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[Footnote 1:Tâtparya@tikâ, p. 81, alsoibid.p. 91, "prathamamâlocito'rtha@h sâmânyavis'e@savân."]
[Footnote 2:Ibid.p.84, "tasmâdvyutpannasyâpi nâmadheyasmara@nâya pûrvame@sitavyo vinaiva nâmadheyamarthapratyaya@h."]
[Footnote 3: _Nyâyakandalî,_p. 189 ff., "ata@h savikalpakamicchatâ nirvikalpakamapye@sitavyam, tacca na sâmânyamâtram g@rh@nâti bhedasyâpi pratibhâsanât nâpi svalak@sa@namâtram sâmânyâkârasyâpi sa@mvedanât vyaktyantaradars'ane pratisandhânâcca, kintu sâmânya@m vis'e@sañcobhayamapi g@rh@nâti yadi paramida@m sâmânyamayam vis'e@sa@h ityeva@m vivicya na pratyeti vastvantarânusandhânavirahât, pi@ndântarânuv@rttigraha@nâddhi sâmânya@m vivicyate, vyâv@rttigraha@nâdvis'e@soyamiti viveka@h."]
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not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible to have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a quality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate (vis'i@s@tavais'i@styajñânam prati hi vis'e@sa@natâvacchedakaprakâra@m jñâna@m kâra@na@m) [Footnote ref 1]. So, before any determinate knowledge such as "I see a cow," "this is a cow" or "a cow" can arise it must be preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the indeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnected with universality or any other relations (jâtyâdiyojanârahita@m vais'i@s@tyânavagâhi ni@sprakârakam nirvikalpaka@m) [Footnote ref 2]. But this stage is never psychologically experienced (atîndriya) and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic conception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicate with a subject. Thus Vis'vanâtha says in his Siddhântamuktâvalî, "the cognition which does not involve relationing cannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form 'I know the jug'; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower, the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of jugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the predicative quality (vis'e@sa@natâvacchedaka) of the predicate 'jug' which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the knowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicative quality, the content [Footnote ref 3]." But in order that the knowledge of the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at which the universal or the pure predication should be known and this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though not testified by experience is after all logically indispensably necessary. In the proposition "It is a cow," the cow is an universal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be related to the particular with which it is associated.
But both the old and the new schools of Nyâya and Vais'e@sika admitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which the Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary particulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or universals and thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the perception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced by objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perception consists in the attribution of jâti (universal), gu@na (quality),
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[Footnote 1:Tattvacintâma@nip. 812.]
[Footnote 2:Ibid. p. 809.]
[Footnote 3:SiddhântamuktâvalîonBhâ@sâpariccheda kârikâ, 58.]
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kriyâ (action), nâma (name), and dravya (substance) to things [Footnote ref 1]. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predication of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The same remark applies to action, for motion is not something different from that which moves. But name is completely different from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified, and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" are altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now as regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference of the Nyâya ontological position with that of the Buddhists, for we know that Nyâya and Vais'e@sika believe jâti, gu@na and kriyâ to be different from substance and therefore the predicating of them of substance as different categories related to it at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vâcaspati replies that the memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associated until the second stage through the joint action of memory is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in order to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associated with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there cannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the Buddhists further object that there is no reason why one should identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual perception. To this Vâcaspati says that through the help of memory or past impressions (sa@mskâra) this can be considered as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is
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[Footnote 1:Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 93-100, "Pañca caite kalpanâ bhavanti jâtikalpanâ, gu@nakalpanâ, kriyâkalpanâ, nâmakalpanâ dravyakalpanâ ceti, tâs'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpanât kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpanât kalpanâ ucyante." See Dharmakîrtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4. See also pp. 409-410 of this book.]
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present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an object of past experience refers to a past time and place and is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with an object which is experienced at the present moment. It has to be admitted that Vâcaspati's answer is not very satisfactory for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception which was challenged by the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1]. It is easy to see that early Nyâya-Vais'e@sika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual development of perception as the progressive effects of causal operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the self and the object under the influence of various intellectual (e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes, it does not, like Vedânta, require that right perception should only give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon the variety of causal collocations.
Mind according to Nyâya is regarded as a separate sense and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy and will. The later Nyâya writers speak of three other kinds of contact of a transcendental nature calledsâmânyalak@sa@na, jñânalak@sa@naandyogaja(miraculous). The contact sâmânyalak@sa@na is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a particular we are transcendentally (alaukika) in contact with all the particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and through it my sense is in contact with the universal associated with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all smoke in general. Jñânalak@sa@na contact is that by virtue of which we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only, but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental contact (alaukika sannikar@sa) by virtue of which this is rendered
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[Footnote 1:Tâtparya@tîkâ, pp. 88-95.]
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possible is called jñânalak@sa@na. But the knowledge acquired by these two contacts is not counted as perception [Footnote ref l].
