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[Footnote 1: It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. SeeUpaskaraI.i. 22.]
[Footnote 2: If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the movement of one we should have felt that two or more things were moving.]
[Footnote 3: It must be noted that karma in this sense is quite different from the more extensive use of karma as meritorious or vicious action which is the cause of rebirth.]
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being (bhâva) indicates continuity only and is hence only a genus. The universals of substance, quality and action maybe both genus and species, but visesa as constituting the ultimate differences (of atoms) exists (independent of any percipient). In connection with this he says that the ultimate genus is being (sattâ) in virtue of which things appear as existent, all other genera may only relatively be regarded as relative genera or species. Being must be regarded as a separate category, since it is different from dravya, gu@na and karma, and yet exists in them, and has no genus or species. It gives us the notion that something is and must be regarded as a category existing as one identical entity in all dravya, gu@na, and karma, for in its universal nature as being it has no special characteristics in the different objects in which it inheres. The specific universals of thingness (dravyatva) qualitiness (gu@natva) or actionness (karmatva) are also categories which are separate from universal being (bhâvaorsattâ) for they also have no separate genus or species and yet may be distinguished from one another, but bhâva or being was the same in all.
In the first chapter of the second book Ka@nâda deals with substances. Earth possesses colour, taste, smell, and touch, water, colour, taste, touch, liquidity, and smoothness (snigdha), fire, colour and touch, air, touch, but none of these qualities can be found in ether (âkâs'a). Liquidity is a special quality of water because butter, lac, wax, lead, iron, silver, gold, become liquids only when they are heated, while water is naturally liquid itself [Footnote ref 1]. Though air cannot be seen, yet its existence can be inferred by touch, just as the existence of the genus of cows may be inferred from the characteristics of horns, tails, etc. Since this thing inferred from touch possesses motion and quality, and does not itself inhere in any other substance, it is a substance (dravya) and is eternal [Footnote ref 2]. The inference of air is of the type of inference of imperceptible things from certain known characteristics calledsâmânyato d@r@s@ta. The name of air "vâyu" is derived from the scriptures. The existence of others different from us has (asmadvis'i@s@tânâ@m) to be admitted for accounting for the
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[Footnote 1: It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This is important for mercury was known at a time later than Caraka.]
[Footnote 2: Substance is that which possesses quality and motion. It should be noted that the word "adravyatvena" in II. i. 13 has been interpreted by me as "adravyavattvena."]
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giving of names to things (sa@mjñâkarma). Because we find that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented by us) [Footnote ref 1]. On account of the fact that movements rest only in one thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any unoccupied space, would not lead us to infer the existence of âkâs'a (ether). Âkâs'a has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance in which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a quality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched, there must be some substance of which it is a quality. And this substance is âkâs'a. It is a substance and eternal like air. As being is one so âkâs'a is one [Footnote ref 2].
In the second chapter of the second book Ka@nâda tries to prove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire, and coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives the notion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. It is one like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, because the notion of time is absent in eternal things. Space supplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much nearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to have diverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the sun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound is eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises when a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features coming under it are not seen, either when these are only remembered, or when some such attribute is seen which resembles some other attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way but appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely grasped, whether rightly seen or not. He then discusses the question whether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons to show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with a number of other reasons proving that it is eternal.
The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the inference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must be some substance in which knowledge produced by the contact of the senses and their object inheres.
The knowledge of sense-objects (indriyârtha) is the reason by
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[Footnote 1: I have differed fromUpaskârain interpreting "sa@mjñâkarma" in II. i. 18, 19 as a genitive compound whileUpaskâramakes it advandvacompound. Upaskâra's interpretation seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for the existence of God.]
[Footnote 2: This interpretation is according to S'a@nkara Mis'ra'sUpaskâra.]
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which we can infer the existence of something different from the senses and the objects which appear in connection with them. The types of inferences referred to are (1) inference of non-existence of some things from the existence of some things, (2) of the existence of some things from the non-existence of some things, (3) of the existence of some things from the existence of others. In all these cases inference is possible only when the two are known to be connected with each other (prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya) [Footnote ref 1]. When such a connection does not exist or is doubtful, we haveanapades'a(fallacious middle) andsandigdha(doubtful middle); thus, it is a horse because it has a horn, or it is a cow because it has a horn are examples of fallacious reason. The inference of soul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, senses and objects is not fallacious in the above way. The inference of the existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar way in which the existence of one's own soul is inferred [Footnote ref 2], i.e. by virtue of the existence of movement and cessation of movement. In the second chapter it is said that the fact that there is cognition only when there is contact between the self, the senses and the objects proves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substance and eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simultaneity of production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; it may also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person).
The soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling of the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections pleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance and eternal can be proved after the manner of vâyu. An objector is supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his soul, the inference of the soul is of the type ofsâmânyatod@r@s@tainference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cognition to infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but that this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of soul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But the Vais'e@sika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to which the expression "I" may be applied, there is no need of falling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But
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[Footnote 1: In connection with this there is a short reference to the methods of fallacy in which Gautama's terminology does not appear. There is no generalised statement, but specific types of inference are only pointed out as the basis.]
[Footnote 2: The forms of inference used show that Ka@nâda was probably not aware of Gautama's terminology.]
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then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such experiences as "I am Yajñadatta" or "I am Devadatta," what is the good of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference lending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the conviction. When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajñadatta goes, there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajñadatta the body alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think that the notion of "I" refers to the self and not to anything else. As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure, pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many by special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on the strength of the scriptures [Footnote ref 1].
