It is of no use to say that we do not need so much currency as the proposed system would supply; because, first, if we should not need it, we shall not use it. Every dollar of paper will represent specific property that can be delivered on demand in redemption of it, and that will have the same market value as gold. The paper dollar, therefore, will have the same market value as the gold dollar, or as a dollar's worth of any other property; and no one will part with it, unless he gets in exchange for it something that will serve his particular wants better; and no one will accept it, unless it will serve his particular wants better than the thing he parts with. No more paper, therefore, can circulate, than is wanted for the purchase and sale of commodities at their true and natural values, as measured by gold.
Secondly, we do not know at all how much currency we do need. That is something that can be determined only by experiment. We know that, heretofore, whenever currency has been increased, industry and traffic have increased to a corresponding extent. And they would unquestionably increase to an extent far beyond any thing the world has ever seen, if onlythey were aided and permitted by an adequate currency.
We, as yet, know very little what wealth mankind are capable of creating. It is only within a hundred years, or a little more, that any considerable portion of them have really begun to invent machinery, and learned that it is only by machinery that they can create any considerable wealth. But they have not yet learned—at least, they profess not to have learned—that money is indispensable to the practical employment of machinery; that it is as impossible to operate machinery without money, as it is to operate it without wind, water, or steam. When they shall have learned, and practically accepted, this great fact, and shall have provided themselves with money, wealth will speedily become universal. And it is only those who would deplore such a result, or those who are too stupid to see the palpable and necessary connection between money and manufacturing industry, who resist the indefinite increase of money.
It is scarcely a more patent fact that land is the indispensable capital for agricultural industry, than it is that money is the indispensable capital for manufacturing industry. Practically, everybody recognizes this fact, and virtually acknowledges it; although, in words, so many deny it. Men as deliberately and accurately calculate the amount of machinery that a hundred dollars in money will operate, as they do the amount of machinery that a ton of coal, or a given amount of water, will operate. They calculate muchmore accurately the amount of manufactured goods a hundred dollars will produce, than they do the amount of grain, grass, or vegetables an acre of land will produce. They no more expect to see mechanics carrying on business for themselves without money, than they do to see agricultural laborers carrying on farming without land, or than they do to see sailors going to sea without ships. They know that all mechanical, as well as agricultural, laborers, who have not the appropriate capital for their special business, must necessarily stand idle, or become mere wage-laborers for others, at such particular employments as the latter may dictate, and at such prices as the latter may see fit to pay.
All these things attest the perfect knowledge that men have, that a money capital is indispensable to manufacturing industry; whatever assertions they may make to the contrary.
They know, therefore, that prohibitions upon money are prohibitions upon industry itself; that there can be no such thing as freedom of industry, where there is not freedom to lend and hire capital for such industry.
Every one knows, too—who knows any thing at all on such a subject—that it is, intrinsically, as flagrant a tyranny, as flagrant a violation of men's natural rights, for a government to forbid the lending and hiring of money for manufacturing industry, as it is to forbid the lending and hiring of land, or agricultural implements, for agricultural industry, or the lendingand hiring of ships for maritime industry. They know that it is as flagrant a tyranny, as flagrant a violation of men's natural rights, to forbid one man to lend another money for mechanical industry, as it would be to forbid the former to lend the latter a house to live in, a shop to work in, or tools to work with.
It is, therefore, a flagrant, manifest tyranny, a flagrant, manifest violation of men's natural rights, to lay any conditions or restrictions whatever upon the business of banking—that is, upon the lending and hiring of money—except such as are laid upon all other transactions between man and man, viz.: the fulfilment of contracts, and restraints upon force and fraud.
A man who is without capital, and who, by prohibitions upon banking, is practically forbidden to hire any, is in a condition elevated but one degree above that of a chattel slave. He may live; but he can live only as the servant of others; compelled to perform such labor, and to perform it at such prices, as they may see fit to dictate. And a government, which, at this day, subjects the great body of the people—or even any portion of them—to this condition, is as fit an object of popular retribution as any tyranny that ever existed.
To deprive mankind of their natural right and power of creating wealth for themselves, is as great a tyranny as it is to rob them of it after they have created it. And this is done by all laws against honest banking.
All these things are so self-evident, so universally known, that no man, of ordinary mental capacity, canclaim to be ignorant of them. And any legislator, who disregards them, should be taught, by a discipline short, sharp, and decisive, that his power is wholly subordinate to the natural rights of mankind.
