Chapter 31

67.See Arist. Metaphys. Lib. I. Cap. 2. & Lib. XII. Cap. 7.

68.Vid. ejus. Mag. Moral. Lib. II. Cap. 15.

69.Vid. ejus. De Moribus, Lib. IX. Cap. 4. & De Mundo, Cap. 6.

70.Vid. Mornæi de Verit. Relig. Christ. cap. 3.

71.Epist. XIII. ad Dionys.

72.See Cicero de Natura Deorum.

73.See Tertull. Apol. Lactant. de falsa Relig. Arnob. contra Gentes; Minut. Fel. Herodian. Hist. Lib. IV. See also Mede’s apostasy of the latter times, chap. 3, 4.

74.Quest. cv.

75.See de Vries Exercitat. Rational.

76.“God is One: a most pure, most simple, and most perfect Being.“The absolute unity and simplicity of this glorious Being is strictly exclusive of any division of perfections. Yet, as human knowledge is not intuitive but discursive, we find it necessary to form and communicate our conceptions, by referring them to distinct and infinite attributes. Such are independence, spirituality, eternity, immutability, power, knowledge, rectitude, and benevolence.“It is absurd to say, that either the abstract essence, or any of the infinite perfections of God, in themselves, or in their exercise, can be grasped, included, or comprehended (or whatever equivalent term be used) by a limited intellect. ‘Apartof His ways, alittle portionof Him,’ we know; for He has unveiled it. The knowledge of the best and greatest finite mind can only be, to immortality, an approximation; and therefore must for ever be infinitely small. God alone isCAPABLE of COMPREHENDINGHis own nature, mode of existence, and perfections.“The only questions, therefore, that we have to ask, are, Has Deity, in fact, communicated to mananyinformation concerningHIMSELF? Andwhathas He communicated? Whatever such revelation may be, it is impossible that it should be self-contradictory, or any other than most becoming to infinite wisdom and purity.“This revelation authorizes us, by a variety of inductive proofs, to conclude, that, with regard to the mode of existence of theONEDivine Essence, the Unity of the Godhead includes a Trinity of Persons (so denominated for want of any better terms) who are scripturally styled the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: Distinct, not in essence or in perfections, but only personally: One, not personally, but in the common possession of the same identical nature and attributes.“No contradiction or absurdity is involved in this doctrine, because the unity refers to one respect, and the trinity to another. But we make no difficulty in professing our incapacity to include in our knowledge, or express by any possible terms,the respectin which the Trinity of persons subsists in the perfect Oneness of the Deity. Such pretension would imply a contradiction.”Smith’s Letters to Belsham.

76.“God is One: a most pure, most simple, and most perfect Being.

“The absolute unity and simplicity of this glorious Being is strictly exclusive of any division of perfections. Yet, as human knowledge is not intuitive but discursive, we find it necessary to form and communicate our conceptions, by referring them to distinct and infinite attributes. Such are independence, spirituality, eternity, immutability, power, knowledge, rectitude, and benevolence.

“It is absurd to say, that either the abstract essence, or any of the infinite perfections of God, in themselves, or in their exercise, can be grasped, included, or comprehended (or whatever equivalent term be used) by a limited intellect. ‘Apartof His ways, alittle portionof Him,’ we know; for He has unveiled it. The knowledge of the best and greatest finite mind can only be, to immortality, an approximation; and therefore must for ever be infinitely small. God alone isCAPABLE of COMPREHENDINGHis own nature, mode of existence, and perfections.

“The only questions, therefore, that we have to ask, are, Has Deity, in fact, communicated to mananyinformation concerningHIMSELF? Andwhathas He communicated? Whatever such revelation may be, it is impossible that it should be self-contradictory, or any other than most becoming to infinite wisdom and purity.

“This revelation authorizes us, by a variety of inductive proofs, to conclude, that, with regard to the mode of existence of theONEDivine Essence, the Unity of the Godhead includes a Trinity of Persons (so denominated for want of any better terms) who are scripturally styled the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: Distinct, not in essence or in perfections, but only personally: One, not personally, but in the common possession of the same identical nature and attributes.

“No contradiction or absurdity is involved in this doctrine, because the unity refers to one respect, and the trinity to another. But we make no difficulty in professing our incapacity to include in our knowledge, or express by any possible terms,the respectin which the Trinity of persons subsists in the perfect Oneness of the Deity. Such pretension would imply a contradiction.”

Smith’s Letters to Belsham.

