S'abda (word) as a pramâ@na means the knowledge that we get about things (not within the purview of our perception) from relevant sentences by understanding the meaning of the words of which they are made up. These sentences may be of two kinds, viz. those uttered by men and those which belong to the Vedas. The first becomes a valid means of knowledge when it is not
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uttered by untrustworthy persons and the second is valid in itself. The meanings of words are of course known to us before, and cannot therefore be counted as a means of proof; but the meanings of sentences involving a knowledge of the relations of words cannot be known by any other acknowledged means of proof, and it is for this that we have to accept s`abda as a separate means of proof. Even if it is admitted that the validity of any sentence may be inferred on the ground of its being uttered by a trustworthy person, yet that would not explain how we understand the meanings of sentences, for when even the name or person of a writer or speaker is not known, we have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of any sentence.
Prabhâkara thinks that all sounds are in the form of letters, or are understandable as combinations of letters. The constituent letters of a word however cannot yield any meaning, and are thus to be regarded as elements of auditory perception which serve as a means for understanding the meaning of a word. The reason of our apprehension of the meaning of any word is to be found in a separate potency existing in the letters by which the denotation of the word may be comprehended. The perception of each letter-sound vanishes the moment it is uttered, but leaves behind an impression which combines with the impressions of the successively dying perceptions of letters, and this brings about the whole word which contains the potency of bringing about the comprehension of a certain meaning. If even on hearing a word the meaning cannot be comprehended, it has to be admitted that the hearer lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for the purpose. As the potency of the word originates from the separate potencies of the letters, it has to be admitted that the latter is the direct cause of verbal cognition. Both Prabhâkara and Kumârila agree on this point.
Another peculiar doctrine expounded here is that all words have natural denotative powers by which they themselves out of their own nature refer to certain objects irrespective of their comprehension or non-comprehension by the hearer. The hearer will not understand the meaning unless it is known to him that the word in question is expressive of such and such a meaning, but the word was all along competent to denote that meaning and it is the hearer's knowledge of that fact that helps him to
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understand the meaning of a word. Mîmâmsâ does not think that the association of a particular meaning with a word is due to conventions among people who introduce and give meanings to the words [Footnote ref 1]. Words are thus acknowledged to be denotative of themselves. It is only about proper names that convention is admitted to be the cause of denotation. It is easy to see the bearing of this doctrine on the self-validity of the Vedic commandments, by the performance of which such results would arise as could not have been predicted by any other person. Again all words are believed to be eternally existent; but though they are ever present some manifestive agency is required by which they are manifested to us. This manifestive agency consists of the effort put forth by the man who pronounces the word. Nyâya thinks that this effort of pronouncing is the cause that produces the word while Mîmâm@sâ thinks that it only manifests to the hearer the ever-existing word.
The process by which according to Prabhâkara the meanings of words are acquired maybe exemplified thus: a senior commands a junior to bring a cow and to bind a horse, and the child on noticing the action of the junior in obedience to the senior's commands comes to understand the meaning of "cow" and "horse." Thus according to him the meanings of words can only be known from words occurring in injunctive sentences; he deduces from this the conclusion that words must denote things only as related to the other factors of the injunction (anvitâbhidhâna vâda), and no word can be comprehended as having any denotation when taken apart from such a sentence. This doctrine holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally related to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence, thus the wordgâmaccusative case ofgo(cow) means that it is intended that something is to be done with the cow or the bovine genus, and it appears only as connected with a specific kind of action, viz. bringing in the sentencegâm ânaya—bring the cow. Kumârila however thinks that words independently express separate meanings which are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea (abhihitânvayavâda). Thus ingâm ânaya, according to Kumârila,gâmmeans the bovine class in the accusative character andânayaindependently means
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[Footnote 1: According to Nyâya God created all words and associated them with their meanings.]
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bring; these two are then combined into the meaning "bring the cow." But on the former theory the wordgâmmeans that it is connected with some kind of action, and the particular sentence only shows what the special kind of action is, as in the above sentence it appears as associated with bringing, but it cannot have any meaning separately by itself. This theory of Kumârila which is also the Nyâya theory is called abhihitânvayavâda [Footnote ref 1].
Lastly according to Prabhâkara it is only the Veda that can be called s'abda-pramâ@na, and only those sentences of it which contain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this way with these things). In all other cases the validity of words is only inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of the speaker. But Kumârila considers the words of all trustworthy persons as s'abda-pramâ@na.
The Pramâ@na of Non-perception (anupalabdhi).
In addition to the above pramâ@nas Kumârila admits a fifth kind of pramâ@na, viz.anupalabdhifor the perception of the non-existence of a thing. Kumârila argues that the non-existence of a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Some people prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anumâna. They say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object there is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no vision of a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy to see that such an inference presupposes the perception of want of vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions are to be accounted for is exactly the point to be solved. How can the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped? It is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of pramâ@na namely anupalabdhi.
All things exist in places either in a positive (sadrûpa) or in a negative relation (asadrûpa), and it is only in the former case
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[Footnote 1: SeePrabhâkaramîmâ@msâby Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ and S.N. Dasgupta'sStudy of Patanjali, appendix. It may be noted in this connection that Mîmâ@msâ did not favour the Spho@ta doctrine of sound which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was manifested (spho@ta) but not created by the passing sounds of the syllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this word manifestation. See Vâcaspati'sTattvabindu, S'lokavârttikaandPrakara@napañcikâ. For the doctrine of anvitâbhidhâna see Sâhkanâtha'sVâkyârthamât@rkâv@rttî.]
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that they come within the purview of the senses, while in the latter case the perception of the negative existence can only be had by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which we designate as a separate pramâ@na as anupalabdhi. Prabhâkara holds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the perception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no need of admitting a separate pramâ@na as anupalabdhi. For what is meant by empty space? If it is necessary that for the perception of the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely empty space before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone we ought not to perceive the non-existence of the jug, inasmuch as the place is not absolutely empty. If empty space is defined as that which is not associated with the jug, then the category of negation is practically admitted as a separate entity. If the perception of empty space is defined as the perception of space at the moment which we associated with a want of knowledge about the jug, then also want of knowledge as a separate entity has to be accepted, which amounts to the same thing as the admission of the want or negation of the jug. Whatever attempt may be made to explain the notion of negation by any positive conception, it will at best be an attempt to shift negation from the objective field to knowledge, or in other words to substitute for the place of the external absence of a thing an associated want of knowledge about the thing (in spite of its being a visible object) and this naturally ends in failure, for negation as a separate category has to be admitted either in the field of knowledge or in the external world. Negation or abhâva as a separate category has anyhow to be admitted. It is said that at the first moment only the ground is seen without any knowledge of the jug or its negation, and then at the next moment comes the comprehension of the non-existence of the jug. But this also means that the moment of the perception of the ground is associated with the want of knowledge of the jug or its negation. But this comes to the same thing as the admission of negation as a separate category, for what other meaning can there be in the perception of "only the ground" if it is not meant that it (the perception of the ground) is associated with or qualified by the want of knowledge of the jug? For the perception of the ground cannot generate the notion of the non-existence of the jug, since even where there is a jug the ground is perceived. The qualifying phrase that "only the ground is perceived" becomes
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meaningless, if things whose presence is excluded are not specified as negative conditions qualifying the perception of the ground. And this would require that we had already the notion of negation in us, which appeared to us of itself in a special manner unaccountable by other means of proof. It should also be noted that non-perception of a sensible object generates the notion of negation immediately and not through other negations, and this is true not only of things of the present moment but also of the memory of past perceptions of non-existence, as when we remember that there was no jug here. Anupalabdhi is thus a separate pramâ@na by which the absence or want of a sensible object—the negation of a thing—can be comprehended.