Pleasures and pains (sukhaanddu@hkha) are held by Nyâya to be different from knowledge (jñâna). For knowledge interprets, conceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. are never found to appear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel that we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot be self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then that experience which generates sukha in one should have generated the same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should have manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does not happen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain, it is evident that there must be some differences between the pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different, and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case was associated with sukha and in another case with du@hkha, This shows that sukha and du@hkha are not themselves knowledge. Such is the course of things that sukha and du@hkha are generated by the collocation of certain conditions, and are manifested through or in association with other objects either in direct perception or in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes in their production.
The yogins are believed to have the pratyak@sa of the most distant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceive the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come,"
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[Footnote 1:SiddhântamuktâvalîonKârikâ63 and 64. We must remember that Ga@nges'a discarded the definition of perception as given in theNyâya sûtrawhich we have discussed above, and held that perception should be defined as that cognition which has the special class-character of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle (Tattvacintâma@ni, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him as the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the definition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by Udyotakara as mentioned above.]
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and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhânajñâna, which is also to be regarded as a pratyak@sa directly by the mind. This is of course different from the other form of perception called mânasa-pratyak@sa, by which memories of past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceive that it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the eye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual percept with it. According to Vedânta this acquired perception is only a case of inference. The prâtibha-pratyak@sa however is that which is with reference to the happening of a future event. When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to the self by the mind as "I know this pot." This is effected by the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cognition which had already been generated in the soul. This second reperception is called anuvyavasâya, and all practical work can proceed as a result of this anuvyavasâya [Footnote ref. l].
Inference.
Inference (anumâna) is the second means of proof (prâmâ@na) and the most valuable contribution that Nyâya has made has been on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or liñga which is associated with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically called liñga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been made (the hill in this example) is called pak@sa, and the term "fire" is called sâdhya. To make a correct inference it is necessary that the hetu or liñga must be present in the pak@sa,
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[Footnote 1: This later Nyâya doctrine that the cognition of self in association with cognition is produced at a later moment must be contrasted with thetriputîpratyak@sadoctrine of Prabhâkara, which holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously in knowledge. Vyavasâya (determinate cognition), according to Ga@nges'a, gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding the former one and is called anu (after) vyavasâya (cognition), "_idamaha@m jânâmîti vyavasâye na bhâsate taddhakendriyasannikar@sâbhâvât kintvida@mvi@sayakajñânatvavis'i@s@tasya jñânasya vais'i@styamâtmani bhâsate; na ca svaprakâs'e vyavasâya tâd@rs'a@m svasya vais'i@s@tya@m bhâsitumarhati, pûrva@m vis'e@sa@nasya tasyâjñânât, tasmâdidamaha@m jânâmiti na vyavasâya@h kintu anuvyavasâyah."Tattvacintâma@ni, p. 795.]
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and in all other known objects similar to the pak@sa in having the sâdhya in it (sapak@sa-sattâ), i.e., which are known to possess the sâdhya (possessing fire in the present example). The liñga must not be present in any such object as does not possess the sâdhya (vipak@sa-vyâv@rttiabsent from vipak@sa or that which does not possess the sâdhya). The inferred assertion should not be such that it is invalidated by direct perception {pratyak@sa) or the testimony of the s'âstra (abâdhita-vi@sayatva). The liñga should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way could also be possible (asat-pratipak@sa). The violation of any one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu as determining the inference, and thus would only make the hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvâbhâsa or seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made. Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the pak@sa) does not possess [Footnote ref l]. This hetvâbhâsa is technically calledasiddha-hetu. Again, hetvâbhâsa of the second type, technically calledviruddha-hetu, may be exemplified in the case that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "being created" is present in the opposite of sâdhya {vipak@sa), namely non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type, technically calledanaikântika-hetu, is found in the case that sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now "being an object of knowledge" (prameyatva) is here the hetu, but it is present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sâdhya), as well as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the sâdhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the sâdhya is not absolute (anaikântika). A fallacy of the fourth type, technically calledkâlâtyayâpadi@s@ta, may be found in the example—fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc. Here pratyak@sa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is fallacious. The fifth fallacy, calledprakara@nasama, is to be found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non-eternal,
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[Footnote 1: It should be borne in mind that Nyâya did not believe in the doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mîmâ@msâ did. Eternality of sound meant with Mîmâ@msâ the theory that sounds existed as eternal indestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of movement of the vocal muscles.]
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since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like âkâs'a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.
The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against inference by the Cârvâkas, that inferential arguments are valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity of nature in two relations, viz.tâdâtmya(essential identity) andtadutpatti(succession in a relation of cause and effect). Tâdâtmya is a relation of genus and species and not of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity (tâdâtmya). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.
Nyâya holds that inference is made because of the invariable association (niyama) of the li@nga or hetu (the concomitance of which with the sâdhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions noted above) with the sâdhya, and not because of such specific relations as tâdâtmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well; for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a pine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential identity, but to the invariable association of the li@nga (mark) with the li@ngin (the possessor of li@nga), otherwise called niyama. The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect) is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of other types of inference, where the association as cause and effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the li@nga with the li@ngin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted above, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l].
