FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[251]Nkandhla column: C squadron N.C.; N.D.M.R.; Z.M.R.; 150 N.P.; pompom section, N.F.A.; and 3 companies N.R. The N.P. at this time had only one officer, Sub-Inspector F.B.E. White. Royston was, at the same time, given command of a column, known as Royston's Brigade, consisting of R.H.; D.L.I.; 4 companies, B, C, G, and H, Natal Rangers; and one section, 15 pounders, B battery, N.F.A.Before the O.C. Troops left Nomangci, his Intelligence Officer, Capt. E.J.B. Hosking, asked for a squadron in order to search for Bambata's body, said to be lying in the Mome gorge. The application however, could not be granted, as there were no men to spare, and because McKenzie realized that, if Bambata was dead, his body could no doubt be recovered later. Under the circumstances, it was certainly wiser to act on the assumption, weak though it was, that Bambata was still at large, than on the far stronger one that he was already dead, and that, therefore, absolute proof of such fact was necessary.[252]Fromufaorulufa, a crack.[253]Conclusive as is the evidence as to Bambata's death, strong rumours nevertheless got afloat shortly after the Rebellion that he was still alive and in hiding, first in one part of Zululand then in another. To this day, there are Natives and Europeans who believe the rumours, but such beliefs have probably been formed without due consideration of the facts here set forth. For the most part, they rest on the mere fact that Bambata's wife, Siyekiwe, did not go into mourning. Under normal conditions, this would undoubtedly have been an important criterion, but the conditions were clearly very abnormal.[254]This officer had been to explain more thoroughly than could be done on paper the particular problems that confronted the troops at Nkandhla.[255]It was composed as follows: N.D.M.R. (with one Maxim), 198; Z.M.R. (with three Rexer guns), 99; N.P., 147; N.R. (three companies, A, D and E), 290; N.F.A. (one 15-pounder and two pompoms), 26; departmental corps, 19; staff, 11. Total, 790. There were also Native levies (Lieut. W.H. London).[256]Woolls-Sampson was ordered to Empandhleni. Leaving his infantry at Ensingabantu store, he reached Empandhleni with the rest of the force on the 22nd. The D.L.I., detached from Royston's brigade, joined Woolls-Sampson, whilst three companies of Rangers (A, D and E), under Boyd-Wilson, became attached to Royston, in lieu of B, C, G and H, whose disposition is referred to further on. The N.F.A. (B battery), moreover, detached from Royston's brigade, returned to Empandhleni to join Mackay, whilst N.F.A. (two guns, 15-pounders), detached from Mackay, joined Royston.Mackay was directed on the 22nd to move to Empandhleni as speedily as possible.Dick, with N.R. (C, F, G and H companies), left on the 23rd for Fort Yolland. He had with him 40 N.N.H. B company, N.R. remained as garrison at Empandhleni. He moved to Middle Drift on the 26th, to Krantzkop on the 28th, and to Thring's Post on the 2nd July.The Cape squadron of R.H. (about 100), arrived at Gingindhlovu on the 23rd, where it was directed to remain pending further orders.Part of the C.M.R. Maxim detachment, after being detained for a few days at Melmoth, came on to Nkandhla and eventually joined Mackay's column.[257]He escorted about 230 Native prisoners from the place referred to to Fort Yolland.[258]A brother of Cetshwayo. Cetshwayo had, years before, attempted to put him to death, when he was obliged to take refuge for some years in Natal.[259]Colonel Maxwell, a firm ruler, with a varied and life-long experience in Natal in different official capacities, was selected for the position, after the Magistrate, who had been defied by Ngobizembe's men when the poll tax was proclaimed, had left Mapumulo.[260]A broad, continuous tract of country, which runs through portions of Mapumulo and Ndwedwe divisions, and extends further south, is reserved entirely for Native occupation. The three districts mentioned had, in 1906, a total population of 80,000 Natives.[261]Qwabe, the progenitor of the tribe was, like the founder of the Zulu tribe, a son of Malandela, who flourished probably at the beginning of the sixteenth century. As Qwabe was Zulu's elder brother, the tribe, though politically subordinate to the Zulu one, is regarded as senior in a social sense.[262]Being of the Zulu tribe, he was, of course, related to Dinuzulu.[263]The following is a digest of interesting evidence given for the prosecution at the trial of Ntshingumuzi, Mbombo and another before the Native High Court. Mbombo was a doctor from Zululand, living near Usutu kraal under Dinuzulu, and one of that Chief's domestic physicians. It was alleged that Ntshingumuzi had called the tribe to his own kraal, early in 1906, to be doctored for war. In response to the summons, the people came carrying sticks and dancing-shields. They formed a circle (umkumbi) in the cattle-kraal. Mbombo then came out of a hut with his face smeared with black powder, and carrying a smoking firebrand. He went round the men, first on the inside and then on the outside of the circle, flourishing the smoking brand wherever he went. He then threw it away and sprinkled the people with medicine, by means of two Native brooms, one being held in each hand. After this, the company was sent by him to a stream. His boy followed with a basket of medicine, which was put into deep running water, so that the water flowed into the basket and out of it. The basket was retained in position by the doctor's boy, assisted by one of the boys from the kraal. The warriors drank of the water, some from the basket itself, and others just below it. This done, they individually moved down the stream and vomited into the water. After washing their bodies, they moved back to the cattle-kraal, chanting as they went in company formation. Thus clean of body and stomach, they dipped their fingers in the war medicine, prepared on heated potsherds, and brought it to their lips. The Chief was not doctored. When sprinkling the warriors, the doctor asked them if they wanted war, they replied in the affirmative. They were then allowed to return to their kraals, but told to sleep on their weapons.—Decisions, Native High Court, 1907, p. 93.It seems that the warriors were also invited by the doctor and Ntshingumuzi to make money contributions, and that shillings and sixpences were given. The money, it was said, was to be sent to the 'Chief of Zululand' (Dinuzulu) to buy drugs, to render their bodies impervious to bullets.[264]These squadrons, when preparing to move from Dundee to Helpmakaar, got orders on the 20th to move to Chaka's Kraal, on the north coast. The destination was altered to Stanger and, on 21st, to Otimati, for which latter place the troops marched from Stanger on the 22nd, having by then been joined by C Battery, N.F.A. (Major Currie); Durban Reserves (Chief Leader N. Chiazzari); and the Indian Stretcher-bearers (Sergt.-Major M.K. Gandhi). The column was placed under the command of Lieut.-Col. W. Arnott.[265]Although giving the command to Arnott, Leuchars accompanied the column, and, with his staff officer (Major Carter), witnessed the operations from the field gun position referred to later on in the text.[266]Probably the first time this type of gun was used in action.[267]The artillery fired about fifteen rounds, viz. shrapnel, fromC. To begin with, the shells burst on graze; later on, good bursts were obtained.[268]This squadron had been sent out in the morning to patrol near Tugela. It arrived at a most opportune moment.

