his providence; sofar as there is sovereignty, or justice, visible in them, we are to conclude that this purpose, relating thereunto, was the result of one or other of these perfections. In some respects it is an act of sovereignty: As, for instance, that God should give one nation the gospel, or the means of grace, and deny it to another; it is not because he sees any thing in one part of the world, that obliges him thereunto, more than in the other; but the reason is, as was observed in the scripture but now mentioned,because it seemed good in his sight, Matt. xi. 26. Moreover, his giving special grace, whereby some are effectually called and sanctified; and denying it to others, is an act of sovereign pleasure.
But on the other hand, God is said sometimes, in the external dispensations of his providence, to leave men to themselves, to give them up to their own hearts lust, in a judicial way, which supposes not only the commission of sin, but persons being obstinate and resolutely determined to continue in it. Thus God saith concerning his people;Israel would none of me; so I gave them up to their own hearts’ lusts, and they walked in their own counsels, Psal. lxxxi. 11, 12. and the Psalmist says elsewhere,Add iniquity to their iniquity, Psal. lxix. 27. which words I would rather consider as a prediction than a prayer, or as an expression of the church’s acquiescence in God’s righteous judgments, which they had ground to conclude, that he would inflict on an impenitent, incorrigible people; these are expressed, byadding iniquity to iniquity, not as though he designed to infuse any habit of sin into them, for that is inconsistent with the holiness of his nature; but that he would reject, and leave them to themselves, in a judicial way, as a punishment inflicted on them for their iniquities, the consequence whereof would be their own adding iniquity to iniquity. Thus, in different respects, the purpose of God, in passing by a part of mankind, may be considered, either as the result of his sovereign pleasure, or as an act of justice.
2. We shall now proceed to consider the other branch of reprobation, which some callpre-damnation, or (to use the scripture-expression before referred to) God’s fore-ordaining those who shall not be saved, to that condemnation, which they shall fall under, as exposing themselves to it by their own wickedness; which is nothing else but his determining, from all eternity, to punish those, as a judge, who should, by their own crimes, deserve it, and thereby to vindicate the holiness of his nature and law. Here let it be observed, that when this doctrine is reproached or misrepresented, it is described as an act of divine sovereignty, but that we are as ready to deny and oppose as they are, since, according to the description we have given of it, it can be no other than an act of justice; for, if tocondemn, or punish, be an act of justice, then the decree, relating hereunto, must be equally so, for one is to be judged of by the other. If God cannot punish creatures as such, but as criminals and rebels, then he must be supposed to have considered them as such, when, in his eternal purpose, he determined to punish them. No man can style this an act of cruelty, or severity in God, but those who reckon the punishing of sin to be so, and are disposed to charge the Judge of all with not doing right, or offering an injury to his creatures, when he pours forth the vials of his wrath on them, who, by their bold and wilful crimes, render themselves obnoxious thereunto.
Here let it be considered, that God, in his actual providence, is not the author of sin, though he suffer it to be committed in the world. And, since his permitting, or not hindering it, cannot be said to be the cause of its being committed, there being no cause thereof, but the will of man; it follows, from hence, that God’s punishing sin, is not to be resolved into his permission of it, as the cause thereof, but into the rebellion of man’s will, as refusing to be subject to the divine law; and thus God considered men, when, in his eternal purpose, he determined to condemn those, whose desert of this punishment was foreseen, by him, from all eternity. And is this a doctrine to be so much decried?
I cannot but wonder the learned author, whom I have before referred to, as opposing this doctrine,[213]should so far give into the common and popular way of misrepresenting it, unless he designed, by this way of opposing it to render it detested; when he speaks concerning them, mentioned in Jude, ver. 4.who were before, of old, ordained to this condemnation, he says, “This cannot be meant of any divine ordination, or appointment of them, to eternal condemnation, because it cannot be thought, without horror, that God doth thus ordain men to perdition, before they had a being.” If he had expressed his horror and resentment against God’s ordaining men to perdition, as creatures, it had been just; but to express this detestation against God’s ordaining men to perdition, who are described as these are, is to expose this doctrine without reason; and it is still more strange that he should cast this censure upon it, when he owns in his farther explication of this text, “That God ordaineth none to punishment but sinners, and ungodly men, as these persons here are styled, and that these were men of whom it was before written, or prophesied, that they should be condemned for their wickedness;” since there is not much difference in the method of reasoning, between saying that the condemnation of sinners, for their wickedness, was before written, or prophesied, and saying, that God fore-ordained them to eternal punishment.
