CONTROL OVER TRIBUNALS
The supervision which the Suprema was thus gradually developing was most salutary as a check upon the irresponsibility of the tribunals, whose acts were shrouded in impenetrable secrecy except when scrutinized with more or less conscientious investigation by visitors at intervals of five or ten years. The conditions in Barcelona as revealed by successive visitations, between 1540 and 1580, show how a tribunal might violate systematically the Instructions, and how fruitless were the exposures made by visitors when the inquisitors chose to disregard the orders elicited by reports of their misdoings. They were virtually a law unto themselves; no one dared to complain of them and the victims’ mouths were closed by the oath of secrecy which bound them under severe penalties not to divulge their experiences. The whole system was so devised as to expose the inquisitor to the maximum of temptation with the minimum risk of detection, and it was the merest chance whether this power was exercised by a Lucero or by a conscientious judge. The consulta de fe and the concurrence of the Ordinary furnished but a feeble barrier, for the record could generally be so presented as to produce the desired impression and the consultors, proud of their position and its immunities, were indisposed to give trouble, especially as their adverse votes did not create a discordia. When Salazar, in 1566, took the unusual trouble of investigating the interminable records of the individual trials, the rebuke of the Suprema to the inquisitors of Barcelona speaks of the numbers of those sentenced to relaxation, reconciliation, the galleys, scourging, etc., after the grossest informalities in the conduct of the trials.[463]The world can never know the cruelties perpetrated under a system which relieved the tribunals from accountability, and consequently any supervision was a benefit, even that imperfectly exercised by the distant Suprema.
There seems to have come a dawning consciousness of this, possibly stimulated by the revelations of Salazar’s investigations into the three tribunals of the crown of Aragon, which led to the Concordia of 1568. In the same year a carta acordada of June 22nd ordered that even when sentences of relaxation were voted unanimously, the process should be sent to the Suprema for its action.[464]From this time forward its intervention, on one score or another, gradually increased. From the records of the tribunal of Toledo,between 1575 and 1610, it appears that it intervened in 228 cases out of 1172, or substantially in one out of five, while in only 82 of these cases, or one out of fourteen, was there discordia—sometimes as to arrest and trial, sometimes as to torture, but mostly as to the final sentence.[465]
At this period it would seem to be the practice in the Suprema to refer cases to two members and act on their report. Thus in the matter of Mari Vaez, condemned in 1594 to relaxation in effigy, the two are Vigil de Quiñones and Mendoza, whose names are inscribed on the back of the sentence and under them the word “Justª” on the strength of which the secretary writes the formal letter to the tribunal, ending with “hagais, señores justicia”—the customary formula of confirmation.[466]As might be expected the degree of scrutiny exercised in the performance of this duty was variable. In the case of Jacques Curtancion, in 1599, it was observed that the ratification of the confession of the accused had been made in the presence of only one interpreter, when the rules required two; the papers were therefore returned to the tribunal of Granada for the rectification of this irregularity, but this exactitude was of no benefit to the sufferer.[467]On the other hand, Pedro Flamenco was tortured in Toledo at 10A.M., June 10, 1570, after which the consulta de fe was held which condemned him to relaxation for fictitious confession. At the earliest the papers could not have reached Madrid until late on the 11th, but on the 12th was despatched the formal reply confirming the sentence. There could scarce have been time to read the voluminous record and certainly none to give it more than perfunctory consideration.[468]Again, delays attributable only to negligence were not infrequent. Diego de Horozco was sentenced to relaxation by the tribunal of Cuenca, which sent the process to the Suprema, September 3, 1585 and, at the same time, asked for instructions about the cases of Alonso Sainz and Francisco Caquen which had been previously forwarded. No reply was received for more than a month, when the tribunal wrote again, October 14th, that it was anxious to hold an auto de fe. This brought the prompt answer to torture Horozco and execute justice in accordance with the result.[469]
CONTROL OVER TRIBUNALS
Besides this direct intervention there grew up a watchfulness over the proceedings of the tribunals through their reports of autos de fe, which were closely scrutinized and returned with criticisms. These reports were required to give full details of all cases decided, whether for public autos or private ones in the audience-chamber, and their regular transmission was enforced by conditioning upon it the payment of the annualayuda de costaor supplement to the salaries of the officials. There was also an opportunity, which was not neglected, of administering reproofs on the reports required from inquisitors of their annual visitations of portions of their districts. These were closely criticized and errors were pointed out without reserve, such as judging cases that ought to have been sent to the tribunal for its action, punishing too severely or too lightly, imperfect reports of cases, etc.[470]Thus in various ways a more or less minute supervision was exercised, and the inquisitors were made to feel the subordination of their position.
