CHAPTER IThe Impulses of Attachment
When in 1914 the great war broke out, the world was astounded. There were forces at work which men were confident would make another war between first-class powers impossible. International relations and groupings, such as those of commerce, labor, art, science, and learning, had increased in strength and number. The terribleness and waste of war were deemed to be so fully realized that modern nations would have no taste for armed conflict. But the war came on, and there must have been mighty causes to be able to produce so gigantic a result. What were they? What could be the nature of such tremendous causes, that yet remained concealed and in their issuance so took men by surprise? The factors were various, and some, of course, had been noted, but one factor which was unnoticed by the general public and yet which is one of fundamental importance is the rôle taken in patriotism by men’s unreasoned dispositions of character. If the phenomenon of patriotism is to be fully understood, it must be analyzed with a view of discovering what are these deeply ingrained sets of mind and character which are its raw material and which make it so powerful.[1]
Patriotism is a complex sentiment. There is, in other words, no single instinctive response in all human beings to the stimulus, country. What, then, are some of the dispositions of which patriotism is composed? There are impulses which make primarily for attachment, and there are those that make primarily for antipathy. One of the most important of the impulses of attachment is the disposition of gregariousness. Hobbes, indeed, and others after him, built their theories of the state upon the doctrine that man would have been able to live alone had not the company of others been forced upon him, but that there is an impulse of gregariousness seems indisputable. It is simply an observable fact that there are species of animals that not only live in herds, packs, or flocks, but which also show uneasiness and distress at being separated from their fellows. James cites the observation of Galton on the gregariousness of the South African cattle.[2]If an individual of this species were separated from the herd it would direct its whole activity towards getting back once more, and when its object was attained, would plunge into the heart of the herd as if to bathe its very body in contact with its fellows. Now man, as well as otheranimals, lives a group life, and it seems almost inevitable that he should develop an impulse parallel to the outward facts of his existence, even were it not probable that he has inherited gregariousness as a psychical disposition from his animal ancestors. That the impulse is actually present in the human species is shown by the fact that there is in man a strong abhorrence of prolonged solitude. Professor James’ words on this point have come to be almost classical: “To be alone is one of the greatest evils for him [the normal man]. Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a mode of torture too cruel and unnatural for civilized countries to adopt. To one long pent up on a desert island the sight of a human footprint or a human form in the distance would be the most tumultuously exciting of experiences.”[3]But the impulse is also apparent in more normal experiences. So much do men desire the company of others that it is not only an element of recreation usually, but the more serious tasks of life often derive their value not more because of the ostensible end sought after than because of the human association which is involved.
Wilfred Trotter[4]has made gregariousness central in his study of society. He begins by approving of the method of those who have come at the study from the standpoint of the instincts, but expresses dissatisfaction with the limits of their results, that is, dissatisfaction with the kind of analysis that would explain man by referring the whole of his conduct to the instincts of self-preservation, nutrition, and sex. Such an explanation, he finds, has been historically attempted, but after it has gone as far as it could, there has always been left over an unexplained X. Trotter accepts self-preservation, nutrition, and sex as fundamental instincts, but completes the list by bringing forward the instinct of the herd which he offers as the explanation of all human activity which was left unexplained by the other three instincts mentioned above. To Trotter there have been two great epoch-making forward steps in the evolution of life. The first came with the change from unicellular to multicellular organisms, the great advantage of which was to make thegroupof cells the unit of selection, thus to some extent relieving the single cell of the burden of the struggle for existence, and permitting it a greater chance for variability without running a greater risk of extinction. This arrangement, says Trotter, had important influences upon all the cells comprised in the organism. The second great evolutionary advance came with the change from solitary to gregarious animals, and was attended by modifications just as profound as had accompanied the advance from unicellular to multicellularorganisms. Here again the power of natural evolution operated upon the group as a unit, thus permitting once more greater variability on the part of the individual. Association in the herd became increasingly valuable in the struggle for existence, and tended to become more and more strongly fixed as a disposition of animal nature, a fact which had fundamental influence upon the mental characteristics of the individual. There are psychological traits which would not exist but for the fact of gregariousness. Shyness, embarrassment, fear, anger, love, sympathy, sorrow, and gratitude would be devoid of meaning apart from their connection with social relations.
The first important result of the instinct of gregariousness is that it makes for homogeneity. That is, it is an impulse making primarily for attachment. Each individual tends to become thoroughly assimilated in the life of the group; the group’s ways have a vital meaning to him. Sensitiveness to the behavior of his fellows is heightened, and resistiveness to the suggestions of the herd is lowered. A suggestion from outside is likely to be rejected, and direct experience tends to have little meaning, if its teachings are at variance with the beliefs of the group. Altruism arises; it is a natural product of the situation where the conditions of life are such that each individual is of necessity constantly in the habit of regarding the welfare of others as well as that of himself. Danger from the outside stimulates each individual, and spreads fear through the whole group. The herd huddles together, and each shares in the panic of all. Loneliness at such a time is unbearable.
