* Extracts of Summary, by Aliquis. of arguments on the Dutyof Inquiry, from the 'Pursuit of Truth, and other Essays, byS. Bailey, in Reasoner No. 12.
Marcus Antoninus, indeed, said 'I seek after truth, by which no man yet was ever injured.' But there is a great practical mistake here. There is danger in truth—-and the admission should be plainly made. Men, where forewarned, make the choice more manfully. We have been wisely told by Emerson, that the cherished thoughts and institutions of mankind are at the mercy of a new generalisation—rest, commodity, reputation. Inconvenience, and suspense, are the consequences of the partizanship of truth. Certain political truths annihilate the interests of whole classes. Certain social truths war with life-cherished prejudices. Certain sanitary truths reduce the value of all city property. Certain scientific truths ruin the working classes by thousands. In a wiser state of society this could be prevented, but our present business is with what is. It is therefore idle to conceal the truth—that there is danger in truth. Pope's dictum, that party is the madness of many for the gain of a few, is inversely true of truth. Truth is the ultimate benefit of many, but the immediate ruin of the few. Here, however, comes to our aid the wise and far-seeing aphorism of Burke—'In all exertions of duty there is something to be hazarded'—and the brave man and wise friend of mankind will risk the fate which surely awaits him—the fate of Galileo, Newton, Salomon de Caus, Volta, Fulton, Winser, Arkwright, Gall, and all who present themselves, with truth in their hands, at the door of this great bedlam called the world—the fate of being received with stones and hisses.
The term Idol is employed by Bacon to designate those prejudices which men prefer to truth. A prejudice is a bias without a reason for it, an opinion without a foundation, a judgment formed of persons and things without sufficient examination, an assent given to a proposition without sufficient evidence. The bias may be honourable, the opinion correct, the assent in the right direction, but still of the nature of prejudice, because, if right, it is right by accident rather than design.
Ignorance hides from us facts, and we decide partially rather than confess our deficiency. Ill-directed education gives us pre-possessions, which are obstacles in the way of truth, and we continue to cherish what, having become a part of our nature, it pains us to discard. The senses will occasionally mislead us and although we are conscious that appearances are not to be wholly trusted, we reluctantly doubt our own infallibility. From early, and therefore unquestioned, associations, we have acquired certain habits, and from fashion certain sentiments, and we continue old customs, and fall into the current opinion unconsciously. Of these sources of prejudice, logic warns us to beware. Of so much importance did Bacon regard these hindrances to truth, that he considered the pursuit of new truth hopeless while they were cherished. In a mixed vein of poetry and philosophy, he divided prejudices into four classes, which he called Idols of the Tribe, the Den, the Market and the Theatre. Idols of the Tribe are prejudices men imbibe from early training, and love of hypothesis. They are so called because common to the whole race or tribe of mankind. Idols of the Den are those which relate to a man's particular character, Idols of the Market are those which are accommodated to common notions. Idols of the Theatre denote such as pertain to hypothetical systems of philosophy.
Remembering the declarations of Euler and Gall, and the daily discoveries of science, we should stand, as it were, on the verge of the old world of experience, and look out on the new world of troth. A young thinker should make for himself a chart of proposed reforms, systems, and changes, agitated in his day—place
In relative positions in the scale of importance such as he deems of value, if true—and then analyse his experience to see what is soundly opposed thereto. Such a practice would go far to rid men of idol-prejudices, which retard private improvement and public progress.
1. All men possessed of an uncontrolled discretionary power, leading to the aggrandisement and profit of their own body, have always abused it.'—Burke's Thoughts on the Present Discontents.
The student will find the proof of this proposition exhibited in the example of Induction, quoted from Mr. Bailey, p. 63.
2. Prosperity could never be reached and maintained in this country, without some provision for the regular employment of the poor.—Mr. Beckett's Speech in the House of Commons, Feb. 3,1842.
The demonstration, to universal conviction, of this proposition, would lead to an entire and beneficial change of the social condition of this country.
3. The pen is the tongue of the world.—Paine. Put this in the syllogistic form.
4. A good instance of a metaphorical argument drawn out is given by Mr. Mill:—'For instance, when Mr. Carlyle, rebuking the Byronic vein, says that "strength does not manifest itself in spasms, but in stout bearing of burdens;" the metaphor proves nothing, it is no argument, only an allusion to an argument; in no other way however could so much of argument be so completely suggested in so few words. The expression suggests a whole train of reasoning, which it would take many sentences to write out at length. As thus: Motions which are violent but brief, which lead to no end, and are not under the control of the will, are, in the physical body, more incident to a weak than to a strong constitution. If this be owing to a cause which equally operates in what relates to the mind, the same conclusion will told there likewise. But such is really the fact. For the body's liability to these sudden and uncontrollable motions arises from irritability, that is, unusual susceptibility of being moved out of its ordinary course by transient influences: which may equally be said of the mind. And this susceptibility, whether of mind or body, must arise from a weakness of the forces which maintain and carry on the ordinary action of the system. All this is conveyed in one short sentence. And since the causes are alike in the body and in the mind, the analogy is a just one, and the maxim holds of the one as much as of the other.'*
* Logic, pp. 433-4, vol. 2.