[251]Nkandhla column: C squadron N.C.; N.D.M.R.; Z.M.R.; 150 N.P.; pompom section, N.F.A.; and 3 companies N.R. The N.P. at this time had only one officer, Sub-Inspector F.B.E. White. Royston was, at the same time, given command of a column, known as Royston's Brigade, consisting of R.H.; D.L.I.; 4 companies, B, C, G, and H, Natal Rangers; and one section, 15 pounders, B battery, N.F.A.Before the O.C. Troops left Nomangci, his Intelligence Officer, Capt. E.J.B. Hosking, asked for a squadron in order to search for Bambata's body, said to be lying in the Mome gorge. The application however, could not be granted, as there were no men to spare, and because McKenzie realized that, if Bambata was dead, his body could no doubt be recovered later. Under the circumstances, it was certainly wiser to act on the assumption, weak though it was, that Bambata was still at large, than on the far stronger one that he was already dead, and that, therefore, absolute proof of such fact was necessary.

Before the O.C. Troops left Nomangci, his Intelligence Officer, Capt. E.J.B. Hosking, asked for a squadron in order to search for Bambata's body, said to be lying in the Mome gorge. The application however, could not be granted, as there were no men to spare, and because McKenzie realized that, if Bambata was dead, his body could no doubt be recovered later. Under the circumstances, it was certainly wiser to act on the assumption, weak though it was, that Bambata was still at large, than on the far stronger one that he was already dead, and that, therefore, absolute proof of such fact was necessary.

[252]Fromufaorulufa, a crack.

[253]Conclusive as is the evidence as to Bambata's death, strong rumours nevertheless got afloat shortly after the Rebellion that he was still alive and in hiding, first in one part of Zululand then in another. To this day, there are Natives and Europeans who believe the rumours, but such beliefs have probably been formed without due consideration of the facts here set forth. For the most part, they rest on the mere fact that Bambata's wife, Siyekiwe, did not go into mourning. Under normal conditions, this would undoubtedly have been an important criterion, but the conditions were clearly very abnormal.

[254]This officer had been to explain more thoroughly than could be done on paper the particular problems that confronted the troops at Nkandhla.

[255]It was composed as follows: N.D.M.R. (with one Maxim), 198; Z.M.R. (with three Rexer guns), 99; N.P., 147; N.R. (three companies, A, D and E), 290; N.F.A. (one 15-pounder and two pompoms), 26; departmental corps, 19; staff, 11. Total, 790. There were also Native levies (Lieut. W.H. London).

[256]Woolls-Sampson was ordered to Empandhleni. Leaving his infantry at Ensingabantu store, he reached Empandhleni with the rest of the force on the 22nd. The D.L.I., detached from Royston's brigade, joined Woolls-Sampson, whilst three companies of Rangers (A, D and E), under Boyd-Wilson, became attached to Royston, in lieu of B, C, G and H, whose disposition is referred to further on. The N.F.A. (B battery), moreover, detached from Royston's brigade, returned to Empandhleni to join Mackay, whilst N.F.A. (two guns, 15-pounders), detached from Mackay, joined Royston.Mackay was directed on the 22nd to move to Empandhleni as speedily as possible.Dick, with N.R. (C, F, G and H companies), left on the 23rd for Fort Yolland. He had with him 40 N.N.H. B company, N.R. remained as garrison at Empandhleni. He moved to Middle Drift on the 26th, to Krantzkop on the 28th, and to Thring's Post on the 2nd July.The Cape squadron of R.H. (about 100), arrived at Gingindhlovu on the 23rd, where it was directed to remain pending further orders.Part of the C.M.R. Maxim detachment, after being detained for a few days at Melmoth, came on to Nkandhla and eventually joined Mackay's column.

Mackay was directed on the 22nd to move to Empandhleni as speedily as possible.

Dick, with N.R. (C, F, G and H companies), left on the 23rd for Fort Yolland. He had with him 40 N.N.H. B company, N.R. remained as garrison at Empandhleni. He moved to Middle Drift on the 26th, to Krantzkop on the 28th, and to Thring's Post on the 2nd July.

The Cape squadron of R.H. (about 100), arrived at Gingindhlovu on the 23rd, where it was directed to remain pending further orders.

Part of the C.M.R. Maxim detachment, after being detained for a few days at Melmoth, came on to Nkandhla and eventually joined Mackay's column.

[257]He escorted about 230 Native prisoners from the place referred to to Fort Yolland.

[258]A brother of Cetshwayo. Cetshwayo had, years before, attempted to put him to death, when he was obliged to take refuge for some years in Natal.

[259]Colonel Maxwell, a firm ruler, with a varied and life-long experience in Natal in different official capacities, was selected for the position, after the Magistrate, who had been defied by Ngobizembe's men when the poll tax was proclaimed, had left Mapumulo.

[260]A broad, continuous tract of country, which runs through portions of Mapumulo and Ndwedwe divisions, and extends further south, is reserved entirely for Native occupation. The three districts mentioned had, in 1906, a total population of 80,000 Natives.

[261]Qwabe, the progenitor of the tribe was, like the founder of the Zulu tribe, a son of Malandela, who flourished probably at the beginning of the sixteenth century. As Qwabe was Zulu's elder brother, the tribe, though politically subordinate to the Zulu one, is regarded as senior in a social sense.

[262]Being of the Zulu tribe, he was, of course, related to Dinuzulu.

[263]The following is a digest of interesting evidence given for the prosecution at the trial of Ntshingumuzi, Mbombo and another before the Native High Court. Mbombo was a doctor from Zululand, living near Usutu kraal under Dinuzulu, and one of that Chief's domestic physicians. It was alleged that Ntshingumuzi had called the tribe to his own kraal, early in 1906, to be doctored for war. In response to the summons, the people came carrying sticks and dancing-shields. They formed a circle (umkumbi) in the cattle-kraal. Mbombo then came out of a hut with his face smeared with black powder, and carrying a smoking firebrand. He went round the men, first on the inside and then on the outside of the circle, flourishing the smoking brand wherever he went. He then threw it away and sprinkled the people with medicine, by means of two Native brooms, one being held in each hand. After this, the company was sent by him to a stream. His boy followed with a basket of medicine, which was put into deep running water, so that the water flowed into the basket and out of it. The basket was retained in position by the doctor's boy, assisted by one of the boys from the kraal. The warriors drank of the water, some from the basket itself, and others just below it. This done, they individually moved down the stream and vomited into the water. After washing their bodies, they moved back to the cattle-kraal, chanting as they went in company formation. Thus clean of body and stomach, they dipped their fingers in the war medicine, prepared on heated potsherds, and brought it to their lips. The Chief was not doctored. When sprinkling the warriors, the doctor asked them if they wanted war, they replied in the affirmative. They were then allowed to return to their kraals, but told to sleep on their weapons.—Decisions, Native High Court, 1907, p. 93.It seems that the warriors were also invited by the doctor and Ntshingumuzi to make money contributions, and that shillings and sixpences were given. The money, it was said, was to be sent to the 'Chief of Zululand' (Dinuzulu) to buy drugs, to render their bodies impervious to bullets.

It seems that the warriors were also invited by the doctor and Ntshingumuzi to make money contributions, and that shillings and sixpences were given. The money, it was said, was to be sent to the 'Chief of Zululand' (Dinuzulu) to buy drugs, to render their bodies impervious to bullets.