In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that which is existent, but yet has no cause, should be considered eternal (nitya). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect can only take place because of the cause. When we speak of anything as non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so that also proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternal is ignorance (avidyâ) [Footnote ref 2]. Colour is visible in a thing which is great (mahat) and compounded. Air (vâyu) is not perceived to have colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has not the actuality of colour (rûpasamskâra—i.e. in air there is only colour in its unmanifested form) in it. Colour is thus visible only when there is colour with special qualifications and conditions [Footnote ref 3]. In this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is also explained. Number, measure, separateness, contact, and disjoining, the quality of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as they abide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. The number etc. of those which have no colour are not perceived by the eye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (gunatva)
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[Footnote 1: I have differed here from the meaning given inUpaskâra. I think the three sûtras "Sukhaduhkhajñananispattyavis'esadekatmyam," "vyavasthato nana,"and"vastrasâmarthyat ca"originally meant that the self was one, though for the sake of many limitations, and also because of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the scriptures, they are regarded as many.]
[Footnote 2: I have differed here also in my meaning from theUpaskâra,which regards this sûtra "avidya" to mean that we do not know of any reasons which lead to the non-eternality of the atoms.]
[Footnote 3: This is what is meant in the later distinctions ofudbhûtarûpavattvaandanudbhûtarûpavattva. The wordsamskârain Vais'e@sika has many senses. It means inertia, elasticity, collection (samavaya), production (udbhava) and not being overcome (anabhibhava). For the last three senses seeUpaskâraIV. i. 7.]
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are perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch, and sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain, etc. by the manas and number etc. by the visual and the tactile sense) [Footnote ref 1].
In the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that the earth, etc. exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. There cannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of the three, but the atoms of different elements may combine when one of them acts as the central radicle (upa@s@tambhaka). Bodies are of two kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are otherwise produced by the combination of the atoms in accordance with special kinds of dharma. All combinations of atoms are due to special kinds of dharmas. Such super-mundane bodies are to be admitted for explaining the fact that things must have been given names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, and also on account of the authority of the Vedas.
In the first chapter of the fifth book action (karma) is discussed. Taking the example of threshing the corn, it is said that the movement of the hand is due to its contact with the soul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is due to its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising of the flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement is not due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of the hand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with the soul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account of heaviness (gurutva) the flail will fall when not held by the hand. Things may have an upward or side motion by specially directed motions (nodanavis'e@sa) which are generated by special kinds of efforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep. The movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknown cause (adr@s@takâranaka). The arrow first acquires motion by specially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia (vegasamskâra) keeps on moving and when that ceases it falls down through heaviness.
The second chapter abounds with extremely crude explanations
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[Footnote 1: This portion has been taken from theUpaskâraof S'ankara Mis'ra on theVais'e@sika sûtrasof Ka@nâda. It must be noted here that the notion of number according to Vais'e@sika is due to mental relativity or oscillation (apeksabuddhijanya). But this mental relativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or touched; and it is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend on the visual or the tactual sense.]
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of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical importance. All the special phenomena of nature are explained as being due to unknown cause (ad@r@s@takâritam) and no explanation is given as to the nature of this unknown (ad@r@s@ta). It is however said that with the absence ofad@r@s@tathere is no contact of body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore mok@sa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the self, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind is in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomes steady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, âkâs'a are regarded as inactive.
The whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that gifts are made to proper persons not through sympathy but on account of the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certain Vedic performances, which brings in ad@r@s@ta, purification and impurities of things, how passions are often generated by ad@r@s@ta, how dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how mok@sa takes place as a result of the work of the soul.
In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The change of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning in the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size is visible. Visibility is due to a thing's being made up of many causes [Footnote ref 1], but the atom is therefore different from those that have great size. The same thing may be called great and small relatively at the same time. In accordance with a@nutva (atomic) and mahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The eternal size ofparima@n@dala(round) belongs to the atoms. Âkâs'a and âtman are calledmahânorparamamahân(the supremely great or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure it is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being of the measure "supremely great" (paramamahat), Atomic size (parima@n@dala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) and the supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether (âkâs'a) are regarded as eternal.
In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity and separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from other qualities. There is no number in movement and quality; the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are
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[Footnote 1: I have differed from theUpaskârain the interpretation of this sûtra.]
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neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (ekap@rthaktva). The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc. Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist independently (yutasiddhyabhâvât). In the eighth book it is said that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the apprehension of qualities, action, generality, and particularity perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the cause of taste, colour and touch[Footnote ref 1]. In the ninth book negation is described; non-existence (asat) is defined as that to which neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things may become non-existent and that which is existent in one way may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind of non-existence which is different from the above kinds of existence and non-existence [Footnote ref 2]. All negation can be directly perceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices).
In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the middle term is described. It is said that anything connected with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contrary or as inseparably connected, will serve as li@nga (reason). The main point is the notion "this is associated with this," or "these two are related as cause and effect," and since this may also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogism from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (avidyâ) is due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal-observation due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite of this is true knowledge (vidyâ). In the tenth it is said that pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to doubt and certainty.
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[Footnote 1:Upaskârahere explains that it is intended that the senses are produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the sûtras.]
[Footnote 2: In the previous three kinds of non-existence,prâgabhâva(negation before production),dhvamsâbhâva(negation after destruction), andanyonyabhava(mutual negation of each other in each other), have been described. The fourth one issâmânyâbhâva(general negation).]
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A dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, for because of its contact with another thing the effect is produced. Karma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Contact is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact which inheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the production of the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat of fire is also a cause.
Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they have no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the Vedas direct them, they have validity.
Philosophy in the Nyâya sûtras [Footnote ref 1].