5. A youth, named Evathlus, engaged with Protagoras to learn dialectics, and promised his tutor a large sum of money,in case he gained the first cause he pleaded, Evathlus, when fully instructed, refused to pay his instructor. Protagoras brought his action thus—'You must pay the money however the cause go, for if I gain you must pay in consequence of the sentence, as being cast in the cause; and if you gain it, you must pay in pursuance of our covenant.' 'Nay,' Evathlus retorts, 'which way soever the cause be decided, you will have nothing, for if I prevail, the sentence gives it that nothing is due: and if I lose, then there is nothing due by the covenant.' What should be the decision in this case?
6. The first case, says Cervantes, requiring Sancho's attention was a question put by a stranger, in presence of the stewards and rest of the attendants. 'My Lord,' said he, 'a certain manor is divided by a large river. I beg your honour will be attentive, for the case is of great consequence and of some difficulty. I say then, upon this river is a bridge, and at one end of it the gibbet, together with a sort of court hall, in which four judges usually sit to execute the law enacted by the lord of the river, bridge, and manor, which runs to this effect: Whoever shall pass this bridge, must first swear whence he comes and whither he goes; if he swear the truth he shall be allowed to pass, but if he forswear himself he shall die upon the gallows without mercy or respite. This law, together with the rigorous penalty, being known, numbers passed, and as it appeared they swore nothing but the truth, the judges permitted them to pass freely and without control. It happened, however, that one man's oath being taken, he affirmed and swore by his deposition that he was going to be hanged on that gibbet, and had no other errand or intention. The judges, having considered this oath, observed: if we allow this man to pass freely, he swore to a lie, and, therefore, ought to be hanged according to law; and if we ordered him to be hanged after he hath sworn he was going to be suspended on that gibbet, he will have sworn the truth, and by the same law he ought to be acquitted, I beg, therefore, to know, my lord governor [and student], what the judges must do with this man?'
Abstract names—the names of attributes.—J. S. Mill. Abstraction—fixing thought on the point of resemblance in one body.—drawing off and contemplating separately any part of an an object.
Action—a volition followed by an effect.—J. S. Mill.
Analogy—resemblance of relation.—Whately.
Analysis—the resolution of a complex whole into its component elements. —J. S. Mill.
Argument—an expression in which, from something laid down as granted, something else is deduced—Whately.
Argumentum ad hominem—appealing to an opponent's professed views.
A priori—reasoning from cause to effect.
A posteriori—arguing from effects to cause.
Body—the unknown cause of our sensations—J. S. Mill.
Cause—the invariable antecedent, or thing going before.—the stimulus of an effect.
Connotative terms—denote a subject, and imply an attribute.—-. J.S. Mill.
Consciousness—sensation of existences.
Definition—the separation of a thing, as by a boundary, from everything else.
Discovery—finding out something already existing.
Effect—the immediate, invariable consequent, or the change produced by power.
ENTHYMEME-An argument with one premiss suppressed being understood.
Experience—events which have taken place within a person's own knowledge.—Whately.
Fallacy—an apparent argument.
General Terms—express the notion of partial similarity.
Generalisation—tracing certain points of resemblance.—naming one respect in which many things agree.
Induction—universalisation of truth by inference from uniform facts.
Intuition—imaginary looking.—Whewell,
Logic—a scientific use of facts.
Logical Truth—that which admits of proof.—Chambers.
Mind—the unknown percipient of sensation.—J. S. Mill.
Necessary Truths—are those in which we not only learn that the proposition is true, but see that it must be true; in which the negative of the truth is not only false, but impossible; in which we cannot, even by an effort of the imagination, or in a supposition, conceive the reverse of that which is asserted.—Dr. Whewell: Phil. Inductive Sciences, pp. 54-5, vol. 1.*
* As 'necessary truths' are much talked of I have introduced here, from Whewell, the completest definition with which I am acquainted. For myself, I coincide on this question with J. S. Mill, as quoted pp. 22-3.
Non-connotative Terms—denote a subject only and an attribute only.—J. S. Mill.
Philosophy—the science of realities in opposition to that of mere appearances—the attempt to comprehend things as they are, rather than as they seem.—Morell.
Point at issue—the real question to be decided.
Power in logic, is the relation of circumstances to each other in time.
Premises the propositions which precede a "conclusion."—the name of the propositions from which a conclusion is deduced.
Principle—an invariable rule.
Proof—sufficient evidence; the balance of probability in favour of a proposition.
Proposition—a sentence which affirms or denies something.—Whately.—An expression in words of a judgment.—J. S. Mill, Reason—the recognition of facts.—the classification of facts.—following in the pathway of facts.—the power of discerning coherences.—a premiss placed after its conclusion.—the minor premiss—in the sense of Reason for asserting something.
Reasoning—argumentation.—process, the same always. Subject—first term of a proposition.
Syllogism—1. A general rule. 2. A fact contained under that rule. 3. A conclusion that the fact is so contained.—an argument stated regularly and at full length.—a valid argument so stated that its conclusiveness is evident from the mere form of the expression.
Technical Terms—the tools of art.—Whately.
Technical Language—regularly formed, defined, and agreed on set of expressions.
Testimony—second-hand experience. Direct evidence is that which is professedly given. Incidental, is corroboration casually introduced on one subject in the course of an evidence delivered on another.
Theory—is a system of rules intended to explain a class of facts. The rules should be precise, and rest on a rigorous induction of facts or probabilities.
Tradition—the relation of a circumstance, not committed to writing by any person who observed it, but communicated orally from one to another for a long period of time.