But all these concessions did not satisfy them, and alledged he might say all this of a tyrant; and therefore commanded him to give it under hand, to own not only the lineal, but the legal succession of king James VII. to the crown of Scotland; which he did, upon a fancy, that legal did not import lawful, but only the formality of their law; withal protesting, he might not be interpreted to approve of his succession. But this was a vain protestation against fact. However, by this we see, what is owning this authority, in the sense of the inquisitors.
The result of all is, to acknowledge allegiance to the present possessor, and to approve his pretended authority as lawful, rightful and righteous; which indeed is the true sense of the words, and any other, that men can forge or find out, is strained. For, to speak properly, if we own his authority in any respect, we own it to be lawful: for every authority, that is owned to be authority indeed, is lawful; authority always importing authorization, and consisting in a right or call to rule, and is formally and essentially contradistinct to usurpation: where ever the place of power is merely usurped, there is no authority but according to his word; a stile without truth, a barely pretended nominal equivocal authority, no real denomination: if we then own this man's authority, we own it to be lawful authority: and if we cannot own it so, we cannot own it all. For it is most suitable, either to manly ingenuity, or Christian simplicity, to speak properly, and to take words always in the sense, that they to whom they are speaking will understand them, without equivocating.
These preliminaries being thus put by, which do contribute to clear somewhat in this controversy, and both furnish us with some arguments for, and solutions in most of the objections against my thesis, in answer to the questions above stated. I set it down thus: A people long oppressed with the encroachments of tyrants and usurpers, may disown all allegiance to their pretended authority, and when imposed upon to acknowledge it, may and must rather chuse to suffer, than to own it. And consequently we cannot, as matters now stand, own, acknowledge, or approve the pretended authority of king James VII. as lawful king of Scotland; as we could not, as matters then stood, own the authority of Charles II. This consequence is abundantly clear from the foregoing deduction, demonstrating their tyranny and usurpation. In prosecuting of this general thesis, which will evince the particular hypothesis, I shall, 1. Adduce some historical instances, whence it may be gathered, that this is not altogether without a precedent, but that people have disowned allegiance to tyrants and usurpers before now. 2. Deduce it from the dictates of reason. 3. Confirm it by scripture arguments.
I. Albeit, as was shewed before, this question, as now stated, is in many respects unprecedented; yet the practice, which in our day hath been the result of it, to disown, or not to own prevailing dominators usurping the government, or abusing it, is not so alien from the examples of history, but that by equivalency or consequence it may be collected from and confirmed by instances.
1. To begin at home, besides many passages related already for confirmation, we may add, (1.) That for about 1025 years, the people had in their choice whom to own, or admit to succeed in the government, 'Even though the kingdom was hereditary; and used to elect, not such who were nearest in blood and line, but these that were judged most fit in government, being of the same progeny of Fergus,' Buchanan's History of Scotland, book vi. pag. 195. in the life of Kenneth III. This continued until the days of Kenneth III. who to cover his villainous murder of his brother's son Malcolm, and prevent his, and secure his own son's succession, procured this charter for tyranny, the settlement of the succession of the next in line from the parliament: which, as it pretended the prevention of many inconveniencies, arising from contentions and competitions about the succession; so it was limited by laws, precluding the succession of fools or monsters, and preserving the people's liberty to shake off the yoke when tyranny should thereby be introduced: otherwise it would have been not only an irrational surrender of all their own rights, and enslaving the posterity, but an irreligious contempt of providence, refuting and anticipating its determination in such a case. However it is clear, before this time, that as none but the fittest were admitted to the government; so if any did usurp upon it, or afterwards did degenerate into tyranny, they took such order with him, as if he had not been admitted at all; as is clear in the instances of the first period, and would never own every pretender to hereditary succession. (2.) As before Kenneth's days, it is hard to reckon the numerous instances of kings that were dethroned, or imprisoned, or slain, upon no other account than that of their oppression and tyranny; so afterwards they maintained the same power and privilege of repressing them, when ever they began to encroach. And although no nation hath been more patient towards bad kings, as well as loyal towards good ones; yet, in all former times, they understood so well the right they had, and the duty they owed to their own preservation, as that they seldom failed of calling the exorbitantly flagitious to an account. And albeit, instead of condoling or avenging the death of the tyrannous, they have often both excused and justified it, yet no kingdom hath inflicted severer punishments upon the murders of just and righteous princes: and therefore, though they did neither enquire after, nor animadvert upon those that slew James III. a flagitious tyrant, yet they did, by most exquisite torments, put them to death who slew James the I. a virtuous monarch. Hence, because these and other instances I mind to adduce of deposing tyrants, may be excepted against, as not pertinent to my purpose, who am not pleading for exauctoration and deposition of tyrants, being impracticable in our case: I shall once for all remove that, and desire it may be considered, (1.) That though we cannot formally exauctorate a tyrant; yet he may, by law itself, fall from his right, and may exauctorate himself, by his laws by whom kings reign; and this is all we plead for as a foundation of not owning him. (2.) Though we have not the same power, yet we have the same grounds, and as great and good, if not greater and better reasons to reject and disown our tyrant, as they, whose example is here adduced, had to depose of their tyrannizing princes. (3.) If they had power and ground to depose them, then a fortiori, they had power and ground to disown them; for that is less, and included in the other, and this we have. (4.) Though it should be granted, that they did not disown them before they were deposed; yet it cannot be said that they did disown them only because they were deposed: for it is not deposition that makes a tyrant; it only declares him to be justly punished for what he was before. As the sentence of a judge does not make a man a murderer or thief, only declares him convict of these crimes, and punishable for them; it is their own committing them that makes him criminal: and, as before the sentence, having certain knowledge of the fact, we might disown the man's innocency or honesty; so a ruler's acts of tyranny and usurpation make him a tyrant and usurper, and give ground to disown his just and legal authority; which he can have no more than a murderer or thief can have innocency or honesty. (3.) We find also examples of their disowning kings undeposed; as king Baliol was disowned with his whole race, for attempting to enslave the kingdom's liberties to foreign power. And if this may be done for such an attempt, as the greatest court parasites, and sycophants consent; what then shall be done for such as attempt to subject the people to domestic or intestine slavery? shall we refuse to be slaves to one without, and be, and own ourselves contented slaves to one within the kingdom? It is known also that king James the I. his authority was refused by his subjects in France, so long as he was a prisoner to the English there, though he charged them upon their allegiance, not to fight against the party who had his person prisoner: they answered, They owned no prisoner for their king, nor owned no allegiance to a prisoner. Hence princes may learn, though people submit to their government; yet their resignation of themselves to their obedience is not so full, as that they are obliged to own allegiance to them, when either morally or physically they are incapacitate to exercise authority over them. They that cannot rule themselves cannot be owned as rulers over a people.
2. Neither hath there been any nation, but what at one time or other hath furnished examples of this nature. The English history gives account, how some of their kings have been dealt with by their subjects, for impieties against the law and light of nature, and encroachments upon the laws of the land. Vortigern was dethroned for incestuously marrying his own sister. Neither did ever blasphemies, adulteries, murders, plotting against the lives of innocents, and taking them away by poison or razor, use to escape the animadversion of men, before they were priest-ridden unto a belief that princes persons were sacred. And if men had that generosity now this man that now reigns might expect some such animadversion. And we find also king Edward, and Richard the II. were deposed, for usurpation upon laws and liberties, in doing whereof the people avowed, They would not suffer the laws of England to be changed.
Surely the people of England must now be far degenerate, who having such laws transmitted to them from their worthy ancestors, and they themselves being born to the possession of them without a change, do now suffer them to be so encroached upon, and mancipate themselves, and leave their children vassals to popery, and slaves to tyranny.