It is, then, one of man's indisputable, natural rights to lend and hire capital in any and every form and manner that is intrinsically honest. And as money, or currency, is the great, the indispensable instrumentality in the production and distribution of wealth; as it is the capital, the motive power, that sets all other instrumentalities in motion; as it is the one thing, without which all the other great agencies of production—such as science, skill, and machinery—are practically paralyzed; to say that we need no more of it, and shall have no more of it, than we now have, is to say that we need no more wealth, and shall have no more wealth, and no more equal or equitable distribution of wealth, than we now have. It is to say that the mass of mankind—the laborers, the producers of wealth—need not to produce, and shall not be permitted to produce, wealth for themselves, but only for others.
For a government to limit the currency of a people, and to designate the individuals (or corporations) who shall have the control of that currency, is, manifestly, equivalent to saying there shall be but so much industry and wealth in the nation, and that these shall be under the special control, and for the special enjoyment, of the individuals designated; and, of course, that all other persons shall be simply their dependants and servants; receiving only such prices for their property, and such compensation for their labor, as these few holders of the currency shall see fit to give for them.
The effect of these prohibitions upon money, and consequently upon industry, are everywhere apparent in the poverty of the great body of the people.
At the present time, the people of this country certainly do not produce one third, very likely not one fifth, of the wealth they might produce. And the little they do produce is all in the hands of a few. All this is attributable to the want of currency and credit, and to the consequent want of science, skill, machinery, and working capital.
Of the twenty million persons, male and female, of sixteen years of age and upwards—capable of producing wealth—certainly not one in five has the science, skill, implements, machinery, and capital necessary to make his or her industry most effective; or to secure to himself or herself the greatest share in the products of his or her own industry. A very large proportion of these persons—nearly all the females, and a great majority of the males—persons capable of running machinery, and of producing each three, five, or ten dollars of wealth per day, are now without science, skill, machinery, or capital, and are either producing nothing, or working only with such inferior means, and at such inferior employments, as to make their industry of scarcely any value at all, either to themselves or others, beyond the provision of the coarsest necessaries of a hard and coarse existence.And this is all owing to the lack of money; or rather to the lack of money and credit.
There are, doubtless, in the country, ten million (10,000,000) persons, male and female—sixteen years of age and upwards—who are naturally capable of creating from three to five dollars of wealth per day, if they had the science, skill, machinery, and capital which they ought to have, and might have; but who, from the want of these, are now creating not more than one dollar each per day, on an average; thus occasioning a loss, to themselves and the country of from twenty to forty millions of dollars per day, for three hundred days in a year; a sum equal to from six to twelve thousand millions per annum; or three to six times the amount of our entire national debt.
And there are another ten million of persons—better supplied, indeed, with capital, machinery, &c., than the ten million before mentioned—but who, nevertheless, from the same causes, are producing far less than they might.
The aggregate loss to the country, from these causes, is, doubtless, equal to from ten to fifteen thousand millions per year; or five, six, or seven times the amount of the entire national debt.
In this estimate no account is taken of the loss suffered from our inability—owing simply to a want of money—to bring to this country, and give employment to, the millions of laborers, in Europe and Asia, who desire to come here, and add the products of their labor to our national wealth.
It is, probably, no more than a reasonable estimate to suppose that the nation, as a nation, is losing twenty thousand millions of dollars ($20,000,000,000) per annum—about ten times the amount of our national debt—solely for the want of money to give such employment as they need, to the population we now have, and to those who desire to come here from other countries.
Among the losses we suffer, from the causes mentioned, the non-production of new inventions is by no means the least. As a general rule, new inventions are made only where money and machinery prevail. And they are generally produced in a ratio corresponding with the amount of money and machinery. In no part of the country are the new inventions equal in number to what they ought to be, and might be. In three fourths of the country very few are produced. In some, almost none at all. The losses from this cause cannot be estimated in money.
The government, in its ignorance, arrogance, and tyranny, either does not see all this, or, seeing it, does not regard it. While these thousands of millions are being lost annually, from the suppression of money, and consequently of industry, and while three fourths of the laborers of the country are either standing idle, or, for the want of capital, are producing only a mere fraction of what they might produce, a two-pence-ha'-penny Secretary of the Treasury can find no better employment for his faculties, than in trying, first, to reduce the rate of interest on the public debt one percent.—thereby saving twenty millions a year,or fifty cents for each person, on an average! And, secondly, in paying one hundred millions per annum of the principal; that is,two and a half dollars for each person, on an average! And he insists that the only way to achieve these astounding results, is to deprive the people at large of money! To destroy, as far as possible, their industry! To deprive them, as far as possible, of all power to manufacture for themselves! And to compel them to pay, to the few manufacturers it has under its protection, fifty or one hundred per cent. more for their manufactures than they are worth!