[264]These squadrons, when preparing to move from Dundee to Helpmakaar, got orders on the 20th to move to Chaka's Kraal, on the north coast. The destination was altered to Stanger and, on 21st, to Otimati, for which latter place the troops marched from Stanger on the 22nd, having by then been joined by C Battery, N.F.A. (Major Currie); Durban Reserves (Chief Leader N. Chiazzari); and the Indian Stretcher-bearers (Sergt.-Major M.K. Gandhi). The column was placed under the command of Lieut.-Col. W. Arnott.

[265]Although giving the command to Arnott, Leuchars accompanied the column, and, with his staff officer (Major Carter), witnessed the operations from the field gun position referred to later on in the text.

[266]Probably the first time this type of gun was used in action.

[267]The artillery fired about fifteen rounds, viz. shrapnel, fromC. To begin with, the shells burst on graze; later on, good bursts were obtained.

[268]This squadron had been sent out in the morning to patrol near Tugela. It arrived at a most opportune moment.

GENERAL CONCENTRATION AT THRING'S POST.—ACTIONS AT MACRAE'S STORE, INSUZE AND PONJWANA.—CONVERGING MOVEMENT ON MESENI'S WARD.

McKenziereached Krantzkop on the same day that the action at Peyana[269]was fought. He met and discussed the position with the Acting Commandant (Major-General Sir John Dartnell)[270]and Leuchars on the 29th June. Owing to its appearing that disaffection was spreading from Mapumulo towards Tongaat, and not being confined to Mapumulo division, as had been supposed, he gave up the idea he had first entertained of trying to force the rebels towards the Tugela, where they would have found themselves opposed by Mansel and Woolls-Sampson on the Zululand side, for one that involved a far more extensive field of operations. In pursuance of the fresh plan, Barker (then at Middle Drift) was detached from Mansel,[271]and, on account of being closer than Mackay, and having mule-transport which had been resting a few days, was sent round by Dalton and Great Noodsberg to take up a position at Esidumbini, that is, on the far or south-western side of the disturbed area. Barker reached Krantzkop from Middle Drift on the 29th. He left the same afternoon and got to Dalton on the 30th. On the night of the 29th, two guns, A Battery, N.F.A., were pushed forward to reinforce him, as it was reported the enemy was in force at the junction of Umvoti and Hlimbitwa rivers. The artillery was sent, as it appeared possible to shell the rebels from the slopes of Noodsberg and drive them back to the sphere of intended operations, viz. that part of Umvoti valley occupied chiefly by Meseni's and Swaimana's people. Woolls-Sampson was instructed to move viâ Bond's Drift and Bulwer to Thring's Post, whilst Mansel, supplemented by such police as, up till then, had been attached to Woolls-Sampson's column, proceeded to the position just vacated by the latter column.[272]A detachment of D.L.I. formed a garrison at Bond's Drift. At this point was a large railway bridge connecting Natal with the coastal districts of Zululand. Mackay's column, by this time hastening to concentrate with the other troops at Thring's Post, reached Krantzkop at mid-day on the 30th, only to move later the same day towards its destination.

The necessity for swiftness of movement was in the air. Every man knew that Mapumulo was one of the most densely-populated districts in Natal. It was a purely Native district in which the ancient superstitions, habits and customs of the Zulus were still generally observed. The country was open and picturesque, with water and pasture abundant. The climate, moreover, was as fresh and exhilarating as that at Nkandhla. Such troops,e.g.Mackay's, as had not as yet clashed with the enemy, betrayed irrepressible eagerness to do so as soon as possible. Not less keenness was displayed by the Transvaalers under Barker, flushed with their recent and brilliantsuccesses in Zululand. Thus, although at this critical moment, some 8,000 rebels were reported to have massed in Umvoti valley, barely a dozen miles from Thring's Post, themoraleof the troops was excellent. And, one and all, the crushing blow at Mome still in their minds, were inspired with the feeling, not only that the concentration taking place was opportune and fitting, but that they were on the winning side and would still further stamp out the Rebellion, be the insurgents 10,000 or 20,000 in number. If ever a man rode a winning horse, knowing he was winning, that man at this moment was McKenzie. Eager co-operation by the Government in every conceivable direction, with a vigilant and sympathetic Governor, and every combatant, white or coloured, animated with a desire to put forth his best,thatwas what all these neo-Usutuites of Natal had to contend with. Thus, although some sharp conflicts with the rebels had still to come, it was a foregone conclusion that the Rebellion in those parts, notwithstanding the formidable numbers that had massed, would be crushed, and crushed in the speediest manner possible.

As soon as Woolls-Sampson reached Bond's Drift on the 1st July, after traversing an exceedingly difficult country for ox-transport, he received orders to push on with all speed to Thring's Post. At Bond's Drift he was joined by a squadron of Royston's Horse that had been recruited in the Cape Colony. He decided to leave his transport at Bond's Drift and to make a night march. Thring's Post was reached at 3 a.m. on the 2nd.

On leaving the drift, Woolls-Sampson instructed Major S.G. Campbell, D.L.I., to establish the garrison referred to with 35 D.L.I. (mounted infantry), 145 D.L.I. and one N.F.A. gun. At 11 a.m. on the 2nd, however, Campbell, then on the Zululand side, received a wire from Woolls-Sampson ordering him to come on at once to Thring's Post with a convoy of twenty-two waggons of supplies, it being imperative for these to reach Thring's Post the same night. By double-spanning (no punt being available, as the water was too low), the waggons were got across, andat 1 p.m. the convoy, consisting of 70 D.L.I., one N.F.A. gun (Beningfield), 50 Z.M.R. (Flindt), and some 15 N.D.M.R., moved forward. When about a mile from Mr. Hulett's house at Bulwer, a Native was seen on the road. As he appeared suspicious, he was made to accompany the convoy. Questioned as to the whereabouts of the enemy, who, it seemed, from a subsequent telegram from Woolls-Sampson, was lurking in the vicinity, the man denied all knowledge of it, though later on said he had heard it might assemble where the springs of two streams were but a few yards apart. A short halt was made at Bulwer and, just after sunset,[273]the convoy pushed on.

In the ordinary course, the best plan, with an enemy close at hand, would have been to lager at Bulwer. It was owing entirely to the stringency of the orders that an advance was made at that late hour. All were warned to be ready in case of attack. Bayonets were fixed and flankers thrown out. With darkness rapidly coming on, the flankers, for fear of being cut off, were not more than thirty yards off the road. Four mounted men of the advanced guard, consisting of a troop Z.M.R., under Capt. D.J.C. Hulley, marched along the road. A couple on the right and another couple on the left did the flanking, whilst seven were in the road in immediate rear of the front four. Behind, with an interval of about fifty yards, came 70 D.L.I. (with a Maxim gun), N.F.A. gun, an ambulance, and 22 waggons. A number of N.D.M.R. were riding on the vehicles. Z.M.R. (35) formed the rear-guard with two Rexer guns. The Native referred to was now noticed staring frequently to the right.

Owing to the likelihood of attack, the men marched as compactly as possible. The worst spot was undoubtedly the long cutting a mile after leaving Bulwer; nothing, however, was seen or heard of the enemy at that point. The little column next moved slowly across the low ridge between the end of the cutting and a small zinc store, known as Macrae's, on a knoll. The small clump of trees between the road and the store could be seen on thehorizon ahead. The country about this part is rugged, though the three or four valleys in the vicinity, if steep, are, just there, small and not deeper than 100 feet. The road was hard and in good condition. After passing the store (at a distance of thirty yards), it is practically level and easy-going the whole way to Thring's Post.