77.“That which is taught in the scriptures concerning the incomprehensible and spiritual essence of God ought to suffice, not only to overthrow the foolish errors of the common people, but also to confute the fine subtilties of profane philosophy. One of the old writers seemed to have said very well, ‘That God is all that we do see, and all that we do not see.’ But by this means he hath imagined the Godhead to be diffused into all the parts of the world. Although God, to the intent to keep men in sober mind, speak but sparingly of his own essence, yet, by those two names of addition that I have rehearsed, he doth both take away all gross imaginations, and also repress the presumptuous boldness of man’s mind. For surely his immeasurable greatness ought to make us afraid, that we attempt not to measure him with our sense: and his spiritual nature forbiddeth us to imagine any thing earthly or fleshly of him. For the same cause he often assigneth his dwelling place to be in heaven. For though, as he is incomprehensible, he filleth the earth also: yet because he seeth our minds by reason of their dulness to lie still in the earth, for good cause he lifteth us up above the world, to shake off our sloth and sluggishness. And here falleth to ground the error of the Manichees, which, in appointing two original beginnings, have made the devil in a manner equal with God. Surely, this was as much as to break the unity of God, and restrain his unmeasurableness. For where they have presumed to abuse certain testimonies, that sheweth a foul ignorance, as their error itself sheweth a detestable madness. And the Anthropomorphites are also easily confuted, who have imagined God to consist of a body, because oftentimes the scripture ascribeth unto him a mouth, ears, eyes, hands, and feet. For what man, yea, though he be slenderly witted, doth not understand that God doth so with us speak as it were childishly, as nurses do with their babes? therefore such manner of speeches do not so plainly express what God is, as they do apply the understanding of him to our slender capacities. Which to do, it behoved of necessity that he descended a great way beneath his own height.“2. But he also setteth out himself by another special mark, whereby he may be more nearly known. For he so declareth himself to be but one, that he yet giveth himself distinctly to be considered in three persons: which, except we learn, a bare and empty name of God without any true God fleeth in our brain. And that no man should think that he is a threefold God, or that the one essence of God is divided in three persons, we must here seek a short and easy definition, to deliver us from all error. But because many do make much about this word Person, as a thing invented by man, how justly they do so, it is best first to see. The apostle naming the Son the engraved form of the hypostasis of his Father, he undoubtedly meaneth, that the Father hath some being, wherein he differeth from the Son. For to take it for essence (as some expositors have done, as if Christ like a piece of wax printed with a seal did represent the substance of the Father) were not only hard, but also an absurdity. For since the essence of God is single or one, and indivisible, he that in himself containeth it all, and not by piece-meal, or by derivation, but in whole perfection, should very improperly, yea, foolishly, be called the engraved form of him. But because the Father, although he be in his own property distinct, hath expressed himself wholly in his Son, it is for good cause said, that he hath given his hypostasis to be seen in him. Wherewith aptly agreeth that which by and by followeth, that he is the brightness of his glory. Surely by the apostle’s words we gather, that there is a certain proper hypostasis in the Father, that shineth in the Son: whereby also again is easily perceived the hypostasis of the Son, that distinguisheth him from the Father. The like order is in the holy Ghost. For we shall by and by prove him to be God, and yet he must needs be other than the Father. Yet this distinction is not of the essence, which it is unlawful to make manifold. Therefore, if the apostle’s testimony be credited, it followeth that there be in God three hypostasis. This term seeing the Latins have expressed by the name of Person, it were too much pride and frowardness to wangle about so clear a matter. But if we list word for word to translate, we may call it subsistance. Many in the same sense have called it substance. And the name of Person hath not been in use among the Latins only, but also the Grecians, perhaps to declare a consent, have taught that there are threeProsopa, that is to say Persons, in God. But they, whether they be Greeks or Latins that differ one from another in the word, do very well agree in the sum of the matter.“3. Now howsoever the hereticks cry out against the name of Person, or some overmuch precise men do carp that they like not the word feigned by the device of men; since they cannot get of us to say, that there be three, whereof every one is wholly God, nor yet that there be many gods: what unreasonableness is this, to dislike words, which express none other thing but that which is testified and approved by the scriptures? It were better (say they) to restrain not only our meanings but also our words within the bounds of scripture, than to devise strange terms, that may be the beginnings of disagreement and brawling: so do we tire ourselves with strife about words: so the truth is lost in contending: so charity is broken by odiously brawling together. If they call that a strange word, which cannot be shewed in scripture, as it is written in number of syllables; then they bind us to a hard law, whereby is condemned all exposition that is not pieced together, with bare laying together of texts of scripture. But if they mean that to be strange, which, being curiously devised, is superstitiously defended, which maketh more for contention than edification, which is either improperly, or to no profit, used, which withdraweth from the simplicity of the word of God, then with all my heart I embrace their sober mind. For I judge that we ought with no less devout reverence to talk of God than to think of him, for as much as whatsoever we do of ourselves think of him is foolish, and whatsoever we speak is unsavoury. But there is a certain measure to be kept. We ought to learn out of the scriptures a rule both to think and speak, whereby to examine all the thoughts of our mind, and words of our mouth. But what hindereth us, but that such as in scripture are to our capacity doubtful and entangled, we may in plainer words express them, being yet such words as do reverently and faithfully serve the truth of the scripture, and be used sparingly, modestly, and not without occasion? Of which sort there are examples enough. And whereas it shall by proof appear that the church of great necessity was forced to use the names of Trinity, and Persons, if any shall then find fault with the newness of words, shall he not be justly thought to be grieved at the light of the truth, as he that blameth only this, that the truth is made so plain and clear to discern?“4. Such newness of words, if it be so called, cometh then chiefly in use, when the truth is to be defended against wranglers that do mock it out with cavils. Which thing we have at this day too much in experience, who have great business in vanquishing the enemies of true and sound doctrine. With such folding and crooked winding, these slippery snakes do slide away, unless they be strongly gripped and holden hard when they be taken. So the old fathers, being troubled with contending against false doctrines, were compelled to shew their meanings in exquisite plainness, lest they should leave any crooked byeways to the wicked, to whom the doubtful constructions of words were hiding-holes of errors. Arius confessed Christ to be God, and the Son of God, because he could not gainsay the evident words of God, and, as if he had been so sufficiently discharged, did feign a certain consent with the rest. But in the meanwhile he ceased not to scatter abroad that Christ was created, and had a beginning, as other creatures. But to the end that they might draw forth his winding subtilty out of his den, the ancient fathers went further, pronouncing Christ to be the eternal Son of the Father, and consubstantial with the Father. Hereat wickedness began to boil, when the Arians began to hate and detest the nameOmoousion, consubstantial. But if in the beginning they had sincerely and with plain meaning confessed Christ to be God, they would not now have denied him to be consubstantial with the Father. Who dare now blame these good men as brawlers and contentious, because, for one little word’s sake, they were so keen in disputation, and disturbed the peace of the church? But that little word shewed the difference between the true believing Christians, and the Arians, who were robbers of God. Afterwards rose up Sabellius, who accounted in a manner for nothing the names of the Father, the Son, and Holy Ghost, saying in disputation that they were not made to shew any manner of distinction, but only were several additions of God, of which sort there are many. If he came to disputation, he confessed that he believed the Father God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost God. But afterwards he would readily slip away with saying, that he had in no otherwise spoken than as if he had named God, a powerful God, just God, and wise God: and so he sung another song, that the Father is the Son, and the Holy Ghost is the Father, without any order, without any distinction. The good doctors who then had care of godliness, to subdue his wickedness, cried out on the other side, that there ought to be acknowledged in one God three properties: and to the end to fence themselves against the crooked winding subtilties with plain and simple truth, they affirmed, that there did truly subsist in one God, or (which is the same thing) that there did subsist in the unity of God, a Trinity of Persons.“5. If then the names have not been without cause invented, we ought to take heed, that in rejecting them we be not justly blamed of proud presumptuousness. I would to God they were buried indeed, so that this faith were agreed of all men, that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, be one God: and yet that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Ghost the Son, but distinctly, by certain property. Yet I am not so precise, that I can find in my heart to strive for bare words. For I observe, that the ancient fathers, who otherwise spake very religiously of such matters, did not every where agree one with another, nor every one with himself. For what forms of speech used by the councils doth Hillary excuse? To how great liberty doth Augustine sometimes break forth? How unlike are the Greeks to the Latins? But of this disagreement one example shall suffice for this time. When the Latins wanted to express the wordOmoousion, they called itConsubstantial, declaring the substance of the Father and the Son to be one, thus using the word substance for essence. Whereupon Hierom to Damasus saith, it is sacrilege to say, that there are three substances in God: and yet above a hundred times you shall find in Hillary, that there are three substances in God. In the wordhypostasis, how is Hierom difficulted? for he suspecteth that there lurketh poison in naming three hypostasis in God. And if a man do use this word in a godly sense, yet he plainly saith that it is an improper speech, if he spake unfeignedly, and did not rather wittingly and willingly seek to charge the bishops of the East, whom he sought to charge with an unjust slander. Sure this one thing he speaketh not very truly, that in all profane schools,Ousia, essence, is nothing else but hypostasis, which is proved false by the common and accustomed use. Augustine is more modest and gentle, who, although he says,De trint. li. 5. cap. 8, 9.that the word hypostasis in that sense is strange to Latin ears, yet so far is it off, that he taketh from the Greeks their usual manner of speaking, that he also gently beareth with the Latins who had followed the Greek phrase. And that which Socrates writeth in the fifth book of the Tripartite history tendeth to this end, as though he meant that he had by unskilful men been wrongfully applied unto this matter. Yea, and the same Hillary himself layeth it as a great fault to the heretics charge,De trin. li. 2.that by their frowardness he is compelled to put those things in peril of the speech of men, which ought to have been kept in religiousness of minds, plainly confessing that this is to do things unlawful, to speak what ought not to be spoken, to attempt things not licensed. A little after, he excuseth himself with many words, for that he was so bold to utter new names. For after he had used the natural names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, he addeth, that whatsoever is sought further is beyond the compass of speech, beyond the reach of sense, and beyond the capacity of understanding. And in another place he saith, that happy are the bishops of Gallia, who had not received, nor knew any other confession but that old and simple one, which from the time of the apostles was received in all churches. And much like is the excuse of Augustine, that this word was wrung out of necessity, by reason of the imperfection of men’s language in so great a matter: not to express that which is, but that it should not be unspoken, how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are three. This modesty of the holy men ought to warn us, that we do not forthwith so severely, like censors, brand them with infamy, who refuse to subscribe and swear to such words as we propound them: so that they do not of pride, or frowardness, or of malicious craft. But let them again consider, by how great necessity we are driven to speak so, that by little and little they may he enured with that profitable manner of speech. Let them also learn to beware, lest since we must meet on the one side with the Arians, on the other side with the Sabellians, while they be offended that we cut off occasion from them both to cavil, they bring themselves in suspicion, that they be the disciples either of Arius or of Sabellius. Arius saith that Christ is God, but he muttereth that he was created, and had a beginning. He saith Christ is one with the Father, but secretly he whispereth in the ears of his disciples, that he was made one as the other faithful be, although by singular prerogative. Say once that Christ is consubstantial with his Father, then pluck you off his visor from the dissembler, and yet you add nothing to the scripture. Sabellius saith, that the several names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, signify nothing in God severally distinct. Say that they are three, and he will cry out that you name three gods. Say that there is in one essence a Trinity of persons, then shall you in one word both say what the scripture speaketh, and stop their vain babbling. Now if any be holden with so curious superstition, that they cannot abide these names, yet is there no man, though he would never so fain, that can deny but that when we hear of one, we must understand an unity of substance: when we hear of three in one essence, that, it is meant of the persons of the Trinity. Which thing being without fraud confessed, we stay no longer upon words. But I have long ago found, and that often, that whosoever do obstinately quarrel about words, do keep within them a secret poison: so that it is better willingly to provoke them, than for their pleasure to speak darkly.”Calvin.

