In the United States, not less clearly than elsewhere in countries of western civilization, marriage and the family are emerging as purely social institutions. Liberated in large measure from the cloud of mediæval tradition, their problems are seen to be identical in kind with those which have everywhere concerned men and women from the infancy of the human race. Accordingly, the extension of the sphere of secular legislation practically to the entire province of these institutions is a phenomenon of surpassing interest. Consciously or unconsciously, it is a recognition of the fact that matrimonial forms and family types are the products of human experience, of human habits, and are therefore to be dealt with by society according to human needs. In thisregard the Reformation marks the beginning of a social revolution. From the days of Luther, however concealed in theological garb or forced under theological sanctions, however opposed by reactionary dogma, public opinion has more and more decidedly recognized the right of the temporal lawmaker in this field. In the seventeenth century the New England Puritan gave the state, in its assemblies and in its courts, complete jurisdiction in questions of marriage and divorce, to the entire exclusion of the ecclesiastical authority. Even the Council of Trent, by adjusting the dogma regarding the minister of the sacrament, had already left to Catholic states the way open for the civil regulation of matrimony—a way, as already seen, on which France did not hesitate to enter.[591]Later the French Revolution wrested from the church judicial and legislative authority in matrimonial law and administration, and placed it in the hands of the state. In 1792, by a wise and tolerant enactment, civil marriage and civil registration were established; but at the same time the revolt against the old ecclesiastical régime led to the sanction of free divorce. Absolute dissolution of wedlock was then authorized at the mutual desire of both husband and wife, for incompatibility of temper on the petition of either spouse, and for seven other specified causes.[592]The natural result was a vast number of decrees.[593]Accordingly, in 1803 the Code Napoléon, while retaining civil marriage, adopted a more conservative policy regarding divorce. Incompatibility was no longer recognized; mutual consent was admitted under limitations; and the whole number of specified causes was reduced to five. The divorce law of 1803 was abrogated in 1816, and only restored in its essential features in 1884; but the liberal policy of France, as expressed in the Code Napoléon, has undoubtedly had a powerful influence in the extension of civil marriage and divorce throughout Europe, where, as in America, the modern statute-maker has recovered and passed beyond the point gained by the Roman imperial constitutions between Augustus and Justinian.
The right of society to deal freely with the whole province of marriage, divorce, and the family may be conceded. To determine the proper character and sphere of legislationis a very different matter. What is the quality of the existing laws under the interpretation given to them by the courts? Are they adequate to secure proper social control? What is the legitimate aim, and what are the needful limits of future legislation? Should the laws be uniform for the fifty-three states and territories; and, if so, how is uniformity to be attained? These are practical questions with whose solution it is high time that society should more earnestly concern itself.
a)The statutes and the common-law marriage.—The defects in the matrimonial laws of the United States are many and grave; but perhaps the chief obstacle in the way of securing a proper social control is the general recognition of the validity of the so-called "common-law marriage." Almost everywhere the public celebration of wedlock is intended by the statute; and in nearly all the states a license or certificate is required before the solemnization may take place. Yet, according to the prevailing doctrine, as expressed in judicial decisions or in the statutes themselves, these provisions are interpreted as merely "directory," not "mandatory;" and marriage contracts made in total disregard of them, by words of mutual present consent, are sustained as valid, although the prescribed penalties may be enforced for violation of the written law. In short, the vicious mediæval distinction between validity and legality is retained as an element of common matrimonial law in the United States.[594]
The doctrine that an informal marriageper verba de praesentiis valid unless expressly declared void by "words of nullity" in the statute is not an invention of the American courts. It is the doctrine maintained by the English judges previous to the decision in the case of the Queenv.Millis in1844; and from the evidence already presented[595]it seems almost certain, if indeed it be not demonstrated, that it was the accepted doctrine in the English colonies. According to an able writer, the colonial statutory "system" entirely superseded the common law; and this system has been "destroyed" by a revolution, effected through the decisions of the American courts, "which has introduced into our law much of the insecurity, the irreverence, the license, of the Middle Ages," our common law today being "the canon law that existed prior to the Council of Trent."[596]No doubt our common-law marriage is thoroughly bad, involving social evils of the most dangerous character; and no doubt the colonial legislative system was a remarkable advance upon anything which had elsewhere appeared. But the common-law marriage was not introduced by the American judges; nor is it historically correct to say that in the English colonies it had been entirely supplanted by legislation, however admirable in its intent and quality that legislation may have been. For the colonial period, as elsewhere shown, the relation of the statutes governing marriage to the common law can only partially be determined from the court records. In the southern colonies the judicial history of the subject is almost a complete blank.[597]Other evidence, however, is available. Only during the thirty-five years between 1661 and 1696 does any statute of Virginia expressly declare a marriage void if not contracted according to its provisions. The new law of 1696, enacted in place of the statute of 1661/2, which was then repealed, declares that "many great andgrievous mischeifes ... dayly doe arise by clandestine and secret marriages to the utter ruin of many heirs and heiresses;" and yet it is significant that the words of nullity contained in the earlier act are omitted. Indeed, by the terms of this law the validity of an irregular marriage thereafter contracted by a female between the ages of twelve and sixteen is clearly implied, although she is to be severely punished.[598]Dissenters had refused to marry according to the statute which they regarded as oppressive; and their resistance, perhaps with a feeling that the act of 1661/2 was itself invalid as being in conflict with the English common law, may have led to the omission of the words of nullity in all subsequent statutes of Virginia. After 1696 irregular marriages were probably regarded as valid, as they certainly were previous to 1661/2; for an act of 1642/3, while prescribing severe penalties for the secret marriage of indented servants, shows beyond question that such a contract, or one between a freeman and an indented maid servant, is looked upon as binding.[599]The facts are much the same for the other southern colonies. After 1692 the invalidating clause disappears from the statutes of Maryland. Only between 1766 and 1778, in North Carolina, is a marriage contracted without previous license expressly declared to be null and void; and it is enlightening that even during this short period of twelve years the penalty of invalidity is not extended to illegal celebration. It was mainly a device of the lawmaker to secure the governor in his revenue from the license fees. The South Carolina act of 1706 merely prescribes penalties for its violation; and, besides, its provisions relating to the celebration were entirely disregarded in the western country, where the various religious sects made use of civil forms or practiced their own peculiar rites. In both the Carolinas as well as in Georgia, since marriages illegallycelebrated before unauthorized laymen or ministers seem to have been valid, there is little reason to doubt that clandestine and other informal contracts by present consent of the parties were likewise good; but regarding this point we have no positive information.[600]