The convoy moved along well, at an average speed of two and a half miles an hour (the usual pace for oxen on good roads). As, after leaving the cutting, danger of attack did not appear so imminent, Capt. Robert Armstrong, N.M.R., was sent on by himself to select a suitable bivouac. The advanced guard now went up the slight incline to the left of the store. When passing, a black dog that was following Hulley stood, and, ruffling its hair, began to growl and bark in the direction of the plantation on the right. Seeing this, Hulley became suspicious; the same instant, noticing a mass of armed Natives springing up from among the trees[274](the sound they made being similar to the rising of a flock of guinea-fowl), he shouted a warning. The guard swung their horses round and began to fall back on the main body in rear as the rebels, some 300 strong, dashed forward from both sides of the road,[275]crying "Usutu! Usutu!" and using their knobsticks as well as assegais. Armstrong, by this time some 200 yards ahead, finding himself cut off, galloped back through the enemy, knocking down two or three, and using his revolver freely as he did so; notwithstanding the heavy fusillade then going on towards him, he succeeded in reaching the main body on the right without mishap. Steady and well-directed volleys were poured into the advancing enemy. He did not assume his characteristic formation, probably owing to the nature of the ground, but moved along the roaden masseand with great dash. The distance from the store to the head of the column was barely eighty yards. The hot and effective fire, however, including case from the 15-pounder, stoppedthe advance, and caused the rebels to break to rear and right of the store.

Two minutes after the attack had failed, reinforcements having, in the meantime, moved up from the rebels' rear, another attack came, slightly to the left of where the first had taken place. This was well met by rifle fire and case, and resulted in a second and speedy retreat.

There being reason to suppose a third would follow, Campbell drew the men up in half-moon formation across the road, the convex side facing the store. The 15-pounder was placed in the centre of the road, the rear-guard was brought up, and the N.D.M.R. directed to fire right and left as necessity arose.

As anticipated, the third attack came, some twenty minutes after the second. It was from the same quarter, and was delivered after darkness had set in. It met with no better luck than the others. During this attack, one of the three Rexer guns was brought into action.[276]

Two hundred yards beyond the store, a road branched off to the left. At this point, a secondimpi, also about 300 strong, had at first lain in waiting, its object evidently being to allow the convoy to get between bothimpis, when it would have been attacked front and rear. The plan failed on account of the foremost body being prematurely forced to take action.

The rebel forces were composed of men of Matshwili's and Ntshingumuzi's tribes, under the indunas Dabulumbimbi and Mvukazi respectively. Mahlanga also accompanied Ntshingumuzi's men as second in command. He remained in rear whilst urging others to charge.

During the engagement, forty rebels were killed and others wounded. Tpr. G. Coll, Z.M.R., was seriously wounded with assegais. He received every attention from Major Campbell, M.D., C.M. (Edin.), but afterwards succumbed to his injuries at Thring's Post.

The dog which had been the first to detect the enemy,and practically saved the column, was accidentally shot by its own side when trying to get back.

The column bivouacked for the night where it had been engaged. Apart from the proximity of the enemy and the darkness, it was impossible to move, because waggons and oxen, owing to Native drivers and voorloopers having run away, had either capsized or become considerably disorganized. Thring's Post was reached at mid-day on the 3rd without further incident.

The smart manner in which these attacks were met and repelled reflects the greatest credit on Campbell and his men, who were not only ambushed at dusk by an enemy far outnumbering them, but were considerably encumbered by slow transport, which had already come some nineteen of the twenty-eight miles to be done that day. Even the 15-pounder was being drawn by oxen. Having regard to the enemy's most determined charges, only remarkable promptitude and resourcefulness on the part of the officer in command turned a threatened calamity into a decisive victory.

But other and even more important developments were occurring almost simultaneously not many miles away. To these we must now hasten to draw the reader's attention.

The last we saw of Barker was his departure from Krantzkop to take up a position at Esidumbini. His force then consisted of four squadrons T.M.R. His orders were to reach Esidumbini as soon as possible and be on high ground overlooking Umvoti Drift at Gaillard's store by daybreak, 3rd July, to co-operate with three other columns from Mapumulo, Thring's Post and Glendale in a general converging movement on Meseni's ward, where, it was known, the rebels had assembled in great force.

A delay occurred at Dalton from 9 a.m. (30th) until 2 p.m., owing to Barker having to wait for supplies. These had to come from Pietermaritzburg and Greytown by rail. He resolved to push forward at 2 p.m., with thirteen waggons, though still somewhat short of supplies. During the same afternoon, he was joined by the guns that had been sent after him.

About 8 p.m., a message came from Chief Leader H. Ehlers, in command of the New Hanover Reserves (70), to say he was in lager at Little Noodsberg Hall, and that intelligence had come in to the effect that he was to be attacked at daybreak on the 1st July by animpithat had been seen during the afternoon on the Great Noodsberg.[277]Barker immediately decided to march to the Hall with three squadrons (each about 100 strong), leaving the fourth as escort to the guns and transport. The Hall was reached at midnight. Everything there was quiet. When daylight appeared, the expected attack was not made. Barker then left for the Great Noodsberg, where he waited till 11 a.m. for the rest of the column to come up. That night the column bivouacked on the Great Noodsberg. A number of scouts had been noticed during the day, all of whom retired suspiciously to the front of the column as it advanced.

By 7 a.m. on the 2nd (Monday), having been joined by the New Hanover Reserves on the preceding afternoon, the column was again on the move.[278]After travelling about a mile and a half, the advanced guard (B squadron, T.M.R.), came upon animpisome 300 strong, concealed on both sides of the road in a wattle plantation (site of the Newspaper Mission Station), which had been thinned out, but had a lot of scrub about it. Steps were now taken todrive the place, with the result that many armed Natives, particularly near their small church, where it had evidently been intended to lie in ambush for the troops, were discovered and shot. Scarcely any other portion of the column, except the advanced guard, came into action. As the enemy retreated, he was pursued by the advanced guard and two troops of A squadron, T.M.R. The operations lasted about twenty minutes. After the fighting was over, the plantation was again, but more thoroughly, driven. About sixty rebels were killed.

At 9.30 a.m., the column moved along easy slopes towards Insuze river, the advanced guard being increased to two squadrons. The strength of the column now was four squadrons, T.M.R. (400); two Maxims and one Colt gun (25); two guns, 15-pounders, N.F.A. (25); and the Reserves (70). There were no Native levies.[279]Many Natives were observed on high ground to the right and left fronts.

