FOOTNOTES:

Intelligence was, at the same time, received that Dinuzulu had, two or three weeks previously, been "doctored for war by a Native doctor, either from Pondoland or Basutoland," and that certain ceremonies had been carried out similar to those in vogue in the days of Tshaka.[317]

An old Boer farmer of Vryheid district, Mr. Conrad Meyer, long a friend of Dinuzulu, paid the latter a visit in October, when, after several interviews, he came to much the same opinion as to the Chief's loyalty as Sir Charles Saunders had so consistently held during 1906.

Whilst the Government, with the foregoing and other facts before it, was seriously considering what action should be taken, an attempt was made (7th October) to murder Mapoyisa, principal son and heir of the Chief Mbuzo, as well as another Native of the same tribe. The evidence went to show that the two would-be murderers had come from Usutu kraal. But people had hardly grasped the facts connected with this attempt when another cold-blooded murder was committed, this time on an elderly and respected Chief, Mpumela. The lives of two other loyalists were attempted about the same time (November). An attempt is also said to have been made on a storekeeper, George, formerly in the Police. His store, about six miles from Usutu, was destroyed by fire. It is, however, possible the latter occurrence was due to lightning.

Information also came in that the ringleaders of the previous year's rebellion, Mangati and Cakijana, had for long been harboured by Dinuzulu, although well knowing that warrants were out for their arrest. The former, captured in November in Vryheid district, stated on oath that Dinuzulu had been and was still instigating the murders. He (Dinuzulu), in short, seemed "determined," as the Administrator pointed out to the Secretary of State in August, "on a course of self-aggrandizement, of cool defiance or indifference to the wishes of the Government, and of open hostility to those Natives who had been loyal; and it was clear that his attitude and actions were becoming a serious cause of unrest and apprehension amongst the loyal Natives, and a menace to the peace of the country."

It was in view of all these and other circumstances, too numerous to refer to, that the Government, supported by the Attorney-General, ultimately decided to issue a warrant for Dinuzulu's arrest on a charge of high treason,[318]and to mobilize a large portion of the Militia to reinforce the Police when proceeding to execute the warrants.

For other reasons, Dinuzulu became very agitated about this time. The arrival of the Police on the 30th September, and especially their being stationed at Nongoma, twelve miles from his kraal, greatly upset him. He contemplated leaving Usutu and establishing himself on the Black Umfolozi, where the hunt had recently been held. He dispatched earnest letters to the Governor, Prime Minister, and Under Secretary for Native Affairs, asking for fair play, expressing confidence in his rulers, etc.; he followed these up, on the day that the troops reached Zululand (3rd December), with an urgent message through the Magistrate, Nongoma, portions of which ran as follows:

"I have heard that it is the intention of Government to send and take me by surprise shortly after Christmas.... I do not understand this, and want to know if there is any truth in it, as I know of no wrong that I have done. If Government think I am in the wrong over anything, why does it not place me on trial and punish me if found guilty? I am also surprised to hear that the court-house at Nongoma has been placed in a state of defence. Police are camped all round it.... Nothing is wrong in this division, as far as I know. The only place where things are wrong is Nkandhla division, and I am not responsible for what happens there; and in my opinion, ... these murders are being committed there on account of Government having given cattle which belonged to rebels to different people in that division, and the original owners of these cattle resent seeing their cattle in other people's possession."

In the meantime, however, seeing that the several murders and other crimes against public order recently committed in Zululand had caused widespread unrest and fear of violence to law-abiding people, and as, in order to restore order and confidence, it was imperative to arrest all persons concerned in the crimes, a proclamation was issued on the 30th November directing the strengthening of the forces in Zululand to enable the arrests to be effected. Orders were, at the same time, issued for themobilization already referred to of the greater portion of the Active Militia. The troops actually called out were 188 officers and 1,928 of other ranks.