This was greatly increased when, in 1632, each tribunal was required to send in a monthly report of all its current business and the condition of each case, whether pending or decided, and this in addition to an annual report on which depended the allowance of the ayuda de costa. It was difficult to enforce the regular performance of this and the command had to be frequently repeated, but it was successful to some extent and afforded an opportunity of criticism which was not neglected. Thus, in 1695, in acknowledging receipt of such a report from Valencia, its slovenliness and imperfection are sharply rebuked as deserving of a heavier penalty, which is suspended through benignity. The character, it is said, of the witnesses should be noted, the number or letter of the prisoner’s cell, the ration assigned to him, whether or not he has property and, if sequestrated, a copy of the sequestration should be added; the crime and the time of entering the prison and the property items should be repeated in all successive reports. After this, each individual case is considered and much fault is found with the details of procedure.[471]Even the requests for information, made by onetribunal of another, were required, by an order of 1635, to be the subject of regular reports by the fiscal every four months.[472]It was impossible, however, to enforce with regularity the rendering of monthly reports and, in 1800, the Suprema contented itself with requiring them thrice a year, a regulation which continued to the end, although it was irregularly observed.[473]
The same process of centralization was developed in the control over individual cases. It was not only when there was discordia or sentences of relaxation that confirmation was required. A carta acordada of August 2, 1625, ordered that no sentence of scourging, galleys, public penance, or vergüenza should be executed until the process was submitted to the Suprema.[474]The records of the tribunal of Valladolid, at this period, not only show that this was observed when corporal punishment was inflicted, but also indicate that a custom was springing up of submitting the sentence in all cases involving clerics, and further that the habit was becoming frequent of consulting the Suprema during the course of trials.[475]When, in 1647, the Suprema required all sentences to be submitted to it as soon as pronounced, it assumed full control over the disposition of cases.[476]It was concentrating in itself the management of the entire business of all the tribunals. The minuteness of detail in its supervision is illustrated when, in 1697, the daily ration of four maravedís for a prisoner in Valladolid was regulated by it and the vote of the tribunal whether a prisoner is to be confined in thecarceles mediasorsecretashad to be confirmed by it.[477]
CENTRALIZATION
Simple arrest by the Inquisition was in itself an infliction of no common severity and, from an early period, the Suprema sought to exercise supervision over it. In 1500, the Instructions of Seville require the tribunals, whenever they make an arrest, to send to the inquisitor-general, by their messenger, the accusation, with the testimony in full, the number of the witnesses andthe character of the accused.[478]This salutary check on the irresponsible power of the inquisitors was too cumbrous for enforcement and it soon became obsolete but, in 1509, when there was discordia as to sentences of arrest they were ordered, before execution, to be submitted to the Suprema with the opinions of the voters.[479]In 1521, to check the persecuting zeal of the tribunals towards the Moriscos, or newly baptized Moors, Cardinal Adrian ordered that they should not be arrested save on conclusive evidence which must first be submitted to the Suprema—a humane measure speedily forgotten.[480]The religious Orders were favored, in 1534, by requiring confirmation of all sentences of arrest pronounced against their members—a measure which required to be repeated in 1555 and, in 1616, it was extended to all ecclesiastics.[481]The Instructions of 1561 order consultation with the Suprema before arresting persons of quality or when the case is otherwise important[482]and, in 1628, it was ordered that no arrest be made on the testimony of a single witness, without first consulting the Suprema; if escape were feared, precautions might be taken, but in such wise as to inflict as little disgrace as possible.[483]Under these limitations the practice is summarized by a writer, about 1675, who tells us that there are cases in which the tribunals can vote arrest, but not execute it without the assent of the Suprema; these are where there is but one witness (but this is not observed with Judaizers), when the accused is a cleric, religious, knight of the Military Orders, notary or superior officer of justice—unless, indeed, flight be apprehended. In these cases thesumaria, or summary of evidence, must be well drawn up and submitted to the Suprema with the votes of the inquisitors.[484]