After passing Butler's store, about a thousand yards from Insuze Drift, Barker, seeing the place was a suitable one for watering, decided to halt. The column accordingly began to pull out on to level ground immediately across and to the right of the drift. The guard, under Lieut. H.S. Liddle, went forward to establish itself on a long grassy ridge, parallel with the river at that part. This ridge rises to a height of 60 ft. above the drift and increases gradually to 80, 100 and 150, as it extends further to left and right fronts. On the immediate right of the small neck through which the road passes over the ridge, was a police station, consisting of two or three small buildings. Three or four Native kraals were also to be seen on the ridge to the left of the road. With the object of protecting the column against surprise, the guard occupied ground (C), some thirty yards to the right of the station. A troop was sent to kopjeF, whilst a section (four men), under Sergt.-Major S.L. Neville, was sent toB,i.e.within fifteenor twenty yards of the kraal—round which grew a thick, bushy fence.[280]Here three of the men dismounted and were just handing over their horses, with the object of searching that and the other kraals, before occupying a kopje near by, when animpi, some 500 strong, sprang from behind the nearest kraal and hedge, and charged round both sides of the kraal at the men, shouting the usual war-cry as they did so. The latter, having no time to fire, mounted and retired to the guard, wheeling slightly to the right, to avoid masking the fire. The enemy continued their charge. The troops at the drift, as well as the guard, opened a hot fire as they ran. In the meantime, anotherimpi, as strong as the first, began to appear from a bush some forty yards to the guard's right rear. The bush, showing but slightly on top, extended down a steep incline on the far side of the ridge. At this moment, Barker, who was watering his horse when the charge began, galloped to the troops at the police station. Whilst six men were told off to check this latter charge, others were engaged with theimpirushing down from the kraal. It was all a matter of seconds. The guard stood their ground and opened smartly with magazine fire. Notwithstanding the cross-fire, flank and front, that was being poured into them by the men near the drift, some of whom had lined the left bank below the drift, whilst others were on higher ground in rear, theimpisucceeded in getting within a very few yards of the guard. The leader did not fall until within six. On his falling, the remainder broke and ran down the slopes on the far side, looking from the drift. When the action was at its height, Barker, whose horse was wounded with an assegai, instinctively perceived that the critical point was the one to which he had just ridden. He at once sent for reinforcements. Such men as were immediately available dashed up. Neither of the two guns at the drift came into action. Had case been promptly fired at those who came from the kraal,it must have proved very destructive at a range of 400 yards. A few seconds later, however, it became impossible to open, owing to the guns being masked by the reinforcements that sprang forward from the drift to the ridge.

A and B squadrons, as well as two troops of D, were sent in pursuit of the now flying enemy. The two 15-pounders were placed at the kraal from which one of theimpishad been in hiding, whilst the Maxims and Colt gun took up positions on the ridge between the police station and the bush.

The rebels retired in a northerly direction, down Insuze valley. They were hotly pursued by the troops, who rode along the ridges. The field guns fired about twenty rounds with great effect at ranges varying from 600 to 1,800 yards, but were eventually forced to cease fire, on account of the pursuing squadrons too closely approaching the enemy. The machine guns, too, did excellent work.

A thirdimpi, also about 500 strong, which up till then had taken no part whatever in the engagement, was accidentally come upon by A squadron (Lieut. R.V. Saner).[281]The attack made by about fifty of thisimpiwas promptly and effectively repelled, whereupon the rebels joined the others in a general retreat.

At a distance of three or four miles from the scene of action, about thirty fugitives got into a narrow valley (through which the pursuing A squadron had to pass), evidently to lie in ambush. They were, however, seen, and dispersed with loss. Still anotherimpiwas observed by the same squadron about a mile to the left, composed apparently of men who had not been engaged at all. They did not, however, come into action.

Two troops of C squadron were ordered to turn out the rebels who were hiding in the long grass and rushes in a valley between the gun position, near the police station, and the pursuing squadrons.

By 11 a.m., the squadrons, having by that time pursued the enemy for four or five miles, were recalled, as a number of rebels had shown themselves on both flanks near the police station. The troops reassembled by about 1.30 p.m., when they off-saddled for an hour on different parts of the ridge.

The casualties were Tpr. Robert Knight, D squadron, T.M.R., killed; Tprs. Simcox and Tobin, A squadron, T.M.R., wounded. The enemy's losses amounted to about 400.

A local Native Chief, Mahlube, who was with Barker's column when the foregoing action was fought, although many of his tribe had joined the rebels, expressed the following opinion: "My belief is that the enemy intended disputing the drift with the troops as they were watering their horses. The T.M.R. saved themselves by their courageous stand. Had they betrayed the slightest weakness, they would have fared badly, for I could see the enemy were reckless and did not care what happened."

The march to Esidumbini was resumed at a quarter to three. A camp was formed at that place on its being reached two hours later. The night passed without incident.

The demeanour of the local and apparently neutral Natives was unsatisfactory. They were very reticent and pretended to know nothing whatever of the intentions of the enemy. They professed to be ignorant of theimpisthat had attacked but a few miles away at Insuze. One of the Chiefs, Njubanjuba, living on high ground, must have seen the fight and could have given valuable information had he chosen. He maintained a sullen and insolent attitude all the time the column was in the district. It was in view of these facts that Barker decided not to leave camp until after daybreak, a decision which, as it happened, was one McKenzie had also come to, in consequence of information obtained by him on the night of the 2nd that the rebels proposed to attack Barker at dawn on the 3rd.

When the column started (7 a.m.), one squadron, T.M.R.,and the New Hanover Reserves being left to guard the camp, it proceeded along the Mapumulo road towards the high ground overlooking Umvoti Drift.

INSUZEDispositions at the beginning of the actionREFERENCEA =First attacking impiB =PicketsC =Two troops, T.M.R.D =Impi; out of sight at driftE =Where part of enemy gathered when about to retreatF =Hill to which pickets were sentG =Police StationH =Six men posted here to check impi in bushJ =Butler's storeK =Position of 15-pdrs. during enemy's retreat. Maxims and Colt gun were then between G and L(arrow)=Direction of enemy's retreat(crescent)=Enemy(block)=Waggon(dashes)=Swamp, with long grass and rushes(circle)=Kraal

On the march, a number of Natives was seen on a ridge at Sikota's kraal in the neighbourhood of a prominent detached hill Ponjwana.[282]Word was passed on to the advanced guard, A squadron (78), who, however, had already perceived the rebels' movements. As further attack was imminent, the main body was kept within two to three hundred yards of the advanced guard. About three miles from Esidumbini Mission Station, the Mapumulo road passes over two well-defined hills about a thousand yards apart, and connected by a hog-backed neck. The country on either side of the road is steep and thickly covered with thorn bush. As the road approaches Sikota's kraal from the hog-backed hill, the ground rises immediately on the left to about fifty feet above the road, such elevation extending for about 200 yards, when the road enters and ascends open ground for another 200 yards. It is about a hundred and twenty yards from the road at this point that the kraal referred to was situated. On the immediate right of the road is a dense, precipitous bush, 100 yards broad at the top and extending some 400 yards down into an enormous, steep, and wooded valley. On the left of the road where Sikota's kraal was, and opposite that kraal, is a patch of open, high ground extending some two or three hundred yards, and about a hundred and fifty broad. To the west of this, the country falls away into another great valley, similar to the one already referred to. At the front, again looking from the road where it is nearest the kraal, the ground slopes gently to the front and right front, but more sharply to the left, where the trees grow more closely together.

As the column came along the hog's back, it became a little "crushed up," whereupon the advanced guardcantered forward a little way to the knoll on which Ngembudi's kraal stood.[283]At this point, a section was marching some thirty to sixty yards ahead along the road, whilst half a dozen scouts moved out to their positions on the right and left fronts, owing to the ground there lending itself to better deployment. No sooner, however, was the top of the knoll reached atAthan the enemy, some three to four hundred strong, was observed 150 yards to the right front, that is, some way down an incline, but not concealed from view of the leading section. The scouts fell back to the troop in rear, which, at the same time, advanced to a point in sight of the enemy and immediately lined across the road.