“2. But he also setteth out himself by another special mark, whereby he may be more nearly known. For he so declareth himself to be but one, that he yet giveth himself distinctly to be considered in three persons: which, except we learn, a bare and empty name of God without any true God fleeth in our brain. And that no man should think that he is a threefold God, or that the one essence of God is divided in three persons, we must here seek a short and easy definition, to deliver us from all error. But because many do make much about this word Person, as a thing invented by man, how justly they do so, it is best first to see. The apostle naming the Son the engraved form of the hypostasis of his Father, he undoubtedly meaneth, that the Father hath some being, wherein he differeth from the Son. For to take it for essence (as some expositors have done, as if Christ like a piece of wax printed with a seal did represent the substance of the Father) were not only hard, but also an absurdity. For since the essence of God is single or one, and indivisible, he that in himself containeth it all, and not by piece-meal, or by derivation, but in whole perfection, should very improperly, yea, foolishly, be called the engraved form of him. But because the Father, although he be in his own property distinct, hath expressed himself wholly in his Son, it is for good cause said, that he hath given his hypostasis to be seen in him. Wherewith aptly agreeth that which by and by followeth, that he is the brightness of his glory. Surely by the apostle’s words we gather, that there is a certain proper hypostasis in the Father, that shineth in the Son: whereby also again is easily perceived the hypostasis of the Son, that distinguisheth him from the Father. The like order is in the holy Ghost. For we shall by and by prove him to be God, and yet he must needs be other than the Father. Yet this distinction is not of the essence, which it is unlawful to make manifold. Therefore, if the apostle’s testimony be credited, it followeth that there be in God three hypostasis. This term seeing the Latins have expressed by the name of Person, it were too much pride and frowardness to wangle about so clear a matter. But if we list word for word to translate, we may call it subsistance. Many in the same sense have called it substance. And the name of Person hath not been in use among the Latins only, but also the Grecians, perhaps to declare a consent, have taught that there are threeProsopa, that is to say Persons, in God. But they, whether they be Greeks or Latins that differ one from another in the word, do very well agree in the sum of the matter.

“3. Now howsoever the hereticks cry out against the name of Person, or some overmuch precise men do carp that they like not the word feigned by the device of men; since they cannot get of us to say, that there be three, whereof every one is wholly God, nor yet that there be many gods: what unreasonableness is this, to dislike words, which express none other thing but that which is testified and approved by the scriptures? It were better (say they) to restrain not only our meanings but also our words within the bounds of scripture, than to devise strange terms, that may be the beginnings of disagreement and brawling: so do we tire ourselves with strife about words: so the truth is lost in contending: so charity is broken by odiously brawling together. If they call that a strange word, which cannot be shewed in scripture, as it is written in number of syllables; then they bind us to a hard law, whereby is condemned all exposition that is not pieced together, with bare laying together of texts of scripture. But if they mean that to be strange, which, being curiously devised, is superstitiously defended, which maketh more for contention than edification, which is either improperly, or to no profit, used, which withdraweth from the simplicity of the word of God, then with all my heart I embrace their sober mind. For I judge that we ought with no less devout reverence to talk of God than to think of him, for as much as whatsoever we do of ourselves think of him is foolish, and whatsoever we speak is unsavoury. But there is a certain measure to be kept. We ought to learn out of the scriptures a rule both to think and speak, whereby to examine all the thoughts of our mind, and words of our mouth. But what hindereth us, but that such as in scripture are to our capacity doubtful and entangled, we may in plainer words express them, being yet such words as do reverently and faithfully serve the truth of the scripture, and be used sparingly, modestly, and not without occasion? Of which sort there are examples enough. And whereas it shall by proof appear that the church of great necessity was forced to use the names of Trinity, and Persons, if any shall then find fault with the newness of words, shall he not be justly thought to be grieved at the light of the truth, as he that blameth only this, that the truth is made so plain and clear to discern?

“4. Such newness of words, if it be so called, cometh then chiefly in use, when the truth is to be defended against wranglers that do mock it out with cavils. Which thing we have at this day too much in experience, who have great business in vanquishing the enemies of true and sound doctrine. With such folding and crooked winding, these slippery snakes do slide away, unless they be strongly gripped and holden hard when they be taken. So the old fathers, being troubled with contending against false doctrines, were compelled to shew their meanings in exquisite plainness, lest they should leave any crooked byeways to the wicked, to whom the doubtful constructions of words were hiding-holes of errors. Arius confessed Christ to be God, and the Son of God, because he could not gainsay the evident words of God, and, as if he had been so sufficiently discharged, did feign a certain consent with the rest. But in the meanwhile he ceased not to scatter abroad that Christ was created, and had a beginning, as other creatures. But to the end that they might draw forth his winding subtilty out of his den, the ancient fathers went further, pronouncing Christ to be the eternal Son of the Father, and consubstantial with the Father. Hereat wickedness began to boil, when the Arians began to hate and detest the nameOmoousion, consubstantial. But if in the beginning they had sincerely and with plain meaning confessed Christ to be God, they would not now have denied him to be consubstantial with the Father. Who dare now blame these good men as brawlers and contentious, because, for one little word’s sake, they were so keen in disputation, and disturbed the peace of the church? But that little word shewed the difference between the true believing Christians, and the Arians, who were robbers of God. Afterwards rose up Sabellius, who accounted in a manner for nothing the names of the Father, the Son, and Holy Ghost, saying in disputation that they were not made to shew any manner of distinction, but only were several additions of God, of which sort there are many. If he came to disputation, he confessed that he believed the Father God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost God. But afterwards he would readily slip away with saying, that he had in no otherwise spoken than as if he had named God, a powerful God, just God, and wise God: and so he sung another song, that the Father is the Son, and the Holy Ghost is the Father, without any order, without any distinction. The good doctors who then had care of godliness, to subdue his wickedness, cried out on the other side, that there ought to be acknowledged in one God three properties: and to the end to fence themselves against the crooked winding subtilties with plain and simple truth, they affirmed, that there did truly subsist in one God, or (which is the same thing) that there did subsist in the unity of God, a Trinity of Persons.

“5. If then the names have not been without cause invented, we ought to take heed, that in rejecting them we be not justly blamed of proud presumptuousness. I would to God they were buried indeed, so that this faith were agreed of all men, that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, be one God: and yet that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Ghost the Son, but distinctly, by certain property. Yet I am not so precise, that I can find in my heart to strive for bare words. For I observe, that the ancient fathers, who otherwise spake very religiously of such matters, did not every where agree one with another, nor every one with himself. For what forms of speech used by the councils doth Hillary excuse? To how great liberty doth Augustine sometimes break forth? How unlike are the Greeks to the Latins? But of this disagreement one example shall suffice for this time. When the Latins wanted to express the wordOmoousion, they called itConsubstantial, declaring the substance of the Father and the Son to be one, thus using the word substance for essence. Whereupon Hierom to Damasus saith, it is sacrilege to say, that there are three substances in God: and yet above a hundred times you shall find in Hillary, that there are three substances in God. In the wordhypostasis, how is Hierom difficulted? for he suspecteth that there lurketh poison in naming three hypostasis in God. And if a man do use this word in a godly sense, yet he plainly saith that it is an improper speech, if he spake unfeignedly, and did not rather wittingly and willingly seek to charge the bishops of the East, whom he sought to charge with an unjust slander. Sure this one thing he speaketh not very truly, that in all profane schools,Ousia, essence, is nothing else but hypostasis, which is proved false by the common and accustomed use. Augustine is more modest and gentle, who, although he says,De trint. li. 5. cap. 8, 9.that the word hypostasis in that sense is strange to Latin ears, yet so far is it off, that he taketh from the Greeks their usual manner of speaking, that he also gently beareth with the Latins who had followed the Greek phrase. And that which Socrates writeth in the fifth book of the Tripartite history tendeth to this end, as though he meant that he had by unskilful men been wrongfully applied unto this matter. Yea, and the same Hillary himself layeth it as a great fault to the heretics charge,De trin. li. 2.that by their frowardness he is compelled to put those things in peril of the speech of men, which ought to have been kept in religiousness of minds, plainly confessing that this is to do things unlawful, to speak what ought not to be spoken, to attempt things not licensed. A little after, he excuseth himself with many words, for that he was so bold to utter new names. For after he had used the natural names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, he addeth, that whatsoever is sought further is beyond the compass of speech, beyond the reach of sense, and beyond the capacity of understanding. And in another place he saith, that happy are the bishops of Gallia, who had not received, nor knew any other confession but that old and simple one, which from the time of the apostles was received in all churches. And much like is the excuse of Augustine, that this word was wrung out of necessity, by reason of the imperfection of men’s language in so great a matter: not to express that which is, but that it should not be unspoken, how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are three. This modesty of the holy men ought to warn us, that we do not forthwith so severely, like censors, brand them with infamy, who refuse to subscribe and swear to such words as we propound them: so that they do not of pride, or frowardness, or of malicious craft. But let them again consider, by how great necessity we are driven to speak so, that by little and little they may he enured with that profitable manner of speech. Let them also learn to beware, lest since we must meet on the one side with the Arians, on the other side with the Sabellians, while they be offended that we cut off occasion from them both to cavil, they bring themselves in suspicion, that they be the disciples either of Arius or of Sabellius. Arius saith that Christ is God, but he muttereth that he was created, and had a beginning. He saith Christ is one with the Father, but secretly he whispereth in the ears of his disciples, that he was made one as the other faithful be, although by singular prerogative. Say once that Christ is consubstantial with his Father, then pluck you off his visor from the dissembler, and yet you add nothing to the scripture. Sabellius saith, that the several names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, signify nothing in God severally distinct. Say that they are three, and he will cry out that you name three gods. Say that there is in one essence a Trinity of persons, then shall you in one word both say what the scripture speaketh, and stop their vain babbling. Now if any be holden with so curious superstition, that they cannot abide these names, yet is there no man, though he would never so fain, that can deny but that when we hear of one, we must understand an unity of substance: when we hear of three in one essence, that, it is meant of the persons of the Trinity. Which thing being without fraud confessed, we stay no longer upon words. But I have long ago found, and that often, that whosoever do obstinately quarrel about words, do keep within them a secret poison: so that it is better willingly to provoke them, than for their pleasure to speak darkly.”