Thus gradually the independent action of the tribunals was curtailed until it finally disappeared and centralization in the Suprema was complete. The precise date of this I have been unable to determine, but a writer of the middle of the eighteenth century tersely describes the conditions, telling us that the inquisitors determine nothing without the orders of the Council,so that, when they draw up thesumariasin cases of faith they submit them and, on their return, do what they are told; they do not sentence but only append their opinions to the processes and the Council decides.[485]
This continued to the end. The book of votes of the Suprema, in the restored Inquisition, from 1814 to 1820, shows that the tribunals had become mere agencies for receiving denunciations, collecting evidence and executing the orders of the Council. Even these slender duties were sometimes denied to them. In the case of Juana de Lima of Xeres, tried for bigamy, the sumaria was made up by the commissioner of Xeres and on it the Suprema, without more ado, sentenced her to four years in a house of correction and sent the sentence to the commissioner to be read to her; the functions of the Seville inquisitors were reduced to transmitting the papers and keeping the records.[486]If a tribunal ventured on the slightest expression of dissent, it was roundly taken to task. Thus, December 23, 1816 that of Madrid was sternly rebuked because, in the case of Don Teodoro Bachiller, it had described as unjustified his imprisonment; that imprisonment had been approved by the Suprema and the tribunal was ordered to expunge from the records this improper expression and never to repeat such an offence, if it desired to escape serious action. So, when the fiscal of the same tribunal remonstrated against an order to remove Caietano Carcer, on the ground of ill health, from the secret prison, the Suprema replied, January 14, 1818, that its orders were dictated by justice and there was no fiscal or tribunal that could object to them. It expected that the tribunal and its fiscal would in future be more self-restrained and obedient to its superior decisions, thus escaping all responsibility, and that they would not oblige the Council to enforce its authority by measures necessary although unpleasant.[487]To this had shrunk the inquisitor before whom, in the old days, bishops and magnates trembled.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
It is satisfactory to be able to say that, as a rule, the interference of the Suprema with the tribunals was on the side of mercy rather than of rigor. It is true that torture, then the universal solvent of doubt, was frequently ordered, but there seems to have been a fairly conscientious discharge of the responsibilitieswhich it had grasped. In the Valladolid records of the seventeenth century, the modifications of sentences are almost uniformly mitigations, especially by the omission of scourging, which the tribunals were accustomed to administer liberally, and there would seem to be especial tenderness for the offences of the clergy.[488]A typical instance of this moderation is seen in the case of Margarita Altamira, sentenced by the Barcelona tribunal, in 1682, to appear in an auto de fe, to abjure de levi, to receive a hundred lashes through the streets and to seven years’ exile from Barcelona and some other places, the first two of which were to be passed serving in a hospital without pay. All this the Suprema reduced to hearing her sentence read in the audience-chamber and to four years’ exile from the same places.[489]This mitigating tendency is especially apparent in the restored Inquisition, from 1814 to 1820, where the sentences are almost uniformly revised with a reduction of penalties. Scourging is more rarely prescribed by the tribunals and, when it is ordered, it is invariably omitted by the Suprema, the power of dispensing with it being attributed to the inquisitor-general.[490]
As the functions of the tribunals thus gradually shrank to mere ministerial duties, the appellate jurisdiction lodged in the inquisitor-general and absorbed by the Suprema, of which we heard so much in earlier times, became less and less important. The bull of Leo X, in 1516, prescribes that appeals shall be heard by the inquisitor-general in conjunction with the Suprema and that, pending the decision, the case shall be suspended.[491]This indicates that appeals were suspensive, although subsequently the Inquisition eluded this by arguing, as in the matter of Villanueva, that they were merely devolutionary—that is, that sentences, in spite of them, were to be promptly executed, thus practically rendering them useless.[492]