TheNyâya sûtrasbegin with an enumeration of the sixteen subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (pramâ@na), object of right knowledge (prameya), doubt (sa@ms'aya), purpose (prayojana), illustrative instances (d@r@s@tânta), accepted conclusions (siddhânta), premisses (avayava), argumentation (tarka), ascertainment (nir@naya), debates (vâda), disputations (jalpa), destructive criticisms (vita@n@dâ), fallacy (hetvâbhâsa), quibble (chala), refutations (jâti), points of opponent's defeat (nigrahasthâna), and hold that by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (nihs'reyasa), is attained. In the second sûtra it is said that salvation (apavarga) is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge (mithyâjñâna), defects (do@sa), endeavours (prav@rtti, birth (janma), and ultimately of sorrow. Then the means of proof are said to be of four kinds, perception (pratyak@sa), inference (anumâna), analogy (upamana), and testimony (s'abda). Perception is defined as uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names proceeding out of sense contact with objects. Inference is of three kinds, from cause to effect (pûrvavat), effect to cause (s'e@savat), and inference from common characteristics (sâmânyato d@r@s@ta). Upamâna is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well-known thing.
S'abda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (âpta)[Footnote ref 2].
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[Footnote 1: This is a brief summary of the doctrines found inNyâya sûtras, supplemented here and there with the views of Vâtsyâyana, the commentator. This follows the order of the sûtras, and tries to present their ideas with as little additions from those of later day Nyâya as possible. The general treatment of Nyâya-Vais'e@sika expounds the two systems in the light of later writers and commentators.]
[Footnote 2: It is curious to notice that Vâtsyâyana says that an ârya, a @r@si or a mleccha (foreigner), may be an âpta (reliable authority).]
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Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be experienced and which are beyond experience. Objects of knowledge are said to be self (âtman), body, senses, sense-objects, understanding (buddhi), mind (manas}, endeavour (prav@rtti), rebirths, enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and salvation. Desire, antipathy, effort (prayatna), pleasure, pain, and knowledge indicate the existence of the self. Body is that which upholds movement, the senses and the rise of pleasure and pain as arising out of the contact of sense with sense-objects [Footnote ref l]; the five senses are derived from the five elements, such as prthivi, ap, tejas, vâyu and âkâs'a; smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are the qualities of the above five elements, and these are also the objects of the senses. The fact that many cognitions cannot occur at any one moment indicates the existence of mind (manas). Endeavour means what is done by speech, understanding, and body. Do@sas (attachment, antipathy, etc) are those which lead men to virtue and vice. Pain is that which causes suffering [Footnote ref 2]. Ultimate cessation from pain is calledapavarga[Footnote ref 3]. Doubt arises when through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting opinions etc., one wants to settle one of the two alternatives. That for attaining which, or for giving up which one sets himself to work is calledprayojana.
Illustrative example (d@r@s@tânta) is that on which both the common man and the expert (parîk@saka) hold the same opinion. Established texts or conclusions (siddhânta) are of four kinds, viz (1) those which are accepted by all schools of thought called thesarvatantrasiddhânta; (2) those which are held by one school or similar schools but opposed by others called thepratitantrasiddhânta; (3) those which being accepted other conclusions will also naturally follow calledadhikara@nasiddhânta; (4) those of the opponent's views which are uncritically granted by a debater, who proceeds then to refute the consequences that follow and thereby show his own special skill and bring the opponent's intellect to disrepute (abhyupagamasiddhânta) [Footnote ref 4]. The premisses are five:
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[Footnote 1: Here I have followed Vâtsyâyana's meaning.]
[Footnote 2: Vâtsyâyana comments here that when one finds all things full of misery, he wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associated with pain becomes unattached and thus is emancipated.]
[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana wants to emphasise that there is no bliss in salvation, but only cessation from pain.]
[Footnote 4: I have followed Vâtsyâyana's interpretation here.]
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(1)pratijñâ(the first enunciation of the thing to be proved); (2)hetu(the reason which establishes the conclusion on the strength of the similarity of the case in hand with known examples or negative instances); (3)udâhara@na(positive or negative illustrative instances); (4)upanaya(corroboration by the instance); (5)nigamana(to reach the conclusion which has been proved). Then come the definitions of tarka, nir@naya, vâda, jalpa, vita@n@dâ, the fallacies (hetvâbhâsa), chala, jâti, and nigrahasthâna, which have been enumerated in the first sûtra.
The second book deals with the refutations of objections against the means of right knowledge (pramâna). In refutation of certain objections against the possibility of the happening of doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since there was always a difference between the two things regarding which doubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when the special differentiating characteristics between the two things are not noted. Certain objectors, probably the Buddhists, are supposed to object to the validity of the pramâ@na in general and particularly of perceptions on the ground that if they were generated before the sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter, and if they are produced after the sense-object contact, they could not establish the nature of the objects, and if the two happened together then there would be no notion of succession in our cognitions. To this the Nyâya reply is that if there were no means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of knowledge by means of which the objector would refute all means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any means of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are no means of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kinds of sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the previous existence of those different kinds of musical instruments, so from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous existence of those objects of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].
The same things (e.g. the senses, etc.) which are regarded as instruments of right knowledge with reference to the right cognition of other things may themselves be the objects of right
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[Footnote 1:Yathâpas'câtsiddhena s'abdena pûrvasiddham âtodyamanumîyate sâdhyam ca âtodyam sâdhanam ca s'abda@h antarhite hyâtodye svanata@h anumânam bhavatîti, vî@nâ vâdyate ve@nu@h pûryyate iti svanavis'e@se@na âtodyavis'e@sam pratipadyate tathâ pûrvasiddham upalabdhivi@sayam pas'câtsiddhena upalabdhihetunâ pratipadyate. Vâtsyâyana bhâ@sya,II. i. 15.]
