CHAPTER II.CHARLES I AT NEWCASTLE.

Externally the Scots treated the King with all the respect due to his rank; but they allowed him no liberty whatever. On the march to Newcastle, which was made with the utmost haste—for they were always afraid of opposition from the Independent army—the King sought to ascertain how they were inclined towards him from an officer whom he trusted[460]. As this man was telling him that he must regard himself as a prisoner, Lesley gave him a proof of the fact by peremptorily interrupting the conversation. Only Montereuil, to whom it could not be refused, was allowed to see the King occasionally; otherwise no one was admitted. The sentinels posted round his quarters were ordered to keep good watch on the windows, that letters might not be thrown out unobserved and received below. The Scots wished to separate their King from all the world, and keep him exclusively under their own influence; for their main object was to induce him actually to make the concessions which were necessary to the consolidation of Presbyterianism in Scotland and in England.

As Charles I had already declared himself willing to receive instruction in Presbyterianism, an attempt was first of all made to convince him of the truth of that system. Alexander Henderson, whom the King already liked, was immediately despatched to Newcastle, to ‘heal the prince as a good physician of the predilection which he had for the Episcopalian system.’ This predilection however was in theA.D. 1646.King not merely a matter of feeling, but depended on conviction, grounded on theological study. It has always been a matter of wonder that the King was so well able, without extraneous help, to encounter the trained Presbyterian controversialist in the correspondence which was preferred to oral discussion[461].

Above all things he maintained firmly that his standpoint was a sound one both in right and historically, for that the English Reformation had been made by those whose right to do so could not be called in question, and that in it there had been no intention of abolishing any of the things which had been in use in the Christian Church ever since the times of the Apostles. Henderson repeated in relation to the first point the old Scottish doctrine, that if the prince neglected the necessary reformation, the right passed to the lower magistrates; and in relation to Episcopacy, that it could not be shown to exist in the first centuries. The King asked whether this last was not the case with the Presbyterian system, for he thought that nothing had been heard of it until Calvin. He required a scriptural proof of the lower magistrates’ right to make reforms. Beyond this he added that he was bound by the oath taken at his coronation to maintain the Episcopal establishment. Henderson remarked that the oath lost its binding force when remitted by those for whose advantage it was taken, as had been done in the present case through Parliament. Charles answered that he had taken this oath not to Parliament, but to the English Church, which was not dependent on Parliament. Henderson replied that it was to the Church in its entirety, for the safety of the people was ever the highest law. The King did not admit that this constituted any release from his oath, for on those grounds we might set aside all laws.

The King resisted Henderson’s arguments: but might he not be so far impressed by them as to be inclined to give way on the representation of its being absolutely necessary?

The English Parliament had again discussed the UxbridgeA.D. 1646.propositions, altered them in some points, and resolved to present them once more to the King: but now no further negotiation was to be allowed; he must accept the propositions simply, like parliamentary bills. The Scots were affected by some of these alterations; among others the control of military matters, over which they had before been allowed some influence, was claimed exclusively for the English Parliament. They were well aware of this, but considering that the chief contents of the old propositions, namely the abolition of the Episcopal system and the substitution of Presbyterianism, were still retained, they deemed it better to give way on the remaining points[462]. At the delivery of the propositions on July 24 at Newcastle, the Chancellor of Scotland insisted as strongly as possible that the King must accept them without further delay. He told him plainly that if he refused he would lose all his friends in Parliament, the city and the country, that England would rise as one man against him, that they would bring him to trial, depose him, and settle the kingdom without him to the ruin of him and his posterity. But the King had already formed his resolution. He did not believe that all the threats uttered by the Scots would be fulfilled, but if even the worst came he would not yield to these demands. The English commissioners declared, as they were instructed, that they could enter into no discussion: their orders were to return within ten days to London with Yes or No. The King however still gave an evasive answer, insisting on the necessity of a fresh debate.

