238.Predestinationto Deathormisery, as the end, and tosinas the means, I call “an impure mixture;” amixture, because its connexion with Predestination to life is arbitrary and forced;—impure, because the supposition itself is a foul aspersion of the divine character. St. Augustine, Calvin, Perkins, Twisse, Rutherford, &c. &c. though highly valuable and excellent men, upon the whole, were not free from this impure mixture of doctrine. But of all modern authors, if we except the philosophical Necessarians, Hobbes, Collins, Hume, Hartley, Priestly, &c. Dr. Hopkins, of America seems the most open in his avowal of the sentiment, thatsin and miseryaredecreedin the same manner as holiness and happiness, in order to produce the greatest general good. The substance of his reasoning is thus expressed by himself: “All future existences, events, and actions, must have a cause of their futurition, or there must be a reason why they are future, or certainly to take place, rather than not. This cause must be thedivine decreedetermining their future existence, or it must be in the futureexistences themselves. But the future existences could not he the cause of their own futurition; for this supposes them to exist as a cause, and to have influence, before they have any existence, even from eternity.—The cause therefore can be nothing butdivine decree, determining their future existence, without which nothing could be future, consequently nothing could be known to be future.”—See his System of doctrines, 2 vol. 8vo. especially Vol. i p. 110-217.On the sentiment itself, by whomsoever held, I would offer the following strictures:1. It is a mere assumption, thatsin, which the above proposition avowedly includes, has no possiblecauseof its futurition but either the divine decree, or the future existences themselves. For though God’s decrees are the cause of our being, faculties, and volitions, none of these, nor any thing else that can he traced to divine causation, will constitutesin. Nor yet is it true that sin is thecause of itself; for then sin would be self-existent. It follows therefore that it must have another origin than either the divine decree or its own existence.2. It is equally plain that thecauseof sin is not itself morally evil; For this would involve a contradiction, making cause and effect to be the same thing. Nor yet can the cause be morally good. For as from truth nothing but truth can legitimately proceed, so from good nothing but good can flow. Evil, indeed, isrelatedto good, but not as cause and effect. Though evil could not follow were there no infinite good, no creature, no will, no freedom, yet something else must be sought as the matrix, where the monster sin is generated and fostered, and which, morally considered, is neither good nor evil.—Therefore,3. We assert, that theorigin of moral evilis to be found in theunionof two principles, neither of which considered alone partakes of amoralcharacter. These two principles areLibertyandPassive Power. Liberty, it is manifest is morally neither good nor bad, but is a mere natural instrument, if I may so speak, and may be termed anatural goodof which God is the author and decreer. On the contrary, Passive Power is anatural evilof which God is not the author or decreer, yet morally considered is not evil. But this term, being little understood, requires further explanation; at least it is incumbent on me to shew in what sense I use it. My design is not to vindicate the use of it by others, but I adopt it to convey a specific idea, for which I find no other word or phrase more appropriate. By ‘Passive Power,’ then, I mean, That which is ofunavoidable necessityfound in every creature, as such, in direct opposition to the self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency of God. In other words, It is thattendencyto nihility, physically considered, and to defection, morally considered, which ofabsolute necessitybelongs to every dependent or created nature. That there is such a principle is self-evident, nor is it probable that any reasonable being will ever controvert its existence. Now, it is demonstrable that this, from the definition, cannot be the object of divine decree, or of will; for it is stated to be ofabsoluteorunavoidablenecessity; besides, it is absurd to suppose that God has decreed, or produces, any thing the existence of which stands indirect contrarietyto himself. That it is not amoralevil is plain, for theholiestcreatures are subjects of it—God alone is exempt.4. Let it be further observed, that the First Cause, being goodness itself, impels, whether decretively or efficiently, togood only; and of this character is even our being necessitated to exercise our volitions. Yet, when the exercise of liberty, in itself innocent,uniteswith passive power, the fruit or offspring of this union is moral evil. This, I am fully persuaded, is the true solution of this question,Whence cometh moral evil?If any person shall think proper candidly to assign his reasons to the contrary, due regard shall be paid to them,5. If it be asked, where lies the difference betweendecreeingandpermittingsin to take place? I answer, the difference is, that the one would be an act ofinjustice, the other isdoing nothing. So that until it can be shewn that there is no difference between injustice and doing nothing, there is no force in the objection. That to necessitate sin decretively would be an act of injustice, and therefore incompatible with the divine character, is, I think, demonstrable; for, it would be to decree to destructionantecedentlyto desert—toannihilatethe sinfulness of any act, making its evil nature to consist in its effects—and to destroy the immutable essences of good and evil. Whereas topermit, or tosufferto take place without prevention, isnot to act not to decree. To ‘decree to permit,’ therefore, is a contradiction in terms.6. But, it has been said, theeventis the same to the sinner, whether he hurried on to sin and misery by a decretive impulse, or these effects are not prevented when in the power of omnipotence to interpose. This objection would have some weight, if thehappinessof the creature were the only, or even theprincipalend of God in creation. But this not being the case, its weight vanishes. To illustrate this we may suppose, that theeventof a man’s execution is well known to a judge; but, instead of proceeding on the principles of law and equity, and to effect conviction and condemnation according to legal evidence, he orders the man to be executed clandestinely without any equitable process, under pretence that it could make no difference to the sufferer, for theeventof his execution wascertain! Besides, the spirit of the objection reflects on God’sactualdealings with his