I am sensible that many are led into this mistake, by supposing that we give a very injurious and perverse sense of that text, in which the doctrine of reprobation is contained, which, it may be, has occasioned this reproach to be cast upon it. For when the apostle says, in Rom. ix. 22.What if God willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, some suppose that we understand this text, as though these vessels of wrath were, from all eternity, prepared for destruction by God, and that his eternal purpose, is his fitting them for it, as intending to bring about that end,viz.his destroying them. But if any have expressed themselves in such a way, as is equivalent thereunto, let them be accountable for their own sense of the text; though this I may say, that some, even of them, who give into the Supralapsarian way of explaining the doctrine of predestination, have not understood it in this sense;[214]and the sense which I would give of it is this, that those, whom the apostle speaks of as vessels of wrath, are persons whom God had rejected, and from the foresight of the sins which they would commit, he hadappointed them to wrath, which is an expression the apostle uses elsewhere, 1 Thess. v. 9. but they were appointed to wrath, not as creatures, but as sinners; they are described as fitted to destruction, not by God’s act, but their own, and that is the reason of their being fore-ordained to it.[215]
There is another scripture, which is generally cited by those who treat on this subject, that we are to use the utmost caution in explaining, lest we give just occasion, to those who oppose it, to express their abhorrence of it, as inconsistent with the divine perfections, namely, what the apostle says concerning those that were not elected, whom he callsthe restof the Jewish nation, in Rom. xi. 7-10. thatthey were blinded, and thatGod had given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear; and he speaks oftheir tablebeing made a snare, and a trap and a stumbling-block, and a recompense to them; let their eyes be darkened, that they may not see, and bow down their back always. The sense which they, who misrepresent this doctrine, suppose that we put upon this scripture, is, that they, who are reprobated, have, as a consequence thereof, occasions of sin laid in their way, some things designed to blind their minds, cast a mist before their eyes, and so lead them out of the way, and other things, that prove a snare to them, a trap, and occasion of sin, and all this with a design to bring about that damnation which God had ordained for them, in this decree of reprobation; which sense of this scripture never was, nor could be given, by any one, who has a due regard to the divine perfections.
And shall this doctrine be judged of hereby, when it is very hard to find any, how unguarded soever they are in their modes of speaking, that understand this text as they represent it? We shall therefore consider what is probably the meaning of this scripture, with which the doctrine we have laid down is very consistent. It is not to be understood as though God were the author of these sins, which they are said to be charged with; but this blindness and stupidity, which is called,A spirit of slumberas it is connected with the idea of their being rejected of God, and his determining not to give them the contrary graces, is considered, as the consequence, not the effect thereof, and that not the immediate, but the remote consequence thereof, in the same sense as stealing is the consequence of poverty, in those who have a vicious inclination thereunto. Thus when a person, who has contracted those habits of sin, that tend to turn men aside from God, is destitute of preventing and restraining grace, the consequence thereof, is, that these corruptions will break forth with greater violence; and God is not obliged to give this grace to an apostate, fallen creature, much less to one who has misimproved the means of grace, by which a multitude of sins might have been prevented; so that nothing is intended hereby but this, that they are left to themselves, and permitted to stumble and fall, and to commit those abominations, which, if they had not been thus judicially left, would have been prevented, and as the consequence thereof, they run into many sins, which they might have avoided; for though we suppose that it is not in a man’s own power, as destitute of the grace of God, to bring himself into a regenerate or converted state, (as will be farther considered, in its proper place) nevertheless, we do not deny but that men might, in the right use of the gifts of nature, avoid many sins, which they, who are said to be thus blinded, and hardened, run into, and so increase their guilt and misery, especially where they are not prevented by the grace of God, which he may, without any impeachment ofhis providence, deny to those whom he has not chosen to eternal life, as he might, had he pleased, have denied it to the whole world, and much more to those who have not improved the common grace, which they received, but have, through the wickedness of their nature, proceeded from one degree of sin unto another.