It was not in this Prince’s nature to give way to threats: the expectation of a political reaction in his favour formed a stronger inducement. The Scots had in view not merely the maintenance of their control over the King: his compliance would also serve them as a weapon against the Independents, whose influence in Parliament was daily growing, from whom the greater stringency of the conditions had mainly proceeded, and who wished for nothing so much as for the failure of all negotiations. For what the Scots mostA.D. 1646.wished, the establishment of Presbyterianism, the Independents most abhorred. It was clear that the King’s procrastinating answer, which they represented as a refusal, was acceptable and advantageous to them.

Could no means be found, not so much for informing the King, for he knew the facts already, but for convincing him that it was to his own interest, since the Independents openly threatened the monarchy, to unite against them with the Presbyterians, who would retain at least the form of royal power? Might he not by this consideration be induced to make a concession which otherwise he would refuse?

This was the point of view from which the state of things was represented to the newly arrived French ambassador. It was the same Bellièvre whom we have met with once before at a fatal moment as representative of France in England. He renewed his old acquaintance with Lord Holland, receiving his suggestions chiefly in the social circles to which the latter belonged, at the houses of Lady Carlisle and the Countess of Devonshire: but how different was their tone from what it had been at the time of his first residence! Then Lord Holland had been one of the most active leaders of the opposition to the King; now he saw himself threatened by a party which had risen up since, far more resolute, and really anti-monarchical: he and his friends sought to lean on the King. Bellièvre was convinced that the further rise of the Independents would annihilate the crown altogether, and that the only escape lay in an alliance with the Presbyterians; for these latter now again spoke favourably of monarchy: in London men seemed to regret having gone so far, and declared themselves ready to restore to the King such authority as his ancestors had possessed[463]. The Scots promised to intercede for the Queen, especially to procure the return of the banished members of her household: but they insisted on the unconditional and immediate acceptance of the propositions, for on this it depended whether they could think of disbanding the army, which would of itself put an end toA.D. 1646.the power of the Independents; and then it would also be possible to limit the further duration of the Parliament to a definite time, on the expiration of which it should dissolve. They also gave a hope that the King might be relieved from giving his personal adherence to the Covenant[464]. The ambassador adopted these views without hesitation: he could see no means of saving the crown and state of England except in the unconditional acceptance by the King of the propositions offered. He sent Montereuil to Paris, instructing him to use every means to induce the court, in consideration of the pressing danger and of the private interests of France, to approve the terms and recommend them to the Queen, whose influence with the King gave some reason to expect that he might even yet be induced to accept the propositions[465].

The propositions of Newcastle were discussed in every shape in the French council; but much as they wished to see an agreement between the King and the Presbyterians, they never for an instant hesitated to reject them, as ruinous to the Catholic Church and in complete contradiction to the conditions claimed for the Queen of England: moreover one king could not possibly advise another to strip himself of the characteristic marks of sovereignty, which would be exciting all neighbouring nations to similar rebellion. Queen Henrietta herself was decidedly against it: the promise that the King should not be compelled to sign the Covenant, and that Parliament should be dissolved, she treated as vain and chimerical. Bellièvre had expressed the opinion that the King might hereafter revoke what he now granted. The Queen observed that if he signed the propositions he would give them legal validity, and neither he nor his successors would ever be able to free themselves from them, for the people would never suffer themselves to be deprived of them again: he would be changing an usurpation into a legal right. And when Bellièvre expressed the apprehension that they would try the King and depose him, and set up an independentA.D. 1646.government under the third prince, the Duke of Gloucester, the Queen thought that even this would be better than that Charles I should in solemn form deprive himself of his power, and clothe Parliament with it. Cardinal Mazarin fully concurred in all this; for they durst not let it come to pass that the King should remain such in name only[466].

Two points especially of the propositions repeated at Newcastle appeared to France inadmissible; one, that the power to dispose of the army and to raise the means necessary for its maintenance should be given over for twenty years, dating from July 1, 1646, into the hands of the Parliament, as well in Scotland as in England and Ireland; the other that a great list should be drawn up of classes of persons disqualified to receive any amnesty, comprising all those, Scots as well as Englishmen, who had ever supported the King’s cause in the field or in negotiations.