He has been tugging at this tremendous task four years, or thereabouts. And he confidently believes that if he can be permitted to enforce this plan for a sufficient period of years, in the future, he will ultimately be able to save the people, annually,fifty cents each, on an average, in interest! and also continue to pay, annually,two dollars and a half for each person, on an average, of the principal, of the national debt!
He apparently does not know, or, if he knows, it is, in his eyes, a matter of comparatively small moment, that this saving of $20,000,000 per annum in interest, and this payment of $100,000,000 per annum of principal, which he proposes to make on behalf of the people, are not equal to whattwo days—or perhaps evenone day—of their industry would amount to, if they were permitted to enjoy their natural rights of lending and hiring capital, and producing such wealth as they please for themselves.
He apparently does not know, or, if he knows, it is with him a small matter, that if the people were permitted to enjoy their natural freedom in currency and credit, and consequently their natural freedom in industry, they could pay the entire national debt three, four, or a half dozen times overevery year, more easily than they can save the $20,000,000, and pay the $100,000,000, annually, by the process that he adopts for saving and paying them.
And yet this man, and his policy, represent the government and its policy. The president keeps him in office, and Congress sustain him in his measures.
In short, the government not only does not offer, but is apparently determined not to suffer, any such thing as freedom in currency and credit, or, consequently, in industry. It is, apparently, so bent upon compelling the people to give more for its few irredeemable notes than they are worth; and so bent upon keeping all wealth, and all means of wealth, in the hands of the few—upon whose money and frauds it relies for support—that it is determined, if possible, to perpetuate this state of things indefinitely. And it will probably succeed in perpetuating it indefinitely—under cover of such false pretences as those of specie payments, inflation of prices, reducing the interest, and paying the principal, of the national debt, &c.—unless the people at large shall open their eyes to the deceit and robbery that are practised upon them; and, by establishingfreedom in currency and credit—and thereby freedom in industry and commerce—end at once and forever the tyranny that impoverishes and enslaves them.
The tariffs, by means of which a few monied men of Massachusetts have so long plundered the rest of the country, and on which they have so largely relied for their prosperity, will not much longer be endured. The nation at large has no need of tariffs. Money is the great instrumentality for manufacturing. And the nation needs nothing but an ample supply of money—in addition to its natural advantages—to enable our people to manufacture for themselves much more cheaply than any other people can manufacture for us.
To say nothing of the many millions who, if we had the money necessary to give them employment, might be brought here from Europe and Asia, and employed in manufactures, more than half the productive power of our present population—in the South and West much more than half—is utterly lost for the want of money, and the consequent want of science, skill, and machinery. And yet those few, who monopolize the present stock of money, insist that they must have tariffs to enable them to manufacture at all. And the nation is duped by these false pretences.
To give bounties to encourage manufactures, and at the same time forbid all but a favored few to have money to manufacture with, is just as absurd as it would be to give bounties to encourage manufactures, and at the same time forbid all but a favored few to have machinery of any kind to manufacture with. It is just as absurd as it would be to give bounties to encourage agriculture, and at the same time forbid all but a favored few to own land, or have cattle, horses, seed corn, seed wheat, or agricultural implements. It is just as absurd as it would be to give bounties to encourage navigation, and at the same time forbid all but a favored few to have ships.
The whole object of such absurdities and tyrannies is to commit the double wrong of depriving the mass of the people of all power to manufacture for themselves, and at the same time compel them to pay extortionate prices to the favored few who are permitted to manufacture.
When tariffs shall be abolished, Massachusetts will have no means of increasing her prosperity, nor even of perpetuating such poor prosperity as she now has,[F]except by a great increase of money; such an increase of money as will enable her skilled laborers and enterprising young men to get capital for such industries and enterprises as they may prefer to engage in here, rather than go elsewhere.