Self, Salvation, God.
Mîmâ@msâ has to accept the existence of soul, for without it who would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would be the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing sacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is thus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the sense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many, one in each body. Prabhâkara thinks that it is manifested to us in all cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence of self as a separate entity from the body, for had it not been so, why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our cognitions—even in those where there is no perception of the body? Kumârila however differs from Prabhâkara about this analysis of the consciousness of self in our cognitions, and says that even though we may not have any notion of the parts of our body or their specific combination, yet the notion of ourselves as embodied beings always appears in all our cognitions. Moreover in our cognitions of external objects we are not always conscious of the self as the knower; so it is not correct to say that self is different from the body on the ground that the consciousness of self is present in all our cognitions, and that the body is not cognized in many of our cognitions. But the true reason for admitting that the self is different from the body is this, that movement or willing, knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., cannot be attributed to the body, for though the body exists at death these cannot then be found. So it has to be admitted that they must belong to some other entity owing to the association with which the body appears
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to be endowed with movement etc. Moreover knowledge, feeling, etc. though apparent to the perceiver, are not yet perceived by others as other qualities of the body, as colour etc., are perceived by other men. It is a general law of causation that the qualities of the constituent elements (in the cause) impart themselves to the effect, but the earth atoms of which the body is made up do not contain the qualities of knowledge etc., and this also corroborates the inference of a separate entity as the vehicle of knowledge etc. The objection is sometimes raised that if the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or a mover? But Mîmâ@msâ does not admit that movement means atomic motion, for the principle of movement is the energy which moves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul. It is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the latter moves. So it is that though the soul does not move it is called an agent on account of the fact that it causes the movement of the body. The self must also be understood as being different from the senses, for even when one loses some of the senses he continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting all through.
The question now arises, how is self cognized? Prabhâkara holds that the self as cognizor is never cognized apart from the cognized object, nor is the object ever cognized without the cognizor entering into the cognition as a necessary factor. Both the self and the object shine forth in the self-luminous knowledge in what we have already described as tripu@ti-pratyâk@sa (perception as three-together). It is not the soul which is self-illumined but knowledge; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self and the object in one operation. But just as in the case of a man who walks, the action of walking rests upon the walker, yet he is regarded as the agent of the work and not as the object, so in the case of the operation of knowledge, though it affects the self, yet it appears as the agent and not as the object. Cognition is not soul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum, and appears in it as the cognitive element "I" which is inseparable from all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object is cognized the self also is not cognized.
Kumârila however thinks that the soul which is distinct from the body is perceived by a mental perception (mânasa-pratyak@saas the substratum of the notion of "I," or in other words the self perceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its
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own nature shines forth in consciousness as the "I." The objection that the self cannot itself be both subject and object to its own operation does not hold, for it applies equally to Prabhâkara's theory in which knowledge reveals the self as its object and yet considers it as the subject of the operation. The analogy of linguistic usage that though the walking affects the walker yet he is the agent, cannot be regarded as an escape from this charge, for the usage of language is not philosophical analysis. Though at the time of the cognition of objects the self is cognized, yet it does not appear as the knower of the knowledge of objects, but reveals itself as an object of a separate mental perception which is distinct from the knowledge of objects. The self is no doubt known as the substratum of "I," but the knowledge of this self does not reveal itself necessarily with the cognition of objects, nor does the self show itself as the knower of all knowledge of objects, but the self is apprehended by a separate mental intuition which we represent as the "I." The self does not reveal itself as the knower but as an object of a separate intuitive process of the mind. This is indeed different from Prabhâkara's analysis, who regarded the cognition of self as inseparable from the object-cognition, both being the result of the illumination of knowledge. Kumârila agrees with Prabhâkara however in holding that soul is not self-illuminating (svayamprakâs'a), for then even in deep sleep the soul should have manifested itself; but there is no such manifestation then, and the state of deep sleep appears as an unconscious state. There is also no bliss in deep sleep, for had it been so people would not have regretted that they had missed sensual enjoyments by untimely sleep. The expression that "I slept in bliss" signifies only that no misery was felt. Moreover the opposite representation of the deep sleep state is also found when a man on rising from sleep says "I slept so long without knowing anything not even my own self." The self is not atomic, since we can simultaneously feel a sensation in the head as well as in the leg. The Jaina theory that it is of the size of the body which contracts and expands according to the body it occupies is unacceptable. It is better therefore that the soul should be regarded as all-pervading as described in the Vedas. This self must also be different in different persons for otherwise their individual experiences of objects and of pleasure and pain cannot be explained [Footnote ref 1]. ___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: SeeS'lokavârttika, âtmavâdaS'âstra-dîpikâ, âtmavâda and mok@savâda.]
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Kumârila considered the self to be merely the potency of knowledge (jñânas'akti) [Footnote ref 1]. Cognitions of things were generated by the activity of the manas and the other senses. This self itself can only be cognized by mental perception, Or at the time of salvation there being none of the senses nor the manas the self remains in pure existence as the potency of knowledge without any actual expression or manifestation. So the state of salvation is the state in which the self remains devoid of any of its characteristic qualities such as pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc., for the self itself is not knowledge nor is it bliss or ânanda as Vedânta supposes; but these are generated in it by its energy and the operation of the senses. The self being divested of all its senses at that time, remains as a mere potency of the energy of knowledge, a mere existence. This view of salvation is accepted in the main by Prabhâkara also.
Salvation is brought about when a man enjoys and suffers the fruits of his good and bad actions and thereby exhausts them and stops the further generation of new effects by refraining from the performance of kâmya-karmas (sacrifices etc. performed for the attainment of certain beneficent results) and guarantees himself against the evil effects of sin by assiduously performing the nitya-karmas (such as the sandhyâ prayers etc., by the performance of which there is no benefit but the non-performance of which produces sins). This state is characterized by the dissolution of the body and the non-production of any further body or rebirth.