creatures, in every instance of their sufferings; because it is in the power of omnipotence to interpose. And in fact, it must be allowed, either that thehappinessof the Creature is not thechiefend of creation, or that the permission of sin is an act of injustice. But the case is plain, that his own glory is the chief end of creation and government, and that there is no injustice in the permission of sin.7. It may be said, If the union of liberty with passive power be the origin of moral evil, and if the holiest creatures in heaven are both free and the subjects of passive power, how is it that they do not sin! If both are united in the same persons, does the one never terminate upon; or unite itself to the other? In answer to this enquiry, we must distinguish betweenhavingthe principle, and being under its influence without control. Though the spirits of the just, and holy angels, have in them the principle, as the condition of their created existence, yet it is counteracted by sovereign favour. They may say, as well as Paul, by the grace of God we are what we are. The object of divine support is thedisposition, or theseatof moral action; this being made good, or pure, or holy, prior to all acts of the will, effectually counteracts the influence of passive power. The Liberty and choice of a heavenly being therefore, terminating on such a disposition, no acts but such as are holy can ensue. Hence,8. If we would know how this is consistent with the actual fall of beings who were once in this condition, we must attend to another important consideration; which is, that when God at any time deals inmere equitywith a moral agent, without the counteracting influence of sovereign favour, the inevitable consequence is, that his liberty, or free choice, will terminate upon his passive power. Hence thecertaintyof the futurition of moral evil, in all possible degrees and circumstances, without any decretive efficiency in its production.—If it be asked, why the exercise ofequityis assigned as the occasion of this union, rather thansovereignty; or, why leaving a free agent to the influence of his passive power should not be considered a sovereign rather than an equitable act? The best answer to this enquiry, is a definition of the two terms. Byequitythen I mean the principle that gives to each his due; bysovereignty, a right to do whatsoever is not inconsistent with equity. And from this definition it must appear that there may he a two-fold deviation from equity,viz.givingmorethan is due, orlessthan is due; more good and less evil, or more evil and less good than is equitable. The former of these, more good and less evil, must needs be for the advantage of the creature; and therefore it may be called agraciousdeviation. Without it, there would be no room for either mercy or grace. The latter, more evil and less good than is due, is properly calledinjustice, and is such a deviation from equity as is not compatible with the divine character. Therefore, to do us goodbeyondour claim is an act ofsovereignty; but to give us neither more nor less than is our due is to deal with us inpure equity.9. Hence it follows, that when God deals with angels or men insovereignty, according to the definitions, he does themgood beyondtheir claim. But to makethisto be the immediatecauseof the sin of men and angels is absurd. On the other hand, it is incompatible with the divine character, as before observed, to give them less good and more evil than is their due; and thereforethiscannot be the cause of sin, as sure as God is incapable of exercising injustice.—Wherefore, it remains that then alone can moral agents fall into sin when dealt with inpure equity. In the act of defection, or becoming sinful, they are equally free from being impelled by injustice, and upheld by sovereign favour.COROLLARIES.1. All thegoodand happiness in the universe of created beings are the fruit of Sovereignty and Decree.2. All themoral eviland misery in the universe are the offspring ofliberty, a natural good, terminating or acting upon, or united topassive power, a natural evil not counteracted by sovereignly gracious acts on the disposition, or the seat of the moral principle, which may be called analogicallythe heart.3. As every act and degree of liberty is perfectly fore-known to God, as the effect of his own decree, and every hypothetical tendency of passive power, though itself not an object of decree, is equally fore-known, it follows, that every sin is as accurately fore-known as if decreed, and has an equally infallible ground of certain futurition.
238.Predestinationto Deathormisery, as the end, and tosinas the means, I call “an impure mixture;” amixture, because its connexion with Predestination to life is arbitrary and forced;—impure, because the supposition itself is a foul aspersion of the divine character. St. Augustine, Calvin, Perkins, Twisse, Rutherford, &c. &c. though highly valuable and excellent men, upon the whole, were not free from this impure mixture of doctrine. But of all modern authors, if we except the philosophical Necessarians, Hobbes, Collins, Hume, Hartley, Priestly, &c. Dr. Hopkins, of America seems the most open in his avowal of the sentiment, thatsin and miseryaredecreedin the same manner as holiness and happiness, in order to produce the greatest general good. The substance of his reasoning is thus expressed by himself: “All future existences, events, and actions, must have a cause of their futurition, or there must be a reason why they are future, or certainly to take place, rather than not. This cause must be thedivine decreedetermining their future existence, or it must be in the futureexistences themselves. But the future existences could not he the cause of their own futurition; for this supposes them to exist as a cause, and to have influence, before they have any existence, even from eternity.—The cause therefore can be nothing butdivine decree, determining their future existence, without which nothing could be future, consequently nothing could be known to be future.”—See his System of doctrines, 2 vol. 8vo. especially Vol. i p. 110-217.
On the sentiment itself, by whomsoever held, I would offer the following strictures:
1. It is a mere assumption, thatsin, which the above proposition avowedly includes, has no possiblecauseof its futurition but either the divine decree, or the future existences themselves. For though God’s decrees are the cause of our being, faculties, and volitions, none of these, nor any thing else that can he traced to divine causation, will constitutesin. Nor yet is it true that sin is thecause of itself; for then sin would be self-existent. It follows therefore that it must have another origin than either the divine decree or its own existence.