3. The Dutch also, who have the best way of guiding of kings of any that ever had to do with them (witness their having so many of them in chains, now in Batavia in the East Indies) are not wanting for their part to furnish us with examples. When the king of Spain would not condescend to govern them according to their ancient laws, and rule for the good of the people, they declared him to be fallen from the seigniory of the Netherlands, and so erected themselves into a flourishing common-wealth. It will not be amiss to transcribe some of the words of the edict of the states general to this purpose. It is well known, (say they) 'That a prince and lord of a country is ordained, by God, to be sovereign and head over his subjects, to preserve and defend them from all injuries, force, and violence; and that if the prince therefore faileth therein, and instead of preserving his subjects, doth outrage and oppress them, depriveth them of their privileges and ancient customs, commandeth them, and will be served of them as slaves; they are no longer bound to respect him as their sovereign lord, but to esteem of him as a tyrant, neither are they bound to acknowledge him as their prince, but may abandon him, &c.' And with this agrees the answer William, prince of Orange, to the edict of proscription, published against him by Philip the II. There is, says he, 'A reciprocal bond betwixt the lord and his vassal; so that if the lord break the oath, which he hath made unto his vassal, the vassal is discharged of the oath made unto his lord.' This was the very argument of the poor suffering people of Scotland, whereupon they disowned the authority of Charles the II.
4. The monarchy of France is very absolute; yet there also the state hath taken order with their tyrants; not only have we many instances of resistances made against them, but also of disowning, disabling, and invalidating their pretended authority, and repressing their tyranny. So was the two Childerici served: so also Sigebertus, Dagabertus, and Lodowick the II. kings of France.
5. The great body of Germany moves very slowly, and is inured to bear great burdens: yet there also we find Joanna of Austria, mother of Charles V. was put to perpetual imprisonment: which example is adduced by the earl of Morton, in his discourse to the queen of England (whereof I rehearsed a part before) vindicating the deposing and disowning queen Mary of Scotland. 'If, saith he, we compare her with Joanna of Austria—what did that poor wretch commit, but that she could not want a little lustful pleasure as a remedy necessary for her age? and yet, poor creature, she suffered that punishment, of which our dame, convicted of most grievous crimes, now complains.'—Buchanan's History of Scotland, book xx. p. 748. The duke of Saxon, the landgrave of Hesse, and the magistrates of Magdeburgh, joined in a war against her son Charles V. and drew up a conclusion by resolution of lawyers, wherein are these words——'Neither are we bound to him by any other reason, than if he keep the conditions on which he was created emperor. By the laws themselves it is provided, That the superior magistrate shall not infringe the right of the inferior, and if the superior magistrate exceed the limits of his power, and command that which is wicked, not only we need not obey him, but if he offer force we may resist him.' Which opinion is confirmed by some of the greatest lawyers, and even some who are patrons of tyranny, Grotius none of the greatest enemies of tyrants, de jure belli. lib. 1. chap. 4. p. 11. saith out of Barclaius, and with him, That the king doth lose his power when he seeketh the destruction of his subjects. It was upon the account of the tyranny of that bloody house of Austria over the Helvetians, that they shook off the rule and government of that family, and established themselves into a republic. And at this present time, upon the same accounts, the tyranny and treachery of this imperial majesty, the Hungarians have essayed to maintain and justify a revolt in disowning the emperor, now for several years.
6. Poland is an elective kingdom, and so cannot but be fertile of many instances of casting off tyrants. Henricus Valesius, disowned for fleeing, and Sigismundus for violating his faith to the states, may suffice. Lex Rex, q. 24. p. 217.
7. In Denmark, we find Christiernus their king, was, for his intolerable cruelty, put from the kingdom, he and all his posterity, and after twenty years did end his life in prison.
8. In Swedland, within the compass of one century, the people deposed and banished the two Christierns, and dethroned and imprisoned Ericus, for their oppressions and tyranny, and for pursuing the destruction of their subjects.
9. The Portuguese, not many years ago, laid aside and confined Alphonsus their king, for his rapines and murders.
10. Some dukes of Venice have been so disowned by these commonwealths men, that laying aside their royal honours as private men, they have spent their days in monasteries. Buchan. de jure regni apud Scotos.
11. If we will resolve the old Roman histories, we shall find no small store of such examples, both in the time of their kings, consuls, and emperors. Their seventh king Tarquinius Superbus was removed by the people, for his evident usurpation: saith Livius, 'That is, for he had nothing for a right to the government, but mere force, and got the rule neither by the people's consent and choice, nor by the authority of the senators.' So afterwards the empire was taken from Vitellius, Heliogabulus, Maximinus, Didius, Julianus, Lex Rex, ubi supra.
12. But it will be said, Can there be any instances of the primitive christians adduced? Did ever they, while groaning under the most insupportable tyranny of their persecuting emperors, disown their authority, or suffer for not owning it? To this I answer, 1. What they did, or did not of this kind, is not of moment to enquire.: seeing their practice and example, under such disadvantages, can neither be known exactly, nor what is known of it be accommodated to our case: for (1.) They were never forced to give their judgment, neither was the question ever put to them, whether they owned their authority or not? If they transgressed the laws, they were liable to the punishment, they craved no more of them. (2.) They confess themselves to be strangers, that had no establishments by law; and therefore they behoved to be passively subject, when in no capacity to resist; there was no more required of them. Yet Lex Rex Quest. 35. page 371. cites Theodoret affirming, 'Then evil men reigned through the unmanliness of the subjects.' (3.) Their examples are not imitable in all things; they were against resistance, which we doubt not to prove is lawful against tyrannical violence: many of them refused to flee from the fury of persecutors: they ran to martyrdom, when neither cited nor accused; and to obtain the crown thereof they willingly yielded up their lives and liberties also to the rage of tyrants. We cannot be obliged to all these. 2. Yet we find some examples not altogether unapplicable to this purpose. When Barochbach, the pretended king of the Jews, after the destruction of Jerusalem, set himself as king in Bitter, a city in Arabia; the Christians that were in his precincts, refused to own him as king; which was one great cause of his persecuting them. It is true he persecuted them also for other things, as for their not denying Christ; so are we persecuted for many other things, than for our simple disowning of the king: yet this is reckoned as a distinct cause of their suffering, by Mr. Mede, on the Revel. Part. 1. Page 43. Gees Magist. Origin. Chap. 10. Sect. 7. Page 361. The same last cited author shews, that when Albinus, Niger, and Cassius, successively usurped the empire, having none of them any legal investiture, the Christians declined the recognition of their claim, and would not own them; and that upon this Tertullian says, That is, the Christians could never be found to be Albinians, or Nigrians, or Cassians, meaning they were never owners of these men for magistrates. And so may we say, We may be ashamed to be found amongst the Charlites and Jacobites of these times. Not unlike is the passage of Ambrose, who, in favours of Valentinian the rightful governor, contested against Maximus the tyrant, and not only disowned him, but excommunicated him, for which he was threatened with death. And yet it is observable, that when Maximus offered to interpose his power in defence of Ambrose, that he might not be banished by Justina the empress, he would not accept of the help of Maximus, whose power he disallowed and disowned. Whence I observe, that it is not without a precedent for a minister to disown a tyrant, to refuse favour from him: yea, and to excommunicate him, yea, even without the concurrence of his fainting brethren; for all which some of our faithful ministers have been much condemned in our day, especially Mr. Donald Cargil for excommunicating Charles the II, and James, Duke of York, as if such a thing had never been done before: whereas, we see what Ambrose did to Maximus. And this same faithful minister, Ambrosius minister at Milan, in Italy, did also hold out of the assembly of the Christians Theodosius the emperor, though a most virtuous prince, for that grievous scandal committed by him, against the innocent people at Thessalonica in killing so many of them in a passionate transport. But, 3. since this objection of primitive Christians is much insisted on, both against this and the head of defensive arms: I shall further take notice of several distinctions, that do make the difference between their case and ours very vast. (1.) There is a great difference betwixt a prince of the common religion of his subjects, but distinct from some of them, whom yet he does not seek to entice to his religion, but gives them liberty, and the benefit of the law as other subjects: which was the case of many in these primitive times sometimes. And a prince, by all means, both foul and fair, pressing to a revolt from the true, and to embrace a false religion. In this case (which is ours with a witness) it must be granted we should be wary, that we neither engage with him, nor own allegiance to him, when he would withdraw us from our allegiance to God. (2.) There is a great difference betwixt a prince persecuting the true religion, which only a few of his subjects here and there did profess, who in regard of their paucity were never in capacity to be looked upon as the body of the people, impowering him as their public servant; (which was their case) and a prince persecuting that religion, which was professed by the body of the nation, when they set him up. In this latter case, men of great sense have denied he should be owned for a prince, because then he is stated against the common good. This was our case under the former king, and yet under this, though all professors be not now persecuted, the public religion and ancient reformation is persecuted in a few, whom he intends to destroy, and in their destruction to bury it. (3.) There is a difference betwixt a prince persecuting religion, publicly owned and received of his subjects, yet never approved nor confirmed by law (as it was not in the primitive times) and a prince persecuting religion ratified and established by the laws of the land, which is our case. It will seem clear to every soul, not benighted with court darkness, that he then of course, and by law, falleth from his right in this case, because now he is not only stated against the common good, but against the very laws by which the subjects must be ruled. Then he ruleth not as a prince, to whom the law giveth his measures and bounds, but rageth as a tiger and tyrant, and ought to be carried towards as such. (4.) There is a difference betwixt a prince suppressing that religion established by law, which he never professed, nor never gave his consent to these laws (as might be the case of some of the Arian emperors) though it be unlawful for any people to set up any mortal over them, who is not in this case bound to the good behaviour; and a prince, opposing and oppressing that religion, which himself hath professed, and is ratified by laws with his own consent: which was our case under the former king, who did give the most solemn ratification of them that ever was given, but afterwards most perfidiously retracted it.