The history of marriage in the middle and the New England colonies leads us to a similar result. From the facts brought to light in the Lauderdale Peerage case, backed by the testimony of Rev. John Rodgers in 1773, it is almost certainly established that the common-law marriage was valid in New York province, and that for eighty-four years preceding the Revolution no other law relating to the subject was in force.[601]In New England the formalities prescribed by the statutes were doubtless usually observed. Yet there were many clandestine and other irregular marriages, and in some instances we know that these were treated as valid.[602]Such was the case in the Plymouth jurisdiction, where "self-marriage" was punished only by a fine. In Massachusetts similar cases of "hand-fasting" and "self-gifta" appear. In one case, that of Governor Bellingham in 1641, the contract was not declared void by the court, although the grand jury had presented his excellency for his offense. Fifteen years later Joseph Hills, "being presented by the grand jury for marrying of himself contrary to the law of the colony," confessed his fault and was merely "admonished by the court."[603]Moreover, at no time during the colonial and provincial periods did the statutes of Massachusetts expressly declare marriages void for disregard of the celebration or other formalities prescribed;[604]and thesame is true of the daughter-colony of Connecticut. By the Rhode Island acts of 1647 and 1665 the issue of a union not formed by the "due and orderly course of law" is pronounced illegitimate; but it is very suggestive that the words of nullity do not appear in any of the later statutes of that province. Occasionally in the colonies statutes were enacted to validate irregular marriages previously contracted. Such were the acts of Rhode Island, 1698; of North Carolina, 1766; and of Virginia, 1780. But it would clearly be rash to infer that the marriages concerned were in fact void without such special intervention. Notoriously this is but a speedy and simple way of quieting doubt as to the status of the children or their rights of property and inheritance. Whether a court would nullify the contracts in question is a different matter. On the whole, the evidence seems clearly to show that the colonial statutes sustained the same relation to the English common law as did the constitutions of the English church requiring the solemnization of wedlock before a clergyman. The colonial statute, like the ecclesiastical constitution, might determine the legal forms which must be observed to escape a penalty; but the common-law marriage was nevertheless valid unless expressly declared null and void in the act itself. Furthermore, it is by no means certain that the colonial assemblies were generally competent, even in this way, to set aside the common law.
After the beginning of independent national life the English common law as a whole in its various branches was retained as a part of the law of the land, unless superseded by constitutional or statutory legislation. It was therefore inevitable that the state and federal courts, as cases arose, should declare whether it had been so superseded. There could no longer be any question, as in the colonial period, regarding the competency of the legislator to define the conditions of a valid matrimonial contract. A brief history ofthe acceptance or rejection of the common-law marriage in the United States, whether by statute or by judicial decree, may now be presented.[605]
The leading case came before the supreme court of New York in 1809, when Chief Justice Kent accepted as binding a common-law marriage, declaring that no solemnization was requisite; that "a contract of marriage madeper verba de praesentiamounts to an actual marriage, and is as valid as if made infacie ecclesiae;" and that the existence of such a contract may be proved "from cohabitation, reputation, acknowledgment of the parties, acceptance in the family, and other circumstances from which a marriage may be inferred."[606]This decision determined the policy of New York for nearly a century, until the common-law marriage was at last superseded by the statute of 1901; and its influence upon the tribunals of other states has been increased through the sanction of its doctrine by the leading authorities upon matrimonial law.[607]The contract by mere present consentof the parties, regardless of the statutory requirements, has been widely accepted as valid in the group of southern and southwestern states and territories. It was so judicially accepted in South Carolina[608]at least as early as 1832; in Louisiana[609]in 1833; Georgia[610]in 1860; District of Columbia[611]in 1865; Alabama[612]in 1869; Arkansas[613]in 1872; Missouri[614]in 1877; and Florida[615]in 1880. By the earlier decisions of Tennessee a strict compliance with the statute was required, the court even declaring in 1829[616]that a marriage solemnized before a justice of the peace out of his own county was "absolutely null and void." This opinion was sustained by a decree of 1831; but later judgments favor the common-law agreement. Texas has had a similar experience. In 1883 and again in 1894 the common-law contract was repudiated, the court deciding that license and parental consent according to the statute were essential;[617]but more recentlythe highest tribunal has held the opposite view.[618]Among the states of the middle and western group Pennsylvania in 1814 was first to follow the New York precedent.[619]Ohio[620]came next in 1861; and Illinois[621]in 1873. By the law of Michigan, declares Judge Cooley decisively in 1875—in an opinion accepted as authority by the federal courts—a marriage may be good, although the statutory regulations have not been complied with. "Whatever the form of ceremony, or even if all ceremony was dispensed with, if the parties agreed presently to take each other for husband and wife, and from that time lived together professedly in that relation, proof of these facts would be sufficient to constitute proof" of a binding marriage; and "this," he adds, "has become the settled doctrine of the American courts."[622]This view has been accepted in Iowa[623]in 1876; Minnesota[624]in 1877; Wisconsin[625]in 1879; Indiana[626]in 1884; Kansas[627]in 1887; Nebraska[628]and Colorado[629]in 1893; Nevada[630]in 1896; and favored by the decisions of New Jersey[631]since 1824.Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has sanctioned the same doctrine. In Jewellv.Jewell,[632]considered in 1843, opinions on the question were evenly balanced, just as they were in the Queenv.Millis which came before the Lords during the next year; but in 1877, in the case of Meisterv.Moore,[633]involving a marriage contracted under the law of Michigan, Justice Strong adopted "as authoritative" Judge Cooley's interpretation rendered two years before.