We perceived in many cases that a li@nga (e.g. smoke) was associated with a li@ngin (fire), and had thence formed the notion
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[Footnote 1: SeeNyâyamañjarion anumâna.]
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that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered the concomitance (vyâpti) of smoke and fire which we had observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill, which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the li@nga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its concomitance with fire (_t@rtîya-li@nga-parâmars'a) is thus the cause (anumitikara@naoranumâna) of the inference (anumiti). The concomitance of smoke with fire is technically calledvyâpti.When this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with those having fire, it is calledbahirvyâpti; and when it refers to the conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was observed, it is calledantarvyâpti.The Buddhists since they did not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyâpti view of concomitance to bahirvyâpti as a means of inference [Footnote ref 1].
Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign (hetu) with the signate (sâdhya), how are we to assure ourselves in each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (vyâptigraha) had been correct, and the observation of concomitance had been valid. The Mîmâ@msâ school held, as we shall see in the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire. But Nyâya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire should be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technically calledanvayavyâptiand the lattervyatirekavyâpti.But even this is not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have been a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but it cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomitance,
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[Footnote 1: SeeAntarvyâptisamarthana,by Ratnâkaras'ânti in theSixBuddhist Nyâya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica, 1910.]
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or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It may be that one might never have observed smoke without an antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately followed by the disappearance of smoke (yasmin sati bhavanam yato vinâ na bhavanam iti bhuyodars'ana@m, Nyâyamañjarî,p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation of concomitance (vyâpti} between the ass and the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. But of course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu, and there might be some other condition (upâdhi) associated with the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus we know that fire in green wood (ârdrendhana) produced smoke, but one might doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that produced smoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it. But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would have to be dispensed with (vyâghâta). Thus such doubts as lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or unsettle the notion of vyâpti or concomitance at which we had arrived by careful observation and consideration [Footnote ref 2]. The Buddhists and the naiyâyikas generally agreed as to the method of forming the notion of concomitance or vyâpti (vyâptigraha), but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a concomitance always depended on a relation of cause and effect or of identity of essence, whereas Nyâya held that neither the relations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity of genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was quite a number of other types of inference which could not be brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the tide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things happening other things would happen could certainly exist, even without the supposition of an identity of essence.
But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often have the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to
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[Footnote 1: SeeTâtparya@tîkâon anumâna and vyâptigraha.]
[Footnote 2:Tâtparya@tîkâon vyâptigraha, andTattvacintâma@niofGa@nges'a on vyâptigraha.]
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infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyâya holds however that though different causes are often found to produce the same effect, yet there must be some difference between one effect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with its other attendant circumstances and peculiarities, it will be found that it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar other effects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavy downpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the water of the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding of the street due to rain will be found to have such special traits that it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to the rise of water in the river. Thus from the flooding of the street of a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circumstances, the special manner in which the water flows by small rivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood was due to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus we see that Nyâya relied on empirical induction based on uniform and uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhists assumeda prioriprinciples of causality or identity of essence. It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyâya works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves assured that there was no such upâdhi (condition) associated with the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but that the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sâdhya in a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce smoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order to produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition (upâdhi) without which, no smoke could be produced. It is on account of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the validity of vyâpti, it is necessary that we must be assured that there should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditioned the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide experience (bhûyodars'ana).
Pras'astapâda in defining inference as the "knowledge of that (e.g. fire) associated with the reason (e.g. smoke) by the sight of the reason" described a valid reason (li@nga) as that which is connected with the object of inference (anumeya) and which exists wherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases
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where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyâya qualifications of _pak@sasattva, sapak@sasattva andvipak@sâsattvaof a valid reason (hetu). Pras'astapâda further quotes a verse to say that this is the same as what Kâs'yapa (believed to be the family name of Ka@nâda) said. Ka@nâda says that we can infer a cause from the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in opposition or in a relation of inherence (IX. ii. 1 and III. i. 9). We can infer by a reason because it is duly associated (prasiddhipûrvakatva) with the object of inference. What this association was according to Ka@nâda can also be understood for he tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper association, the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferred or it has no concomitance with it (aprasiddha) or it has a doubtful existencesandigdha). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has horns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns. Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, for there is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though a cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The first fallacy is a combination of pak@sâsattva and sapak@sâsattva, for not only the present pak@sa (the ass) had no horns, but no horses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipak@sasattva, for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus, it seems that when Pras'astapâda says that he is giving us the view of Ka@nâda he is faithful to it. Pras'astapâda says that wherever there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke. When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that there is fire. But with regard to Ka@nâda's enumeration of types of inference such as "a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect from the cause," etc., Pras'astapâda holds that these are not the only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connection such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides inference into two classes, d@r@s@ta (from the experienced characteristics of one member of a class to another member of the same class), and sâmânyato d@r@s@ta. D@r@s@ta (perceived resemblance) is that where the previously known case and the inferred case is exactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of flesh on its neck (sâsnâ), I can whenever I see the same hanging