As also this apostate papist, did sometime profess himself protestant, and consented to the laws establishing it, and the penal statutes against papists, though now he is going about to raze all, and ruin that alone valuable treasure of our nation, religion. (5.) There is a difference betwixt a prince consenting to laws establishing religion which he now persecuteth (which might have been the case of Julian the apostate) and a prince, who not only consented to these laws, but who did upon these very terms, and no other, get and receive his crown and sceptre, that he should preserve the religion as reformed, and protect as a father the professors thereof, and maintain the laws establishing it, which yet he, perfidiously, being once settled in the government, breaks, casts, cassates and overturns (which was done by Charles) or, and a prince who will be bounded by the laws consented to, nor be bound to the observation of any laws whatsoever; but challenges it as his prerogative royal, to be absolute above all laws, and denying all security upon terms, is free to destroy religion and liberty, and all the valuable interests of the nation, when he pleases. This is James's character. (6.) There is a difference betwixt a prince breaking the main and only article of his covenant, in a fit of fury and rage being transported upon some mistakes (which was the case of Theodosius the emperor) and a prince not only violating this upon deliberation, but plainly declaring, that neither oath nor declaration can or will bind him; but these being made void, he will destroy without restraint all these covenanted privileges (this was the case of Charles) or, and a prince who, as he never will come under the bond of a covenant with his people: so tho' he makes never so many fair promises with the greatest solemnities, maintains a principle, that he will keep no promises, but when, and with whom he pleases, and can get a dispensation to break all when he likes. (This is James's ingenuity.) Sure in this case, such as are characterized, declare themselves so far from being princes, that they profess before the world, they are no more men to be conversed with: for if neither their words, writs, vows, promises, oaths, declarations, nor protections can bind them, what society can be had with them? Are they not to be looked upon, and carried towards as common enemies of morality, religion, righteousness, liberty, humanity, yea even of mankind itself? Now then, let the world be judge, if the people of Scotland can be judged in conscience, reason, prudence, policy, or any imaginable way, bound to own their authority, being so stated, and by the act rescissory all human ground rescinded, that ever it shall be otherwise; let them go seek other slaves where they can find them, for we will not sell ourselves and posterity to tyrants as slaves, nor give up our religion and the exercise of it to the mouldings of the court.
II. In the second place, it being clear from these forementioned instances, that tyrants and usurpers have been disowned; and it being also as clear as light can make any thing, from the foregoing account of their government, and all the characters of truculency, treachery and tyranny, conspicuously relucent therein, that these two gentlemen, whose authority we are pressed to own, were tyrants and usurpers: it remains therefore to prove from all dictates of reason about government, that their pretended authority could not nor cannot be owned.
For the argument runs thus; the authority of tyrants and usurpers cannot be owned; but the authority of Charles and James was and is the authority of tyrants and usurpers, therefore their authority cannot be owned. Now it is the major of this syllogism that I undertake to prove, the minor being so clear from their history, that to prove it by witnesses were to do what is already done.
1. All authority to be owned of men must be of God, and ordained of God: for so the apostle teacheth expresly, Rom. xiii. 1. &c. which is the alone formal reason of our subjection to them, and that which makes it a damnable sin to resist them; because it is a resisting the ordinance of God. The Lord owns himself to be the author of magistrates, Prov. viii. 15. By me kings reign and princes decree justice.
As he is the author of man, and hath made him a sociable creature, so he is the author of the order of human society, which is necessary for the preservation of mankind, he being the God of order and not of confusion.
And this must hold not only of the supreme authority, but of subordinate magistrates also; for they must be included in the higher powers, to whom we must be subject, Rom. xiii. and they that resist them, resist God's ordinance too. Their judgment is God's, as well as the judgment of the supreme magistrate, Deut. i. 17. 2 Chron. xix. 6, 8. They are called gods among whom the Lord judgeth, Psal. lxxxii. 1. He speaketh not there of a congregation of kings.
We are to be subject to them for the Lord's sake, as well as to the supreme magistrate, 1 Pet. ii. 13. therefore all magistrates, superior and inferior, are ordained of God in the respective places. It is true, Peter calls every degree of magistracy an ordinance of man, not that he denies it to be an ordinance of God for so he would contradict Paul, Rom. xiii. but terms it so emphatically, to commend the worth of obedience to magistrates, though but men, when we do it for the Lord's sake: not effectively, as an invention of men, but subjectively, because exercised by men, and created and invested by human suffrages, considered as men in society, and objectively, for the good of man, and for the external peace and safety of man, thereby differenced from the ministry, an ordinance of Christ, for the Spiritual good of mens souls. Hence, those rulers that are not of God, nor ordained of God, cannot be owned without sin; but tyrants and usurpers are the rulers, that are not of God, nor ordained of God, but are set up, and not by him, &c. Hos. viii. 1.-4. therefore they cannot be owned without sin.
I refer it to any man of conscience and reason to judge, if these scriptures, proving magistracy to be the ordinance of God, for which alone is to be owned, can be applied to tyrants and usurpers. How will that, Rom. xiii. read of tyrants? Let every soul be subject to tyrants, for they are ordained of God as his ministers of justice, &c. and are a terror to good works, and a praise to the evil. Would not every man nauseate that as not the doctrine of God? Again, how would that sound, Prov. viii. By me tyrants reign, and usurpers decree injustice? Harsh to Christian ears. Can they be said to be gods among whom the Lord judgeth? If they be, they must be such as the witch of Endor saw, gods coming out of the earth, when she raised the devil; in a very catechrestical meaning, as the devil is called the god of this world. And indeed they have no more power, nor otherwise to be owned, than he hath: for this is a truth, tyranny is a work of satan, and not from God; because sin, either habitual or actual, is not from God; tyranny is sin in habit and act: therefore——The magistrate, as magistrate, is good in nature and end, being the minister of God for good, a tyrant as a tyrant, is quite contrary. Lex Rex saith well, 'A power ethical, politic or moral, to oppress, is not from God, and is not a power, but a licentious deviation of a power, and no more from God, but from sinful nature, and the old serpent, than a licence to sin,' quest. 9. p. 59. Hence sin, a licence to sin, a licentious sinning, cannot be from God; but tyranny, usurpation, absolute power enaroaching upon all liberties, laws, divine and human, is sin, a licence to sin, a licentious sinning: therefore——But, to make this clear, and to obviate what may be said against this, let it be considered, how the powers that be are of God, and ordained of God. Things are said to be of God and ordained of God, two ways; by his purpose and providence, and by his word and warrant.