Calvin.

78.“There are some doctrines in the gospel the understanding could not discover; but when they are revealed, it hath a clear apprehension of them upon a rational account, and sees the characters of truth visibly stampt on their forehead: as the doctrine of satisfaction to divine justice, that pardon might be dispensed to repenting sinners. For our natural conception of God includes his infinite purity and justice; and when the design of the gospel is made known, whereby he hath provided abundantly for the honour of those attributes, so that He doth the greatest good without encouraging the least evil, reason acquiesces, and acknowledges. This I sought, but could not find. Now, although the primary obligation to believe such doctrines ariseth from revelation, yet being ratified by reason, they are embraced with more clearness by the mind.“2. There are some doctrines, which as reason by its light could not discover; so when they are made known, it cannot comprehend; but they are by a clear and necessary connexion joined with the other that reason approves: as the mystery of the Trinity, and the Incarnation of the Son of God, which are the foundations of the whole work of our redemption. The nature of God is repugnant to plurality, there can be but one essence; and the nature of satisfaction requires a distinction of persons: For he that suffers as guilty, must be distinguished from the person of the judge that exacts satisfaction; and no mere creature is able by his obedient sufferings to repair the honour of God: So that a divine person, assuming the nature of man, was alone capable to make that satisfaction, which the gospel propounds, and reason consents to. Now, according to the distinction of capacities in the Trinity, the Father required an honourable reparation for the breach of the divine law, and the Son bore the punishment in the sufferings of the human nature; that is peculiarly his own. Besides, ’tis clear that the doctrine of the Trinity, that is, of three glorious relations in the Godhead, and of the Incarnation, are most firmly connected with all the parts of the christian religion, left in the writings of the apostles, which as they were confirmed by miracles, the divine signatures of their certainty, so they contain such authentic marks of their divinity, that right reason cannot reject them.“3. Whereas there are three principles by which we apprehend things, Sense, Reason and Faith; these lights have their different objects that must not be confounded. Sense is confined to things material; Reason considers things abstracted from matter; Faith regards the mysteries revealed from heaven: and these must not transgress their order. Sense is an incompetent judge of things about which reason is only conversant. It can only make a report of those objects, which by their natural characters are exposed to it. And reason can only discourse of things, within its sphere: supernatural things which derive from revelation, and are purely the objects of faith, are not within its territories and jurisdiction. Those superlative mysteries exceed all our intellectual abilities. ’Tis true, the understanding is a rational faculty, and every act of it is really or in appearance grounded on reason. But there is a wide difference between the proving a doctrine by reason, and the giving a reason why we believe the truth of it. For instance, we cannot prove the Trinity by natural reason; and the subtilty of the schoolmen, who affect to give some reason of all things, is here more prejudicial than advantageous to the truth: For he that pretends to maintain a point by reason, and is unsuccessful, doth weaken the credit which the authority of revelation gives. And ’tis considerable, that the scripture, in delivering supernatural truths, produces God’s authority as their only proof, without using any other way of arguing: But although we cannot demonstrate these mysteries by reason, yet we may give a rational account why we believe them.“Is it not the highest reason to believe the discovery that God hath made of himself, and his decrees? For he perfectly knows his own nature and will; and ’tis impossible he should deceive us: this natural principle is the foundation of faith. When God speaks, it becomes man to hear with silence and submission. His naked word is as certain as a demonstration.“And is it not most reasonable to believe that the Deity cannot be fully understood by us? The sun may more easily be included in a spark of fire, than the infinite perfections of God be comprehended by a finite mind. The angels, who dwell so near the fountain of light,cover their facesin a holy confusion, not being able to comprehend Him. How much less can man in this earthly state, distant from God, and opprest with a burthen of flesh? Now from hence it follows;“1. That ignorance of the manner how divine mysteries exist is no sufficient plea for infidelity, when the scripture reveals that they are. For reason that is limited and restrained cannot frame a conception that is commensurate to the essence and power of God. This will appear more clearly by considering the mysterious excellencies of the divine nature, the certainty of which we believe, but the manner we cannot understand: As that his essence and attributes are the same, without the least shadow of composition; yet his wisdom and power are to our apprehensions distinct, and his mercy and justice in some manner opposite.[79]That his essence is intire in all places, yet not terminated in any. That he is above the heavens, and beneath the earth, yet hath no relation of high or low, distant or near. That he penetrates all substances, but is mixed with none. That he understands, yet receives no ideas within himself: That he wills, yet hath no motion that carries him out of himself. That in him time hath no succession; that which is past is not gone, and that which is future is not to come. That he loves without passion, is angry without disturbance, repents without change. These perfections are above the capacity of reason fully to understand; Yet essential to the deity. Here we must exalt faith, and abase reason. Thus in the mystery of the incarnation, (1 Tim.iii. 16.) that two such distant natures should compose one person, without the confusion of properties, reason cannot reach unto; but it is clearly revealed in the word: (Johni. 14.) Here therefore we must obey, not enquire.“The obedience of faith is, to embrace an obscure truth with a firm assent, upon the account of a divine testimony. If reason will not assent to revelation, till it understands the manner how divine things are, it doth not obey it at all. The understanding then sincerely submits, when it is inclined by those motives, which demonstrate that such a belief is due to the authority of the revealer, and to the quality of the object. To believe only in proportion to our narrow conceptions is to disparage the divine truth, and debase the divine power. We can’t know what God can do; he is omnipotent, though we are not omniscient: ’Tis just we should humble our ignorance to his wisdom,and that every lofty imagination, and high thing, that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, should be cast down, and every thought captivated into the obedience of Christ; 2 Cor. x. 5. ’Tis our wisdom to receive the great mysteries of the gospel in their simplicity: for in attempting to give an exact and curious explication of them, the understanding, as in an hedge of thorns, the more it strives, the more ’tis wounded and entangled.God’s ways are far above ours, and his thoughts above ours as heaven is above the earth.To reject what we can’t comprehend, is not only to sin against faith, but against reason, which acknowledges itself finite, and unableto search out the Almighty to perfection; Job xi. 7.“2. We are obliged to believe those mysteries that are plainly delivered in scripture, notwithstanding those seeming contradictions wherewith they may be charged. In the objects of sense, the contrariety of appearances doth not lessen the certainty of things. The stars to our sight seem but glittering sparks, yet they are immense bodies. And it is one thing to be assured of a truth, another to answer to all the difficulties that encounter it: a mean understanding is capable of the first; the second is so difficult, that in clear things the profoundest philosophers may not be able to untie all the intricate and knotty objections which may be urged against them. ’Tis sufficient the belief of supernatural mysteries is built on the veracity and power of God; this makes them prudently credible: this resolves all doubts, and produces such a stability of spirit, as nothing can shake. A sincere believer is assured, that all opposition against revealed truths is fallacious, though he cannot discover the fallacy. Now the transcendent mysteries of the Christian religion, the Trinity of persons in the divine nature, the incarnation of the Son of God, are clearly set down in the scripture. And although subtile and obstinate opponents have used many guilty arts to dispirit and enervate those texts by an inferior sense, and have rackt them with violence to make them speak according to their prejudices, yet all is vain, the evidence of truth is victorious. A heathen, who considers not the gospel as a divine revelation, but merely as a doctrine delivered in writings, and judges of its sense by natural light, will acknowledge that those things are delivered in it: And notwithstanding those who usurp a sovereign authority to themselves, to judge of divine mysteries according to their own apprehensions, deny them as mere contradictions, yet they can never conclude them impossible: for no certain argument can be alledged against the being of a thing without a clear knowledge of its nature: Now, although we may understand the nature of man, we do not the nature of God, the œconomy of the persons, and his power to unite himself to a nature below him.“It is true, no article of faith is really repugnant to reason; for God is the author of natural, as well as of supernatural, light, and he cannot contradict himself: They are emanations from him, and though different, yet not destructive of each other. But we must distinguish between those things that are above reason and incomprehensible, and things that are against reason and utterly inconceivable: Some things are above reason in regard of their transcendent excellency, or distance from us; the divine essence, the eternal decrees, the hypostatical union, are such high and glorious objects, that it is an impossible enterprise to comprehend them: the intellectual eye is dazzled with their overpowering light. We can have but an imperfect knowledge of them; and there is no just cause of wonder that supernatural revelation should speak incomprehensible things of God. For he is a singular and admirable Being, infinitely above the ordinary course of nature. The maxims of philosophy are not to be extended to him. We must adore what we cannot fully understand. But those things are against reason, and utterly inconceivable, that involve a contradiction, and have a natural repugnancy to our understandings, which cannot conceive any thing that is formally impossible: and there is no such doctrine in the Christian religion.“3. We must distinguish between reason corrupted, and right reason. Since the fall, the clearness of the human understanding is lost, and the light that remains is eclipsed by the interposition of sensual lust. The carnal mind cannot, out of ignorance, and will not from pride and other malignant habits, receive things spiritual. And from hence arises many suspicions and doubts, (concerning supernatural verities) the shadows of darkened reason, and of dying faith. If any divine mystery seems incredible, it is from the corruption of our reason, not from reason itself; from its darkness, not its light. And as reason is obliged to correct the errors of sense, when it is deceived either by some vicious quality in the organ, or by the distance of the object, or by the falseness of the medium, that corrupts the image in conveying of it. So it is the office of faith to reform the judgment of reason, when either from its own weakness, or the height of things spiritual, it is mistaken about them. For this end supernatural revelation was given, not to extinguish reason, but to redress it, and enrich it with the discovery of heavenly things. Faith is called wisdom and knowledge: it doth not quench the vigour of the faculty wherein it is seated, but elevates it, and gives it a spiritual perception of those things that are most distant from its commerce. It doth not lead us through a mist to the inheritance of the saints in light.”Bates.