2. It is equally plain that thecauseof sin is not itself morally evil; For this would involve a contradiction, making cause and effect to be the same thing. Nor yet can the cause be morally good. For as from truth nothing but truth can legitimately proceed, so from good nothing but good can flow. Evil, indeed, isrelatedto good, but not as cause and effect. Though evil could not follow were there no infinite good, no creature, no will, no freedom, yet something else must be sought as the matrix, where the monster sin is generated and fostered, and which, morally considered, is neither good nor evil.—Therefore,
3. We assert, that theorigin of moral evilis to be found in theunionof two principles, neither of which considered alone partakes of amoralcharacter. These two principles areLibertyandPassive Power. Liberty, it is manifest is morally neither good nor bad, but is a mere natural instrument, if I may so speak, and may be termed anatural goodof which God is the author and decreer. On the contrary, Passive Power is anatural evilof which God is not the author or decreer, yet morally considered is not evil. But this term, being little understood, requires further explanation; at least it is incumbent on me to shew in what sense I use it. My design is not to vindicate the use of it by others, but I adopt it to convey a specific idea, for which I find no other word or phrase more appropriate. By ‘Passive Power,’ then, I mean, That which is ofunavoidable necessityfound in every creature, as such, in direct opposition to the self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency of God. In other words, It is thattendencyto nihility, physically considered, and to defection, morally considered, which ofabsolute necessitybelongs to every dependent or created nature. That there is such a principle is self-evident, nor is it probable that any reasonable being will ever controvert its existence. Now, it is demonstrable that this, from the definition, cannot be the object of divine decree, or of will; for it is stated to be ofabsoluteorunavoidablenecessity; besides, it is absurd to suppose that God has decreed, or produces, any thing the existence of which stands indirect contrarietyto himself. That it is not amoralevil is plain, for theholiestcreatures are subjects of it—God alone is exempt.
4. Let it be further observed, that the First Cause, being goodness itself, impels, whether decretively or efficiently, togood only; and of this character is even our being necessitated to exercise our volitions. Yet, when the exercise of liberty, in itself innocent,uniteswith passive power, the fruit or offspring of this union is moral evil. This, I am fully persuaded, is the true solution of this question,Whence cometh moral evil?If any person shall think proper candidly to assign his reasons to the contrary, due regard shall be paid to them,
5. If it be asked, where lies the difference betweendecreeingandpermittingsin to take place? I answer, the difference is, that the one would be an act ofinjustice, the other isdoing nothing. So that until it can be shewn that there is no difference between injustice and doing nothing, there is no force in the objection. That to necessitate sin decretively would be an act of injustice, and therefore incompatible with the divine character, is, I think, demonstrable; for, it would be to decree to destructionantecedentlyto desert—toannihilatethe sinfulness of any act, making its evil nature to consist in its effects—and to destroy the immutable essences of good and evil. Whereas topermit, or tosufferto take place without prevention, isnot to act not to decree. To ‘decree to permit,’ therefore, is a contradiction in terms.
6. But, it has been said, theeventis the same to the sinner, whether he hurried on to sin and misery by a decretive impulse, or these effects are not prevented when in the power of omnipotence to interpose. This objection would have some weight, if thehappinessof the creature were the only, or even theprincipalend of God in creation. But this not being the case, its weight vanishes. To illustrate this we may suppose, that theeventof a man’s execution is well known to a judge; but, instead of proceeding on the principles of law and equity, and to effect conviction and condemnation according to legal evidence, he orders the man to be executed clandestinely without any equitable process, under pretence that it could make no difference to the sufferer, for theeventof his execution wascertain! Besides, the spirit of the objection reflects on God’sactualdealings with his creatures, in every instance of their sufferings; because it is in the power of omnipotence to interpose. And in fact, it must be allowed, either that thehappinessof the Creature is not thechiefend of creation, or that the permission of sin is an act of injustice. But the case is plain, that his own glory is the chief end of creation and government, and that there is no injustice in the permission of sin.
7. It may be said, If the union of liberty with passive power be the origin of moral evil, and if the holiest creatures in heaven are both free and the subjects of passive power, how is it that they do not sin! If both are united in the same persons, does the one never terminate upon; or unite itself to the other? In answer to this enquiry, we must distinguish betweenhavingthe principle, and being under its influence without control. Though the spirits of the just, and holy angels, have in them the principle, as the condition of their created existence, yet it is counteracted by sovereign favour. They may say, as well as Paul, by the grace of God we are what we are. The object of divine support is thedisposition, or theseatof moral action; this being made good, or pure, or holy, prior to all acts of the will, effectually counteracts the influence of passive power. The Liberty and choice of a heavenly being therefore, terminating on such a disposition, no acts but such as are holy can ensue. Hence,
8. If we would know how this is consistent with the actual fall of beings who were once in this condition, we must attend to another important consideration; which is, that when God at any time deals inmere equitywith a moral agent, without the counteracting influence of sovereign favour, the inevitable consequence is, that his liberty, or free choice, will terminate upon his passive power. Hence thecertaintyof the futurition of moral evil, in all possible degrees and circumstances, without any decretive efficiency in its production.—If it be asked, why the exercise ofequityis assigned as the occasion of this union, rather thansovereignty; or, why leaving a free agent to the influence of his passive power should not be considered a sovereign rather than an equitable act? The best answer to this enquiry, is a definition of the two terms. Byequitythen I mean the principle that gives to each his due; bysovereignty, a right to do whatsoever is not inconsistent with equity. And from this definition it must appear that there may he a two-fold deviation from equity,viz.givingmorethan is due, orlessthan is due; more good and less evil, or more evil and less good than is equitable. The former of these, more good and less evil, must needs be for the advantage of the creature; and therefore it may be called agraciousdeviation. Without it, there would be no room for either mercy or grace. The latter, more evil and less good than is due, is properly calledinjustice, and is such a deviation from equity as is not compatible with the divine character. Therefore, to do us goodbeyondour claim is an act ofsovereignty; but to give us neither more nor less than is our due is to deal with us inpure equity.