There was good reason to suppose that Dinuzulu's immediately availableimpiwas comparatively insignificant, notwithstanding his hasty endeavours to augment it under the shallow pretext of the young men being required to 'weed his gardens.' Such appeals had been made to Chiefs living outside Zululand, viz. in Vryheid and Ngotshe districts. Mr. Meyer had reported "one sees at a glance that he (Dinuzulu) is a man of rank without followers." That the force dispatched to deal with him was so overwhelmingly strong, was due solely to the Government's wish to overawe armed rebels or others at Usutu against all forms of resistance. It was recognized that an outbreak at Usutu might be taken by the Zulus as the signal for a general rising. Another reason was that Silwana, a powerful Chief of Weenen, whose levy, it will be remembered, behaved unsatisfactorily during the Rebellion, was said to be calling on his people to rebel.

Units mobilized with the same remarkable rapidity that had characterized their movements in the preceding year, and were ordered to proceed by rail direct to Gingindhlovu. This station, on the Zululand coast and nearly twenty miles from Eshowe, was reached on the evening of the 3rd December.[319]On the same day, martial law was proclaimed, to operate, however, in Zululand only. Owing to the sudden, and necessarily sudden, mobilization, no preparation was made to fill up the places of those who had been called away. The ex-Commandant (Colonel Bru-de-Wold) was hastily summoned from Port Shepstone and asked to arrange for the defence of Natal in the event of hostilitiesbreaking out in Zululand. The necessary organization was carried out in a thorough-going manner. The Reserves in sixteen districts (videAppendix VII.) were called out and ordered to patrol their respective districts.

As soon as Dinuzulu's message was received, the Government, although the troops were by then well on their way to Gingindhlovu, thought it necessary to advise the Chief that there was no intention to take him by surprise, and that the Chief Commissioner of Police was being sent "to require him to surrender himself in order that charges against him might be tried." He was, at the same time, directed to proceed to Nongoma and there await the police officer.

A communication such as this could not, of course, do otherwise than bring about confusion among the troops that were concentrating at Gingindhlovu, through altering elaborate arrangements which had already been made for their subsequent advance.

The position, from the Government's point of view, was a difficult one, but with martial law proclaimed, and the troops actually in the field, the stronger and better course, perhaps, would have been to have referred Dinuzulu's communication to the O.C. Troops to deal with as he might have considered necessary under the circumstances. As it was, his hands were tied, and his plans considerably upset.

That the Ministry were not alone in their desire for settlement of a trouble inherited to some extent from their predecessors, can be seen from the following remarks by the Governor, Sir Matthew Nathan, to the Secretary of State: "Though I am doubtful whether this situation would have arisen if Ministers had at once, after the suppression of last year's Rebellion, or even at a later date, adopted the policy of amnesty and conciliation, and had thereby prevented Dinuzulu from acquiring the power he has done by protecting outlaws and by reason of the country remaining unsettled, yet I recognize that, under existing conditions, with a growing tale of unpunished murders attributed throughout the country to that Chief,it was not possible for the Government to remain inactive."[320]

The previous Government had, however, been out of office for over a year. During such time, the new Government had had, and had taken advantage of, opportunities of ameliorating the conditions as far as was possible. More was to follow as soon as time had been given to introduce some of the legislation recommended by the Native Affairs Commission. If the Government erred in not declaring an amnesty sooner, or in not releasing prisoners in larger lots than it did, that gave Dinuzulu no right to persist in disloyal and treasonable behaviour. At no moment could a general amnesty have cured such position as then existed. The fact that such policy had answered in other parts of the world, or even in Zululand after the 1888 disturbances, cannot be taken as a formula to apply to circumstances which happen to be similar in a few respects. Had a general amnesty been attempted sooner than it was, it would have been a blunder and enabled Dinuzulu, especially as rumours were current in Zululand at the time thathewas going to secure an amnesty, to pose as liberator-general, although known to be actively and flagrantly disloyal. It would have been to place a premium on still more serious rebellion in the future. The only remedy was the one adopted, namely, to remove the source of mischief once for all. That the Ministers were not mistaken in the view they took, will be seen further on. As it was, between July and the issue of the warrants for Dinuzulu's arrest, some 500 to 600 prisoners had been released, whilst, as soon as the arrest was made, Ministers decided to release the remainder at short intervals, 300 at a time.