“2. There are some doctrines, which as reason by its light could not discover; so when they are made known, it cannot comprehend; but they are by a clear and necessary connexion joined with the other that reason approves: as the mystery of the Trinity, and the Incarnation of the Son of God, which are the foundations of the whole work of our redemption. The nature of God is repugnant to plurality, there can be but one essence; and the nature of satisfaction requires a distinction of persons: For he that suffers as guilty, must be distinguished from the person of the judge that exacts satisfaction; and no mere creature is able by his obedient sufferings to repair the honour of God: So that a divine person, assuming the nature of man, was alone capable to make that satisfaction, which the gospel propounds, and reason consents to. Now, according to the distinction of capacities in the Trinity, the Father required an honourable reparation for the breach of the divine law, and the Son bore the punishment in the sufferings of the human nature; that is peculiarly his own. Besides, ’tis clear that the doctrine of the Trinity, that is, of three glorious relations in the Godhead, and of the Incarnation, are most firmly connected with all the parts of the christian religion, left in the writings of the apostles, which as they were confirmed by miracles, the divine signatures of their certainty, so they contain such authentic marks of their divinity, that right reason cannot reject them.

“3. Whereas there are three principles by which we apprehend things, Sense, Reason and Faith; these lights have their different objects that must not be confounded. Sense is confined to things material; Reason considers things abstracted from matter; Faith regards the mysteries revealed from heaven: and these must not transgress their order. Sense is an incompetent judge of things about which reason is only conversant. It can only make a report of those objects, which by their natural characters are exposed to it. And reason can only discourse of things, within its sphere: supernatural things which derive from revelation, and are purely the objects of faith, are not within its territories and jurisdiction. Those superlative mysteries exceed all our intellectual abilities. ’Tis true, the understanding is a rational faculty, and every act of it is really or in appearance grounded on reason. But there is a wide difference between the proving a doctrine by reason, and the giving a reason why we believe the truth of it. For instance, we cannot prove the Trinity by natural reason; and the subtilty of the schoolmen, who affect to give some reason of all things, is here more prejudicial than advantageous to the truth: For he that pretends to maintain a point by reason, and is unsuccessful, doth weaken the credit which the authority of revelation gives. And ’tis considerable, that the scripture, in delivering supernatural truths, produces God’s authority as their only proof, without using any other way of arguing: But although we cannot demonstrate these mysteries by reason, yet we may give a rational account why we believe them.

“Is it not the highest reason to believe the discovery that God hath made of himself, and his decrees? For he perfectly knows his own nature and will; and ’tis impossible he should deceive us: this natural principle is the foundation of faith. When God speaks, it becomes man to hear with silence and submission. His naked word is as certain as a demonstration.

“And is it not most reasonable to believe that the Deity cannot be fully understood by us? The sun may more easily be included in a spark of fire, than the infinite perfections of God be comprehended by a finite mind. The angels, who dwell so near the fountain of light,cover their facesin a holy confusion, not being able to comprehend Him. How much less can man in this earthly state, distant from God, and opprest with a burthen of flesh? Now from hence it follows;

“1. That ignorance of the manner how divine mysteries exist is no sufficient plea for infidelity, when the scripture reveals that they are. For reason that is limited and restrained cannot frame a conception that is commensurate to the essence and power of God. This will appear more clearly by considering the mysterious excellencies of the divine nature, the certainty of which we believe, but the manner we cannot understand: As that his essence and attributes are the same, without the least shadow of composition; yet his wisdom and power are to our apprehensions distinct, and his mercy and justice in some manner opposite.[79]That his essence is intire in all places, yet not terminated in any. That he is above the heavens, and beneath the earth, yet hath no relation of high or low, distant or near. That he penetrates all substances, but is mixed with none. That he understands, yet receives no ideas within himself: That he wills, yet hath no motion that carries him out of himself. That in him time hath no succession; that which is past is not gone, and that which is future is not to come. That he loves without passion, is angry without disturbance, repents without change. These perfections are above the capacity of reason fully to understand; Yet essential to the deity. Here we must exalt faith, and abase reason. Thus in the mystery of the incarnation, (1 Tim.iii. 16.) that two such distant natures should compose one person, without the confusion of properties, reason cannot reach unto; but it is clearly revealed in the word: (Johni. 14.) Here therefore we must obey, not enquire.

