POEMS.

There rests the heroical,[56]whose very name, I think, should daunt all backbiters.  For by what conceit can a tongue be directed to speak evil of that which draweth with him no less champions than Achilles, Cyrus, Æneas, Turus, Tydeus, Rinaldo? who doth not only teach and move to truth, but teacheth and moveth to the most high and excellent truth: who maketh magnanimity and justice shine through all misty fearfulness and foggy desires? who, if the saying of Plato and Tully be true, that who could see virtue, would be wonderfully ravished with the love of her beauty; this man setteth her out to make her more lovely, in her holiday apparel, to the eye of any that will deign not to disdain until they understand.  But if any thing be already said in the defence of sweet poetry, all concurreth to the maintaining the heroical, which is not only a kind, but the best and most accomplished kind, of poetry.  For, as the image of each action stirreth and instructeth the mind, so the lofty image of such worthies most inflameth the mind with desire to be worthy, and informs with counsel how to be worthy.  Only let Æneas be worn in the tablet of your memory, how he governeth himself in the ruin of his country; in the preserving his old father, and carrying away his religious ceremonies; in obeying God’s commandments, to leave Dido, though not only passionate kindness, but even the human consideration of virtuous gratefulness, would have craved other of him; how in storms, how in sports, how in war, how in peace, how a fugitive, how victorious, how besieged, how besieging, how to strangers, how to allies, how to enemies; how to his own, lastly, how in his inward self, and how in his outward government; and I think, in a mind most prejudiced with a prejudicating humour, he will be found in excellency fruitful.  Yea, as Horace saith, “Melius Chrysippo et Crantore:”[57]but, truly, I imagine it falleth out with these poet-whippers as with some good women who often are sick, but in faith they cannot tell where.  So the name of poetry is odious to them, but neither his cause nor effects, neither the sum that contains him, nor the particularities descending from him, give any fast handle to their carping dispraise.

Since, then,[58]poetry is of all human learnings the most ancient, and of most fatherly antiquity, as from whence other learnings have taken their beginnings; since it is so universal that no learned nation doth despise it, nor barbarous nation is without it; since both Roman and Greek gave such divine names unto it, the one of prophesying, the other of making, and that indeed that name of making is fit for him, considering, that where all other arts retain themselves within their subject, and receive, as it were, their being from it, the poet only, only bringeth his own stuff, and doth not learn a conceit out of a matter, but maketh matter for a conceit; since neither his description nor end containeth any evil, the thing described cannot be evil; since his effects be so good as to teach goodness, and delight the learners of it; since therein (namely, in moral doctrine, the chief of all knowledges) he doth not only far pass the historian, but, for instructing, is well nigh comparable to the philosopher; for moving, leaveth him behind him; since the Holy Scripture (wherein there is no uncleanness) hath whole parts in it poetical, and that even our Saviour Christ vouchsafed to use the flowers of it; since all his kinds are not only in their united forms, but in their severed dissections fully commendable; I think, and think I think rightly, the laurel crown appointed for triumphant captains, doth worthily, of all other learnings, honour the poet’s triumph.

But[59]because we have ears as well as tongues, and that the lightest reasons that may be, will seem to weigh greatly, if nothing be put in the counterbalance, let us hear, and, as well as we can, ponder what objections be made against this art, which may be worthy either of yielding or answering.

First, truly, I note, not only in these μισομούσοι, poet-haters, but in all that kind of people who seek a praise by dispraising others, that they do prodigally spend a great many wandering words in quips and scoffs, carping and taunting at each thing, which, by stirring the spleen, may stay the brain from a thorough beholding, the worthiness of the subject.  Those kind of objections, as they are full of a very idle uneasiness (since there is nothing of so sacred a majesty, but that an itching tongue may rub itself upon it), so deserve they no other answer, but, instead of laughing at the jest, to laugh at the jester.  We know a playing wit can praise the discretion of an ass, the comfortableness of being in debt, and the jolly commodities of being sick of the plague; so, of the contrary side, if we will turn Ovid’s verse,

“Ut lateat virtus proximitate mali.”

“Ut lateat virtus proximitate mali.”

“That good lies hid in nearness of the evil,” Agrippa will be as merry in the showing the Vanity of Science, as Erasmus was in the commending of Folly;[60]neither shall any man or matter escape some touch of these smiling railers.  But for Erasmus and Agrippa, they had another foundation than the superficial part would promise.  Marry, these other pleasant fault-finders, who will correct the verb before they understand the noun, and confute others’ knowledge before they confirm their own; I would have them only remember, that scoffing cometh not of wisdom; so as the best title in true English they get with their merriments, is to be called good fools; for so have our grave forefathers ever termed that humorous kind of jesters.

But that which giveth greatest scope to their scorning humour, is rhyming and versing.[61]It is already said, and, as I think, truly said, it is not rhyming and versing that maketh poesy; one may be a poet without versing, and a versifier without poetry.  But yet, presuppose it were inseparable, as indeed, it seemeth Scaliger judgeth truly, it were an inseparable commendation; for if “oratio” next to “ratio,” speech next to reason, be the greatest gift bestowed upon mortality, that cannot be praiseless which doth most polish that blessing of speech; which considereth each word, not only as a man may say by his forcible quality, but by his best measured quantity; carrying even in themselves a harmony; without, perchance, number, measure, order, proportion be in our time grown odious.

But lay aside the just praise it hath, by being the only fit speech for music—music, I say, the most divine striker of the senses; thus much is undoubtedly true, that if reading be foolish without remembering, memory being the only treasure of knowledge, those words which are fittest for memory, are likewise most convenient for knowledge.  Now, that verse far exceedeth prose in the knitting up of the memory, the reason is manifest: the words, besides their delight, which hath a great affinity to memory, being so set as one cannot be lost, but the whole work fails: which accusing itself, calleth the remembrance back to itself, and so most strongly confirmeth it.  Besides, one word so, as it were, begetting another, as, be it in rhyme or measured verse, by the former a man shall have a near guess to the follower.  Lastly, even they that have taught the art of memory, have showed nothing so apt for it as a certain room divided into many places, well and thoroughly known; now that hath the verse in effect perfectly, every word having his natural seat, which seat must needs make the word remembered.  But what needs more in a thing so known to all men?  Who is it that ever was a scholar that doth not carry away some verses of Virgil, Horace, or Cato, which in his youth he learned, and even to his old age serve him for hourly lessons? as,

“Percontatorem fugito: nam garrulus idem est.Dum sibi quisque placet credula turba sumus.”[62]

“Percontatorem fugito: nam garrulus idem est.Dum sibi quisque placet credula turba sumus.”[62]

But the fitness it hath for memory is notably proved by all delivery of arts, wherein, for the most part, from grammar to logic, mathematics, physic, and the rest, the rules chiefly necessary to be borne away are compiled in verses.  So that verse being in itself sweet and orderly, and being best for memory, the only handle of knowledge, it must be in jest that any man can speak against it.