On the other hand, in a number of states the courts have decided that the common-law marriage is entirely superseded by the statutes, even when these do not contain words of nullity, and sometimes when they are expressed in terms far less "mandatory" than in some instances where the opposite doctrine prevails.[634]In the words of a writer who believes the courts are historically and logically justified in this view, "they affirm that when from a comparative study of the whole course of legislation as well as of the terms of the various statutes, it is the plain intent to make conformity to any statutory formality indispensable to the constitution of marriage, such common law isipso factorepealed, and a marriage celebrated by mere consent, without this formality, has no validity whatever in law. One such indispensable formality, at least, they find in the intent of the statutes, namely, the presence at the celebration of an authorized third person."[635]First to take this position was Massachusetts in 1810, the year after Kent's opposite decision already cited, when Chief Justice Parsons, in an opinion which hasbeen steadily sustained ever since, but which is not remarkable for historical knowledge, held that "when our ancestors left England, and ever since, it is well known that a lawful [valid?] marriage there must be celebrated before a clergyman in orders;" and hence in Massachusetts, although "not declared void by any statute," a "marriage merely the effect of a mutual engagement between the parties, or solemnized by any one not a justice of the peace or an ordained minister, is not a legal marriage, entitled to the incidents of a marriage duly solemnized."[636]Since 1848 the Massachusetts doctrine has been followed by Vermont.[637]In the same year it was adopted in New Hampshire;[638]but in the absence of more recent decisions the law of that state cannot be regarded as absolutely settled. It was favored in Maine[639]by a decision of 1841, although the informal contract was not then positively rejected by a direct decree. The courts of Connecticut are silent on the question; but the statute declares that all marriages "attempted to be solemnized by any other person" than those authorized by it "shall be void."[640]
Several states of the South have taken a similar stand. Maryland[641]and North Carolina[642]have thus repudiated the common-law agreement, a formal celebration being made essential to a valid marriage. The supreme court of West Virginia has gone farther, holding that not only solemnization, but also license and other prescribed formalities, are requisite. "Our statute," runs a decision of 1887, "has wholly superseded the common law, and in effect, if not in express terms, renders invalid all attempted marriages contracted in this state, which have not been solemnized in compliance with its provisions.... When the terms of the statute are such that they cannot be made effective, to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without interpreting the statutes as mandatory, then such interpretation should be given them."[643]In 1821 the common-law contract was judicially accepted in Kentucky;[644]but by the model statute of 1852—remarkable for clearness and terseness—a "marriage is prohibited and declared void when not solemnized or contracted in the presence of an authorized person or society."[645]Likewise in Mississippi until recently the informal agreement was held sufficient to constitute the parties husband and wife;[646]butsince 1892 the statute renders a marriage invalid if contracted or solemnized without a previous license.[647]Moreover, in Porto Rico, by the code of 1902, the authorization and celebration of the contract "according to the forms and solemnities prescribed by law" are requisite for a valid marriage.[648]With these six southern and the four New England commonwealths must be classed five states of the middle and western division. Two of these—Oregon[649]since 1870 and Washington[650]since 1892—have proceeded by judicial decree; and three—California[651]in 1895, Utah[652]in 1898, and New York[653]in 1901—have superseded the common-law agreement by statutes containing the nullifying clause.
All the other states and territories have enacted laws governing the celebration and other preliminaries of marriage; but whether these laws are to be regarded as mandatory or merely directory has not yet been judicially determined. The courts are thus silent in Connecticut and Rhode Island,[654]of the New England group; in Arizona, Indian Territory, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Virginia, ofthe southern and southwestern group; in Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming,[655]of the middle and western division. Of these Delaware, Virginia,[656]and Connecticut would probably reject the common-law doctrine, were the question brought to a judicial test; while it would almost certainly be accepted by the courts of the other twelve states and territories, should the statutes remain as they are. Indeed, in a number of the last-named states, notably in Idaho, Montana, and South Dakota, it is virtually sanctioned by the terms of the statutes themselves.