Mîmâ@msâ does not admit the existence of any God as the creator and destroyer of the universe. Though the universe is made up of parts, yet there is no reason to suppose that the universe had ever any beginning in time, or that any God created it. Every day animals and men are coming into being by the action of the parents without the operation of any God. Neither is it necessary as Nyâya supposes that dharma and adharma should have a supervisor, for these belong to the performer and
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[Footnote 1: It may be mentioned in this connection that unlike Nyâya Mîmâ@msâ did not consider all activity as being only of the nature of molecular vibration (parispanda). It admitted the existence of energy (s'akti) as a separate category which manifested itself in actual movements. The self being considered as a s'akti can move the body and yet remain unmoved itself. Manifestation of action only means the relationing of the energy with a thing. Nyâya strongly opposes this doctrine of a non-sensible (atîndriya) energy and seeks to explain all action by actual molecular motion.]
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no one can have any knowledge of them. Moreover there cannot be any contact (sa@myoga) or inherence (samavâya) of dharma and adharma with God that he might supervise them; he cannot have any tools or body wherewith to fashion the world like the carpenter. Moreover he could have no motive to create the world either as a merciful or as a cruel act. For when in the beginning there were no beings towards whom should he be actuated with a feeling of mercy? Moreover he would himself require a creator to create him. So there is no God, no creator, no creation, no dissolution or pralaya. The world has ever been running the same, without any new creation or dissolution, s@r@s@ti or pralaya.
Mîmâ@msâ as philosophy and Mîmâ@msâ as ritualism.
From what we have said before it will be easy to see that Mîmâ@msâ agrees in the main with Vais'e@sika about the existence of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, rûpa, rasa, etc. Kumârila's differences on the points of jâti, samavâya, etc. and Prabhâkara's peculiarities have also been mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that Kumârila was influenced by Sâ@mkhya thought rather than by Nyâya. Sâ@mkhya and Vais'e@sika are the only Hindu systems which have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics; other systems have generally followed them or have differed from them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhâkara and Kumârila have thus but little importance, as they agree in general with the Vais'e@sika view. In fact they were justified in not laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyâya-Vais'e@sika about the world was most suitable.
The main difference of Mîmâ@msâ with Nyâya consists of the theory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that the Veda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity from God, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by any other means. To do this it began by trying to establish the self-validity of all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda the advantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicated to us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, and there being nothing to contradict them later on there would be nothing in the world which could render the Vedic injunctions
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invalid. The other pramâ@nas such as perception, inference, etc. were described, firstly to indicate that they could not show to us how dharma could be acquired, for dharma was not an existing thing which could be perceived by the other pramâ@nas, but a thing which could only be produced by acting according to the injunctions of the Vedas. For the knowledge of dharma and adharma therefore the s'abdapramâ@na of the Veda was our only source. Secondly it was necessary that we should have a knowledge of the different means of cognition, as without them it would be difficult to discuss and verify the meanings of debatable Vedic sentences. The doctrine of creation and dissolution which is recognized by all other Hindu systems could not be acknowledged by the Mîmâ@msâ as it would have endangered the eternality of the Vedas. Even God had to be dispensed with on that account.
The Veda is defined as the collection of Mantras and Brâhma@nas (also called thevidhisor injunctive sentences). There are three classes of injunctions (1) apûrva-vidhi, (2) niyama-vidhi, and (3) parisa@nkhyâ-vidhi. Apûrva-vidhi is an order which enjoins something not otherwise known, e.g. the grains should be washed (we could not know that this part of the duty was necessary for the sacrifice except by the above injunction). Niyama-vidhi is that where when a thing could have been done in a number of ways, an order is made by the Veda which restricts us to following some definite alternative (e.g. though the chaff from the corn could be separated even by the nails, the order that "corn should be threshed" restricts us to the alternative of threshing as the only course acceptable for the sacrifice). In the niyama-vidhi that which is ordered is already known as possible but only as an alternative, and the vidhi insists upon one of these methods as the only one. In apûrva-vidhi the thing to be done would have remained undone and unknown had it not been for the vidhi. In parisa@nkhyâ-vidhi all that is enjoined is already known but not necessarily as possible alternatives. A certain mantra "I take up the rein" (imâm ag@rbhnâ@m ras'anâ@m) which could be used in a number of cases should not however be used at the time of holding the reins of an ass.
There are three main principles of interpreting the Vedic sentences. (1) When some sentences are such that connectively they yield a meaning but not individually, then they should be
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taken together connectively as a whole. (2) If the separate sentences can however yield meanings separately by themselves they should not be connected together. (3) In the case of certain sentences which are incomplete suitable words from the context of immediately preceding sentences are to be supplied.
The vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of dharma. The mantras which are generally hymns in praise of some deities or powers are to be taken as being for the specification of the deity to whom the libation is to be offered. It should be remembered that as dharma can only be acquired by following the injunctions of the Vedas they should all be interpreted as giving us injunctions. Anything therefore found in the Vedas which cannot be connected with the injunctive orders as forming part of them is to be regarded as untrustworthy or at best inexpressive. Thus it is that those sentences in the Vedas which describe existing things merely or praise some deed of injunction (called thearthavâdas) should be interpreted as forming part of a vidhi-vâkya (injunction) or be rejected altogether. Even those expressions which give reasons for the performance of certain actions are to be treated as mere arthavâdas and interpreted as praising injunctions. For Vedas have value only as mandates by the performance of which dharma may be acquired.
When a sacrifice is performed according to the injunctions of the Vedas, a capacity which did not exist before and whose existence is proved by the authority of the scriptures is generated either in the action or in the agent. This capacity or positive force calledapûrvaproduces in time the beneficent results of the sacrifice (e.g. leads the performer to Heaven). This apûrva is like a potency or faculty in the agent which abides in him until the desired results follow [Footnote ref 1].
It is needless to dilate upon these, for the voluminous works of S'abara and Kumârila make an elaborate research into the nature of sacrifices, rituals, and other relevant matters in great detail, which anyhow can have but little interest for a student of philosophy.
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[Footnote 1: See Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ'sPrabhâkaramîmâ@msâand Mâdhava'sNyâyamâlâvistara.]
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Comprehension of the philosophical Issues more essential than the Dialectic of controversy.