“The obedience of faith is, to embrace an obscure truth with a firm assent, upon the account of a divine testimony. If reason will not assent to revelation, till it understands the manner how divine things are, it doth not obey it at all. The understanding then sincerely submits, when it is inclined by those motives, which demonstrate that such a belief is due to the authority of the revealer, and to the quality of the object. To believe only in proportion to our narrow conceptions is to disparage the divine truth, and debase the divine power. We can’t know what God can do; he is omnipotent, though we are not omniscient: ’Tis just we should humble our ignorance to his wisdom,and that every lofty imagination, and high thing, that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, should be cast down, and every thought captivated into the obedience of Christ; 2 Cor. x. 5. ’Tis our wisdom to receive the great mysteries of the gospel in their simplicity: for in attempting to give an exact and curious explication of them, the understanding, as in an hedge of thorns, the more it strives, the more ’tis wounded and entangled.God’s ways are far above ours, and his thoughts above ours as heaven is above the earth.To reject what we can’t comprehend, is not only to sin against faith, but against reason, which acknowledges itself finite, and unableto search out the Almighty to perfection; Job xi. 7.

“2. We are obliged to believe those mysteries that are plainly delivered in scripture, notwithstanding those seeming contradictions wherewith they may be charged. In the objects of sense, the contrariety of appearances doth not lessen the certainty of things. The stars to our sight seem but glittering sparks, yet they are immense bodies. And it is one thing to be assured of a truth, another to answer to all the difficulties that encounter it: a mean understanding is capable of the first; the second is so difficult, that in clear things the profoundest philosophers may not be able to untie all the intricate and knotty objections which may be urged against them. ’Tis sufficient the belief of supernatural mysteries is built on the veracity and power of God; this makes them prudently credible: this resolves all doubts, and produces such a stability of spirit, as nothing can shake. A sincere believer is assured, that all opposition against revealed truths is fallacious, though he cannot discover the fallacy. Now the transcendent mysteries of the Christian religion, the Trinity of persons in the divine nature, the incarnation of the Son of God, are clearly set down in the scripture. And although subtile and obstinate opponents have used many guilty arts to dispirit and enervate those texts by an inferior sense, and have rackt them with violence to make them speak according to their prejudices, yet all is vain, the evidence of truth is victorious. A heathen, who considers not the gospel as a divine revelation, but merely as a doctrine delivered in writings, and judges of its sense by natural light, will acknowledge that those things are delivered in it: And notwithstanding those who usurp a sovereign authority to themselves, to judge of divine mysteries according to their own apprehensions, deny them as mere contradictions, yet they can never conclude them impossible: for no certain argument can be alledged against the being of a thing without a clear knowledge of its nature: Now, although we may understand the nature of man, we do not the nature of God, the œconomy of the persons, and his power to unite himself to a nature below him.

“It is true, no article of faith is really repugnant to reason; for God is the author of natural, as well as of supernatural, light, and he cannot contradict himself: They are emanations from him, and though different, yet not destructive of each other. But we must distinguish between those things that are above reason and incomprehensible, and things that are against reason and utterly inconceivable: Some things are above reason in regard of their transcendent excellency, or distance from us; the divine essence, the eternal decrees, the hypostatical union, are such high and glorious objects, that it is an impossible enterprise to comprehend them: the intellectual eye is dazzled with their overpowering light. We can have but an imperfect knowledge of them; and there is no just cause of wonder that supernatural revelation should speak incomprehensible things of God. For he is a singular and admirable Being, infinitely above the ordinary course of nature. The maxims of philosophy are not to be extended to him. We must adore what we cannot fully understand. But those things are against reason, and utterly inconceivable, that involve a contradiction, and have a natural repugnancy to our understandings, which cannot conceive any thing that is formally impossible: and there is no such doctrine in the Christian religion.

“3. We must distinguish between reason corrupted, and right reason. Since the fall, the clearness of the human understanding is lost, and the light that remains is eclipsed by the interposition of sensual lust. The carnal mind cannot, out of ignorance, and will not from pride and other malignant habits, receive things spiritual. And from hence arises many suspicions and doubts, (concerning supernatural verities) the shadows of darkened reason, and of dying faith. If any divine mystery seems incredible, it is from the corruption of our reason, not from reason itself; from its darkness, not its light. And as reason is obliged to correct the errors of sense, when it is deceived either by some vicious quality in the organ, or by the distance of the object, or by the falseness of the medium, that corrupts the image in conveying of it. So it is the office of faith to reform the judgment of reason, when either from its own weakness, or the height of things spiritual, it is mistaken about them. For this end supernatural revelation was given, not to extinguish reason, but to redress it, and enrich it with the discovery of heavenly things. Faith is called wisdom and knowledge: it doth not quench the vigour of the faculty wherein it is seated, but elevates it, and gives it a spiritual perception of those things that are most distant from its commerce. It doth not lead us through a mist to the inheritance of the saints in light.”

Bates.

79.Infinitus, immensus & soli sibi tantus, quantus est notus, nobis vero ad intellectum pectus angustum est, & ideò sic cum dignè estimamus, cùm inaestimabilem dicimus.Min. Fel.

80.He who has marked the differences between truth and error, good and evil, made them discoverable, and formed human minds susceptible of their impressions, thereby discovers his will that we should attend to them, and has made it our duty to do so. With this sentiment sacred revelation is expressly accordant; “prove all things, hold fast that which is good.” The Gospel requires not faith without evidence, it demands no more assent than is proportioned to the weight of probability, and charges as a crime only our refusing to attend to the evidence, or our coming to it with hearts prejudiced against, and therefore insensible to, its evidence. The exercise of reason is essential to faith, for how sudden soever our convictions, still it is the judgment which is convinced.Yet reason has her due province; she may and ought to ascertain the genuineness, authenticity, and divine authority of the scriptures. When this is done, she cannot correctly delay her assent, because she may not fully comprehend the promises or works of God, for this would require wisdom no less than Divine. But suppose she should presume to try them, by what balances shall she weigh them? To what shall she compare them? To the reasons and fitness of things? what are these but circumstances and relations springing from the works of God? His creation originated from his wisdom and power, and is ever dependent on them. This is therefore to circumscribe infinite wisdom by what has been already discovered of it; it is to limit infinite power from effecting any thing which it has not hitherto accomplished. Such judgment is not the work of reason, it is irrational. Reason can only make an induction, where there exists premises from which a conclusion can be drawn; but here her limits are exceeded, she has no standard by which she can measure infinity. By reasoning we justly infer from the works of God, many of his glorious moral, as well as natural, perfections; we gather that he is holy, just, true, and good, and we may fairly say that he will never depart from such rectitude, but that all his works will be conformed to such principles. We can go no farther than unto generals, we have no right to question any word or act of his, and say it is not conformed to such perfections, because this would suppose that we possess infinite wisdom. He may have ways of solving our difficulties and objections, with which we are not acquainted. Such judgment is not only irrational, but arrogant, as it is an extension of the claims of reason beyond her just limits. Our duty in such case is exemplified in the father of the faithful. At God’s command we must, like him, sacrifice our Isaacs, and leave to him both to accomplish his promises and to justify the action. It is evident that the doctrine of the Trinity is but partially revealed to man, but sufficiently to let him into a competent knowledge of the plan of redemption.

Yet reason has her due province; she may and ought to ascertain the genuineness, authenticity, and divine authority of the scriptures. When this is done, she cannot correctly delay her assent, because she may not fully comprehend the promises or works of God, for this would require wisdom no less than Divine. But suppose she should presume to try them, by what balances shall she weigh them? To what shall she compare them? To the reasons and fitness of things? what are these but circumstances and relations springing from the works of God? His creation originated from his wisdom and power, and is ever dependent on them. This is therefore to circumscribe infinite wisdom by what has been already discovered of it; it is to limit infinite power from effecting any thing which it has not hitherto accomplished. Such judgment is not the work of reason, it is irrational. Reason can only make an induction, where there exists premises from which a conclusion can be drawn; but here her limits are exceeded, she has no standard by which she can measure infinity. By reasoning we justly infer from the works of God, many of his glorious moral, as well as natural, perfections; we gather that he is holy, just, true, and good, and we may fairly say that he will never depart from such rectitude, but that all his works will be conformed to such principles. We can go no farther than unto generals, we have no right to question any word or act of his, and say it is not conformed to such perfections, because this would suppose that we possess infinite wisdom. He may have ways of solving our difficulties and objections, with which we are not acquainted. Such judgment is not only irrational, but arrogant, as it is an extension of the claims of reason beyond her just limits. Our duty in such case is exemplified in the father of the faithful. At God’s command we must, like him, sacrifice our Isaacs, and leave to him both to accomplish his promises and to justify the action. It is evident that the doctrine of the Trinity is but partially revealed to man, but sufficiently to let him into a competent knowledge of the plan of redemption.