The French statesmen had a double motive for not wishing to give the Independents the opportunity of possessing themselves of the supreme authority: they were afraid of their anti-monarchical doctrines and their general influence in Europe, but moreover they feared that Great Britain might form a compact power on principles opposite to their own. They did not however mean to avert these dangers by recommending concessions which were contrary to monarchy as understood in France, but by influence over the Scots and renewal of their league with them.

Bellièvre, who in his earlier mission had worked chiefly for this object, was instructed to represent to them his astonishment that, after giving the King, when at the advice of France and to their great advantage he came to their camp, reason to hope for more favourable terms, they should now wish to compel him to accept less favourable ones: they would in this way make an enemy for ever of their King, who might yet recover his power: but if they would support him now,A.D. 1646.France would be for ever bound to them, would not only secure them against the enmity of the English, but would even take their part if Charles I should ever break his promises to them, and would be inclined in the pending negotiations for a general peace to make the concessions necessary for attaining it, so as to be able in the next spring, before there was anything to be apprehended even from the Independent army, to give them help[467].

France was at this time at the height of her military power and political influence in the world: she hoped before the end of the year to establish her position by the conclusion of peace at Munster: and then it was the purpose of her leading minister to interfere actively in English affairs, and support with all his strength the union between Charles I and the Scots, which he hoped meanwhile to bring to completion[468].

For this connexion concessions were necessary, and the French court was entirely in favour of their being made, but not of so comprehensive a kind as was demanded. Queen Henrietta Maria warned her husband afresh against accepting the Covenant; but she admitted that Bellièvre was right in thinking that the Episcopalian system must be given up. She well knew, she said, how distasteful this was to the King, and it was equally so to herself, but there was no means of saving the bishops without ruining himself. If he fell they were irretrievably lost, whereas he might restore them, if he again attained power. All seemed to her to depend on his not giving up his prerogative in relation to the armed force, the right of the militia; for then he would have the means, and God would give him still more—she meant French help—to restore all. The disorder in Ireland was dying out: she had received from Scotland offers of great importance, and from the Queen of Sweden satisfactory assurances of friendship.A.D. 1646.If the King stood fast, and abandoned neither his friends nor the right of the militia, their cause might yet prosper.

Ever since July Bellièvre had been with the King at Newcastle. He had entered into more intimate relations with him than might have been expected from the incidents of his first mission, but they seemed forgotten in the whirl of later events. Bellièvre wondered at the tranquillity with which the King awaited the terrible events impending: he said that he admired it, but could not imitate it[469].

Some Scots also repaired to Newcastle, where the forms of the court were still observed; amongst them Charles I’s old confidant, Hamilton, who had been released in the course of events from his imprisonment at Pendennis, appeared one day when the King gave audience. It was observed that both blushed when their eyes met: Hamilton would have retired among the rest of those present, but the King called him to his side. In fact he had never believed in the actual guilt of his old friend, and when he declared this, the old confidence was at once restored between them: the King said that Hamilton would not quit him in his misfortunes, and Hamilton replied that he was ready to fulfil the King’s commands.

But thereupon Hamilton urged him to give way on the subject of religion, as without this he would never win to his side either the Scots or the city of London, on which all depended. Others, who were regarded as a middle party between Argyle and Hamilton, promised the King shelter in the country and armed assistance, but they made the same condition. The King was firmly resolved not to accept it; and among his attendants there was at least one who gave him some hope that this unendurable necessity might be spared him. This was Murray, who was on confidential terms with many leading men in England and Scotland, and knew their opinions. The King formed a very close intimacy with him, and with his aid in the first half of October concocted an answer to the last propositions, which he hoped would find acceptance in London and in time at least, might bring about a happy result.

A.D. 1646.

