"To reduce that Tariff to the lowest degree, consistent, in each particular country, with the two legitimate objects of all duties—either the collection of the revenue, or the protection absolutely requisite for the maintenance of our own internal industry.
"To abolish all discriminating duties upon the navigation of other countries, so that the products and merchandize of these nations, when imported in their own ships, shall be subject to the same rates only as when imported in British ships."
Such principles are certainly most liberal; but in what did the wisdom of those who professed them consist? certainly not in that of this world; if the lofty position of Great Britain was considered at the period when such regulations were framed, and when the then state of our commerce with other nations were taken into account. But let us see how this system has worked. Suppose we speak of cotton, (but we might take, with almost equal advantage, other articles imported into the United Kingdom), as being the chief export from the United States. It is mostly brought to us in American ships, navigated, in a great measure, by British seamen, some of whom they pretend to have naturalized; but at present we shall say no more of this. Our merchants will not of course, employ, to any extent, British ships to bring cotton from the United States, because the Americans can afford, from various causes, not counteracted by us, to convey it cheaper to them. Where then can we find reciprocity in the shipping and seamen employed in this great branch of trade? To balance this fairly, we should surely, if it were only in self-defence,lay a tax upon cotton imported in American, or any other vessels, in order to compel British merchants to employ British ships and British seamen to bring it in its raw state from America, or from our East India possessions, or from any other country where we might think fit to encourage the growth of this article. It may be said that cotton, thus raised in price, would become too expensive for our manufacturers to be able to contend with foreigners in the continental and other markets; but this could not be long the case, for the American carrying trade being thus diminished, they could not afford to convey it at low prices to any country, or to pay their or rather our seamen such high wages; and are we not wisely improving the models of all new ships which are built; and consequently their rates of sailing, so that we shall soon be able to cope in this respect, with the United States ships also.
I may, however, be told that the United States can meet us in this way by laying taxes upon articles manufactured in the British dominions and imported into their Union; or, perhaps, upon the cotton itself, before it is exported to this country. Let them do so if they please, but they will not adhere very long to that plan. We can find cotton elsewhere or substitutes for most of it in flax and wool, to the great benefit of our own colonies, and the Americans would soon create for our advantage, by taxing our wares, a "pretty considerable" body of fair traders out of the present sympathizers all along their most extensive frontier. The last war did this, to my certain knowledge, to a great extent, and I even had a person connected in some manner with ahigh civil authority of the State of New York caught and brought to me when engaged in this kind of traffic. We had, at the time I allude to, excellent information of what was going forward in the adjoining States to Canada. I was told that a military man of rank was in the habit of crossing the boundary line, generally at night, and it was supposed, judging from some of those who met him, that he came as a spy. I had him therefore taken and marched into St. John's one morning.—I was surprised however to find that he was a very gentleman-like man, both in appearance and manners. He at once acquainted me with his object in venturing so imprudently into Canada: indeed the very unpleasant situation in which he stood as a spy made this quite necessary. He was soon able to convince me by mentioning mercantile houses with which he was connected in Montreal, &c. that though in a kind of military situation, about the high authority I have alluded to, he had no intention whatever of acting the part of a spy, but had only some commercial business of importance on his hands. I had, of course, to report the circumstance of his capture, through Sir Thomas Brisbane, who was then at Montreal upon duty, for the information of Government, and in the meantime I took this gentleman-like person into my own house, he having pledged his word of honour that he would not attempt to escape.
The answer I received to my letter respecting him rather alarmed me on his account, for what I had mentioned as the reasons for his coming into the Provincewere not deemed sufficiently satisfactory; and I saw they were more inclined to look upon him as a spy than in any other light. I therefore had to examine him again more minutely, and according to instructions sent me; when he gave references to so many respectable mercantile gentlemen as being well aware why he had come into Canada, that I at last received orders to permit him to go back to the States. But during the time I had the pleasure of his company I had also an opportunity of becoming acquainted with a highly-informed agreeable gentleman. But this, I conceive, will show clearly that the fair trade during the war, had fallen into very respectable hands; and from all I knew it was progressing in such a way as to hold out expectations of great improvement had it lasted. I have been induced to be thus minute in order to show how our manufactures are at any time, and under any circumstances, certain of finding their way into the States.
