Should it occur to your mind that you have contended that the evidence of revelation is as different from the evidence required in natural discoveries, as the subjects themselves are different, you are reminded that you have contended for this only with a view toweakenthe force of the former, and in a way to disallow its validity. At the same time you state that you do not undertake to deny a special revelation from God, but "wish only to take a review of the evidences, and see if they are such that it isimpossibleit should be false." Of these evidences you speak thus; "Although ever so clear at first, and ever so well supported by facts, concerning which the witnesses had the clearest evidences, yet the evidences being of such a nature as to preclude a repetition, like those respecting a vision of the night or any other phenomenon, are liable to suffer by passing from one to another," and finally "lose all their strength." Here it seems you pretend to state the character of the evidences of a divine revelation, which evidences you wish to review. Permit me to ask, dear brother, if it would not have appeared more consistent with piety and candor to have reviewed before you fixed the character of the evidences?—There is a proper order in which every thing should be conducted. All our researches should be kept from the embarrassments of prejudice. Though I feel much reluctance in entering on so great a subject as the vindication of the truth of divine revelation, fearing, I should fail in doing that honour to the subject which I am confident it deserves, I am inclined to suggest a few things which I think are worthy of some notice. As you speak of a vision of the night, the evidences of which were clear to the person and satisfactory at the time, those evidences would naturally lose their force when communicated to others and finally lose their strength. Let us suppose a case. A man shall have a vision of the night, in which it shall be revealed to him that some time before the present generation shall leave the stage of life, the kingdom of Great Britain will be overcome by the power of France; that very many of the flourishing cities of England will be destroyed in a very awful manner; that London will be laid level with the ground; that the distress of the inhabitants during the siege will be extreme; that for some time before this great event, there will be wars and rumors of wars among the nations, and certain signs very wonderful will be seen in the heavens. This man tells his vision very circumstantially and several persons write it down. Now suppose as the time passes away, these events, one after another, should take place, all in the same order in which the vision represented them; do you feel willing to say that the evidences of the truth of this vision, are all the time losing their force? No surely they are not; they are all the time gaining strength and waxing brighter. Whether I am able to satisfy you that the above case is a fair representation of the evidences of divine revelation, or not, it discovers in some degree the ground on which, in my mind, revelation is established.
Compare, if you please, the prophesy of Jesus recorded in the 24th of Matthew, with the history of the events of which the divine messenger spake.
Yours, &c.
P. S. You have noticed, no doubt, in a parenthesis, that I do not allow your argument on the dissimilarity of divine revelation and principles of nature to have any force to do away the argument of our brother, to which you replied. It was evidently not his design to argue a similarity between the nature of these widely different subjects, but to show that no greater partiality appears in the divine wisdom, in not discovering the truths of revelation in all ages, to all nations and in all languages, than in its not leading the human mind to the discovery of electricity or any other of the laws of nature in the same manner. Will you endeavour to maintain that the divine economy has nothing to do in directing means and circumstances to the developement of the laws of nature and to the discovery of useful inventions? And if you allow it has, why do you not assign a reason why these discoveries should not have been made in all ages, to all nations, and written or ratherprinted, in all languages that cannot as well be applied in the other case? In this way you would do away his reasoning and my own likewise, for as you notice, we were both of one mind on this subject.
Before I close this postscript, I wish to remark on the subject which you have in view, in reviewing the evidences of divine revelation, which you say is to "see if they are such that it isimpossibleit should be false." Now it appears to your humble servant, that faith does not require evidence of the description you lay down. I grant it wants to be satisfied and it has a right to expect it; it feels under no obligation to evidence which comes short of conviction; but it does not require allpossibilityto be taken into its account. This would seem to go beyond the limits of faith and enter into the regions of certainty. If the evidences in support of faith be sufficient to give rest, peace, and consolation to the mind, and if the faith be strong enough to effect the conduct of the believer in a proper manner, the object of faith is obtained.
The hopes of the husbandman may serve to illustrate this particular. He does not know for certainty that his fields will produce him any thing; he does not know that the coming season will be favourable to his crops, yet he plants and sows in comfortable expectation. He rises early and labours cheerfully, his expectations are full of comfort, he sleeps quietly and enjoys content. But if you ask him whether he views itimpossiblethat he should fail of a harvest? he will with but very little concern answer in the negative.
"The just shall live by faith, we walk by faith and not by sight." All, therefore, that we can reasonably expect in the case before us, is to find a decidedbalanceof evidence in favour of the religion of the gospel. And toreviewthe evidences of this religion, it seems necessary first to allow that there are evidences in existence which go to prove it, if their validity be allowed. For instance, the four evangelists, the acts of the apostles, together with the epistles of the apostles are considered evidences of the truth of this religion. And can you reasonably require more until you are able to show that all these come short of establishing the credibility of the facts which they relate with apparent honesty and simplicity not to be met with in any other ancient writings?
There are a great many other evidences which serve to corroborate those mentioned, but if you can dothemaway, no doubt the others may be as easily removed.
You will duly consider that in disproving the religion of Jesus Christ, you disprove all religion, for I am satisfied that you will not pretend that you are making a choice between the gospel and some other doctrine. No, the choice is between the gospel and no religion at all.
Come then, strip away all the clouds of superstition, and demonstrate at once that there has been no sun in the firmament during the whole of a cloudy day! Soar like the strong pinioned eagle, make your tour beyond the mists of error and bring us the joyless tidings that there is no clear sky in the heavens. Can you imagine any thing to be more pleasing than the coming of one that broughtgoodtidings? But let us have the worst of it. Show from undoubted authority that there never was such a man as Jesus, or show that he was a wicked impostor and deservedly lost his life. Show moreover, that there never were such men as the apostles of Jesus, or that they were likewise impostors, and all suffered death for their wicked impiety! Give the particulars of Saul's madly forsaking the honourable connexion in which he stood, for the sake of practising a fraud which produced him an immense income of suffering!
But you say the apostles were not bad men. Very well, then let us see how good men could tell so many things which they knew were not true, and suffer and die in attestation of what they knew to be false. You will see the danger of supposing that honest men can bear testimony to falsehood under the pretence of doing good, as this would destroy all testimony at once; even your own cannot be relied on after you maintain this abominable principle, which has been practised a wicked priesthood for ages. H.B.
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EXTRACTS No. IV.
[The objector in his fourth number begins by explaining himself in some particulars wherein he had not been fully understood, and also by making some concessions respecting the importance of retaining the original languages in which the scriptures were written; and, bringing these remarks to a close, he proceeds as follows:]
"In regard to a revelation from God, the three propositions which you have stated answer my mind well enough, as far as they go, to which, however, I would wish to add a fourth; and ask, admitting the three first propositions true. 'Fourth. Is it reasonable to suppose that the apostles had any other means of forming their opinions relative to a future state than what passed before their eyes?—viz. the miracles of Christ, the circumstances attending his death, his resurrection, and the miracles wrought by themselves in his name?'
