1. As cavalry acts effectively on the field of battle only by its charge, good cavalry of the line can be formed in no other way than by beingexercised in this, its special and peculiar function.
On taking command of the Army of Italy in 1796, Bonaparte found the French cavalry to be entirely worthless. They had never been accustomed to charge, and he had the greatest difficulty in making them engage. Seeing the great importance of this arm, he determined to make good cavalry of them by compelling them to fight. So, in his attack on Borghetto, he sent his cavalry forward, with his grenadiers on their flanks, and his artillery close behind them. Thus enclosed, and led on by Murat to the charge, they attacked and routed that famous Austrian cavalry whose superiority they had so much dreaded. This was the first step in the formation of the splendid French cavalry to which Napoleon afterwards owed so many of his victories. And, at the battle of Hochstedt, on the Danube, in 1801, its superiority over the Austrian cavalry was, at last, completely established.
2. Cavalrycharges—
(1.) In line; but this only on even ground, and at short distances;
(2.) In column; and
(3.) As foragers, or in dispersed order. But this kind of charge is exceptional. It can rarely be used with safety against any but an uncivilized or an undisciplined foe.
3. A charge inone long continuous lineshould never be attempted. Such a charge will be usually indecisive, as it cannot be made with the necessaryensembleor unity. The success of a charge in line depends on the preservation of a well-regulated speed and of a perfect alignment; by means of which the whole line reaches the enemy at once. At the charging gait, this is rarely attainable; so that the charge in line, except at short distances, and over very even ground, usually degenerates into a charge by groups, or individual troopers, arriving successively. The most dashing riders, or those mounted on the swiftest horses, will naturally arrive first, and be overpowered by numbers.
4. A chargein deep columnis also objectionable; its long flank exposing it too much to artillery fire and to the enemy's cavalry.
But when cavalry is surprised, it must charge at once, in whatever order it happens to be, rather than hesitate or attempt to manœuvre, for this would expose it to destruction.
5. A prompt and unhesitating obedience to the command to charge, without regard to the circumstances under which it is given, may sometimes lead to resultsunexpected even to the charging troops themselves.
One instance of this was related to me by an old officer of Napoleon's favorite Fifth Cuirassiers. The regiment was on the left of the line of battle. Directly in front of it was an extensive marsh; beyond which rose an eminence, abrupt in front, but sloping gently towards the rear, the crest of which was crowned by formidable Austrian batteries. For two hours the cuirassiers had been standing in line, listening to the roar of battle on the right, and eagerly expecting a summons to gosomewhereto engage the enemy. The very horses were neighing and pawing the ground, in their impatience to be off. Just then galloped up one of the Emperor's aids, saying, "Colonel, the Emperor desires you to charge directly on the enemy's batteries opposite your position." The brave colonel, who was one of Napoleon's personal favorites, though chafing at the prolonged inaction of his command, pointed to the marsh, and requested the officer to inform the Emperor of the obstacle in his front, with the existence of which his majesty, he said, was probably unacquainted. In a few minutes the officer came riding furiously back with a message to the colonel, that "if he did not immediately charge, the Emperor would come and lead the regiment himself." Stung by this reproof, the colonel plunged his spurs into his horse's flanks, and giving the command "Forward," led his regiment, at full gallop, directly through the marsh upon the point that had been indicated.
The charge itself was, of course, a failure. The regiment finally struggled its way through the marsh to the opposite side, but leaving behind it a large number of gallant officers and men, who had sunk to rise no more; my informant being of the number who escaped.