Now man is a social creature, and has the characteristics that result from herd instinct. He tends to become solidified with those of his own kind, and feel uncomfortable when out of touch with them; to be suggestible to the influences of his group, and resistive to the influences of other groups; to feel altruism towards those of his own herd and aversion towards those of other herds; to be aroused when the nation is threatened, and huddle in the group in the face of danger. All these characteristics under the proper stimuli are manifested by patriotism. A definition of patriotism from the standpoint of attachment to the group is that of Sumner: “Patriotism is loyalty to the civic group to which one belongs by birth or other group bond. It is a sentiment of fellowship and coöperation in all the hopes, work, and sufferings of the group.[5]
The herd is not tolerant of the nonconformist. The nonconformist has in a way become a stranger. He has put himself out of touchwith the group. The group knows him and his ways, but he has not permitted himself to be thoroughly assimilated by it. And the very thing that the herd desires and insists upon is homogeneity. In the words of one writer, “The crowd not only needs to make adherents and thus maintain its existence and increase in volume and power; it needs no less to assimilate, to digest, the individuals which it swallows up.”[6]The individual, then, cannot be too insistent upon the expression of his own personality. His life, even his inner life, must conform to that of the group. His emotions will not be a matter merely of his own concern. “Herd-union does not intensify all emotions. It intensifies those which are felt in common, but it actually deadens and shuts down those which are only felt by the individual.”[7]And independent thought is even more taboo. “Thought ... is markedly individual and personal.... Thought is critical, and the Herd wants unanimity, not criticism. Consequently Herd-union deadens thought.”[8]Hence the nonconformist gets himself disliked, and the outcome of the situation has usually been to submerge the individual, and assimilate him to the group. The moral of the tale is that patriotism acts in that way. “Patriotism, which is the crowd-emotion of a Nation, makes at times supreme claims on every citizen and enforces them by public opinion so powerful that few can or desire to evade them.”[9]
These observations throw light upon the question whether patriotism is apoliticalornationalemotion. Is patriotism attachment to the government or state, or is it love of one’s national group? There can be no doubt that it is the latter rather than the former. It is an outgrowth of tribal feeling. Bertrand Russell is only overstating a truth when he says that “Tribal feeling, which always underlay loyalty to the sovereign, has remained as strong as it ever was, and is now the chief support for the power of the State.”[10]
There is an egoistic element in the attachment of patriotism. It is an adhesion to one’s own, and one’s own is but an extension of himself. Patriotism is a personal matter. That is, it is based upon a personal relationship. One cleaves to his group not on account of its intrinsic worth simply but because of what it is worthto him. The majority of men are most loyal to what is nearest themselves. Each one of them seems to himself to be the center of his sphere, and things vary in importance in direct ratio to their nearness to the center. This fact gives the key to a very common kind of patriotism. It is simply the loyalty that men feel to the extension of their own ego.
“One’s own” includes the people of his group,i. e., the people who are most like himself. These people share many things in common with himself. They have similar habits and customs, and all this conduces to render them one’s own. “One’s own” also includes the soil. It is that which is beneath one’s very feet; it sustains one; it nourishes one. Furthermore, one knows it as he cannot know any strange land, and as no stranger can know his land. He lives in it throughout the whole year, and knows it intimately in all its peculiarities and changing moods. Consequently, his patriotism has in it a love of the “land where his fathers died.” Virgil understood the meaning of this love of the soil. He himself felt it keenly, and because of it refused to accept the old home estate of a Roman sent into exile. It was characteristic that he made Æneas lament Troy even when he was going out to establish Rome itself. It was because of this understanding, in part at least, that he was led to urge the Romans to get back to the soil, realizing that from a love ofthe soilto a love ofour soilis but a step.[11]
However, what one has been used to should not be taken as the only kind of the patriotism of attachment that there is. If adhesion to one’s own could not be overcome, loyalty to one’s earliest home would quite uniformly be stronger than patriotism. But sometimes one begins to feel that his childhood was spent in cramped quarters, and that his early opinions were inadequate. The emotion that he may be very likely to feel under such conditions is not that of affection but that of contempt and disgust. Quite often when there is a conflict between loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the community, loyalty to the nation proves the stronger. Another indication that men are not inseparably bound to what they have been used to is that they change their nation, adopt another country, and side with it even against the country of their birth. Some time ago there appeared in one of the large newspapers a letter from a naturalized German in which was this sentence: “Perhaps you would appreciate your American citizenship better if, like me, you had been born and brought up in Germany.”[12]
A reason for this attachment to one’s own is the impulse which impels one to want to feel at home in his world. It is an impulse which craves order; and it shows itself in a desire for a unified world. There seems to be an esthetic element in it; the normal mind with a sense of beauty cannot endure chaos. It represents a rational demand; it is, for instance, a driving force in philosophy. It finds another rootin the desire for safety. One wants a friendly world in which he feels sure of himself and where he can live freely without being troubled by the strange or unknown. Now one’s country presents a world that he knows and can find his way in; consequently, it satisfies this demand for a unified world organized about one’s own life, and by virtue of this character it is able to furnish an additional item in the stimuli to patriotism.