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mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But when on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended to a different class of objects, it is called sâmânyato d@r@s@ta. Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests, namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of heaven). When the conclusion, to which one has arrived (svanis'citârtha) is expressed in five premisses for convincing others who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then the inference is called parârthânumâna. We know that the distinction of svârthânumâna (inference for oneself) and parârthânumâna (inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists. Pras'astapâda does not make a sharp distinction of two classes of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is called parârthânumâna. But this need not be considered as an entirely new innovation of Pras'astapâda, for in IX. 2, Ka@nâda himself definitely alludes to this distinction (asyeda@m kâryyakâra@nasambandhas'câvayavâdbhavati). The five premisses which are called in Nyâyapratijñâ, hetu d@r@s@tânta, upanaya,andnigamanaare called in Vais'e@sikapratijñâ, apades'a, nidars'ana, anusandhâna, andpratyâmnâya. Ka@nâda however does not mention the name of any of these premisses excepting the second "apades'a." Pratijñâ is of course the same as we have in Nyâya, and the term nidars'ana is very similar to Nyâya d@r@s@tânta, but the last two are entirely different. Nidars'ana may be of two kinds, (1) agreement in presence (e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case of an arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not a substance has no motion as is seen in the case of the universal being [Footnote ref l]). He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example
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{Footnote 1: Dr Vidyâbhû@sa@na says that "An example before the time of Dignâga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the listener, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; like a kitchen (example). Asa@nga made the example more serviceable to reasoning, but Dignâga converted it into a universal proposition, that is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen" (Indian Logic, pp. 95, 96). It is of course true that Vâtsyâyana had an imperfect example as "like a kitchen" (s'abda@h utpatvidharmakatvâdanuya@h sthâlyâdivat, I.i. 36), but Pras'astapâda has it in the proper form. Whether Pras'astapâda borrowed it from Dig@nnâga or Dig@nnâga from Pras'astapâda cannot be easily settled.]
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(nidars'anâbhâsa). Pras'astapâda's contribution thus seems to consist of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of the nidars'ana, but the names of the last two premisses are so different from what are current in other systems that it is reasonable to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional Vais'e@sika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being pursued in Vais'e@sika circles independently of Nyâya. There is no reason however to suppose that Pras'astapâda borrowed anything from Di@nnâga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes, for, as I have shown above, most of Pras'astapâda's apparent innovations are all definitely alluded to by Ka@nâda himself, and Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the question of the fallacies of nidars'ana, unless it is definitely proved that Di@nnâga preceded Pras'astapâda, there is no reason whatever to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former [Footnote ref 1].
The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most important part of inference. Vâtsyâyana says that an inference can be made by the sight of the li@nga (reason or middle) through the memory of the connection between the middle and the major previously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the connection of the middle with the major that should be regarded as leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to inference, but that which immediately leads to inference isli@ngaparâmars'a, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the minor associated with the memory of its connection with the major, for inference does not immediately follow the memory of the connection, but the present perception of the middle associated with the memory of the connection (sm@rtyanug@rhîto li@ngaparâmars'o). But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance. Udyotakara's criticisms of Di@nnâga as shown by Vâcaspati have no reference to this point The doctrine oftâdâtmyaandtadutpattiwas therefore in all probability a new contribution to Buddhist logic by Dharmakîrtti. Dharmakîrtti's contention was that the root principle of the connection between the middle and the major was that the former was either identical in essence with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us
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[Footnote 1: Pras'astapâda's bhâ@sya withNyâyakandalî, pp. 200-255.]
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the desired connection [Footnote ref 1]. Vâcaspati in his refutation of this view says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as a separate relation. If causality means invariable immediate antecedence such that there being fire there is smoke and there being no fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with perfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case the smoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unless it can be ascertained that there was no invisible element associated, it cannot be said that the smoke was immediately preceded by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake of argument that causality can be determined, then also cause is known to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke can only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding time and not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are many cases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of cause and effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this morning by the sunrise of yesterday morning). In the case of identity of essence (tâdâtmyaas in the case of the pine and the tree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be inferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any inference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be described in either of these ways. Some things (e.g. smoke) are naturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when such is the case, though we may not know any further about the nature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former and not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only under certain conditions (e.g. green wood). It may be argued that there may always be certain unknown conditions which may vitiate the validity of inference. To this Vâcaspati's answer is that if even after observing a large number of cases and careful search such conditions (upâdhi) cannot be discovered, we have to take it for granted that they do not exist and that there is a natural connection between the middle and the major. The later Buddhists introduced the method ofPañcakâra@nîin order to determine effectively the causal relation. These five conditions determining the causal relation are (1) neither the cause nor the effect is perceived, (2) the cause is perceived, (3) in immediate succession the effect is perceived, (4) the cause disappears, (5) in
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[Footnote 1:Kâryyakâra@nubhâvâdvâ svabhâvâdva niyâmakât avinâbhâvaniyamo' dars'anânna na dars'anât. Tâtparya@tîkâ, p. 105.]
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immediate succession the effect disappears. But this method cannot guarantee the infallibility of the determination of cause and effect relation; and if by the assumption of a cause-effect relation no higher degree of certainty is available, it is better to accept a natural relation without limiting it to a cause-effect relation [Footnote ref 1].