There is another scripture, which, some suppose we understand in such a sense, as gives the like occasion of prejudice to many against this doctrine, in 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12.For this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness; the meaning whereof is this, that God suffered them to be deluded, who, in the following verse, are represented as not receivingthe love of the truth; not that God was the author of these delusions, or deceived them by a false representation of things to them, or by exciting or inclining them to adhere to the suggestions of those who lie in wait to deceive; but, since he did not design to give them grace under the means of grace, or to enable them to receive the truth in the love thereof, which he was not obliged to do to any, much less to those who rebelled against the light that had been already given them; hereupon, through the blindness of their own minds, they became an easy prey to those who endeavoured to ensnare or delude them; so that the decree of God only respects his denying preventing grace to those, who, through the corruption of their own nature, took occasion, from thence, to run greater lengths in their apostasy from, and rebellion against God. And as for that mode of speaking here used, thatGod shall send them strong delusions, that only respects his will to permit it, and not his design to delude them.
There is another scripture to the same purpose, in Psal. lxxxi. 12.So I gave them up unto their own heart’s lust, and they walked in their own counsels; the meaning of which is, that God left them to themselves, and then lust, or the corrupt habits of sin, which they had acquired, conceived, and, as the apostle James speaks,brought forth sin, chap i. 15. or greater acts of sin, which exposed them to a greater degree of condemnation; and all this is to be resolved into God’s permissive will, or purpose, to leave man, in his fallen state, to himself, which he might do, without giving occasion to any to say, on the one hand, that he is the author of sin; or, on the other, that he deals injuriously with the sinful creature.
And to this we may add our Saviour’s words concerning the Jews, in John xii. 39, 40.Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I shouldheal them. The sense which they, who misrepresent this doctrine, suppose we put upon them, and conclude, that no other is consistent with the argument we are maintaining, is, that the unbelief, which the Jews are charged with, was principally, if not altogether, resolved into God’s eternal purpose, to blind their eyes, and harden their hearts, namely, by some positive act, as a cause producing this effect, with this view, that they should not be converted, and saved, that thereby his decree to condemn them, might take effect. It is no wonder to find persons prejudiced against this doctrine, when set in such a light; but as this is very remote from the explication we have given thereof, so our Saviour’s design, in this text, is to give an account why those miracles, which he wrought before the Jews, were ineffectual for their conviction; the more immediate cause whereof was the blindness of their mind, and the hardness of their hearts, inasmuch as they had shut their eyes against the light, and, through the corruption of their nature, had hardened their own hearts. As to what God is said to have done, in a judicial way, agreeable to the mode of speaking here used, when it is said,He hath hardened their hearts, it imports nothing else but his leaving them to the hardness of their own hearts, or denying them heart-softening grace, which would have been an effectual remedy against it. And may not God deny his grace to sinners, without being charged as the author of sin, or the blame thereof devolved on him, and not themselves? And, since this judicial act of providence cannot but be the result of an eternal purpose, is there any thing, in this decree, that reflects on his perfections, any more than there is in the execution thereof?
There is another scripture, in Prov. xvi. 4.The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil; from whence they infer, that the doctrine of reprobation, which they suppose to be founded on a perverse sense given of it, includes in it the divine purpose to make man to damn him; for they conclude that we understand it in that sense; and they proceed a little farther than this, and pretend that we infer from it, that God made men wicked, or that he made them wicked for his glory, as if he had need of sinful man for that end. I should never have thought that so vile a consequence could be drawn from this doctrine, if the learned writer, before mentioned, had not told the world that we infer this from it;[216]and, to give countenance to this suggestion, he quotes a passage out of Dr. Twiss;[217]his words are these: “That all, besides the elect, God hath ordained to bring them forth into the world in their corrupt mass, and to permit them to themselves,to go on in their own ways, and so finally to persevere in sin; and, lastly, to damn them for their sin, for the manifestation of the glory of his justice on them.”