Pramâ@nain Sanskrit signifies the means and the movement by which knowledge is acquired,pramâtâmeans the subject or the knower who cognizes,pramâthe result of pramâ@na—right knowledge,prameyathe object of knowledge, andprâmâ@nyathe validity of knowledge acquired. The validity of knowledge is sometimes used in the sense of the faithfulness of knowledge to its object, and sometimes in the sense of an inner notion of validity in the mind of the subject—the knower (that his perceptions are true), which moves him to work in accordance with his perceptions to adapt himself to his environment for the attainment of pleasurable and the avoidance of painful things. The question wherein consists the prâmâ@nya of knowledge has not only an epistemological and psychological bearing but a metaphysical one also. It contains on one side a theory of knowledge based on an analysis of psychological experience, and on the other indicates a metaphysical situation consistent with the theory of knowledge. All the different schools tried to justify a theory of knowledge by an appeal to the analysis and interpretation of experience which the others sometimes ignored or sometimes regarded as unimportant. The thinkers of different schools were accustomed often to meet together and defeat one another in actual debates, and the result of these debates was frequently very important in determining the prestige of any school of thought. If a Buddhist for example could defeat a great Nyâya or Mîmâ@msâ thinker in a great public debate attended by many learned scholars from different parts of the country, his fame at once spread all over the country and he could probably secure a large number of followers on the spot. Extensive tours of disputation were often undertaken by great masters all over the country for the purpose of defeating the teachers of the opposite schools and of securing adherents to their own. These debates were therefore not generally conducted merely in a passionless philosophical
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mood with the object of arriving at the truth but in order to inflict a defeat on opponents and to establish the ascendency of some particular school of thought. It was often a sense of personal victory and of the victory of the school of thought to which the debater adhered that led him to pursue the debate. Advanced Sanskrit philosophical works give us a picture of the attitude of mind of these debaters and we find that most of these debates attempt to criticize the different schools of thinkers by exposing their inconsistencies and self-contradictions by close dialectical reasoning, anticipating the answers of the opponent, asking him to define his statements, and ultimately proving that his theory was inconsistent, led to contradictions, and was opposed to the testimony of experience. In reading an advanced work on Indian philosophy in the original, a student has to pass through an interminable series of dialectic arguments, and negative criticisms (to thwart opponents) sometimes calledvita@n@dâ, before he can come to the root of the quarrel, the real philosophical divergence. All the resources of the arts of controversy find full play for silencing the opponent before the final philosophical answer is given. But to a modern student of philosophy, who belongs to no party and is consequently indifferent to the respective victory of either side, the most important thing is the comprehension of the different aspects from which the problem of the theory of knowledge and its associated metaphysical theory was looked at by the philosophers, and also a clear understanding of the deficiency of each view, the value of the mutual criticisms, the speculations on the experience of each school, their analysis, and their net contribution to philosophy. With Vedânta we come to an end of the present volume, and it may not be out of place here to make a brief survey of the main conflicting theories from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, in order to indicate the position of the Vedânta of the S'a@nkara school in the field of Indian philosophy so far as we have traversed it. I shall therefore now try to lay before my readers the solution of the theory of knowledge (pramâ@navâda) reached by some of the main schools of thought. Their relations to the solution offered by the S'a@nkara Vedânta will also be dealt with, as we shall attempt to sketch the views of the Vedanta later on in this chapter.
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The philosophical situation. A Review.
Before dealing with the Vedânta system it seems advisable to review the general attitude of the schools already discussed to the main philosophical and epistemological questions which determine the position of the Vedânta as taught by S'a@nkara and his school.
The Sautrântika Buddhist says that in all his affairs man is concerned with the fulfilment of his ends and desires (puru@sâdrtka). This however cannot be done without right knowledge (samyagjñâna) which rightly represents things to men. Knowledge is said to be right when we can get things just as we perceived them. So far as mere representation or illumination of objects is concerned, it is a patent fact that we all have knowledge, and therefore this does not deserve criticism or examination. Our enquiry about knowledge is thus restricted to its aspect of later verification or contradiction in experience, for we are all concerned to know how far our perceptions of things which invariably precede all our actions can be trusted as rightly indicating what we want to get in our practical experience (arthaprâdpakatva). The perception is right (abhrântanon-illusory) when following its representation we can get in the external world such things as were represented by it (sa@mvâdakatva). That perception alone can be right which is generated by the object and not merely supplied by our imagination. When I say "this is the cow I had seen," what I see is the object with the brown colour, horns, feet, etc., but the fact that this is called cow, or that this is existing from a past time, is not perceived by the visual sense, as this is not generated by the visual object. For all things are momentary, and that which I see now never existed before so as to be invested with this or that permanent name. This association of name and permanence to objects perceived is calledkaipanâorabhilâpa. Our perception is correct only so far as it is without the abhilâpa association (kalpanâpo@dha), for though this is taken as a part of our perceptual experience it is not derived from the object, and hence its association with the object is an evident error. The object as unassociated with name—the nirvikalpa—is thus what is perceived. As a result of the pratyak@sa the manovijñâna or thought and mental perception of pleasure and pain is also determined. At one moment perception reveals the object as an
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object of knowledge (grâhya), and by the fact of the rise of such a percept, at another moment it appears as a thing realizable or attainable in the external world. The special features of the object undefinable in themselves as being what they are in themselves (svalak@sa@na) are what is actually perceived (pratyak@savi@saya) [Footnote ref 1]. Thepramâ@naphala(result of perception) is the
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[Footnote 1: There is a difference of opinion about the meaning of the word "svalak@sa@na" of Dharmakîrtti between ray esteemed friend Professor Stcherbatsky of Petrograd and myself. He maintains that Dharmakîrtti held that the content of the presentative element at the moment of perception was almost totally empty. Thus he writes to me, "According to your interpretation svalak@sa@na mean,—the object (or idea with Vijñânavâdin)from which everything past and everything future has been eliminated, this I do not deny at all. But I maintain that if everything past and future has been taken away, what remains?The presentand the present is ak@sa@nai.e. nothing…. The reverse of k@sa@na is a k@sa@nasamtâna or simply sa@mtâna and in every sa@mtâna there is a synthesis ekîbhâva of moments past and future, produced by the intellect (buddhi = nis'caya = kalpana = adhyavasâya)…There is in the perception of a jugsomething(a k@sa@na of sense knowledge) which we must distinguish from theideaof a jug (which is always a sa@mtâna, always vikalpita), and if you take the idea away in a strict unconditional sense, no knowledge remains: k@sanasya jñânena prâpayitumas'akyatvât. This is absolutely the Kantian teaching aboutSynthesis of Apprehension. Accordingly pratyak@sa is atranscendentalsource of knowledge, because practically speaking it gives no knowledge at all. Thispramâ@naisasatkalpa. Kant says that without the elements of intuition (= sense-knowledge = pratyak@sa = kalpanâpo@dha) our cognitions would be empty and without the elements of intellect (kalpanâ = buddhi = synthesis = ekîbhâva) they would be blind. Empirically both are always combined. This is exactly the theory of Dharmakîrtti. He is a Vijñânavâdî as I understand, because he maintains the cognizability of ideas (vijñâna) alone, but the reality is an incognizable foundation of our knowledge; he admits, it is bâhya, it is artha, it is arthakriyâk@sa@na = svalak@sa@na; that is the reason for which he sometimes is called Sautrântika and this school is sometimes called Sautranta-vijñânavâda, as opposed to the Vijñânavâda of As'vagho@sa and Âryâsanga, which had no elaborate theory of cognition. If the jug as it exists in our representation were the svalak@sa@na and paramârthasat, what would remain of Vijñânavâda? But there is the perception of the jug as opposed to thepure ideaof a jug (s'uddhâ kalpanâ), an element of reality, the sensational k@sa@na, which is communicated to us by sense knowledge. Kant's 'thing in itself' is also a k@sa@na and also an element of sense knowledge of pure sense as opposed to pure reason, Dharmakîrtti has alsos'uddhâ kalpanâands'uddham pratyak@sam. …And very interesting is the opposition between pratyak@sa and anumâna, the first moves from k@sa@na to sa@mtâna and the second from sa@mtâna to k@sa@na, that is the reason that although bhrânta the anumâna is nevertheless pramâ@na because through it we indirectly also reach k@sa@na, the arthakriyâk@sa@na. It is bhrânta directly and pramâ@na indirectly; pratyak@sa is pramâ@na directly and bhrânta (asatkalpa) indirectly… ." So far as the passages to which Professor Stcherbatsky refers are concerned, I am in full agreement with him. But I think that he pushes the interpretation too far on Kantian lines. When I perceive "this is blue," the perception consists of two parts, the actual presentative element of sense-knowledge (svalak@sa@na) and the affirmation (nis'caya). So far we are in complete agreement. But Professor Stcherbatsky says that this sense-knowledge is a k@sa@na (moment) and is nothing. I also hold that it is a k@sa@na, but it is nothing only in the sense that it is not the same as the notion involving affirmation such as "this is blue." The affirmative process occurring at the succeeding moments is determined by the presentative element of the first moment (pratyak@sabalotpannaN.T., p. 20) but this presentative element divested from the product of the affirmative process of the succeeding moments is not characterless, though we cannot express its character; as soon as we try to express it, names and other ideas consisting of affirmation are associated and these did not form a part of the presentative element. Its own character is said to be its own specific nature (svalak@sa@na). But what is this specific nature? Dharmakîrtti's answer on this point is that by specific nature he means those specific characteristics of the object which appear clear when the object is near and hazy when it is at a distance (yasyârthasya sannidhânâsannidhânâbkyâm jñânapratibhâsabhedastat svalak@sa@namN., p. 1 and N.T., p. 16). Sense-knowledge thus gives us the specific characteristics of the object, and this has the same form as the object itself; it is the appearance of the "blue" in its specific character in the mind and when this is associated by the affirmative or ideational process, the result is the concept or idea "this is blue" (nîlasarûpa@m pratyak@samanubhûyamâna@m nîlabodharûpamavasthâpyate … nîlasârûpyamasya pramâ@nam nîlavikalpanarûpa@m tvasya pramâ@naphalam, N.T.p. 22). At the first moment there is the appearance of the blue (nîlanirbhâsa@m hi vijñânam, N.T. 19) and this is direct acquaintance (yatkiñcit arthasya sâk@sâtkârijñânam tatpratyak@samucyate, N.T. 7) and this is real (paramârthasat) and valid. This blue sensation is different from the idea "this is blue" (nîlabodha, N.T. 22) which is the result of the former (pramâ@naphala) through the association of the affirmative process (adhyavasâya) and is regarded as invalid for it contains elements other than what were presented to the sense and is avikalpapratyaya. In my opinionsvalak@sa@natherefore means pure sensation of the moment presenting the specific features of the object and with Dharmakîrtti this is the only thing which is valid in perception and vikalpapratyaya or pramânaphala is the idea or concept which follows it. But though the latter is a product of the former, yet, being the construction of succeeding moments, it cannot give us the pure stage of the first moment of sensation-presentation (k@sa@nasya prâpayitumas'akyatvât, N.T. 16). N.T. =Nyâyabindu@tîkâ, N = _Nyâyabindu (Peterson's edition).]
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ideational concept and power that such knowledge has of showing the means which being followed the thing can be got (yena k@rtena artha@h prâpito bhavati). Pramâ@na then is the similarity of the knowledge with the object by which it is generated, by which we assure ourselves that this is our knowledge of the object as it is perceived, and are thus led to attain it by practical experience. Yet this later stage is pramâ@naphala and not pramâ@na which consists merely in the vision of the thing (devoid of other associations), and which determines the attitude of the perceiver towards the perceived object. The pramâ@na therefore only refers to the newly-acquired knowledge (anadhigatâdhigant@r) as this is of use to the perceiver in determining his relations with the objective world. This account of perception leaves out the real epistemological question as to how the knowledge is generated by the external world, or what it is in itself. It only looks to the correctness or faithfulness of the perception to the object and its value for us in the practical realization of our ends. The question of the relation of the external world with knowledge as determining the latter is regarded as unimportant.
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The Yogâcâras or idealistic Buddhists take their cue from the above-mentioned Sautrântika Buddhists, and say that since we can come into touch with knowledge and knowledge alone, what is the use of admitting an external world of objects as the data of sensation determining our knowledge? You say that sensations are copies of the external world, but why should you say that they copy, and not that they alone exist? We never come into touch with objects in themselves; these can only be grasped by us simultaneously with knowledge of them, they must therefore be the same as knowledge (sahopalambhaniyamât abhedo nîlataddhiyo@h); for it is in and through knowledge that external objects can appear to us, and without knowledge we are not in touch with the so-called external objects. So it is knowledge which is self-apparent in itself, that projects itself in such a manner as to appear as referring to other external objects. We all acknowledge that in dreams there are no external objects, but even there we have knowledge. The question why then if there are no external objects, there should be so much diversity in the forms of knowledge, is not better solved by the assumption of an external world; for in such an assumption, the external objects have to be admitted as possessing the infinitely diverse powers of diversely affecting and determining our knowledge; that being so, it may rather be said that in the beginningless series of flowing knowledge, preceding knowledge-moments by virtue of their inherent specific qualities determine the succeeding knowledge-moments. Thus knowledge alone exists; the projection of an external word is an illusion of knowledge brought about by beginningless potencies of desire (vâsanâ) associated with it. The preceding knowledge determines the succeeding one and that another and so on. Knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc. are not qualities requiring a permanent entity as soul in which they may inhere, but are the various forms in which knowledge appears. Even the cognition, "I perceive a blue thing," is but a form of knowledge, and this is often erroneously interpreted as referring to a permanent knower. Though the cognitions are all passing and momentary, yet so long as the series continues to be the same, as in the case of one person, say Devadatta, the phenomena of memory, recognition, etc. can happen in the succeeding moments, for these are evidently illusory cognitions, so far as they refer to the permanence of the objects
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believed to have been perceived before, for things or knowledge-moments, whatever they may be, are destroyed the next moment after their birth. There is no permanent entity as perceiver or knower, but the knowledge-moments are at once the knowledge, the knower and the known. This thoroughgoing idealism brushes off all references to an objective field of experience, interprets the verdict of knowledge as involving a knower and the known as mere illusory appearance, and considers the flow of knowledge as a self-determining series in successive objective forms as the only truth. The Hindu schools of thought, Nyâya, Sâ@mkhya, and the Mîmâ@msâ, accept the duality of soul and matter, and attempt to explain the relation between the two. With the Hindu writers it was not the practical utility of knowledge that was the only important thing, but the nature of knowledge and the manner in which it came into being were also enquired after and considered important.