It appears, then—to summarize the details presented in the foregoing discussion—that twenty-three states and territories have already sanctioned or favored the common-law marriage; while twelve others are soon likely to do so, unless the statutes shall be changed. On the contrary, eighteen commonwealths have repudiated or are inclined to repudiate the informal agreement. Six of these, it should be noted, have liberated themselves by statute; five—Mississippi, California, Utah, New York, and Porto Rico[657]—having done so within the last ten years. This is a fact of vast social importance. From it the reformer may gather new courage. In such legislation, in response to a better-educated popular sentiment, lies the hope of the future: to free American society from the manifold evils which lurk in the doctrine of the common-law marriage. It is, indeed, marvelous that a progressive people with respect to an institution which is thevery basis of the social order should so long neglect the function of proper public control. For what, according to its nature, is the common-law marriage? Its possibilities for anarchy are realistically described by Chief Justice Folger, of New York, in 1880, when that state was still exposed to them. "A man and a woman," he declares, "who are competent to marry each other, without going before a minister or magistrate, without the presence of any person as a witness, with no previous public notice given, with no form or ceremony, civil or religious, and with no record or written evidence of the act kept, and merely by words of present contract between them, may take upon themselves the relation of husband and wife, and be bound to themselves, to the state, and to society."[658]Verily this is individualism absolutely unrestrained! It is the simple truth, as already suggested, that in principle the canon law as it existed in Catholic lands before the Council of Trent, and in England until the marriage act of 1753, with a possibility of all of its attendant scandals and hardships, still survives in the United States.[659]The apology of the Middle Ages was found in the sacramental dogma. Matrimony as such, under whatever conditions contracted, was too "holy" to be dissolved or effectively hindered for the ordinary prudential reasons which appeal to the statesman or legislator. Today there is doubtless a lingering tradition of the same falsesentiment. Yet the common-law marriage is now supported on two principal grounds. The innocent offspring, we are told, ought not to suffer because the parents have neglected the formalities prescribed by a mere statute. Moreover, to declare an irregular, perhaps a clandestine, union void is to invade the most sacred right of the individual. There is urgent need that the American people should realize the fallacy of such arguments. Far better that the children of a delinquent minority should bear the stain of illegitimacy than that the welfare of the whole social body should be endangered. For the same reason the supposed right of the individual must yield to the higher claims of society. In no part of the whole range of human activity is there such imperative need of state interference and control as in the sphere of the matrimonial relations. In this field as in others we are beginning to see more clearly that the highest individual liberty can be secured only when it is subordinated to the highest social good. It is, however, not merely the public which suffers. "Our common-law marriage fails to protect not only the contracting parties, but also the families to which they belong. Indeed to protect the latter it makes not the least attempt, and in this respect it is far behind the law of Western Europe."[660]As a preliminary to a general reform of our marriage laws as a whole it is earnestly to be desired that every state or territory not already emancipated should enact a statute as clear and decisive as that of Kentucky, Utah, or New York, absolutely repudiating the common-law contract. It is only through legislation that this revolution can be effected. It is not the proper function of the courts to attempt it. It may be that those states which have superseded the common law through judicial interpretation of their statutes have done well. The end has perhaps justified the means. It is quite possiblethat in those cases it was the intent of the lawmaker to render the statute mandatory. Nevertheless he did not express his intent in the form which has itself become a part of the common law. Chief Justice Parsons and his followers may have been enforcing a "higher law;" but it was a "judge-made" law. History is on the side of Chief Justice Kent and the great number of jurists who have followed him. Moreover, it is evident from the trend of recent decisions that not much more can be expected from the courts. According to the overwhelming weight of juridical opinion, to go farther in this way would be to legislate consciously through the bench. Besides "bench-made" law is alwaysex post facto. The only practical course is to create or further develop a sound popular sentiment in favor of proper social control of the marital relation; and then to express that sentiment in statutes whose terms are mandatory beyond the possibility of evasion.
b)Resulting character of matrimonial legislation.—The absurd and demoralizing conflict between common-law validity and statutory legality ought first to be abolished, because in large measure it hinders, even frustrates, the effort to develop a thorough and uniform system of matrimonial administration in the United States. This once effected, there will remain plenty of hard work to do. If we consider the details of our legislation, as already analyzed in the sixteenth chapter, we perceive in nearly every department urgent need of reform, often of radical innovation. Almost everywhere there is a want of clearness, certainty, and simplicity; and this defect is all the more harmful because of the lack of uniformity among the different states. Diversity, even conflict, in every branch of state legislation is a burdensome incident of the federal system; and in no branch is the evil more formidable than in the field of marriage and divorce. As hereafter suggested, we need notdespair of eventually overcoming it; but from the very nature of the case it may be many years before an effective remedy can generally be applied. In the meantime it is all the more necessary that the laws of each individual state should be made as clear, simple, and efficient as possible, and that every opportunity should be seized to prepare the way for a common matrimonial code for the whole country.
First of all, the statutes relating to the preliminaries of marriage ought to be overhauled. Already during the past century progress has been made. Within the last two decades in particular many reforms in matters of detail have been carried out in various states. Furthermore, in the broad features or outlines of the law throughout the country an approximation to a uniform system has been attained; and this fact may be of great significance when the task of securing absolutely the same law for all the states is earnestly taken in hand. Thus there is practical agreement among the states and territories in requiring a license from a local civil officer before a marriage may be legally celebrated. The dual system of banns or license survives only in Maryland, Georgia, Delaware, and Ohio. All the other states and territories, except Alaska, New Mexico, and South Carolina, where there is no statute governing the subject, with New York and New Jersey, where there is a substitute plan, have each adopted a system of civil license or certificate, the same in its purpose, though varying widely in the forms and procedure prescribed. This is a stride in the direction at once of simplicity and harmony; and besides, for its own sake, it is well to get rid of the ancient device of oral banns, which has proved as unsatisfactory in America as in the Old World. Again, we have developed substantially a common statutory law regarding the manner of entering into the marital relation. Everywhere, except in Maryland and West Virginia, where a religious ceremony is essential to a valid union, theoptional civil or religions ceremony, at the pleasure of the persons contracting, is sanctioned by the law. As already seen, this dual system has its roots planted deeply in the history of two centuries. It is clearly entitled to be regarded as the American plan; although since 1836, with important modifications, it has also been accepted in the British Isles. It does not follow, however, that it is the ideal plan. It is too complex; and it is an obstacle in the way of developing the most efficient system of matrimonial administration. It is inconsistent with a proper social control. It will prevent the attainment of the "maximum of simplicity and the maximum of certainty" in matrimonial legislation. It is awkward, thoroughly illogical, to intrust the execution of that part of the law on which publicity and security so much depend to two different classes of persons: the one consisting of civil officers created and wholly under control of the state; the other in its origin, its personnel, and its character completely beyond such control, and only subject to administrative rules and restraints. With this system it will be very difficult to establish a proper standard of special fitness, of special knowledge, such as is highly needful to exact from public servants intrusted with functions of vast social importance. European peoples have reached a wiser solution of the problem in prescribing in all cases without exception, as the prerequisite of a valid marriage, the obligatory celebration before an authorized civil officer, leaving the wedded pair to decide, as wholly a private matter, whether a religious ceremony shall be added.