Fire was opened at the rebels then swiftly charging, with uplifted shields, like a hive of bees upset, over somewhat uneven ground. Some of the guard at first fired from the saddle, aiming rather at the oncoming mass than at particular individuals.

The men, ordered to dismount, handed over their horses to be held, and, dropping quickly on one knee, opened a hot and rapid fire. The charge was direct and determined. Some of the enemy came to within ten feet of the rifles when, their centre by that time blown out by the first-class marksmen that happened to be among the troops, they swerved off to right and left. Those going to the right were in the act of passing between the flank and the kraal, when C squadron was moved smartly to the right, only to come to so close quarters with the strong force then at and about the kraal as to be obliged to fall back to hold the lineBindicated on the plan. Barker had, in the meantime, moved up from the main body, some 200-300 yards in rear at the moment of attack, and addressed himself to the situation on the right, then the most critical. At the same time, the left flank being threatened, support was also pushed forward there. This caused the rebels opposite that flank to retreat to west and down the steep inclines.

After the main fire had been turned towards theimpiat the kraal, thatimpiwas also repulsed, when it forthwith precipitated itself into the dense bush on the immediate east of the kraal, and from thence down the great, steep valleys and ravines which were near at hand.

PONJWANA(SIKOTA'S KRAAL)SKETCH PLANDispositions at the beginning of the actionREFERENCEA =Where scouts first caught sight of impi at DB =Line held by troops when pressed on right flankC =Ngembudi's kraalD =Impi that attacked first(dashes)=T.M.R. scouts(crescent)=The enemy(arrow)=Lines of enemy's retreat

Just as the situation in front was becoming critical, that is, about the end of the first charge, another and different body of the enemy, about 200 strong, charged down on the rear-guard from that part of the hog's back which rises fifty feet above the road on the left, whilst yet another, though smallerimpi, attacked from the right rear.

The scouts that were in rear galloped up to the last two troops which, turning left and right about as the position required, proceeded to pour in a hot fire at the charging enemy, then some 100-150 yards away. The rushes were stopped, whereupon the rebels broke and fled down the valley on the right, to join those who had already fled from the kraal into the valley on that side.

When the attacks had been beaten off, Barker at once sent A and B squadrons in pursuit, but, owing to the extremely broken nature of the ground and to the extensive thorn-bush, the majority of the rebels escaped. It was impossible for the 15-pounders, particularly during the retreat, to be used with effect. During the engagement, Capt. J.T. Mitchell was wounded. About 100 of the enemy were killed.

Whilst Barker's column was thus brilliantly holding its own, each time against animpilarger than itself, a large European force was being concentrated with surprising rapidity at Thring's Post, the place selected by McKenzie as his general base of operations.

Arnott, leaving Otimati at 2 p.m. on the 1st, reached Thring's Post the same afternoon.

After explaining the situation to the Acting Commandant and McKenzie, and discussing the future plan of campaign, Leuchars left Elandskop with the U.F.F. on the 29th and reached Thring's Post on the 1st.

Mackay moved from Mvuzana stream near Nkandhla at 8 a.m. on the 28th June, and crossed the Tugela at MiddleDrift on the same day. On the 29th, leaving his ox-transport to ascend Krantzkop mountain during the afternoon and following morning, he reached Elandskop at noon. Unable to march before noon on the 30th, because of the transport, the column nevertheless succeeded in arriving at Thring's Post early on the 2nd July,i.e.a few hours after Woolls-Sampson had come in from Zululand. He was thereupon joined by C squadron, N.C. (which had, for about five weeks, served as bodyguard to O.C. Troops), as well as by squadron D of the same regiment.[284]

Thus, between 27th June (day of the action at Peyana) and the 2nd July, the situation in Mapumulo division had so far changed that, instead of less than 200 troops being in the district, there were over 2,500 at Thring's Post, and 500 with Barker at Esidumbini.

In addition to the steps taken to cope with the situation in that part of the Colony, and to Mansel being posted in the neighbourhood of Isiwasamanqe in Zululand, Dick was ordered to proceed with the N.R. direct to Mapumulo, leaving half a company to garrison Krantzkop, whilst the detachment of N.R.R., then at Krantzkop, was ordered to Greytown.

The Chief Leader at Krantzkop got orders to mobilize at once the First, Second and Third Reserves.

The detachment of D.L.I. at Pomeroy was sent to Ndwedwe viâ Verulam. The posts at Fort Wales and Sibindi in Umsinga division were evacuated, the N.R.R., up to then garrisoning those places, moving to Pomeroy to replace the D.L.I.

The detachment of D.L.I. at Melmoth proceeded to Eshowe and from there, with as many others of the D.L.I. as could be spared by O.C. Eshowe, went to join their regiment at Bond's Drift.

Whilst camped at Otimati, Mackay decided to send a Native spy to Meseni's principal kraal with the object of finding out as much as he could about the movements, strength and intentions of the enemy. Nkantolo, the man in question, left at 4 a.m. on the 2nd. He rejoined Mackay's column at Thring's Post at 9 p.m. the same day, to report that, disguised as a rebel, he had been to the principal kraal Mtandeni, where he learnt that a vastimpihad been mobilized and was camped in the immediate vicinity of the kraal; and that portions of the force were already out guarding parts of the valley where it was supposed the troops might attempt to enter. He heard of the fight that had already taken place that day with Barker at Insuze, and that, with a view of checking the latter's advance—it being already known his column was a small one—animpihad been sent towards Esidumbini to lie in ambush on the road to be travelled. The same man also ascertained that, on the preceding Sunday afternoon (1st), a European who was passing through the district on a bicycle from Mapumulo towards the coast, had been captured by the rebels, brought to Mtandeni, and there murdered and mutilated.

On this intelligence being brought to the notice of Colonel McKenzie, he decided at once to inform Barker of his danger. It was accordingly arranged that Nkantolo, notwithstanding that he had already walked some twenty-five miles that day, should take a despatch to Barker warning him not to leave Esidumbini before dawn, which, according to instructions previously issued to that officer by McKenzie, it was necessary for him to do. In view, however, of the fact that the distance from Thring's Post to Esidumbini by the most direct route is not less than twenty miles, the task, in spite of the Native's assurances to the contrary, appeared a greater one than he could possibly perform, especially as, seeing the intervening country was under arms, it was imperative to use a still longer route to avoid contact with the enemy. When Nkantolo, having travelled through the night, was approaching his destination, he heard the fire at Ponjwanaand, afraid of being mistaken by Barker's force for a rebel, decided to make another detour to Esidumbini. After reaching that place and reporting himself, he at once followed the route taken by Barker, passing over the battle-field at Ponjwana, and delivering his message about noon in the neighbourhood of Umvoti Drift. Thus, between 4 a.m. on the 2nd and noon on the 3rd, a distance of not less than sixty miles had been covered by the messenger. This is but an illustration of what many Zulus are capable of doing. Such extraordinary mobility is but one of the factors that has to be taken into account in a war between Europeans and Natives.