Pramâ@na is defined by Nyâya as the collocation of instruments by which unerring and indubitable knowledge comes into being. The collocation of instruments which brings about definite knowledge consists partly of consciousness (bodha) and partly of material factors (bodhâbodhasvabhâva). Thus in perception the proper contact of the visual sense with the object (e.g. jug) first brings about a non-intelligent, non-apprehensible indeterminate consciousness (nirvikalpa) as the jugness (gha@tatva) and this later on combining with the remaining other collocations of sense-contact etc. produces the determinate consciousness: this is a jug. The existence of this indeterminate state of consciousness as a factor in bringing about the determinate consciousness, cannot of course be perceived, but its existence can be inferred from the fact that if the perceiver were not already in possession of the qualifying factor (vis'e@sanajñânaas jugness) he could not have comprehended the qualified object (vis'i@s@tabuddhi} the jug (i.e. the object which possesses jugness). In inference (anumâ@na) knowledge of the li@nga takes part, and in upamâna the sight of similarity with other material conglomerations. In the case of the Buddhists knowledge itself was regarded as pramâ@na; even by those who admitted the existence of the objective world, right knowledge was called pramâ@na, because it was of the same form as the external objects it represented, and it was by the form of the knowledge (e.g. blue) that we could apprehend that the
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external object was also blue. Knowledge does not determine the external world but simply enforces our convictions about the external world. So far as knowledge leads us to form our convictions of the external world it is pramâ@na, and so far as it determines our attitude towards the external world it is pramâ@naphala. The question how knowledge is generated had little importance with them, but how with knowledge we could form convictions of the external world was the most important thing. Knowledge was called pramâ@na, because it was the means by which we could form convictions (adhyavasâya) about the external world. Nyâya sought to answer the question how knowledge was generated in us, but could not understand that knowledge was not a mere phenomenon like any other objective phenomenon, but thought that though as a gu@na (quality) it was external like other gu@nas, yet it was associated with our self as a result of collocations like any other happening in the material world. Pramâ@na does not necessarily bring to us new knowledge (anadhigatâdhi-gant@r) as the Buddhists demanded, but whensoever there were collocations of pramâ@na, knowledge was produced, no matter whether the object was previously unknown or known. Even the knowledge of known things may be repeated if there be suitable collocations. Knowledge like any other physical effect is produced whenever the cause of it namely the pramâ@na collocation is present. Categories which are merely mental such as class (sâmânya), inherence (samavâya), etc., were considered as having as much independent existence as the atoms of the four elements. The phenomenon of the rise of knowledge in the soul was thus conceived to be as much a phenomenon as the turning of the colour of the jug by fire from black to red. The element of indeterminate consciousness was believed to be combining with the sense contact, the object, etc. to produce the determinate consciousness. There was no other subtler form of movement than the molecular. Such a movement brought about by a certain collocation of things ended in a certain result (phala). Jñâna (knowledge) was thus the result of certain united collocations (sâmagrî) and their movements (e.g. contact of manas with soul, of manas with the senses, of the senses with the object, etc.). This confusion renders it impossible to understand the real philosophical distinction between knowledge and an external event of the objective world. Nyâya thus fails to explain the cause
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of the origin of knowledge, and its true relations with the objective world. Pleasure, pain, willing, etc. were regarded as qualities which belonged to the soul, and the soul itself was regarded as a qualitiless entity which could not be apprehended directly but was inferred as that in which the qualities of jñâna, sukha (pleasure), etc. inhered. Qualities had independent existence as much as substances, but when any new substances were produced, the qualities rushed forward and inhered in them. It is very probable that in Nyâya the cultivation of the art of inference was originally pre-eminent and metaphysics was deduced later by an application of the inferential method which gave the introspective method but little scope for its application, so that inference came in to explain even perception (e.g. this is a jug since it has jugness) and the testimony of personal psychological experience was taken only as a supplement to corroborate the results arrived at by inference and was not used to criticize it [Footnote ref 1].
Sâ@mkhya understood the difference between knowledge and material events. But so far as knowledge consisted in being the copy of external things, it could not be absolutely different from the objects themselves; it was even then an invisible translucent sort of thing, devoid of weight and grossness such as the external objects possessed. But the fact that it copies those gross objects makes it evident that knowledge had essentially the same substances though in a subtler form as that of which the objects were made. But though the matter of knowledge, which assumed the form of the objects with which it came in touch, was probably thus a subtler combination of the same elementary substances of which matter was made up, yet there was in it another element, viz. intelligence, which at once distinguished it as utterly different from material combinations. This element of intelligence is indeed different from the substances or content of the knowledge itself, for the element of intelligence is like a stationary light, "the self," which illuminates the crowding, bustling knowledge which is incessantly changing its form in accordance with the objects with which it comes in touch. This light of intelligence is the same that finds its manifestation in consciousness as the "I," the changeless entity amidst all the fluctuations of the changeful procession of knowledge. How this element of light which is foreign to the substance of knowledge
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[Footnote 1: SeeNyâyamañjarîon pramâ@na.]
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relates itself to knowledge, and how knowledge itself takes it up into itself and appears as conscious, is the most difficult point of the Sâ@mkhya epistemology and metaphysics. The substance of knowledge copies the external world, and this copy-shape of knowledge is again intelligized by the pure intelligence (puru@sa) when it appears as conscious. The forming of the buddhi-shape of knowledge is thus the pramâ@na (instrument and process of knowledge) and the validity or invalidity of any of these shapes is criticized by the later shapes of knowledge and not by the external objects (svata@h-prâmâ@nyaandsvata@h-aprâmâ@nya). The pramâ@na however can lead to a pramâ or right knowledge only when it is intelligized by the puru@sa. The puru@sa comes in touch with buddhi not by the ordinary means of physical contact but by what may be called an inexplicable transcendental contact. It is the transcendental influence of puru@sa that sets in motion the original prak@rti in Sâ@mkhya metaphysics, and it is the same transcendent touch (call it yogyatâ according to Vâcaspati or samyoga according to Bhik@su) of the transcendent entity of puru@sa that transforms the non-intelligent states of buddhi into consciousness. The Vijñânavâdin Buddhist did not make any distinction between the pure consciousness and its forms (âkâra) and did not therefore agree that the âkâra of knowledge was due to its copying the objects. Sâ@mkhya was however a realist who admitted the external world and regarded the forms as all due to copying, all stamped as such upon a translucent substance (sattva) which could assume the shape of the objects. But Sâ@mkhya was also transcendentalist in this, that it did not think like Nyâya that the âkâra of knowledge was all that knowledge had to show; it held that there was a transcendent element which shone forth in knowledge and made it conscious. With Nyâya there was no distinction between the shaped buddhi and the intelligence, and that being so consciousness was almost like a physical event. With Sâ@mkhya however so far as the content and the shape manifested in consciousness were concerned it was indeed a physical event, but so far as the pure intelligizing element of consciousness was concerned it was a wholly transcendent affair beyond the scope and province of physics. The rise of consciousness was thus at once both transcendent and physical.