81.Vid. Epist. 2. ad Dionys.

82.Vid. Euseb. Præp. Evang. Lib. XIII. cap. 12.

83.Vid. Huet. Concord. Ration. & Fid. Lib. II. cap. 3.

84.See Dr. Berriman’s Historical account, &c. page 94.

85.“Philo uses not the name for his derivative Being in the Godhead, which we see the other Jews of the time using in the Gospels. He speaks not of him, by his natural appellation of the Son of God. No! He takes up another title for him, which indeed was known equally to other Jews, or Philo could not possibly have adopted it; which was known equally to the Gentiles, as I shall show hereafter; but which was known only to the scholars of either. He calls him ‘theLogosof God.’ This is a name, that can be borrowed, together with the idea annexed to it, only from the Jews, or from the common ancestors of them and of the Gentiles; that answers exactly to theDabarof Jehovah in the Hebrew Scriptures, and to theMemraof Jehovah in the Chaldee paraphrasts upon them; and signifies merely ‘theWordof God.’ This name has been since introduced into our religion, by one of the inspired teachers of it. And notwithstanding the ductility of the Greek language in this instance, which would allow it to be rendered either theWordor theReasonof God; yet the English Bible, with a strict adherence to propriety, and in full conformity to the ancient Christians and ancient Jews, has rejected the accidental signification, and embraced only the immediate and the genuine. Yet, even now, the name is confined in its use to the more improved intellects among us. And it must therefore have peculiarly been, in the days of Philo, thephilosophicaldenomination of Him, who waspopularlycalled the Son of God.“The use of the name of Logos, or Word, by Philo and by St. John in concurrence, sufficiently marks the knowledge of the name among the Jews. But the total silence concerning it, by the Jewish writers of the three first Gospels; the equal silence of the introduced Jews concerning it, in all the four; and theacknowledgeduse of it through all the Jewish records of our religion, merely by St. John himself; prove it to have been familiar to a few only. It is indeed too mysterious in its allusion, and too reducible into metaphor in its import, to have ever been the common and ordinary appellation for the Son of God. Originating from thespiritualprinciple of connexion, betwixt the first and the second Being in the Godhead; marking this, by aspiritualidea of connexion; and considering it to be as close and as necessary as theWordis to the energetickMindof God, which cannot bury its intellectual energies in silence, but must put them forth in speech; it is toospiritualin itself, to be addressed to the faith of the multitude. If with so full a reference to ourbodilyideas, and so positive afiliationof the Second Being to the First, we have seen the grossness of Arian criticism endeavouring to resolve the doctrine into the mere dust of a figure; how much more ready would it have been to do so, if we had only such aspiritualdenomination as this, for the second? This would certainly have been considered by it, as too unsubstantial for distinct personality, and therefore too evanescent for equal divinity.“St. John indeed adopted this philosophical title, for the denomination of the Son of God; only in one solemn and prefatory passage of his Gospel, in two slight and incidental passages of his Epistles, and in one of his Book of revelations. Even there, the use of the popular instead of the philosophical name, in the three Gospels antecedent to his, precluded all probability of misconstruction. Yet, not content with this, he formed an additional barrier. At the same instant in which he speaks of the Logos, he asserts him to be distinct from God the Father, and yet to be equally God with him. ‘In the beginning,’ he says, ‘wasthe Word; andthe WordwaswithGod; andthe WordwasGod.’ Having thus secured the two grand points relating to the Logos, he can have nothing more to say upon the subject, than to repeat what he has stated, for impressing the deeper conviction. He accordingly repeats it. His personality he impresses again, thus; ‘THE SAMEwas in the beginningwithGod.’ His divinity also he again inculcates, thus: ‘ALL THINGS WERE MADE BY HIM, andWITHOUT HIM WAS NOT ANY THING MADE THAT WAS MADE.’ Here the very repetition itself, of enforcing his claim to divinity, by ascribing the creation to him; is plainly an union of two clauses, each announcing him as the Creator of the universe, and one doubling over the other. And the uncreated nature of his own existence is the more strongly enforced upon the mind, by being contrasted with the created nature of all other existences. These wereMADE, but he himselfWAS;madeby Him, whowaswith God, andwasGod. Nor would all this precaution suffice, in the opinion of St. John. He must place still stronger fences against the dangerous spirit of error. He therefore goes on to say, in confirmation of his personality and divinity, and in application of all to our Saviour: ‘Hewas in the world, andTHE WORLD WAS MADE BY HIM, and the world knew him not;Hecame untoHIS OWN[PROPER DOMAINS,] andHIS OWN[PROPER DOMESTICKS] received him not.’ And he closes all, with judiciously drawing the several parts of his assertions before into one full point; and with additionally explaining his philosophical term, by a direct reference of it to that popular one which he uses ever afterwards: ‘andthe Wordwas made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory, the glory as ofthe only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.’“Yet, when such guards were requisite, what induced St. John to use this philosophical title at all? The reason was assuredly this. The title was in high repute, and in familiar use, among the refined spirits of the age; and his Gospel was peculiarly calculated for the service ofsuch. The almost perpetual recurrence of the appellation in Philo’s works shows evidently the use and the repute in which it was, among the more spiritualized of the Jews. St. John therefore adopted it himself, for the more easy access totheirconviction. It was also congenial, probably, of itself to the spiritualized state of St. John’s mind. He, who has dwelt so much more than the other Evangelists upon thedoctrinesof our Saviour; and who has drawn out so many of them, in all their spiritual refinement of ideas; would naturally prefer thespiritualterm of relationship for God the Son and God the Father, before thebodily, whenever the intellect was raised enough to receive it, and whenever the use of it was sufficiently guarded from danger. These were two reasons, I suppose, that induced St. John to use it afewtimes. And these were equally (I suppose) the reasons, that induced him, with all his guards, to use it only a few.“Nor let us be told, in the rashness of Arian absurdity, that we misunderstand St. John in this interpretation of his words. If reason is capable of explaining words, and if St. John was capable of conveying his meaning in words to the ear of reason; then we may boldly appeal to the common sense of mankind, and insist upon the truth of our interpretation. Common sense indeed hathalreadydetermined the point, in an impartial person, in an enemy, in a Heathen. I allude to that extraordinary approbation, which was given by a Heathen of the third century to this passage of St. John. ‘Of modern philosophers,’ says Eusebius, ‘Ameliusis an eminent one, being himself, if ever there was one, a zealot for the philosophy of Plato; and he called the Divine of the Hebrewsa Barbarian, as if he would not condescend to make mention of the Evangelist John by name.’ Such is Eusebius’s account of our referee. But what are the terms of his award? They are these. ‘And such indeed was the Logos,’ he says, ‘by whom, a perpetual existence, the things created were created, as also Heraclitus has said; and who by Jupiter,the Barbariansays, being constituted in the rank and dignity of a Principle, is with God and is God, by whom all things absolutely were created; in whom the created living thing, and life, and existence, had a birth, and fell into a body, and putting on flesh appeared a man; and, after showing the greatness of his nature, and being wholly dissolved, is again deified and is God, such as he was before he was brought down into the body and the flesh and a man. These things, if translated out ofthe Barbarian’stheology, not as shaded over there, but on the contrary as placed in full view, would be plain.’ In this very singular and very valuable comment upon St. John’s Gospel in general, and upon his preface in particular, we may see, through the harsh and obscure language of the whole, some circumstances of great moment. The bold air of arrogance in the blinded Heathen over the illuminated Divine must strike at once upon every eye. But the Logos appears, from him, to have been known to thephilosophersof antiquitylaterthan the Gospel; and known too as a perpetual Existence, and the Maker of the world. St. John also is witnessed by a Heathen, and by one who put him down for a Barbarian, to have represented the Logos asthe Maker of all things, aswith God, and asGod; as one likewise, ‘in whomthe created living Thing,’ or the human soul of our Saviour, ‘and’ even ‘Life and Existence’ themselves, those primogenial principles of Deity, ‘hada birth, andfell into a body, andputting on flesh appeared a man,’ who was therefore man and God in one; who accordingly ‘showed the greatness of his nature’ by his miracles, was ‘wholly dissolved,’ and then ‘wasagainDEIFIED, andis God,’ even ‘SUCH AS HE WAS, before he wasbrought down into the bodyandthe fleshanda man.’ And St. John is attested to have declared this, ‘not even asshaded over,’ but ‘on the contrary asplaced in full view.’ We have thus a testimony tothe plain meaningof St. John, and to theevident Godheadof his Logos, aGodheadequallybeforeandafterhis death; most unquestionable in its nature, very early in its age, and peculiarly forcible in its import. St. John, we see, is referred to in a language, that shows him to have been well known to the Grecian cotemporaries of Amelius, as a writer, as a foreigner, and as a marked assertor ofDivinityfor his Logos.”Whitaker.