It was not the French policy, though that was now backed by his wife, whose counsels usually had the greatest weight with him, that the King adopted: on the contrary, without any such exclusive reference to the Scots as France recommended, he still hoped to attain his end by the course of reconciliation with the English Parliament once before tried. He accepted those of the propositions which related to repression of the Papists: he declared himself ready to give satisfaction to the Parliament in all that concerned Ireland, in reference to war and religion: while pronouncing a general amnesty most desirable, he promised to go as far in the way of limiting it as honour and justice allowed. He said further that it was impossible for him to deprive himself for ever of the sword, and place it unconditionally in the hands of Parliament; but since it appeared necessary for the establishment and security of peace, he would leave the right of the militia by land and sea in the hands of Parliament for ten years, on the condition however that afterwards it should stand as in the times of his father and Queen Elizabeth. He implored the members of Parliament, by their duty as Englishmen and Christians, to accept this offer and thereby restore peace[470].

There was still left the chief demand, concerning the abolition of the Episcopalian establishment. The idea occurred to the King himself, that in respect to this also he might by a temporary concession calm their minds and at the same time not violate his conscience: everything should stay for three years in the present condition, and during that time the question should be discussed from all sides by a new committee, and ultimately settled in the old parliamentary fashion. Even about this he had scruples, and would not make the proposal until he had received the assurance of two distinguished bishops—those of London and Salisbury—that he might do so with an easy conscience[471]. He requested them to tell him their opinion freely and candidly, as they would answer for it at the Judgment Day. The bishopsA.D. 1646.answered that, assuming it to be the King’s firm resolve not to depart from his coronation oath, and to maintain the Established Church, to which end the new proposals were meant to serve, they were of opinion that he would not be breaking his oath by making them, for he was only allowing for a time what he could not prevent[472].

Thus assured by an episcopal judgment which he valued very highly, the King offered to sanction the Presbyterian establishment with all its forms, and the order of public worship already adopted, for a term of three years, without prejudice to his own personal liberty: a definite arrangement to be resolved on after that time by himself and the two Houses of Parliament, after new consultations of the committee with the Assembly of Divines[473].

These were the first definite offers made by King Charles after his defeat. They are closely connected with those suggested by him at Uxbridge through his representatives; but compared with them are certainly much more comprehensive. The right of the militia is handed over to the Parliament, no longer for three years and jointly with the King, but completely and for ten years. He offered not a meaningless approximation to the Presbyterian system, but an effective recognition of it for several years. Nevertheless his own standpoint, it is easy to discern, was still not materially changed. The King contemplated a return to the old state of things, unconditionally in respect to the first point: as to the second he clearly expected that it would follow.

The doubt was whether he would effect anything by this. The first storm he had to withstand was from his wife. She had wished, in accordance with the French policy, that he should firmly hold to his temporal rights and make extensive concessions as to religion. Instead of this Charles I gave way a step further in temporal matters, but in religious matters conceded so little that he could not have hoped to obtain anyA.D. 1646.result in Scotland. The Queen told him that he seemed not to value the right of the militia highly enough, and that if his conscience would allow him to comply in the religious question for three years, he might well have given way further to save his kingdom.

The King was much concerned at the opposition of his wife, whose esteem and love was a great consolation to him in all his troubles; but even against her he stood firm. He replied that military strength did not form so thoroughly stable a power in England as perhaps in France, and that he did not surrender his rights: so too he held to his claims as to religion—the temporary compliance which he offered would not wound his conscience, but further he would not be urged to go. His previous ill-fortune he regarded as the punishment of God for the weakness of which he had been guilty in allowing the execution of Strafford and the exclusion of the bishops from Parliament. The abolition of the Episcopalian system would be a relapse into the same error, would draw down the wrath of God upon him afresh, and deprive him of his settled peace of mind—he should fall into despair.