The Mîmâ@msist Prabhâkara agreed with Nyâya in general as regards the way in which the objective world and sense contact
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induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a unique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knower and the known. We are not concerned with physical collocations, for whatever these may be it is knowledge which reveals things—the direct apprehension that should be called the pramâ@na. Pramâ@na in this sense is the same as pramiti or pramâ, the phenomenon of apprehension. Pramâ@na may also indeed mean the collocations so far as they induce the pramâ. For pramâ or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists, but it manifests itself differently under different circumstances. The validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specific attitude that is generated in us with reference to the objective world. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge, and it does not await the verdict of any later experience in the objective field (sa@mvâdin). Knowledge as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) means the whole knowledge of the object and not merely a non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate class-notion as Nyâya holds. The savikalpa (determinate) knowledge only re-establishes the knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects as represented by memory [Footnote ref 1].
Prabhâkara rejected the Sâ@mkhya conception of a dual element in consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (cit) and a material part, the buddhi; but it regarded consciousness as an unique thing which by itself in one flash represented both the knower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not depend upon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating (pradars'akatva) external objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension (anubhûti) has of prompting us to action in the external world; knowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all its self-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apart from its self-revealing character Prabhâkara did not enquire.
Kumârila declared that jñâna (knowledge) was a movement brought about by the activity of the self which resulted in producing consciousness (jñâtatâ) of objective things. Jñâna itself cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movement necessary for producing the jñâtatâ or consciousness of things. Movement with Kumârila was not a mere atomic vibration, but was a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration
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[Footnote 1: Sâ@mkhya considered nirvikalpa as the dim knowledge of the first moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next moment, was called savikalpa.]
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was sometimes the result. Jñâna was a movement and not the result of causal operation as Nyâya supposed. Nyâya would not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities, such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accomplishment of a physical movement. Kumârila accords the same self-validity to knowledge that Prabhâkara gives. Later knowledge by experience is not endowed with any special quality which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the previous movement. For what is called sa@mvâdi or later testimony of experience is but later knowledge and nothing more [Footnote ref 1]. The self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating circumstances leading to cognition of things that is called jñâna [Footnote ref 2]. Here Kumârila distinguishes knowledge as movement from knowledge as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was beyond sense perception and could only be inferred.
The idealistic tendency of Vijñânavâda Buddhism, Sâ@mkhya, and Mîmâ@msâ was manifest in its attempt at establishing the unique character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in touch. But Vijñânavâda denied the external world, and thereby did violence to the testimony of knowledge. Sâ@mkhya admitted the external world but created a gulf between the content of knowledge and pure intelligence; Prabhâkara ignored this difference, and was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and the known, Kumârila however admitted a transcendent element of movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness, but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question remained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects, how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative, either referring to one's being prompted to the objective world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the suitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later
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[Footnote 1: SeeNyâyaratnamâla, svata@h-prâmâ@nya-nir@naya.]
[Footnote 2: SeeNyâyamañjarion Pramâ@na,S'lokavârttikaonPratyak@sa, and Gâgâ Bha@t@ta'sBha@t@tâcintama@nion Pratyak@sa.]
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uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether any absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge and matter could be made at all. That which appeared was regarded as the real. But the question was not asked, whether there was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth, the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable, reality. This philosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the Hindu mind.
Vedânta Literature.
It is difficult to ascertain the time when theBrahma-sûtraswere written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the other Indian systems, even of the S'ûnyavâda Buddhism (of course according to S'a@nkara's interpretation), they cannot have been written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in supposing that they were written some time in the second century B.C. About the period 780 A.D. Gau@dapâda revived the monistic teaching of the Upani@sads by his commentary on the Mâ@n@dûkya Upani@sad in verse calledMâ@n@dûkyakârikâ. His disciple Govinda was the teacher of S'a@nkara (788—820 A.D.). S'a@nkara's commentary on theBrahma-sûtrasis the root from which sprang forth a host of commentaries and studies on Vedântism of great originality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus Ânandagiri, a disciple of S'a@nkara, wrote a commentary calledNyâyanir@naya, and Govindânanda wrote another commentary namedRatna-prabhâ. Vâcaspati Mis'ra, who flourished about 841 A.D., wrote another commentary on it called theBhâmati.Amalânanda (1247—1260 A.D.) wrote hisKalpataruon it, and Apyayadik@sita (1550 A.D.) son of Ra@ngarâjadhvarîndra of Kâñcî wrote hisKalpataruparimalaon theKalpataru.Another disciple of S'a@nkara, Padmapâda, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it known asPañcapâdikâ. From the manner in which the book is begun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary on the whole of S'a@nkara's bhâsya, but it ends abruptly at the end of the fourth sûtra. Mâdhava (1350), in hisS'a@nkaravijaya,recites an interesting story about it. He says that Sures'vara received S'a@nkara's permission to write a vârttika on the bhâsya. But other pupils objected to S'a@nkara that since Sures'vara was formerly a great Mîmâ@msist (Ma@n@dana Misra was called Sures'vara after his conversion to Vedântism) he was not competent to write
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a goodvârttikaon the bhâ@sya. Sures'vara, disappointed, wrote a treatise calledNai@skarmyasiddhi.Padmapâda wrote a @tîkâ but this was burnt in his uncle's house. S'a@nkara, who had once seen it, recited it from memory and Padmapâda wrote it down. Prakâs'âtman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapâda'sPañcapâdikâknown as _Pañcapâdikâvivara@na. _Akha@n@dânanda wrote hisTattvadîpana,and the famous N@rsi@mhâs'rama Muni (1500) wrote hisVivara@nabhâvaprakâs'ikâon it. Amalânanda and Vidyasâgara also wrote commentaries onPañcapâdikâ,namedPañcapâdikâdarpa@naandPañcapâdikâ@tîkârespectively, but thePañcapâdikâvivara@nahad by far the greatest reputation. Vidyâra@nya who is generally identified by some with Mâdhava (1350) wrote his famous workVivara@naprameyasa@mgraha[Footnote ref 1], elaborating the ideas ofPañcapâdikâvivara@na; Vidyâra@nya wrote also another excellent work namedJîvanmuktivivekaon the Vedânta doctrine of emancipation. Sures'vara's (800 A.D.) excellent workNai@skarmyasiddhiis probably the earliest independent treatise on S'a@nkara's philosophy as expressed in his bhâ@sya. It has been commented upon by Jñânottama Mis'ra. Vidyâra@nya also wrote another work of great merit known asPañcadas'î,which is a very popular and illuminating treatise in verse on Vedânta. Another important work written in verse on the main teachings of S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya isSa@mk@sepas'arîraka, written by Sarvajñâtma Muni (900 A.D.). This has also been commented upon by Râmatîrtha. S'rîhar@sa (1190 A.D.) wrote hisKha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya, the most celebrated work on the Vedânta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly after S'rîhar@sa, wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote an independent work on Vedânta dialectic known asTattvadîpikâwhich has also a commentary calledNayanaprasâdinîwritten by Pratyagrûpa. S'a@nkara Mis'ra and Raghunâtha also wrote commentaries onKha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya.A work on Vedânta epistemology and the principal topics of Vedânta of great originality and merit known asVedântaparibhâ@sâwas written by Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra (about 155OA.D.). His son Râmak@r@snâdhvarin wrote hisS'ikhâma@nion it and Amaradâsa hisMa@niprabhâ.TheVedântaparibhâ@sâwith these two commentaries forms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamental principles of Vedânta. Another work of supreme importance
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[Footnote 1: See Narasi@mhâcârya's article in theIndian Antiquary, 1916.]