9. Hence it follows, that when God deals with angels or men insovereignty, according to the definitions, he does themgood beyondtheir claim. But to makethisto be the immediatecauseof the sin of men and angels is absurd. On the other hand, it is incompatible with the divine character, as before observed, to give them less good and more evil than is their due; and thereforethiscannot be the cause of sin, as sure as God is incapable of exercising injustice.—Wherefore, it remains that then alone can moral agents fall into sin when dealt with inpure equity. In the act of defection, or becoming sinful, they are equally free from being impelled by injustice, and upheld by sovereign favour.
COROLLARIES.
1. All thegoodand happiness in the universe of created beings are the fruit of Sovereignty and Decree.
2. All themoral eviland misery in the universe are the offspring ofliberty, a natural good, terminating or acting upon, or united topassive power, a natural evil not counteracted by sovereignly gracious acts on the disposition, or the seat of the moral principle, which may be called analogicallythe heart.
3. As every act and degree of liberty is perfectly fore-known to God, as the effect of his own decree, and every hypothetical tendency of passive power, though itself not an object of decree, is equally fore-known, it follows, that every sin is as accurately fore-known as if decreed, and has an equally infallible ground of certain futurition.
239.It is allowed that there is a difference between thecause of sin, as aprinciple, and being asinner; but when applied to anagent, to be the author or the cause of sin, and to be a sinner, is the same thing. Therefore, when applied to God, in no proper sense whatever can it be said that he is theauthor of sin.—“If bythe author of sinis meant (says President Edwards) the permitter, or anot hindererof sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin infallibly follows: I say, if this be all that is meant by the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin, though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense.” Edwards on the Will, Part iv. Sect. xi.But though this acute and excellent writer disavows the use of the phrase, he no where assigns thetrue groundwhy it should not be used. The truth is, he does not seem to have been aware of any alternative between thecertain futuritionof sin and its beingdecreed. And his only method of warding off the most ruinous consequences appears to have been adopted for want of a better, and not from the satisfactory nature of that method. His view, in brief, is this: God is a being of infinite goodness and wisdom; he can will nothing but good; the system he hath adopted is the best; now, says he, “if the will be good, and the object of his will be, all things considered, good and best, then the choosing and willing it, is notwilling evil. And if so, then his ordering according to that will is notdoing evil.”It is very seldom that this eminent author fails in his reasoning; but here certainly he does fail. The phraseswilling evil, anddoing evil, are not used in the same sense in both parts of the premises, from whence the conclusion is inferred. A system, all things considered, being best, is no good reason why each individual part of it is good. And it may be forcibly retorted; a system which includes an infinite evil as a part of its institution cannot be from God. Nor can it be said that this is arguing againstfact, without begging the question, that God hasappointed the evilwhich is blended with the good.—On the subject itself let the following things be considered:1. If choosing and willing a system in whichsin is a decreed partis notwilling evil, because the system is good and best, all things considered then it would inevitably follow, that sin, because such a part of that system isnot an evil. But, it may be said, It is willing it for agood end. Does then a goodendor intention destroy thenatureof sin? Was the sin of Paul or any other saintanihilatedbecause hesincerely aimedat the Glory of God? Or has anydesign, however comprehensive, exalted or sincere, theleast tendencyto alter thenatureof sin?2. Allowing as incontrovertible that the present system of things is the best, all things considered, and that sin is actually blended with it, it does not thence follow that the sin itself isdecreed, or is any part of divine appointment. Fornot to hindersin, is extremely different from being thecauseor author of it. The one is perfectly consistent with equity, the other would be an act ofinjustice.3. It is a sentiment so repugnant to all analogical propriety, todo evil that good may come, that it cannot be supposed a man of Mr. Edwards’ piety would have adopted any thing like it, but from what appeared to him an inevitable necessity. And indeed whoever assumes the principle, that every event comes to pass fromdecretivenecessity, sin not excepted, must of course be driven to his conclusion. But this valuable author had no need to recur to that opinion, in order to establish his theory ofhypotheticalnecessity; for this will stand on a rock, immoveably, without such aid.4. In reality, the certain futurition ofgood, and that ofevil, arises fromdifferent, yea from diametricallyoppositecauses. The one flows from the operative will of God, and is fore-known to be future because decreed, the other flows from a deficient or privative cause, passive power, when united to liberty, as before explained, which exists only in created beings, and in all these, as a contrast to self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency. Yetthisis the subject of hypothetical tendencies and results no less than the good to which it stands opposed, in all the boundless varieties of its blendings; therefore no case can be so complicated, but to infinite prescience the event must appear withequal certaintyas if decreed.