Even if Massachusetts were willing to manufacture for the South and West,without a tariff, she could hope to do so only until the South and West should supply themselves with money. So soon as they shall supply themselves with money, they will be able to manufacture for themselves more cheaply than Massachusetts can manufacture for them. Their natural advantages for manufacturing are greatly superior to those of Massachusetts. They have the cheap food, coal, iron, lead, copper, wool, cotton, hides, &c., &c. They lack only money to avail themselves of these advantages. And, under the system proposed, their lands and railroads are capable of supplying all the money they need. And they will soon adopt that, or some other system. And they will then not only be independent of Massachusetts, but will be able to draw away from her her skilled laborers, and enterprising young men, unless she shall first supply them with the money capital necessary for such industries and enterprises as may induce them to remain. They will, of course, go where they can get capital, instead of staying where they can get none.
So great are the natural advantages of the South and West over those of Massachusetts, that it is doubtful how many of these men can be persuaded to remain, by all the inducements that capital can offer. But without such inducements it is certain they will all go.
And Massachusetts has no means of supplying this needed money, except by using her real estate as banking capital.
It is, therefore, plainly a matter of life or death to the holders of real estate in Massachusetts to use it for that purpose; for their real estate will be worth nothing when the skilled labor and the enterprising young men of Massachusetts shall have deserted her.
All this is so manifest as to need no further demonstration. And Massachusetts will do well to look the facts in the face before it is too late.
What prospect has Massachusetts under the present "National" system?
The Comptroller of the Currency, in his last annual report, says, that of the $354,000,000 of circulation authorized by law, Massachusetts has now $58,506,686. He says, further, that this is more than four times as much as she would be entitled to, if the currency were apportioned equally among the States, according to population; more than twice as much as she would be entitled to, if the circulation were apportioned among the States, according to their wealth; and three times as much as she is entitled to upon an apportionment made—as apportionments are now professedly made—half upon population, and half upon wealth.
The Comptroller further says, that a law of Congress, passed July 12, 1870, requiring him to withdraw circulation from those States having more than their just proportion, and to distribute it among those now having less than their just proportion, will require him towithdraw "from thirty-six banks in the City of Boston, $11,403,000; [and] from fifty-three country banks of Massachusetts, $2,997,000."
Thus the law requires $14,400,000 to be withdrawn from the present banks of Massachusetts.
When this shall have been done, she will have but $44,106,686 left. And as this will be more than three times her just proportion on a basis of population, and nearly twice her just share on a basis of wealth, there is no knowing how soon the remaining excess over her just share may be withdrawn.[G]
By the census of 1870, Massachusetts had a population of 1,457,351. She has now, doubtless, a population of 1,500,000. Calling her population 1,500,000, the $58,506,686 of circulation which she now has, is equal to $39 for each person, on an average. When $14,400,000 of this amount shall have been withdrawn, as the law now requires it to be, the circulation will be reduced to less than $30 for each person, on an average. If the circulation should be reduced to the proportion to which Massachusetts is entitled, on the basis of wealth—that is, to $25,098,600—she will then have less than $17 for each person, on an average. If the circulation should be reduced to the proportion to which Massachusetts is entitled on a basis of population—that is to $13,879,778—she will then have a trifle less than $9 for each person, on an average.
For years the industry of Massachusetts has been greatly crippled for the want of bank credits, although her banks have been authorized to issue their notes to the amount of $58,506,686; or $39 to each person, on an average. What will her industry be when her banks shall be authorized to issue only $44,106,686, or $30 for each person, on an average? What will it be, if her bank issues shall be reduced to her proportion on a basis of wealth, to wit, $25,098,600; or less than $17 for each person, on an average? Or what will it be, if her bank circulation shall be reduced to her proportion on a basis of population, to wit, to $13,379,778; or less than $9 for each person, on an average?
In contrast with such contemptible sums as these, Massachusetts, under the system proposed, could have nine hundred millions ($900,000,000) of bank loans;[H]that is, $600 for every man, woman, and child, on an average; or $1,500 to each adult, male and female, on an average; or $3,000 to eachmaleadult, on an average.
Which, now, of these two systems is most likely to secure and increase the prosperity of Massachusetts? Which is most likely to give to every deserving man and woman in the State, the capital necessary to make their industry most productive to themselves individually, and to the State? Which system is most likely to induce the skilled laborers and enterprising young men of Massachusetts to remain here? And which is most likely to drive them away?
But the whole is not yet told. The present "National" system is so burdened with taxes and other onerous conditions, that no banking at all can be done under it, except at rates of interest that are two or three times as high as they ought to be; or as they would be under the system proposed.
The burdens imposed on the present banks are probably equal to from six to eight per cent.upon the amount of their own notes that they are permitted to issue.