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knowledge. There are no hard and fast limits that those which are instruments of knowledge should always be treated as mere instruments, for they themselves may be objects of right knowledge. The means of right knowledge (pramâ@na) do not require other sets of means for revealing them, for they like the light of a lamp in revealing the objects of right knowledge reveal themselves as well.
Coming to the question of the correctness of the definition of perception, it is held that the definition includes the contact of the soul with the mind [Footnote ref 1]. Then it is said that though we perceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the perception of the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since we can pull and draw things wholes exist, and the whole is not merely the parts collected together, for were it so one could say that we perceived the ultimate parts or the atoms [Footnote ref 2]. Some objectors hold that since there may be a plurality of causes it is wrong to infer particular causes from particular effects. To this the Nyáya answer is that there is always such a difference in the specific nature of each effect that if properly observed each particular effect will lead us to a correct inference of its own particular cause [Footnote ref 3]. In refuting those who object to the existence of time on the ground of relativity, it is said that if the present time did not exist, then no perception of it would have been possible. The past and future also exist, for otherwise we should not have perceived things as being done in the past or as going to be done in the future. The validity of analogy (upamána) as a means of knowledge and the validity of the Vedas is then proved. The four pramâ@nas of perception, inference, analogy, and scripture
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[Footnote 1: Here the sûtras, II. i. 20-28, are probably later interpolations to answer criticisms, not against the Nyâya doctrine of perception, but against the wording of the definition of perception as given in the,Nyâya sûtra, II. i. 4.]
[Footnote 2: This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who rejected the existence of wholes (avayavî). On this subject a later Buddhist monograph by Pandita As'oka (9th century A.D.),Avayavinirâkara@nainSix Buddhist Nyâya Tracts, may be referred to.]
[Footnote 3:Pûrvodakavis'i@s@tam khalu var@sodakan s'îghrataram srotasâ bahutaraphenaphalapar@nakâs@thâdivahanañcopalabhamâna@h pûr@natvena, nadya upari v@r@sto deva ityanuminoti nodakab@rddhimâtre@na. V@atsyâyana bhâ@sya, II. i. 38. The inference that there has been rain up the river is not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwater augmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its current large quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics, associated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of water, which can only be due to the happening of rain up the river].
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are quite sufficient and it is needless to accept arthâpatti (implication), aitihya (tradition), sambhava (when a thing is understood in terms of higher measure the lower measure contained in it is also understood—if we know that there is a bushel of corn anywhere we understand that the same contains eight gallons of corn as well) and abhâva (non-existence) as separate pramâ@nas for the tradition is included in verbal testimony and arthâpatti, sambhava and abhâva are included within inference.
The validity of these as pramâ@nas is recognized, but they are said to be included in the four pramâ@nas mentioned before. The theory of the eternity of sound is then refuted and the non-eternity proved in great detail. The meaning of words is said to refer to class-notions (jâti), individuals (vyakti), and the specific position of the limbs (âk@rti), by which the class notion is manifested. Class (jâti} is defined as that which produces the notion of sameness (samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h).
The third book begins with the proofs for the existence of the self or âtman. It is said that each of the senses is associated with its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity in us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions and produced the perception of the total object as distinguished from the separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then there would be no sin in injuring the bodies of men: again if there were no permanent self, no one would be able to recognize things as having seen them before; the two images produced by the eyes in visual perception could not also have been united together as one visual perception of the things [Footnote ref 1]; moreover if there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sour fruit one could not be reminded of its sour taste. If consciousness belonged to the senses only, then there would be no recognition, for the experience of one could not be recognized by another. If it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effected by manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purpose as self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for this entity the knower would require some instrument by which it would co-ordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas is admitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though the sense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the
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[Footnote 1: According to Vâtsyâyana, in the two eyes we have two different senses. Udyotakara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which works in both eyes.]
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senses, yet imagining, thinking, etc., could not be explained. Another argument for the admission of soul is this, that infants show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy and this could not be due to anything but similar experiences in previous lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires, and no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachments and desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it is argued that desires in infants are due to their experience in previous existences.
The body is made up of the k@siti element. The visual sense is material and so also are all other senses [Footnote ref l]. Incidentally the view held by some that the skin is the only organ of sensation is also refuted. The earth possesses four qualities, water three, fire two, air one, and ether one, but the sense of smell, taste, eye, and touch which are made respectively by the four elements of earth, etc., can only grasp the distinctive features of the elements of which they are made. Thus though the organ of smell is made by earth which contains four qualities, it can only grasp the distinctive quality of earth, viz. smell.
Against the Sâ@mkhya distinction ofbuddhi(cognition) andcit(pure intelligence) it is said that there is no difference between thebuddhiandcit. We do not find in our consciousness two elements of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal consciousness, but only one, by whichever name it may be called. The Sâ@mkhya epistemology that the anta@hkara@na assumes diverse forms in cognitive acts is also denied, and these are explained on the supposition of contacts of manas with the senses, âtman and external objects. The Buddhist objection against the Sâ@mkhya explanation that the anta@hkara@nas catch reflection from the external world just as a crystal does from the coloured objects that may lie near it, that there were really momentary productions of crystals and no permanent crystal catching different reflections at different times is refuted by Nyâya; for it says that it cannot be said that all creations are momentary, but it can only be agreed to in those cases where momentariness was actually experienced. In the case of the transformation of milk into curd there is no coming in of new qualities and disappearance of old ones, but
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[Footnote 1: It is well to remember that Sâ@mkhya did not believe that the senses were constituted of the gross elements. But the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga view represented inÂtreya-sa@mhitâ(Caraka) regarded the senses as bhautika or constituted of the gross elements.]