At this period the relations between the Council and the inquisitor-general as to appellate jurisdiction do not appear to be definitely settled. In 1520, Antonio de la Bastida appealed about his wife’s dowry from the judge of confiscations of Calahorra,and the decision in his favor was rendered by the Suprema “in consultation with the very reverend father, the Cardinal of Tortosa (Adrian),” and, as the crown was concerned, it was confirmed by Charles V.[493]In two cases, however, in 1527 and 1528, in which, on appeal, Cardinal Manrique remitted or mitigated sentences, the letters were issued in his name and without signature by the members of the Council.[494]During Manrique’s disgrace, the Suprema apparently acted independently for, in a letter of December 9, 1535, to the Valencia tribunal, alluding to the cases on appeal pending before it, it promises to adjudicate them as speedily as possible.[495]That, by this time, at least its concurrence had become essential would appear from the modification, on appeal by Juan Gómez from a sentence imposed by the Valencia tribunal, when the letter was signed both by Inquisitor-general Tavera and the members of the Council.[496]When, as we have seen, the secular courts endeavored to entertain appeals in cases of confiscation and matters not strictly of faith, Prince Philip’s cédula of March 10, 1553 emphatically declared that appellate jurisdiction was vested solely in the Suprema, which held faculties for that purpose from the Holy See and from the crown.[497]
CONTROL OVER DETAILS
This would seem to dispose of any claim that appellate jurisdiction was a special attribute of the inquisitor-general, and this is confirmed by a case, in 1552, in which Angelica Vidama appealed from the sentence of the Valencia tribunal condemning the memory and fame of her deceased mother Beatriz Vidama. On March 8th, Inquisitor-general Valdés and the members of the Council with some assessors declared that, after examining the matter in several sessions their opinion was that the sentence should be revoked. Then, on March 12th, in the presence of Valdés, the Council adopted a sentence restoring her and her posterity to honor and good fame and releasing the confiscation of her estate. The sentence is not signed by Valdés but only by three members of the Council, which indicates that his signature was unnecessary.[498]When he was held simply to have a vote, like every other member, he could claim no special authority as toappeals and, with the gradual intervention of the Suprema in all the acts of the tribunals, appeals themselves became obsolete.
From a comparatively early period the control assumed by the Suprema over the provincial tribunals was absolute. Already, in 1533, it tersely informed them that what it ordered and what it forbade must be obeyed to the letter; this it repeated in 1556 and, in 1568, it took occasion to tell them that it was not to be answered, nor were inquisitors to offer excuses when they were rebuked.[499]This control was not confined to their judicial proceedings but extended to every detail of their affairs. Even Ferdinand, with his minute watchfulness over the management of the tribunals, gave to the inquisitors a certain latitude as to expenses and instructed his receivers that they were to honor the requisitions of the inquisitors for outlays on messengers, lodgings, work on houses, prisons, stagings, etc.[500]The Suprema permitted no such liberty of action; it required to be consulted in advance and roundly scolded tribunals which incurred expenses on their own responsibility.[501]In 1569 a general order specified in minute detail the trifling matters of daily necessity for which they could make disbursements; for everything else reference must first be made to the Suprema.[502]This continued to the end and its correspondence is filled with instructions as to petty outlays of all kinds, and largely with regard to repairs of the houses and other properties belonging to the Inquisition. If Valencia, in 1647, wanted a clock in the audience-chamber, it had to apply for permission to purchase one and, in 1650, the Suprema ordered its price to be allowed in the receiver’s accounts. In 1665 it ordered the fiscal of Barcelona to be lodged in the palace of the Inquisition and gave minute instructions how the apartments were to be redistributed so as to accommodate him.[503]It is scarce necessary to add that the determination of salaries, which had originally been lodged in the hands of the inquisitor-general, had passed absolutely under the control of the Suprema.