I shall most likely be told by the admirers of reciprocity, that the American ships carry back our wares in return for their raw cotton. This is not the case to any very great extent, and is chiefly done where British mercantile houses have establishments in both countries; for Jonathan will make what he can at home; and he would do much more in this way, if he did not find that he can purchase most articles cheaper ready made, than he can (owing to the great expense of labour, and of living in the States) manufacture them himself, or else he will send for what he wants to the cheapest markets, such as Hamburg, Holland, Belgium,&c. where, we are informed, things are sold at lower prices than what we can afford, even with the aid of science and improved machinery, to make them for; and thus I am again at a loss to understand where reciprocity in trade, carried on with all the advantages on one side, is to be found.
I shall not enter into other branches of commerce, for such matters would not suit this work, nor allude to what is practised by other countries; but the same principles would apply equally to them as to the United States. But it may not, perhaps, be improper here to ask, if it has ever entered into the calculations of our "Squires of the lofty Towers," which we see looking proudly down upon so many parts of the country, in what manner the multitudes they have congregated, like our chiefs of old, around their Baronial castles, are to be fed in case of even a temporary stagnation of trade? But it is beneath them to think of such matters, and they wisely leave subjects of this kind to be discussed hereafter by improvident landlords, who, in consideration of temporary advantages, have granted certain leases of parts of their estates to thesesquires, to enable them to create cities, towns, and villages, the enormous population of which, if it is to be kept in tranquillity, must constantly require the presence of such troops as I have in view.
I am afraid it may be found out before long, that we are rather too closely connected with the United States; and are sacrificing far too much, in a national point of view, and to our serious injury, in order to maintainthis imprudent connexion. Has it not already thrown the greater part of the carrying trade into the hands of the Americans; and has it not been the means of seducing from Great Britain her best seamen? Let it, therefore, be made the interests of our merchants to employ our sailors at such rates of wages as they can receive in American or in any other ships. Let us meet countries fairly in commercial affairs, who will really meet us fairly, and let us look less to theories, and more to the essential object of practically promoting our maritime prosperity.
Naval and military men must hereafter be much more closely connected, than they have hitherto been, or I should not, in this work, presume to speak of them as acting together; but must not every contemplative mind foresee, that wonderful changes must soon be wrought by the power of steam, not only upon naval, but also upon military affairs.
We must, therefore, turn our thoughts to it, with the deepest interest, so as to ascertain, in time, what may be the best modes of bringing the vast resources of Great Britain, in this respect, into action; and also to the manner in which powerful armaments are to be conducted with skill and rapidity to points selected for sudden invasion, for that such must be the most prominent feature in all our future wars, will most assuredly be developed, and that too before many years have passed away.
Amongst the great and important changes to bebrought about in war by steam, we must look forward to its facilitating, by the certainty and rapidity of the movements of those destined to accomplish the objects in view, the protection, or destruction of much property, both public and private; also to its occasioning, for the same reasons, vast suffering to the inhabitants of the countries fixed upon, for whatever cause, to become the theatres of these awful and devastating operations. I cannot exactly compare them, and their consequences, to the unlooked for descents of the sea-kings of old, yet they must greatly, I fear, resemble them in their destructive and other effects, and they must be felt ere long all over the world. We were, as a nation, allowed by Providence, no doubt for wise purposes, to live so long in, I fear, not duly valued tranquillity and security, under the protection of our splendid navy of former days, that those who remained at home really knew nothing of war, and its attendant trials and privations, but the name. Long may this be the case, and this happy state, when compared with that of other countries, may, in all human probability, be rendered more lasting, if we will only be wise enough to take timely lessons from the past. History tells us of the rapid fall of many once powerful nations—how they fell it is not for me to relate; but Spain, her former greatness, and the causes of her present debasement, should be constantly before our eyes. We are still a great and warlike people, but I trust that we may be enabled to act with judgment, and to take,at all events, such steps as will prevent any other nation from anticipating us in the use of steam for warlike purposes.