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the old milk is destroyed and the curd originates anew. The contact of manas with soul (âtman) takes place within the body and not in that part of âtman which is outside the body; knowledge belongs to the self and not to the senses or the object for even when they are destroyed knowledge remains. New cognitions destroy the old ones. No two recollections can be simultaneous. Desire and antipathy also belong to the soul. None of these can belong either to the body or to the mind (manas). Manas cannot be conscious for it is dependent upon self. Again if it was conscious then the actions done by it would have to be borne by the self and one cannot reap the fruits of the actions of another. The causes of recollection on the part of self are given as follows: (1) attention, (2) context, (3) repetition, (4) sign, (5) association, (6) likeness, (7) association of the possessor and the possessed or master and servant, or things which are generally seen to follow each other, (8) separation (as of husband and wife), (9) simpler employment, (10) opposition, (11) excess, (12) that from which anything can be got, (13) cover and covered, (14) pleasure and pain causing memory of that which caused them, (15) fear, (16) entreaty, (17) action such as that of the chariot reminding the charioteer, (18) affection, (19) merit and demerit [Footnote ref 1]. It is said that knowledge does not belong to body, and then the question of the production of the body as due to ad@r@s@ta is described. Salvation (apavarga) is effected by the manas being permanently separated from the soul (âtman) through the destruction of karma.
In the fourth book in course of the examination of do@sa (defects), it is said that moha (ignorance), is at the root of all other defects such as râga (attachment) and dve@sa (antipathy). As against the Buddhist view that a thing could be produced by destruction, it is said that destruction is only a stage in the process of origination. Îs'vara is regarded as the cause of the production of effects of deeds performed by men's efforts, for man is not always found to attain success according to his efforts. A reference is made to the doctrine of those who say that all things have come into being by no-cause (animitta), for then no-cause would be the cause, which is impossible.
The doctrine of some that all things are eternal is next refuted on the ground that we always see things produced and destroyed.
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[Footnote 1:Nyâya sûtraIII. ii. 44.]
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The doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (s'ûnyavâdin Bauddhas) that all things are what they are by virtue of their relations to other things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there are merely the qualities and parts but no substances or wholes, are then refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being like the fruits of trees which take some time before they can ripen. Even though there may be pleasures here and there, birth means sorrow for men, for even the man who enjoys pleasure is tormented by many sorrows, and sometimes one mistakes pains for pleasures. As there is no sorrow in the man who is in deep dreamless sleep, so there is no affliction (kles'a) in the man who attains apavarga (salvation) [Footnote ref 1]. When once this state is attained all efforts (prav@rtti) cease for ever, for though efforts were beginningless with us they were all due to attachment, antipathy, etc. Then there are short discussions regarding the way in which egoism (aha@mkâra) ceases with the knowledge of the true causes of defects (do@sa); about the nature of whole and parts and about the nature of atoms (a@nus) which cannot further be divided. A discussion is then introduced against the doctrine of the Vijñânavâdins that nothing can be regarded as having any reality when separated from thoughts. Incidentally Yoga is mentioned as leading to right knowledge.
The whole of the fifth book which seems to be a later addition is devoted to the enumeration of different kinds of refutations (nigrahasthâna) and futilities (jâti).
Caraka, Nyâya sûtras and Vais'e@sika sûtras.
When we compare theNyâya sûtraswith theVais'e@sika sûtraswe find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. The large amount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical art for defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it was probably originally compiled from some other existing treatises which were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for rendering themselves fit to hold their own in debates with their opponents [Footnote ref 2]. This assumption is justified when
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[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâyana notes that this is the salvation of him who has known Brahman, IV. i. 63.]
[Footnote 2: A reference to theSuvar@naprabhâsa sûtrashows that the Buddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improving their voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took to the worship of Sarasvatî (goddess of learning), who they supposed would help them in bringing readily before their mind all the information and ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates.]
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we compare the futilities (jâti) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to disputations as found in theNyâya sûtrawith those that are found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting theNyâya sûtraandCaraka-sa@mhitâwhich have treated of these matters. Caraka's description of some of the categories (e.g. d@r@s@tânta, prayojana, pratijñâ and vita@n@dâ) follows very closely the definitions given of those in theNyâya sûtras. There are others such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthâna, etc., where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g.prati@s@thâpanâ, jijñâsâ, vyavasâya, vâkyado@sa, vâkyapras'a@msâ, upalambha, parihâra, abhyanujñâ, etc.) which are not found in theNyâya sûtra[Footnote ref 1]. Again, the various types of futilities (jâti) and points of opponent's refutation (nigrahasthâna) mentioned in theNyâya sûtraare not found inCaraka. There are some terms which are found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g.aupamyainCaraka, upamânainNyâya sûtra, arthâpattiinNyâya sûtraandarthaprâptiinCaraka. Caraka does not seem to know anything about the Nyâya work on this subject, and it is plain that the treatment of these terms of disputations in theCarakais much simpler and less technical than what we find in theNyâya sûtras. If we leave out the varieties of jâti and nigrahasthâna of the fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the treatment of Caraka and that of theNyâya sûtras. It seems therefore in a high degree probable that both Caraka and theNyâya sûtraswere indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka's compilation was earlier, whereas the compilation of theNyâya sûtrasrepresents a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work. It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have been earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing through theNyâya sûtrasis that of a polemic against the doctrines which could be attributed to the Sautrântika Buddhists, the Vijñânavâda Buddhists, the nihilists, the Sâ@mkhya, the Cârvâka, and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no
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[Footnote 1: Like Vais'e@sika, Caraka does not know the threefold division of inference (anumâna) aspûrvavat, s'e@savat and sâmânyatod@r@s@ta.]