It is, however, highly probable that the optional system of celebration is too firmly grounded in popular sentiment to be soon discarded. The practical reformer must perforce content himself with striving to make it as effective as possible. At present the law is very lax in providing proper safeguards for the religious solemnization. In the firstplace, the qualified minister should be authorized to act only within the local district of his permanent residence, the limits thereof to be defined by statute. By the early laws of New England, as we have already seen, the clergyman's functions were carefully confined to his own town, district, or county; and similar requirements appear elsewhere in some of the older statutes. This wise policy has been gradually abandoned, so that now in no instance is there such a restriction. Only in a very few cases, as in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont, is authority conferred only upon ministers dwelling within the state. Apparently in the great majority of states and territories, although the statutes are often far from clear, all qualified ministers, residing anywhere in the United States, may act. Indeed, Louisiana is still more generous, granting full privilege to celebrate wedlock to any clergyman or priest "whether a citizen of the United States or not." Another useful lesson may be learned from the early laws. Proofs of ordination by the filing of credentials were often demanded. Some of the southern states went farther, exacting from the minister a bond for the faithful performance of his trust, in addition to credentials of ordination and good standing. Both these conditions are still enforced by the statutes of Kentucky,[661]Virginia, and West Virginia. Some other states have contented themselves with less severe requirements. Rhode Island has thus a careful system of local registration; in Maine and New Hampshire the clerical celebrant must secure a "commission" from the governor; in Minnesota, Wisconsin, Nevada, and Arkansas he must file his credentials with the proper county officer and receive a certificate; Ohio requires a license from the county judge of probate; a license from the proper authority is also demanded in Hawaii;[662]butin the majority of cases no such precautions are specified in the statutes. Here is need of reform. Under present social conditions, and considering the vast multiplication and subdivision of religious sects, the Virginia system is not too rigorous to justify its adoption throughout the land. Furthermore, the future lawmaker may perhaps get a suggestion from English legislation, which has had to deal with the same problem. The ministers of every religious sect are authorized to celebrate marriages according to its own rites; but, aside from Jews, Quakers, and the Church of England, otherwise provided for in the statute, they may do so only in a "registered building" and in the presence of the civil registrar of the district and two witnesses.
The laws regarding the civil ceremony are also seriously defective, if not in all respects equally lax. The magistrate in the exercise of his functions is not usually restricted to a local district sufficiently small to guarantee safe administration. In this regard the colonial and early state legislation was superior. At present in twenty-two states and territories the justice of the peace, or the corresponding local officer, is confined to his own county or district. Elsewhere he may act anywhere within the commonwealth; and this is almost universally the rule with the higher judges and officials who are granted the same authority. In no case, except in Virginia, and in Massachusetts under the act of 1899, is there any provision for the appointment of a person to celebrate wedlock for an area of less extent than the county. Nor are the persons to whom is confided this important social trust possessed of the needful qualifications. They are not selected because of special fitness. In no instance, unless in Virginia, does the law provide for the separate office of marriage celebrant. The duties of such a post are conferred,ex officio, in a haphazard fashion, upon a great variety of functionaries, who are eitherincompetent or else too busy with other matters to discharge them properly. As a rule, the justice of the peace is thus notoriously unfit; and there is something grotesque in giving authority to solemnize marriages to aldermen and police justices, as in New York; to speakers of the house and senate, as in Tennessee; or to the county supervisors, as in Mississippi. In this regard we have much to learn from European states, some of which have created special local officers for this branch of administration. Thus in France[663]all marriages are regularly celebrated before the mayor of the commune; in Germany,[664]before the registrar of the district in which one of the betrothed persons resides, or before some civil officer designated by him in writing; while in England the legal celebrant in case of civil procedure is also the district registrar, whose presence is likewise requisite at the religious ceremony when conducted according to the rites of the nonconformist sects. Massachusetts alone has taken a step in the right direction. The act of 1899, already summarized, not only provides that no justice of the peace—except when the holder of a specified clerical office—shall solemnize marriage unless specially designated therefor by the governor's certificate, but it also limits the number of justices who may be thus licensed. Touching another point in this connection the American lawmaker is at fault. Often there is no direct provision to secure evidence of the contract. Only nineteen of the fifty-three[665]states and territories expressly require the presence at the ceremony of even one witness; while in two or three other cases the statute appears to take their presence for granted.