Now[63]then go we to the most important imputations laid to the poor poets; for aught I can yet learn, they are these.

First, that there being many other more fruitful knowledges, a man might better spend his time in them than in this.

Secondly, that it is the mother of lies.

Thirdly, that it is the nurse of abuse, infecting us with many pestilent desires, with a syren sweetness, drawing the mind to the serpent’s tail of sinful fancies; and herein, especially, comedies give the largest field to ear, as Chaucer saith; how, both in other nations and ours, before poets did soften us, we were full of courage, given to martial exercises, the pillars of manlike liberty, and not lulled asleep in shady idleness with poets’ pastimes.

And lastly and chiefly, they cry out with open mouth, as if they had overshot Robin Hood, that Plato banished them out of his commonwealth.  Truly this is much, if there be much truth in it.

First,[64]to the first, that a man might better spend his time, is a reason indeed; but it doth, as they say, but “petere principium.”[65]For if it be, as I affirm, that no learning is so good as that which teacheth and moveth to virtue, and that none can both teach and move thereto so much as poesy, then is the conclusion manifest, that ink and paper cannot be to a more profitable purpose employed.  And certainly, though a man should grant their first assumption, it should follow, methinks, very unwillingly, that good is not good because better is better.  But I still and utterly deny that there is sprung out of earth a more fruitful knowledge.

To[66]the second, therefore, that they should be the principal liars, I answer paradoxically, but truly, I think truly, that of all writers under the sun, the poet is the least liar; and though he would, as a poet, can scarcely be a liar.  The astronomer, with his cousin the geometrician, can hardly escape when they take upon them to measure the height of the stars.  How often, think you, do the physicians lie, when they aver things good for sicknesses, which afterwards send Charon a great number of souls drowned in a potion before they come to his ferry.  And no less of the rest which take upon them to affirm.  Now for the poet, he nothing affirmeth, and therefore never lieth; for, as I take it, to lie is to affirm that to be true which is false: so as the other artists, and especially the historian, affirmeth many things, can, in the cloudy knowledge of mankind, hardly escape from many lies: but the poet, as I said before, never affirmeth; the poet never maketh any circles about your imagination, to conjure you to believe for true what he writeth: he citeth not authorities of other histories, but even for his entry calleth the sweet Muses to inspire into him a good invention; in troth, not labouring to tell you what is or is not, but what should or should not be.  And, therefore, though he recount things not true, yet because he telleth them not for true he lieth not; without we will say that Nathan lied in his speech, before alleged, to David; which, as a wicked man durst scarce say, so think I none so simple would say, that Æsop lied in the tales of his beasts; for who thinketh that Æsop wrote it for actually true, were well worthy to have his name chronicled among the beasts he writeth of.  What child is there that cometh to a play, and seeing Thebes written in great letters upon an old door, doth believe that it is Thebes?  If then a man can arrive to the child’s age, to know that the poet’s persons and doings are but pictures what should be, and not stories what have been, they will never give the lie to things not affirmatively, but allegorically and figuratively written; and therefore, as in history, looking for truth, they may go away full fraught with falsehood, so in poesy, looking but for fiction, they shall use the narration but as an imaginative ground-plot of a profitable invention.

But hereto is replied, that the poets give names to men they write of, which argueth a conceit of an actual truth, and so, not being true, proveth a falsehood.  And doth the lawyer lie then, when, under the names of John of the Stile, and John of the Nokes, he putteth his case?  But that is easily answered, their naming of men is but to make their picture the more lively, and not to build any history.  Painting men, they cannot leave men nameless; we see we cannot play at chess but that we must give names to our chess-men: and yet, methinks, he were a very partial champion of truth that would say we lied for giving a piece of wood the reverend title of a bishop.  The poet nameth Cyrus and Æneas no other way than to show what men of their fames, fortunes, and estates should do.

Their[67]third is, how much it abuseth men’s wit, training it to a wanton sinfulness and lustful love.  For, indeed, that is the principal if not only abuse I can hear alleged.  They say the comedies rather teach, than reprehend, amorous conceits; they say the lyric is larded with passionate sonnets; the elegiac weeps the want of his mistress; and that even to the heroical Cupid hath ambitiously climbed.  Alas! Love, I would thou couldst as well defend thyself, as thou canst offend others!  I would those on whom thou dost attend, could either put thee away or yield good reason why they keep thee!  But grant love of beauty to be a beastly fault, although it be very hard, since only man, and no beast, hath that gift to discern beauty; grant that lovely name of love to deserve all hateful reproaches, although even some of my masters the philosophers spent a good deal of their lamp-oil in setting forth the excellency of it; grant, I say, what they will have granted, that not only love, but lust, but vanity, but, if they list, scurrility, possess many leaves of the poets’ books; yet, think I, when this is granted, they will find their sentence may, with good manners, put the last words foremost; and not say that poetry abuseth man’s wit, but that man’s wit abuseth poetry.  For I will not deny but that man’s wit may make poesy, which should be φραστικὴ, which some learned have defined, figuring forth good things, to be φανταστικὴ, which doth contrariwise infect the fancy with unworthy objects; as the painter, who should give to the eye either some excellent perspective, or some fine picture fit for building or fortification, or containing in it some notable example, as Abraham sacrificing his son Isaac, Judith killing Holofernes, David fighting with Goliath, may leave those, and please an ill-pleased eye with wanton shows of better-hidden matters.

But, what! shall the abuse of a thing make the right use odious?  Nay, truly, though I yield that poesy may not only be abused, but that being abused, by the reason of his sweet charming force, it can do more hurt than any other army of words, yet shall it be so far from concluding, that the abuse shall give reproach to the abused, that, contrariwise, it is a good reason, that whatsoever being abused, doth most harm, being rightly used (and upon the right use each thing receives his title) doth most good.  Do we not see skill of physic, the best rampire[68]to our often-assaulted bodies, being abused, teach poison, the most violent destroyer?  Doth not knowledge of law, whose end is to even and right all things, being abused, grow the crooked fosterer of horrible injuries?  Doth not (to go in the highest) God’s word abused breed heresy, and His name abused become blasphemy?  Truly, a needle cannot do much hurt, and as truly (with leave of ladies be it spoken) it cannot do much good.  With a sword thou mayest kill thy father, and with a sword thou mayest defend thy prince and country; so that, as in their calling poets fathers of lies, they said nothing, so in this their argument of abuse, they prove the commendation.