Among the perquisites of the officials was that they were furnished with mourning on occasions of public mourning, and a carta acordada of January 20, 1578 ordered that, when this was to be given, a detailed statement must be made out in advance of the persons entitled to it, how much there would be required, what kind of cloth and at what price. On the death of Philip II, in 1598, two persons in Valencia complained that they had been omitted in the distribution, whereupon it wrote to the tribunal for information, on receipt of which it ordered that one of them should be gratified.[504]So, in 1665, on the death of Philip IV, Dr. Paladio Juncar, one of the physicians of the tribunal of Barcelona, asked for an allowance such as had been given to his colleague Dr. Maruch, whereupon the Suprema called for a report as to the cost of the mourning given to Dr. Maruch and whether it was customary to give it to two physicians. A similar petition from Juan Carbonell, one of the advocates for poor prisoners, led to another demand for information and the result was that the Suprema refused them both.[505]
This close watchfulness did not diminish with time. In 1816, when returning the papers of a case to the tribunal of Madrid, a reprimand was administered because in one place there was a blank of half a page which might have been utilized for a certain record. So, in 1817, Seville was rebuked for the number of blank pages in the processes sent, causing not only a useless waste of paper but an increase of postage; six months later Seville sent the sumaria of Miguel Villavicencio, in which the Suprema counted fourteen blank pages, whereupon it referred to its previous instructions and commanded the tribunal to tell the secretaries that they must obey orders, else they would be not only charged with the excess of postage but would be severely punished.[506]
CONTROL OVER FINANCES
The development of this absolute authority was largely aided by the complete control over the finances of the tribunals claimed and exercised by the inquisitor-general or the Suprema or concurrently by both. This, after the death of Ferdinand, practically passed into their hands, except when Charles, in his early years,made grants to his courtiers from the confiscations. All that was gathered in by the labors of the provincial inquisitors was treated as a common fund at the sole discretion of the central power. Most of the tribunals, as we shall see, held investments, partially adequate to their support, in addition to their current gains, but even these were held subject to the Suprema. In 1517, orders were sent to the farmers of the revenue to pay to the receiver-general of the Suprema, instead of to the tribunals, thejuros, or assignments on the taxes, held by the latter. Of these the holdings of the Seville tribunal amounted to 500,000 maravedís per annum—100,000 on the tithe of oil, 200,000 on the alcavala of oil and 200,000 on the alcavala of the shambles. Córdova suffered less from this, for that tribunal held only 103,000 maravedís of income—63,000 on the alcavala of meal, 16,000 on that of wine and 24,000 on that of fruit.[507]But it was not only on the investments but also on the current earnings of the tribunals that the Suprema laid its hand. Its salary list was considerable, it had no settled source of income and the royal policy was that the Inquisition must pay its own way besides having a surplus for the treasury. In 1515, while the Suprema of Castile was yet separate from that of Aragon, its pay-roll aggregated 750,000 maravedís, with 340,000 additional for ayudas de costa, or in all 1,090,000, without counting Inquisitor-general Ximenes who seems to have disdained the emoluments of his office. This large sum, the receiver of Seville, Pedro de Villacis, was required to defray in 1515, while, in 1516, the demand fell upon Guillastegui, receiver of Toledo; in 1517 the salaries were paid by Seville and the ayuda de costa by Toledo and, in 1518, by Valencia.[508]The burden was apportioned among them according to their luck. In addition to this were the innumerable orders to pay the salaries and expenses of the tribunals, which were sometimes issued in the name of Cardinal Adrian and sometimes in that of the Suprema.