Those who have already deeply considered the subject, have come to the conclusion, that a comparatively small, but well constructed, and powerfully propelled steamer, alike overcoming wind and tide; capable of taking up and retaining a position within a certain distance of the largest sailing vessel, may be supposed able to destroy or capture her, however brave or excellent her officers and crew may be, and it is concluded, that this could probably be accomplished with but very little loss or damage, being sustained by the steamer, if judiciously manœuvred, and her commander would besides possess the great advantage, of going into action or not, as he might think most advisable. The old naval tactics, such as that of ships gaining what is termed the weather gage of each other, or any thing of that kind, in going into action, must be wholely abandoned whenever a steamer heaves in sight; for the sailing vessel is at once supposed to be, in a great measure, at her mercy.
But such reasoners also calculate upon what would happen in an engagement between two fleets, in which steam-ships of a large class would be more numerous on one side than the other; for they could at once act together, regardless of wind or weather, and thus concentrating their force, they could cut off or destroy a certain part of their opponent's fleet, before sailing vessels could possibly come to their assistance. Theyalso calculate upon this manœuvre being repeated upon the remainder of the enemy's ships, which cannot escape from these powerful steamers.
These are points, however, for seamen to decide; yet suppose a steamer, calculated to carry only a few traversing guns of the longest range for shot or shells, with what are usually termed percussion locks, to insure good practice even when the vessel is in motion, to be well managed or manœuvred by a skilful naval officer; and should he occasionally use shot heated in the furnaces for the boilers, what a formidable opponent she must prove, especially in a calm, or even in a storm, to any sailing vessel. Many officers may remember what treatment our ships of war frequently met with in parts of the Mediterranean, from even a single Spanish gun-boat, carrying perhaps but one long gun; and when the facility and rapidity of movement of a steamer are considered, there can be no comparison whatever drawn between her and a common gun-boat, even when propelled by sweeps or oars, but which become useless in a rough sea. Such matters as these can, however, be brought by calculation to something very near to certainty as to results.
I am aware that the great difficulty which presents itself at present is how to protect from shot the chimneys, paddles, and machinery of war-steamers; but if, in these times, when science is daily performing such wonders amongst us, sufficient rewards were offered for the best plans for this purpose, I have no doubt but we should soon see much accomplished; but even untilthis may be effected, the position which can be taken up by the steamer will, it is thought, insure her being no great sufferer from the shot fired from a sailing vessel. But these, and many other points connected with steam, will be fully elucidated the very first war in which we may be seriously engaged; but in the mean time much can be immediately done, by merely making some useful experiments, whereby we may, to a considerable extent, be taught whether it be advisable or not for us to continue, at a great expense, building and equipping, at all events for what may be termed home service, the present description of sailing vessels, or whether it would not be prudent to direct more attention to war steamers, or to those ships which are propelled by both sails and steam; though I should fear that this combination of the two propelling powers must be found objectionable, as both would most likely be imperfect.
For foreign service, or for those parts of the world where the necessary supplies of fuel for steamers cannot easily be procured, the combining the two principles in a ship may be useful; but wherever perfect steamers can be available, they should decidedly have the preference. But for some time to come, causing both steamers and sailing vessels to act together for mutual assistance and support in action, especially in distant parts of the world, must obviously be desirable.
It appears to be demonstrated that a steamer, from fifteen hundred to two thousand tons burden, and upwards, possesses great proportional advantages over one of only four or five hundred, in carrying troops,cargo, or fuel; and her increased power of steam, gives her also proportional superiority in forcing her way through the water, and storms or heavy seas have much less effect upon her than upon smaller vessels. A steamship of war of two thousand tons burden, well manned and armed—and she need not carry many, but they ought to be guns of long range—must possess such powers of movement, and of destruction, as cannot be easily calculated or understood; and conceive that ship to carry, independent of her crew, (which need not be anything like so numerous as that of even a large frigate,) a regiment of cavalry, or two of infantry; then suppose thirty such steam ships conveying an army of perhaps 30,000 men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, such as I am so anxious to have called out in the manner I have proposed, and which could be carried by these irresistible steamers into almost any port having sufficient depth of water, or to any selected point, and there landed, ready to act against an unprepared, or perhaps distracted people; and how easy it would be with such ships to supply an army afterwards with every requisite; and the object in view being accomplished, or even if frustrated, with what little difficulty could the troops, and their materiel, be again received on board, and conveyed to any other point of attack, or back to our own shores.