They allege herewith, that before poets began to be in price, our nation had set their heart’s delight upon action, and not imagination; rather doing things worthy to be written, than writing things fit to be done.  What that before time was, I think scarcely Sphynx can tell; since no memory is so ancient that gives not the precedence to poetry.  And certain it is, that, in our plainest homeliness, yet never was the Albion nation without poetry.  Marry, this argument, though it be levelled against poetry, yet it is indeed a chain-shot against all learning or bookishness, as they commonly term it.  Of such mind were certain Goths, of whom it is written, that having in the spoil of a famous city taken a fair library, one hangman, belike fit to execute the fruits of their wits, who had murdered a great number of bodies, would have set fire in it.  “No,” said another, very gravely, “take heed what you do, for while they are busy about those toys, we shall with more leisure conquer their countries.”  This, indeed, is the ordinary doctrine of ignorance, and many words sometimes I have heard spent in it; but because this reason is generally against all learning as well as poetry, or rather all learning but poetry; because it were too large a digression to handle it, or at least too superfluous, since it is manifest that all government of action is to be gotten by knowledge, and knowledge best by gathering many knowledges, which is reading; I only say with Horace, to him that is of that opinion,

“Jubeo stultum esse libenter—”[69]

“Jubeo stultum esse libenter—”[69]

for as for poetry itself, it is the freest from this, objection, for poetry is the companion of camps.  I dare undertake, Orlando Furioso, or honest King Arthur, will never displease a soldier: but the quiddity of “ens” and “prima materia” will hardly agree with a corslet.  And, therefore, as I said in the beginning, even Turks and Tartars are delighted with poets.  Homer, a Greek, flourished before Greece flourished; and if to a slight conjecture a conjecture may be opposed, truly it may seem, that as by him their learned men took almost their first light of knowledge, so their active men receive their first notions of courage.  Only Alexander’s example may serve, who by Plutarch is accounted of such virtue that fortune was not his guide but his footstool; whose acts speak for him, though Plutarch did not; indeed, the phoenix of warlike princes.  This Alexander left his schoolmaster, living Aristotle, behind him, but took dead Homer with him.  He put the philosopher Callisthenes to death, for his seeming philosophical, indeed mutinous, stubbornness; but the chief thing he was ever heard to wish for was that Homer had been alive.  He well found he received more bravery of mind by the pattern of Achilles, than by hearing the definition of fortitude.  And, therefore, if Cato misliked Fulvius for carrying Ennius with him to the field, it may be answered that if Cato misliked it the noble Fulvius liked it, or else he had not done it; for it was not the excellent Cato Uticensis whose authority I would much more have reverenced, but it was the former, in truth a bitter punisher of faults, but else a man that had never sacrificed to the Graces.  He misliked, and cried out against, all Greek learning, and yet, being fourscore years old, began to learn it, belike fearing that Pluto understood not Latin.  Indeed, the Roman laws allowed no person to be carried to the wars but he that was in the soldiers’ roll.  And, therefore, though Cato misliked his unmustered person, he misliked not his work.  And if he had, Scipio Nasica (judged by common consent the best Roman) loved him: both the other Scipio brothers, who had by their virtues no less surnames than of Asia and Afric, so loved him that they caused his body to be buried in their sepulture.  So, as Cato’s authority being but against his person, and that answered with so far greater than himself, is herein of no validity.

But[70]now, indeed, my burthen is great, that Plato’s name is laid upon me, whom, I must confess, of all philosophers I have ever esteemed most worthy of reverence; and with good reason, since of all philosophers he is the most poetical; yet if he will defile the fountain out of which his flowing streams have proceeded, let us boldly examine with what reason he did it.

First, truly, a man might maliciously object that Plato, being a philosopher, was a natural enemy of poets.  For, indeed, after the philosophers had picked out of the sweet mysteries of poetry the right discerning of true points of knowledge, they forthwith, putting it in method, and making a school of art of that which the poets did only teach by a divine delightfulness, beginning to spurn at their guides, like ungrateful apprentices, were not content to set up shop for themselves, but sought by all means to discredit their masters; which, by the force of delight being barred them, the less they could overthrow them, the more they hated them.  For, indeed, they found for Homer seven cities strove who should have him for their citizen, where many cities banished philosophers as not fit members to live among them.  For only repeating certain of Euripides’ verses many Athenians had their lives saved of the Syracusans, where the Athenians themselves thought many of the philosophers unworthy to live.  Certain poets, as Simonides and Pindar, had so prevailed with Hiero the First, that of a tyrant they made him a just king; where Plato could do so little with Dionysius that he himself, of a philosopher, was made a slave.  But who should do thus, I confess, should requite the objections raised against poets with like cavillations against philosophers; as likewise one should do that should bid one read Phædrus or Symposium in Plato, or the discourse of Love in Plutarch, and see whether any poet do authorise abominable filthiness as they do.

Again, a man might ask, out of what Commonwealth Plato doth banish them?  In sooth, thence where he himself alloweth community of women.  So, as belike this banishment grew not for effeminate wantonness, since little should poetical sonnets be hurtful, when a man might have what woman he listed.  But I honour philosophical instructions, and bless the wits which bred them, so as they be not abused, which is likewise stretched to poetry.  Saint Paul himself sets a watchword upon philosophy, indeed upon the abuse.  So doth Plato upon the abuse, not upon poetry.  Plato found fault that the poets of his time filled the world with wrong opinions of the gods, making light tales of that unspotted essence, and therefore would not have the youth depraved with such opinions.  Herein may much be said; let this suffice: the poets did not induce such opinions, but did imitate those opinions already induced.  For all the Greek stories can well testify that the very religion of that time stood upon many and many-fashioned gods; not taught so by poets, but followed according to their nature of imitation.  Who list may read in Plutarch the discourses of Isis and Osiris, of the cause why oracles ceased, of the Divine providence, and see whether the theology of that nation stood not upon such dreams, which the poets indeed superstitiously observed; and truly, since they had not the light of Christ, did much better in it than the philosophers, who, shaking off superstition, brought in atheism.