"1st. Is it reasonable to suppose that God has ever made a special revelation to man?
"You say I have acknowledged that a divine revelation 'if real, is of all truths the most important;' hence you call upon the 'eye of reason' to examine this proposition to see why it should be considered more important than the discoveries made in the arts and sciences, &c. I think these questions may be easily and correctly answered. One relates to the blessings ofeternity; and the others to those only oftime; hence if the truths manifested by a revelation had been of no more importance to man than the truths in natural philosophy, reason would say, God would have left them also to be discovered, if discovered at all, like all other truths, without a special revelation. But, you must excuse me for not being able to see the force and conclusiveness of your reasoning, when you say that my 'allowing it any importance at all, is, in the eye of reason, an argument in its support.' Supposing I am informed of a large estate bequeathed to me by some benefactor. I acknowledge that it is very important to me, if true, as I am in great need; yet I do not believe it true. Now, is my acknowledging its importance, if true, an argument in support of its truth? If it is so, the reason of it is out of my sight.
"I should think that the reason of man (the only reason with which we are acquainted) would hardly undertake to say whether a revelation is either necessary or not necessary. The only evidence that reason can have of its necessity is its truth; and a supposition that it is not true equally supposes it not to be necessary. For to suppose otherwise supposes that God has omitted something which was necessary to be done! Try the matter as it respects a new revelation. Who will undertake to say that a new revelation either is or is not necessary? No one who believes in a revelation will deny the possibility of such an event. Suppose then for the moment it is true; and something is brought to light infinitely more glorious than any thing of which the human mind has yet conceived; will any one say it is unimportant? Or is the 'allowing it any importance—an argument in its support?'
"I am very ready to allow that a 'divinely munificent Creator would not omit any thing which is of importance to his intelligent creatures:' and on this ground I admitted theimportanceof revelation 'if real;' but I am yet unable to see how this is any argument in its support. It seems to me that this argument might be turned right the other way with equal force. If revelation be not true, it is not necessary it should be; and man can be made just as happy in this world by knowing all that he can know without it, as those are who believe in it; and admitting it not true there is no more importance in all the stories about it, than there is in theAlcoran! Now, supposing you should 'allow' all this, would it be any argument against the truth of revelation? I think not.
"In answer therefore to the first particular, I must be allowed to say that the only reason in favour of a divine revelation must grow out of the evidence in support of the facts on which it is predicated; for, aside from those evidences, I do not see why mankind should be taught to believe in a future life and immortality by special revelation, any more than they should be taught the arts and sciences by special revelation; yet reason does not reject the evidences of such an event when they are made clear to the understanding.—Therefore, it appears to me that your first proposition is involved in the second, viz.
"2d. Is the resurrection of Jesus capable of being proved?
"I should have said something more on the subject which was answered in your first number, and which I neglected to acknowledge in my second, if it had occurred to me as being necessary. I will briefly state here that your reasoning on that subject is satisfactory; and if a revelation can be fully proved I feel not disposed to complain on account of its seeming partiality. Infinite wisdom dispenses his blessings so as best to answer his benevolent designs; and were we to object to themanner, merely because we do not comprehend theequality, we should be satisfied, strictly speaking, with nothing.
"But you have excused yourself from undertaking to prove your second proposition in a way that I did not expect, viz. by finding, as you supposed, in my words, an acknowledgement of its truth. Here again I must confess my misfortune in giving too much grounds for the wrong construction. Every one knows however the ambiguity of words, and how the meaning of a sentence may be altered by placing the emphasis on a different word from what the author intended. I acknowledge that my words will admit the construction you have given them; yet you could but see that it was giving up at once what I had in a number of places, both before and after, considered a main question. And then, you ask me why I wish you to prove what I acknowledge to be true. If you will be good enough to review the passage, and notice that the wordsubstantiallywas emphatic, and contrasted withcircumstantial, a little below, you will perceive that my meaning was simply this. No one will pretend that the evangelists were correct in every minute particular, but only correct insubstance; and by the ALL, by whom this will be admitted, I mean those who believe in divine revelation; that even they would acknowledge, that in point of correctness, the writers were 'no more' thansubstantiallyso. However:
"You think if I am 'disposed to doubt,' &c. it is my province to bring forward my 'strong reasoning,' &c. I know of no disposition that I feel respecting the subject but to ascertain, if possible, the truth. If I have doubts, it is not because I choose to doubt, but because I cannot help them; and if I have faith it is such as is given me. Of one thing I have no doubt; that is, that the truth, whatever it is, is right. But:
"Admitting the scriptures are not true, I shall not attempt to guess what is true respecting the subjects to which they relate. For I might guess a hundred different ways to account for what we know is true, and all of them be wrong.
"My doubts on this subject are nothing more thandoubts; they do not amount to a confirmedunbelief; because they admit the possibility of the account's being true.
"Yours, &c.
* * * * *
Much esteemed friend,—Your fourth number is hereby acknowledged; and though occasions for finding fault are in some measure extenuated, it still appears that you have lost the real connexion of your arguments, and have made the subject of the languages one of your main subjects, when judging from your first number, it was no more than a vestibule to the grand edifice which it was in your mind to examine.
However, you having paid more than half, we will not stand about the fraction, as long as we have a profitable object in view. You call up what you call the subject. I suppose the main subject. This you state as follows: "In regard to a revelation from God, the three propositions which you have stated answer my mind well enough, as far as they go; to which however, I would wish to add a fourth, and ask; admitting the three first particulars true.—4th. Is it reasonable to suppose, that the apostles had any other means of forming their opinions, relative to a future state, than what passed before their eyes? viz. the miracles of Christ, the circumstance attending his death, his resurrection, and the miracles wrought by themselves in his name?" I wish, in this place, to show you that your added proposition possesses no power relative to our argument which is not comprehended in the last of the three which I stated. For if it be allowed, as you propose, that my propositions are true, then you consent to the validity of the apostles' testimony respecting a future state, which granted, it makes no difference in what way the apostles come to the knowledge of futurity. When a thing is known, it is known. The means by which it is known add nothing to either side of the argument. If you allow that my argument on this subject is correct, as it seems you do, then you acknowledge that God would not endow men with the power to heal the sick and raise the dead, whose testimony concerning a future state could be justly doubted. I will not be too positive that I rightly apprehend your meaning on this subject, but as you propose to allow my three propositions, and as you make no attempt to do away my reasoning, especially on my last, I think I should not understand you according to your own proposal in any other way.