It would seem that the receivers of the tribunals, who were practically treasurers, occasionally hesitated in honoring these calls for, in 1520, Charles V issued cédulas to all the receivers of Castile and Aragon to pay whatever the inquisitor-general andSuprema should order.[509]The theory that the funds belonged to the crown in no way limited the control of the inquisitor-general and Suprema and this, during the disgrace of Manrique, naturally passed into the hands of the Council. Under his successor, Tavera, orders were sometimes drawn in his name and countersigned by the members of the Council and sometimes all reference to him was omitted. There seems not to have been any settled rule until, about 1704, the victory of the Council over Mendoza was emphasized by an instruction that no order for the payment of money, given by the inquisitor-general, was to be recognized unless countersigned by the members.[510]
The Suprema called without stint on the tribunals to meet its expenses and its fluctuating sources of supply are indicated in its varying demands for a few ducats for some special payment to large sums from some tribunal which had made a fortunate raid on wealthy heretics as when, being in Valladolid in 1549, it demanded 2000 ducats from that tribunal for its pay-roll.[511]It seems to have made an attempt to levy a settled contribution on Saragossa which, in 1539, it ordered to furnish the money for its salaries, but the enforcement of this seems to have been difficult for, from 1540 to 1546, we find it paying its receiver-general Loazes 15,000 maravedís a year for making the collection. After an interval of ten years, in 1557, it demanded of Saragossa 10,000 sueldos (400 ducats) a year toward its pay-roll, but again there was trouble, for although the order was issued in April, the inquisitors in October were reminded of it, with the significant hint that, unless the money were forthcoming, their salaries would be cut off.[512]In 1559 a papal grant of 100,000 ducats on the ecclesiastical revenues of Spain kept it in funds for awhile and when the tribunals of the colonies were fairly in operation they contributed largely but, in the eighteenth century, we still find it drawing upon the tribunals, although it had accumulated a considerable invested capital, yielding a handsome income.[513]
CONTROL OVER FINANCES
While thus caring for itself, it also looked after the tribunals which were less fortunate than their fellows, treating the profits of all as a common fund to be distributed at its discretion. These transfers were incessant; as examples of them may be cited an order, in 1562, to Valladolid to pay 1000 ducats to Barcelona which was deeply in debt and, in 1565, Murcia was called upon to give it 400,000 maravedís for its salaries. Murcia, at this time, seems to have struck a rich vein of confiscations for, in 1567, it was required to contribute 1500 ducats for the salaries of Valencia. Barcelona continued in trouble; there were few heretics there and its chief business was quarrelling with the people, which was not productive financially, so, in 1579, Llerena was required to give it 500 ducats towards its pay-roll and, in 1586, Seville, Murcia and Llerena were ordered to furnish 500 ducats each for the same purpose. The expulsion of the Moriscos, in 1609-10, brought Valencia to destitution and, in 1612, Granada and Seville were obliged to lend it 1000 ducats apiece.[514]
This system remained in force until the last. Under the Restoration the Holy Office was seriously cramped for funds, as we shall see, and its financial troubles were frequent. In 1816, Majorca was required to furnish over 40,000 reales to Logroño and Logroño was called upon to supply the same sum to the Suprema. It was not prompt in meeting this demand but paid 15,000; in March, 1817, the Suprema notified it that the balance would be drawn for; on this a partial payment seems to have been made, leaving 12,000, for which, in 1818, the receiver-general of the Suprema drew, but his draft came back dishonored. This aroused the wrath of the Council which wrote, July 3rd, expressing its surprise; if the tribunal had no funds in hand, it should have gone out and borrowed them; it must do so now and not let such a thing occur again.[515]