Man is attached to his country very much as he is attached to himself; he could not very well help the one any more than he could help the other. But what is in one way a mere expression of egoism becomes also an affection. Unless there is some special reason for the contrary, one is likely to cherish a real affection for that with which he has long been associated, and especially so, if it has been of use to him. This fact gives justification for the popular definition of patriotism as “theloveof country.” This affection even may be selfish, but it may also take on a more altruistic character. Altruism naturally and perforce develops in a gregarious society. And, moreover, the parental instinct adds its strength. The protection of the home is a strong sentiment in patriotism. And the tender emotion of the parental instinct may be extended to others besides offspring. Patriotism gets colored by it, and becomes very much like it. McDougall says that, “Like the fully developed parental sentiment, the patriotism of many men is a fusion of this quasi-altruistic extension of the self-regarding sentiment with the truly altruistic sentiment of love.”[13]Patriotism is, then, in part egoistic and in part altruistic. In a nation beset with enemies it will indeed take the form of animosity toward the enemy, but in a prosperous nation will direct itself very frequently to internal improvement. And it may be said that it retains something of altruism as well as egoism even in war. It is, even while being combative towards theout-group, altruistic towards thein-group.[14]
The spirit of attachment in patriotism may even go so far as to become a worship. Religious impulse has frequently been an element in patriotism. Religion and patriotism were almost the same thing in Israel. But there are modern parallels. A clergyman not long ago was reported to have said that the men who died upon the field of battle (he was thinking of men of his own nation) would straightway reach heaven, since they had died for their fellow men. It is evident that being a patriot held something of a religious fervor for that clergyman. Probably the Kaiser feels a religious exaltation which sustains him in the belief that he is the instrument of God.
Alfred Loisy[15]opposes Christianity and patriotism to one another, much to the credit of patriotism. According to Loisy, the teachings of Christianity and patriotism are incompatible, and those of Christianity are quite inadequate for the present crisis. Therefore patriotism is much nobler and not only should but will supplant Christianity. The only living faith, so he says, is that of devotion to one’s country. For that men will sacrifice. “Certainly,” says Loisy, “it is an august life for which a man will sacrifice his own without grudging it; but it is not for a blessed immortality in the company of Christ and the saints; it is for the life of the country.”[16]This account of what Loisy says is set down here not so much because it gives an idea of patriotism, but because through it Loisy passionately expresses his own ideal. In his book there breathes a most intense love for France. This love, he says, is the absorbing passion of the people of France, and is what unites them. Again we quote his own words: “There are a faith and love in which it [the army] is unanimous [as against the lack of unanimity in Christianity]: the love of our country, and an imperishable belief in her future; over these sentiments, all are in communion, and the whole country agrees with the army. Here is our common religion: one which has no unbelievers; in which those who are faithful to the old creed may fraternize indiscriminately with the adherents of the newer principles.... Differences [of religion] count no longer in face of the absorbing interest, the burning passion, the true religion, both of this and of every moment, namely devotion to the immortality of France.”[17]“So long as we live, we are determined to live in our own way; and that which gives us our vigour now against the invader is neither a lust of conquest, nor the hate which an unjust, cruel, and fanatical enemy deserves, but the love of our ancient France, who is our all, whom we yearn to preserve, and whom we are vowed to save.”[18]Here is a devotion which amounts to a religion, and it furnishes an example of the working of the religious impulse in patriotism.
It is not yet time to draw final conclusions, but it is not out of place to note in passing that patriotism was not condemned by its egoistic ingredients, and is not now justified by its elements of altruism. Viewed as a religion, one may say that it is too likely to become fanatical. The willingness to die upon the battlefield, rather than goodness, becomes the final test of the desirable citizen. Moreover, the injury worked upon others is apt to be overlooked. As a religion, patriotism has the strength, but not the necessary universality. What it does is wrongly to elevatea goodto the standard ofthe Good.