In the first place, they are required, for every $90 of circulation, to invest $100 in five or six per cent. government bonds.[I]This alone is a great burden to all that class of persons who want their capital for active business. It amounts to actual prohibition upon all whose property is in real estate, and therefore not convertible into bonds. And this is a purely tyrannical provision, inasmuch as real estate is a much safer and better capital than the bonds. Let us call this a burden oftwo per cent. on their circulation.
Next, is the risk as to the permanent value of the bonds. Any war, civil or foreign, would cause them todrop in value, as the frost causes the mercury to drop in the thermometer. Even any danger of war would at once reduce them in value. Let us call this risk another burden ofone per cent. on the circulation.
Next, every bank in seventeen or eighteen of the largest cities—Boston among the number—are required to keep on hand, at all times, a reserve—in dead capital(legal tenders)—"equal to at least twenty-five per centum," and all other banks a similar reserve "equal to at least fifteen per centum," "of the aggregate amount of theirnotes in circulation, and of their deposits."
Doubtless, two thirds—very likely three fourths—of all the bank circulation and deposits are in the seventeen cities named. And as these city banks are required to keep a reserve of dead capital equal to twenty-five per cent., and all others a similar reserve equal to fifteen per cent.,both on their circulation and deposits, this average burden on all the banks is, doubtless, equal totwo per cent. on their circulation.
Next, the banks are required to pay to the United States an annual tax of one per cent. on their average circulation, and half of one per cent. on the amount of their deposits.
Here is another burden equal to at leastone and a half per cent. on their circulation.
Then the capitals of the banks—the United States bonds—are made liable to State taxes to any extent, "not at a greater rate than is assessed upon the monied capital in the hands of individual citizens of suchState." This tax is probably equal toone per cent. on their circulation.
Here, then, are taxes and burdens equal toseven and a half per cent. on their circulation.
Next, the banks are required to make at leastfivereports annually, to the Comptroller of the Currency, of their "resources and liabilities." Also reports of "the amount of each dividend declared by the association."
Then, too, the banks are restricted as to the rates of interest they are permitted to take.
Then "Congress may at any time alter, amend, or repeal this act;" and thus impose upon the banks still further taxes, conditions, restrictions, returns, and reports. Or it may at pleasure abolish the banks altogether.
All these taxes, burdens, and liabilities, cannot be reckoned at less thaneight or nine per cent. on the circulation of the banks; a sum two or three times as great as the rate of interest ought to be; and two or three times as great as it would be under the system proposed.
And yet the banks must submit to all these burdens as a condition of being permitted to loan money at all. And they must make up—in their rates of interest—for all these burdens. Under this system, therefore, the rate of interest must always be two or three times as high as it ought to be.
The objections to the system, then, are, first, that it furnishes very little loanable capital; and, second, thatit necessarily raises the interest on that little to two or three times what it ought to be.
Such a system, obviously, could not be endured at all, but for these reasons, viz.: first, that, being a monopoly, those holding it are enabled to make enormous extortions upon borrowers; and, secondly, that these borrowers—most of whom are the bankers themselves—employ the money in the manufacture and sale of goods that are protected, by tariffs, from foreign competition, and for which they are thus enabled to get, say, fifty per cent. more than they are worth.
In this way, these bank extortions and tariff extortions are thrown ultimately upon the people who consume the goods which the bank capital is employed in producing and selling.
Thus the joint effect of the bank system and the tariff is, first, to deprive the mass of the people of the money capital that would enable them to manufacture for themselves; and, secondly, to compel them to pay extortionate prices for the few manufactures that are produced.
Under the system proposed, all these things would be done away. The West and the South, that are now relied on to pay all these extortions, would manufacture for themselves. Their lands and railroads would enable them to supply all the manufacturing capital that could be used. And they could supply it at one half, or one third, the rates now required by the "National" banks. Of course, Massachusetts could not—under the "National" system—manufacture a dollar's worth for the South and West. She could not keep her manufacturing laborers. They would all go where they could get cheap capital, cheap supplies, and good markets. And then the manufacturing industry of Massachusetts, and with it the value of her real estate, will have perished from the natural and legitimate effect of her meanness, extortion, and tyranny.
Looking to the future, then, there is no State in the Union—certainly none outside of New England—that has a greater interest in supplying her mechanics with the greatest possible amount of capital; or in supplying it at the lowest possible rates of interest. And this can be done only by using her real estate as banking capital.
Under the "National" system there are less than 2,000 banks. But let us call them 2,000.