I am not ashamed to own my very great esteem of this excellently learned and pious writer, who was as considerable for that part of learning, which his works discover him to have been conversant in, as most in his day; though I cannot think myself obliged, in every respect, to explain this doctrine as he does; and Dr. Whitby knew very well, that if such an inference, as what we have been speaking of, were to be deduced from the writings of any, who maintain the doctrine of reprobation, it must be from one who gives into the Supralapsarian way of explaining it; and this expression, which, it may be, was a little unguarded, seems to bid as fair for it as any other he could have found out: But any one that reads it, without prejudice, and especially that compares it with what is connected therewith, would not suppose that any thing is intended hereby, that gives the least ground to conclude that God made men wicked for the manifestation of his justice. The most obnoxious part of this quotation, is,God ordained to bring forth into the world the non-elect, in their corrupt mass, that is, that persons, who are every day born into the world, are the seed of corrupt and fallen man, and so have the habits of sin propagated with their nature, which many other divines have endeavoured to maintain. What my sentiments are concerning this matter, I shall rather choose to insist on, under a following answer, in which we shall be lead to speak of the doctrine of original sin, and of that corruption of nature, which is the consequence of it; therefore, passing this by, there is nothing, in what remains of this quotation, but what is very defensible, and far from making God the author of sin; for we may observe, that all he says, concerning the providence of God relating to this matter, is only, that he permits, or leaves them to themselves, and he supposes them finally to persevere in sin, without which they cannot be liable to damnation, or the display of the justice of God therein; and if the author, who brings this quotation, had duly considered the words immediately before, he might have seen the reason to have saved himself the trouble of making this reflection upon it; for Dr. Twiss, who, though a Supralapsarian, says, “That he reckons that controversy, relating to the order of God’s decrees, to be merelyApex Logicus, as he calls it,a logical nicety;” and adds, “That his opinion about it is well known, namely, that God doth not ordain any man to damnation, before the consideration of sin;” and, a few lines after, he says, “That God, of his mere pleasure, created all, but, of his mere pleasure, he damneth none; but every one that is damned, is damned for his sin, and that wilfully committed, and contumaciouslycontinued in by them that come to ripe years.” And if nothing more than this is intended by the doctrine of reprobation, it ought not to be so misrepresented, with a design to cast an odium upon it.
But to return to the scripture but now mentioned: When God is saidto have made the wicked for the day of evil, the meaning is not that man’s damnation was the end designed by God, in creating him, for there are some other ideas that intervene between God’s purpose to create and condemn him; he must be considered not barely as a creature, but as a sinner; now, as God did not create man that he might sin, he could not be said to create him, that he might condemn him. Accordingly, the sense which some give of this text, is, that God is said to havemade all things for himself, to wit, for his own glory. And inasmuch as some will be ready to object, that God will have no glory from the wicked, who oppose his name and interest in the world; the answer to this is, that in them, from whom he shall have no glory, as a Saviour, he will, notwithstanding, be glorified as a Judge; which judicial act, though it be deferred for a time, while his long-suffering waits upon them, yet it shall fall heavily on them, in the day of evil: which is very remote from that supposition, that God made man to damn him. And there is a sense given of it by some, who are on the other side of the question, which seems equally probable, or agreeable to the mind of the Holy Ghost, and is not in the least subversive of the doctrine we are maintaining, namely, “That the Lord disposeth all things throughout the world, to serve such ends as he thinks fit to design, which they cannot refuse to comply withal; for if any man be so wicked as to oppose his will, he will not lose their service; but when he brings a public calamity upon a country, employ them to be the executioners of his wrath: Of this there was a remarkable instance in the destruction of Jerusalem, by the Roman soldiers, whom our Saviour used, to punish his crucifiers, not that they undertook that war out of any design or desire to do our blessed Saviour right, but out of an ambition to enslave the world; yet God made use of them for another design, as public executioners, by whom he punished the ungodly[218].” So the Assyrian is said, in Isa. x. 5, 6. to bethe rod of God’s anger, and to besent against the people of Israel, and to lead them captive, and thereinto tread them down, like the mire in the streets[219]. And as to what concerns the purposeof God, on which these judicial proceedings depend, this is to be judged of by the execution thereof, as is evidently to be inferred from thence. And this is the sense in which we understand the doctrine ofreprobation, as in the foregoing argument.