A necessary feature of this financial control was the centralization in the Suprema of the auditing of the accounts of all the tribunals. Their receivers or treasurers were supposed to send, at regular intervals, itemized statements with vouchers of all receipts and expenditures, which were audited by thecontador general, or auditor, of the Council.[516]The efficiency of this system was marred by habitual vices of maladministration and the hesitation to punish offenders, of which a petition of the historian,Gerónimo Zurita, affords us a glimpse. In 1538 he was made secretary, orescribano de cameraof the Suprema. In 1548 Inquisitor-general Valdés gave this place to Juan de Valdés, presumably a kinsman, and Zurita was transferred to thecontaduría generalfor Aragon. In a petition presented May 2, 1560, he represents that he has served as contador for twelve years at a salary less than that of his predecessor and with more work; there were the accounts of the tribunal of Sicily, which had not been rendered for twenty years, and it was notorious that the accounts of the receivers had been very confused and embarrassing, all of which he had straightened out with the utmost care, rejecting, for the service of the Holy Office, opportunities offering him better prospects, and now the only reward he asks is that his son, Miguel Zurita, a youth of 18, may be adjoined to him as an assistant—a moderate prayer which was granted.[517]That Zurita was a laborious and conscientious auditor it would be impossible to doubt, but the frequency of defalcations, as we shall see hereafter, would indicate that such officials were not universal and that the precautions of the system were negligently enforced.
SALARIES AND PERQUISITES
That the Suprema should exact all that it could from the tribunals was a necessity, for its pay-roll grew, partly as the result of its increased functions in the centralizing process, and partly in accordance with the inevitable law of an office-holding class to multiply. As the business and profits of the Inquisition decreased its officials consequently grew more numerous and costly. After the death of Ferdinand in 1516, when Aguirre and Calcena were dismissed, there were for some years only three members, a fiscal, a secretary, an alguazil, a “relator” (to report on cases sent up on appeal), a contador and receiver-general, two physicians, a messenger and a portero—twelve in all—with a pay-roll, including the ayuda de costa, of 1,090,000 maravedísor a little less than 3000 ducats.[518]In the seventeenth century all this had changed. Various gratifications had become habitual additions to the salaries proper, in lieu of the old ayuda de costa. Thus there were three largerpropinasorpourboiresa year, on the days of San Isidro (May 15th), San Juan (June 24th) and Santa Ana (July 26th) and five smaller ones, calledmanualeson certain other feasts. There were alsoluminariasor reimbursement for the cost of the frequent illuminations publicly ordered, which seem to have been averaged into a fixed sum, and at times there was an allowance for the Autos of Corpus Christi, or plays represented before the Council on Corpus Christi day, while thetorosor bull-fights which were celebrated on the days of the three chief propinas sometimes replace the latter. There were other smaller perquisites, such as wax and sugar—the latter a distribution, on each of the feasts of Corpus Christi and San Pedro Martir, of an arroba (25 pounds) of sugar to the inquisitor-general, half an arroba to the members and a quarter to the subordinates, making in all nine arrobas. In 1657 we learn that sugar was worth 161 reales per arroba, making an annual outlay for this purpose of 2900 reales.[519]A larger gratuity was that of houses. The Suprema owned a number and allowed them to be occupied by its officials, while those who were not thus housed received a cash equivalent. Thus in various ways the nominal salaries were largely supplemented and, whatever were the necessities of the State, the Council took care that its members and officials should be abundantly supplied.