Calling the population of the country forty millions, there is but one bank to 20,000 people.
And this one bank is,in law, a person; and only a single person. In lending money, it acts, and can act, only as a unit. Its several stockholders cannot act separately, as so many individuals, in lending money.
So far, therefore, as this system is concerned,there is but one money lender for twenty thousand people!
Of these 20,000 people, ten thousand (male and female) are sixteen years of age and upwards, capable of creating wealth, and requiring capital to make their labor most productive.
Yet, so far as this system is concerned, there is but one person authorized to lend money to, or for, these ten thousand, who wish to borrow.
And this one money lender is one who, proverbially "has no soul." It is not a natural human being. It is a legal, an artificial, and not a natural, person. It is neither masculine nor feminine. It has not the ordinary human sympathies, and is not influenced by the ordinary human motives of action. It is no father, who might wish to lend money to his children, to start them in life. It is no neighbor, who might wish to assist his neighbor. It is no citizen, who might wish to promote the public welfare. It is simply a nondescript, created by law, that wants money, and nothing else.
Moreover, it has only $177,000 to lend to these 10,000 borrowers;that is, a fraction less than $18, on an average, for each one!
What chance of borrowing capital have these ten thousand persons, who are forbidden to borrow, except from this one soulless person, who has so little to lend?
If money lenders must be soulless—as, perhaps, to some extent, they must be—it is certainly of the utmost importance that there be so many of them, and that they may have so much money to lend, as that they may be necessitated, by their own selfishness, to compete with each other, and thus save the borrowers from their extortions.
But the "National" system says, not only that the money lender shall be a soulless person, and one having only a little money to lend, but that he shall also have the whole field—a field of 10,000 borrowers—entirely to himself!
It says that this soulless person shall have this whole field to himself, notwithstanding he has so little money to lend, and notwithstanding there are many other persons standing by, having, in the aggregate, fifty timesas much money to lend as he; and desiring to lend it at one half, or one third, the rates he is demanding, and extorting!
It says, too, that he shall have this whole field to himself, notwithstanding that ninety-nine one-hundredths of those who desire to borrow, are sent away empty! and are thereby condemned—so far as such a system can condemn them—to inevitable poverty!
But further. Each one of these 2,000 legal, or artificial, persons, who alone are permitted tolendmoney, is made up of, say, fifty actual, or natural, persons, to whom alone, it is well known, that this legal person will lend it!
These 2,000 legal persons, then, who alone are permitted to lend money, are made up of 100,000 actual persons, who alone are to borrow it.
These 100,000 actual persons, who compose the legal persons, do not, then, become bankers because they have money to lend to others, but only because they themselves want to borrow!
Thus when the system says that they alone shall lend, it virtually says that they alone shall borrow; because it is well known that, in practice, theywilllend only to themselves.
In short, it says that only these 100,000 men—or one in four hundred of the population—shall have liberty either to lend, or borrow, capital! Such capitalas is indispensable to every producer of wealth, if he would control his own industry, or make his labor most productive.
Consequently, it says, practically—so far as it is in its power to say—that only one person in four hundred of the population shall be permitted to have capital; or, consequently, to labor directly for himself; and that all the rest of the four hundred shall be compelled to labor for this one, at such occupations, and for such wages, as he shall see fit to dictate.
In short, the system says—as far as it can say—that only 100,000 persons—only one person in four hundred of the population—shall be suffered to have any money! And, consequently, that all the property and labor of the thirty-nine million nine hundred thousand (39,900,000) persons shall be under the practical, and nearly absolute, control of these 100,000 persons! It says that thirty-nine million nine hundred thousand (39,900,000) persons shall be in a state of industrial and commercial servitude (to the 100,000), elevated but one degree above that of chattel slavery.
And this scheme is substantially carried out in practice. These 100,000 men call themselves "the business men" of the country. By this it is meant, not that they are the producers of wealth, but only that they alone handle the money! Other persons are permitted to sell only to them! to buy only of them! to labor only for them! and to sell to, buy of, and labor for, them, only at such prices as these 100,000 shall dictate.
These 100,000 so called "business men," not only own the government, but theyarethe government. Congress is made up of them, and their tools. And they hold all the other departments of the government in their hands. Their sole purpose is power and plunder; and they suffer no constitutional or natural law to stand in the way of their rapacity.
How many times, during the last presidential canvass, were we told that "the business men" of the country wished things to remain as they were? Having gathered all power into their own hands, having subjected all the property and all the labor of the country to their service and control, who can wonder that they were content with things as they were? That they did not desire any change? And their money and their frauds being omnipotent in carrying elections, there was no change.