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further allusion elsewhere. TheVais'e@sika sûtrasas we have already seen had argued only against the Mîmâ@msâ, and ultimately agreed with them on most points. The dispute with Mîmâ@msâ in theNyâya sûtrasis the same as in the Vais'e@sika over the question of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the self-validity of knowledge (svata@h prâmâ@nyavâda)and the akhyâti doctrine of illusion of the Mîmâ@msists, which form the two chief points of discussion between later Mîmâ@msâ and later Nyâya, are never alluded to in theNyâya sûtras. The advocacy of Yoga methods (Nyâya sûtras, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be an alien element; these are not found in Vais'e@sika and are not in keeping with the general tendency of theNyâya sûtras, and the Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda S'astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable.
TheVais'e@sika sûtras, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the self (âtman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived under special conditions of sa@mskâra (conglomeration etc.). The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity (ayaugapadya) of knowledge and efforts is almost the same with Vais'e@sika as with Nyâya. TheNyâya sûtrasgive a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring in the questions of sa@mskâra or udbhûtarûpavattva which Vais'e@sika does. On the question of inference Nyâya gives three classifications as pûrvavat, s'e@savat and samânyatod@r@s@ta, but no definition. TheVais'e@sika sûtrasdo not know of these classifications, and give only particular types or instances of inference (V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyâpti (concomitance ofhetu(reason) andsâdhya(probandum)) which became so important in later Nyâya has never been properly formulated either in theNyâya sûtrasor in the Vais'e@sika.Vais'e@sika sutra, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance between hetu and sadhya (prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya),
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[Footnote 1:J.A.S.B.1905.]
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but the technical vyâpti is not known, and the connotation of the termprasiddhipûrvakatvaof Vais'e@sika seems to be more loose than the termvyâptias we know it in the later Nyâya. TheVais'e@sika sûtrasdo not count scriptures (s'abda) as a separate pramâ@na, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas. WithNyâya sûtrass'abda as a pramâ@na applies not only to the Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and Vâtsyâyana says that trustworthy persons may be of three kinds@r@si, âryaandmleccha(foreigners). Upamâna which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyâya is not even referred to in theVais'e@sika sûtras. TheNyâya sûtrasknow of other pramâ@nas, such asarthâpatti, sambhavaandaitihya, but include them within the pramâ@nas admitted by them, but theVais'e@sika sûtrasdo not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. TheVais'e@sika sûtrasbelieve in the perception of negation (abhâva) through the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i. 1-10). TheNyâya sûtras(II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhâva as non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that absence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Though there is thus an agreement between the Nyâya and theVais'e@sika sûtrasabout the acceptance of abhâva as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different. TheNyâya sûtrassay nothing about the categories ofdravya, gu@na, karma, vis'e@saandsamavâyawhich form the main subjects of Vais'e@ska discussions [Footnote ref 3]. TheNyâya sûtrastake much pains to prove the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have been important with Vais'e@sika. The slight reference to this question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient. TheVais'e@sika sûtrasdo not mention the name of "Îs'vara," whereas theNyâya sûtrastry to prove his existence on eschatological grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self in theNyâya sûtrasare mainly on the ground of the unity of sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the
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[Footnote 1: The only old authority which knows these pramâ@nas is Caraka.But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different fromNyâya and callsarthâpatti arthaprâpti(CarakaIII. viii.).]
[Footnote 2: The details of this example are taken from Vâtsyâyana's commentary.]
[Footnote 3: TheNyâya sûtrano doubt incidentally gives a definition of jâti as "samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h" (II. ii. 71).]
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Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact of knowledge. Both the Nyâya and theVais'e@sika sûtrasadmit the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of atomic structure in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika are absent there. The Vai'se@sika calls salvationni@hs'reyasaormok@saand the Nyâyaapavarga. Mok@sa with Vais'e@sika is the permanent cessation of connection with body; the apavarga with Nyâya is cessation of pain [Footnote ref l]. In later times the main points of difference between the Vais'e@sika and Nyâya are said to lie with regard to theory of the notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc. Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness, then from a sense of relativeness—apek@sâbuddhi—notion of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two things); again, the doctrine of pilupâka (changes of qualities by heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyâya held) was held by Vais'e@sika, which the Naiyâyikas did not admit [Footnote ref 2]. But as theNyâya sûtrasare silent on these points, it is not possible to say that such were really the differences between early Nyâya and early Vaise@sika. These differences may be said to hold between the later interpreters of Vais'e@sika and the later interpreters of Nyâya. The Vais'e@sika as we find it in the commentary of Pras'astapâda (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyâya from the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found from the sixth century onwards.
The Vais'e@sika and Nyâya Literature.
It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of theVais'e@sika sûtrasby Ka@nâda, also called Aulûkya the son of Ulûka, though there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It
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[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha quotes a passage fromSa@mk@sepas'a@nkarajaya, XVI. 68-69 inJ.A.S.B., 1905, and another passage from a Nyâya writer Bhâsarvajña, pp. 39-41, inJ.A.S.B., 1914, to show that the old Naiyâyikas considered that there was an element of happiness (sukha) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the Vais'e@sikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found in the Nyâya or theVais'e@sika sûtras, unless the cessation of pain with Nyâya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of bliss or happiness.]
[Footnote 2: See Mâdhava'sSarvadars'anasa@mgraha-Aulûkyadars'ana.]