But the result of this demonstration was most decisive. Seeing that the height on which the Austrians had planted their heavy batteries, and which commanded the entire ground, was the key of the battle, Napoleon had determined to wrest it from them, together with the batteries which crowned it. Accordingly, the evening before, he had dispatched a body of light infantry by a very circuitous route, to turn the position and attack the batteries in rear. He had accurately calculated the time the detachment would require to reach its destination; and when the moment arrived at which it should be ready to commence its attack, he ordered the cuirassiers to charge directly upon the position in front. The Austrian artillery, suddenly attacked in rear, and, at the same time, threatened with a cavalry charge in front, where it had deemed itself perfectly secure, tried to change the position of its pieces, so as to get a fire on its assailants from both directions. But it was too late; the temporary confusion into which it was thrown enabled the French infantry to carry all before it, and the height was won, with all its batteries.
So, at Waterloo, Sir Hussey Vivian's brigade of Light Cavalry, which was marching in column by half squadrons, left in front, had begun to form up into line on the leading half squadron, when an order arrived from Wellington to charge. Instantly the charge was made, and, of course, in echelons of half squadrons, extending to the right. The effect of this was that a body of French cavalry on its right, then attacking the British line, was suddenly taken in flank and completely routed.
6. A charge in deep column may sometimes be made necessary bythe nature of the ground, which, at the same time, protects its long flanks: as where, in our pursuit of the rebels after the battle of Nashville, in 1864, the Fourth United States Cavalry, approaching them over a narrow turnpike, made a vigorous charge in column of fours, which broke their centre, and, with the help of infantry skirmishers on the flanks, drove them from the ground.
7. When the ground is rugged, in order to lessen the number of falls, the rear-rank, in the charge, shouldopen out six paces, closing up again at the last moment.
8. Cavalry advances to charge at atrot, or at agallop. A fast trot is better than a gallop, as alignments are not easily kept at great speed. Experience has shown that the best distance from the enemy to begin the gallop, is about two hundred and sixty yards; thence steadily increasing to the maximum of speed. This gradual increase of speed is very important, to prevent the horses from being completely blown on reaching the enemy.
9. Cavalry should not charge bya wood, till it has been carried by our own infantry, if it can possibly be avoided.
At the battle of Kollin, in 1756, Frederick's cavalry, pursuing the Austrians, was taken in flank by some Austrian infantry posted in a wood, and made to retire with great loss.
10. When cavalry is required to charge over unknown ground, it should be preceded by a few men thrown out to the front as skirmishers, in order toscout the groundto be passed over. The neglect of this precaution has sometimes led to great disaster.
At Talavera, two cavalry regiments, the First German Hussars and the Twenty-third Light Dragoons, were ordered to charge the head of some French infantry columns. When near the top of their speed they came suddenly upon a deep ravine, with steep sides. Colonel Arentschild commanding the Hussars, who was in front, at once reined up, and halted his regiment, saying: "I vill not kill my young mensch!" But the other regiment, commanded by Colonel Seymour, which was on its left, not seeing the obstacle in time, plunged down it, men and horses rolling over on each other in frightful confusion. Of the survivors, who arrived on the other side by twos and threes, many were killed or taken; and only one-half of the regiment ever returned.
So, at the battle of Courtrai, in 1302, from the French cavalry's omitting to scout the ground they charged over, the Flemings won a great victory. All theéliteof the French nobility and chivalry was destroyed, and gold spurs were collected by bushels on the field. It was the French Cannæ. The Flemings were drawn up behind a canal, flowing between high banks, and hidden from view. The French rushing on at full gallop, all the leading ranks were plunged into the canal. The entire cavalry was thereby checked and thrown into irretrievable disorder, which extended to the infantry, in their rear. The Flemings, profiting by their confusion, crossed the canal at two points simultaneously, attacked them in flank, and completed their rout.
So, at the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, Murat, in his great cavalry charge on the Allied centre, had captured twenty-six guns, and was carrying all before him, when he pushed on to the village of Gulden Gossa, where the ground had not been reconnoitred, and could not be distinctly seen from a distance. Here the French found their career suddenly checked by a great hollow, full of buildings, pools of water, and clusters of trees; while the Allied infantry, from behind the various covers afforded by the ground, opened upon them a destructive fire. Being then suddenly charged in flank by the Russian cavalry, they were driven back with heavy loss; the Allies recapturing twenty of the twenty-six guns they had lost.