239.It is allowed that there is a difference between thecause of sin, as aprinciple, and being asinner; but when applied to anagent, to be the author or the cause of sin, and to be a sinner, is the same thing. Therefore, when applied to God, in no proper sense whatever can it be said that he is theauthor of sin.—“If bythe author of sinis meant (says President Edwards) the permitter, or anot hindererof sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin infallibly follows: I say, if this be all that is meant by the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin, though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense.” Edwards on the Will, Part iv. Sect. xi.
But though this acute and excellent writer disavows the use of the phrase, he no where assigns thetrue groundwhy it should not be used. The truth is, he does not seem to have been aware of any alternative between thecertain futuritionof sin and its beingdecreed. And his only method of warding off the most ruinous consequences appears to have been adopted for want of a better, and not from the satisfactory nature of that method. His view, in brief, is this: God is a being of infinite goodness and wisdom; he can will nothing but good; the system he hath adopted is the best; now, says he, “if the will be good, and the object of his will be, all things considered, good and best, then the choosing and willing it, is notwilling evil. And if so, then his ordering according to that will is notdoing evil.”
It is very seldom that this eminent author fails in his reasoning; but here certainly he does fail. The phraseswilling evil, anddoing evil, are not used in the same sense in both parts of the premises, from whence the conclusion is inferred. A system, all things considered, being best, is no good reason why each individual part of it is good. And it may be forcibly retorted; a system which includes an infinite evil as a part of its institution cannot be from God. Nor can it be said that this is arguing againstfact, without begging the question, that God hasappointed the evilwhich is blended with the good.—On the subject itself let the following things be considered:
1. If choosing and willing a system in whichsin is a decreed partis notwilling evil, because the system is good and best, all things considered then it would inevitably follow, that sin, because such a part of that system isnot an evil. But, it may be said, It is willing it for agood end. Does then a goodendor intention destroy thenatureof sin? Was the sin of Paul or any other saintanihilatedbecause hesincerely aimedat the Glory of God? Or has anydesign, however comprehensive, exalted or sincere, theleast tendencyto alter thenatureof sin?
2. Allowing as incontrovertible that the present system of things is the best, all things considered, and that sin is actually blended with it, it does not thence follow that the sin itself isdecreed, or is any part of divine appointment. Fornot to hindersin, is extremely different from being thecauseor author of it. The one is perfectly consistent with equity, the other would be an act ofinjustice.
3. It is a sentiment so repugnant to all analogical propriety, todo evil that good may come, that it cannot be supposed a man of Mr. Edwards’ piety would have adopted any thing like it, but from what appeared to him an inevitable necessity. And indeed whoever assumes the principle, that every event comes to pass fromdecretivenecessity, sin not excepted, must of course be driven to his conclusion. But this valuable author had no need to recur to that opinion, in order to establish his theory ofhypotheticalnecessity; for this will stand on a rock, immoveably, without such aid.
4. In reality, the certain futurition ofgood, and that ofevil, arises fromdifferent, yea from diametricallyoppositecauses. The one flows from the operative will of God, and is fore-known to be future because decreed, the other flows from a deficient or privative cause, passive power, when united to liberty, as before explained, which exists only in created beings, and in all these, as a contrast to self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency. Yetthisis the subject of hypothetical tendencies and results no less than the good to which it stands opposed, in all the boundless varieties of its blendings; therefore no case can be so complicated, but to infinite prescience the event must appear withequal certaintyas if decreed.
