The next day's proceedings began promptly, Dr. Medjora taking the stand for cross-examination. His evidence in his own behalf, it was generally conceded, had materially weakened the prosecution's case, and it was with much interest that the lawyers watched the outcome of his cross-examination. Mr. Munson began:
"You have testified that Miss Sloane was a morphinehabitué." Before he could propound a question based upon this statement, the Doctor replied quickly:
"I have not so testified."
"You have not?" asked the attorney, with much surprise.
"No! I said that she had taken morphine, for pain from Bright's disease, until she had almost become anhabitué."
"That is practically the same thing," said the lawyer, testily.
"Pardon my disagreeing with you. Had she become a confirmed user of the drug, for the drug's sake, she would probably have been suspected by those who lived in the house with her, and thus it would be easy for us to produce witnesses in corroboration of my assertion. But as she used it merely to soothe pain, even though she did take large doses, it was at such intervals, that symptoms of morphine were not sufficiently marked to attract the attention of an ordinary observer."
Messrs. Dudley and Bliss were delighted at this early proof that the Doctor would be a match for the astute attorney, who was about to endeavor to entangle him in contradictions, or damaging admissions.
"Oh! Very well!" said Mr. Munson. "You say that she took morphine in large doses. You knew this, and also that she had a serious disease, and yet you left her alone in a strange boarding-house, whilst you went away to Europe?"
"I left her under the medical care of one who certainly possessed skill, and who pretended to be my friend. I went to Europe, in the cause of humanity, to prosecute studies which I yet hope to make a benefit to my fellows." Thus the Doctor confidently predicted his acquittal. This was most shrewd, for it not infrequently occurs that men may be moved by suggestion, even when not in the hypnotic state. Dr. Medjora was a past master in psychological science.
"How long had you been married, at this time?"
"Eighteen months."
"Then, when you left this woman, she was not only suffering from disease, and the dangers of morphine, but she was grieving for her dead child, was she not?"
This was a neat trap, sprung without warning, but the game was shy and wary. The Doctor replied sternly:
"I have not testified either that she had a child, or that, if so, she had lost it."
"Well, did she have a child?"
"You have had expert testimony upon that point. Why ask me?"
"That is my affair. Answer my question."
"I must decline to do so!"
"I appeal to the court to compel the witness to answer."
"Your Honor," cried Mr. Dudley, rising, "we object. Counsel, for some undiscoverable reason, seems determined to probe the private affairs of our client. We think that this question is irrelevant and incompetent."
"What is the object of this, Mr. Munson," asked the Recorder.
"Your Honor has ruled, and a million precedents uphold you, that we may examine into the relations that existed between the accused and the deceased."
"Your Honor," interjected Mr. Dudley, "you allowed a similar question yesterday, because counsel argued, that if he could prove the existence of a natural child, he would show that the deceased through the child had strong claim upon our client. I will also call your Honor's attention to the fact, that at that time allusion was made to another visionary claim on the part of the prosecution. This was that Dr. Medjora was in the position to marry a wealthy woman, and that the poor musician, with her child, became an obstacle in his way. Now, not a scintilla of evidence has been brought out, in substantiation of that claim, which as I said, at that time, was made merely to affect the jury. Moreover, since then, we have shown that this woman was the lawful wife of Dr. Medjora, and, therefore, her having, or not having a child, can have no possible bearing upon the issue. I hope that the question will not be allowed."
"I cannot see," said the Recorder, "what is to be gained by this, Mr.Munson?"
"Oh, very well, your Honor," said Mr. Munson, "if you think that it is unnecessary to the case of the people, I will withdraw it. We only seek for justice, despite the aspersions of counsel."
"I have no doubt whatever of your conscientiousness," said the Recorder, to mollify the rising anger of Mr. Munson. The examination then proceeded.
"You told us yesterday, that you had received a letter whilst in Europe, in which Miss Sloane wrote that Dr. Meredith was persecuting her with his attentions. Of course you have that letter?"
"No! It has been lost, unfortunately!"
"Unfortunately lost! I should say most unfortunately lost, since it is the only corroboration you had of your remarkable statement. How did you happen to lose this precious document?"
"I think that it was stolen when my office was searched by detectives, who were accompanied by Dr. Meredith."
The insinuation deftly concealed in this statement, that either Dr. Meredith had taken the paper, or that the District Attorney had suppressed it, had a visible effect upon the jury, who looked from one to the other significantly. Mr. Munson was chagrined to find what he had thought a good point in his favor, thus turned against him so quickly. He attempted to repair the damage.
"You say you think this. Do you not know, that what a man thinks is not admissible in evidence?"
"I did the best that I could to answer your question." This reply, in the humblest of tones, caused a smile.
"You have no positive knowledge that it was stolen, have you?"
"I know that it was locked in my desk, that during my absence the desk was forced open, and that upon my return the paper was gone. Whether it was stolen, or whether it forced its way out of my desk, you may decide for yourself."
"You have no evidence, beyond your own word, that Dr. Meredith acted as you have charged?"
"None!"
"You never told any friend, before the death of this girl, that Dr.Meredith had persecuted her?"
"No. I had no confidants."
"Not even when you found that he had been called in to attend MissSloane? You did not explain this to Dr. Fisher?"
"No. Dr. Fisher was comparatively a stranger to me. I knew him by association in societies only."
"You could have spoken to him however, and so have had Dr. Meredith dismissed from the case."
"I considered the matter, and decided not to do so."
"Why did you come to so singular a conclusion?"
"Because, as I have already testified, despite my animosity, I concurred with Dr. Fisher's estimate of his skill. I thought him the most valuable consulting physician to be had, and, in a case of life and death, I believed that personal antagonisms should be forgotten."
"You say Dr. Meredith was the most valuable consulting physician to be had. Do you mean that he is the most skilled expert that you know?"
"No. But he is skilful and his office is very near to the house where the patient was. That fact was of importance in deciding whether to retain him or not."
Mr. Munson seemed to strive almost in vain to outwit the witness who adroitly parried every attack.
"You have claimed," continued the lawyer, "that Miss Sloane administered morphine to herself?"
"I assert it."
"Then at least you admit that a dose, a large dose, was taken by the deceased in your presence, on the day of her death?"
"Yes."
"And though you, as a physician, were conversant with her troubles and aware of the danger of such a dose, you did not prevent her from taking this dangerous poison?"
"I endeavored to do so. I took the syringe away from her."
"You took it away from her after she had taken nearly all of the dose?"