Charles then had an idea of resigning the supreme power to the Prince of Wales; if he could reconcile it to his conscience to make greater concessions to the Scots, he might do so. But neither his wife nor the Prince would hear of this: Mazarin also and Bellièvre deemed the project too dangerous. They would have been afraid of a republic being immediately proclaimed, and perhaps obtaining control of the three kingdoms.

As the royal authority could not be induced to grant the chief demand of the Scots, the French had no other resource for carrying out their plan, except to try how far the Scots would be satisfied with the King’s concessions. At the beginning of December, 1646, his answer to the propositions was sent to them, and met with a very unfavourable reception. The limitation to three years of the recognition of Presbyterianism, the exemption of the royal family from all pledges to conform to it, the entire omission of any mention of the Covenant, displeased the zealous Scots in the highest degree. The French did not yet despair of bringing about a goodA.D. 1646.understanding: once more Montereuil repaired to Scotland with instructions to suggest a prospect of the open intervention of France in favour of the King, and to promise splendid rewards to all who should take part in the great work of restoring the King[474]. Montereuil spoke first with Hamilton and his friends: they assured him that they were ready to shed their blood for their King, but that they should be able to achieve nothing for him with their countrymen unless he signed the Covenant. Montereuil hurried next to the middle party, with which Bellièvre had had dealings, Traquair, Calander, Roxburgh, Morton: they declared that they could do nothing without the Hamiltons, and also required the concession which was not to be obtained from the King. In Parliament a resolution was passed in opposition to more moderate proposals, to insist on the acceptation of the propositions as a whole, and if the King refused, to provide for the government of the country without him. The Church Assembly expressed itself to the same effect: the King should never be received in the country unless he accepted the Covenant, and gave a satisfactory answer in respect to the propositions[475].

Thus this negotiation also miscarried. Bellièvre attempted to open to the King the chance of flight to Ireland or the Scottish Highlands, for he must stay in one of his kingdoms, so as to be able to form a party: but even an attempt at such a thing proved impracticable; in consequence of a fresh turn in politics the vigilance around his person had been doubled.

Turning away from all dealings which might lead to a one-sided alliance with the King and with France, the Scots had again come to terms with the English Parliament. Their religious zeal was satisfied by Presbyterianism being now in fact introduced into England: lay elders had been chosen and church sessions established in London: the AssemblyA.D. 1647.of Divines were proceeding to compile a catechism and confession. The Scots had no objection to the King being kept for the future in custody in England: they hoped that either he would thus be brought to accept the propositions, or that without this form they would succeed in carrying out their old purposes. This concession was joined to a new agreement, whereby all differences between England and Scotland were fully settled: the English agreed to pay all arrears due to the Scots, £400,000 in all, £200,000 at once in two instalments: the Scots agreed to quit England; the first instalment was to be paid to them before they recrossed the Tyne, the second directly afterwards.

We shall soon see what views, as against other common enemies, were at the bottom of this reconciliation. The immediate consequence was that the King’s answer to the propositions had no effect in England; for as the Scots, who had no reason for being entirely satisfied with them, held firmly to them, it was not likely that the English Parliament, from which they proceeded, should abandon them. It was agreed that the King should be brought to Holmby House, and remain there until he gave his assent to the last proposals: the Scots only stipulated that the constitution should not be further altered, nor the succession interfered with. The moderate members of the English Parliament readily assented, for they hoped, having these fixed points to rely on, that they would be better able to resist the opposite party, which aimed at abolishing the monarchy. The Presbyterians of the two countries, being thus united, hoped to establish for ever their joint supremacy.