240.“Equally impious and needless.”Needless, because the existence of sin is fairly and fully accounted for on another principle;impious, because it ascribes to God the worst of all principles, the causation of sin. That God superintends, directs, and over-rules the actions of men is worthy of him; and equally so that he doesnot hinderthe existence of moral evil; but that he is a positive and efficacious cause of moral evil, or that this is consistent with either his justice or holiness can never be proved. Dr. Hopkins, indeed, says, that “the attempt todistinguishbetween the sinful volitions or actions of men as natural and moral actions; and making God the origin and cause of them considered as natural actions, and men the cause and authors of thedepravityand sin which is in them, is, it is believed,unintelligible—unless by making this distinction it be meant, that in every sinful action, God is not the sinful cause of it.” The author, however, candidly adds, “But if the contrary can be made to appear, this doctrine, with all that is implied in it, shall be given up and renounced.” As the removal of this principle, and the establishment of the other, appear to me of the highest importance in theology, a few remarks, in addition to those already made, may not be superfluous, as tending to exhibit the principle here maintained in different lights and connexions; and when all are properly examined, it is probable they will not be wholly “unintelligible.”1. God, JEHOVAH, is the infinite and eternal Essence, which is ofabsolute necessity—the self-existent, independent, and all-sufficient Being—from eternity to eternity generating his own light and joy, called his only begotten Son; not from mere will, but of the same necessity.2. God in his boundless all-sufficiency views allpossibleswith all their positive and privativetendencies. That all possibles have theirpositivetendencies is as plain as that two added to three make five. Were there no positive tendencies, there could be no hypothetical certainty, no law of nature, no connexion between cause and effect. And it is equally true, though not equally plain, that there areprivativetendencies in all beings but that one who exists ofabsolute necessity. To suppose the contrary, is the same as to suppose that a creaturemay be madeindependent, and all-sufficient. But that is, every reasonable being must allow,absolutely impossible, as implying the grossest contradiction. On this demonstrated fact rests unavoidably the existence of that principle in every created nature which I callPassive Power. Yet.3. It does not follow that the mere collateral existence of these two principles in the same subject must needs produce moral evil. Then alone does this take place when the one terminates upon, or is united to the other, without the interposition of sovereign favour. It is not in the power of equity to assist. For the exercise of equity is to give each his due; but topreventsin is notdueto the subject of it, otherwise no onecould ever sinbut on condition ofinjusticein God.4. After all, it may be objected, that thescripturesascribe to God the causation of moral evil; as, hardening the heart of Pharaoh—hardening whom he will—making the wicked for the day of evil—appointing to destruction—determining the death of Christ—delivering him by determinate counsel—doing all evil in a city—making vessels to dishonour—fitting them for destruction, &c.—In reply to this objection it must be considered, that whatever the import of such representations may be, no interpretation which isunworthy of Godcan be the true meaning—that the idioms of the sacred languages ascribing cause or operation to God must be understood according to the nature of the subject—and, what is particularly to our purpose, that active verbs which denotemaking,doing,causing, and the like, often denote adeclarationof the thing done, or that shall take place; or apermissionof it.Take a few specimens. Thus Acts x. 15. “What God hathcleansed,” means, what God hathdeclaredto be clean.—Isai. vi. 9, 10. The prophet is commanded to tell the people, “understand not, perceive not;” and he is ordered to “makethe heart of this people fat, tomaketheir ears heavy, and toshuttheir eyes.” And what can this mean more than todeclare a fact, either what they then were, or what they would be?—So Jer. i. 10. The Prophet’sdeclarationof what should be, is called hisrootingoutpullingdown, &c.—Ezek. xliii. 3. The prophet says, “when I came todestroythe city;” his meaning undoubtedly is, When I came to prophecy ordeclarethat the city should be destroyed.—Exod. v. 22. “Lord, wherefore hast thouevil entreatedthis people?” Moses means, Wherefore hast thoupermittedthem to be evil entreated?—Jer. iv. 10. “Lord God, thou hast greatlydeceivedthis people;” that is,permittedor not hindered them to be deceived by the false Prophets.—Ezek. xiv. 9. “I the Lord havedeceivedthat prophet.” Can any thing else be meant than suffering him to deceive himself?—Matt. xi. 25. “Thou hasthidthese things”i. e.not revealed.——Thus also, Rom. ix. 18. “Whom he will hehardeneth,” he suffereth to be hardened.—Rom. xi. 8. “Godgave thema spirit of slumber,”i. e.permitted them to slumber. 2 Thes. ii. 11. “God shallsendthem strong delusion, that they should believe a lie;”i. e.shallpermitthem to be deluded so that they shall believe a lie.—Exod. vii. 3. &c. “And I willhardenPharaoh’s heart,” i. e. I willsufferit to be hardened. Matt. x. 34, 35. “I am not come tosendpeace, buta sword; For I am come toseta manat varianceagainst his father,” That is, my coming shall be theinnocent occasionof wars and variance.—Jude 4. “Who were before of oldordainedto this condemnation;”i. e.foretold, orforewritten, as the word signifies;announcedin the sacred pages, andproscribedby divine law.But the passage above all others, which appears to countenance the notion, that God is thecauseof sin, is 1 Pet. ii. 8. “A stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even in them which stumble at the word, being disobedient,whereunto also they were appointed.”i. e.unto which thing, their stumbling,they were appointed because disobedient. The Greek participle includes the cause of their falling; as Heb. ii. 3.Neglectingso great salvation, how shall we escape?To whichnot escaping, theywere appointed, for neglectingso great salvation. A strikingcontrastto this we have, John vii. 17. “If any man willdo his will, he shallknowof the doctrine;” but thedisobedientshall, according to an awful but equitableappointment, “stumble, and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and be taken.”—(Isa. viii. 15.) We have a further illustration of this meaning in Heb. iii. 18. “To whom sware he that they should not enter into his rest, but to them thatbelievenot?”i. e.Who wereappointedto destruction? The answer is, thedisobedient; for the original word is the same here as in Peter, under a different inflection. And it is added, ver. 19. “So they could not enter inbecauseofunbelief.”—Thus also Rom. xi. 7. “The restwere blinded, orhardened;”i. e.weresufferedto be blind or hard. And that this is the meaning is decided by ver. 20. “Because of unbeliefthey were broken off.”Upon the whole, Peter intimates, that none should be offended at such characters, men of learning and eminence rejecting the Messiah and his gospel. Their end is what might be expected, asforetoldby the prophets, according to God’srighteousgovernment, and his eternalappointment, ordetermination, respecting all such offenders. Their habitual unbelievingdisobediencewas thecause, but their actual stumbling at the word to their destruction was the natural, the righteous, the appointedeffect. To this they were appointed,placed, orset forth(as Pharaoh wasraised up) by the righteous judgment of God, who resisteth the proud and disobedient; in order to shew forth the glory of his justice in them. They were personallyappointedto exalted situations, being civil and ecclesiasticalbuilders; they weresufferedto reject Christ, in pure equity; and thus were deservedlyconstitutedawful warnings to others.