In early Nyâya books three kinds of inference are described, namely pûrvavat, s'e@savat, and sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta. Pûrvavat is the inference of effects from causes, e.g. that of impending rain from heavy dark clouds; s'e@savat is the inference of causes from effects, e.g. that of rain from the rise of water in the river; sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta refers to the inference in all cases other than those of cause and effect, e.g. the inference of the sour taste of the tamarind from its form and colour.Nyâyamañjarîmentions another form of anumâna, namely paris'e@samâna (reductio ad absurdum), which consists in asserting anything (e.g. consciousness) of any other thing (e.g. âtman), because it was already definitely found out that consciousness was not produced in any other part of man. Since consciousness could not belong to anything else, it must belong to soul of necessity. In spite of these variant forms they are all however of one kind, namely that of the inference of the probandum (sâdhya) by virtue of the unconditional and invariable concomitance of the hetu, called the vyâpti-niyama. In the new school of Nyâya (Navya-Nyâya) a formal distinction of three kinds of inference occupies an important place, namely anvayavyatireki, kevalânvayi, and kevalavyatireki. Anvayavyatireki is that inference where the vyâpti has been observed by a combination of a large number of instances of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, as in the case of the concomitance of smoke and fire (wherever there is smoke there is fire (anvaya), and where there is no fire, there is no smoke (vyatireka)). An inference could be for one's own self (svârthânumâna) or for the sake of convincing others (parârthânumâna). In the latter case, when it was necessary that an inference should be put explicitly in an unambiguous manner, live propositions (avayavas) were regarded as necessary, namely pratijña (e.g. the hill is fiery), hetu (since it has smoke), udâhara@na (where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen), upanaya (this hill has smoke), niga@mana (therefore it has got
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[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâya@na's bhâsya, Udyotakara'sVârttikaandTâtparyya@tîkâ,I.i. 5.]
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fire). Kevalânvayi is that type of inference, the vyâpti of which could not be based on any negative instance, as in the case "this object has a name, since it is an object of knowledge (ida@m, vâcyam prameyatvât)." Now no such case is known which is not an object of knowledge; we cannot therefore know of any case where there was no object of knowledge (prameyatva) and no name (vâcyatva); the vyâpti here has therefore to be based necessarily on cases of agreement—wherever there is prameyatva or an object of knowledge, there is vâcyatva or name. The third form of kevalavyatireki is that where positive instances in agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of the inference that earth differs from other elements in possessing the specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ from other elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evident that there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and the concomitance has to be taken from negative instances. There is only one instance, which is exactly the proposition of our inference—earth differs from other elements, since it has the special qualities of earth. This inference could be of use only in those cases where we had to infer anything by reason of such special traits of it as was possessed by it and it alone.
Upamâna and S'abda.
The third pramâ@na, which is admitted by Nyâya and not by Vais'e@sika, isupamâna, and consists in associating a thing unknown before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some other known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never seen a wild ox (gavaya) goes to the forest, asks a forester—"what is gavaya?" and the forester replies—"oh, you do not know it, it is just like a cow"; after hearing this from the forester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to be similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya. This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its similarity to a known thing is calledupamâna. If some forester had pointed out a gavaya to a man of the city and had told him that it was called a gavaya, then also the man would have known the animal by the name gavaya, but then this would have been due to testimony (_s'abda-prama@na). The knowledge is said to be generated by the upamâna process when the association of the unknown animal with its name is made by the observer
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on the strength of the experience of the similarity of the unknown animal to a known one. The naiyâyikas are thorough realists, and as such they do not regard the observation of similarity as being due to any subjective process of the mind. Similarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet the association of the name in accordance with the perception of similarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is calledupamâna[Footnote ref 1].
S'abda-pramâ@na or testimony is the right knowledge which we derive from the utterances of infallible and absolutely truthful persons. All knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, for the Vedas were uttered by Îs'vara himself. The Vedas give us right knowledge not of itself, but because they came out as the utterances of the infallible Îs'vara. The Vais'e@sikas did not admit s'abda as a separate pramâ@na, but they sought to establish the validity of testimony (s'abda) on the strength of inference (anumiti) on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible person. But as I have said before, this explanation is hardly corroborated by the Vais'e@sika sûtras, which tacitly admit the validity of the scriptures on its own authority. But anyhow this was how Vais'e@sika was interpreted in later times.
Negation in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika.