The license system is uncertain and complex in many of its features. To guard against the clandestine marriage ofminors, an affidavit from either the bride or bridegroom ought to be made obligatory in all cases, instead of leaving its requirement to the discretion of the officer, as is now usually the practice where there is any provision at all regarding the matter. In several instances the age below which parental consent is required is still too low; and the laws of some states are entirely silent on the subject. Throughout the country the limit for each sex ought to coincide with the attainment of legal majority.[666]More care should be taken to prevent deception when consent of parent or guardian is produced in writing. At the very least, in harmony with the requirement of many states, the affidavit of one witness to the signature should always be made obligatory; and in every such case it might be well as a guaranty to exact a license bond.[667]There is a still graver fault in the license laws of nearly the whole country. Nowhere, except in Porto Rico, is there any adequate provision regarding notice or the filing and trial of objections to a proposed marriage. Maine and Wisconsin have each made a start in requiring the certificate or license to be procured five days before the celebration. No other state, except NewHampshire[668]and New Jersey in the case of non-residents, seems to have provided for such a delay; and in all cases apparently, except Porto Rico, the license is issued at the time the notice of intention to marry is filed.[669]All this is contrary to sound public policy. The notice of intention should be recorded for a reasonable period, say ten days, before issuance of the license; and during this term it should be officially posted, and also published in the newspapers—not merely concealed in the register or published at the discretion of the official, as is now the usual course. Objections might then be filed, and in case of need tried in a court clothed with proper jurisdiction, before the celebration were allowed to proceed. Under the existing state legislation it would be difficult, certainly awkward, to stop a proposed marriage on the ground of alleged legal impediments. To make an objection effective, it might be necessary either to "anticipate the notice" or to interrupt the nuptial ceremony.[670]There is also much confusion, and uncertainty regarding the place of obtaining the license and that of making return. In no instance is a definite term of residence for either the man or the woman prescribed; and this is a fruitful source of clandestine marriage.[671]A glanceat the facts collected in the sixteenth chapter will show that in some states the license must be secured in the place of the bride's residence; in others, in that of the marriage; while in a third group it may be issued in the place where either dwells. Indeed, Pennsylvania, more liberal still, allows a choice among all three places. The same laxity exists regarding the place of return; and sometimes the place of return is not the same as that of issue. A reasonable term of residence ought always to be required; and, unless in cases of emergency, the license should be issued by, and return made to, the same official in the district where the woman dwells. Even the lack of uniformity in license fees is sometimes the cause of migration to neighboring districts for the sake of cheaper weddings.[672]Finally, a marriage entered into without license, just as without authorized celebration, should be declared null and void by the statute.
During the last fifteen years considerable progress has been made in the state systems of registration; but in most cases the laws are still exceedingly lax; and too frequently they are badly executed, or remain a "dead letter" on the statute book.[673]
The radical reform of the administrative division of our matrimonial laws on some such lines as those suggested will be a worthy task for the future legislator. As a necessary antecedent of more detailed action the official system should be entirely reconstructed. The simplest mechanism is likely to prove the best. Its elements are close at hand in the local constitution. Every county should be divided into districts, for each of which a registrar should be authorized tolicense, solemnize, and register all marriages civilly contracted therein;[674]and to license, register, and attend religious celebrations. His authority should be carefully restricted to the district and no other person should be permitted to share his functions. The district registrars should report at short intervals to the county registrar, who in turn should annually submit a summary of statistics to the registrar-general for the state, by whom the local registrars should be commissioned. If desirable for the sake of economy, especially in states of sparse population, the collection and registry of all vital statistics might be intrusted to the same series of officials.[675]The moral influence of the creation of a distinct system, such as that outlined, would itself be of great value. It would effectively accent the high relative importance to society of matrimonial law and of intelligent service in its administration.
Aside from its public features, just considered, the future matrimonial code of the United States will have to remedy numerous defects in the substance of the law. These may be seen by reference to the detailed examination elsewhere presented. In particular, it will be necessary to get rid of the appalling chaos of state regulations regarding void and voidable contracts. The absurd conflicts touching the forbidden degrees of relationship are a positive social menace. The most serious complications may arise. For instance, a man and a woman who may be legally wed in the place where they dwell might, should they move a mile across the state line and then marry, be guilty of incestuous union andtheir children become bastards. Surely it ought to be possible for an enlightened people to agree upon a common rule in a matter of such vital concern.[676]
In many of the states the laws governing the "age of consent"—that is, the age below which a person may not legally consent to carnal union[677]—are still very defective, although distinct progress has been made since 1885. In that year Mr. W. T. Stead's exposure of the frightful traffic in young girls then tolerated in London aroused the social conscience on both sides of the sea. The "old common law period of ten, sometimes twelve, years" was then "the basis of the age of consent legislation of most of the states, and also of the law of congress pertaining to rape in the District of Columbia and other territory under the immediate jurisdiction of the national government.... It was not until after the astounding revelations made by Mr. Stead ... that the age of consent laws in the United States began to attract attention.... Even then the age of consent in England was thirteen years. One outcome of Mr. Stead's shocking exposures was the speedy raising of the age by the British parliament from thirteen to sixteen years, Mr. Gladstone and others advocating eighteen." The New York Committee for the Prevention of State Regulation of Vice was already engaged in its long struggle to "thwart the periodical efforts[678]made to introduce in NewYork and other American cities the odious old-world system of licensed and state-regulated vice; but its members were quite unaware, until Mr. Stead's startling London revelations suggested the inquiry here, that, by the age of consent laws of New York and of most of the states, young girls of ten years were made legally capable of consenting to their own ruin, and that at that time in one state, Delaware, the age was at the shockingly low period of seven years! Bad as English law had been shown to be in its inadequate protection of girlhood our own legal position ... was found to be still worse. The New York committee, as soon as the facts were known, inaugurated a campaign of petitions to sundry state legislatures and to the congress of the United States, asking that the age be raised to at least eighteen years, and the work was also entered into earnestly and effectively by the Woman's Christian Temperance Unions and the White Cross societies."