The methaphor which you use to help you away from my argument respecting theimportanceof a revelation from God, does not appear fully adequate to the purpose for which you use it. It might not be a reasonable, a necessary disposition of property for the proposed benefactor, to give you a large estate; it might be, in the eye of reason a very improper donation, and one which would deprive legitimate heirs of what they had a right to expect from a father towards whom they had always acted with filial obedience.—But if you will make the case a parallel, and suppose you are an heir, a lawful child, and your father has a large estate to dispose of, then you will see that it is right and just, and no more than what you have reason to expect; that it is necessary, and that this necessity is the importance of the subject, you will at once see that this importance is a reason, yea an evidence that you have a right to expect it. I called on you to prove that no revelation was needed; I acknowledged that if none was necessary, a being of infinite wisdom would make none. You venture to say, that the "only evidence that reason can have of the necessity of divine revelation is its truth." It is believed, sir, that this hypothesis involves too much. It is saying that reason can discern the necessity of nothing until it obtains it, whereas the truth is evidently the other side of the assertion. We are frequently experiencing the necessity of things which we have not already attained, and by this want we are incited to use the means by which we finally obtain them.—"Ask, and ye shall receive, seek, and ye shall find, knock, and it shall be opened unto you," &c. It is believed, and no doubt it may be argued with success, that the moral and religious state of man really required a divine revelation. Never did the parched ground, the withering plant, the thirsty herds need the showers from heaven, more than man, that WORD of life which descended as the rain and distilled as the dew, when the gospel was published by a cloud of faithful witnesses, called of God for that purpose.
After acknowledging that your words admit of the construction which I gave them respecting the apostles stating no more than what was substantially true, you inform me that you meant something very different; then, sir, it seems you must mean that they stated that which is not true. And if so, why do you not prove wherein they testified falsely, which would at once cast their bands from us? By this mean you would show that their testimony is deserving of no credit.
On the subjects of your doubts, you recollected my request, that you bring forward your reasons, &c. But in room of doing this you inform me that your doubts areinvoluntary. But I wish to know if this renders it improper for you to state your reasons for doubting? You further inform me that your doubts do not amount to a confirmed unbelief. Again, I would ask if it be necessary for you to wait until you are a confirmed unbeliever before you state your reasons for doubting the truth of the testimony which Christians call divine?
By these questions you will perceive that I am waiting for you, and if I am not able to meet your arguments, I am ready on making the discovery, to acknowledge your reasoning too strong for my weak powers to manage.
Yours, &c.
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EXTRACTS No. V.
[After acknowledging the receipt ofLettersNos. 3 and 4, and remarking on several parts of the reply toExtractsNo. 2, making some concessions, &c. as he found it necessary, theobjectorproceeds as follows.]
"But, your final conclusion, after all, comes so near what I conceive to be the truth, that, were you as correct in every thing as you appear to be in this, I should hardly think it expedient to pursue this controversy any further. "The Christian is enabled," you say, "to hope for existence with God in an eternal state, and this is as much as our present welfare requires." Most excellent! To this proposition I cherfully assent. Yea, I would consent even to pruning it a little, which no doubt would spoil it in your view. Instead of 'this is as much as,' read, 'even this is more than,' and your proposition would stand exactly right. Again, you say,
"'I have many reasons for not believing in the general sentiment that supposes the revelation contained in the scriptures was designed to prepare men in this world for happiness in another, and that a want of a correct knowledge of this revelation here, would subject the ignorant to inconvenience in a future state. Such a sentiment is an impeachment of the wisdom and goodness of God.'
"Here again, should I admit a divine revelation, I most heartily agree with you; and also with the reasoning which follows under this proposition. For it is more consistent with reason and good sense to believe (like the fool) in the existence of no God, than to believe in a God who is either partial or cruel! If such were the general sentiment of mankind, the evils resulting from it, in my humble opinion, would not be worse than the evils which have resulted from the belief in a God of the character just mentioned. One who, according to the sentiment, has let millions, even millions of millions, of his rational creatures die ignorant of a divine revelation, when he knew without the knowledge of, and belief in, such a revelation, they must sink down into eternal ruin and misery! And, so far as a revelation respects the damned, as though it was designed to aggravate and increase their misery by increasing their sensibility, he makes known his will, by special revelation, to a few, accompanied with the gift of his holy spirit, through the divine efficacy of which, a selected and chosen number will be admitted to bliss and glory, to the utter and eternal exclusion of the millions above mentioned!!!
"If such a sentiment does not impeach the divine character, not only of partiality, but ofcruelty, I know of nothing that could. But, Sir,
"Are you not aware that your sentiment, as above stated, which has met my approbation, on the supposition that divine revelation can be maintained, is as much opposed to the general sentiment of Christianity, as it respects this particular, as any thing which I have written or probably shall write on this subject? I presume you are aware of all this, and I hope you are prepared for its consequences. You have more to apprehend, however, from this general sentiment, than I have. You have levelled an arrow at the very seat of life of what is consideredorthodoxyin divinity, it is impossible but that the wound should be severly felt. For you are not insensible sir, that it is not only the general, but almost the universal sentiment of orthodoxy, fromhis holiness the Popedown to the smallest child who has been taught to lisp the christian name, that the revelation of the gospel of Jesus Christ was designed to prepare mankind in this world for heaven and happiness in another. Hence it has been believed that those who have died ignorant of the gospel, and being at the same time born of ignorant or unbelieving parents, must be lost forever. But those who hear and reject the gospel must be still more wretched in another world. With this sentiment, however, it seems you have no more fellowship than I. Therefore, my brother, it may be well for both, but more especially for you, that the days of rigorous persecution are over. For notwithstanding orthodoxy will consider us both equally opposed to christianity at heart, yet, of the two, you will be considered the most dangerous character. I shall be considered theopen, but you thesecret enemy; who, under the garb of professed friendship, are doing your utmost to sap the very foundation of the christian's hope! And you will not be considered any the less dangerous for your writings, being approved in any sense, by one who has the audacity, as they will term it, to doubt of the truth, of divine revelation! Instead of discovered impious blasphemy in the honest inquiry of your friend as it will be supposed you ought to have done, and instead of threatening him with endless burnings therefor;—or for not being disposed to receive, even truth, without cautious and thorough examination, you have painted christianity in such beautiful colours that infidelity itself finds but little cause to oppose it. Should these letters therefore ever come before the public you must be prepared for the gathering storm. For should you be able to reconcile revelation with the above proposition, if reason be not fully convinced of its truth, it will find nothing to object to the principles it inculcates. However, as this is not the avowed sentiment of christians, generally speaking, you must permit me to proceed.
"As it respects biblical criticism, notwithstanding all I have written on the subject, if the object is what you have proposed, 'to get the understanding of the sacred text,' I have no objection to it, but, for those who have time and inclination, think it laudible. Your caution, likewise, that in our zeal to cleanse we 'take care and not destroy,' is no doubt reasonable, and I trust duly appreciated. Your method also for curing or removing unbelief is happily chosen, and is what I am now attempting, which, with your assistance, I hope to make a proper, if not a successful application.