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appears from theVâyu purânathat he was born in Prabhâsa near Dvârakâ, and was the disciple of Somas'armâ. The time of Pras'astapâda who wrote a bhâ@sya (commentary) of theVais'e@sika sûtrascannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity of Pras'astapâda's bhâ@sya is this that unlike other bhâ@syas (which first give brief explanations of the text of the sûtras and then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining the first brief comments), it does not follow the sûtras but is an independent dissertation based on their main contents [Footnote ref 1]. There were two other bhâ@syas on theVais'e@sika sûtras, namelyRâva@na-bhâ@syaandBharâdvâja-v@rtti, but these are now probably lost. References to the former are found inKira@nâvalîbhâskaraof Padmanâbha Mis'ra and also inRatnaprabhâ2. 2. II. Four commentaries were written on this bhâ@sya, namelyVyomavatîby Vyomas'ekharâcârya,Nyâyakandalîby S'ridhara,Kira@nâvalîby Udayana (984 A.D.) andLîlâvatîS'rîvatsâcârya. In addition to these Jagadîs'a Bha@t@tâcârya of Navadvîpa and S'a@nkara Mis'ra wrote two other commentaries on thePras'astapâda-bhâsya, namelyBhâsyasûktiandKa@nâda-rahasya. S'a@nkara Mis'ra (1425 A.D.) also wrote a commentary on theVais'e@sika sûtrascalled theUpaskâra. Of theseNyâya-kandalîof S'rîdhara on account of its simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably the best for a modern student of Vais'e@sika. Its author was a native of the village of Bhûris@r@s@ti in Bengal (Râ@dha). His father's name was Baladeva and mother's name was Acchokâ and he wrote his work in 913 S'aka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes at the end of his work.
TheNyâya sûtrawas written by Ak@sapâda or Gautama, and the earliest commentary on it written by Vâtsyâyana is known as theVâtsyâyana-bhâ@sya. The date of Vâtsyâyana has not
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[Footnote 1: The bhâ@sya of Pras'astapâda can hardly he called a bhâ@sya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and calls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories (Padârthadharmasa@mgraha). He takes the categories ofdravya, gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@saandsamavâyain order and without raising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on them. Some of the doctrines which are important in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of pilupâka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat occur in his narration for the first time as theVais'e@sika sûtrasare silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vais'e@sika available to us after Ka@nâda and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th century A.D.]
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been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he lived some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote aVârttikaon Vâtsyâyana's bhâ@sya to establish the Nyâya views and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Di@nnâga (about 500 A.D.) in hisPramâ@nasamuccaya. Vâcaspatimis'ra (840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on theNyâyavârttikaof Udyotakara calledNyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâin order to make clear the right meanings of Udyotakara'sVârttikawhich was sinking in the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings (dustarakunibandhapa@nkamagnânâm). Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on theTâtparya@tîkâcalledTâtparya@tîkâparis'uddhi. Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called theNyâyanibandhaprakâs'a. Padmanâbha wrote a sub-commentary on that calledVarddhamânenduand S'a@nkara Mis'ra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called theNyâyatâtparyama@n@dana. In the seventeenth century Vis'vanâtha wrote an independent short commentary known asVis'vanâthav@rtti, on theNyâya sûtra, and Râdhâmohana wrote a separate commentary on theNyâya sûtrasknown asNyâyasûtravivara@na. In addition to these works on theNyâya sûtrasmany other independent works of great philosophical value have been written on the Nyâya system. The most important of these in medieval times is theNyâyamañjariof Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished shortly after Vâcaspatimis'ra. Jayanta chooses some of theNyâya sûtrasfor interpretation, but he discusses the Nyâya views quite independently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian thought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vâcaspati'sTâtparya@tîkâ, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another important work is Udayana'sKusumâñjaliin which he tries to prove the existence of Îs'vara (God). This work ought to be read with its commentaryPrakâs'aby Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) and its sub-commentaryMakarandaby Rucidatta (1275 A.D.). Udayana'sÂtmatattvavivekais a polemical work against the Buddhists, in which he tries to establish the Nyâya doctrine of soul. In addition to these we have a number of useful works on Nyâya in later times. Of these the following deserve special mention in connection with the present work.Bhâ@sâparicchedaby Vis'vanâtha with its commentariesMuktâvalî, DinakarîandRâmarudrî, TarkasamgrahawithNyâyanir@naya, Tarkabkâ@sâof Kes'ava Mis'ra with
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the commentaryNyâyapradîpa, Saptapadârthîof S'ivâditya,Târkikarak@sâof Varadarâja with the commentaryNi@ska@n@takaof Mallinâtha,Nyâyasâraof Mâdhava Deva of the city of Dhâra andNyâyasiddhântamañjarîof Jânakinâtha Bha@t@tâcarya with theNyâyamanjarisaraby Yâdavâcârya, andNyâyasiddhântadîpaof S'a@sadhara withPrabhâby S'e@sânantâcârya.
The new school of Nyâya philosophy known as Navya-Nyâya began with Ga@nges'a Upâdhyâya of Mithilâ, about 1200 A.D. Ga@nges'a wrote only on the four pramâ@nas admitted by the Nyâya, viz. pratyak@sa, anumâna, upamâna, and s'abda, and not on any of the topics of Nyâya metaphysics. But it so happened that his discussions on anumâna (inference) attracted unusually great attention in Navadvîpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and commentaries of commentaries were written on the anumâna portion of his work _Tattvacintâma@ni, and many independent treatises on sabda and anumâna were also written by the scholars of Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home of Nyâya studies. The commentaries of Raghunâtha S'iroma@ni (1500 A.D.), Mathurâ Bha@t@tâcârya (1580 A.D.), Gadâdhara Bha@t@tâcârya (1650 A.D.) and Jagadîsa Bha@t@tâcârya (1590 A.D.), commentaries on S'iroma@ni's commentary on _Tattvacintâmani, had been very widely read in Bengal. The new school of Nyâya became the most important study in Navadvîpa and there appeared a series of thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject [Footnote ref l].The contribution was not in the direction of metaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly in developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accurately and precisely any concept or its relation with other concepts [Footnote ref 2]. Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the nature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke and fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature of the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that there should be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic thinking and the development of a system of highly technical
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[Footnote 1: From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third quarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Nyâya was started in Mithilâ (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyâya studies. See Mr Cakravarttî's paper,J. A.S.B.1915. I am indebted to it for some of the dates mentioned in this section.]