The troopers employed to scout the ground before a charge would not be in much danger from the enemy, who would hardly fire on a horseman or two, especially when expecting a charge.
11. Cavalry must never pursue, unless its supports areclose at hand.
In pursuing, it must be circumspect, and not go too far. Union and order are indispensable; for, without them, a slight resistance may suffice to cause a repulse.
First, as to itsAttack Generally.Secondly, its attackOn Squares.
A. Generally.
1. Cavalry must avoiddistant engagementswith infantry; in which the latter must always have the advantage.
2. The slightest cavalry charge on theflankof infantry will rout it.
3. As to a cavalry attackin front: If the infantry stand firm, the chances are against its success. If the infantry cannot be attacked in flank, the cavalry should therefore wait till it has been shattered by artillery, or has become exhausted, or demoralized, or till it begins to manœuvre.
4. If the infantry bein line, orin column, cavalry should attack it in flank; ifin square, at one of its angles; ifin several squares, at one of its flank ones, so as to avoid a cross-fire from the other squares. If a flank square be broken, the next one to it, being no longer protected by the fire of any other square, may be attacked with the same prospect of success; and so on successively.
5. But if the hostile infantry havesupporting cavalry, we must not charge in such a manner as to enable it to take us in flank.
6. Totest the infantryabout to be attacked, cavalry may pass a few hundred paces in its front, to threaten it, sending forward a few horsemen to fire, gallop forward, and raise a dust. If the infantry, instead of disregarding these movements, begin to fire, it will probably be broken, on the cavalry's charging it at once and vigorously, whether in column or in line. But otherwise, if the infantry reserve its fire, and only sends out a few sharpshooters.
7.Ascending slopes, if not too steep, are not unfavorable to attacks on infantry; for their shots, as experience shows, will then mostly fly too high.
8. On adescending slope, cavalry charges down on infantry with terrible effect; as it then arrives with an impetus which nothing can stop.
At Waterloo, a column of French infantry was ascending a steep slope. Suddenly the Scotch Greys cavalry regiment dashed down upon it from above, rode over, and destroyed it.
B. On Squares.
1. Infantry squares are usually charged inopen column; the distance between the subdivisions being a subdivision front and a few yards over; in order that each subdivision may have time to break into the square, or, if unsuccessful, to disengage itself and retire.
But the distances should never be so great as to allow the square to reload after firing a volley at the next preceding subdivision.
2. The leading subdivision will usuallydraw the fireof the square. If this is delivered at very short range, say at twenty paces, it will raise up a rampart of dead and wounded men and horses which will probably suffice to check the following subdivisions, and so repulse the charge. But an infantry square rarely reserves its fire so long; and if the fire is delivered at any considerable distance, no such effect will be produced.
3. Agood formationto attack a square is said to be a column of three squadrons, with squadron front, at double distance; followed by a fourth squadron, in column of divisions or platoons, to surround the square, and make prisoners, if it is broken.
4. Before cavalry charges a square, it should be first shattered or demoralized byartillery fire, when this is practicable. In the absence of artillery, sharpshooting infantry skirmishers may, to a certain extent, supply its place.
5. A square should be attacked at one of its angles, which are obviously its weakest and most vulnerable points. But to cover a real attack on an angle, cavalry sometimes makes afalse attackon the front of a square.
6. When squares are formed checkerwise, cavalry must attacka flank square, and not expose itself to a cross-fire by charging an interior one.
7. Cavalry charging a square firing irregularly will usually break it. But when the square reserves its fire, and pours in well-aimed volleys at short range, the charge will rarely succeed. The cavalry should, therefore, before charging, use every effort todraw the fireof the square, or of the fronts which threaten it. This is sometimes accomplished by sending forward a few skirmishers to fire on the square.