Reference has already been made to the general plan of converging on Meseni's valley, and the attempt made by Barker to carry out his share of that plan.

The instructions to Woolls-Sampson were to proceed to Mapumulo and, picking up there the N.M.R. and a detachment of C.M.R. Maxims, to make a night march to a kopje overlooking the drift (Gaillard's), where the Mapumulo-Esidumbini road crosses the Umvoti. He was to arrive at that spot before dawn, and there co-operate with the columns of Mackay on the left and Barker on the right.

Mackay was to proceed viâ Hlonono Mission Station, close to the scene of Arnott's recent action, towards Meseni's principal kraal, and there co-operate with Woolls-Sampson on the right and Leuchars on the left.

Leuchars[285]was to move after dark into Glendale valley, along the main road from Kearsney. He was then to bivouack for the night, and move sufficiently early on the 3rd to co-operate with Mackay and Barker.

From all reports that had been received, it appeared the main force of the rebels was concentrated at Meseni's Mtandeni kraal, hence the nominal objective of each of the columns was this kraal. They converged thereon, roughly speaking, from the four points of the compass. McKenzie gave the column commanders clearly to understand that the movements of the different columns were to be of an encircling nature, with the object of hemming the enemy in, and it was with that object in view that they were to co-operate with one another as much as possible.

Colonel McKenzie, who was accompanied by the Acting Commandant, attached himself to Mackay's column. This force reached Hlonono Mission Station just as day broke. As the troops were proceeding down a ridge, a party of rebels was surprised in a thorn valley on the right. This valley was swept through by the Natal Carbineers, one squadron being sent to a ridge on the right of the valley. The main body passed down the quickly-descending ridges towards Meseni's kraal, hurriedly searching the country as they went.

On Mackay's column reaching Mtandeni, the kraal was found completely deserted. Two separate camps of temporary war-huts had been erected within 300 yards of the kraal at the rear, capable of accommodating 1,500 men. Many signs of recent occupation were observed, such as bones of cattle that had been slaughtered, pots, etc. The kraal had evidently been hurriedly vacated, as numerous articles, such as dishes, mats, spoons, ornaments, etc., etc., were found lying about in the huts. A search was made for the European said to have been murdered. A bicycle with satchel attached, containing articles of clothing evidently belonging to the deceased, was found. Later on, under a tree, 150 yards from the kraal, the corpse of the murdered man was also come upon. The body had been horribly mutilated. The head had been cut off and removed; and the whole of the intestines, heart, lungs, liver, stomach, etc., extracted. The right hand, cut off at the wrist, was missing, whilst the pad or sole of one of the feet had also been cut away and removed.

The body was shortly after identified as that of Mr. Oliver Edward Veal, of the Public Works Department, who had left Pietermaritzburg in the hope of seeing a friend attached to Colonel McKenzie's staff. Deceased left Pietermaritzburg for Greytown by train on the 30th June, and from thence viâ Krantzkop to Mapumulo on a bicycle. At the latter place, he was warned of the danger of entering Meseni's ward but, having already come further than he had intended, he decided to go on to Tongaat and catch the train back to Pietermaritzburg on the Sunday. He was quite unarmed. He, moreover, not being a combatant, was in mufti. A party of rebels caught him half a mile from Gaillard's Drift and triumphantly conveyed him to Mtandeni. Meseni was informed of what had happened. He ordered Veal to be conveyed back to Mapumulo, but the large force there congregated was in no mood to carry out the order. Macabacaba, the fighting induna, not only ignored his Chief's orders, but identified himself with those who clamoured for Veal's being put to death. The rebels accused the latter of being a spy. Had he been able to speak Zulu, he might have been able to clear himself of the charge. As it was, Meseni concluded he was not a spy; it was on that account he gave the order he did. That the Chief's order should have been ignored shows that he had practically lost control of the tribe. Instead, however, of actively interfering, he allowed the rebels to do what they wished. And so this perfectly innocent young man, actuated by no other motive whatever than that of getting back to duty as speedily as possible, was struck, stabbed, and fearfully mutilated in the manner already described. The principal motive of the murder was, no doubt, to enable the local war-doctor to obtain parts of the body for doctoring the impi and rendering it so terrible to its opponents as to ensure victory on a conflict occurring.

There is no truth in the rumour that the sole of deceased's foot was removed whilst he was still alive, and that he was then compelled to walk. Zulus are undoubtedly barbarous in certain respects, but to say thatthe above took place is a libel. If proof be wanted, we have it in the fact that the foot was closely examined on the body being found, when no trace whatever of dirt attaching thereto was detected.

The killing of this fine young fellow, loved by all who knew him, only shows what Natives were still capable of during the Rebellion, and how necessary it was to guard against members of any regiment becoming detached and wandering about in the enemy's country.

Another point is that whereas the rebel Chiefs generally protected civilians as far as they could, such protection could not be relied on, especially in the case of Meseni who, though present, was unable or did not care to assert his authority. In spite of all professions by the ringleaders that European non-combatants, including women and children, would not be molested, there was no guarantee whatever that a time would not arise when indiscriminate massacres would take place. Thus, the only way of checking these possible catastrophes was to do as McKenzie did, viz. so punish the rebels as to show them that rebellion, even in incipient forms, would be stamped out with the utmost severity. Had Chiefs been able to exercise effective control, especially when the passions of their people were aroused, a corresponding modification might have been introduced by European officers in dealing with the situation, but with instances as revolting as the one described, no other course was left than to suppress the tendencies in the sternest manner.

Meseni's kraal was burnt and Veal's remains buried close to where they were found.

McKenzie moved to an elevated position about a mile from Mtandeni, from where he generally directed the operations.

Woolls-Sampson, after leaving Mapumulo at 2 a.m. on the 2nd, advanced due south towards Wome kopje, overlooking Gaillard's Drift. Difficulty was experienced, when compelled to leave the road, through his not having a proper guide. A party of rebel scouts was surprised just before dawn—half a dozen of them were shot and twocaptured. The night-march was otherwise without incident. As soon as it got light, about forty of the enemy were observed on top of a steep hill, Mpumulwana, about a mile from Wome. There were other signs that the enemy was concentrating there—the beginning of exceedingly broken country, covered with thorn trees. Woolls-Sampson sent B squadron N.M.R., dismounted, under Rattray, to dislodge the rebels. After going half-way up the steep hill in close order with bayonets fixed, Rattray sent Tpr. Le Mesurier on horseback to draw the enemy. The squadron followed close in rear. Le Mesurier rode practically up to the enemy, whom he found to be 300 to 400 strong. He then turned and galloped down the incline. The rebels, armed with shields and assegais, at once began to charge. As they appeared over the brow, they were met by the fire of Rattray's men. Instead of continuing, they drew back to the crest from whence they had come, and there once more concealed themselves as best they could.

Woolls-Sampson now sent the N.D.M.R. (under Abraham) at the gallop, with Z.M.R. and R.H., to a hill on the enemy's right flank, which commanded the rear of the hill occupied by the enemy. N.D.M.R. opened fire from right rear when the rebels, seeing they might be surrounded, retreated down the slopes in their rear towards the Umvoti river. As they made off, they were closely pursued by Rattray. Many were shot in the pursuit, especially by the Maxims. The remainder of the force was brought up, when the bush was driven to the river.