"Although the 'validity of the evidences' of revelation was not intended to have been granted, as I have informed you in my fourth number, yet I shall not press you to argue the points till I have given you the reasons for my doubts; for these being removed, nothing more will be necessary.
"Yours &c.
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EXTRACTS No. VI.
[Here twelve pages or more of the objector's manuscript are omitted, as the nature of his arguments will pretty fully appear in the reply; and as he has been obliged to rescind the ground he had taken, it is not expedient to publish his remarks. That the reader may see a little of the manner, however, in which he has given up his part of the argument, the following is inserted.]
"Speaking however on the evidences of revelation, you have stated some things worthy of serious consideration; which if correct, and I cannot say but they are, give me considerable satisfaction; and are very grateful to my feelings. 'It' (faith) say you 'does not require allpossibilityto be taken into the account: this would seem to go beyond the limits of faith and enter into the regions of certainty.'
"According to this doctrine, I may yet, perhaps, be considered a believer in divine revelation, and of course in Christianity. If 'all possibility' is not required, then certainly somedoubts, somepossibilityof failure, may be admited without destroying the consistency of the Christian faith.
"Here as it respects the argument, you have seemingly forclosed every thing which I shall say by way of objection; at least, you have anticipated all my arguments on this subject. For evidences and circumstances calculated to raisedoubtsin the mind; and shewing thepossibilityof uncertainty, are all the arguments which I have expected to produce in this case. But it may not be improper to inquire how much uncertainty, orpossibilityof uncertainty, may I admit in my calculation without destroying the Christian faith? That there are evidences in favor of divine revelation, and, which would support it, if there were nothing to counterbalance their testimony, is a proposition which I admit, and which I think cannot be disputed. Hence I conceive it must be admitted that there is apossibility, at least, of its being true.—But after all, if the weight of evidence in the mind of any one should preponderate against it, I doubt whether such an one could consistently be called a believer in divine revelation.
"You have suggested that in disproving the religion of Jesus Christ, I should disprove all religion; as there can be no choice between this and any other; for if this can be proved false all may be proved false &c. or words to that effect. In this I hardly know how to understand you. So far as the religion of Christ consists in 'feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, and keeping himself unspotted from the world,' I admit, that 'in disproving the religion of Christ,' I should 'disprove all religion:' that is to say, in other words, so far as the religion of Christ is not founded on revelation, but on the relation and dependence existing between man and man, to disprove it would disprove all religion: but if the religion of Jesus Christ consists purely and exclusively in believing in a future state of existence, then disproving it would not disprove all religion. A man may be what the poet calls 'the noblest work of God' i.e. 'an honest man,' and attend to all the duties embraced in that religion which St. James calls 'pure and undefiled before God and the father,' and yet have noopinion, that is, no settled opinion, in regard to a future state. If a man has religion enough to be a good husband, a good neighbor, a good citizen, and can rationably enjoy all the blessings which appertain to this life, of what consequence is it to him, or to any one else, what he believes in regard to a future state? This is a question worthy of serious consideration.
"The denial of revelation, much less to doubt its truth, does not render it necessary that I should do what you have proposed; neither is it my disposition to destroy if I could the peace even of an individual. Hence, I have no wish to 'demonstrate that there is no sun in a cloudy day;' but only to prove that clouds and darkness are as necessary to the well being of man as clear sunshine. Neither would I be the bearer of the 'joyless tidings that there is no clear sky in the heavens;' but only to query whether our portion of 'clear sky' is not that which reflects upon the earth; and that only during the short period of our lives? Who has a right to complain, if our blessings are circumscribed to our sphere of action? Must we enjoy nothing, because more is not allotted to our share? It is very probable there may be millions of other suns, enlightening other worlds, and systems of worlds, giving life, light and warmth to rational beings like ourselves, exceeding all imagination in number; and yet, have little of the blessings of those heavenly luminaries that falls to our enjoyment! They merly form a beautiful canopy over our heads. It is true, their greatest use to us may be that of which we are mostly ignorant; in balancing systems &c. but yet we must have some knowledge of those benefits, before me can feel grateful for them. Dost thou wish to visit them? Dost thou desire to know more concerning them than thou canst know in this state? Calm and deliberate reason would say unto the, 'Be content, O vain man! with thine own lot, and not try to soar above thy proper station!'
"The above is not designed as a reflection; it is only what I take to myself.
"You have proposed what I conceive you think is the only alternative to which I must flee, when I give up the truth of divine revelation. But may I not stop to inquire whether there is not some medium between the two extremes which you have mentioned? Must I believe that there was no such man as Jesus, or if there were, that he was an impostor; or else believe all that is stated concerning him? Must I also believe the same of the apostles or else believe them impeccable? May not even good men be honestly deceived? and being deceived, honestly lead others into an error?—That honest men do not bear 'testimony to falshood,' I admit; neither could such a principle be justified even under a 'pretence of doing good;' yet I will not undertake to say that no suchpious fraudshave ever been practiced in the world, and even among professed christians; and how soon it was practiced after the days of the apostles, and whether or not by some even in their day, would be very difficult now to determine. Neither is it necessary I should say any thing more upon the subject, as you admit this principle 'has been practised upon by a wicked priesthood for ages!'
"In remarking on my fourth proposition, which I added to thethreewhich you had proposed, you say, 'I will not be too positive that I rightly apprehend your meaning on this subject, but as you propose to allow my three propositions, and as you make no attempt to do away my reasoning, especially on my last,' &c. Here permit me to observe, I am well persuaded you did not fully understand me, whatever you did yourself, on this subject. You will perceive, sir, both by my fourth number, and also by my fifth, that my answer to yourthree propositionswas not completed. Probably if you had waited for the whole of my answer you would have understood me much better, and also would have seen the use and propriety of my fourth proposition.
"I think, as you will perceive by my fifth number that even honest men may be mistaken. And if so, it is very important to know whether the apostles judged only from outward circumstances, or whether they had some internal evidence, calledinspiration, by which they always knew the truth of the things whereof they affirmed. This was the object of my fourth proposition.
"That you did not fully understand me appears by your saying, 'If it be allowed that my propositions are true, then youconsentto the validity of the apostles' testimony respecting a future state.' If this could be allowed, it might then be admitted, that in this argument it makes no difference how the apostles come by their 'knowledge of futurity.'—But I did not know, neither do I now perceive, that my admitting the apostles to be honest men makes it necessary also to admit the validity of their 'testimony respecting a future state;' unless it can be shown that honest men are never mistaken respecting the things whereof they affirm. I admit the 'honesty' of my good friend, in the above quoted proposition; but I can hardly be willing, purely on this account, to 'consent' to its truth.
"As it respects an inheritance given in a WILL, &c. I have some doubts whether reason always carries things as far as you would wish to carry this metaphor to make it a parallel. Reason sometimes moves in a small circle; and that too without being unreasonable. If the benefit is said to have been absolutely made, and reason is informed of the fact, it has a right to take it for granted, that the donor had the property to give, and that it is not given to the injury of any one else. But yet he consults his own interest, and that only, when he says, 'this is very important to me, if true, yet I doubt, yea I have reasons for not believing it true.' Would any one say that such a man talketh unreasonably?