"She had taken all but five minims before I could reach her."
"It was you who sent the nurse away, I believe?"
"I gave her permission to go out."
"You told her to remain until nine o'clock?"
"I told her that she might do so."
"And this syringe incident occurred at eight o'clock?"
"At eight thirty."
"That is, half an hour before you expected to be interrupted by the return of the nurse?"
"You do not word your questions justly. I did not expect to be interrupted by the return of the nurse. To be interrupted, one must be occupied with some special work. I was not specially engaged."
"You were supposed to be specially engaged watching your patient, in place of the nurse, with whose services you had dispensed. Had you done your full duty, that is, had you done what the nurse would have done, kept your patient under surveillance, she would not have had a chance to take the morphine, would she?"
"It may be that I was grievously at fault, not to observe her more closely. But I thought that she was asleep. An error is not a crime."
"There are errors that are criminal. Your jury will judge in this case. Now, if you please, answer my question without further evasion. Did not the nurse return half an hour sooner than you expected her?"
"She returned half an hour earlier than the time up to which I had given her permission to be away."
"Exactly. Now, had she remained the full time, she would not have known anything about this morphine incident?"
"Of course not."
"In which case, you would have kept it a secret."
"Most probably."
"But, as she did see you handling the syringe, you knew that she would be in the position to testify to the fact that you yourself administered the morphine?"
"It is not a fact that I administered the morphine, but I supposed that she would so testify, judging from what she saw."
"Judging honestly?"
"Yes. Judging honestly."
"So that this professional nurse, accustomed herself to using hypodermic syringes, had a right, as you admit, to judge from what she saw, that you administered morphine to the patient?"
"She saw me taking away the syringe, and of course could conclude that I inserted the needle myself. Nevertheless her opinion was only an opinion; it was not knowledge."
"Very well. You admit that she had a right to her opinion, and that you suspected what that opinion would be. Now, of course you realized, being an intellectual man, that such evidence would weigh against you?"
"I fully appreciated the gravity of the situation."
"And that if not refuted, this testimony almost alone, would tend towards a conviction?"
"Yes."
"Therefore you decided to claim that the drug was self-administered, knowing that the administration would be proved?"
"I knew that the administration of the drug would be proved. But my reason for saying that it was self-administered, is because it is the truth."
"That will be for the jury to decide!" With this parting shot the lawyer dismissed the witness, and his own counsel decided to ask no further questions.
The clergyman who had performed the marriage ceremony, then took the stand, and testified to the validity of the marriage. He was not cross-examined.
Then a celebrated expert toxicologist was called, Professor Newburg. He testified in corroboration of the claims of the defence, and especially to the large doses of morphine, which he had known to be tolerated by persons accustomed to it by habit. It also was claimed by him, that persons who had been known to take as much as four and five grains per day without ill effect, had suddenly died from so small a dose as half a grain. He thought that in these cases the drug had accumulated in the system, and the whole quantity stored up, was made active by the assimilation of the last dose, which of itself would not have been poisonous. Cross-examination did not materially alter his testimony.
Next a pathologist was introduced, and in answer to a long hypothetical question, based upon the testimony of Dr. Fisher and the experts for the prosecution, he said that in his opinion the deceased died from anæmia, following diphtheria. The symptoms of morphine poisoning observed were probably due to the morphine which she had taken, but under the conditions described, he did not think that even three and a half grains would have caused death. He came to this conclusion, arguing that the condition of the kidneys showed that they were diseased, and the tendency would have been to store up this last dose, just as previous doses had probably been retained. In that event only a small portion would have become active, and whilst it might have caused contracted pupils, it would not have caused death. All things duly considered, therefore, he thought that death was attributable to diphtheria.
Under cross-examination he admitted the postulate of the previous witness, that a small dose, following retained larger doses, might cause death, but still he adhered to his opinion that it had not occurred here. A long series of questions failed to shake his opinion, or cause him to contradict himself.
Several other witnesses were called, but I need scarcely introduce their evidence here, as much of it was of small importance, and none of it could have materially affected the verdict. The defence then rested.
Mr. Munson called several witnesses in rebuttal, but to so little effect that Mr. Bliss did not even cross-examine them, considering his case practically won. He did interfere, however, when Mr. Munson at last called Madame Cora Corona.
"I must ask your Honor, what counsel expects to prove by this witness, and moreover, your Honor, I will ask that the jury be sent from the room, before any discussion of this subject be allowed."
This request was granted, and the jury went into an adjoining apartment. Mr. Munson then explained:
"We have been trying for a long time to summon this witness, your Honor, but she has skilfully avoided the court officers, so that it was only this morning that we found her. She will testify to the fact that Dr. Medjora has been courting her, and seeking a marriage with her, even previous to the death of the woman who he claims was his wife."
"That is the most extraordinary expedient I have ever heard of, your Honor," said Mr. Bliss. "Counsel certainly knows better, than to suppose that at this late hour he can introduce new evidence. He certainly cannot claim that this is in rebuttal!"
"But I do claim that!" said Mr. Munson.
"What does it rebut?" asked the Recorder.
"This man claims that he was a true and loving husband to his wife, and denies that he contemplated such a marriage as this one, by which a wealthy wife would aid him to accomplish his ambitions."
"That claim, Mr. Munson, was made by counsel for the defence," said the Recorder. "It has not come out upon the witness stand. You cannot introduce a witness to rebut a statement of counsel. If you wished to introduce this evidence you should have questioned the prisoner upon these points when on the witness stand. Had he denied the desire to marry again, I would have allowed you to disprove his assertion by this witness. As it is, I must rule out the evidence offered."
Mr. Munson bit his lip in mortification, when the Recorder pointed out to him the serious omission made in the examination of the accused, but of course he was powerless to do anything. Having no other witness to call, when the jurors had returned to their seats, Mr. Bliss arose and addressed the jury.