I had written the above observations, when I saw, by accident, the following description of the Cyclops steam frigate, and from what is said of her, it may be seen what I had in view. A few of the 96-pounders will soon decide the fate of a battle.
"The Cyclops, Steam Frigate.—This magnificent vessel, the largest steam man-of-war in the world, was launched from Pembroke Dock-yard a few days ago. Her dimensions are as follow:—Length 225 feet, beam between paddles 38 feet, depth of hold 21 feet. Her tonnage is about 1,300, being 200 tons larger than the Gorgon, launched from the same slip about eighteen months since. Her equipment, as a man-of-war, will be the same in all respects as a frigate, having a complete gun, or main-deck, as well as an upper or quarter-deck. On the main-deck she will carry eighteen long 36-pounders, and on the upper deck four 48-pounders, and two 96-pounders on swivels, carrying a ball of ten inches diameter, and sweeping round the horizon 240 degrees. The Cyclops, like the vessel already referred to, will be commanded by a post-captain, these two being the only steamers taking frigate's rank. Her crew will consist of 210 men, 20 engineers and stokers, and a lieutenant's party of marines, who will have charge of the guns, all of which move upon slides and fixed pivots, thereby taking a much wider range than the ordinary carriages can give. She will be schooner-rigged, but her foremast will be of the same scantling and height as that of a 36-gun frigate. Her draught of water, with all on board, including six months' provisions, completely armed, and with twenty days' fuel, will be fifteen feet. This quantity of fuel (400 tons) will be carried in the engine-room, but there is a space in the fore and after holds for ten days more coal, making, in all, sufficient fuelfor a thirty days' run. She has an orlop deck below the gun-deck, of dimensions so magnificent that there is room to stow with comfort eight hundred troops and their officers; so that, taking her all in all, the Cyclops may be considered the most powerful vessel in her Majesty's service. The Cyclops has been built in six months, under the immediate inspection of Mr. W. Eyde, master-builder, of Pembroke-yard, from drawings and plans prepared by his brother, Mr. John Eyde, the able assistant of Sir W. Symonds, the inspector of the navy, upon whose principle—namely, the combining of the sailing and steaming properties—this vessel has been constructed. The Cyclops will be docked in Sheerness Dock-yard on the 30th instant, and, after remaining there for a few days, will proceed to the manufactory of Messrs. Seaward, at Millwall, Poplar, to receive her engines, which will be of 320 horsepower, on the principle which, in the case of the Gorgon, has proved so successful that the Lords of the Admiralty have given orders for five more pairs of engines upon the same plan, for as many frigates. Half-a-dozen such steamers would do three times as much work as the same number of line-of-battle ships. Twelve years ago Lord Cochrane maintained, that a few well-appointed steamers would suffice to keep in check opposing fleets in the Mediterranean; and if we may judge from appearances, a short time only will elapse before the experiment is tried."
Suppose also that each of these powerful steamers had assigned to her to take in tow, when necessary, a sailing vessel, conveying either additional troops,horses, coals, provisions, forage, &c. &c., how much more formidable such an armament would become.
In combined naval and military operations, I should conclude that the usual mode of proceeding would be to secure the point of debarkation, or any other considered more suitable, so as to admit of the army being again received on board the ships with as little difficulty and loss as possible; for we may well suppose that the exasperated and suffering inhabitants would do every thing in their power to destroy and annoy the invaders. Field entrenchments, but on as confined a scale as possible, must be thrown up with skill and rapidity, in situations to favour the re-embarking of the army, with all that belongs to it; and how essential it must then be, that soldiers should be as much accustomed to the use of the pickaxe and shovel as to their arms; in short, it will become indispensable that they should have habits of working, like the Roman soldiers of old.