"You have called on me to prove 'that no revelation was needed;' and have acknowledged, 'that if none was necessary, a being of infinite wisdom would make none.' And at the same time you have argued very pathetically indeed to prove the necessity of a revelation; that is, if that can be called argument which grows out of a man's own feelings: A man, however, of different feelings might bring forward arguments equally energetic, and perhaps equally conclusive, but diametrically opposite.
"I know not what evidence you wish, or what evidence would be accepted, to prove that a revelation is not necessary. Even if such were the fact, it appears to me to be hardly susceptible of proof. It may be no more difficult, however, than it is to prove that a revelation is true. I presume that nothing short of arevelationwould convince you that arevelationis not necessary! For who but God can know what either is, or is not necessary for God to make known?
"But if arguments drawn from our feelings are admissible, hear, for once, the voice of simple nature, proclaiming in her simplicity by every thing which exists either in or around you, that a revelation is neither necessary nor useful. That every thing which can be enjoyed in life can be enjoyed equally as well, and often better, without either its knowledge or belief. That every duty, either to God or man, can be performed as well, and with the same beneficial effect. And finally that man may be brought, without either the aid, knowledge, or belief of revelation, not only to be reconciled to his conditions and station in life, but also to curtail all hisanxiousdesires to which he not onlybelievesbutknowsthere is a natural possibility of obtaining.
"If one could be brought who would solemnly testify to the truth of the above paragraph, would you believe his testimony? I presume not. But why not? Will you say it is impossible it should be true? No one can know this for a certainty, except those whose misfortune it is, if it be a misfortune not to believe in a future state of existence. If such there are, however, and yet their lives are exactly correct, their examples in society equally good, and their enjoyments apparently equally as great as other men, why should you doubt their testimony? Would you say they werebad men?—could you say they weredishonest men?—and ifhonest, according to your argument, why not believe them? I can see no inducement that any one could have to deny a revelation, if he believes it true; but I can see a very great inducement for mankind to maintain the reality of a revelation, although at the same time they may doubt its truth.
"If you doubt whether the human mind can be brought to such a state as has been mentioned above, it is only for the want of proper evidence; the fact, however, is susceptible of proof. Yea, it can be more than proved;the happy unbelieverin idle tales, but believing in eternal principles, knows it for a certainty. I do not mean that he knows for a certainty, that there is no revelation, but he knows for a certainty that a belief in revelation is not absolutely necessary to a happy life. Now, if such characters exists, will you receive their own testimony in support of the above fact? If not, it will be of no use to produce them.
"In order to make a proper estimation of virtue, we should take into consideration the motives and inducements a person has to be virtuous. The virtue of some men seems to be predicated on the following principles; on the consideration that they are going to heaven and happiness in another world, while others, whom they conceive not so good as themselves are going to hell, a place of never ending torments. On this ground they can be verypiousalso, and do a great deal for religion. At the same time they will tell you, as many have, if they believed all were to be alike happy in another world, they would then stick at no crimes to obtain their object, but would indulge themselves in all manner of gratifications, &c. Such virtue, however, I conclude does not stand very high in your estimation. No; but you would be virtuous on a more noble scale; so long as you can believe that you shall have an eternal existence with God, in a happy conscious identity, you are willing every body else should enjoy the same blessing; on supposition that this is true, or as you can believe it, you are for doing all the good in your power, and at the same time taking all the comfort you can in doing it. You are trying to make every one believe what you believe, that they may enjoy what you enjoy. But the moment this faith, and this hope of yours is gone, your virtue is gone with it; you can now do nothing, and of course enjoy nothing!
"Now compare this virtue with the virtue of one whom the christian world would call an infidel! One whose faith, and of course, hope, does not extend beyond what he knows has been the lot of some, and, as far as circumstances will admit, may be his own; and yet he is always faithful in the discharge of whatever appears to be his duty, always enjoys life, whether in prosperity or adversity, and is always, so far as it respects circumstances over which he has no control, reconciled and contented with his lot. He knows his life is uncertain, and although he has no real faith or well grounded hope beyond the present state of existence, yet the thought gives him neither anxiety nor concern. His only object is to do good; to enjoy life while it lasts, to cultivate and improve human nature for the benefit of posterity; to bear the evils and misfortunes of life with fortitude, and to be unfeignedly thankful for all the happiness of which he is made susceptible. Therefore whether his life be for a day, or for eternity, it matters not, because, for the present, it is all the same to him: his duties are the same, and his enjoyments are the same. O how happy! How inexpressibly happy, is such a state as this!
"While others are feasting their fruitful imaginations with the idle and visionary dreams of fanaticism; with a kind of chimerical heaven of which they knownothing, as to its certainty: this man is in heaven already: dwelling in love, he 'dwelleth in God, and God in him.'
"Do you not wish, my brother, that you could find such a character among Christians? But Christianity does not afford such a character, infull, nor is it possible that it ever should. Such a character, however, there may be, and when the world, or any considerable part of them can receive his testimony, he may make his appearance.
"You seem to think it may be successfully argued 'that the moral and religious state of man really required a divine revelation.' This argument, if I understand you, grows out of the ardent desires of man; which, it is admitted, would be pretty conclusive if it could be made to appear that the desires of man are never fruitless. Man, it is true, rationally desires happiness; for this is essential to his moral existence; yet, may he not, through ignorance, or from some other cause, suppose things essential to his happiness, which, in fact, are not essential, and therefore ardently desire them? But does it necessarily follow that the particular things desired in such cases are absolutely necessary? and therefore will absolutely be granted? I believe not.—And if he may be thus deceived in any one thing, why may he not be deceived in the supposed necessity of a divine revelation? It is believed that a perfect reconciliation to the present state of man; to what he is, with the prospect only of what he yet may be in this life, without either the hope or the fear of a future existence, would be infinitely better than any thing which has yet been produced by a belief in divine revelation; especially any further than a revelation is conducive to this end; and if a revelation ever was necessary, it was necessary only to reconcile man to his present state of existence. But if man can be equally reconciled without theknowledge, or, what amounts to the same thing, without thebeliefof divine revelation, then the end of such a revelation is obtained.
"It seems to be expedient that I should say a few more words, 'respecting the apostles' stating no more than what was substantially true.'
"I hope, however, we shall not lose sight of the main subject in debate, by criticising on words. I saymain subjecthere, as I think there will be no occasion of saying any thing more on the subject of thelanguagesin relation to the arts and sciences.
"I am not disposed to think, sir, that you have designedly wrested the meaning of my words; nor that you are unwilling to receive my meaning when it is fully understood; and yet, having once explained on this subject, I am unable to account for your remarks.