The execution of these arrangements, when once decided on, was not delayed for a moment. The money payment was brought in a somewhat offensive way into connexion with the surrender of the King. On January 21, 1646/7, Thursday, the first payment towards the stipulated sum was made near Northallerton, both parties appearing with military escorts: on the following Saturday the English commissioners arrived at Newcastle, to inform the King that he must follow them. It was Lord Pembroke, who in the most submissive form, not omitting the three reverences practised at Whitehall, madeA.D. 1647.these announcements to the King. He told him that he was deputed by Parliament to follow him to Holmby, and be at his service on the journey[476]. The King as usual begged for time to consider it. He spoke first with the deputies from Scotland, who gave him to understand, though in the gentlest terms which they could find, that the Scottish Parliament fully concurred. They informed him that their garrison would quit Newcastle, and an English one enter in their stead. On Saturday, the 30th, the Scots quitted Newcastle, and the English entered: in the afternoon an English guard entered the King’s presence under arms instead of the Scottish one. The Scottish deputies left him, after presenting a declaration of their Parliament in relation to his surrender: and the English entered in their stead: the latter told him that he would be received with joy by his people (always assuming that he accepted the Covenant), and that never had a King been more powerful in England than he should be. He fixed February 3 for the day of his departure: they made short journeys by day, so as not to be exposed at night-fall to any disasters, or inconvenient demonstration. All the magic effect of the reverence, which for centuries had been shewn to the wearer of the crown, still remained with Charles I. Crowds streamed in from all sides, in order to be cured, according to the old belief, by his health-giving touch, in such numbers that the concourse had to be stopped by proclamation. When they reached Holmby—a country house built by Christopher Hatton in the splendid style of the Elizabethan age, that at a later date had passed into the hands of the royal family—the strictest confinement was ordered as lately at Newcastle. No man durst approach the King, who had not committed himself to the new order of things by accepting the protest and the Covenant. Even of these the sentinels let none pass, who could not produce written leave from the commissioners, through whose hands all letters which concerned him, had to pass. The treatment of the King recalls what his grandmother Mary Stuart had to endure at Fotheringhay: the differenceA.D. 1647.was that his life was secured by treaty with the Scots; and the prevailing Parliamentary authority, at least in most part of the members constituting it, was in fact of opinion that the promise should be kept.

FOOTNOTES:[460]Turner (to whom he spoke) Memoirs 41.[461]The papers which passed between his sacred Majesty and Mr. Alexander Henderson—three letters of Henderson’s and five of the King’s, in Aiton’s Henderson 633.[462]Cp. § xiii of the Newcastle propositions with § xvii of the Uxbridge ones. Baillie ii. 377, 379.[463]Bellièvre, July 15/25 from London: ‘Retablir leur roi non seulement dans le pouvoir qu’ils appellent légitime, mais dans une autorité fort rapprochante de la plus grande qu’eut jamais un roi d’Angleterre.’ Ambassade de Bellièvre 1646.[464]‘(Les Ecossais) me promettent autant que les Anglais une chose qui peut être la décision de cette affaire, qu’ils empêcheront que le roi de Gr. Brne. ne soit pressé de prendre le covenant (ib.).’[465]Mémoire du roi à Mr. de Bellièvre, apporté par Mr. de Montereuil. 19 Sept.[466]A. Bellièvre, 6 Août. ‘Je suis bien de cet avis, qu’il vaudroit mieux attendre toutes les violences que le parlement pourroit commettre, même celle a déposséder le roi, mais non pas que luy même consentist qu’on ne luy laissait que le nom et la figure du roi, qu’on ne manqueroit pas de luy oster peu de temps après.’[467]‘En cas qu’ils se disposent a faire leur devoir, on se relâchera d’icy en beaucoup de choses pour faciliter la conclusion de la paix générale, affin de nous mettre en état de les secourir.’[468]Henrietta Maria to Charles I, Oct. 9/19, 1646. ‘Cl. Mazarin m’a assuré que la paix générale seroit faite devant Noël, et cela estant, on vous assisteroit puissamment.’[469]‘La force d’attendre l’évènement de toutes ces choses horribles avec une tranquillité d’âme sans example.’[470]The King to the Queen, in Bruce 65, 67.[471]‘A proposition which no man but myself has thought on.’ Charles I for William Murray. Clarendon State Papers ii. 267.[472]The two letters; Clarendon State Papers ii. 265, 267.[473]His Majesty’s answer to the propositions, in Burnet, Hamiltons 299. As it appears, it was first drawn up towards the middle of November during a second visit of Murray to Newcastle (Letter to the Queen of Nov. 14 in Bruce 75). The earlier drafts, differing in some few points, were also communicated to the Queen.[474]‘La paix générale se faisant, comme, Dieu mercy, nous sommes à la veille, la France se declarera en faveur du roy de la Gr. Brne., comme aussi, si dés à present il ne manquoit pour faire declarer en faveur du dit roy, si ce n’est que la France se declarast, LL. MM. y seroient disposés, pourvu que Ton vit evidemment Futilité du restablissement du roi.’ (Mazarin to Bellièvre, Dec. 10.)[475]Letter of Lanerick, Dec. 17, in Burnet, Hamiltons 306.[476]So says Montereuil, to whom the King had told it. Jan. 26.