Let us consider the consequences of such a descent. The country to a considerable extent must be instantly over-run by an army perfect in all respects, and amply supplied independent of the invaded country. Should the destruction of the power of an adversary in steam be alone the object, gunpowder and other means we can readily command, would speedily accomplish this. Dock-yards, building-yards, coal pits, mines, machinery, railways, constructed at enormous expense, and all public and private works of vast value—in a few days, and before any force sufficient for their protection couldbe assembled, might be laid in ruins, or so destroyed, as to render the amount of mischief done incalculable. But these are matters which demand instant and due consideration; and the country should be prepared to meet the expense which must be incurred, if it is only to ensure our exemption from such mortifications and misfortunes. Fortifications can afford a country but little protection against such calamities; for to a superiority in steam ships we can alone look for this, and to that Omnipotent Being who can influence the judgments and views of those who, by Him, are permitted to direct the affairs of this mighty empire.
It is obvious, that in our future wars, we must require not only an efficient steam navy and a fine army, but also that the latter should be in the highest state of discipline, and be led by able officers. Such conduct as that of which our troops were guilty at Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, and on many other occasions, if attempted in these enterprises, to which we must look forward as of frequent occurrence, would most certainly lead to total ruin: sobriety, good conduct, and the strictest obedience to orders cannot then be dispensed with; and the country I hope will be convinced by what has been adduced, that we could not possibly expect to find these necessary qualities in a British army unless raised, organized, and officered in the manner I have ventured to propose. In short, we want an army, similar in point of discipline, though differently enforced, to that which Charles the 12th of Sweden led to constant victory, until the fatal battle of Pultowa. And to our army of reserve I wouldhold up, as an example, the brave and patriotic behaviour of the Swedish militia, which under General Steinbock, during the absence of Charles at Bender, defeated at Helsingborg, though almost entirely composed of raw recruits, unclothed and badly armed, a regular Danish army that dared to invade their country, and of which, as its rash and extraordinary king was absent, they expected to have made an easy conquest.
But what a contrast to our troops, or indeed to those of any other country, must a victorious Swedish army have been; as we find in the account given of them by the famous Comte de Saxe, who tells us, that the Swedes always kept their ranks and that after the battle of Gadebesck was gained, the first line of these brave troops, with the enemy dead at their feet, did not even dare to stoop down to strip them—such was the discipline established in their regiments—until prayers had been offered up on the field of battle.
It has, as a matter of course, been proposed that men regularly brought up to the sea, should be exempted from serving in our armies; but this can answer no wise purpose, so long as it is in their power to enter the service even of our enemies, or rather of those who may soon become so. A captain of the navy, in one of his works, has lately given us a very melancholy account of the desertion of their country by British seamen; and has also, I believe, assigned the true causes of such defection; but it would be giving up as hopeless and unavailing, every good feeling implanted in the heart of man towards his country, if no exertions are made to recallto their allegiance these brave, thoughtless, but warm-hearted wanderers.
This may not now be easily accomplished, but something ought notwithstanding to be attempted, or else our navy should be rendered independent of the merchant service for supplies of sailors; and the changes which steam is producing in seamanship, must make this the less difficult to be effected, as seamen for steamers can be much sooner formed than those intended for sailing vessels; and allow me to ask, why might not bodies of seamen be raised, so as to become crews for ships of war, for a certain number of years service; and ought there not to be held out to them even superior advantages, as to pension, &c. to what has been spoken of for soldiers; for a navy is of much more importance to Great Britain than an army; and why might not seamen and their officers of all ranks be transferred bodily from ship to ship, as might be found desirable or necessary, without obstinately adhering to the old injurious plan of paying all off, when the ships in which they have served are put, for whatever cause, out of commission; and why might not such a plan render it seldom necessary to have recourse to impressment, which ought never, however, to be altogether abandoned. There might surely be for the navy, as well as for the army, a fixed peace establishment, on a proper and enlarged scale; and in case of a war, if additional crews are wanted for ships of a larger class about to be commissioned, those which until then had been serving in the smaller rates, could be augmented to the requiredestablishments in both officers and men, and new crews for the smaller rates, if still to be employed, could be easily raised by impressment or bounty; but seamen taken by the former, ought invariably to be discharged as soon as their places can be supplied by volunteers; but most of them, if the advantages I have just mentioned are held out to them, will have no wish to leave their ships and comrades, or the officers they have served under; and having had a good foundation of seamen (if I may use the expression) to build upon, excellent crews, increased in numbers, would in a very short time be available for ships of even the largest class.