"After my informing you that you had misconstrued me, and also stating my meaning, as I supposed, more explicitly, you have informed me that if your first construction was not my meaning, it seems that I must have meant the reverse of it, which, I must aver, is as foreign from my meaning as your first construction! For neither your former nor latter construction was in my mind when I wrote the sentence to which I allude: but a different idea from either of your constructions was in my mind, and was what I meant to state; which idea, as I conceive, is as fairly expressed by my words, and is a more just construction of them, taking into consideration the sentence which follows, than either of the ideas which you have expressed as their meaning.
"Permit me therefore to state again, that whatever might have been my opinion respecting the writings of the apostles, I did not mean to suggest, and much less to affirm in that sentence 'that they stated that which is not true!'—Neither did I mean to acknowledge in that sentence that they had stated 'no more' than what is true, at least insubstance; but I did mean this, and this only, that admitting those things were true, all would admit that the design of the apostles was nothingmorethan to state the truth of those things insubstance; because all would acknowledge that they were not careful to be correct as to everyminutiae. But as this makes nothing either for or against the main point, I wish to add no more respecting it, than simply to remark, that even if the apostles had gone on the opposite extreme of what I meant I should not think them 'deserving ofno credit.' Supposing they had descended intominutiae, and related, to an exact nicety, every particular circumstance (which is exactly the reverse of what I mean to state), would they on this account have been deserving ofno credit? I think not. Considering the time, however, which had elapsed after the facts are said to have taken place, before a history of them was given in writing, I think the evangelists are entitled tomore credit, on the whole, than what they would have been if their testimony had borne the complexion last mentioned.
"To close this letter, which perhaps is already too long, I would here acknowledge that as I have expressed doubts in the subject of divine revelation, you have a right to hear my reasons for doubting. These I promised to give you (as I thought) at the close of my fourth number. You have informed me, verbally, that I promised to give you mydoubtsonly. If I did so, it was only a slip of the pen, to which I am too prone; it was myreasons for doubting, which I meant to have promised you; and in my next I shall endeavor to fulfil that promise.
"Yours, &c.
* * * * *
Dear sir, and brother,—Your fifth and sixth numbers were received together, and will be noticed in the order in which they came to hand.
You observe that you know of no better evidence that "there ever was such a story reported among the Jews, in the days of the apostles, than there is to prove the actual resurrection of Jesus," &c. This suggestion leads to the following queries.
1st. Was there in the days of the apostles, such a man known in the country of the Jews, as Jesus Christ?
2d. Was this man put to death, as the four evangelists and others testify?
3d. Did the apostles declare to the people who put him to death, that they knew that he had arisen from the dead?
4th. If the Jews who put Jesus to death could go to his sepulchre and show his dead body to the people, would the story of the resurrection ever have gained any credit among the Jews?
5th. If they could not find the body of him who had been crucified, would the opposers not endeavour to report something that might appear as plausible as they could, especially as they had the keeping of the sepulchre in their own hands?
6th. What would more naturally suggest itself to the imagination of men, in the situation of the rulers of the Jews, than the story of the disciples having stolen the dead body, &c. Or,
7th. Was this account written long since the apostles' days, by an unknown author, who made the whole story as he wrote it? If this last question cannot be answered in the affirmative without doing violence to the most authentic testimony and also to the plainest dictates of reason, it seems to follow that the 6th preceding question, must be accepted in the affirmative, which furnishes sufficient evidence to prove that such a story was reported among the Jews in the days of the apostles.
Whether you are correct in supposing there is as much evidence to prove the resurrection as to prove the report of the disciples' having stolen the body, or not, it appears to me, that there is no proper ground on which the latter can even be doubted.
Suppose a writer in vindicating believer's baptism in opposition to the sprinkling of infants, should relate a wonderful story concerning the persecutions of the baptists, in which he should set forth the particulars of one of their leading characters having been put to death by their opposers. In this account, the author says; Those murderers, after they put the man to death, for fear his friends should steal the body, went and placed a strong guard round the tomb to watch for the space of three days and nights, but before the expiration of this period, the guard came to the rulers and make known that the body is gone, and acknowledge at the same time, that there were such wonders seen by them at the tomb, that they were unable to endure the sight and retain their natural powers; that the rulers gave them money to report that a number of the baptists came while the guard was asleep and stole the body—"So they took the money, and did as they were taught: and this saying is commonly reported among the Pædobaptists unto this day." Would this story appear any ways to the advantage of a cause, with which reason and common sense have any thing to do?
Reason, sir, for which you seem determined to contend, is candid; it readily acknowledges that the account of this report among the Jews is a true account. And it acknowledges also that the truth of this account is good evidence to prove that the rulers of the Jews found it necessary, in order to oppose the truth of the resurrection, to get such a report in circulation.
You have not taken me exactly on the ground of my argument, in supposing that, byrevelation, I mean nothing more than "what was revealed to me by the resurrection of Jesus, allowing the resurrection true." My design was to consider the three propositions, viz. revelation, the resurrection of Jesus, and the truth of the testimony of the apostles, concerning matters of fact, true, disjunctively; and also to avail myself of whatever might arise to the advantage of my argument from the relation of these facts. All this you will, as a generous and candid antagonist, be willing to allow me to do, on the supposition that the three propositions, above named, be granted. For surely no necessary deduction from granted premises can mislead, unless what is granted be false. You will furthermore see, that by granting the truth of divine revelation some degree of allowance is given to the probability, at least, of the testimony of the apostles respecting a future state. The confining of the subject of revelation, to that only which is revealed by the resurrection of Jesus, seems an unnecessary restriction, which can answer no purpose but to embarrass an argument which it would have no real force in refuting; for if the resurrection be admitted, which affords such an important revelation as grows out of the fact, it establishes the general truth of a DIVINE REVELATION from God to man. This being granted, all that stands in a necessary relation to it may with propriety be used in defence of any particular question relative to the general subject. I have already argued the truth of what the apostles say of a future state, from the facts which you grant for the sake of the argument, but you seem to misapprehend me in supposing that I mean to contend, that what the apostles have said respecting a future state, was spoken by way ofconclusionfrom certain known facts. The known facts, such as the miracles of Jesus, his resurrection, and the miracles wrought by the apostles, I used as proof of the divine mission of these servants of God. This divine mission being proved, gives the ground on which I contend for the merit of their testimony concerning a future state. You should have regarded my argument, as placing the credibility of the apostles' testimony concerning a future state, on the fact of their divine mission, and not as you seem to have done, on the supposition, that they could not err in drawing conclusions, &c.
You have misunderstood me also, in supposing that by "the guess work of men," I had any allusion to the known miracles related by the apostles. What I called "mere guess work of men," was theopinionsof the apostles on supposition they were not divinely directed, in the testimony they laid down respecting a future state. On this particular subject, all you have said in reply to my reasoning, has no just relation to my argument.
