Those interested in the ethics of evolution, treated in Chapter XXVII, should not miss reading the fourth chapter of Darwin'sDescent of Man. Huxley's essay,Evolution and Ethics, might be read. The "Prolegomena" to the essay is, however, much more valuable than the essay itself. Spencer's general theory of conduct is best gathered from hisData of Ethics, which was reprinted as Part I of hisPrinciples of Ethics. The volume by C. M. Williams, entitled,A Review of Evolutionary Ethics, gives a convenient account of a dozen or more writers who have treated of ethics from the evolutionary standpoint. It is well not to overlook what Sidgwick has to say of evolution and ethics; seeThe Methods of Ethics, Book I, chapter ii, Sec 2.
As for Chapter XXVIII, on "Pessimism," it is enough, I think, to refer the reader to Book IV, in Schopenhauer's work onThe World as Will and Idea. The Book is entitledThe Assertion and Denial of the Will to Live, where Self-consciousness has been Attained. See also his supplementary chapters, xlvi, on "The Vanity and Suffering of Life," and xlviii, "On the Doctrine of the Denial of the Will to Live." For the doctrine of von Hartmann, see chapters xiii to xv, in the part of his work entitled,The Metaphysic of the Unconscious.
For the chapter on Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, I shall give but a few references, though the literature on these writers is enormous. The English reader will find T. K. Abbott's translation of Kant's ethical writings a very convenient volume (third edition, London, 1883). The translation of Hegel'sPhilosophy of Right, by S. W. Dyde (1896), I have found good, where I have compared it with the original. The word "Right" in the title is unavoidably ambiguous, for the German word means both "right" and "law." Hegel is dealing, in a sense, with both. I have indicated, in a foot-note, that Nietzsche ought to be read in the original. He is a marvellous artist.
Perhaps I should add that Nietzsche will be read with most pleasure by those who do not attempt to find in his works a system of ethics. I recommend to the reader, especially, his three volumes:The Genealogy of Morals;Beyond Good and Evil; andThus Spake Zarathustra; (New York, 1911).
8. CHAPTERS XXX TO XXXVI.—I shall not comment on Chapter XXX. It is sufficiently interpreted by what has been said earlier in this book. Nor do I think that Chapter XXXI needs to be discussed here. I need only say that many moralists have commented upon the negative aspect of the moral law. It will be remembered that the "demon" of Socrates—a dreadful translation—was a negative sign. I do not think that those who have dwelt upon the negative aspect of morality have reflected sufficiently upon the moral organization of society. We are put to school unavoidably as soon as we are born.
I shall not dwell upon Chapters XXXII and XXXIII. Here I appeal merely to the good sense of the reader.
But Chapter XXXIV demands more attention. He who is ignorant of history, and has come into no close contact with the organization and functioning of any state other than his own, is as unfit to pass judgment upon states generally, as is the man who has never been away from his native village to pass judgment upon towns generally—towns inhabited by various peoples and situated in different quarters of the globe. His lot may, it is true, happen to be cast in a good village; but how he is to tell that it is good, I cannot conceive. He has no standard of comparison.
Fortunately, his ignorance is not as harmful as it might be. The Rational Social Will, which is penetrated through and through with traditions wiser than the whims of the individual, carries him along upon its broad bosom, and makes decisions for him.
The sociologist and the political philosopher should be consulted, as well as the historian, by one who would make a satisfactory list of books touching the subject of this chapter. But the moralist may be allowed to suggest a few titles, some of them very old ones. Plato'sRepublicis fascinating, and Aristotle'sPoliticsis the shrewdest of books. But compare the state as conceived by these men with our notions of a modern democracy! More'sUtopiais a delight. To get back to earth and see whathistorymeans to a state, and to its constitution and laws, read Sir Henry Maine'sAncient Law. States are not made in a day, although, under abnormal conditions, governments may be upset, and new ones set up, within twenty-four hours. After such unhistorical proceedings, one can scarcely expect "fast colors." One or two washings will suffice to show what was there before.
He who has a weakness for the operatic can peruse Rousseau'sSocial Contractand theDeclaration of the Rights of Manpublished in the great French Revolution. As an antidote, I suggest Bentham's essay onAnarchical Fallacies.
But reading will do little good—even historical reading—unless one also thinks. It is wonderful how much knowledge a man may escape, if he is born under the proper star. I once knew an undergraduate in an American university, who attended compulsory chapel for more than three years, and who still thought that the Old Testament was a history of the Ancient Romans.
There is quite too much to say about Chapters XXXV and XXXVI. The only thing to do is to say nothing. I shall touch upon just one point in each chapter. I venture to beg the teacher, when he treats of International Ethics, to read in class, with his students, those pages in which Sir Thomas More describes the principles upon which the Utopians conducted their wars. Remember that Sir Thomas was not merely a statesman, but, by common consent, a learned, a great, and a good man. Mark the reaction of the undergraduate mind.
The one matter upon which I shall comment in Chapter XXXVI, is the question of belief as an object of approval or of censure. Westermarck states (The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Volume I, chapter viii, p. 216), that neither the Catholic nor the Protestant Church regardedbelief, as such, as an object of censure. Yet each was willing to punish heresy. The point is most interesting, and I hazard an explanation. The churches were organizations with a definite object. They made use of reward and punishment. This was reasonable enough, abstractly considered. However, doctrine was the affair of the theologian. Now the theologian, like the philosopher, is a man who assumes that he is concerned withproofs, and with proofs only. If a thing isproved, how can a manhelpbelieving it? Only if hewillnot, which is sheer obstinacy or perversity. Let him, then, be punished on account of his defective character (see Westermarck, I, chapter xi, p. 283).
I think the apparent quibbling here can be gotten rid of by recognizing the truth emphasized in Sec Sec 167-168, namely, that logical proofs play but a subordinate part in the adoption or rejection of beliefs touching a vast number of matters both secular and religious. If we can influence men's emotions, we can influence their beliefs. Both State and Church have this power. It is a power that can be abused. But it is, on the whole, a good thing that men's beliefs can thus be influenced. There would be no stability in human society could they not. Every ignorant man—and many men are ignorant—would be at the mercy of every clever talker; and he would change his beliefs every day. As men act on beliefs, this means that he would zig-zag through life to the detriment of all orderly development. I beg the reader, learned or unlearned, to put aside prepossessions, and to look at things as they are in this field.