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(though probably the last great work on Vedânta) is theAdvaitasiddhiof Madhusûdana Sarasvatî who followed Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra. This has three commentaries known asGau@dabrahmânandî,Vi@t@thales'opadhyâyîandSiddhivyâkhyâ. Sadânanda Vyâsa wrote also a summary of it known asAdvaitasiddhisiddhântasâra. Sadânanda wrote also an excellent elementary work namedVedântasârawhich has also two commentariesSubodhinîandVidvanmanorañjinî. TheAdvaitabrahmasiddhiof Sadânanda Yati though much inferior toAdvaitasiddhiis important, as it touches on many points of Vedânta interest which are not dealt with in other Vedânta works. TheNyâyamakarandaof Ânandabodha Bha@t@târakâcâryya treats of the doctrines of illusion very well, as also some other important points of Vedânta interest.Vedântasiddhântamuktâvalîof Prakâs'ânanda discusses many of the subtle points regarding the nature of ajñâna and its relations to cit, the doctrine ofd@r@stis@r@stivâda, etc., with great clearness. _Siddhântales'a by Apyayadîk@sita is very important as a summary of the divergent views of different writers on many points of interest.VedântatattvadîpikâandSiddhântatattvaare also good as well as deep in their general summary of the Vedânta system.Bhedadhikkâraof Nrsi@mhâs'rama Muni also is to be regarded as an important work on the Vedânta dialectic.
The above is only a list of some of the most important Vedânta works on which the present chapter has been based.
Vedânta in Gau@dapâda.
It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of the Vedânta thought as contained in theBrahma-sûtraswithout making any reference to the commentary of S'a@nkara or any other commentator. There is reason to believe that theBrahma-sûtraswere first commented upon by some Vai@s@nava writers who held some form of modified dualism [Footnote ref 1]. There have been more than a half dozen Vai@s@nava commentators of theBrahma-sûtraswho not only differed from S'a@nkara's interpretation, but also differed largely amongst themselves in accordance with the different degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects of their dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed that his interpretation was the only one that was faithful to the sûtras and to
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[Footnote 1: This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume, when I shall deal with the systems expounded by the Vai@s@nava commentators of theBrahma-sûtras.]
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the Upani@sads. Should I attempt to give an interpretation myself and claim that to be the right one, it would be only just one additional view. But however that may be, I am myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of theBrahma-sûtraswere probably more faithful to the sûtras than the interpretations of S'añkara.
TheS'rîmadbhagavadgîtâ, which itself was a work of the Ekânti (singularistic) Vai@s@navas, mentions theBrahma-sûtrasas having the same purport as its own, giving cogent reasons [Footnote ref 1]. Professor Jacobi in discussing the date of the philosophical sûtras of the Hindus has shown that the references to Buddhism found in theBrahma-sûtrasare not with regard to the Vijñâna-vada of Vasubandhu, but with regard to the S'ûnyavâda, but he regards the composition of theBrahma-sûtrasto be later than Nâgârjuna. I agree with the late Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@shana in holding that both the Yogâcâra system and the system of Nâgârjuna evolved from thePrajñâpâramitâ[Footnote ref 2]. Nâgârjuna's merit consisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in support of S'unyavâda; but so far as the essentials of S'unyavâda are concerned I believe that the Tathatâ philosophy of As'vagho@sa and the philosophy of thePrajñâpâramitâcontained no less. There is no reason to suppose that the works of Nâgârjuna were better known to the Hindu writers than theMahâyâna sûtras. Even in such later times as that of Vâcaspati Mis'ra, we find him quoting a passage of theS'âlistambha sûtrato give an account of the Buddhist doctrine of pratîtyasamutpâda [Footnote ref 3]. We could interpret any reference to S'ûnyavâda as pointing to Nâgârjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methods were referred to in any way. On the other hand, the reference in theBhagavadgîtâto theBrahma-sûtrasclearly points out a date prior to that of Nâgârjuna; though we may be slow to believe such an early date as has been assigned to theBhagavadgîtâby Telang, yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far back as the first half of the first century B.C. or the last part of the second century B.C. TheBrahma-sûtrascould thus be placed slightly earlier than the date of theBhagavadgîtâ.
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[Footnote 1: "Brahmasûtrapadais'caiva hetumadbhirvinis'cita@h"Bhagavadgîtâ. The proofs in support of the view that theBhagavadgîtâis a Vai@s@nava work will be discussed in the 2nd volume of the present work in the section onBhagavadgîtâand its philosophy.]
[Footnote 2:Indian Antiquary, 1915.]
[Footnote 3: See Vâcaspati Mis'ra'sBhâmatîon S'a@nkara's bhâsya onBrahma-sûtra, II. ii.]
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I do not know of any evidence that would come in conflict with this supposition. The fact that we do not know of any Hindu writer who held such monistic views as Gau@dapâda or S'a@nkara, and who interpreted theBrahma-sûtrasin accordance with those monistic ideas, when combined with the fact that the dualists had been writing commentaries on theBrahma-sûtras, goes to show that theBrahma-sûtraswere originally regarded as an authoritative work of the dualists. This also explains the fact that theBhagavadgîtâ, the canonical work of the Ekânti Vai@s@navas, should refer to it. I do not know of any Hindu writer previous to Gau@dapâda who attempted to give an exposition of the monistic doctrine (apart from the Upani@sads), either by writing a commentary as did S'a@nkara, or by writing an independent work as did Gau@dapâda. I am inclined to think therefore that as the pure monism of the Upani@sads was not worked out in a coherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, it was dealt with by people who had sympathies with some form of dualism which was already developing in the later days of the Upani@sads, as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies of such Upani@sads as the S'vetâs'vatara, and the like. The epic S'a@mkhya was also the result of this dualistic development.
It seems that Bâdarâya@na, the writer of theBrahma-sûtras, was probably more a theist, than an absolutist like his commentator S'a@nkara. Gau@dapâda seems to be the most important man, after the Upani@sad sages, who revived the monistic tendencies of the Upani@sads in a bold and clear form and tried to formulate them in a systematic manner. It seems very significant that no other kârikâs on the Upani@sads were interpreted, except theMân@dûkyakârikâby Gau@dapâda, who did not himself make any reference to any other writer of the monistic school, not even Bâdarâya@na. S'a@nkara himself makes the confession that the absolutist (advaita) creed was recovered from the Vedas by Gau@dapâda. Thus at the conclusion of his commentary on Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, he says that "he adores by falling at the feet of that great guru (teacher) the adored of his adored, who on finding all the people sinking in the ocean made dreadful by the crocodiles of rebirth, out of kindness for all people, by churning the great ocean of the Veda by his great churning rod of wisdom recovered what lay deep in the heart of the Veda, and is hardly attainable even by the immortal