Plato, therefore, whose authority I had much rather justly construe than unjustly resist, meant not in general of poets, in those words of which Julius Scaliger saith, “qua authoritate, barbari quidam atque insipidi, abuti velint ad poetas e republicâ exigendos[71]:” but only meant to drive out those wrong opinions of the Deity, whereof now, without farther law, Christianity hath taken away all the hurtful belief, perchance as he thought nourished by then esteemed poets.  And a man need go no farther than to Plato himself to know his meaning; who, in his dialogue called “Ion,”[72]giveth high, and rightly, divine commendation unto poetry.  So as Plato, banishing the abuse, not the thing, not banishing it, but giving due honour to it, shall be our patron, and not our adversary.  For, indeed, I had much rather, since truly I may do it, show their mistaking of Plato, under whose lion’s skin they would make an ass-like braying against poesy, than go about to overthrow his authority; whom, the wiser a man is, the more just cause he shall find to have in admiration; especially since he attributeth unto poesy more than myself do, namely, to be a very inspiring of a divine force, far above man’s wit, as in the fore-named dialogue is apparent.

Of the other side, who would show the honours have been by the best sort of judgments granted them, a whole sea of examples would present themselves; Alexanders, Cæsars, Scipios, all favourers of poets; Lælius, called the Roman Socrates, himself a poet; so as part of Heautontimeroumenos, in Terence, was supposed to be made by him.  And even the Greek Socrates, whom Apollo confirmed to be the only wise man, is said to have spent part of his old time in putting Æsop’s Fables into verse; and, therefore, full evil should it become his scholar Plato to put such words in his master’s mouth against poets. But what needs more?  Aristotle writes the “Art of Poesy;” and why, if it should not be written?  Plutarch teacheth the use to be gathered of them; and how, if they should not be read?  And who reads Plutarch’s either history or philosophy, shall find he trimmeth both their garments with guards[73]of poesy.

But I list not to defend poesy with the help of his underling historiographer.  Let it suffice to have showed it is a fit soil for praise to dwell upon; and what dispraise may be set upon it is either easily overcome, or transformed into just commendation.  So that since the excellences of it may be so easily and so justly confirmed, and the low creeping objections so soon trodden down[74]; it not being an art of lies, but of true doctrine; not of effeminateness, but of notable stirring of courage; not of abusing man’s wit, but of strengthening man’s wit; not banished, but honoured by Plato; let us rather plant more laurels for to ingarland the poets’ heads (which honour of being laureate, as besides them only triumphant captains were, is a sufficient authority to show the price they ought to be held in) than suffer the ill-favoured breath of such wrong speakers once to blow upon the clear springs of poesy.

But[75]since I have run so long a career in this matter, methinks, before I give my pen a full stop, it shall be but a little more lost time to inquire, why England, the mother of excellent minds, should be grown so hard a step-mother to poets, who certainly in wit ought to pass all others, since all only proceeds from their wit, being, indeed, makers of themselves, not takers of others.  How can I but exclaim,

“Musa, mihi causas memora, quo numine læso?”[76]

“Musa, mihi causas memora, quo numine læso?”[76]

Sweet poesy! that hath anciently had kings, emperors, senators, great captains, such as, besides a thousand others, David, Adrian, Sophocles, Germanicus, not only to favour poets, but to be poets; and of our nearer times can present for her patrons, a Robert, King of Sicily; the great King Francis of France; King James of Scotland; such cardinals as Bembus and Bibiena; such famous preachers and teachers as Beza and Melancthon; so learned philosophers as Fracastorius and Scaliger; so great orators as Pontanus and Muretus; so piercing wits as George Buchanan; so grave councillors as, besides many, but before all, that Hospital[77]of France, than whom, I think, that realm never brought forth a more accomplished judgment more firmly builded upon virtue; I say these, with numbers of others, not only to read others’ poesies, but to poetise for others’ reading: that poesy, thus embraced in all other places, should only find in our time a hard welcome in England, I think the very earth laments it, and therefore decks our soil with fewer laurels than it was accustomed.  For heretofore poets have in England also flourished; and, which is to be noted, even in those times when the trumpet of Mars did sound loudest.  And now that an over-faint quietness should seem to strew the house for poets, they are almost in as good reputation as the mountebanks at Venice.  Truly, even that, as of the one side it giveth great praise to poesy, which, like Venus (but to better purpose), had rather be troubled in the net with Mars, than enjoy the homely quiet of Vulcan; so serveth it for a piece of a reason why they are less grateful to idle England, which now can scarce endure the pain of a pen.  Upon this necessarily followeth that base men with servile wits undertake it, who think it enough if they can be rewarded of the printer; and so as Epaminondas is said, with the honour of his virtue, to have made an office by his exercising it, which before was contemptible, to become highly respected; so these men, no more but setting their names to it, by their own disgracefulness, disgrace the most graceful poesy.  For now, as if all the Muses were got with child, to bring forth bastard poets, without any commission, they do post over the banks of Helicon, until they make their readers more weary than post-horses; while, in the meantime, they,

“Queis meliore luto finxit præcordia Titan,”[78]

“Queis meliore luto finxit præcordia Titan,”[78]

are better content to suppress the outflowings of their wit, than by publishing them to be accounted knights of the same order.

But I that, before ever I durst aspire unto the dignity, am admitted into the company of the paper-blurrers, do find the very true cause of our wanting estimation is want of desert, taking upon us to be poets in despite of Pallas.  Now, wherein we want desert, were a thankworthy labour to express.  But if I knew, I should have mended myself; but as I never desired the title so have I neglected the means to come by it; only, overmastered by some thoughts, I yielded an inky tribute unto them.  Marry, they that delight in poesy itself, should seek to know what they do, and how they do, especially look themselves in an unflattering glass of reason, if they be inclinable unto it.

For poesy must not be drawn by the ears, it must be gently led, or rather it must lead; which was partly the cause that made the ancient learned affirm it was a divine, and no human skill, since all other knowledges lie ready for any that have strength of wit; a poet no industry can make, if his own genius be not carried into it.  And therefore is an old proverb, “Orator fit, poeta nascitur.”[79]Yet confess I always, that as the fertilest ground must be manured, so must the highest flying wit have a Dædalus to guide him.  That Dædalus, they say, both in this and in other, hath three wings to bear itself up into the air of due commendation; that is art, imitation, and exercise.  But these, neither artificial rules, nor imitative patterns, we much cumber ourselves withal.  Exercise, indeed, we do, but that very forebackwardly; for where we should exercise to know, we exercise as having known; and so is our brain delivered of much matter which never was begotten by knowledge.  For there being two principal parts, matter to be expressed by words, and words to express the matter, in neither we use art or imitation rightly.  Our matter is “quodlibet,”[80]indeed, although wrongly, performing Ovid’s verse,

“Quicquid conabor dicere, versus erit;”[81]

“Quicquid conabor dicere, versus erit;”[81]

never marshalling it into any assured rank, that almost the readers cannot tell where to find themselves.