Although a soldier, I have been much at sea, and I have frequently heard and remarked, that the very best sailors were those trained, especially from boyhood, in our ships of war.
At first, seamen might be taken wherever they could be found, to man our ships; but if a system of this kind were adopted—and of course many points connected with it would require to be well weighed—there could not be a doubt but our ships would soon be very superiorly manned by perfectly trained seamen, who could use cannon, mortars, &c. with proper effect; and if they were only treated with kindness, which I have no doubt they would be, and paid fairly and liberally, the navy would have a most decided advantage over our merchant service, and men would gladly enter the former in preference to the latter.
A considerable proportion of the crews for the several classes of ships, should even at the commencementof the system be boys; and it might naturally be expected, that they would not only grow up in a complete knowledge of their duties as sailors, but also become, like soldiers, strongly attached to their officers, in whom they could have confidence, and from whom they were not, under any circumstances, to be separated. Of course, such permanent seamen would require occasionally, and especially after long voyages, to be allowed to visit their families and friends; leave of absence from their ships, ought, whenever it was possible, to be liberally granted to them; and such men, when on shore, would know how to conduct themselves with propriety; for on board, I should conclude that due attention was paid to their religious and common education.
But I must not forget that there is one serious objection to this plan being adopted, however advantageous it might be to the navy, not on account of its being suggested by a soldier, but it would do away with muchpatronage, which those in power do not like to relinquish.
Much has been said of the hardships experienced by mates, and the class of petty officers of the navy in general; but this is a subject into which I cannot, and ought not, to enter. But let us look a little into other matters, and try to comprehend what interest it takes, even to have one's son made a midshipman—then to get a captain to take him with him for the three years he may be afloat—then another captain must be found to take him for three years more under his wing, orelse we must have excellent interest indeed, if we can contrive to get him forward without nursing captains; and all this time we have been obliged to allow him sufficient for his messing, and to enable him to appear dressed like an officer and a gentleman. In some ships this cannot be done under sixty pounds a year. Then he probably comes home to us a stout light-hearted fellow, who has already passed his examinations for a lieutenancy, and would give the world to be made one; but to effect this (for any services he may have performed are of no importance) takes a vast deal of interest. This at last accomplished; again patronage is required to get him afloat for some years longer. But although now an experienced officer, what interest it must take to have him made a commander. And then how much more to get him appointed to a ship. In short, nothing but patronage or interest from beginning to end will answer, or ever did answer in our navy; and the reader need not therefore be surprised at my feeling next to hopeless, that all this will ever be overturned, to suit what will no doubt, be held up to the world as the effusions of a madman. Be this, however, as it may, (and I leave it to the good sense of the country to settle the matter with patrons,) a captain now commanding one of our frigates, in a conversation I had with him on subjects of this kind, mentioned, that he calculated it would cost him about £1,200., over and above his pay, &c. to keep his table, and to meet other unavoidable expenses, and that too, with strict attention to economy,for the three years he calculated upon being actively employed; and I am aware that it took a good deal of interest on his part, to get the ship he now commands.
Our navy, I believe, has but little, if any, fixed system for its guidance. Every captain of a ship carrying on its duties or discipline, and managing almost everything according to his own views, or as taught by experience. Ought this to be permitted, and should not certain regulations be established to prevent his running into extremes, even in zeal for the credit of his ship, in appearance, discipline, or even in points which in themselves may be good, if not carried so far as to become from their frivolity vexatious to those under his command, and which I have seen occasion much punishment, which might have been better avoided. In short, ought a captain not to be restrained by established system, almost in a similar manner to that by which I propose to prevent the injurious effects of whim or caprice in commanding officers of regiments.