Things may be of God, either of his hand working, or bringing them about, ordaining and ordering them to be to his glory, either by a holy over-ruling providence, as Samson's desire of a wife was of God, Judg. xiv. 4. and Amaziah's insolent and foolish rejection of Joash's peaceable overture, 2 Chron. xxv. 20. or by a powerful effective providence; so Rom. xi. 36. Of him and through him are all things, 1 Cor. viii. 6. One God, of whom are all things. Or things be of God, of his word warranting and authorizing. So we are commanded to try the spirits; whether they be of God (1 John iv. i.) So in this sense, sin, tentation, lust, corruptions of the world are not of God, Jam. i. 13, 1 John ii. 16.
Again, things are ordained of God, ether by the order of his counsel or providential will; either effectively, by way of production, or direction; or permissively, by way of non-impedition: or they are ordained by the order of his word and preceptive will. The former is God's rule, the latter is ours: the former is always accomplished, the latter is often contradicted: the former orders all actions, even sinful; the latter only that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God: by the former Israel rejected Samuel, by the latter they should have continued Samuel's government, and not sought a king: by the former Athaliah usurped the government, by the latter she should have yielded obedience, and resigned the government to the posterity of Ahaziah: by the former, all have a physical subordination to God at creatures, subject to his all disposing will; by the latter, those whom he approves have a moral subordination to God, as obedient subjects to his commanding will. Now magistrates are of God, and ordained by him both these ways, tyrants but one of them. I say, magistrates, the higher powers, to whom we owe and must own subjection, are of God both these ways; both by his purpose and providence; and that not merely eventual, but effective and executive of his word, disposing both of the title and right, and possession of the power, to them whom he approves, and bringing the people under a conscientious subjection, and by his word and warrant. So Adonijah the usurper (though he had the pretence of hereditary right, and also possession by providence) was forced to own king Solomon in these terms, upon which only a magistrate may be owned: 'the kingdom' says he, 'was mine, and all Israel set their faces on me that I should reign: howbeit the kingdom is turned about, and become my brother's, for it was his from the Lord,' 1 Kings ii. 15. He had both providence turning about the kingdom to him, and also the warrant of the Lord's approbative and preceptive will. But tyrants and usurpers are only of God, and ordained of God, by his over-ruling purpose and permissive providence, either for performing his holy purpose towards themselves, as Rehoboam's professing he would be a tyrant, and refusing the lawful desires of the people was of God, 2 Chron. x. 15. or for a judgement and vengeance upon them that are subject to them, Zech. xi. 6. whereby they get a power in their hand, which is the rod of the Lord's indignation, and a charge and commission against a hypocritical nation, Isa. x. 5, 6. This is all the power they have from God, who 'gives Jacob to the spoil, and Israel to the robbers, when they sin against him,' Isa. xlii. 24. This doth not give these robbers any right, no more than they whose 'tabernacle prosper, into whose hand God bringeth abundantly,' Job xii. 6. Thus all robbers, and the great legal robbers, tyrants and their authorized murderers, may be of God, viz. by his providence. Hence those that are not ordained of God's preceptive will, but merely by his providential will; their authority is not to be owned; but tyrants and usurpers are not ordained of God's preceptive, but merely by his providential will. The minor needs no proof, yet will be cleared by many following arguments, the major will be afterwards more demonstrated. Here I shall only say, they that have no other ordination of God impowering them to be rulers, than the devil hath, must not be owned; but they that have no other than the ordination of providence, have no other ordination of God impowering them to be rulers, than the devil hath: therefore they that have no other than the ordination of providence, must not be owned.
2. But let us next consider what is comprehended in the ordination of that authority which is to be owned as of God: and it may be demonstrated, there are two things in it, without which no authority can be owned as of God, viz. institution and constitution so as to give him, whom we must own as God's minister, authority both in the abstract and concrete, that is, that he should have magistracy by God's ordination, and be a magistrate by and according to the will of God. All acknowledge that magistracy hath God's institution, for the powers that be are ordained of God: which contains not only the appointment of it, but the qualification and form of it. That government is appointed by divine precept all agree, but whether the precept be moral natural, or moral positive, whether it was appointed in the state of innocency, or since disorder came into the world, whether it be primario or secundario, from the law of nature, is not agreed upon. It may possibly be all these ways; government in the general may be from the law and light of nature appointed in innocency, because all its relative duties are enjoined in the fifth command, and all nations naturally have an esteem of it, without which there could be no order, distinction, or communion in human societies but the specification or individuation may be by a postnate, positive and secondary law, yet natural too, for though there be no reason in nature why any man should be king and lord over another, being in some sense all naturally free, but as they yield themselves under jurisdiction the exalting of David over Israel is not ascribed to nature, but to an act of divine bounty, which took him from following the ewes, and made him feeder of the people of Israel, Psal. lxxviii. 70, 71. yet nature teacheth, that Israel and other people should have a government, and that this should be subjected to. Next, not only is it appointed to be, but qualified by institution, and the office is defined, the end prescribed, and the measures and boundaries thereof are limited, as we shall hear. 'Again, the forms of it though politically, they are not stinted, that people should have such a form and not another; yet morally, at least negatively, whatever be the form it is limited to the rules of equity and justice, and must be none other than what hath the Lord's mould and sanction. But there is no institution any of these ways for tyranny. Hence, that power hath no institution from God, cannot be owned as his ordinance; but the power of tyrants is that power, being contrary in every respect to God's institution, and a mere deviation from it, and eversion of it: Ergo—To the minor it may be replied; though the power which tyrants may exercise, and usurpers assume, may be in concrete contrary to God's institution, and so not to be owned; yet, in the abstract, it may be acknowledged of God. It is but the abuse of the power, and that does not take away the use. We may own the power, though we do not own the abuse of it. I answer, 1. I acknowledge the distinction as to magistrates is very pertinent; for it is well said by the congregation in a letter to the nobility, Knox's History of Scotland, Book 2. 'That there is a great difference betwixt the authority, which is God's ordinance, and the persons of these who are placed in authority; the authority and ordinance of God can never do wrong, for it commandeth that vice be punished, and virtue maintained; but the corrupted person placed in this authority may offend.'
It is certain, higher powers are not to be resisted; but some persons in power may be resisted. The powers are ordained of God; but kings commanding unjust things are not ordained of God to do such things; but to apply this to tyrants, I do not understand. Magistrates in some acts may be guilty of tyranny, and yet retain the power of magistracy; but tyrants cannot be capable of magistracy, nor any one of the scripture-characters of righteous rulers. They cannot retain that which they have forfeited, and which they have overturned; and usurpers cannot retain that which they never had. They may act and enact some things materially just, but they are not formally such as can make them magistrates, no more than some unjust actions can make a magistrate a tyrant. A murderer, saving the life of one and killing another, does not make him no murderer: once a murderer ay a murderer, once a robber ay a robber, till he restore what he hath robbed: so once a tyrant ay a tyrant, till he makes amends for his tyranny, and that will be hard to do. 2. The concrete does specificate the abstract in actuating it, as a magistrate in his exercising government, makes his power to be magistry; a robber, in his robbing, makes his power to be robbery; an usurper in his usurping makes his power to be usurpation; so a tyrant in his tyrannizing, can have no power but tyranny. As the abstract of a magistrate is nothing but magistracy, so the abstract of a tyrant is nothing but tyranny. It is frivolous then to distinguish between a tyrannical power in the concrete, and tyranny in the abstract; the power and the abuse of the power: for he hath no power as a tyrant, but what is abused. 3. They that object thus, must either mean, that power in it general notion is ordained of God, but this particular power abused by tyrants, and assumed by usurpers, is not ordained: or they must mean, that the very power of tyrants and usurpers is ordained of God, but the way of holding it and using it, is not of God. If the first be said, they grant all I plead for; for though the power in general be ordained, yet what is this to tyrants and usurpers? would not this claim be ridiculous for any man to soy, God hath ordained governments to be, therefore I will challenge it? God hath ordained marriage, therefore any may cohabit together as man and wife, without formal matrimony. If the second be alledged, that the power of these prevailing dominators is ordained, but not their holding and using of it: this is nonsense, for how can a power be ordained, and the use of it be unlawful? For the abuse and use of tyrannical power is all one and reciprocal: an usurper cannot use his power but by usurpation.