Thus we have endeavoured to prove the doctrine ofelectionandreprobation, and defend it from the reproaches and misrepresentations cast upon it by considering it, not only as agreeable to the divine perfections, but as founded on scripture. We shall therefore proceed,
VI. To enquire, whether the contrary doctrine as defended by some, be not derogatory to the divine perfections, and therefore does not contain greater absurdities; or, if expressions of detestation were a sufficient argument to set it aside, whether we have not as much reason to testify our dislike that way, as they have against the doctrine we are maintaining? As to that part of the charge brought against us, as though we represented God as severe and cruel to his creatures; or that it is inconsistent with his goodness to suppose that he leaves any to themselves in their fallen state, so as not to give them the means of grace, when he knew that being destitute thereof, they could not believe, and so would fall short of salvation, pursuant to his eternal purpose relating thereunto: can this be said to be inconsistent with his goodness, any more than all his other displays of vindictive justice? If they suppose that it is, we might easily retort the argument upon them since they will not assert, that the whole race of fallen man shall be saved; and, if so, must we not suppose that God certainly fore-knew this, otherwise where is his infinite understanding? And if he knew that this would be the consequence of their being born, and living in the world, where is his goodness in bringing them into it? If it be said that they have a free-will to choose what is good, and so had a power to attain salvation; therefore their not attaining it, is wholly owing to themselves. Suppose this were taken for granted, without entering on that subject at present; yet it must be farther enquired whether they will allow that God fore-know that they would abuse this freedom of will, or power to make themselves holy or happy; and, if so, could he not have prevented this? Did he make a will that he could not govern or restrain? Could he not have prevented the sin that he knew they would commit? And, if he could, why did he not do it, and thereby prevent their ruin, which he knew would be the consequence hereof? So that if men are disposed to find fault with the divine dispensation, it is no difficult matter to invent some methods of reasoning to give umbrage to it; and, indeed this objection is not so much against God’s fore-ordaining what comes to pass, as it is a spurning at his judicial hand, and finding fault with the equity of his proceedings, when hetakes vengeance on sinners for their iniquities; or charging severity on God, because all mankind are not the objects of his goodness, and consequently not elected to eternal life.
But passing by this, we shall proceed to consider how, in several instances, the methods used to oppose the doctrine, which we are maintaining, are attended with many absurd consequences, derogatory to the divine perfections; which farther discovers the unreasonableness of their opposition to it; particularly,
1. It represents God as indeterminate, or unresolved what to do, which is the plain sense of their asserting that he has not fore-ordained whatever comes to pass. To suppose him destitute of any determination, is directly contrary to his wisdom and sovereignty, and it would argue that there are some excellencies and perfections belonging to intelligent creatures, which are to be denied to him, who is a God of infinite perfection: but if, on the other hand, they suppose that every thing, which comes to pass, is determined by him; nevertheless, that his determinations, as they respect the actions of intelligent creatures, are not certain and peremptory, but such as may be disannulled, or rendered ineffectual as taking his measures from the uncertain determinations of man’s will; this is, in effect to say, that they are not determined by God; for an uncertain determination, or a conditional purpose, cannot properly be called a determination. Thus for God to determine, that he that believes shall be saved, without resolving to give that faith which is necessary to salvation, is, in effect, not to determine that any shall be saved; for, since they suppose that it is left to man’s free-will to believe or not, and liberty is generally explained by them, as implying that a person might, had he pleased, have done the contrary to that which he is said to do freely; it follows that all mankind might not have believed, and repented, and consequently that they might have missed of salvation, and then the purpose of God, relating thereunto, is the same as though he had been indeterminate, as to that matter. But, if, on the other hand, they suppose that to prevent this disappointment, God over-rules the free actions of men, in order to the accomplishment of his own purpose, then they give up their own cause, and allow us all that we contend for; but this they are not disposed to do; therefore we cannot see how the independency of the divine will can be defended by them, consistently with their method of opposing this doctrine.
Again, if it be supposed, as an expedient to fence against this absurd consequence, that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and that his determinations were the result thereof, and, consequently, that the event is as certain as the divine fore-knowledge, this is what is not universally allowed of bythem; for many are sensible that it is as hard to prove, that God fore-knew what must certainly come to pass, without inferring the inevitable necessity of things, as it is to assert that, he willed or determined them, whereby they are rendered eventually necessary. And if they suppose that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and, particularly, that they would convert themselves, and improve the liberty of their will, so as to render themselves objects fit for divine grace, without supposing that he determined to exert that power and grace, which was necessary thereunto; this is to exclude his providence from having a hand in the government of the world, or to assert that his determinations rather respect what others will do, than what he will enable them to do, which farther appears to be inconsistent with the divine perfections.