"May it please your Honor and gentlemen of the jury," began Mr. Bliss, amidst an impressive silence, "in a few hours you will be called upon to act in a capacity which has been delegated to you by your fellow-men, but which finally is the province of our heavenly Father alone. You are to sit in judgment upon a human being, and accordingly as ye judge him, so shall ye be judged hereafter. I have not the least doubt of the integrity of your purpose; I fully believe that such verdict as you shall render will be honestly adopted, after the most thorough weighing of the evidence which has been presented to you. All I ask is that you form your final opinion with due recognition of the fact, that if a mistake is to be made, far better would it be that you release our client, if he be guilty, than that you should send him to the hangman, though innocent. I beg of you to remember that great as is the majesty of the law and the rights of the people, yet more must you respect the rights of this man, who stands alone, to defend himself against such an array of witnesses and lawyers, as the wealth of the whole commonwealth has been able to summon against him. The very weakness of his position, as compared with the forces against which he has to contend, should excite your sympathies. If there be any doubt in your minds, it becomes, not your privilege, but your sworn duty to accord it to him. For, as his Honor will undoubtedly explain to you when expounding the law, the prosecution must prove the charge beyond all doubt. The burden of proof is upon them. They claim that the deceased came to her death by poison administered by our client. They must therefore prove that she died of poison, and that the poison was given by Dr. Medjora. But they must prove even more than that, for they must show that it was given with intent to destroy life. Thus, if you decide that she died of diphtheria, of Bright's disease, of poison retained in the system, or even of the last dose which was taken by her, you are bound to acquit our client, unless indeed you should adopt the extraordinary conclusion, that the final dose of morphine alone produced death, and that Dr. Medjora himself administered it, intending that it should destroy his beloved wife, for whom he had retained skilled medical service and nursing, and at whose bedside he even tolerated the presence of his bitterest enemy, because he knew that the man possessed the greatest skill available in the vicinity of the house where the poor girl lay ill. Had he intended to injure his wife, had he premeditated poisoning her, do you think that he would have allowed a man to be nigh, who would be only too glad to find a pretext upon which to charge him with a crime, but who, moreover, was possessed of exactly the experience and ability needed to detect the symptoms of a deadly poison? The proposition is preposterous, and I am sure that such intelligent gentlemen as yourselves will cast it aside from you. But if the prosecution fail to prove that the girl did not die from natural causes, then they fail utterly to make out their case. Upon this point the law is most explicit. In fact in one of our great text books, a work recognized by the entire legal profession as the highest authority, I find a passage which seems almost to have been written for your enlightenment in this very case. I will read it to you:
"'It does not follow that because a person is wounded and dies, the death is caused by the wound; and the burden in such cases is on the prosecution to show beyond reasonable doubt that the wound in question produced death. It may happen also, where poison has been administered, that death resulted from natural causes. The presence of poison may be ascertained from symptoms during life, thepost mortemappearances, the moral circumstances, and the discovery of the existence of poison in the body, in the matter ejected from the stomach, or in food or drink of which the sufferer has partaken. But to this should be added proof that the poison thus received into the system was the cause of death.'
"I think that passage most clearly indicates to you the task which the prosecution have undertaken. Upon what do they rely for the accomplishment of their purpose? Two things mainly. Circumstantial evidence, and expert testimony. And now, if I may hope for your close attention, I will say a few words upon both of these classes of evidence, in general.
"Circumstantial evidence, I need hardly tell you, is most delusive in its character. Analyzed, what do we find it to be? It has been truly argued that there is, and can be, no cause without an effect. In considering circumstantial evidence, the mind of the investigator is presented with the relation of a number of facts, or effects, and he is asked to deduce that they are all attributable to a stated cause. For example, a peddler is known to have started out upon a lonely road, and to have in his pack certain wares, a given amount of money in specified coins and bills, wearing a watch and chain, and he is subsequently found murdered, by the wayside. Later, a tramp is arrested upon whose person is found the exact missing money, and many of the articles which were known to have been in the pack. He is charged with the crime, and the evidence against him is circumstantial. His possession of these articles is an effect, which is said to be attributable to a cause, to wit, the killing of the peddler. But strong as such evidence may appear, as I have said, it is delusive. For just as the prosecution ask you to believe that a number of effects are traceable to a single cause, the crime charged, so also it is possible that all of the effects may have resulted from various causes. Thus in the case cited, the tramp may have been a thief, and may have stolen the articles from the peddler after some other person had killed him. And if it could be shown that the watch and chain were missing, and yet were not found upon the tramp, that would be as good evidence in his favor, as the other facts are against him. So that in circumstantial evidence the chain must be complete. If a single link be missing, or have a flaw, the argument is inconclusive, and a doubt is created, the benefit of which must invariably be given in favor of the accused.
"If this be true where there is a single link that has a flaw, what are we to say when we find that the entire chain is composed of links which are faulty? You are asked to decide that from this fact, and that fact, and the other fact, the accused is guilty of a crime! Suppose that we show that from either the first, or the second, or the third fact, we can trace back to other causes as producing the result? Why, then, the prosecution's case is rendered so fragile that the gentlest breath of a zephyr must blow each separate link to a different quarter of the globe. Now, that is what I shall endeavor to demonstrate; that, from the chief facts claimed by the prosecution, you may deduce innocence rather than guilt.
"First, we have the accuser, Dr. Meredith. He aids the prosecution's claim of poison by relating the symptoms of poisoning, which he says he observed before death. Now, even granting that this is a true statement of facts, observed by an unprejudiced mind,—of which, gentlemen, you can readily judge, when you recall the abundant testimony as to an existing animosity,—but, even granting its absolute truth, what does it show? Simply that morphine had been administered, in a dose large enough to have producedante-mortemevidences of its presence. But what of that? Does it show that the drug was administered by any particular person? By Dr. Medjora, as the prosecution have claimed? If so then I am ignorant, and ill informed as to all the rules of logic. It shows that morphine was present, and it shows no more, and no less. Now that fact we freely admit. The Doctor himself told you how the drug was taken, and there has been nothing whatever offered, that even tends to disprove his assertion. Thus, as his testimony is all that we have upon the subject, and as it has been unimpeached, you are bound to accept it as the only evidence available. I may also remind you at this point, that in this country, where the God-given liberty of one man is as much cherished as that of the whole people, a man is to be considered innocent until after he has been adjudged guilty. He therefore goes upon the witness stand, as unsullied as any other witness, and his evidence is entitled to the same credence. I may also interject a momentary remark as to the difference between juridical and common judgment. You may see a man commit a crime and if accepted upon the jury which tries him, although you know that he is guilty, you are bound to bring him in innocent, unless the evidence introduced against him proves his guilt, entirely aside from your own prejudices or prejudgment. You must give a juridical opinion only. So that if you have imbibed any prejudices against Dr. Medjora,—which is scarcely probable, for he must have impressed you as favorably as he has every one else who has seen him in court,—but if so, you are to set that all aside, and accept his unimpeached evidence upon this point, relative to the administration of the morphine, as the only available evidence upon which to base an opinion. And if you do adopt that, and decide, as you necessarily would, that self-administered morphine cannot implicate Dr. Medjora in this crime, why the case is ended at once, and need scarcely go any further.