The problem of negation or non-existence (abhâva) is of great interest in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only from the point of view of perceptibility. Kumârila [Footnote ref 2]
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[Footnote 1: SeeNyâyamañjarîon upamâna. The oldest Nyâya view was that the instruction given by the forester by virtue of which the association of the name "wild ox" to the strange animal was possible was itself "upamâna." When Pras'astapâda held that upamâna should be treated as a case of testimony (âptavacana), he had probably this interpretation in view. But Udyotakara and Vâcaspati hold that it was not by the instruction alone of the forester that the association of the name "wild ox" was made, but there was the perception of similarity, and the memory of the instruction of the forester too. So it is the perception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories that lead us to this association called upamâna. What Vâtsyâya@na meant is not very clear, but Di@nnâga supposes that according to him the result of upamâna was the knowledge of similarity or the knowledge of a thing having similarity. Vâcaspati of course holds that he has correctly interpreted Vâtsyâya@na's intention. It is however definite that upamâna means the associating of a name to a new object (samâkhyâsambandhapratipattirupamânârtha@h, Vâtsyâya@na). Jayanta points out that it is the preception of similarity which directly leads to the association of the name and hence the instruction of the forester cannot be regarded as the direct cause and consequently it cannot be classed under testimony (s'abda). See Pras'astapâda andNyâyakandalî,pp. 220-22, Vâtsyâya@na, Udyotakara, Vâcaspati and Jayanta onUpamâna.]
[Footnote 2: See Kumârila's treatment of abhâva in theS'lokavârttika, pp. 473-492.]
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and his followers, whose philosophy we shall deal with in the next chapter, hold that negation (abhâva) appears as an intuition (mânam) with reference to the object negated where there are no means of ordinary cognition (pramâ@na) leading to prove the existence (satparicchedakam) of that thing. They held that the notion "it is not existent" cannot be due to perception, for there is no contact here with sense and object. It is true indeed that when we turn our eyes (e.g. in the case of the perception of the non-existence of a jug) to the ground, we see both the ground and the non-existence of a jug, and when we shut them we can see neither the jug nor the ground, and therefore it could be urged that if we called the ground visually perceptible, we could say the same with regard to the non-existence of the jug. But even then since in the case of the perception of the jug there is sense-contact, which is absent in the other case, we could never say that both are grasped by perception. We see the ground and remember the jug (which is absent) and thus in the mind rises the notion of non-existence which has no reference at all to visual perception. A man may be sitting in a place where there were no tigers, but he might not then be aware of their non-existence at the time, since he did not think of them, but when later on he is asked in the evening if there were any tigers at the place where he was sitting in the morning, he then thinks and becomes aware of the non-existence of tigers there in the morning, even without perceiving the place and without any operation of the memory of the non-existence of tigers. There is no question of there being any inference in the rise of our notion of non-existence, for it is not preceded by any notion of concomitance of any kind, and neither the ground nor the non-perception of the jug could be regarded as a reason (li@nga), for the non-perception of the jug is related to the jug and not to the negation of the jug, and no concomitance is known between the non-perception of the jug and its non-existence, and when the question of the concomitance of non-perception with non-existence is brought in, the same difficulty about the notion of non-existence (abhâva) which was sought to be explained will recur again. Negation is therefore to be admitted as cognized by a separate and independent process of knowledge. Nyâya however says that the perception of non-existence (e.g. there is no jug here) is a unitary perception of one whole, just as any perception of positive existence (e.g.
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there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the ground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jug arise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and there is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the ground should be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of the negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be due to a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug is taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principle that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact with it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation or non-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even without any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive substance, and hence there cannot be any question here of sense-contact. It may be urged that if no sense-contact is required in apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negation or non-existence of other places which are far away from him. To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessary that the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a thing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can only be taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as well. We can apprehend non-existence only through the apprehension of its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to be apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of non-existence but a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived before along with the perception of the locus of non-existence (e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (abhâva) can thus, according to Nyâya, generate its cognition just as any positive existence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or mere vacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition "is not," as position (bhâva) is what generates the cognition "it is."
The Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They hold that when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended with specific time and space conditions (e.g. this is not here now); but in spite of such an apprehension, we could never think that negation could thus be associated with them in any relation. There is also no relation between the negation and itspratiyogi(thing negated—e.g. jug in the negation of jug), for when there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when there is the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even the relation of opposition (virodha), for we could have admitted it, if
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the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug, for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without effecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether negation is to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the nature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it will be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it will be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or that particular negation. There are however many kinds of non-perception, e.g. (1) svabhâvânupalabdhi (natural non-perception—there is no jug because none is perceived); (2) kâra@nânupalabdhi (non-perception of cause—there is no smoke here, since there is no fire); (3) vyâpakânupalabdhi (non-perception of the species—there is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) kâryânupalabdhi (non-perception of effects—there are not the causes of smoke here, since there is no smoke); (5) svabhâvaviruddhopalabdhi (perception of contradictory natures—there is no cold touch here because of fire); (6) viruddhakâryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory effects—there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7) virudhavyâptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance—past is not of necessity destructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) kâryyaviruddhopalabdhi (opposition of effects—there is not here the causes which can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi (opposite concomitants—there is no touch of snow here, because of fire); (10) kâra@naviruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes—there is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire); (11) kâra@naviruddhakâryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes—this place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it is full of smoke [Footnote ref 1]).
There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of negation, but that does not prove that there is any reason for the cognition of negation (heturnâbhâvasamvida@h). All that we can say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use (yogyatâ) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyatâ is positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort. Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence of negation, but only shows that there are certain positive perceptions which are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that
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[Footnote 1: SeeNyâyabindu, p. 11, andNyâyamañjarî, pp. 53-7.]