Chaucer, undoubtedly, did excellently in his Troilus and Cressida; of whom, truly, I know not whether to marvel more, either that he in that misty time could see so clearly, or that we in this clear age go so stumblingly after him.  Yet had he great wants, fit to be forgiven in so reverend antiquity.  I account the Mirror of Magistrates meetly furnished of beautiful parts.  And in the Earl of Surrey’s Lyrics, many things tasting of a noble birth, and worthy of a noble mind.  The “Shepherds’ Kalendar” hath much poesy in his eclogues, indeed, worthy the reading, if I be not deceived.  That same framing of his[82]style to an old rustic language, I dare not allow; since neither Theocritus in Greek, Virgil in Latin, nor Sannazaro in Italian, did affect it.  Besides these, I do not remember to have seen but few (to speak boldly) printed that have poetical sinews in them.  For proof whereof, let but most of the verses be put in prose, and then ask the meaning, and it will be found that one verse did but beget another, without ordering at the first what should be at the last; which becomes a confused mass of words, with a tinkling sound of rhyme, barely accompanied with reason.

Our[83]tragedies and comedies, not without cause, are cried out against, observing rules neither of honest civility nor skilful poetry.  ExceptingGorboduc(again I say of those that I have seen), which notwithstanding, as it is full of stately speeches, and well-sounding phrases, climbing to the height of Seneca his style, and as full of notable morality, which it does most delightfully teach, and so obtain the very end of poesy; yet, in truth, it is very defectuous in the circumstances, which grieves me, because it might not remain as an exact model of all tragedies.  For it is faulty both in place and time, the two necessary companions of all corporal actions.  For where the stage should always represent but one place; and the uttermost time presupposed in it should be, both by Aristotle’s precept, and common reason, but one day; there is both many days and many places inartificially imagined.

But if it be so in Gorboduc, how much more in all the rest? where you shall have Asia of the one side, and Afric of the other, and so many other under kingdoms, that the player, when he comes in, must ever begin with telling where he is,[84]or else the tale will not be conceived.  Now shall you have three ladies walk to gather flowers, and then we must believe the stage to be a garden.  By and by, we hear news of shipwreck in the same place, then we are to blame if we accept it not for a rock.  Upon the back of that comes out a hideous monster with fire and smoke, and then the miserable beholders are bound to take it for a cave; while, in the meantime, two armies fly in, represented with four swords and bucklers, and then, what hard heart will not receive it for a pitched field?

Now of time they are much more liberal; for ordinary it is, that two young princes fall in love; after many traverses she is got with child; delivered of a fair boy; he is lost, groweth a man, falleth in love, and is ready to get another child; and all this in two hours’ space; which, how absurd it is in sense, even sense may imagine; and art hath taught and all ancient examples justified, and at this day the ordinary players in Italy will not err in.  Yet will some bring in an example of the Eunuch in Terence, that containeth matter of two days, yet far short of twenty years.  True it is, and so was it to be played in two days, and so fitted to the time it set forth.  And though Plautus have in one place done amiss, let us hit it with him, and not miss with him.  But they will say, How then shall we set forth a story which contains both many places and many times?  And do they not know, that a tragedy is tied to the laws of poesy, and not of history; not bound to follow the story, but having liberty either to feign a quite new matter, or to frame the history to the most tragical convenience?  Again, many things may be told, which cannot be showed: if they know the difference betwixt reporting and representing.  As for example, I may speak, though I am here, of Peru, and in speech digress from that to the description of Calicut; but in action I cannot represent it without Pacolet’s horse.  And so was the manner the ancients took by some “Nuntius,”[85]to recount things done in former time, or other place.

Lastly, if they will represent an history, they must not, as Horace saith, begin “ab ovo,”[86]but they must come to the principal point of that one action which they will represent.  By example this will be best expressed; I have a story of young Polydorus, delivered, for safety’s sake, with great riches, by his father Priamus to Polymnestor, King of Thrace, in the Trojan war time.  He, after some years, hearing of the overthrow of Priamus, for to make the treasure his own, murdereth the child; the body of the child is taken up; Hecuba, she, the same day, findeth a sleight to be revenged most cruelly of the tyrant.  Where, now, would one of our tragedy-writers begin, but with the delivery of the child?  Then should he sail over into Thrace, and so spend I know not how many years, and travel numbers of places.  But where doth Euripides?  Even with the finding of the body; leaving the rest to be told by the spirit of Polydorus.  This needs no farther to be enlarged; the dullest wit may conceive it.

But, besides these gross absurdities, how all their plays be neither right tragedies nor right comedies, mingling kings and clowns, not because the matter so carrieth it, but thrust in the clown by head and shoulders to play a part in majestical matters, with neither decency nor discretion; so as neither the admiration and commiseration, nor the right sportfulness, is by their mongrel tragi-comedy obtained.  I know Apuleius did somewhat so, but that is a thing recounted with space of time, not represented in one moment: and I know the ancients have one or two examples of tragi-comedies as Plautus hath Amphytrio.  But, if we mark them well, we shall find, that they never, or very daintily, match horn-pipes and funerals.  So falleth it out, that having indeed no right comedy in that comical part of our tragedy, we have nothing but scurrility, unworthy of any chaste ears; or some extreme show of doltishness, indeed fit to lift up a loud laughter, and nothing else; where the whole tract of a comedy should be full of delight; as the tragedy should be still maintained in a well-raised admiration.

But our comedians think there is no delight without laughter, which is very wrong; for though laughter may come with delight, yet cometh it not of delight, as though delight should be the cause of laughter; but well may one thing breed both together.  Nay, in themselves, they have, as it were, a kind of contrariety.  For delight we scarcely do, but in things that have a conveniency to ourselves, or to the general nature.  Laughter almost ever cometh of things most disproportioned to ourselves and nature: delight hath a joy in it either permanent or present; laughter hath only a scornful tickling.  For example: we are ravished with delight to see a fair woman, and yet are far from being moved to laughter; we laugh at deformed creatures, wherein certainly we cannot delight; we delight in good chances; we laugh at mischances; we delight to hear the happiness of our friends and country, at which he were worthy to be laughed at that would laugh: we shall, contrarily, sometimes laugh to find a matter quite mistaken, and go down the hill against the bias,[87]in the mouth of some such men, as for the respect of them, one shall be heartily sorrow he cannot choose but laugh, and so is rather pained than delighted with laughter.  Yet deny I not, but that they may go well together; for, as in Alexander’s picture well set out, we delight without laughter, and in twenty mad antics we laugh without delight: so in Hercules, painted with his great beard and furious countenance, in a woman’s attire, spinning at Omphale’s commandment, it breeds both delight and laughter; for the representing of so strange a power in love procures delight, and the scornfulness of the action stirreth laughter.