"However, merely as a matter of form, I will take up one or two more points. The second link in this circumstantial chain is that evidences of morphine were found at the autopsy. But, gentlemen, what of that? You and I know how it entered the system, and of course we expect that eminent specialists, such as the gentlemen who performed the autopsy, must necessarily recognize the recent presence of the drug. It forms no particle of proof whatever against Dr. Medjora. That we see clearly enough, when we eliminate the bare facts from the fog of misinterpretation. But I may casually remind you of another fact, which these same eminent specialists told us about. They found that the kidneys were atrophied, an evidence of disease, and later we learned that if the kidneys are diseased morphine is retained in the system, until a poisonous dose may accumulate. So we see that even if the deceased was poisoned to death, it was only by the retention of many doses, due to a diseased condition, and in no way attributable to criminal interference.
"The next link is the actual presence of the drug, as testified by the expert chemists. They tell us that they found morphine. Why of course they did. It was in the system; we knew that it was there; and we are not at all shocked by the discovery.
"But I need not take up any other of these forged links, for, as you plainly see, the principal ones are so very faulty that as they are the mainstay of the bonds that bind our client, we break them asunder with scarcely an effort.
"Now, I will say a few words relative to expert testimony, and I beg of you to understand throughout, that however I may attack this sort of evidence as a class, I speak in general terms only, and in no way cast any imputations against the scientific gentlemen who have appeared upon the stand, except as they come within the limitations of their class, as I am about to explain to you.
"When expert testimony was first introduced it was received with marked respect. The expert witness was counted as a professor in his specialty, and his word was almost final. Experience, however, has materially altered all this. The field from which the expert may be cited has been vastly broadened, whilst at the same time his testimony is accepted with much more caution, and less credence. The causes which have operated towards this state of things are manifold, but I need not explain them here. Wherever there is any sort of specialty, from the blacking of boots, to the highest scientific pursuits, we now have experts who go upon the stand, and dogmatically inform us that their opinions are the true and only accepted finality upon the subject presented. But we have found, that however positive one, or two, or three experts may be in asseverating what they claim to be a fact, an equal number, of equally scientific, equally experienced, and equally trustworthy experts, may be found whose testimony will be equally as positive, though diametrically opposed. Indeed, so true is this, that I may quote the wise words of that eminent jurist Lord Campbell, who says: 'Skilled witnesses come with such a bias on their minds to support the cause in which they are embarked, that hardly any weight should be given to their evidence.' These are strong words, but what does Lord Campbell mean? That an eminent scientist would go upon the witness stand, and perjure himself merely because he has been engaged to substantiate a given proposition? Not at all. Of all experts, I may be permitted to say perhaps, that the most eminent are those connected with the professions, for we must rank the professions higher than the arts, just as the arts are above the trades. We have three great professions, to wit, the Ministry, Medicine, and Law. If we could have before us the most prominent Minister, the most celebrated Physician, and the most eminent Lawyer, we would probably have three men standing equally high in public esteem. Then let us suppose that this most eminent lawyer were engaged as counsel in some great suit. Suppose that some intricate technicality of law should arise, upon which the presiding judge should ask for argument and precedents. Suppose, then, that associate counsel should place this most eminent lawyer upon the stand as an expert witness? Remembering that he had been paid for advocating the cause in behalf of which he was testifying, how much weight would his evidence have? I think you will agree that it would be very slight indeed! Yet is it not the same with the expert physician? Is not the skilled medical witness hired, and paid for his advocacy, just as that eminent lawyer was? Then why should we discard the evidence of the one, and accept the other? Neither of these gentlemen commits perjury. What they tell, is honestly told. But—and, gentlemen of the jury, I now come to the vital point of this argument—the expert does not give us an unbiased opinion. The reason is plain. As experts can be found with varying opinions, so those are sought whose opinions agree with the position which they are called to sustain. To be more definite, the experts called by the prosecution in this case, were called, because it was known in advance what they would testify, and because said testimony would be favorable to the hypothesis of the prosecution. Though, I may say parenthetically, in this case it has proven otherwise. But, stated on general principles, that is the fact. The prosecution chooses experts, whose views can be relied upon to support the charge against the prisoner. And I must candidly confess that the defence is actuated similarly. Surmising in advance what the opposing experts would tell us, we went about amongst equally eminent men, and found no difficulty in selecting those who could with equal positiveness, with equal authority, and with equal experience and knowledge, support our hypothesis. Had we found a gentleman who entertained views similar to those of the prosecution's witnesses, do you suppose, for one moment, that we would have engaged such a man to aid us? Of course not! Then are the lawyers for the prosecution any more human than we? Do you suppose that they would call an expert, if they knew that his honest opinions would controvert their claims? Certainly not. Were they not loath to call Dr. Fisher? Thus, gentlemen, have we discovered, by analytical reasoning, the cause of the bias existing in the mind of an honest man. His opinion is sought in advance. If favorable he is engaged. When engaged he becomes a hired advocate, as much as the lawyer. Moreover, unlike the witness of facts, his testimony is tinged by a personal interest. He knows that celebrated experts will oppose his views. His reputation is on trial, as it were. If the verdict is for his side, it is a sort of juridical upholding of his position. He is therefore arrayed against his antagonists, as much as the lawyers of the opposing sides. In short, having once expressed an opinion, he will go to any extreme almost, to prove that he is right. The questions asked by the counsel for his side, the majority of which he prepares or dictates himself, are glibly and positively answered. But when the cross-examination begins, what do we see? An interesting spectacle from a psychological standpoint. We see a man, honest in his intentions, standing between two almost equal forces; the love of himself and of his own opinions, on the one side, and upon the other the love of scientific truth which is inherent in all truly professional men. When a question is asked, to which he can reply without injury to his pronounced opinion, how eagerly he answers. But when a query is propounded, which his knowledge shows him in a moment, indicates a reply which his quick intelligence sees will be against his side, what does he do? We find that he fences with the question. As anxious not to state what he knows to be false, as he is not to injure his side of the case, he parries. He tells you in hesitating tones, 'It may be so, in rare cases,' 'Other men have seen and reported such instances, but I have not met them,' 'It might be possible under extraordinary circumstances, but not in this case,' and so on, and so on, reluctant to express himself so that he may be cited afterwards. You have witnessed this very kind of evasion in this case, so that you readily grasp my meaning. When I asked Professor Orton, whether the action of morphine is modified by disease, his answer was, 'It might be'; and when I asked him whether, from continual dosage, it could accumulate in the system, he said, 'The records contain reports of such cases.' When I asked him if morphine would not be so retained where Bright's disease were present, he tried evasion again by saying, 'I have never seen such a case,' after which he admitted that he had read of them in good authorities.