I am aware that I must look forward to every possible objection being thrown in the way of what I have presumed to suggest for the benefit of both our navy and army; and I fully expect some will say that all this is very well, but what do you intend to do with the numbers of retired officers, now on the lists of both services? In the first place, to expect me to answer every objection is not a little unreasonable; and in the next, I am convinced it cannot be anticipated, that one-tenth of suchancientscan ever again be called into active service, I therefore suppose the country mustcontinue, under any circumstances, to furnish the pittance now doled out to them, as long as most of them shall live; but even to balance this continued charge upon the country, and which cannot be avoided, have I not, amongst other items, shown that we can call out our army, and keep it up hereafter in a much more efficient state than it ever was, without any expense in the shape of bounty? Now the bounty for at least 100,000 men, taking the army in all its branches, at a low establishment, amounts to something; yet we shall not take this into account, but let us say (whilst I have no intention of recapitulating all the modes I have mentioned, by which savings can be effected), that we want annually 20,000 recruits, according to our present system, to keep it up to its peace establishment, in which calculation I consider that I am borne out by the returns of the number of men raised for Her Majesty's service in Great Britain and Ireland. Then suppose that each of these recruits stands the country in only five pounds (but in time of war it could not be done for much more) a-head for bounty, &c. we should thus save something considerable; let this sum be therefore allowed to go annually towards providing for retired officers, who it may be apprehended will continue a burden upon the country for a few years longer. But alas! climate, wounds, &c. under the effects of which many of these poor but gallant fellows are suffering, will not admit of our having very long an opportunity of evincing our gratitude to them for past services.
Colonel Pasley, one of our ablest and most scientificofficers, I believe, about the year 1807, wrote a most useful work, calling the attention of the country to a plan he proposed for carrying the war, which had even then been of unusually long duration, into the north of Europe, where landing an army, it was, as he suggested, to have proceeded gradually, as joined by the troops which could be assembled in the countries that lay between the point selected and France, till Napoleon could be at last assailed upon his own ground. His work produced a considerable sensation at the time, but Spain and Portugal, very opportunely, presented themselves to us, and in which the very game recommended by Colonel Pasley was successfully played. I hope, therefore, I may be allowed to observe, that it is much to be regretted, it has not struck Colonel Pasley, that a work coming from him, elucidating some of the subjects I have reluctantly ventured to touch upon, especially those connected with Russia, and a new boundary line for our North American territories, would be well received by statesmen, military men, and the country in general; all of whom must allow that an efficient and highly disciplined army and navy are now wanted by Great Britain, and that no time should be lost in acquiring them. If these essential objects were once attained, would it not be wiser for us to look more to our own interests, and with a view to securing our internal tranquillity and national industry, than to what we have so little to say to; and would it not be better, if we did not allow ourselves to be led away and entangled in intricate Russian, Austrian, and Turkishpolicy? This ought certainly to be carefully watched by us; but it should never be permitted so to embarrass us, as to prevent our being able at all times to direct our attention and powerful means to objects of much more importance to us as a great maritime empire, possessing the finest and most valuable colonies in the world. It is also to be hoped that the brave people of France and Great Britain have at length seen the madness of having wasted centuries in unceasing rivalry and jealousy, and likewise the folly of tearing each other to pieces, to the delight of countries which would glory in seeing both so humbled as to suit their own boundless ambitious views. What is Constantinople, and even all Turkey, Egypt, and such countries, to us, farther than our commercial relations with them are concerned, in comparison to Great Britain retaining her superiority upon the ocean, and which pre-eminence was acquired, in former wars, at the cost of so much blood and treasure, and which enabled her to extend her enlightening influence, religious and commercial blessings all over the world. Let Austria and other states, which must immediately feel the effects of Russian acquisitions of territory from the Turkish dominions, take measures to guard against the consequences to arise out of such acquirements, especially as the aspect of the times most clearly indicates that the very storms, we are taught to look for, are now gathering in that quarter, and the awful effects attendant upon their bursting upon the world cannot probably by any human means be prevented from ever reachingus. Ought not we, therefore, if