FOOTNOTES:[310]Report. Native Affairs Commission, 25th July, 1907.[311]Deposition by Mgunguluzo, 1st Feb. 1907.[312]Cd. 3,888, p. 83.[313]It will be remembered that Mr. Saunders, while at Usutu, got a telegram saying Bambata had broken into rebellion, and that he told Dinuzulu this, whereupon the latter and his indunas were, says the Commissioner, "unanimous in their expressions of indignation; their frank demeanour left no doubt in my mind that these expressions were perfectly genuine and that Dinuzulu and his people were not in any way associated with Bambata and his doings."—Cd. 3,207, p. 31. And yet the wife and children of the very man whose acts they had unanimously condemned to the principal executive officer of the Government were not 100 yards away as they were speaking![314]It was definitely proved later that Dinuzulu was in possession of unregistered guns at the time of his arrest (December, 1907). Hence his opportunity of conforming to the Governor's advice extended over six months.[315]Minute, C.N.A. to Prime Minister, 23rd Aug. 1907.[316]Administrator (Mr. W.H. Beaumont) to Secretary of State, 29th Aug. 1907.[317]Minute by Magistrate, Ndwandwe district, 29th Sept. 1907.[318]There was also another warrant, charging him with being in possession of unregistered firearms.[319]Of the Carbineers, one of the newspapers reported: "They were the first to get orders ... and in an incredibly short time were on their way to Zululand. The regiment is to be congratulated on being referred to in a despatch by the Prime Minister to the Governor as having performed 'one of, if not the quickest mobilizations on record.'" Receiving orders to mobilize on the 30th November, the Headquarters squadrons entrained at 5.15 p.m. on the 2nd, and reached Gingindhlovu at 5.35 a.m. on the 3rd December.[320]Cd. 3,888, p. 182.

[310]Report. Native Affairs Commission, 25th July, 1907.

[311]Deposition by Mgunguluzo, 1st Feb. 1907.

[312]Cd. 3,888, p. 83.

[313]It will be remembered that Mr. Saunders, while at Usutu, got a telegram saying Bambata had broken into rebellion, and that he told Dinuzulu this, whereupon the latter and his indunas were, says the Commissioner, "unanimous in their expressions of indignation; their frank demeanour left no doubt in my mind that these expressions were perfectly genuine and that Dinuzulu and his people were not in any way associated with Bambata and his doings."—Cd. 3,207, p. 31. And yet the wife and children of the very man whose acts they had unanimously condemned to the principal executive officer of the Government were not 100 yards away as they were speaking!

[314]It was definitely proved later that Dinuzulu was in possession of unregistered guns at the time of his arrest (December, 1907). Hence his opportunity of conforming to the Governor's advice extended over six months.

[315]Minute, C.N.A. to Prime Minister, 23rd Aug. 1907.

[316]Administrator (Mr. W.H. Beaumont) to Secretary of State, 29th Aug. 1907.

[317]Minute by Magistrate, Ndwandwe district, 29th Sept. 1907.

[318]There was also another warrant, charging him with being in possession of unregistered firearms.

[319]Of the Carbineers, one of the newspapers reported: "They were the first to get orders ... and in an incredibly short time were on their way to Zululand. The regiment is to be congratulated on being referred to in a despatch by the Prime Minister to the Governor as having performed 'one of, if not the quickest mobilizations on record.'" Receiving orders to mobilize on the 30th November, the Headquarters squadrons entrained at 5.15 p.m. on the 2nd, and reached Gingindhlovu at 5.35 a.m. on the 3rd December.

[320]Cd. 3,888, p. 182.

DINUZULU EXPEDITION.—SURRENDER OF DINUZULU.—CALLING IN OF FIREARMS.—SEARCHING FOR OUTSTANDING REBELS.