When, in 1629, there was some talk of reforming the Suprema, Philip IV called upon Castañeda, the contador-general, for a detailed statement of the salaries, propinas, bull-fights and illuminations, with their aggregate for each person connected with it, from the inquisitor-general down to the lowest employee, and the same information was required as to the tribunals. As usual the Suprema equivocated and concealed. All that it saw fit to reply was that the salary of a member was 500,000 maravedís, of aconsejero de la tarde166,666, of the royal secretary and receiver-general 200,000 each.[520]We happen to have a detailed statement of the personnel and emoluments of the Suprema at this period which furnishes the information thus withheld fromthe king. It shows that the salary of the inquisitor-general was 1,100,000 maravedís and the extras 352,920, or in all, 1,452,920. Each of the full members received one half of this, while theconsejeros de la tardehad one third of the salary of a full member, one half of his propina and no luminarias. The whole number on the pay-roll was thirty-six; the aggregate of their salaries was 7,152,539 maravedís and of the extras 2,891,088, or in all, 10,043,627, equivalent to 295,400 reales or 26,855 ducats, being about ten-fold the cost of a century earlier.[521]Of course, the purchasing power of money had fallen greatly during the interval, but this does not wholly explain the later extravagance. It is observable, moreover that, in the case of the minor subordinates, where the salaries were low, the extras amount to twice as much as the regular pay, and also that as yet there were but three propinas a year and these and the luminarias were the only extras.
A statement of a few years later, probably 1635, may be summarized thus:
SALARIES AND PERQUISITES
In this for the first time appears the name of the king as a recipient of the propinas and luminarias, with an allowance double that of the inquisitor-general, but though he figured in the estimates he was not paid.[522]So carefully were these extrasobserved that when, in 1679 and 1680 thefiestas de torosor bull-fights, on the feasts of San Isidro and Santa Ana, were omitted and, in 1680 theAutos Sacramentalesof Corpus Christi, the Suprema indemnified itself, in 1680, by distributing 687,276 maravedís, from which we learn that the perquisites of a bull-fight amounted to 137,275 and of an exhibition of autos to 144,976.[523]
The terrible condition of the debased currency, known asvellon, at a discount fromplataor silver, ranging from 25 to 50 per cent., gave further opportunities for quietly increasing salaries. As a rule, public officials had to take their salaries in the depreciated vellon—the government was obliged to accept it for taxes and to pay it out at its face value.[524]The Suprema, however, computed its salaries in silver and paid in vellon with the discount added. In 1680 the members made a special grant to themselves, for they ordered the salaries to be paid one half in silver and the other half in vellon with a hundred per cent. added, thus in effect doubling their salaries. How often this liberality was repeated it would be impossible now to say; it was not a settled matter, for the receipts in 1681 show a return to the usual practice of payment in vellon with 50 per cent. added.[525]Another device by which the depreciation in vellon was made a pretext for augmenting salaries is shown by the receipts for 1670. Payments were made every three months in advance; the firsttercio, on January 1st, and the second on May 1st, were made in vellon with the customary addition of 50 per cent.; then, on September 1st this augmented sum was taken as a basis and 66⅔ per cent. added, bringing the payment to two and a half times the legitimate amount.[526]The Suprema was not particular as to other devices for increasing its emoluments. In 1659, the birth of the Infante Fernando Thomás served as an excuse for two extra propinas and for five luminarias.[527]In 1690, when it probably was in funds from the confiscations in Majorca, under the transparent pretext of replacing various articles of which it had availed itself, it voted to its members and chief officers 14,160 reales in silver and to the subordinates 8555 in vellon.[528]It was also profuse in gratuities to its employees, as when, in 1670, it voted to Doña Juana deFita y Ribera—evidently the daughter or niece of its secretary Joseph de Ribera—the handsome pension of four hundred ducats, to enable her to marry.[529]In spite of its perpetual complaints of poverty, it evidently was not an inexpensive department of the government.
The Suprema was none the less liberal in providing for the amusement and gratification of its members, in ghastly contrast with the sources from which the funds were drawn—the confiscations that ruined thousands of industrious and happy families. In fact, it gives us a new conception of the grim tribunal, which held in its hand the life and honor of every Spaniard and had as its motto “Exsurge Domine et vindica causam tuam,” to note its careful provision for comfort and enjoyment on festal occasions.