8. When one square fires to assist another, the firing square should beinstantly charged, before it has time to reload.
9. To succeed, a cavalry charge should be made with adesperate, forlorn-hope recklessness, and with reiterated attacks on one point. If the fire has been delivered at very close range, though its effect has probably been destructive, the smoke will momentarily shut out the line of infantry from the horses' view, thus removing the chief obstacle to their breaking through it. The survivors of the fire should therefore rush desperately on.
If the French attacks on the British squares at Quatre Bras had been made in this manner, instead of opening to the right and left, and diverging to a flank at the moment of closing, they would probably have succeeded.
But this sudden divergence is often the fault of the horses, which instinctively recoil before a serried line of infantry, with bayonets at the charge. Cavalry should, therefore, never be practised on the drill-ground in charging a square, as the horses would thereby acquire the habit of suddenly checking their course, or of diverging to a flank, on arriving at the enemy. This would so strengthen their natural instinct that they could never be got to break a square. Or, at least, when this manœuvre is practised for the purpose of instruction, the horses used should never afterwards be taken into the field.
10. The cavalry most formidable to an infantry square areLancers. Their lances, which are from eleven to sixteen feet long, easily reach and transfix the infantry soldier, while the sabres of the other cavalry are too short to reach him over the horse's neck, and over the musket, lengthened by the bayonet. But Lancers are usually no match against other cavalry, who can parry and ripost before the lance can resume the guard.
11. When cavalry has succeeded in completely breaking a body of infantry, it may often inflictfearful slaughterupon them.
At the battle of Rio Seco, in Spain, after Lasalle's twelve hundred horse had broken the Spanish infantry, they galloped at will among twenty-five thousand soldiers, some five thousand of whom they slew.
1. Besides its uses on the field of battle, cavalry may render most important service in completing the destruction of beaten corps, or compelling their surrender, and so enable us to secure the great strategic objects of the campaign. Thus, after the battle of Waterloo, it was the Prussian cavalry that completed the dispersion of the French army, and prevented it from rallying. And, but for Napoleon's ill fortune in respect to Grouchy, in that battle, he would, to all appearance, have succeeded in accomplishing his plan of campaign, which was, to separate the English from the Prussians, beat them in detail, and complete their destruction with his twenty thousand cavalry.
2. The battles of the late War of the Rebellion, the earlier ones, at least, were mostly indecisive. One chief cause of this was, that neither side had a sufficient force of true cavalry to enable it to complete a victory, to turn a defeat into a rout, and drive the enemy effectually from the field. The cavalry charges were generally such as mounted infantry could have just as well made; charges in which the pistol and carbine played the principal part, instead of the spur and sabre. It was not until the fight at Brandy Station, in June, 1863, that sabres were used, to any extent, at close quarters. Thus, neither of the contending armies was able to break up and disperse, destroy, or capture its enemy's infantry masses, in the manner practised in Napoleon's great wars, not having, to any considerable extent, that description of force called Cavalry of the Line, which alone is capable of effecting these results by its solid and compact formations, its skilful, yet rapid manœuvring, and its crashing charges.
3. European cavalry of the line is divided into Heavy and Light. Heavy cavalry is heavily armed; that is, their weapons are larger and heavier than those of light cavalry, and to these weapons, carbines, in most of the corps, are added. Some of the corps wear steel or brass cuirasses; and the men and horses are of the largest size.
In Light cavalry, the only weapons are the sabre and pistol; and the men and horses are light and active, rather than strong and large.
Lancers are considered a medium between Heavy and Light cavalry.
4. Great as may be the advantages of a large force of regular cavalry of the line, there were serious objections to its being raised at the opening of the late war.
(1.) The theatre of war presented nowhere any of those wide and level plains so common in Europe, and on which cavalry masses are able to produce such decisive effects in battle. On the contrary, the ground was almost everywhere so rugged and mountainous, or else so densely wooded, as to be extremely unfavorable to the movements of cavalry of this description.