[Footnote 2:Îs'varânumânaof Raghunatha as well as hisPadârthatattvanirûpa@naare, however, notable exceptions.]
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expressions mark the development of this literature. The technical expressions invented by this school were thus generally accepted even by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurate and subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskrit ceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India the importance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and it can hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position by attracting enthusiastic students in large numbers.
I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that so far as the logical portion of the Nyâya system is concerned, though Ak@sapâda was the first to write a comprehensive account of it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independently worked at this subject and had criticized the Nyâya account of logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logicDas'avaikâlikaniryuktiof Bhadrabâhu (357 B.C.), Umâsvâti'sTattvârthâdhigama sûtra,Nyâyâvatâraof Siddhasena Divâkara (533 A.D.) Mâ@nikya Nandi's (800 A.D.)Parîk@sâmukha sûtra, andPramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâraof Deva Sûri (1159 A.D.) andPrameyakamalamârta@n@daof Prabhâcandra deserve special notice.Pramâ@nasamuccayaandNyâyapraves'aof Di@nnâga (500 A.D.),Pramâ@nayârttika kârikâandNyâyabinduof Dharmakîrtti (650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most interesting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic [Footnote ref l]. The diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and Buddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on Indian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the present volume.
It is interesting to notice that between theVâtsyâyana bhâ@syaand the Udyotakara'sVârttikano Hindu work on logic of importance seems to have been written: it appears that the science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and the Buddhists; and it was Di@nnâga's criticism of Hindu Nyâya that roused Udyotakara to write theVârttika. The Buddhist and the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we come to Ga@nges'a, and there is probably only one Hindu work of importance on Nyâya in the Buddhist style namelyNyâyasâraof Bhâsarvajña. Other older Hindu works generally treated of
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[Footnote 1: SeeIndian Logic Medieval School, by Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@sa@na, for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.]
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inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyâya interest [Footnote ref 1].
The main doctrine of the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy [Footnote ref 2].
The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held that things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same. Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things are testified by experience to be existing.
As the Nyâya-Vais'e@sikas depended solely on experience and on valid reasons, they dismissed the Sâ@mkhya cosmology, but accepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (bhûtas), earth (k@siti), water (ap), fire (tejas), and air (marut). These atoms are eternal; the fifth substance (âkâs'a) is all pervasive and eternal. It is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all-pervading and thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it manifests sound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it shows itself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man deserves to hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deaf man though he has the âkâs'a as his sense of hearing, cannot hear on account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that sense organ [Footnote ref 3]. In addition to these they admitted the existence of time (kâla) as extending from the past through the present to the
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[Footnote 1: Almost all the books on Nyâya and Vais'e@sika referred to have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be acquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic should refer to the paper called "The History of Navya Nyâya in Bengal," by Mr. Cakravarttî inJ.A.S.B.1915.]
[Footnote 2: I have treated Nyâya and Vais'e@sika as the same system. Whatever may have been their original differences, they are regarded since about 600 A.D. as being in complete agreement except in some minor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by those of the other. The original character of the two systems has already been treated.]
[Footnote 3: SeeNyâyakandalî, pp. 59-64.]
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endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Sâ@mkhya did not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit of kâla is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms and their movements. The appearance of kâla as a separate entity is a creation of our buddhi(buddhinirmâ@na) as it represents the order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But kâla in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is regarded as a substance existing by itself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself as past, present, and future. Sâ@mkhya regarded it as past, present, and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things in its different manifesting stages of evolution(adhvan)_. The astronomers regarded it as being clue to the motion of the planets. These must all be contrasted with the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika conception of kala which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless substance which appears as many in association with the changes related to it [Footnote ref l].
The seventh substance is relative space(dik). It is that substance by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; kâla like dik is also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight directions and in the upper and lower [Footnote ref 2]. The eighth substance is the soul(âtman)which is all-pervading. There are separate âtmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings of pleasure and pain, desire, etc. belong toâtman. Manas (mind) is the ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory; all affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are generated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the objects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with the senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling, or willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have a separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not simultaneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition
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[Footnote 1: SeeNyâyakandalî,pp. 64-66, andNyâyamañjarî, pp. 136-139. TheVais'e@sika sûtrasregarded time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.]
[Footnote 2: SeeNyâyakandalî,pp. 66-69, andNyayamañjarî, p. 140.]
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of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas the other things such as quality (gu@na), action (karma), sameness or generality (sâmânya), speciality or specific individuality (vis'e@sa) and the relation of inherence (samavâya) cannot show themselves without the help of substance (dravya). Dravya is thus the place of rest (âs'rayâ) on which all the others depend (âs'@rta). Dravya, gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@sa, and samavâya are the six original entities of which all things in the world are made up [Footnote ref 1]. When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated [Footnote ref 2]. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demands of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlying principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types or categories (padârtha), and held that the notion of each type was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in number—dravya, gu@na, etc. If we take a percept "I see a red book," the book appears to be an independent entity on which rests the concept of "redness" and "oneness," and we thus call the book a substance (dravya); dravya is thus defined as that which has the characteristic of a dravya (dravyatva). So also gu@na and karma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with Sâ@mkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say