But I speak to this purpose, that all the end of the comical part be not upon such scornful matters as stir laughter only, but mix with it that delightful teaching which is the end of poesy.  And the great fault, even in that point of laughter, and forbidden plainly by Aristotle, is, that they stir laughter in sinful things, which are rather execrable than ridiculous; or in miserable, which are rather to be pitied than scorned.  For what is it to make folks gape at a wretched beggar, and a beggarly clown; or against the law of hospitality, to jest at strangers, because they speak not English so well as we do? what do we learn, since it is certain,

“Nil habet infelix pauperatas durius in se,Quam qnod ridiculos, homines facit.”[88]

“Nil habet infelix pauperatas durius in se,Quam qnod ridiculos, homines facit.”[88]

But rather a busy loving courtier, and a heartless threatening Thraso; a self-wise seeming school-master; a wry-transformed traveller: these, if we saw walk in stage names, which we play naturally, therein were delightful laughter, and teaching delightfulness: as in the other, the tragedies of Buchanan[89]do justly bring forth a divine admiration.

But I have lavished out too many words of this play matter; I do it, because, as they are excelling parts of poesy, so is there none so much used in England, and none can be more pitifully abused; which, like an unmannerly daughter, showing a bad education, causeth her mother Poesy’s honesty to be called in question.

Other[90]sorts of poetry, almost, have we none, but that lyrical kind of songs and sonnets, which, if the Lord gave us so good minds, how well it might be employed, and with how heavenly fruits, both private and public, in singing the praises of the immortal beauty, the immortal goodness of that God, who giveth us hands to write, and wits to conceive; of which we might well want words, but never matter; of which we could turn our eyes to nothing, but we should ever have new budding occasions.

But, truly, many of such writings as come under the banner of unresistible love, if I were a mistress, would never persuade me they were in love; so coldly they apply fiery speeches, as men that had rather read lover’s writings, and so caught up certain swelling phrases, which hang together like a man that once told me, “the wind was at north-west and by south,” because he would be sure to name winds enough; than that, in truth, they feel those passions, which easily, as I think, may be bewrayed by the same forcibleness, or “energia” (as the Greeks call it), of the writer.  But let this be a sufficient, though short note, that we miss the right use of the material point of poesy.

Now[91]for the outside of it, which is words, or (as I may term it) diction, it is even well worse; so is that honey-flowing matron eloquence, apparelled, or rather disguised, in a courtesan-like painted affectation.  One time with so far-fetched words, that many seem monsters, but most seem strangers to any poor Englishman: another time with coursing of a letter, as if they were bound to follow the method of a dictionary: another time with figures and flowers, extremely winter-starved.

But I would this fault were only peculiar to versifiers, and had not as large possession among prose printers: and, which is to be marvelled, among many scholars, and, which is to be pitied, among some preachers.  Truly, I could wish (if at least I might be so bold to wish, in a thing beyond the reach of my capacity) the diligent imitators of Tully and Demosthenes, most worthy to be imitated, did not so much keep Nizolian paper-books[92]of their figures and phrases, as by attentive translation, as it were, devour them whole, and make them wholly theirs.  For now they cast sugar and spice upon every dish that is served at the table: like those Indians, not content to wear ear-rings at the fit and natural place of the ears, but they will thrust jewels through their nose and lips, because they will be sure to be fine.

Tully, when he was to drive out Catiline, as it were with a thunderbolt of eloquence, often useth the figure of repetition, as “vivit et vincit, imo in senatum venit, imo in senatum venit,” &c.[93]Indeed, inflamed with a well-grounded rage, he would have his words, as it were, double out of his mouth; and so do that artificially which we see men in choler do naturally.  And we, having noted the grace of those words, hale them in sometimes to a familiar epistle, when it were too much choler to be choleric.

How well, store of “similiter cadences” doth sound with the gravity of the pulpit, I would but invoke Demosthenes’ soul to tell, who with a rare daintiness useth them.  Truly, they have made me think of the sophister, that with too much subtlety would prove two eggs three, and though he may be counted a sophister, had none for his labour.  So these men bringing in such a kind of eloquence, well may they obtain an opinion of a seeming fineness, but persuade few, which should be the end of their fineness.

Now for similitudes in certain printed discourses, I think all herbalists, all stories of beasts, fowls, and fishes are rifled up, that they may come in multitudes to wait upon any of our conceits, which certainly is as absurd a surfeit to the ears as is possible.  For the force of a similitude not being to prove anything to a contrary disputer, but only to explain to a willing hearer: when that is done, the rest is a most tedious prattling, rather overswaying the memory from the purpose whereto they were applied, than any whit informing the judgment, already either satisfied, or by similitudes not to be satisfied.

For my part, I do not doubt, when Antonius and Crassus, the great forefathers of Cicero in eloquence; the one (as Cicero testifieth of them) pretended not to know art, the other not to set by it, because with a plain sensibleness they might win credit of popular ears, which credit is the nearest step to persuasion (which persuasion is the chief mark of oratory); I do not doubt, I say, but that they used these knacks very sparingly; which who doth generally use, any man may see, doth dance to his own music; and so to be noted by the audience, more careful to speak curiously than truly.  Undoubtedly (at least to my opinion undoubtedly) I have found in divers small-learned courtiers a more sound style than in some professors of learning; of which I can guess no other cause, but that the courtier following that which by practice he findeth fittest to nature, therein (though he know it not) doth according to art, though not by art: where the other, using art to show art, and not hide art (as in these cases he should do), flieth from nature, and indeed abuseth art.

But what! methinks I deserve to be pounded[94]for straying from poetry to oratory: but both have such an affinity in the wordish considerations, that I think this digression will make my meaning receive the fuller understanding: which is not to take upon me to teach poets how they should do, but only finding myself sick among the rest, to allow some one or two spots of the common infection grown among the most part of writers; that, acknowledging ourselves somewhat awry, we may bend to the right use both of matter and manner: whereto our language giveth us great occasion, being, indeed, capable of any excellent exercising of it.[95]I know some will say, it is a mingled language: and why not so much the better, taking the best of both the other?  Another will say, it wanteth grammar.  Nay, truly, it hath that praise, that it wants not grammar; for grammar it might have, but needs it not; being so easy in itself, and so void of those cumbersome differences of cases, genders, moods, and tenses; which, I think, was a piece of the tower of Babylon’s curse, that a man should be put to school to learn his mother tongue.  But for the uttering sweetly and properly the conceit of the mind, which is the end of speech, that hath it equally with any other tongue in the world, and is particularly happy in compositions of two or three words together, near the Greek, far beyond the Latin; which is one of the greatest beauties can be in a language.