"As I have told you, speaking generally, this sort of evasion under cross-examination is a peculiarity common to nearly all experts, so that in singling out Professor Orton as an example, I do so with no intention of attacking his honesty of purpose. He was simply defending himself, and upholding the side which pays him for his advocacy. But I choose this testimony because if we analyze it I think we will find more, much more than appears at a glance; and I can at the same time show you how all expert testimony should be received. I will exemplify the amount of caution to be displayed in accepting what a skilled witness tells. I will show you principally, that what the expert testifies under cross-examination is more likely to be true, than what he tells the friendly lawyer on his own side.
"Now, when I asked Professor Orton whether Bright's disease would act as a cause to facilitate the accumulation of morphine in the system, he answered, 'I have never seen such a case.' That, gentlemen, is the set of words which I beg of you to analyze. Why did the Professor use just this language? For, mark you, it is a well-studied answer. Let us suppose that this eminent toxicologist had made an exhaustive series of experiments, which had proved, beyond all cavil, that the commonly accepted idea among physicians is wrong, and that Bright's disease will not effect an accumulation of morphine. How gladly would he have said 'No' to my question! How positively would he have asserted that Bright's disease would not have the effect which we claim! Therefore, that he does not use any such dogmatic denial shows logically and conclusively that he has no such knowledge. He does not know, beyond all doubt, that Bright's disease will not modify the action of this poison. But we can see more in this answer. Suppose that, lacking absolute knowledge, he had still a firm conviction. He would then most probably have said, 'It is my opinion that Bright's disease does not modify the drug's action.' But, gentlemen, he had not even a conviction of this kind. On the contrary, he must either have known, or else have leaned towards the belief that such an accumulation is possible, otherwise he would not have said just what he did say: 'I have not seen such a case.' 'I have not seen such a case'! Why, the very words suggest that such a case has existed. More—that the Professor had heard of such cases, and believed in them. Perhaps he hoped that this evasive answer would be accepted as final. In that case, gentlemen, it might have served, in your minds, as well as a negative reply. But, gentlemen, a lawyer's mind is necessarily trained to the quick appreciation of situations like this. As soon as he had said that he had never seen such a case, I was prompted by intuition to ask if he had not heard of them. Then the fat was in the fire, and we had an admission, however reluctantly given, that he had heard of them, and from competent authority. But the very attempt on the part of this witness to parry the question, and evade a full and truthful reply, carries a conviction with it, that he recognized immediately the importance of our claim, and the possibility that it is a true explanation of the sad death of this young wife. He saw at once that all the damning evidences of the presence of poison, are explainable by this simple hypothesis, that Bright's disease might cause otherwise proper doses of morphine to accumulate until a lethal dose be present, and then act to destroy life. He therefore attempted to belittle the hypothesis. He could not refute it; he scarcely dared to deny it as a possibility, and therefore he essayed evasion.
"Thus we may deduce more from the reluctant admission of an expert, than from their glibly-told tales which have been rehearsed in the office of the District Attorney. So that, after all, expert testimony is valuable—most valuable—if we but consider it with caution, and analyze it, until bereft of bias and prejudice, the grain of truth stands out, as truth ever will, conspicuous midst the mass of extraneous matter surrounding it, much of which is introduced for the express purpose of befogging your minds, and leading you away from the facts.
"Thus, gentlemen, upon closer examination we find that just as their circumstantial evidence was faulty, so the prosecution's experts prove a boomerang. For it is upon their evidence that we mainly rely for acquittal. Dr. McDougal, the Coroner's physician, examined the kidneys at the autopsy, and freely expressed the opinion that Bright's disease had been present. Of course he denied that this disease had caused death, but there we have the opinion of an advocate. Next we have Professor Orton, who, as I have shown, practically testifies that Bright's disease may cause morphine to accumulate in the system until a poisonous dose has resulted. Is not that enough, gentlemen, to satisfy you that, if this girl died of morphine, she died a natural death, and was not murdered? At least, does it not raise a doubt in your minds, which must be credited to Dr. Medjora, and which would deter you from sending him to the hangman? I am so positive that it must, that I will close this appeal, without calling your attention to the evidence, which has been abundant, and which indicates that death was not the result of poisoning at all, but of diphtheria, as indeed was certified in the burial permit. I could go over all the evidence in greater detail, but I am so strongly impressed with the innocence of our client, and so firmly confident that you are as capable as I am of reaching a proper conclusion in considering the evidence, that I will not take up more of your time, but leave our cause now in your care, satisfied that, regardless of the able rhetorical ability of the gentleman on the other side, you will be guided by Providence, and your own hearts, to aid the cause of justice and release Dr. Medjora from his present trying situation. And as you deal justly with him now, so may you receive your reward in the life hereafter."
The District Attorney himself arose to speak for the commonwealth. "May it please your Honor and gentlemen of the jury," he began, "you have just heard an able argument in behalf of the prisoner. Counsel has told you truly, that in this free Republic, which has become the refuge and asylum for the oppressed of all nations, the liberty of one man is as sacred as the rights of the whole people. He has also used the well-worn argument that the prisoner should have your sympathy, because of the weakness of his position. By this is meant, that the State; having wealth, can engage prosecuting officers of ability, whilst the prisoner, thrown upon his private resources, may be compelled to intrust his cause to the care of inferior counsel. But, gentlemen, you must see at a glance that our learned opponent has weakened his own argument by the unusual display of ability which he has exhibited in this case. Surely in his hands the cause of the prisoner is eminently safe! The commonwealth, with all its resources, cannot summon greater legal ability to its aid. Therefore you may relieve your minds of any idea of pity for the prisoner, and omitting all thought of him personally, decide this case entirely on the evidence.
"But if you find it difficult to disregard the fact that here is a man, whose liberty or life is at stake, then I bid you remember, that whilst it is true that his rights are equal to those of the State, they are no greater. The commonwealth must have equal place, in your judgment, with the prisoner.