240.“Equally impious and needless.”Needless, because the existence of sin is fairly and fully accounted for on another principle;impious, because it ascribes to God the worst of all principles, the causation of sin. That God superintends, directs, and over-rules the actions of men is worthy of him; and equally so that he doesnot hinderthe existence of moral evil; but that he is a positive and efficacious cause of moral evil, or that this is consistent with either his justice or holiness can never be proved. Dr. Hopkins, indeed, says, that “the attempt todistinguishbetween the sinful volitions or actions of men as natural and moral actions; and making God the origin and cause of them considered as natural actions, and men the cause and authors of thedepravityand sin which is in them, is, it is believed,unintelligible—unless by making this distinction it be meant, that in every sinful action, God is not the sinful cause of it.” The author, however, candidly adds, “But if the contrary can be made to appear, this doctrine, with all that is implied in it, shall be given up and renounced.” As the removal of this principle, and the establishment of the other, appear to me of the highest importance in theology, a few remarks, in addition to those already made, may not be superfluous, as tending to exhibit the principle here maintained in different lights and connexions; and when all are properly examined, it is probable they will not be wholly “unintelligible.”
1. God, JEHOVAH, is the infinite and eternal Essence, which is ofabsolute necessity—the self-existent, independent, and all-sufficient Being—from eternity to eternity generating his own light and joy, called his only begotten Son; not from mere will, but of the same necessity.
2. God in his boundless all-sufficiency views allpossibleswith all their positive and privativetendencies. That all possibles have theirpositivetendencies is as plain as that two added to three make five. Were there no positive tendencies, there could be no hypothetical certainty, no law of nature, no connexion between cause and effect. And it is equally true, though not equally plain, that there areprivativetendencies in all beings but that one who exists ofabsolute necessity. To suppose the contrary, is the same as to suppose that a creaturemay be madeindependent, and all-sufficient. But that is, every reasonable being must allow,absolutely impossible, as implying the grossest contradiction. On this demonstrated fact rests unavoidably the existence of that principle in every created nature which I callPassive Power. Yet.
3. It does not follow that the mere collateral existence of these two principles in the same subject must needs produce moral evil. Then alone does this take place when the one terminates upon, or is united to the other, without the interposition of sovereign favour. It is not in the power of equity to assist. For the exercise of equity is to give each his due; but topreventsin is notdueto the subject of it, otherwise no onecould ever sinbut on condition ofinjusticein God.
4. After all, it may be objected, that thescripturesascribe to God the causation of moral evil; as, hardening the heart of Pharaoh—hardening whom he will—making the wicked for the day of evil—appointing to destruction—determining the death of Christ—delivering him by determinate counsel—doing all evil in a city—making vessels to dishonour—fitting them for destruction, &c.—In reply to this objection it must be considered, that whatever the import of such representations may be, no interpretation which isunworthy of Godcan be the true meaning—that the idioms of the sacred languages ascribing cause or operation to God must be understood according to the nature of the subject—and, what is particularly to our purpose, that active verbs which denotemaking,doing,causing, and the like, often denote adeclarationof the thing done, or that shall take place; or apermissionof it.
Take a few specimens. Thus Acts x. 15. “What God hathcleansed,” means, what God hathdeclaredto be clean.—Isai. vi. 9, 10. The prophet is commanded to tell the people, “understand not, perceive not;” and he is ordered to “makethe heart of this people fat, tomaketheir ears heavy, and toshuttheir eyes.” And what can this mean more than todeclare a fact, either what they then were, or what they would be?—So Jer. i. 10. The Prophet’sdeclarationof what should be, is called hisrootingoutpullingdown, &c.—Ezek. xliii. 3. The prophet says, “when I came todestroythe city;” his meaning undoubtedly is, When I came to prophecy ordeclarethat the city should be destroyed.—Exod. v. 22. “Lord, wherefore hast thouevil entreatedthis people?” Moses means, Wherefore hast thoupermittedthem to be evil entreated?—Jer. iv. 10. “Lord God, thou hast greatlydeceivedthis people;” that is,permittedor not hindered them to be deceived by the false Prophets.—Ezek. xiv. 9. “I the Lord havedeceivedthat prophet.” Can any thing else be meant than suffering him to deceive himself?—Matt. xi. 25. “Thou hasthidthese things”i. e.not revealed.——Thus also, Rom. ix. 18. “Whom he will hehardeneth,” he suffereth to be hardened.—Rom. xi. 8. “Godgave thema spirit of slumber,”i. e.permitted them to slumber. 2 Thes. ii. 11. “God shallsendthem strong delusion, that they should believe a lie;”i. e.shallpermitthem to be deluded so that they shall believe a lie.—Exod. vii. 3. &c. “And I willhardenPharaoh’s heart,” i. e. I willsufferit to be hardened. Matt. x. 34, 35. “I am not come tosendpeace, buta sword; For I am come toseta manat varianceagainst his father,” That is, my coming shall be theinnocent occasionof wars and variance.—Jude 4. “Who were before of oldordainedto this condemnation;”i. e.foretold, orforewritten, as the word signifies;announcedin the sacred pages, andproscribedby divine law.