Again, is it not plain, that the abstract and the concrete, the act or habit, and the subject wherein it is, cannot have a contrary denomination? if drunkenness and theft, lying or murder, be of the devil; then the drunkard, the thief, the liar, and the murderer, are of the devil too: so if tyranny and usurpation, or the use or abuse of tyrants and usurpers be of the devil, then most the tyrants and usurpers also be of him: none can say, the one is of the devil, and the other of God. Wherefore it is altogether impertinent to use such a distinction, with application to tyrants or usurpers, as many do in their pleading for the owning of our oppressors; for they have no power, but what is the abuse of power.
3. As that authority which is God's ordinance must have his institution; so it must have his divine constitution from himself and by the people. Wherever then there is authority to be owned of men, there must be these two, constitution from God and constitution from the people. For the first, God hath a special interest in the constitution of authority, both immediately and mediately. Immediately, he declares such and such forms of government to be lawful and eligible, and does order whom, and who, and how people shall direct governors. And so, he confers royal graces, and endowments, and gifts for government on them, as on Joshua and Saul: so they become the Lord's anointed, placed and set on the throne of the Lord, 1 Chron. xxix. 23. and honoured with majesty, as his deputes and vicegerants, having their crown let on by God, Psal. xxi. 3. But in regard now he doth not by any special revelation determine, who shall be the governors in this or that place; therefore he makes this constitution by meditation of men, giving them rules how they shall proceed in setting them up. And seeing, by the law of nature, he hath enjoined government to be, but hath ordered no particular in it with application to singulars he hath committed it to the positive transaction of men, to be disposed according to certain general rules of justice. And it must needs be so; for first, without this constitution, either all or none would be magistrates: if he hath ordained civil power to be, and taken no order in whom it shall be, or how it shall be conveyed, any might pretend to it; and yet none would have it, more than another. If then he hath affixed it to a peculiar having and holding, by virtue whereof this man is enstated and entitled to the office, and not that man, there must be a law for constituting him in authority, which will discover in whom it is. 2. If it were not so, then resisting of a particular magistrate would not be a resisting of the ordinance of God, if a particular magistrate were not constitute of God, as well as magistracy is institute of God: for still it would be undetermined, who were the owner; and so it would be left as free and lawful for the resister to take the place, as for the resisted to hold it; the institution would be satisfied if any possessed it: therefore there must be constitution to determine it. 3. No common law of nature can put in practice, without particular constitution regulating it. That wives and children own their superior relations, is the law of nature; but there must be such a relation first fixed by human transaction, before they can own them; there must be marriage authorized of God, there must be children begotten, and then the divine ordination of these relative duties take place. So the judges of Israel for four hundred and fifty years were given of God, Acts xiii. 20. not all by an immediate express designation, but a mediate call from God by men, as Jephthah; Judg. xi. 6, 11. Inferior judges also are magistrates appointed by God, yet they have their deputation from men. Our Saviour speaks of all magistrates, when he applies that of the 82 psalm to them, I said ye are gods; and shews how they were gods, because unto them the word of God came, John x. 35. that is, by his word and warrant he authorized them, not by immediate designation in reference to the most of them, but the word of God comes to them, or his constitution is past upon them, who are advanced by men according to his word. When men therefore do act according to the divine rule, in the moulding and erecting of government and governors, there the constitution is of God, though it be not immediate. And where this is not observed, whatever power (so named or pretended) there may be, or whatsoever persons there be that take upon them to be the power, and are not thereto appointed or therein instated, and do exercise such a power as God hath not legitimated, they are not a power ordained of God. Hence, whatsoever power hath no constitution from God, either immediate or mediate, cannot be owned: but the authority of tyrants and usurpers, is a power that hath no constitution from God, either immediate or mediate; therefore it cannot be owned. The major is cleared above. The minor is also undeniable: for, either they must pretend to an immediate constitution by revelation, that James duke of York a vassal of antichrist, had, by all his plots and pranks, merited the crown of Britain, and therefore must be constitute king; and this I hope they will not pretend to, except the Pope hath gotten such a revelation from Pluto's oracle; or they must have recourse to the mediate constitution by men: and if so, then either this mediate constitution of God is left undetermined, indefinitely and absolutely giving way to any that will assume what power they please and can: and then, I confess tyrants may have a constitution; but this constitution cannot be of God; or else it is fixed by a rule, regulating the succession or constitution of the governors, and obliging the people to own the government so constituted, with exclusion and disallowance of any other. And so, if in that constitution there be a substantial deviation from the rule, as when incompetent or unallowed persons be the advancers of themselves, or others, into that place by illegal and sinistrous means, in as much as in that case there is the divine disapprobation, it may be said there is no ordinance of God, but a contradiction and contra-ordination to God's order. Gee's magist. origin. chap. 5. sect. 4. subject 3 page 135. This will shake off this of ours, and all other tyrants and usurpers, that come into the government, and hold it not according to God's rule.
4. It is clear also in the second place, that the authority which we can own out of conscience, must have constitution by the people. The special way by which men should be called into the place of sovereign power, may perhaps not be found so expresly defined in scripture, as mens call to the other ordinance of the ministry is; yet in this two things are essentially necessary to the constitution of a magistrate, the peoples consent and compact either formal and virtual. And without these we can own conscientious subjection and allegiance to no man living. That the first is necessary will be evident, from the law of nature and nations, and from scripture. First, The light and law of nature dictates, that the right and interest of constituting magistrates is in the elective vote or suffrage of the people. This will appear, 1. If we consider the original of government among men, especially after they were so multiplied, that there was a necessity of a reduction into diverse communities; which, whatever was before the flood, yet after it, behoved to be by a coalition with consent under an elective government. The scripture makes it more than probable, that the partition of commonwealths was in Peleg's days, in whole time the earth was divided, Gen. x. 2. occasioned by the confusion of "languages at Babel, which did dissolve their union, and scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth," Gen. xi. 9.
Then was it that we may conceive, as Buchanan says, de jure regni apud Scot. 'The time was when men dwelt in cottages and caves, and as strangers did wander to and fro without laws, and such as could converse together of the same language, assembled together as their humours did lead them or as some common utility did allure them, a certain instinct of nature did oblige them to desire converse and society.' But this confusion of languages, and communion of language, in several divided parcels, could not incorporate these several parties into communities; that behoved to be the effect of some other cause: and what should that be, but the joint will, consent and agreement of the severally languaged? It could not be by consanguinity; for there is no direction from nature for a confinement of that into such and such degrees, to make out the bonds of a common-wealth, or possibility of knowing all within such degrees; besides all within these degrees might not be of the same language. Now, the scripture says, they "were divided every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations," Gen. x. 5. Next, it could not be by cohabitation: for how that must go to be the boundaries of a common-wealth, inclusively, or exclusively, is not defined by nature, nor can it be otherwise determined, than by human choice. Then, it could not be by mens belonging to such a sovereign: for, after that division and confusion, they could not all be under one sovereign, nor under the same that they were subject to before; and a sovereign cannot be before the aggregation of the subjects whereof he is head, they must first be a commonwealth before they can belong to it. Again, it cannot be founded upon the right of fatherhood: for, in that scattering, such a right could not be uninterruptedly preserved: and then Noah should also have been the universal magistrate, which he could not be in these multiplied secessions. And further, if it be refounded on the right of fatherhood, either every company had one common father over all, or every father made a commonwealth of his own children: the latter cannot be said, for that would multiply commonwealths in infinitum: neither can the first be said; for, if they had one common father, either this behoved to be the natural father of all the company, which none can think was so happily ordered by Babel's confusion: or else the eldest in age, and so he might be incapable for government, and the law of nature does not direct that the government should alway be astricted to the eldest of the community: or else, finally, he behoved to be their political father, by consent. For, before this consent, they were unengaged as to common order of government; none of the community having any legal claim to sovereignty more than the rest. When therefore they were forced to conclude upon association, for their mutual preservation, they must be thought to act rationally, and not to make their condition worse, but rather better by that conclusion; and if they found it worse, to resume their radical right which they had conferred upon men subject to law, not to tyrannize over them: and in this case, certainly they had the power of choosing what kind of government suited most to their advantage, and would best preserve their liberties, and how far this should be extended, and who should be affirmed into this combination; still with a reservation of the privilege to their own safety, if their associates should not do their duty: and so they might also reserve to themselves a liberty to alter the form, when they found it productive of more prejudice than advantage, and never to leave their condition remediless; and to pitch upon this way of succession, and not another, the way of free election of every successor, or of definite election limited to one line, or to the nearest in line; ande contra, with a reserve still of their primeve privileges, to secure themselves from the inconveniences of that determination, or to change it; and to make choices of such a family and line, and not another, and whether the eldest always of that family, or the fittest is to be chosen; and however it be, yet still by the peoples consent: and in all this to have respect to some good, great and necessary ends, which, if they should be disappointed of, and find these means useless or destructive to, they were to be loosed from their obligation to use or to own them. See Jus populi vindicat. chap. 5. p. 80, &c. 2. If we consider how nature determines the peoples interest in the constitution of governors: whence comes it that this man, and not that man, this race and family, and not that, is invested with that title? It will be found there is no title on earth now to the crowns, to families, to persons, but the peoples suffrage: for the institution of magistracy in general does not make James Stewart a king, no more than John Chamberlain: neither do qualifications make one, otherwise there might be many better than is this day extant; for there are many men better qualified: and there is no prophetical or immediate callings to kingdoms now: and as for conquest without consent, and having no more for a title, it is no better than royal Latrociny.