“The use of the name of Logos, or Word, by Philo and by St. John in concurrence, sufficiently marks the knowledge of the name among the Jews. But the total silence concerning it, by the Jewish writers of the three first Gospels; the equal silence of the introduced Jews concerning it, in all the four; and theacknowledgeduse of it through all the Jewish records of our religion, merely by St. John himself; prove it to have been familiar to a few only. It is indeed too mysterious in its allusion, and too reducible into metaphor in its import, to have ever been the common and ordinary appellation for the Son of God. Originating from thespiritualprinciple of connexion, betwixt the first and the second Being in the Godhead; marking this, by aspiritualidea of connexion; and considering it to be as close and as necessary as theWordis to the energetickMindof God, which cannot bury its intellectual energies in silence, but must put them forth in speech; it is toospiritualin itself, to be addressed to the faith of the multitude. If with so full a reference to ourbodilyideas, and so positive afiliationof the Second Being to the First, we have seen the grossness of Arian criticism endeavouring to resolve the doctrine into the mere dust of a figure; how much more ready would it have been to do so, if we had only such aspiritualdenomination as this, for the second? This would certainly have been considered by it, as too unsubstantial for distinct personality, and therefore too evanescent for equal divinity.

“St. John indeed adopted this philosophical title, for the denomination of the Son of God; only in one solemn and prefatory passage of his Gospel, in two slight and incidental passages of his Epistles, and in one of his Book of revelations. Even there, the use of the popular instead of the philosophical name, in the three Gospels antecedent to his, precluded all probability of misconstruction. Yet, not content with this, he formed an additional barrier. At the same instant in which he speaks of the Logos, he asserts him to be distinct from God the Father, and yet to be equally God with him. ‘In the beginning,’ he says, ‘wasthe Word; andthe WordwaswithGod; andthe WordwasGod.’ Having thus secured the two grand points relating to the Logos, he can have nothing more to say upon the subject, than to repeat what he has stated, for impressing the deeper conviction. He accordingly repeats it. His personality he impresses again, thus; ‘THE SAMEwas in the beginningwithGod.’ His divinity also he again inculcates, thus: ‘ALL THINGS WERE MADE BY HIM, andWITHOUT HIM WAS NOT ANY THING MADE THAT WAS MADE.’ Here the very repetition itself, of enforcing his claim to divinity, by ascribing the creation to him; is plainly an union of two clauses, each announcing him as the Creator of the universe, and one doubling over the other. And the uncreated nature of his own existence is the more strongly enforced upon the mind, by being contrasted with the created nature of all other existences. These wereMADE, but he himselfWAS;madeby Him, whowaswith God, andwasGod. Nor would all this precaution suffice, in the opinion of St. John. He must place still stronger fences against the dangerous spirit of error. He therefore goes on to say, in confirmation of his personality and divinity, and in application of all to our Saviour: ‘Hewas in the world, andTHE WORLD WAS MADE BY HIM, and the world knew him not;Hecame untoHIS OWN[PROPER DOMAINS,] andHIS OWN[PROPER DOMESTICKS] received him not.’ And he closes all, with judiciously drawing the several parts of his assertions before into one full point; and with additionally explaining his philosophical term, by a direct reference of it to that popular one which he uses ever afterwards: ‘andthe Wordwas made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory, the glory as ofthe only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.’

“Yet, when such guards were requisite, what induced St. John to use this philosophical title at all? The reason was assuredly this. The title was in high repute, and in familiar use, among the refined spirits of the age; and his Gospel was peculiarly calculated for the service ofsuch. The almost perpetual recurrence of the appellation in Philo’s works shows evidently the use and the repute in which it was, among the more spiritualized of the Jews. St. John therefore adopted it himself, for the more easy access totheirconviction. It was also congenial, probably, of itself to the spiritualized state of St. John’s mind. He, who has dwelt so much more than the other Evangelists upon thedoctrinesof our Saviour; and who has drawn out so many of them, in all their spiritual refinement of ideas; would naturally prefer thespiritualterm of relationship for God the Son and God the Father, before thebodily, whenever the intellect was raised enough to receive it, and whenever the use of it was sufficiently guarded from danger. These were two reasons, I suppose, that induced St. John to use it afewtimes. And these were equally (I suppose) the reasons, that induced him, with all his guards, to use it only a few.

“Nor let us be told, in the rashness of Arian absurdity, that we misunderstand St. John in this interpretation of his words. If reason is capable of explaining words, and if St. John was capable of conveying his meaning in words to the ear of reason; then we may boldly appeal to the common sense of mankind, and insist upon the truth of our interpretation. Common sense indeed hathalreadydetermined the point, in an impartial person, in an enemy, in a Heathen. I allude to that extraordinary approbation, which was given by a Heathen of the third century to this passage of St. John. ‘Of modern philosophers,’ says Eusebius, ‘Ameliusis an eminent one, being himself, if ever there was one, a zealot for the philosophy of Plato; and he called the Divine of the Hebrewsa Barbarian, as if he would not condescend to make mention of the Evangelist John by name.’ Such is Eusebius’s account of our referee. But what are the terms of his award? They are these. ‘And such indeed was the Logos,’ he says, ‘by whom, a perpetual existence, the things created were created, as also Heraclitus has said; and who by Jupiter,the Barbariansays, being constituted in the rank and dignity of a Principle, is with God and is God, by whom all things absolutely were created; in whom the created living thing, and life, and existence, had a birth, and fell into a body, and putting on flesh appeared a man; and, after showing the greatness of his nature, and being wholly dissolved, is again deified and is God, such as he was before he was brought down into the body and the flesh and a man. These things, if translated out ofthe Barbarian’stheology, not as shaded over there, but on the contrary as placed in full view, would be plain.’ In this very singular and very valuable comment upon St. John’s Gospel in general, and upon his preface in particular, we may see, through the harsh and obscure language of the whole, some circumstances of great moment. The bold air of arrogance in the blinded Heathen over the illuminated Divine must strike at once upon every eye. But the Logos appears, from him, to have been known to thephilosophersof antiquitylaterthan the Gospel; and known too as a perpetual Existence, and the Maker of the world. St. John also is witnessed by a Heathen, and by one who put him down for a Barbarian, to have represented the Logos asthe Maker of all things, aswith God, and asGod; as one likewise, ‘in whomthe created living Thing,’ or the human soul of our Saviour, ‘and’ even ‘Life and Existence’ themselves, those primogenial principles of Deity, ‘hada birth, andfell into a body, andputting on flesh appeared a man,’ who was therefore man and God in one; who accordingly ‘showed the greatness of his nature’ by his miracles, was ‘wholly dissolved,’ and then ‘wasagainDEIFIED, andis God,’ even ‘SUCH AS HE WAS, before he wasbrought down into the bodyandthe fleshanda man.’ And St. John is attested to have declared this, ‘not even asshaded over,’ but ‘on the contrary asplaced in full view.’ We have thus a testimony tothe plain meaningof St. John, and to theevident Godheadof his Logos, aGodheadequallybeforeandafterhis death; most unquestionable in its nature, very early in its age, and peculiarly forcible in its import. St. John, we see, is referred to in a language, that shows him to have been well known to the Grecian cotemporaries of Amelius, as a writer, as a foreigner, and as a marked assertor ofDivinityfor his Logos.”

Whitaker.

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