[460]Turner (to whom he spoke) Memoirs 41.

[461]The papers which passed between his sacred Majesty and Mr. Alexander Henderson—three letters of Henderson’s and five of the King’s, in Aiton’s Henderson 633.

[462]Cp. § xiii of the Newcastle propositions with § xvii of the Uxbridge ones. Baillie ii. 377, 379.

[463]Bellièvre, July 15/25 from London: ‘Retablir leur roi non seulement dans le pouvoir qu’ils appellent légitime, mais dans une autorité fort rapprochante de la plus grande qu’eut jamais un roi d’Angleterre.’ Ambassade de Bellièvre 1646.

[464]‘(Les Ecossais) me promettent autant que les Anglais une chose qui peut être la décision de cette affaire, qu’ils empêcheront que le roi de Gr. Brne. ne soit pressé de prendre le covenant (ib.).’

[465]Mémoire du roi à Mr. de Bellièvre, apporté par Mr. de Montereuil. 19 Sept.

[466]A. Bellièvre, 6 Août. ‘Je suis bien de cet avis, qu’il vaudroit mieux attendre toutes les violences que le parlement pourroit commettre, même celle a déposséder le roi, mais non pas que luy même consentist qu’on ne luy laissait que le nom et la figure du roi, qu’on ne manqueroit pas de luy oster peu de temps après.’

[467]‘En cas qu’ils se disposent a faire leur devoir, on se relâchera d’icy en beaucoup de choses pour faciliter la conclusion de la paix générale, affin de nous mettre en état de les secourir.’

[468]Henrietta Maria to Charles I, Oct. 9/19, 1646. ‘Cl. Mazarin m’a assuré que la paix générale seroit faite devant Noël, et cela estant, on vous assisteroit puissamment.’

[469]‘La force d’attendre l’évènement de toutes ces choses horribles avec une tranquillité d’âme sans example.’

[470]The King to the Queen, in Bruce 65, 67.

[471]‘A proposition which no man but myself has thought on.’ Charles I for William Murray. Clarendon State Papers ii. 267.

[472]The two letters; Clarendon State Papers ii. 265, 267.

[473]His Majesty’s answer to the propositions, in Burnet, Hamiltons 299. As it appears, it was first drawn up towards the middle of November during a second visit of Murray to Newcastle (Letter to the Queen of Nov. 14 in Bruce 75). The earlier drafts, differing in some few points, were also communicated to the Queen.

[474]‘La paix générale se faisant, comme, Dieu mercy, nous sommes à la veille, la France se declarera en faveur du roy de la Gr. Brne., comme aussi, si dés à present il ne manquoit pour faire declarer en faveur du dit roy, si ce n’est que la France se declarast, LL. MM. y seroient disposés, pourvu que Ton vit evidemment Futilité du restablissement du roi.’ (Mazarin to Bellièvre, Dec. 10.)

[475]Letter of Lanerick, Dec. 17, in Burnet, Hamiltons 306.

[476]So says Montereuil, to whom the King had told it. Jan. 26.

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