It is certain, God would not command us to obey kings, and leave us in the dark, that we should not know him that hath a real call to it. And if he have not the peoples call, where shall we find another? It remains therefore they must have it from the people, who have it to give radically and virtually, having a power to preserve themselves, and to put it in the hands of one or more rulers, that they may preserve themselves by them. All men are born alike as to civil power (no man being born with a crown on his head) and yet men united in society may give it to this man, and not to that man; therefore they must have it virtually, for they cannot give what they have not. And as cities have power to choose their magistrates, so many cities have power to create an universal ruler over them all. The people also have power to limit the magistrates power with conditions; so that the present ruler shall not have so much prerogative as his predecessor, as royalists cannot deny, therefore they must have given that power which they can limit. See Lex Rex, quest. 4. p. 10. &c. 2dly, The scripture also gives light in this particular. 1. In giving directions and rules about their orderly calling their governors, impowering them to "take wise men, and understanding, and known among their tribes, to be made rulers," Deut. i. 13. "To make judges and officers in all their gates," Deut. xvi. 18. "To set one among their brethren king over them, and not a stranger," Deut. xvii. 15. To what purpose are these rules given them, if they had no interest to choose their magistrates? Would God command them to set a king over them, if they had not power to do it? And to set such a man over them, and not such an one, if they had no influence in making one at all? And accordingly that wise statist says very well, 2 Sam. xvi. 18. Hushai to Absalom, nay, but whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide. Which will also hold in the negative, whom the Lord and the people, and all the men of the kingdom do not choose, his we will not be, nor with him will we abide. 2. The scripture expressly attributeth the making of kings to the people. All the people of Judah took Azariah, and made him king, instead of his father Amaziah, whom they had executed, 2 Kings xiv. 21. They came with a perfect heart to make David king in Hebron, 1 Chron. xii. 38. So they made Joash king, 2 Chron. xxiii. 11. 3. Even these that were particularly designed of God, and chosen to be rulers, yet were not formally invested with power, before the people conferred it upon them. Gideon was called of God to it, but was not judge, till the people said, Rule thou over us, both thou and thy son, giving him an hereditary right for his children, Judg. viii. 12. Saul was appointed to be king, and therefore Samuel honoured him, because he was marked out of God to be king, 1 Sam. ix. 24. and anointed him with oil, 1 Sam. x. 1. after which he was gifted and qualified for government. God gave him another heart, vers. 9. yet all this did not make him king, till the people met for his inauguration, vers. 17. &c. and crowned him, and made him king in Gilgal, 1 Sam. xi. last verse. David was anointed by Samuel, and yet was a persecuted fugitive for several years, and never acknowledged formally king, till the men of Judah came and anointed him, 2 Sam. ii. 4. for if he had been king before, then there were two kings in Israel at one time, and David failed of his royal duty, in not punishing the murderer Saul; whereas himself says, he would not touch the Lord's anointed. Therefore the people made all kings, and that by choice and consent, without which they were no kings. Hence I argue, if the consent and choice of the people be so essentially necessary to the making of kings, then they who set up themselves against the consent of the body of the land, and without the choice of any, must be usurpers, not to be acknowledged for lawful kings; but the former is true, as is proven above: therefore.——Now plain it is, that this duke set up himself against the consent of the body, being excluded from the government by the representatives of England, and generally hated of all; who disdaining to wait upon the formal choice of any, but after he had paved his passage to the throne upon his brother's blood, did usurp the title without all law.
5. The second thing necessary for the legal constitution of a king by the people, is their compact with him: which must either be express or tacit, explicit or implicit. Two things are here to be proven, that will furnish an argument for disowning both the brothers. First, that there must be a conditional reciprocally obliging covenant between the sovereign and the subjects, without which there is no relation to be owned. Secondly, that when this compact is broken in all or its chiefest conditions by the sovereign, the peoples obligation ceases. The first I shall set down, in the words of a famous author, our renowned countryman Buchanan, in his dialogue 'de jure regni apud scotos. There is then (or there ought to be) a mutual compact between the king and his subjects', &c. That this is indispensibly necessary and essential to make up the relation of sovereign and subjects, may be proved both from the light of nature and revelation.
First, It may appear from the light of natural reason. 1. From the rise of government, and the interest people have in erecting it by consent and choice (as is shewed above) if a king cannot be without the peoples making, then, all the power he hath must either be by compact or gift: if by compact, then we have what we proposed: and if by gift: then if abused, they may recal it; or if they cannot recover it, yet they may and ought to hold their hand, and give him no more that they may retain, that is, no more honour or respect, which is in the honourer before the honoured get it. Can it be imagined, that a people acting rationally, would give a power absolutely, without restrictions, to destroy all their own rights? Could they suppose this boundless and lawless creature, left at liberty to tyrannize, would be a fit mean to procure the ends of government? for this were to set up a rampant tyrant to rule as he listeth, which would make their condition a great deal worse than if they had no ruler at all, for then they might have more liberty to see to their safety. See jus populi, chap. 9. pag. 96, 97. 2. This will be clear from the nature of that authority, which only a sovereign can have over his subjects; which, whatever be the nature of it, it cannot be absolute, that is against scripture, nature, and common sense, as shall be proven at more length.
That is to set up a tyrant, one who is free from all conditions, a roaring lion and a ranging bear to destroy all if he pleases. It must be granted by all, that the sovereign authority is only fiduciary, entrusted by God and the people with a great charge: a great pledge is impawned and committed to the care and custody of the magistrate, which he must take special care of, and not abuse, or waste, or alienate, or sell: (for in that case, royalists themselves grant he may be deposed.) He is by office a patron of the subjects liberties, and keeper of the law both of God and man, the keeper of both tables. Sure, he hath no power over the laws of God, but a ministerial power, he may not stop and disable them as he pleases; of the same nature is it, over all other parts of his charge. He is rather a tutor, than an inheritor and proprietor of the commonwealth, and may not do what his pupil's interest, what he pleases. In a word, the nature and whole significancy of his power lies in this, that he is the nation's public servant, both objectively in that he is only for the good of the people, and representatively in that the people hath impawned in his hand all their power to do royal service. The scripture teaches this, in giving him the titles of service, as watchmen, &c. allowing him royal wages for his royal work, Rom. xiii. he is God's minister attending continually on this thing.