It was expected, that in relation to the foregoing subject, you would have seen the necessity of either denying the reality of those miracles, which, if true, prove the divine mission of Christ and his apostles, or of granting the authority of their testimony. But in room of finding what was so confidently expected, I find the mistakes above pointed out, which occupy considerable space, without deciding any thing, or furnishing ground on which I feel disposed to place any argument.
The next particular which demands notice is stated as follows: "Your final conclusion, after all, comes so near what I conceive to be the truth, that were you as correct in every thing as you appear to be in this, I should hardly think it expedient to pursue this controversy any further." You then quote me. "The Christian is enabled to hope for existence with God in an eternal state, and this is as much as our present welfare requires." You rejoin; "Most excellent! to this proposition I cheerfully assent. Yea, I would consent even to pruning it a little which no doubt would spoil it in your view. Instead of, 'this is as much as,' read, 'even this is more than,' and your proposition would stand exactly right." You assure me that you are in search of truth.—Truth is the only design of your heart. It would be uncharitable in me to doubt your sincerity. You sincerely and cheerfully assent to the above proposition viz. that the christian is enabled to hope for existence with God in an eternal state, and this is as much as our present welfare requires. This you say ismostexcellent. But notwithstanding you cheerfully assent to this proposition, and can pronounce itmostexcellent! Yet you think, if the proposition was so altered as to allow us no hope of a future existence with God, it would standexactlyright! This variation is so small, this difference is so little that you think if I were as correct in every thing as I am in this, there would be no need of pursuing this controversy any further! Let me ask dear sir, if such reasoning as this can promise a profitable reward for our labours, and a recompence for the precious time we are spending? The eye of reason, I say is candid: it sees and knows, that if a hope of existence with God hereafter ismore thanour present welfare requires, such an expectation is awfully dreadful beyond the power of language to describe. Reason knows that there is an infinite difference between no existence hereafter, and an eternal existence. And it knows, that if the former is exactly what our present welfare requires, the latter is completely repugnant to it.
With what you here contend for, I will connect a passage from your sixth number. "He knows that a belief in revelation is not absolutely necessary to a happy life." By bringing these passages together, I am led to understand what you mean by the latter viz. that a belief in a happy future state, is not necessary to our present felicity. This is what you know! What then are you in pursuant of? You pretend to be earnestly solicitous to have your doubts respecting divine revelation removed if possible; you call on me to assist in this work as if you viewed it with deep concern.—If your doubts should be removed, if you should be altogether convinced that God has actually revealed the truth of a a happy immortality, you know it would add nothing to your happiness. Furthermore you argue, following the passage quoted from your sixth number, that this belief in the revelation of a happy futurity is not necessary to produce a virtuous life. Allowing all you argue on this subject, you feel sure that a real conviction of the truth of the christian doctrine, and hope of future blessedness, would be of no advantage to your virtue or happiness! I ask again, what are you in pursuit of? You compliment me too highly in your encomium on the sermon in which I laid down that man is so constituted that he is always willing to exchange that which gives him trouble, for that which gives him comfort. And you advert to this particular sentiment of mine, in your observations on St. Paul's conversion, and very justly refuse to allow him to be an exception of the general rule. But are you not an exception of this rule? Do you not appear to be solicitous to have your doubts removed without expecting the least advantage by it? Are you not employing your time in writing voluminously on a subject which youknowcan yield you no recompence? In search after the evidences of the christian hope, you cannot say: where is that faithful, that friendly witness by which I can believe, and believing, enjoy as a precious reality that hope which is as an anchor to the soul, both sure and stedfast; which entereth into that within the veil, where our forerunner hath for us entered; which hope would enable me to sing that triumphant song; "O death where is thy sting, O grave where is thy victory? Thanks be to God who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." No, this hope would add nothing to your happiness, and what you want it for is not for me to imagine.
You can employ the powers of luminous reason in contemplating eternal nothing with sweet complacency. This is "exactly" as it should be! Varying from this the proposition would need to be "pruned!" Dear brother, does reason countenance all this absurdity? If it be a pleasure to contemplate non-existence does it not involve the absurdity of enjoying the expectation of the discontinuance of enjoyment?
You have expressed, with interjections, the value of truth. You seem almost disposed to arrogate to yourself a peculiar regard for this divine treasure. I can fancy I hear your secret addresses to this lovely divinity; in rapturous language, with aspect of eager affection saying; O truth, the loveliest of all attractions, thou art balsam for every wound, antidote for every poison; thou sweetenest every bitter cup; the gloomy prospect of living, in thy bright sunshine is by thee changed into the joyous expectation of soon losing sight of thee forever in the elysium of non-existence!
I will not burden you with further deductions, so repugnant to the dictates of reason; but I will cherish a hope, that you will see sufficient reason for rescinding the arguments which lead to them.[1]
[Footnote 1: Perhaps the reader may be a little astonished here, that the objector should ever have consented to publish arguments which makes him appear so much to a disadvantage. But an honest objector, who has been so blind to his own heart as not to perceive the real cause of a perfect reconciliation to the general providence of God, instead of feelingchagrined, will feelgrateful, when his errors arehonestly exposed. Believing, therefore, that others may be in the same predicament, these arguments are published to the world.]
On supposition divine revelation be true, you agree with me on the subject wherein I differ from the general opinion, that a knowledge of the gospel in this world is indispensable to the soul's felicity in the next, but you are confident that this my sentiment will be viewed by the Christian world in general, with greater abhorrence than even your own arguments, &c. And you hope I am prepared for the consequences. Reply—I have little or no concern about what opinion reputed orthodoxy may entertain of the truths which reason and revelation harmonize in supporting, nor am very careful about any preparation to meet the consequences which may result from the inseparable companions,superstitionandignorance.
In my view, the commonly received opinion, on the subject under consideration, is no more reasonable, than the supposition that the happiness and wellbeing of our children, in this world, depend on their having had a correct knowledge of their parents, of their wisdom and parental providence for them, before they were born. The wisdom and goodness of God, according to scripture and reason, are universal. The ignorance of mortals concerning them, on the one hand, makes them no less, and their knowledge, on the other makes them no greater. We must duly regard, however, the evident fact, that the enjoyment of reasonable beings, is extended by the extension of knowledge, which renders acquirements in science and divinity an object of the first magnitude.
The sentiment which you express on the above subject is what I am well persuaded can never be refuted, and it appears to me that by placing the system of divine revelation on the ground above noticed, it is rendered free from these absurdities which have rendered it exceptionable to the eye of reason and philosophy.
The gospel of everlasting life, like all real science, has always existed, but like the sciences, has been developed by degrees, and brought to the understanding of mankind as a mean of refinement, improvement, and of conformity to mortal principles, as expressed by that eminent divine St. Paul, 2 Cor. 5, 18, 19, 20. "And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation; to wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them: and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation. Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us; we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God." Now to suppose that men, who on account of their ignorance of the gospel are unreconciled to God, who has undertaken the gracious work of reconciling them to himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them, are on account of their unreconciliation excluded from being the objects of divine favour is a grand absurdity to say the least.