"As the prosecuting attorney I stand in a somewhat peculiar position. In ordinary lawsuits, opposing counsel are retained by the various sides, and are arrayed against each other solely. Under such circumstances the able arguments of Mr. Bliss would hold sway. I am alluding now to his attack upon expert witnesses. Let us suppose that a suit is brought to overthrow a will, the plaintiff arguing that the signature has been forged. Experts in chirography are called by both sides. It is manifest, as Mr. Bliss has said, that the opinions of experts will be sought by the contending counsel, and at the trial we would have those favoring the theory, forgery, testifying to that effect, whilst the others would support the genuineness of the signature. Undoubtedly, also, had either of these gentlemen expressed a different opinion prior to the trial, he would have been found upon the opposite side. Or, in plainer words, the men are hired to testify, because, previous to the trial, they hold an opinion favorable to the side which pays them. Thus, as has been shown to you at some length, eminent jurists now accord but cautious credence to expert testimony, because of the bias which must attend paid advocacy. But, gentlemen of the jury, as logical as all this is, when applied to a civil suit, it becomes but the most specious reasoning when introduced into a criminal case, such as this.
"We are often led astray by arguments, which contain analogies which are but apparently analogous. In this case there is a flaw at the very root of the argument, and therefore the very flower and fruit of the whole beautiful array of words must wilt and fail.
"This flaw is easily pointed out. In the civil case, as I have said, and as you know, opposing counsel defend but the side that pays them. In a criminal case it is entirely different. The District Attorney is engaged, not for a special case, against a special prisoner, but by the whole community, for the protection of all the people. Now the prisoner is himself one of these, and his rights are ever in the minds of the very men who prepare the arguments against him. Let us glance for a moment at themodus operandi. Suspicion is aroused against a man. If sufficiently grave, the first bits of evidence attainable are presented to the Grand Jury, and perhaps they find an indictment. This gives the State authority to hold the prisoner by arrest, until such time when he may be tried. But, gentlemen of the jury, are all indicted men tried? Not at all. The District Attorney not infrequently, in the course of preparing a case, finds that an error has been made: that the man is the victim of circumstances: in short that he is innocent. What occurs then? Does he act the part of the hired lawyer and proceed, merely that he may collect a fee? Not at all. He protects the rights of the prisoner, as one of the people, and by due process of law the man is released from custody, free from even a stain upon his character.
"Now let us for a moment suppose that the charge is one of murder; of murder by poisoning, let us say. The first step is to place the medical investigation of the facts into the hands of eminent experts. Here we find that the very resources of the commonwealth become the prisoner's greatest safeguard. The State having abundance of money, places this investigation into the care of the very ablest men to be obtained. It is not at all true, that these experts are retained because of their known opinions. When they are retained, they have no opinions whatever, because they are engaged to pursue an investigation, and their opinions are non-existent until after the conclusion of their analyses. Now, gentlemen, imagine that the commonwealth's counsel would be base enough to dispense with an expert witness, because his testimony would be detrimental to the hypothesis of the prosecution, would such a course be possible? Not at all. In the first place, the autopsy and the chemical analyses have been made upon the tissues of the body of the deceased. In the course of this work these tissues are rendered useless for any further analyses. Therefore, the only investigation possible is the original one, and the only expert opinions obtainable are those of the men, who, as I have shown, are engaged long before they have any opinion to express. If these men were omitted from the case then no experts could be called to replace them; but what would be worse, these very witnesses, discarded by the prosecution, would immediately be retained by the defence. For, as Mr. Bliss has candidly admitted, the defence only engages experts whose opinions are known to be favorable. That is the difference between the paid experts of the defence, and those engaged by the prosecution. The one is an advocate for a fee, whilst the other is merely an independent outsider, who relates the medical facts which he has found upon examination of the body of the deceased, and then explains the scientific deductions which he makes from these facts. The witness of the defence is biased; the witness of the prosecution is not. No, gentlemen of the jury, when the experts for the prosecution form opinions which oppose the idea of a crime, the District Attorney has but one course which he can pursue. He must protect the prisoner, as it is his sworn duty to do, and obtain his release.
"Butper contra, when these eminent medical men discover, within the tissues of the deceased, plain evidences of the fact that a crime has been consummated, it then becomes the duty of the District Attorney to prosecute the accused, and to produce, before a jury of his countrymen, the evidence which these gentlemen of science have discovered. And this class of evidence is not only valuable, and pertinent, but it is indispensable. Without the assistance of experts, it would be almost impossible to convict a man of murder, by the use of poison. The pistol, the knife, and other weapons, all leave wounds discernible by the eyes of all. But poison works insidiously, and is unseen. As deadly as the bullet, it operates not only without noise, but in skilful hands the death may simulate that caused by known diseases, so that even eminent physicians might sign a burial permit, as did Dr. Fisher in this case, without a suspicion of the presence of the poison. But suspicion having been aroused, by the aid of science it is now possible to search microscopically into the tissues of the victim, and find every trace of poison if one has been used. And if, gentlemen, able men of science, prominent in their specialties, and honored by their professional brethren as well as by the community in which they dwell, make an impartial investigation of this nature, and report to you that they have found poison actually present, and in quantities which would have proved fatal, I submit it to your intelligence, gentlemen, is not that expert testimony of the most important character? Can we assail such evidence with the cry of bias, merely because it comes within the general category of expert testimony? Certainly not. You will therefore forget entirely the anathema which Mr. Bliss has delivered against experts, for though true enough against the class, it does not apply in this instance.
"Before dismissing this phase of the subject, I must say a few words in defence of Professor Orton. Mr. Bliss pointed out to you that when an expert is replying to direct examination he answers readily, whereas, when answering the cross-examining lawyer, he is more cautious. This is true; but, gentlemen, what does that signify? Simply that having told the truth, the witness is compelled to defend himself against the traps that will be set for him by the opposite side. He knows in advance that he will be assailed by hypothetical and ambiguous questions, worded to confuse him, and to mystify the jury. Under these circumstances, therefore, he must necessarily think well, before replying. He is in a court of law, under oath, and his professional reputation is at stake. If he were not cautious in his replies he would be worthless as a witness. He is justified, too, in parrying questions which he knows are introduced merely to disguise the truth, or to lead the minds of the jury into wrong channels. Mr. Bliss has made much, or thinks that he has made much, of the answers which Professor Orton gave. By specious reasoning he tries to prove that Professor Orton believed that this woman died of an accumulation of morphine, caused by a diseased condition of the kidneys. Mr. Bliss tells us that he rests his case upon the evidence of our witnesses, and largely upon this admission from Professor Orton. Now, as a matter of fact, what Professor Orton did say cannot help the prisoner. He admitted that other men have held the opinion that diseased kidneys may cause an accumulation of morphine. But, gentlemen, how does that effect this case? This very witness, upon whom Mr. Bliss is willing to rely, tells us that whatever the possibilities might be in other cases, it is his positive belief that this particular woman did not die as claimed by the defence. He found poison in the stomach in considerable quantities, whereas, where death occurs by a slow accumulation, the drug would have passed beyond that organ, and none would have been found there. So that we see, that what might be, and what perhaps has been in the past, has no bearing on this case even inferentially, because the same expert who says it is possible in other cases, tells us plainly that it did not occur in this instance.