These 100,000 "business men," having secured to themselves the control of all bank credits, and thereby the control of all business depending on bank loans; having also obtained control of the government, enact that foreigners shall not be permitted to compete with them, by selling goods in our markets, except under a disadvantage of fifty to one hundred per cent.
And this is the industrial and financial system which the "National" bank system establishes—so far as it can establish it. And this is the scheme by means of which these 100,000 men cripple, and more than half paralyze, the industry of forty millions of people, and secure to themselves so large a portion of the proceeds of such industry as they see fit to permit.
As Mr. Amasa Walker is considered the highest authority in the country, in opposition to all paper currency that does not represent gold or silver actually on hand, it will not be impertinent to give his opinion of the system now proposed.
He reviewed it in a somewhat elaborate article, entitled "Modern Alchemy," published in theBankers Magazine (N. Y.)for December, 1861.
That he had no disposition to do any thing but condemn the system to the best of his ability, may be inferred from the following facts.
After describing the efforts of the old alchemists to transmute the baser metals into gold, he represents all attempts to make a useful paper currency as attempts "to transmute paper into gold." He says that the idea that paper can be made to serve the purposes of money is "a perfectly cognate idea" with that of the old alchemists, that the baser metals can be transmuted into gold. (p. 407.)
He also informs us that—
"It is perfectly impracticableto transmute paper into goldto any extent or degree whatever, and that all attempts to do so (beneficially to the trade andcommerce of the world) are as absurd and futile as the efforts of the old alchemists to change the baser metals into the most precious." (p. 415).
"It is perfectly impracticableto transmute paper into goldto any extent or degree whatever, and that all attempts to do so (beneficially to the trade andcommerce of the world) are as absurd and futile as the efforts of the old alchemists to change the baser metals into the most precious." (p. 415).
These extracts are given to show the spirit and principle of his article, and the kind of arguments he employs against all paper that represents other property than coin; even though that property have equal value with coin in the market.
Yet he says:—
"One thing we cheerfully accord toMr. Spooner'ssystem—it is an honest one. Here is no fraud, no deception.It makes no promise that it cannot fulfil.It does not profess to be convertible into specie [on demand]. It is the best transmutation project we have seen." (p. 413).
"One thing we cheerfully accord toMr. Spooner'ssystem—it is an honest one. Here is no fraud, no deception.It makes no promise that it cannot fulfil.It does not profess to be convertible into specie [on demand]. It is the best transmutation project we have seen." (p. 413).
When he says that "it is the besttransmutationproject he has seen," the context shows that he means to say that itcomes nearer to transmuting paper into gold, than any other system he has seen.
This admission, coming from so violent an opponent of paper currency, may reasonably be set down as the highest commendation thathecould be expected to pay to anypapersystem.
He also says:—
"Many schemes of the same kind have, at different times, been presented to the world; but none of them have been more complete in detail, or more systematically arranged, than that ofMr. Spooner. (p. 414).
"Many schemes of the same kind have, at different times, been presented to the world; but none of them have been more complete in detail, or more systematically arranged, than that ofMr. Spooner. (p. 414).
But by way of condemning the system as far as possible, he says:—
"Mr. Spooner, however, can, we think, make no claim to originality, so far as the general principle is concerned. The famous bank ofJohn Law, in France, was essentially of the same character." (p. 413.)
"Mr. Spooner, however, can, we think, make no claim to originality, so far as the general principle is concerned. The famous bank ofJohn Law, in France, was essentially of the same character." (p. 413.)
No, it wasnotessentially of the same character. One difference—to say nothing of twenty others—between the two systems was this: thatLaw'sbank issued notes that it had no means to redeem; whereasMr. Walkerhimself admits that "Mr. Spooner'ssystem makes no promises that it cannot fulfil." That is to say, it purports to represent nothing except what it actually represents, viz.: property that is actually on hand, and can always be delivered,on demand, in redemption of the paper. Is not this difference an "essential" one? IfMr. Walkerthinks it is not, he differs "essentially" from the rest of mankind. What fault was ever found withJohn Law'sbank, except that it could not redeem its paper? WillMr. Walkerinform us?