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leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug (anupalambha@h abhâva@m vyavahârayati) [Footnote ref 1].
The Nyâya reply against this is that the perception of positive existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we have no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the perception of the ground without the jug. But is this being without the jug identical with the ground or different? If identical then it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even when the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only over the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be a distinct category. If some difference is noted between the ground with the jug, and the ground without it, then call it "ground, without the jugness" or "the negation of jug," it does not matter much, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. Negation is apprehended by perception as much as any positive existent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are different; just as even in the perception of positive sense-objects there are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation of negation with space and time with which it appears associated is the relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality (vis'e@sya vis'e@sa@na). The relation between the negation and its pratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is the other is not. TheVais'e@sika sûtra(IX. i. 6) seems to take abhâva in a similar way as Kumârila the Mima@msist does, though the commentators have tried to explain it away [Footnote ref 2]. In Vais'e@sika the four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1)prâgabhâva(the negation preceding the production of an object—e.g. of the jug before it is made by the potter); (2)dhva@msâbhâva(the negation following the destruction of an object—as of the jug after it is destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3)anyonyâbhâva(mutual negation—e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and
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[Footnote 1: SeeNyâyabindu@tîkâ, pp. 34 ff., and alsoNyâyamañjarî, pp. 48-63.]
[Footnote 2 Pras'astapâda says that as the production of an effect is the sign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign of its non-existence, S'rîdbara in commenting upon it says that the non-preception of a sensible object is the sign (li@nga) of its non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for he says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses (bhâvavad abhâvo'pîndriyagraha@nayogyah) and that there is an actual sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the preception of non-existence (abhâvendriyasannikar@so'pi abhâvagraha@nasâmagrî), Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 225-30.]
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in the horse that of the cow); (4)atyantâbhâva(a negation which always exists—e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in other places is not destroyed) [Footnote ref 1].
The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker of Salvation.
It is probable that the Nyâya philosophy arose in an atmosphere of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These aretarka,nir@naya,vâda,jalpa,vita@n@dâ,hetvâbhâsa,chala,jâtiandnigrahasthâna.
Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is not inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right conclusion. When there is doubt (sa@ms'aya) about the specific nature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nir@naya means the conclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two opposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the doctrines that there is or is not an âtman, in which each of them tries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is called avâda. Jalpa means a dispute in which the disputants give wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective opponents. A jalpa is called avita@n@dâwhen it is only a destructive criticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine without seeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetvâbhâsas are those which appear as hetus but are really not so.Nyâyasûtras enumerate five fallacies (hetvâbhâsas) of the middle (hetu):savyabhicâra(erratic),viruddha(contradictory),prakara@nasama(tautology),sâddhyasama(unproved reason) andkâlâtîta(inopportune). Savyabhicâra is that where the same reason may prove opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it is intangible like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because it is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); viruddha is that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a jug is eternal, because it is produced); prakara@nasama is that
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[Footnote 1: The doctrine of negation, its function and value with reference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects, and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.]
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where the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form (e.g. sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality of eternality); sâdhyasama is that where the reason itself requires to be proved (e.g. shadow is a substance because it has motion, but it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not); kâlâtîta is a false analogy where the reason fails because it does not tally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue that sound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and the drum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light and the object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colour is simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what was already there and only manifested by the light, whereas in the case of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of the stick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal. The later Nyâya works divide savyabhicâra into three classes, (1) sâdhâra@na or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire is also an object of knowledge), (2) asâdhâra@na or too restricted (e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound; this cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the sound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasa@mhârin or unsubsuming (e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of knowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusion may also be drawn). The fallacysatpratipak@sais that in which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is non-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacyasiddha(unreal) is of three kinds (i)âs'rayâsiddha(the lotus of the sky is fragrant because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in the sky), (2)svarûpâsiddha(sound is a quality because it is visible; but sound has no visibility), (3)vyâpyatvâsiddhais that where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence is not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because there is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated with smoke. The fallacybâdhitais that which pretends to prove a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot because it is a substance. We have already enumerated the fallacies counted by Vais'e@sika. Contrary to Nyâya practice
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Pras'astapâda counts the fallacies of the example. Di@nnâga also counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms; but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmakîrtti counted also the fallacies of the pak@sa (minor); but Nyâya rightly considers that the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard inference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the intentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the purpose of defeating him. Jâti consists in the drawing of contradictory conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthâna means the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious opponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to emancipation, it is said by Jayanta in hisNyâyamañjarîthat these had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils. If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the pupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow, and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding onward for the attainment of mok@sa should acquire these devices for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A knowledge of these has therefore been enjoined in the Nyâya sûtra as being necessary for the attainment of salvation [Footnote ref l].
The doctrine of Soul.