[679]Under the leadership of Helen H. Gardener, Frances E. Willard, and others, the women of the country conducted a veritable "crusade" of education against the existing state laws, which for zeal, ability, and effective method may well serve as a model for future united efforts in favor of social reforms. It was pointed out as a notorious fact "that brothels and vice-factories get their recruits from the ranks of childhood—fromthe ignorance which is unprotected by the law;" that "children's lives are thus wrecked, and the state is burdened with disease and vice and crime and insanity, which is transmitted and retransmitted until its proportions appall those who understand;" and that it is absurd to make the legal age for consent to a valid marriage higher than that for consent to prostitution. It was urged that the age of consent ought to be advanced to that of legal majority; that girls "have a right to legal protection of their persons, which is more imperative by far than is the protection which every state has recognized as a matter beyond controversy when applied to a girl's property or her ability to make contracts, deeds, and wills, or to her control of herself in any matters which are of importance to her as an individual, and to the state, because she is one of its citizens whose future welfare is a matter of moment to the commonwealth;" and that in respect to her person, as well as regarding property or marriage, she should be protected even against her own will.[680]As a result of the campaign of 1895 alone the age of consent was raised in no less than fifteen states and territories; and in the outset it was significantly pointed out that the "two states in which the age of legal protection for girlhood has been raised to eighteen years are states in which women vote—Wyoming, upon equal terms with men, and Kansas, in municipal elections."[681]A brief summary of the laws of the states and territories regarding the subject under consideration may now be presented.
Encouraging progress has been made in New England, although, in comparison with some of the new commonwealths of the West, the facts are not very creditable. By the Rhode Island statute the age of consent is sixteen.[682]InNew Hampshire it was raised from thirteen to sixteen in 1897;[683]in Vermont, from fourteen to sixteen in 1898;[684]and in Connecticut, from fourteen to sixteen in 1895, while in 1901 the maximum term of imprisonment for abusing a girl under sixteen was increased from three to thirty years.[685]The age limit was only ten in Maine until 1887. It was then raised to thirteen, and in 1889 to fourteen years.[686]In Massachusetts likewise the disgracefully low age of ten years for a girl was sanctioned by statute from 1852 until 1886, when thirteen was substituted. Two years later it was increased to fourteen; and by an act of 1893 an offense against a female under sixteen may be punished by imprisonment for life or for any shorter term of years.[687]The results are even less satisfactory in the southern and southwestern group of states. Florida now heads the list, but with a rather inadequate penalty, the age of consent being raised from sixteen to eighteen years in 1901.[688]Missouri in 1889 increased the age from twelve to fourteen, and in 1895 advanced it nominally to eighteen; but the provisions of the law are such as practically to leave the limit of protection at fourteen years.[689]Previous to 1895 in Arizona the age of consent was fourteen. In that year it was raised toeighteen; but unfortunately it was reduced to seventeen in 1899.[690]In Arkansas[691]it was raised from twelve to sixteen years in 1893; in Louisiana,[692]from twelve to sixteen in 1896; in the District of Columbia[693]and in Indian Territory[694]it has been sixteen since 1889; in Oklahoma[695]it was increased from fourteen to sixteen in 1895; in Maryland,[696]from ten to fourteen in 1890, and to sixteen in 1898; in Tennessee,[697]from ten to sixteen years and one day in 1893; but the statutes of the three states last named are so lax as really to leave the age of consent at twelve in Tennessee and at fourteen in Maryland and Oklahoma. Texas advanced the limit from ten to twelve in 1891, and to fifteen in1895;[698]South Carolina,[699]from ten to fourteen, and Virginia,[700]from twelve to fourteen, in 1896; West Virginia,[701]from twelve to fourteen in 1901; North Carolina,[702]from ten to fourteen in 1895; Alabama,[703]from ten to fourteen in 1897; while fourteen is likewise the age in New Mexico[704]and possibly also in Georgia;[705]but because of vicious clauses in their statutes a girl is in fact only given effectual protection below the age of ten in Alabama and North Carolina, and by common law at the same age in Georgia. Twelve is the limit in Kentucky;[706]and Mississippi[707]still retains the shamefully low age of ten years.
The most enlightened legislation regarding the age of consent is found among the states of the middle and westerngroup. Kansas[708]in 1887, and Wyoming[709]in 1890, set a good example by raising it to eighteen years. The same limit was adopted by Nebraska,[710]Colorado,[711]Idaho,[712]and New York[713]in 1895; by Utah[714]in 1896; by Washington[715]in 1897; and by North Dakota in 1903.[716]Until 1889 Delaware sanctioned the barbarous age of seven years. It was then advanced to fifteen, and in 1895 to eighteen, for both sexes; but the penalties prescribed by the statute are far too lenient to guarantee entire protection beyond the age of seven.[717]Next come ten states and districts in which the age is actually or nominally placed at sixteen years. Minnesota[718]in1891, South Dakota[719]in 1893, Michigan,[720]Montana,[721]and Oregon[722]in 1895, Ohio[723]in 1896, and California[724]in 1897, each advanced to this limit from fourteen. Sixteen is also the age in Alaska.[725]But in 1902 Ohio took a backward step, so lowering the penalty for the offense as nearly to destroy the force of her law. Pennsylvania[726]and New Jersey[727]each raised the age from ten to sixteen in 1887; but in Pennsylvania the girl must prove previous good character, and in both states the penalties are too lax to secure adequate protection beyond the age of ten. Since 1896 the age of consent has been fifteen in Iowa.[728]In Illinois[729]since 1887, Nevada[730]since 1889, Indiana[731]since1893, Wisconsin[732]since 1895, and in Porto Rico by the code of 1902,[733]it is fourteen; while in Hawaii it is but ten years.[734]
It appears, then, although in many cases the statutes are very imperfect, that of the fifty-three states and territories twelve have actually or nominally advanced the age of consent to eighteen; one to seventeen; twenty-two to sixteen; two to fifteen; thirteen to fourteen; while two still retain the low age of twelve and one that of ten years. It should everywhere be raised to eighteen or twenty-one—the age of legal majority for a woman in her business or political relations—by a statute as rigorous as that of Idaho or Kansas. A wide field for beneficent legislation therefore remains; and, although morality "can not be legislated into a people," it is precisely by wise measures of this character that the lawmaker can render powerful aid in the creation of an environment favorable to moral and social progress.