(2.) Since the introduction of the new rifled arms, exposing cavalry masses to a deadly fire at far greater distances than ever before known, a fire often reaching to the reserves, it seemed doubtful whether the manœuvring and charging in heavy, compact masses, which formerly rendered cavalry of the line so formidable, would any longer be practicable.
(3.) The comparative cost of this kind of force is so great, that, if it had been raised and kept up on the scale required, the expense of this war, enormous as it has been, would have been vastly augmented. Three years are required for the thorough training and instruction of the men and horses; so that it would not have been until the fourth year of the war that we could begin, even, to reap the fruits of so enormous an outlay.
5. But to carry on any war successfully, what is needed, and is, in fact, indispensable, is an ample force of light cavalry, of a kind requiring comparatively but little time and training to fit it for the various and important duties devolving upon it in the field, and therefore far less expensive than cavalry of the line; and having all the discipline of this latter kind of force, though wanting its perfection of manœuvre. Every army, or considerable detachment, must have enough of this kind of force with it to furnish what is requisite for Outpost duty, Patrols offensive and defensive, Escorts to trains, Foraging parties, Reconnoissances, and the various other purposes necessarily incidental to operations in the field; and in marches, all Advanced, Rear, and Flank guards should consist, in part, at least, of cavalry. Finally, this description of force is needed for the performance of those arduous, but most valuable, services often rendered by the quasi-independent bodies called Partisan Corps; services usually requiring great celerity of movement.
6. This kind of force being "the eyes and ears of an army," it often contributes powerfully to the success of strategic operations.
In the campaign of 1813, Napoleon complained that, for want of light cavalry, he could get no intelligence of the enemy's movements.
So, in the rebel campaign of 1863, culminating at Gettysburg, General Lee attributed his ignorance of our position and movements, which led to the failure of his operations, to his being destitute of this arm; Stuart's cavalry, on which he depended for information, having got too far away from him.
In Pope's campaign in 1862, the rebels, by their cavalry raid on Catlett's Station, obtained possession of the commanding general's correspondence, plans, and orders from Washington.
On the other hand, whilst keeping us informed of the enemy's movements, an abundant light cavalry, active and well commanded, may be so used as to constitute an impenetrable screen of our own movements from the enemy, as effectual as would be a lofty and impassable mountain range.
Again, if we are greatly inferior to the enemy in cavalry, our own cavalry will have to keep itself within our infantry lines; and the consequence will be that the enemy will obtain control of the entire country around us, and so deprive us of all the supplies it contains.
As, besides this, cavalry is absolutely necessary for the protection of convoys, and, from its celerity of movement, is the kind of force best fitted for guarding our communications, it is evident that the subsistence of an army is dependent, to a great extent, upon this arm.
From what has been said in relation to the three arms, it is evident—
1. ThatArtillery, within the range of its fire, is powerful in preventing the enemy's approach to it; but, only to a limited extent, can pursue and drive the enemy from his position; and that its function is, therefore, mainlyDEFENSIVE.
2. ThatCavalry, by the impetuosity of its charge, is peculiarly fit for driving the enemy from his position; but, remaining in position itself, has but feeble power to prevent the enemy's approaching it; and this, only by its carbine and pistol fire, which is far from effective; and that its function is, therefore, mainlyOFFENSIVE.
3. ThatInfantryhas great power, both in keeping the enemy at a distance by its fire and in driving him from his position with the bayonet; and that this arm is, therefore, bothOFFENSIVEandDEFENSIVE.
4. That although artillery is mainly a defensive arm, it plays an important offensive part in the powerful assistance it renders to infantry, in shattering and disorganizing the enemy's masses; thereby opening the way for our attacking columns.
5. That although cavalry is mainly an offensive arm, its defensive value is also very great in the protection it affords, in various emergencies, to the other arms, by its actual charge, or by its threatening position.
The special parts usually played in battle by the three arms respectively, may be briefly stated thus:—
Artillery prepares the victory; Infantry achieves it; Cavalry completes it, and secures its fruits.
THE END.