"And now, before speaking of the actual evidence in this case, let me say a few words in regard to circumstantial evidence. It has been common practice for counsel defending criminal cases to inveigh against circumstantial evidence, until a suspicion has been engendered in the public mind, that it is of dubious value. Indeed, the people, knowing a little law, and understanding that all reasonable doubt must be accorded to the prisoner, and, further, having imbibed the idea that all circumstantial evidence contains a doubt, have come almost to feel that a conviction obtained by such means is a miscarriage of justice.
"This is entirely erroneous. All evidence is divided arbitrarily into two great classes, direct and circumstantial. I do not here allude to documentary evidence, which is somewhere between the two, the validity of the document being necessarily proved by one or the other. This classification, as I say, is arbitrary, for he would indeed be a wise man who could tell us exactly where direct evidence ceases to be direct, or where circumstantial evidence becomes solely circumstantial. The two are so interdependent, that it is only by extreme examples that we can dissociate them. All direct evidence must be sustained by circumstances, whilst all circumstantial evidence is dependent upon direct facts.
"Let me give you an example of each, that this may be more clear to your minds. Let us suppose that several boys go to a pool of water to swim. One of these is seen by his companions to dive into the water, and he does not arise. His death is reported, and the authorities, later, drag the pool and find a body. This is called direct evidence. The boy was seen to drown, you are told, and your judgment concedes the fact readily. But is the proposition proved, even though you have these several witnesses to the actual drowning? Let us see. The body is taken to the morgue, and the keeper there, an expert in such matters, makes the startling assertion that instead of a few hours, or let us say a day, the body must have been immersed for several days. This is circumstantial evidence. The keeper has no positive knowledge that this particular body has been under water so long. Still he has seen thousands of bodies, and none has presented such an appearance after so short an interval. How shall we judge between such conflicting evidence? On the one side we have direct evidence which is most positive. On the other we have circumstantial evidence which is equally so. Is the original hypothesis proven? Does not the circumstantial evidence raise a doubt? Certainly. Now let us take another step. The witnesses to the drowning are called again, and view the body, and now among ten of them, we find one who hesitates in his identification. At once we find another circumstance wanting in substantiation of the original claim. Now we see, that all that was really proved was, that a boy was drowned, and not at all that it was this particular boy who was found. But is this even proved? How can it be, in the absence of the drowned body? Now suppose that, at the last hour, the original boy turns up alive, and reports that he had been washed ashore down the stream and subsequently recovered. We find that our direct evidence, with numerous witnesses to the actual fact, was entirely misleading after all, because we had jumped to a conclusion, without duly considering the attendant circumstances of the case. So it is always. This is no case manufactured to point an argument. There is no such thing as positive proof, which does not depend upon circumstances. The old example may be cited briefly again. If you see one man shoot at another and see the other fall and die, can you say without further knowledge, that one killed the other? If you do, you may find later that the pistol carried only a blank cartridge, and that the man died of fright.
"It is equally true of circumstantial evidence, that without some direct fact upon which it depends it is worthless. As an example of this, I may as well save your time by introducing the case at issue. If we could show you that the prisoner desired the death of this girl; that he profited by her death; that he had a secret in connection with her child which he can keep from the world better, now that she is dead; that she died under circumstances which made the attending physician suspect morphine poisoning; that as soon as the suspicion was announced, the prisoner mysteriously disappeared, and remained in hiding for several days; that he had the opportunity to administer the poison; that he understood the working of the drug; and other circumstances of a similar nature, the argument would be entirely circumstantial. All this might be true and the man might be innocent. But, selecting from this array of suspicious facts, the one which indicates morphine as the drug employed, and then add to it the fact that expert chemists actually find morphine in the tissues of the body, and you see, gentlemen, that at once this single bit of direct evidence gives substantial form to the whole. The circumstantial is strengthened by the direct, just as the direct is made important by the circumstantial. The mere finding of poison in a body, though direct evidence as to the cause of death, neither convicts the assassin, nor even positively indicates that a murder has been committed. The poison might have reached the victim by accident. But consider the attendant circumstances, and then we see that a definite conclusion is inevitable. It is from the circumstantial evidence only that we can reach the true meaning of what the direct testimony teaches.
"So we come at last to find that evidence is evidence, and that all evidence is important, and may prove convincing. This is true, without regard to the technical classification. Leave classification to the lawyers, gentlemen. You have but to weigh all that has been offered to you as relevant, and bearing upon the issue. Be assured, the Recorder would not have admitted any extraneous matter. You are not to cast aside anything that you have heard, merely because Mr. Bliss tells you that it is delusive. It is not delusive. On the contrary, all is very clear, as I shall now demonstrate to you.
"I will take up the chain of evidence much in the same order as did Mr. Bliss. First, then, we have Dr. Meredith. Mr. Bliss hints to you that he is a prejudiced witness, but whilst I might argue that a man must be more than a villain to falsely accuse another of murder, I need go into no defence of this witness, because it has been freely admitted that his testimony is true. Mr. Bliss argues that all that can be deduced from what Dr. Meredith tells us, is that morphine was present in quantity sufficient to show toxic symptoms. Now that is all that we care to claim from this witness. He recognized morphine poisoning prior to death, but Mr. Bliss attempts to belittle the value of this by the hypothesis that the drug was self-administered. He calls your attention to the statements of the prisoner to this effect, and tells you to believe him. On this subject I will speak again in a moment. The principal thing at this point is, do they ask us to believe that the girl died from diphtheria, or did she die of poison, regardless of how she received it? They do not choose between these two queries, but ask you to say either that she died of diphtheria, or, if of poison, that it was self-administered. It rests with you, gentlemen, then, to decide this weighty point. As to diphtheria, we have the report of the experts against it. Dr. Meredith declared, even before her death, that she was dying from poison. The autopsy showed that the cause of death was poison. The chemical analysis shows morphine in a poisonous dose, which is declared to be more than three grains. True, Dr. Fisher, a witness who was forced upon the prosecution, declares that diphtheria caused the death, but this is in contradiction to the opinion of all the others, and though honestly offered, no doubt, may be accounted for by the natural desire to substantiate the statement made in the death certificate. But this same witness tells us later that exactly three and a half grains of morphine is missing from his medicine-case, the one from which the defence admits that the morphine was taken. We find also that the defence seem to lay more stress upon explaining the death by morphine, than upon any effort to prove that diphtheria killed this girl.