Dhûrtta Cârvâkas denied the existence of soul and regarded consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were other Cârvâkas called Sus'ik@sita Cârvâkas who admitted the existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death. The Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self. The naiyâyikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysics mainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience. They argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing, etc. could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be
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[Footnote 1: SeeNyâyamañjarî, pp. 586-659, andTârkikarak@sâofVaradarâja andNiska@n@takaof Mallinâtha, pp. 185 ff.]
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some entity to which they belonged; the existence of the self is not proved according to Nyâya merely by the notion of our self-consciousness, as in the case of Mîmâ@msâ, for Nyâya holds that we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may be erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or I am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot be relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we cannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the inference that the self has to be admitted as that entity to which consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are produced as a result of collocations. Never has the production of âtman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any destruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is not located in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i.e. exists at the same time in all places (vibhu), and does not travel with the body but exists everywhere at the same time. But though âtman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions are seen in the body because it is with the help of the collocation of bodily limbs, etc. that action in the self can be manifested or produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires consciousness as a result of suitable collocations [Footnote ref l].
Even at birth children show signs of pleasure by their different facial features, and this could not be due to anything else than the memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures and pains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasures and pains and of successes and failures prove that these must be due to the different kinds of good and bad action that men performed in their past lives. Since the inequality of the world must have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma as the determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance.
Îs'vara and Salvation.
Nyâya seeks to establish the existence of Îs'vara on the basis of inference. We know that the Jains, the Sâ@mkhya and the Buddhists did not believe in the existence of Îs'vara and offered many antitheistic arguments. Nyâya wanted to refute these and prove the existence of Is'vara by an inference of the sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta type.
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[Footnote 1:Jñânasamavâyanibandhanamevâtmanas'cetayit@rtvam, &c. SeeNyâyamañjarî, pp. 432 ff.]
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The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to this view the Nyâya holds that the world as a whole is also an effect like any other effect. Many geological changes and landslips occur, and from these destructive operations proceeding in nature it may be assumed that this world is not eternal but a result of production. But even if this is not admitted by the atheists they can in no way deny the arrangement and order of the universe. But they would argue that there was certainly a difference between the order and arrangement of human productions (e.g. a jug) and the order and arrangement of the universe; and therefore from the order and arrangement(sannives'a-vis'i@s@tatâ) of the universe it could not be argued that the universe was produced by a creator; for, it is from the sort of order and arrangement that is found in human productions that a creator or producer could be inferred. To this, Nyâya answers that the concomitance is to be taken between the "order and arrangement" in a general sense and "the existence of a creator" and not with specific cases of "order and arrangement," for each specific case may have some such peculiarity in which it differs from similar other specific cases; thus the fire in the kitchen is not the same kind of fire as we find in a forest fire, but yet we are to disregard the specific individual peculiarities of fire in each case and consider the concomitance of fire in general with smoke in general. So here, we have to consider the concomitance of "order and arrangement" in general with "the existence of a creator," and thus though the order and arrangement of the world may be different from the order and arrangement of things produced by man, yet an inference from it for the existence of a creator would not be inadmissible. The objection that even now we see many effects (e.g. trees) which are daily shooting forth from the ground without any creator being found to produce them, does not hold, for it can never be proved that the plants are not actually created by a creator. The inference therefore stands that the world has a creator, since it is an effect and has order and arrangement in its construction. Everything that is an effect and has an order and arrangement has a creator, like the jug. The world is an effect and has order and arrangement and has therefore a creator. Just as the potter knows all the purposes of the jug that he makes,
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so Îs'vara knows all the purposes of this wide universe and is thus omniscient. He knows all things always and therefore does not require memory; all things are perceived by him directly without any intervention of any internal sense such as manas, etc. He is always happy. His will is eternal, and in accordance with the karma of men the same will produces dissolution, creates, or protects the world, in the order by which each man reaps the results of his own deeds. As our self which is in itself bodiless can by its will produce changes in our body and through it in the external world, so Îs'vara also can by his will create the universe though he has no body. Some, however, say that if any association of body with Îs'vara is indispensable for our conception of him, the atoms may as well be regarded as his body, so that just as by the will of our self changes and movement of our body take place, so also by his will changes and movements are produced in the atoms [Footnote ref l].
The naiyâyikas in common with most other systems of Indian philosophy believed that the world was full of sorrow and that the small bits of pleasure only served to intensify the force of sorrow. To a wise person therefore everything is sorrow (sarva@m du@hkha@m vivekina@h); the wise therefore is never attached to the so-called pleasures of life which only lead us to further sorrows.
The bondage of the world is due to false knowledge (mithyâjñâna) which consists in thinking as my own self that which is not my self, namely body, senses, manas, feelings and knowledge; when once the true knowledge of the six padârthas and as Nyâya says, of the proofs (pramâ@na), the objects of knowledge (prameya), and of the other logical categories of inference is attained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge can be removed by constant thinking of its opposite (pratipak@sabhâvanâ), namely the true estimates of things. Thus when any pleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality but pain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and it will never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destruction of false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things and ignorance about them (collectively called do@sa, cf. the kles'a of Patañjali) are also destroyed.
With the destruction of attachment actions (prav@rtti) for the