The troops were halted some 300 yards from Mpumulwana. 'A' squadron, N.M.R., was now sent to cover the right flank, as well as endeavour to bring fire to bear on the part of the hill occupied by the enemy. In the meantime, C squadron went forward to support Rattray.

When the N.D.M.R., after operating on a ridge almost parallel to that on which the main body was, reached the base of a conical hill, still nearer Wome, on their left front, a separate and considerable body of Nativescharged on to them from the top. The attack was immediately met and the rebels, having no opportunity to form up, hid themselves, after suffering severe loss, in scrub, dongas, etc. Whilst crossing some mealie-fields which appeared to be clear of rebels, Abraham and Lieut. H.G. James, Z.M.R., who were riding together with a few men, were suddenly attacked by rebels, up till then carefully concealed. Both officers used their revolvers with effect at close quarters.

In the operations about Mpumulwana and Wome, 102 of the enemy were killed.

It so happened that many of the rebels who escaped from Woolls-Sampson came in the direction of Mackay's column, when, later in the morning, very heavy losses were inflicted on them by the Carbineers in the scrub and thorns on both sides of the river—especially on the left bank.

Woolls-Sampson moved the whole of his force to the river, but although at once getting in touch with Mackay, he failed to do so with Barker, whose delay was, of course, accounted for by his having been engaged with otherimpisat Ponjwana, as already related.

Now, as to Leuchars. At daybreak, after entering Glendale valley, the column worked up the river. At a place where the Umvoti flows close to a precipitous and thickly-wooded slope, the road was found well barricaded with trees. The removal of the obstruction delayed the advance for about fifteen minutes. On the edge of some cane-fields, a few Natives were seen running into a densely-wooded valley on the right. Two shells were fired at them. Leuchars ascertained from Indians living there that the rebels were in the habit of secreting themselves in the cane, and that they were there then. It, therefore, became necessary to proceed with caution and to take the column off the road and through a field of young cane. Further delay arose through an ambulance waggon capsizing.

On the mill being reached, it was found that a store had been burnt and a house looted.

Leuchars' principal difficulties, however, arose after the road came to an end beyond the mill, when the guns and ambulance were obliged to proceed along trackless country, for the most part covered with thorn bush.

It was 2.30 p.m. when he sighted Mackay's column on a knoll near Umvoti river.

After his action at Ponjwana, Barker resumed his march at 9 a.m., and arrived at Gaillard's store, Umvoti Drift, shortly before noon. His progress through the intervening thorn country was retarded somewhat owing to being occasionally threatened by the enemy, though without any serious attempt to come to close quarters. After conferring with McKenzie, he moved back to Esidumbini, reaching his camp at 7.30 p.m. after an uneventful march.

In the afternoon, Mackay's, Woolls-Sampson's and Leuchars' columns proceeded to high ground on the road, about 1,000 yards from Gaillard's Drift (left side), and close to the spot where, two days before, Veal had been caught. Here the combined forces bivouacked for the night.

The total number of rebels killed by the columns during the day was 444, and about 400 cattle were captured.

On the following day (4th July), McKenzie decided to remain in Umvoti valley and to continue the sweeping operations generally in a northerly direction. Leuchars operated on the left, Mackay in the centre and Woolls-Sampson on Mackay's right. Each column traversed exceedingly rugged country during the day, but practically none of the enemy were met with in any force. All the rebels had apparently dispersed. Mackay proceeded viâ Misi hill into Swaimana's ward where, owing to not having vacated their kraals as instructed to do, two brothers of Swaimana—loyalists—were unfortunately shot in the belief that they were rebels.

Nineteen rebels were killed and a large quantity of stock captured during the day.

The columns—searching the country as they went—returned to Thring's Post on the 5th.

Attached to the Natal Carbineers was Lance-CorporalV.J.W. Christopher. When in the neighbourhood of Hlonono Mission Station, he went to a kraal to make investigations. As he entered the place, a rebel, who had armed and concealed himself behind a fence, immediately pounced upon and stabbed him and his horse to death. The body was removed and buried at Ladysmith.

Although the combined operations in Umvoti valley, on account of Barker having been opposed at Ponjwana and Leuchars having to bring his guns and ambulance along rough and roadless country, did not achieve McKenzie's principal object, viz. establishing a cordon round Meseni's entire force, they were nevertheless successful in stamping out rebellion in that part. As late as the evening of the 2nd, all reports had gone to show that some 6,000 to 7,000 Natives were under arms in Umvoti valley. But, as the result of the vigorous operations of the 3rd, 4th and 5th, the rebel forces, defeated in action at two points, had entirely vanished. And, with their kraals destroyed and stock captured, no opportunity was allowed them to reorganize with any prospect of success.

Theterrainhere, though difficult to operate in, differed greatly from that at Nkandhla in having no strongholds of any importance. Had the valley been dealt with piece-meal, it is more than probable hostilities would have been kept up longer than they were, and been accompanied with far greater loss of life to the rebels than actually took place. Although the punishment was not as severe as it might have been, it was heavy enough to show Natives the futility of taking up arms against organized European troops. The swoop on Meseni's valley from four widely-separated points was a fine conception, and, although not as effective as it might have been, and was intended by McKenzie to be, the rebels saw enough to realize that an octopus had come down upon them from the surrounding heights, against whose powerful and far-reaching tentacles their own efforts were puny and feeble in the extreme. The reader may remember that a Zulu dreads nothing so much as being surrounded or hemmed in. The very effort to do this on the 3rd no doubt causedmany of them to be afflicted with nightmare, for that was the day on which, as they say, "every hill was covered with European troops, which, moving closer and closer, threatened and meted out destruction on every side."

On intelligence being brought in at 2 p.m. on the 6th that Meseni was in hiding a short distance off, three squadrons hurriedly left Thring's Post, only, however, to find, after proceeding a couple of miles, that the place was at least nine miles from camp, and required a much larger force to deal with. The troops accordingly returned to camp. Orders were issued the same night that all mounted troops of Leuchars', Woolls-Sampson's and Mackay's columns were to move out at 3.30 a.m. on the 7th in the direction of Glendale. Fortunately there was a bright moon.

Woolls-Sampson's men took the right. After making a long detour, they, approaching on the west, reached the appointed rendezvous, Mzonono gorge, shortly after daybreak, and got into touch with Mackay, who had moved to the east side from the north. Leuchars was to have closed the bottom end from the south-east, but he arrived late, owing to having been conducted along the wrong road. McKenzie, who was with Mackay's column, caused the bush in the gorge to be driven, but without result. Woolls-Sampson's and Mackay's men subsequently went to the top of hills overlooking the Kearsney sugar plantations and searched some caves near there. Leuchars, in the meantime, drove a valley on the east. During the day, thirteen prisoners were taken and six rebels killed. Tpr. Reed, N.C., accidentally shot himself through one of his lungs, but the injury luckily did not prove fatal.

The troops returned the same afternoon to Thring's Post, without having been able to ascertain the Chief's whereabouts.[286]

With the object of dispersing a body of rebels, said to be between Spitzkop and Riet valley, Barker was instructed to move his column towards the upper portion of Umhlali river. A company N.R., was, at the same time, detached from Royston's column (which had just reached Dundee), and ordered to proceed by rail to join Barker.

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