"I think, then, that, with no injustice to the accused, you may adopt the pet theory of the defence, and conclude that this girl died of morphine poisoning. But, gentlemen, I shall now even admit more than that. Let us grant that a diseased kidney will cause accumulation of morphine, and that this girl had such a disease. More than that, let us admit that she had taken a considerable quantity of morphine prior to her illness, and that a large portion of it was held secreted in some part of her body. Now, what is the situation on that last evening of her life? She has been ill for several days with diphtheria, but she is recovering. She is so far convalescent that the senior physician deems it unnecessary for him to see her again that night. She also has slight kidney trouble, and she has some morphine stored up in her system; an amount, however, which has been tolerated throughout the attack of diphtheria, when vitality was at its lowest ebb, but which has neither acted fatally, nor even affected her so that symptoms of its presence attracted the attention of the doctors.
"Gentlemen of the jury, now follow me closely if you please. We can often bring witnesses to a murder where a weapon is used, but rare indeed is it that the poisoner is actually seen at his deadly work. But, by a singular act of Providence, that is what happened here. The prisoner arrived at that house that night, and dismissed the trained nurse. Observe that this occurs precisely upon the night when the patient has been declared to be convalescent. Here, then, is this man, a physician himself, alone in the presence of a weak woman. Does not this surely indicate to you that he had the opportunity to commit the foul deed? Supposing that he wished to rid himself of this girl, how gladly would he have awaited for her death by natural causes? How willingly have seen the dread diphtheria remove her from his path, and save his soul from the stain of crime? But no! It was not to be! On this night, his skilled eye saw what the other doctors had seen. The girl would recover! If she was to die, it must be by his hand. Now how should he accomplish it? By what means rid himself of the girl, and be safe from the hangman himself. Here the diabolical working of a scientific mind reveals itself. As he has told us he well knew her condition. He knew that she had kidney disease. He knew that she had been taking morphine, and readily guessed that some of the deadly drug was still stored up in her system. If he administered morphine to this poor woman, infatuated alike with the drug and with him, she would not offer the slightest remonstrance. No cry would escape her lips as the deadly needle punctured her fair flesh. Loving him and trusting him, she would yield to his suggestion, and so go into the last sleep. But what of the after effects? He certainly would think of that? Why, certainly! The girl would die of coma, and the attending physicians, if summoned in time, would say that she died of anæmia caused by diphtheria. Or, even if suspicion were aroused, it might be claimed afterwards, just, gentlemen, as it has been claimed, that the drug was self-administered, and was not enough in itself to have proven fatal. He knew that the autopsy would substantiate his claim of kidney trouble, and that the toxicologists would admit the effect upon morphine. But more than all, being himself something of an expert in all branches of medical science, and especially in chemistry, he could almost to a nicety gauge the quantity of the drug which would be required, which of itself might not prove fatal to a morphinehabitué, but which would compass her death when added to what was already in her system. Chance seemed to favor his horrible design, for Dr. Fisher had left his syringe and a supply of the drug. See this fiend, this scientific wife murderer, measure out and prepare the lethal dose! See him pierce the yielding flesh and inject the deadly drug, and then, lo! Providence brings upon the scene a witness to the deed! The nurse returns unexpectedly and sees, gentlemen, mark my words, actually sees this man in the act of using the hypodermic syringe!
"What can he do? He knows that it would be hazardous to deny the testimony of this trained nurse. Therefore he admits what she tells us, and then ingeniously invents the explanation that he was removing the syringe, but had not made the injection. But I submit it to you, gentlemen, is that a probable tale? If this girl had time to prepare the drug, to fill the syringe, to pierce her flesh, to inject the drug, would she not have been able to remove it herself? Does it take ten minutes to withdraw a needle? Or five minutes, or one minute? Or one second, gentlemen? Can you even compute the brief moment of time in which the withdrawal could have been effected? Mr. Bliss told you that the testimony of the accused must be final on this point. That until he is convicted of crime his word is as acceptable as that of any other witness. This may be a presumption of law, gentlemen, but it is a still greater presumption on the part of counsel to ask such intelligent men as you are, to believe that a murderer, or even an innocent man, would not perjure himself to save his life! Such things are told in romance, but we know that in actual life the most scrupulous of us all, will lie unhesitatingly if life itself be the stake.
"Thus, gentlemen, the whole thing comes to this. It matters not how much morphine this woman had taken herself, prior to her illness; it matters not how diseased were her kidneys: the cause of her death was that last dose of morphine, and you have to decide whether this man administered it as the nurse tells us, or whether the weak convalescent mixed and prepared the drug, and then injected it herself. We claim that Dr. Medjora administered that last dose, and that by that act he committed the crime of murder. And remember this, that if you decide that he administered that morphine, your verdict must be murder in the first degree, for having denied that he gave the drug at all, he cannot claim now that he gave it with no intention to destroy life. Gentlemen, you are the final arbiters in this matter."
The Recorder immediately charged the jury, but though he spoke at considerable length, I need scarcely give his speech here, as it was chiefly an explanation of the law. He was eminently impartial in all that he said, and it was surprising, therefore, how many objections and exceptions were entered by the defence. At last the jury was sent out, and the long wait began. The hours passed slowly and still those present remained in their seats, loath to risk being absent when the verdict should be announced.
It was nearly ten o'clock at night, and the jury had been out five hours, when word was sent in, that a verdict had been found. The Recorder a few moments later resumed his seat, and the jury filed in. After the usual formalities, the foreman arose and announced the following verdict:
"We find the prisoner, Dr. Emanuel Medjora, not guilty."
The words were received almost in silence by all present. Above the stillness a deep sob was heard at the farther end of the room. This had escaped from the tightly compressed lips of Madame Cora Corona.