TheGovernment's decision to arrest Dinuzulu was communicated at once to the Commandant. This officer had already been put in command of the Natal Police Reserve, under Dimmick, at Nongoma. On the 24th November, 100 Natal Police, under Inspector W.F. Lyttle, left Pietermaritzburg; fifty of these proceeded to Melmoth, whilst the balance reinforced Dimmick.

Dimmick got orders to make it known that the additional men were considered necessary to effectually patrol the district, then in a disturbed state in consequence of the recent murders. Lyttle was instructed to pay a visit by himself to Emtonjaneni heights, and there select a site for a camp a mile from Emtonjaneni store, and along the road to Nkandhla. He was, at the same time, advised that he would be ordered to move his camp there at an early date. The object was, in this and other ways, to create the impression that the next movement of troops would be to Nkandhla for the purpose of arresting murderers, and certain unpardoned rebels known to be still in hiding in that district. A detachment of N.P. that was at Mahlabatini joined Lyttle at Melmoth.

On the Militia being called out to arrest Dinuzulu, a plan of campaign was drawn up by the Commandant and submitted for the consideration of Government. The troops were thereupon ordered to mobilize and concentrateat Gingindhlovu, the idea being to march from there viâ Emtonjaneni to Usutu.

Sir Duncan McKenzie left Pietermaritzburg on the 3rd for Gingindhlovu. On reaching Durban, however, he received a wire from the Prime Minister embodying the message from Dinuzulu anticipating arrest, and was told that the Magistrate, Nongoma, had been instructed to advise Dinuzulu to surrender at once at Nongoma, where he would be taken charge of by the Chief Commissioner of Police. This arrangement, of course, completely altered the aspect of affairs. After consulting Sir Charles Saunders, the Commandant decided that there was then no object in marching the troops, by that time already at Gingindhlovu, from that station to Nongoma, when they could be taken by rail to Somkele, and thus considerably shorten the march.

There was, indeed, nothing else to be done. Owing to Dinuzulu having been authoritatively informed of the intention of the troops, the necessity for stratagem had completely disappeared.

A small infantry force, consisting of D.L.I. and two guns N.F.A. (C battery), was accordingly dispatched, under Brevet Lieut.-Col. J. Dick, D.L.I., to Melmoth, to augment the Police already at that post. The object of this movement was that the two bodies should combine and proceed, as they eventually did, to Emtonjaneni heights, to be in readiness to co-operate with the troops at Nongoma in the event of Dinuzulu offering resistance. The Z.M.R. were mobilized and ordered to join Dick's force.

The remainder of the troops were directed to go by rail to Somkele and from there by march route to Nongoma. By this time, however, the rail transport that had conveyed the troops to Gingindhlovu was on its way to Durban, and delay resulted from its having to be recalled.

On the afternoon of the 4th, the Commandant, leaving the troops under the command of Lieut.-Col. W. Arnott, and accompanied by Sir Charles Saunders, Chief Commissioner Clarke, N.P., and a small staff, proceeded by train to Somkele to interview the Chiefs of that locality,and thereafter to move on to Nongoma and personally conduct negotiations with Dinuzulu. It was expected the troops would come on during the night and reach Somkele the following morning. As, however, provision on the Gingindhlovu-Somkele section had been made with the object of running only one train a day, it was impossible to transport the brigade to Somkele as expeditiously as was desired. The regiments consequently arrived at Somkele with considerable intervals of time between them.

Responsibility for failure to convey the troops, etc., with reasonable rapidity, cannot in any way be regarded as falling on the railway authorities who, during this expedition, as well as throughout the operations in 1906, did everything that could possibly have been done to ensure success. Had a few days' notice been given on the occasion in question, there would probably have been nothing to complain of.

As Somkele is very unhealthy both for man and beast (malaria and horse-sickness), especially in December, the brigade was ordered to leave as soon as possible after arrival, proceed to high ground in the vicinity of Hlabisa, and from thence to Nongoma. Owing, however, to the difficulties already referred to, also to rain and bad roads, it was impossible to carry out the new plan. The regiments moved more or less independently of one another. N.C., B.M.R., U.M.R. and N.F.A. reached Nongoma on the 10th, and the remainder of the brigade on the following day.