The fact is, the gospel is a dispensation of general favour, and it actually communicates many invaluable blessings to those who know nothing of its divine principles. There are millions of people in the world who are blessed in a great variety of respects by means of civil government, who know nothing of the principles of the governments by which they are protected. How many blessings are constantly falling, as it were like a shower, on our infants and youth in America, from the favourable government of our happy country, and yet these children know not the difference between an absolute monarchy and a republic.
How many millions of the human race are daily fed from the products of agriculture, who know nothing of the principles which produce those rich supplies. So there are multitudes who enjoy many blessings procured by the gospel of Christ, who have no knowledge of the sublime principles of this religion. But here again I will repeat the remark, that our rational felicity is greatly increased by an extension of our knowledge in the principles of the doctrine of Jesus, which consideration is a proper incentive to grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.
Knowledge is food for the mind and nourishes and strengthens it as aliment does the body. Our youth learn to read the books which they are favoured with in consequence of the discovery of the art of printing, and they obtain great advantages by means of those books, while they remain entirely ignorant, many of them, of the art by which such a favour is put into their hands. But still it is healthy to the youthful mind, to receive the knowledge of this and other arts, and even to know that an art so extensively useful was not known in the world four hundred years ago. A person on being informed of the first discovery of this art, and of its being practiced, in the first place, with separate wooden types, might be disposed to doubt the ignorance of men in those times. He might think it incredible that any thing so easy, that even children can perform was unknown to the learned world in those times when learning flourished in ancient Greece and Rome. And I am of opinion that many now, who are disposed to doubt the circumstances which attended the first promulgation of the gospel, and even call themselves unbelievers, do in reality, owe even their existence and of course every blessing they enjoy to those facts of which they now doubt. Yes, sir, the light of reason, and the knowledge of moral principles, on which you feel disposed to place so much consequence, I am inclined to believe are reflections of that light which was the delightful theme of the evangelical Isaiah, chapters 6, 7, 8. "I the Lord hath called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand, and will keep thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles; to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison house. I am the Lord; that is my name: and my glory will I not give to another, nor my praise to graven images." Am I deceived, sir, or is it evident, that the glorious LIGHT which illuminates our moral hemisphere, and distinguishes our country from barbarism and savage ignorance, is the gospel? The name of Jesus, his doctrine, the reformation, seceding from the Church of England and persecution for conscience sake, rank as causes of the settlement of New England by our forefathers, and of the existence of the men who are carrying on this correspondence. This is mentioned with a view to direct your mind to the consideration of that course of causes and effects by which we are enabled to reason on what wo call moral and physical principles. And a hope is entertained that due regard will be paid to this self-evident fact, that nothing ever took place without an adequate cause to produce it.
With this reflection, I come to notice your remarks on the subject of St. Paul's conversion; for it appears to me that you have allowed certain facts without assigning any adequate causes by which those facts came to exist. You make no attempt to deny that there was such a man as St. Paul, nor do you deny his having been educated, and religiously instructed as the scripture history concerning this man sets forth. But you assign no reason why he became a believer in Jesus Christ, you assign no reason for his becoming a preacher of the doctrine of Jesus, you assign no reason why he should so patiently suffer for the religion, the truth of which you are now calling in question. You allow that before his conversion he persecuted unto death the "weak and defenceless disciples of the meek and lowly Jesus." But you assign no reasons why weak and defenceless men should become the disciples of Jesus. You would fain insinuate that what he relates of the particular circumstance which happened to him on his way to Damascus was a mere reverie. But you make no attempt to show how such a reverie could produce in this learned pharisee a belief that Jesus, who was crucified had actually arose from the dead, when there were not even the shadow of evidence existing to prove such an improbable fact. You are inclined to this notion of a reverie on account of some experience of your own, which your good sense and after reflection have discovered to be nothing on which dependence ought to be placed. Sir, where is the similarity of your case with that of the learned pharisee? Do you really believe you ever experienced a reverie, that would go in the least to cause you to believe in the resurrection of a man who was hanged in your sight, and who you knew was buried, and of whose resurrection you had no evidence, only a vague reverie? Do you believe you ever experienced a mere imagination which was strong enough to produce the above belief, and which could continue to influence you all your life long, lead you to forsake a most honourable connexion, and to espouse a religion which all the prejudices of your education opposed, and to labour continually for its support and to suffer every thing for its defence? No, you pretend to no such thing, therefore your case is very different from St. Paul's.
I agree with you, that the case of this apostle comes under the rule which you recollect I suggested in my sermon. He undoubtedly viewed the religion which he received in room of the one he parted with the most valuable. And to this agrees his own testimony. Phil. iii. 7, &c. "But what things were gain to me, those I counted loss for Christ. Yea, doubtless, and I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord; for whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but dung that I may win Christ, and be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith."
As you promise to say more on this subject, I shallcontinueto expect an attempt to deny the conversion of such a man as St. Paul is set forth to have been, to the Christian religion, under all the circumstances which the scripture account mentions; or an attempt to show that such a conversion couldprobablytake place without supposing the facts on which the religion of Christ was founded were realities; or lastly, an acknowledgment that this conversion may reasonably be allowed as evidence to us of the truth of the Christian religion.
Should you be disposed to disallow the account which the scripture gives of St. Paul, I will ask the favour of you to point out and show to my understanding where in Paley's Horae Paulinae fails of proving the truth of the scripture history of St. Paul.
* * * * *
What follows is designed to notice your sixth number; out of which the following subjects are selected, on which some remarks are made.
1st. You observe that "when we hear things, which to our understanding are improbable, the improbability of the facts raises a doubt in our minds; and certainly there can be no harm in suspending our judgment, nor yet in withholding our belief until we are fully satisfied." This first subject regards the degrees of evidences which are required in different cases, and the moral propriety of withholding the assent of the mind in the case of a want of evidence.
2d. You are not disposed to doubt that many of the prophets were good men; nor will you contend that they were not all such, and taught the people according to the best of their abilities—And yet you hesitate to allow the divinity of their testimony.
3d. I notice that you acknowledge that there are evidences in favour of divine revelation, which would support it, if there were nothing to counterbalance their testimony.
4th. You hardly know how to understand me where I suggest, that in disproving the religion of Jesus Christ, you disprove all religion, &c.
5th. An inquiry whether Jesus and the apostles might not be honest men, and yet their testimony in certain cases not to be relied on!
6th. You suppose that arguments equally energetic and equally conclusive might be drawn from our feelings against, as in favour of the necessity of divine revelation.
7th. In enumerating the virtues and enjoyments of one who does not even desire a future state, you mention unfeigned thankfulness for all the happiness of which he is made susceptible.