FOOTNOTES[A]By the State valuation of May, 1871, the real estate of Boston is estimated at $395,214,950.[B]By the State valuation of May, 1871, the real estate of the Commonwealth is estimated at $991,196,803.[C]The amount of circulation now authorized by the present "National" banks of Massachusetts, is $58,506,686, as appears by the recent report of the Comptroller of the Currency.[D]There would always be a plenty of specie for sale, in the seaports, as merchandise.[E]Exclusive of the so-called "gold" banks, which are too few to be worthy of notice.[F]I say "poor prosperity," because the present prosperity of Massachusetts is not only a dishonest prosperity, but is also only the prosperity of the few, and not of the many.[G]If the excess mentioned in the text should not be withdrawn, it will be only because the system is so villainous in itself, that other parts of the country will not accept the shares to which they are entitled.[H]Since the notes on page fifth were printed, theBoston Journal, of Jan. 11, 1873, says that, by the valuation of 1872, the real estate of Massachusetts is $1,131,306,347.[I]At first they were required to invest only insixper cent. bonds. But more recently they have been coerced or "persuaded" to invest sixty-five millions ($65,000,000) infiveper cent. bonds. And very lately it has been announced that "The Comptroller of the Currency will not hereafter change United States bonds, deposited as security for circulating notes of national banks, except upon condition of substituting the new five per cents. of the loan of July 14, 1870, and January 20, 1872."—Boston Daily Advertiser of February 5, 1873.From this it is evident that all the banks are to be "persuaded" into investing their capitals infiveper cent. bonds.
[A]By the State valuation of May, 1871, the real estate of Boston is estimated at $395,214,950.
[A]By the State valuation of May, 1871, the real estate of Boston is estimated at $395,214,950.
[B]By the State valuation of May, 1871, the real estate of the Commonwealth is estimated at $991,196,803.
[B]By the State valuation of May, 1871, the real estate of the Commonwealth is estimated at $991,196,803.
[C]The amount of circulation now authorized by the present "National" banks of Massachusetts, is $58,506,686, as appears by the recent report of the Comptroller of the Currency.
[C]The amount of circulation now authorized by the present "National" banks of Massachusetts, is $58,506,686, as appears by the recent report of the Comptroller of the Currency.
[D]There would always be a plenty of specie for sale, in the seaports, as merchandise.
[D]There would always be a plenty of specie for sale, in the seaports, as merchandise.
[E]Exclusive of the so-called "gold" banks, which are too few to be worthy of notice.
[E]Exclusive of the so-called "gold" banks, which are too few to be worthy of notice.
[F]I say "poor prosperity," because the present prosperity of Massachusetts is not only a dishonest prosperity, but is also only the prosperity of the few, and not of the many.
[F]I say "poor prosperity," because the present prosperity of Massachusetts is not only a dishonest prosperity, but is also only the prosperity of the few, and not of the many.
[G]If the excess mentioned in the text should not be withdrawn, it will be only because the system is so villainous in itself, that other parts of the country will not accept the shares to which they are entitled.
[G]If the excess mentioned in the text should not be withdrawn, it will be only because the system is so villainous in itself, that other parts of the country will not accept the shares to which they are entitled.
[H]Since the notes on page fifth were printed, theBoston Journal, of Jan. 11, 1873, says that, by the valuation of 1872, the real estate of Massachusetts is $1,131,306,347.
[H]Since the notes on page fifth were printed, theBoston Journal, of Jan. 11, 1873, says that, by the valuation of 1872, the real estate of Massachusetts is $1,131,306,347.
[I]At first they were required to invest only insixper cent. bonds. But more recently they have been coerced or "persuaded" to invest sixty-five millions ($65,000,000) infiveper cent. bonds. And very lately it has been announced that "The Comptroller of the Currency will not hereafter change United States bonds, deposited as security for circulating notes of national banks, except upon condition of substituting the new five per cents. of the loan of July 14, 1870, and January 20, 1872."—Boston Daily Advertiser of February 5, 1873.From this it is evident that all the banks are to be "persuaded" into investing their capitals infiveper cent. bonds.
[I]At first they were required to invest only insixper cent. bonds. But more recently they have been coerced or "persuaded" to invest sixty-five millions ($65,000,000) infiveper cent. bonds. And very lately it has been announced that "The Comptroller of the Currency will not hereafter change United States bonds, deposited as security for circulating notes of national banks, except upon condition of substituting the new five per cents. of the loan of July 14, 1870, and January 20, 1872."—Boston Daily Advertiser of February 5, 1873.
From this it is evident that all the banks are to be "persuaded" into investing their capitals infiveper cent. bonds.