c)Resulting character of divorce legislation.—What has just been said regarding the function of social legislation applies with special force to the laws relating to divorce. Here, as in the case of marriage, there is a wide sphere of useful activity for the lawmaker. He cannot, it is true, reach the root of the matter: the fundamental causes of divorce which are planted deeply in the imperfections of the social system—particularly in false sentiments regarding marriage and the family—and which, as will presently appear, can only be removed through more rational principles and methods of education. He can, however, by carefully drawn and uniform statutes render the external conditions—the legal environment—favorable for the operation of the proper remedy. In this sense it is possible to have "good divorce laws," just as we may have good charity laws, good laws forthe check of contagious diseases, or good laws in any department of remedial social legislation.[735]So far as their ethical content is concerned, good divorce laws, like any other, will not lead, but must follow at some distance, the highest moral sentiment of the community. They should, however, follow as closely as practicable in order to secure the obedience of all. In this field it is highly essential that the laws should be simple, certain, and uniform. They should not from their very nature become a dead letter, or even an encouragement to domestic discord, by offering opportunity for evasion, collusion, or lax interpretation. Statutes which are not in good faith executed, like those of France under the oldrégime, are always a fruitful source of social disorder. They tend to destroy the reverence for law itself. In this respect the divorce laws of many of the states are still defective, although decided progress has been made during the last twenty years. Within this period the foundation of what may some time become a common and effective divorce code for the whole Union has slowly been laid. Little by little, as the detailed discussion already presented in the seventeenth chapter reveals, more stringent provisions for notice have been made, longer terms of previous residence for the plaintiff required, and more satisfactory conditions of remarriage after the decree prescribed; while some of the "omnibus" clauses in the list of statutory causes have been repealed. Much of the best of this work has been accomplished, it is but just to record, through the activity of the National Divorce Reform League and its successor, the National League for the Protection of the Family, under the able guidance of its alertand zealous corresponding secretary, Rev. Samuel Dike, of Auburndale.[736]By this league was suggested the compilation of the elaborate report of Hon. Carroll D. Wright, commissioner of labor, published in 1889; and this has had a powerful influence for good, providing the body of facts needful for the wise direction of legal reform. But in many ways in various states lax legislation is still a demoralizing social factor. Thus, until the statute of 1902 has perhaps put a stop to the traffic, Rhode Island was a favorite resort of persons from New York who were able to escape the marital bond through the institution of "fake suits" for nonsupport. Reno, Nev., has continued to be the Mecca of newly divorced people from California and elsewhere, seeking to evade their own laws by flight to a place where there are no legal obstacles to immediate remarriage.[737]Greenwich, Conn., sustains a similar relation to New York. Sioux Falls, S. D.—to produce one more from the many examples which might be mentioned—appears still to have a flourishing "divorce colony;" yet it may be true, as strongly urged, that the laws of this state, though liberal, are honestly and strictly interpreted.[738]Nor must it be inferred in such cases that those who seek relief in a foreign jurisdiction are for that reason unworthy people. There are sometimes wrongs committed under shelter of the marriage bond so monstrous as to warrant any legal means of gaining relief. Indeed, the evil of clandestine divorce in the United States has been much exaggerated. "A vital question connectedwith divorce," declares Commissioner Wright in 1891, "relates to the real or supposed migration of parties from one state to another for the purpose of seeking divorce. The popular idea is that a great deal of migration takes place for the purpose named. This idea is dispelled in some degree by the statistics that are available upon this point, and getting at the truth as nearly as possible, it is found that but little less than 20 per cent, of all the couples in the country were divorced in other states than those in which they were married. But the ordinary migration of parties for legitimate purposes, especially from the older to the newer states, which in 1870 showed that 23+ per cent. of the native born population, and for 1880 22+ per cent. of such population were living in states other than the ones in which they were born, would apparently reduce the percentage of persons migrating for the purpose of divorce to a point even less than that stated."[739]In fact, for the reason assigned by Mr. Wright, it seems highly probable that the number of such persons must be placed at considerably less than 10 per cent. of the whole number of persons divorced in the United States.[740]Accordingly, it has been inferred that uniformity of law throughout the country would do little to lower the divorce rate. "The establishment of uniform laws," concludesMr. Dike, "is not the central point of the problem."[741]Furthermore, there is another important fact bearing on the evil of clandestine divorce. In a number of cases arising in various states the courts have declared null and void decrees secured in jurisdictions where the plaintiffs were notbona fideresidents, even when they had dwelt in such jurisdictions for the statutory term prescribed as a condition for obtaining a divorce.[742]