possible, to be prepared? Should not Great Britain at all times look with a jealous eye from her vast Eastern Empire towards Russia, so as to be ready for such events as may happen? Should not the question be asked—what has Russia, not a maritime nation, in view, in forming and keeping up such fleets as we are told she now possesses in the Baltic and in the Black Sea? For with the numerous and well-trained armies at her command, she can have nothing to apprehend from her neighbours, nor from us. Encroachments upon other nations can therefore be her only object. If Russia will not regard our remonstrances as to her unnecessary, and to other nations dangerous naval preparations for war, the safety and honour of Great Britain require, that such diversions should be made, as must compel her to look to her own already enormous acquisitions from her weaker neighbours. For instance, a little assistance from us would soon enable Circassia, and other countries to the south of Russia, to give ample employment to her overgrown armies. Poland, if fully assured of aid, from France especially (for France is as much interested in Russia being kept in check as we are), could be easily roused at the same time to assert her freedom, and to revenge her wrongs. It could not be very difficult to form, under the powerful protection of Great Britain, a coalition of the Northern States, whose frontiers are now bounded by Russia, and which only exist as kingdoms through Russian sufferance, with the view of insuring their independence. Wars thus created,through her ambition, by exhausting her resources, would effectually put an end to her power of subjugating other nations; and if the standard of a war arising out of opinions, which such measures would most likely produce, was once unfurled in that extensive empire, in which the lofty ideas of a proud, turbulent and wealthy nobility would to a certainty come into contact with the hitherto suppressed feelings of millions of enslaved serfs, there is no possibility of calculating in what such a war might terminate, for there is no middle class in Russia which could act as a check to both.
A few of the steam expeditions, which were before alluded to, would quickly settle such questions, and curtail the deliberations of diplomatists, and convince the world—that it is both dangerous and impolitic to rouse Great Britain, or to give her cause of alarm about the superiority of her navy upon the ocean. "Ships, colonies and commerce," ought to be inscribed upon the banner of Britain, and our chief efforts and views, should at all times be directed to these, to us as a nation, important objects, whilst at the same time every possible encouragement should be given to our own agriculture; for we must never depend upon the continent of Europe, or upon any other part of the world, forbread—if we are ever obliged to do so, we must no more talk or even think of war.
I do not, like some men, look upon history to be as worthless as an old almanack, for by it we are taught many useful lessons; and whatever their opinions may be of history, popery, or even of prophecy, I avow myselfto be one of those who attach some importance to what is handed down to us, especially in Scripture. Yet, without almost touching upon such subjects, we may find, that a great maritime power will seemingly soon be required, to act a most prominent part in the world, when events will undoubtedly occur to command the attention and excite the fears of mankind in general. As to what power may be intended to perform this conspicuous part, it would be most presumptuous and even impious to conjecture; and such is the rapid fall and rise of nations, that all calculations in this respect must be as vain as unprofitable.
The grand object which ought never for a moment to be lost sight of, is to have Great Britain ready for coming events. Let her vast resources be, as far as necessary, called forth in time. Let the attention of Government be wisely directed to providing such a number of steamers of all classes, as to render competition on the part of other countries hopeless; and why might not engagements be entered into with wealthy companies and individuals, so as to induce them to employ, in mercantile and other pursuits, steam vessels of such a construction, that they could, in cases of emergency, be instantly fitted up and armed with guns of long range for war; for very few, of those now in use, can be made efficient in this respect. To accomplish this could not be attended with any great expense to the country, especially if advantages, as to exemption of vessels so constructed from various charges, to which all are now liable, are held out tothe owners; and this would make it unnecessary at once to provide such a number of war-steamers as might otherwise be requisite; and thus Government could, at any moment, know where to find ships of all classes fit for immediate service, on board of which, crews, such as I have ventured to speak of, could be employed with every advantage to the country. Lastly, let our army be also perfectly organized, and in all respects prepared for a new and more rapid mode of warfare; and, under Providence, we may not only be still the most powerful of maritime nations, but also the means of promoting the tranquillity and happiness of the world in general.
THE END.
G. NORMAN, PRINTER, MAIDEN LANE, COVENT GARDEN.