But the passage above all others, which appears to countenance the notion, that God is thecauseof sin, is 1 Pet. ii. 8. “A stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even in them which stumble at the word, being disobedient,whereunto also they were appointed.”i. e.unto which thing, their stumbling,they were appointed because disobedient. The Greek participle includes the cause of their falling; as Heb. ii. 3.Neglectingso great salvation, how shall we escape?To whichnot escaping, theywere appointed, for neglectingso great salvation. A strikingcontrastto this we have, John vii. 17. “If any man willdo his will, he shallknowof the doctrine;” but thedisobedientshall, according to an awful but equitableappointment, “stumble, and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and be taken.”—(Isa. viii. 15.) We have a further illustration of this meaning in Heb. iii. 18. “To whom sware he that they should not enter into his rest, but to them thatbelievenot?”i. e.Who wereappointedto destruction? The answer is, thedisobedient; for the original word is the same here as in Peter, under a different inflection. And it is added, ver. 19. “So they could not enter inbecauseofunbelief.”—Thus also Rom. xi. 7. “The restwere blinded, orhardened;”i. e.weresufferedto be blind or hard. And that this is the meaning is decided by ver. 20. “Because of unbeliefthey were broken off.”
Upon the whole, Peter intimates, that none should be offended at such characters, men of learning and eminence rejecting the Messiah and his gospel. Their end is what might be expected, asforetoldby the prophets, according to God’srighteousgovernment, and his eternalappointment, ordetermination, respecting all such offenders. Their habitual unbelievingdisobediencewas thecause, but their actual stumbling at the word to their destruction was the natural, the righteous, the appointedeffect. To this they were appointed,placed, orset forth(as Pharaoh wasraised up) by the righteous judgment of God, who resisteth the proud and disobedient; in order to shew forth the glory of his justice in them. They were personallyappointedto exalted situations, being civil and ecclesiasticalbuilders; they weresufferedto reject Christ, in pure equity; and thus were deservedlyconstitutedawful warnings to others.
241.This notion, perhaps more than any other, has been termedBaxterianism, and yet it is not easy to say that Mr. Baxter ever maintained it. He says indeed “all have so much (grace) as bringeth and leaveth the success to man’s will;” and this in a discourse wherein he allows that God hath “positively elected certain persons by an absolute decree to overcome all their resistances of his Spirit, and to draw them to Christ, and by Christ to himself, by such a power and way as shallinfalliblyconvert and save them.” He moreover says, “What if men cannot here tell how to resolve the question, whetheranyorhow manyare ever converted or saved by thatmere gracewhich we callsufficient, or rathernecessary, and common to those that are not converted; and whether man’s will ever make a saving determining improvement of it?”—“And yet,” he adds, “this question itself is formed on false suppositions and is capable of a satisfactory solution.” Baxter’s Works, Vol. ii. p. 929.—On the subject of this Note the author begs leave to refer his readers to Doddridge’s Works, Vol. v. p. 238, 239, Notes.
241.This notion, perhaps more than any other, has been termedBaxterianism, and yet it is not easy to say that Mr. Baxter ever maintained it. He says indeed “all have so much (grace) as bringeth and leaveth the success to man’s will;” and this in a discourse wherein he allows that God hath “positively elected certain persons by an absolute decree to overcome all their resistances of his Spirit, and to draw them to Christ, and by Christ to himself, by such a power and way as shallinfalliblyconvert and save them.” He moreover says, “What if men cannot here tell how to resolve the question, whetheranyorhow manyare ever converted or saved by thatmere gracewhich we callsufficient, or rathernecessary, and common to those that are not converted; and whether man’s will ever make a saving determining improvement of it?”—“And yet,” he adds, “this question itself is formed on false suppositions and is capable of a satisfactory solution.” Baxter’s Works, Vol. ii. p. 929.—On the subject of this Note the author begs leave to refer his readers to Doddridge’s Works, Vol. v. p. 238, 239, Notes.
242.The nature of God, his holy will, and our peculiar relation to him, form an adamantine chain of obligation to duty which cannot with impunity be broken; from which predestination is so far from releasing us, that it forms another chain of gold that shall finally prevail; and divine grace personally experienced is a silken cord to draw the soul along in the path of duty. But do these powerful ties render useless God’sreasoningwith sinners, hisexhortationsto repentance, to believing, to obedience, and to every particular branch of duty? No: for these methods are the very means to attain the end, and form a part of the decree itself.
242.The nature of God, his holy will, and our peculiar relation to him, form an adamantine chain of obligation to duty which cannot with impunity be broken; from which predestination is so far from releasing us, that it forms another chain of gold that shall finally prevail; and divine grace personally experienced is a silken cord to draw the soul along in the path of duty. But do these powerful ties render useless God’sreasoningwith sinners, hisexhortationsto repentance, to believing, to obedience, and to every particular branch of duty? No: for these methods are the very means to attain the end, and form a part of the decree itself.
Transcriber’s Notes:Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected. The author's archaic punctuation and spellings have been retained.
Transcriber’s Notes:
Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected. The author's archaic punctuation and spellings have been retained.