Now,[96]of versifying there are two sorts, the one ancient, the other modern; the ancient marked the quantity of each syllable, and according to that framed his verse; the modern, observing only number, with some regard of the accent, the chief life of it standeth in that like sounding of the words, which we call rhyme.  Whether of these be the more excellent, would bear many speeches; the ancient, no doubt more fit for music, both words and time observing quantity; and more fit lively to express divers passions, by the low or lofty sound of the well-weighed syllable.  The latter, likewise, with his rhyme striketh a certain music to the ear; and, in fine, since it doth delight, though by another way, it obtaineth the same purpose; there being in either, sweetness, and wanting in neither, majesty.  Truly the English, before any vulgar language I know, is fit for both sorts; for, for the ancient, the Italian is so full of vowels, that it must ever be cumbered with elisions.  The Dutch so, of the other side, with consonants, that they cannot yield the sweet sliding fit for a verse.  The French, in his whole language, hath not one word that hath his accent in the last syllable, saving two, called antepenultima; and little more, hath the Spanish, and therefore very gracelessly may they use dactiles.  The English is subject to none of these defects.

Now for rhyme, though we do not observe quantity, we observe the accent very precisely, which other languages either cannot do, or will not do so absolutely.  That “cæsura,” or breathing-place, in the midst of the verse, neither Italian nor Spanish have, the French and we never almost fail of.  Lastly, even the very rhyme itself the Italian cannot put in the last syllable, by the French named the masculine rhyme, but still in the next to the last, which the French call the female; or the next before that, which the Italian calls “sdrucciola:” the example of the former is, “buono,” “suono;” of the sdrucciola is, “femina,” “semina.”  The French, of the other side, hath both the male, as “bon,” “son,” and the female, as “plaise,” “taise;” but the “sdrucciola” he hath not; where the English hath all three, as “due,” “true,” “father,” “rather,” “motion,” “potion;” with much more which might be said, but that already I find the trifling of this discourse is much too much enlarged.

So[97]that since the ever praiseworthy poesy is full of virtue, breeding delightfulness, and void of no gift that ought to be in the noble name of learning; since the blames laid against it are either false or feeble; since the cause why it is not esteemed in England is the fault of poet-apes, not poets; since, lastly, our tongue is most fit to honour poesy, and to be honoured by poesy; I conjure you all that have had the evil luck to read this ink-wasting toy of mine, even in the name of the Nine Muses, no more to scorn the sacred mysteries of poesy; no more to laugh at the name of poets, as though they were next inheritors to fools; no more to jest at the reverend title of “a rhymer;” but to believe, with Aristotle, that they were the ancient treasurers of the Grecian’s divinity; to believe, with Bembus, that they were the first bringers in of all civility; to believe, with Scaliger, that no philosopher’s precepts can sooner make you an honest man, than the reading of Virgil; to believe, with Clauserus, the translator of Cornutus, that it pleased the heavenly deity by Hesiod and Homer, under the veil of fables, to give us all knowledge, logic, rhetoric, philosophy natural and moral, and “quid non?” to believe, with me, that there are many mysteries contained in poetry, which of purpose were written darkly, lest by profane wits it should be abused; to believe, with Landin, that they are so beloved of the gods that whatsoever they write proceeds of a divine fury.  Lastly, to believe themselves, when they tell you they will make you immortal by their verses.

Thus doing, your names shall flourish in the printers’ shops: thus doing, you shall be of kin to many a poetical preface: thus doing, you shall be most fair, most rich, most wise, most all: you shall dwell upon superlatives: thus doing, though you be “Libertino patre natus,” you shall suddenly grow “Herculea proles,”

“Si quid mea Carmina possunt:”

“Si quid mea Carmina possunt:”

thus doing, your soul shall be placed with Dante’s Beatrix, or Virgil’s Anchisis.

But if (fie of such a but!) you be born so near the dull-making cataract of Nilus, that you cannot hear the planet-like music of poetry; if you have so earth-creeping a mind, that it cannot lift itself up to look to the sky of poetry, or rather, by a certain rustical disdain, will become such a Mome, as to be a Momus of poetry; then, though I will not wish unto you the ass’s ears of Midas, nor to be driven by a poet’s verses, as Bubonax was, to hang himself; nor to be rhymed to death, as is said to be done in Ireland; yet thus much curse I must send you in the behalf of all poets; that while you live, you live in love, and never get favour, for lacking skill of a sonnet; and when you die, your memory die from the earth for want of an epitaph.

Made by Sir Philip Sidney,upon his meeting with his two worthy friends and fellow poets,Sir Edward Dyer and M. Fulke Greville.

Joinmates in mirth to me,Grant pleasure to our meeting;Let Pan, our good god, seeHow grateful is our greeting.Join hearts and hands, so let it be,Make but one mind in bodies three.

Ye hymns and singing skillOf god Apollo’s giving,Be pressed our reeds to fillWith sound of music living.Join hearts and hands, so let it be,Make but one mind in bodies three.

Sweet Orpheus’ harp, whose soundThe stedfast mountains moved,Let there thy skill abound,To join sweet friends beloved.Join hearts and hands, so let it be,Make but one mind in bodies three.

My two and I be met,A happy blessed trinity,As three more jointly setIn firmest band of unity.Join hearts and hands, so let it be,Make but one mind in bodies three.

Welcome my two to me,The number best beloved,Within my heart you beIn friendship unremoved.Join hearts and hands, so let it be,Make but one mind in bodies three.

Give leave your flocks to range,Let us the while be playing;Within the elmy grange,Your flocks will not be straying.Join hearts and hands, so let it be,Make but one mind in bodies three.

Cause all the mirth you can,Since I am now come hither,Who never joy, but whenI am with you together.Join hearts and hands, so let it be,Make but one mind in bodies three.

Like lovers do their love,So joy I in you seeing:Let nothing me removeFrom always with you being.Join hearts and hands, so let it be,Make but one mind in bodies three.

And as the turtle doveTo mate with whom he liveth,Such comfort fervent loveOf you to my heart giveth.Join hearts and hands, so let it be,Make but one mind in bodies three.

Now joinéd be our hands,Let them be ne’er asunder,But link’d in binding bandsBy metamorphosed wonder.So should our severed bodies threeAs one for ever joinéd be.

Walkingin bright Phœbus’ blaze,Where with heat oppressed I was,I got to a shady wood,Where green leaves did newly bud;And of grass was plenty dwelling,Decked with pied flowers sweetly smelling.

In this wood a man I met,On lamenting wholly set;Ruing change of wonted state,Whence he was transforméd late,Once to shepherds’ God retaining,Now in servile court remaining.