There is his work, for this cause pay you tribute also. There is his wages and maintainance. He is called so in that transaction with Rehoboam; the old men advised him to be a servant unto the people, then they should be his servants, 1 Kings xii. 7. There was a conditional bargain proposed: as to be a servant, or tutor, or guardian upon trust, always implies conditions and accountableness to them that entrust them. 3. It must needs be so, otherwise great absurdities would follow. Here would be a voluntary contracted relation, obliging us to relative duties, to a man that owed none correlative to us, and yet one whom we set over us. It were strange, if there were no condition here; and no other voluntarily suscepted relations can be without this, as between man and wife, master and servant, &c. This would give him the disposal of us and ours, as if both we and what we have were his own, as a man's goods are, against which he does not sin whatever he doth with them. So this would make a king that could not sin against us; being no ways obliged to us, for he can no otherwise be obliged to us, but upon covenant conditions; he may be obliged and bound in duty to God otherwise, but he cannot be bound to us otherwise: and if he be not bound, then he may do what he will, he can do no wrong to us to whom he is noways bound. This also is point blank against the law of God, which is the second way to prove it, by the light of revelation or scripture. 1. In the very directions about making and setting up of kings, the Lord shews what conditions shall be required of them, Deut. xvii. 15. &c. and in all directions for obeying them, the qualifications they should have are rehearsed, as Rom. xii. 3, 4. Therefore none are to be set up but on these conditions, and none are to be obeyed but such as have these qualifications. 2. In his promises of the succession of kings, he secures their continuation only conditionally, to establish the kingdom, if they be constant to do his commandments and judgments, 1 Chron. xxviii. 7. There shall not fail a man to sit upon the throne, yet so that they take heed to their way to walk in God's law, as David did, 2 Chron. vi. 16.
Now he was not otherwise to perform these promises, but by the action and suffrage of the people setting him up, (which he had appointed to be the way of calling kings to thrones,) if therefore the Lord's promise be conditional, the people's actions also behoved to be suspended upon the same conditions. 3. We have many express covenants between rulers and subjects in scripture. Jephthah was fetched from the land of Tob, and made the head of the Gileadites by an explicit mutual stipulation, wherein the Lord was invocated as a witness, Judg. xi. 6, 8, 9, 10, 11. So all the elders of Israel came to make David king; and king David made a league with them in Hebron before the Lord, and then they anointed him over Israel, 2 Sam. v. 3. he made there a covenant with them before the Lord, 1 Chron. xi. 3.
He was no king before this covenant, and so it was a pactional oath between him and the kingdom, upon terms according to the law, Deut. xvii. He was only a king in fieri; one who was to be king, but now actually inaugurate a covenanted king upon terms that sanctified them. It is true, they came to recognosce Rehoboam's rights, and came to Shechem to make him king, 1 Kings xii. 1. and yet when he would not enter in covenant-terms with them, to satisfy their just demands, the people answered the king, saying, what portion have we in David, neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse, to your tents, O Israel, vers. 16. They refused to acknowledge such an usurper, and we find no prophets ever condemning them for it. So when Jehoash or Joash was crowned, Jehoiada made a covenant between the Lord and the king and the people, between the king also and the people, 2 Kings xi. 17. 2 Chron. xxiii. 11, 16. From all these reasons and scriptures, it is clear, there must be a mutual compact between the subjects and every sovereign they own subjection to, which if he refuse, and usurp the sword, they are under an anterior obligation to subtract their allegiance, and to make use of their sword, if they be in capacity to pull it out of his hands, and use it against him. And of this we are put in mind by the motto of our old coronation pieces, which have these words about the sword, 'for me, but, if I deserve, against me:' and surely to him that hath it now in his hands, it may be said, thou hast deserved, and as yet deserves. We see then, the allegiance that this usurper alledges is his due, wants a bottom, to wit, a compact with the people. Whence I argue, if there must of necessity be a compact between the king and the people, when he is advanced to the government: then he that advances himself, without and against this compact, is an usurper not to be owned; but the former is true: therefore he that advances himself without and against this compact, is an usurper not to be owned. And who more notoriously deserving such a signature, than James VII. and II. who hath made horns of his own strength, or the Pope's bulls, to push his brother out and himself into the throne, upon no terms at all, or any security for religion and liberty. One objection is to be removed here: can the customs of the Jews be binding to all nations? The kings of Judah made such covenants, shall therefore all kings do so?Answ.Why not this custom, as well as crowning, which they used likewise? These rules are not typical or ceremonial, nor only so judicial as to be peculiarly judicial, but are matters of moral equity, bearing a standing reason founded upon that law, Deut. xvii. 15. &c. limiting the prince to stand to conditions. If we cast at divine laws for rules of government where will we find better laws? It is recorded of the first of the British kings who was Christian, that writing to Eleutherius bishop of Rome, (before Antichrist took that seat) for the Roman laws, he received this answer: 'By divine clemency ye have received the law and faith of Christ, you have the Old and New Testaments, out of them in God's name by counsel of your states take laws, and govern your kingdom.' And of another, that he began his laws thus. God spake all these words, &c. And so repeated the laws of God. The second thing I undertook to prove, is that assertion of Buchanan ubi supra, de Jure Regni. 'There being a paction between the king and subjects, he who first recedes from what is covenanted, and doth counteract what he hath covenanted, he looses the contract; and the bond being loosed which did hold fast the king with the people, whatever right did belong to him by virtue of that compact, he looses it, and the people are as free as before the stipulation.' Which is also asserted by the author of Jus populi, chap. 6. pag. 112. 'It is no less clear, that when the sovereign doth not perform the principal, main, and most necessary conditions, condescended and agreed upon, by right he falleth from his sovereignty: and pag. 117. when the prince doth violate his compact, as to all its conditions, or as to its chief, main, and most necessary condition, the subjects are by right free from subjection to him, and at liberty to make choice of another.' This is so clear that it needs no labour to prove it, that, upon this head, we were loosed from all allegiance to the former tyrant, who was admitted upon terms of an explicit covenant, the conditions whereof he did as explicitly break.