There he wand’ring malecontent,Up and down perpléxed went,Daring not to tell to me,Spake unto a senseless tree,One among the rest electing,These same words, or this affecting:

“My old mates I grieve to seeVoid of me in field to be,Where we once our lovely sheepLovingly like friends did keep;Oft each other’s friendship proving,Never striving, but in loving.

“But may love abiding beIn poor shepherds’ base degree?It belongs to such aloneTo whom art of love is known:Seely shepherds are not wittingWhat in art of love is fitting.

“Nay, what need the art to thoseTo whom we our love disclose?It is to be uséd then,When we do but flatter men:Friendship true, in heart assured,Is by Nature’s gifts procured.

“Therefore shepherds, wanting skill,Can Love’s duties best fulfil;Since they know not how to feign,Nor with love to cloak disdain,Like the wiser sort, whose learningHides their inward will of harming.

“Well was I, while under shadeOaten reeds me music made,Striving with my mates in song;Mixing mirth our songs among.Greater was the shepherd’s treasureThan this false, fine, courtly pleasure.

“Where how many creatures be,So many puffed in mind I see;Like to Juno’s birds of pride,Scarce each other can abide:Friends like to black swans appearing,Sooner these than those in hearing.

“Therefore, Pan, if thou may’st beMade to listen unto me,Grant, I say, if seely manMay make treaty to god Pan,That I, without thy denying,May be still to thee relying.

“Only for my two loves’ sake,In whose love I pleasure take;Only two do me delightWith their ever-pleasing sight;Of all men to thee retaining,Grant me with those two remaining.

“So shall I to thee alwaysWith my reeds sound mighty praise:And first lamb that shall befall,Yearly deck thine altar shall,If it please thee to be reflected,And I from thee not rejected.”

So I left him in that place,Taking pity on his case;Learning this among the rest,That the mean estate is best;Better filléd with contenting,Void of wishing and repenting.

Ringout your bells, let mourning shows be spread,For Love is dead:All Love is dead, infectedWith plague of deep disdain:Worth, as nought worth, rejected,And faith fair scorn doth gain.From so ungrateful fancy;From such a female frenzy;From them that use men thus,Good Lord, deliver us.

Weep, neighbours, weep, do you not hear it saidThat Love is dead:His death-bed, peacock’s folly:His winding-sheet is shame;His will, false-seeming holy,His sole executor, blame.From so ungrateful fancy;From such a female frenzy;From them that use men thus,Good Lord, deliver us.

Let dirge be sung, and trentals rightly read,For Love is dead:Sir Wrong his tomb ordainethMy mistress’ marble heart;Which epitaph containeth,“Her eyes were once his dart.”From so ungrateful fancy;From such a female frenzy;From them that use men thus,Good Lord, deliver us.

Alas! I lie: rage hath this error bred;Love is not dead,Love is not dead, but sleepethIn her unmatchéd mind:Where she his counsel keepethTill due deserts she find.Therefore from so vile fancy,To call such wit a frenzy:Who Love can temper thus,Good Lord, deliver us.

Ah, poor Love, why dost thou live,Thus to see thy service lost;If she will no comfort give,Make an end, yield up the ghost!

That she may, at length, approveThat she hardly long believed,That the heart will die for loveThat is not in time relieved.

Oh, that ever I was bornService so to be refused;Faithful love to be forborn!Never love was so abused.

But, sweet Love, be still awhile;She that hurt thee, Love, may heal thee;Sweet!  I see within her smileMore than reason can reveal thee.

For, though she be rich and fair,Yet she is both wise and kind,And, therefore, do thou not despairBut thy faith may fancy find.

Yet, although she be a queenThat may such a snake despise,Yet, with silence all unseen,Run, and hide thee in her eyes:

Where if she will let thee die,Yet at latest gasp of breath,Say that in a lady’s eyeLove both took his life and death.

Philocleaand Pamela sweet,By chance, in one great house did meet;And meeting, did so join in heart,That th’ one from th’ other could not part:And who indeed (not made of stones)Would separate such lovely ones?The one is beautiful, and fairAs orient pearls and rubies are;And sweet as, after gentle showers,The breath is of some thousand flowers:For due proportion, such an airCircles the other, and so fair,That it her brownness beautifies,And doth enchant the wisest eyes.

Have you not seen, on some great day,Two goodly horses, white and bay,Which were so beauteous in their pride,You knew not which to choose or ride?Such are these two; you scarce can tell,Which is the daintier bonny belle;And they are such, as, by my troth,I had been sick with love of both,And might have sadly said, ‘Good-nightDiscretion and good fortune quite;’But that young Cupid, my old master,Presented me a sovereign plaster:Mopsa! ev’n Mopsa! (precious pet)Whose lips of marble, teeth of jet,Are spells and charms of strong defence,To conjure down concupiscence.

How oft have I been reft of sense,By gazing on their excellence,But meeting Mopsa in my way,And looking on her face of clay,Been healed, and cured, and made as sound,As though I ne’er had had a wound?And when in tables of my heart,Love wrought such things as bred my smart,Mopsa would come, with face of clout,And in an instant wipe them out.And when their faces made me sick,Mopsa would come, with face of brick,A little heated in the fire,And break the neck of my desire.Now from their face I turn mine eyes,But (cruel panthers!) they surpriseMe with their breath, that incense sweet,Which only for the gods is meet,And jointly from them doth respire,Like both the Indies set on fire:

Which so o’ercomes man’s ravished sense,That souls, to follow it, fly hence.No such-like smell you if you rangeTo th’ Stocks, or Cornhill’s square Exchange;There stood I still as any stock,Till Mopsa, with her puddle dock,Her compound or electuary,Made of old ling and young canary,Bloat-herring, cheese, and voided physic,Being somewhat troubled with a phthisic,Did cough, and fetch a sigh so deep,As did her very bottom sweep:Whereby to all she did impart,How love lay rankling at her heart:Which, when I smelt, desire was slain,And they breathed forth perfumes in vain.Their angel voice surprised me now;But Mopsa, her Too-whit, Too-whoo,Descending through her oboe nose,Did that distemper soon compose.

And, therefore, O thou precious owl,The wise Minerva’s only fowl;What, at thy shrine, shall I deviseTo offer up a sacrifice?Hang Æsculapius, and Apollo,And Ovid, with his precious shallow.Mopsa is love’s best medicine,True water to a lover’s wine.Nay, she’s the yellow antidote,Both bred and born to cut Love’s throat:Be but my second, and stand by,Mopsa, and I’ll them both defy;And all else of those gallant races,Who wear infection in their faces;For thy face (that Medusa’s shield!)Will bring me safe out of the field.


Back to IndexNext