There are two cases wherein subjects are loosed from covenanted allegiance to their princes. 1. When the prince remits the obligation of the subjects, and refuses allegiance upon that basis; then he can no more demand it by virtue of that compact. He that remits, and will not have that allegiance, that the subjects covenanted upon such and such conditions to him, these subjects should not give it that they so covenanted, for they should not prostitute it to a refuser and remitter: but Charles the II. remitted and would not have that allegiance, which we covenanted upon such and such conditions, viz. upon the terms of the covenant, which he cassed and annulled and made criminal to own: therefore to him we should not have given it, which we so covenanted. 2. When the prince doth enter into a mutual covenant with the people upon mutual conditions, and does not only cease to perform the conditions, but simply denies all obligation to do it, and makes it a quarrel to insinuate so much, yea persecutes all who dare assert the obligation of that covenant; and yet demands allegiance, not upon the obligation of that covenant which he hath remitted, but absolutely upon the grounds of his prerogative: in this case it will be evident also, the subjects are not bound either to own their formerly covenanted allegiance to him, or that which he demands on other grounds. Grotius de Jure belli, is clear as to this, lib. 1. cap. 4. num. 12. 'If there be such a clause or condition in the very devolution of the government upon a prince, as if he do so and so, the subjects shall be loosed from all bonds of obedience, then, when he does so, he becomes a mere private person.' Grotius there supposes the power is transferred upon a resolutive condition; that is, if he transgress the condition, the power shall be resolved into its first fountain: much more if it be transferred expresly also upon a suspensive condition, that he shall continue to maintain the ends of the covenant, defend religion and the liberties of the subjects, in the defence whereof we shall own allegiance to him, otherwise not. In that case, if he do not maintain these ends, plain it is, our obligation ceases; for how can it stand upon a conditional obligation, when his performance of the condition sists? But whatever be the conditions mutual, it flows natively from the nature of a mutual compact, 'That he who doth not perform the conditions agreed upon, hath no right to the benefit granted upon condition of performance of these conditions; especially if he perform not, or violate these conditions upon supposition whereof he would not have gotten the benefit: it were very absurd to say in a mutual conditional compact, one party shall still be found to perform his conditions, though the other perform none, but break all. Were it the act of rational creatures to set up a sovereign, upon conditions he shall not play the tyrant, and yet be bound to him though he tyrannize never so much? We have the name of mutual compacts in the spies covenant with Rahab, Josh. ii. 20. "If thou utter this our business, then we will be quit of thine oath, which thou hast made us to swear:" if she should break, condition, then the obligation on their part should cease. But next, all the stress will ly in proving that the covenant, on such and such conditions between a prince and subjects, doth equally and mutually oblige both to each other: for if it equally oblige both, then both are equally disengaged from other by the breach on either side, and either of them may have a just claim in law against the other for breach of the conditions. But royalists and court slaves alledge, that such a covenant obliges the king to God, but not to the people at all: so that he is no more accountable to them, than if he had none at all. But the contrary is evident: for, (1.) If the compact be mutual, and if it be infringed on one side, it must be so in the other also; for in contracts, the parties are considered as equals, whatever inequality there may be betwixt them otherwise: I speak of contracts among men. (2.) If it be not so, there is no covenant made with the people at all: and so David did no more covenant with Israel, than with the Chaldeans: for to all with whom the covenant is made it obliges them to it. Otherwise it must be said, he only made the covenant with God, contrary to the text: for he made it only before the Lord as a witness, not with him as a party. Joash's covenant with the Lord is expresly distinguished from that with the people. (3.) If it be not so, it were altogether nonsense to say, there were any covenant made with the king on the other hand: for he is supposed to be made king on such and such terms: and yet, by this, after he is made king he is no more obliged unto them, than if there had been no compact with him at all. (4.) If he be bound as king, and not only as a man or Christian, then he is bound with respect to the people; for with respect to them he is only king: but he is bound as king, and not only as a man or Christian, because it is only with him as king that the people covenant, and he must transact with them under the same consideration. Next, that which he is obliged to, is the specifical act of a king, to defend religion and liberty, and rule in righteousness; and therefore his covenant binds him as a king. Again, if he be not bound as king, then as a king he is under no obligation of law or oath, which is to make him a lawless tyrant; yea, none of God's subjects. It would also suppose that the king as king could not sin against the people at all, but only against God: for as king he could be under no obligation of duty to the people, and where there is no obligation, there is no sin; by this he would be set above all obligations to love his neighbour as himself, for he is above all his neighbours, and all mankind, and only less than God; and so by this doctrine, he is loosed from all duties of the second table, or at least he is not so much obliged to them as others. But against this it is objected: both prince and people are obliged to perform their part to each other, and both are obliged to God, but both are not accountable to each other; there is not mutual power in the parties to compel one another to perform the promised duty; the king hath it indeed over the people, but not the people over the king, and there is no indifferent judge superior to both, to compel both, but God. Ans. 1. What if all this should be granted? Yet it doth not infringe the proposition: what if the people have not power to compel him? Yet, if by law, he may fall from his sovereignty, though, indeed, he is not deposed: he loses his right to our part, when he breaks his part. 2. There is no need of a superior arbiter: for as in contracting they are considered as equal, so the party keeping the contract is superior to the other breaking it. 3. There may be mutual co-active power, where there is no mutual relation of superiority and inferiority: yea, in some cases, inferiors may have a co-active power by law, to compel their superiors failing in their duty to them; as a son wronged by his father, may compel him to reparation by law; and independent kingdoms, nothing inferior to each other, being in covenant together, the wronged may have a co-active power to force the other to duty, without any superior arbiter. 4. The bond of suretiship brings a man under the obligation to be accountable to the creditor, though the surety were never so high, and the creditor never so low: Solomon says, in general, without exception of kings; yea, including them because he was a king that spake it, Prov. vi. 1, 2. "My son, if thou be surety for thy friend,——thou art snared with the words of thy mouth." Now a king's power is but fiduciary; and therefore he cannot be unaccountable for the power concredited to him. And if this generation had minded this, our stewards should have been called to an account for their stewardship ere now. Hence I argue, if a covenanted prince, breaking all the conditions of his compact, doth forfeit his right to the subjects allegiance, then they are no more to own him as their sovereign; but the former is proved, that a covenanted prince, breaking all the conditions of his compact, doth forfeit his right to the subjects allegiance: Therefore——And consequently when Charles II. expresly bound by covenant to defend and promote the covenanted reformation and liberties of the kingdom, to whom only we were bound in the terms of his defending and promoting the same, did violently and villainously violate and vilify these conditions, we were no more bound to them. Somewhat possibly may be objected here, 1. If this be the sense of the covenant, then it would seem that we were not bound to own the king, but only when and while he were actually promoting and carrying on the ends of the covenant.Ans.It does not follow, but that we are obliged to preserve his person and authority in these necessary intervals, when he is called to see to himself as a man; for we must preserve him as a mean, because of his aptitude and designation for such an end, albeit not always formally prosecuting it: we do not say, that we are never to own him, but when actually exercised in prosecuting these ends: but we say, we are never to own him, when he is tyrannically and treacherously abusing his authority for destroying and overturning these ends, and violating all the conditions of his compact. It may be. Object. 2. Saul was a tyrant, and a breaker of his royal covenant, and persecutor of the godly, and murderer of the priests of the Lord, usurper upon the priest's office, and many other ways guilty of breaking all conditions: and yet David and all Israel owned him as the anointed of the Lord.Ans.1. Saul was indeed a tyrant, rejected of God, and to be ejected out of his kingdom in his own time and way, which David, a prophet knowing, would not anticipate. But he was far short, and a mere bungler in acts of tyranny in comparison of our grassators: he broke his royal covenant in very gross particular acts, but did not cass and rescind the whole of it, did not burn it, did not make it criminal to own its obligation, nor did he so much as profess a breach of it, nor arrogate an absolute prerogative, nor attempt arbitrary government, nor to evert the fundamental laws, and overturn the religion of Israel, and bring in idolatry as ours have done: he was a persecutor of David upon some private quarrels, not of all the godly upon the account of their covenanted religion: he murdered 85 priests of the Lord, in a transport of fury, because of their kindness to David; but he did not make laws adjudging all the ministers of the Lord to death, who should be found most faithful in their duty to God and his church, as ours have done against all field preachers: he usurped upon the priest's office, in one elicit act of sacrificing: but he did not usurp a supremacy over them, and annex it as an inherent right of his crown. 2. He was indeed such a tyrant, as deserved to have been dethroned and brought to condign punishment, upon the same accounts that Amaziah and Uzziah were deposed for afterwards: and in this the people failed in their duty, and for it they were plagued remarkably. Shall their omission be an argument to us? 3. As the question was never put to the people, whether they owned his authority as lawful, or not? So we do not read, either of their universal owning him, or their positive disowning him: however, that is no good argument, which is drawn from a not doing to a doing; because they did it not, therefore it must not be done. 4. They owned him; but how? As the minister of God, not to be resisted or revolted from under pain of damnation? (as all lawful magistrates ought to be owned, Rom. xiii. 2, 4.) This I deny: for David and his six hundred men resisted him resolutely; and though the body of the nation did long lazily ly and couch as asses under his burden, yet, at length, weary of his tyranny, many revolted from under him, and adjoined themselves to David at Ziklag, "while he kept himself close, because of Saul the son of Kish," 1 Chron. xii. 1. who are commended by the Spirit of God for their valour, verse. 2. &c. "and many out of Manasseh fell to him, when he came with the Philistines against Saul, to battle," verse 19. This was a practical disowning of the tyrant, before the Lord deposed him. 5. David did indeed pay him and his character some deference, as having been the anointed of the Lord; yet perhaps his honouring him with that title, the Lord's anointed, 1 Sam. xxiv. 1 Sam. xxvi. and calling him so often his Lord the King, cannot be altogether justified, no more than his using that same language to Achish king of Gath, 1 Sam. xxix. 8. I shewed before how titles might be allowed; but this so circumstantiate, does not seem so consistent with his imprecatory prayer, for the Lord's avenging him on him, 1 Sam. xxiv 12. and many other imprecations against him in his Psalms. In some of which he calls the same man, whom here he called, Psal. lix. 63, 14. and the evil, violent and wicked man, Psal. cxl. 1, 4. and the vilest of men, Psal. xii. ult. However it be, there can be no argument from hence, to own the authority of tyrants and usurpers.