In the meantime, the Commandant had had interviews on the 5th and 6th with Chiefs at Somkele and Hlabisa. They were told that, as troops would soon be passing through their wards, with the object of putting an end to unrest in other parts of the territory, there was no occasion whatever for alarm. They were very grateful for the warning, and hoped every success would be met with in ascertaining and punishing the wrong-doers.

The Commandant arrived at Nongoma on the 6th, to find 170 N.P., under Dimmick, already on the spot.

On Saturday the 7th, three messengers, including Mankulumana, arrived from Dinuzulu, notwithstandingthat the Government had on the 3rd clearly directed the latter "to proceed at once to the Nongoma magistracy and there await the arrival of Mr. Clarke (Chief Commissioner of Police)." They came to say that Dinuzulu did not know what offence he had committed to necessitate his surrendering. He desired to know his alleged offence, and who the informant was. The messengers were considerably surprised to find Sir Duncan McKenzie at Nongoma, as Dinuzulu's instructions were that Mankulumana should apply through the Magistrate and Commissioner for permission to see the Governor, of whom they felt the information above referred to should properly be sought. It was explained that Dinuzulu would have made the journey himself, but was prevented from doing so through having a bad knee. They added that he feared being taken by surprise, as had happened when Sitshitshili was murdered. He could not understand why fortifications had been constructed at Nongoma[321]; if such were necessary, why was not notice of the impending danger given him, in order that he, too, might avail himself of the protection? He denied the rumoured accusation of arming his people. All he had done was to summon boys in the usual way to hoe and weed his gardens.[322]He could not understand how the Governmentcould have gone the length of thinking he was arming against it.

In reply, the Commandant said it was quite unnecessary to send a messenger to Pietermaritzburg, as he was in a position to answer all the questions that had been put. The charge was high treason, and had been laid by various witnesses, whose statements were in the Government's possession. The best thing the Chief could do, seeing that martial law had been proclaimed in Zululand, was to surrender before the troops got to Nongoma. To enable him to come in, as he said he was unwell, a suitable conveyance would be placed at his disposal.

A lawyer (Mr. E. Renaud, of Durban), who had been engaged on behalf of Dinuzulu, and who arrived before the messengers had left, was allowed to write advising the Chief as to the course to pursue. Permission was, moreover, given him to communicate with Dinuzulu at any time, on condition that his letters were produced for inspection.

On the 8th and 9th, further messages came from Dinuzulu, the main subject of which was the ways and means of surrendering. It was decided to send an ambulance as far towards Usutu kraal as it was possible to get, leaving the intervening three miles to be traversed by him on horseback. Capt. Stuart proceeded on the 9th to receive the surrender at the spot agreed on. Instead of being at the place about noon as arranged, Dinuzulu did not get there till 7 p.m. He arrived with a small following, a number of whom accompanied the waggon all the way to the magistracy (fifteen miles). In consequence of Dinuzulu's delay, hilly country, and a dark night, Nongoma was not reached until 11.15 p.m. As accommodation was naturally very limited and as it was drizzling, the Chief was given a room within the gaol and made as comfortable as possible. It turned out he had previously dispatched a party with a marquee and tents in charge of Mankulumana to the magistracy by another route, in the hope that there would be no objection to his putting up outside the lager. This, however, could not be allowed, thoughthere was no objection to his pitching and occupying the tents within the lager. Under the circumstances, he preferred to remain where he was,i.e.in one of the gaol cells.

The formal interview with the Commandant took place at 3 p.m. on the following day. Mankulumana, Mgwaqo and Ncapayi (his secretary) were allowed to be present. Dinuzulu, who was well dressed in European costume, and wore a military helmet, walked with ease from the gaol to the court-house, a distance of about 150 yards.[323]As, by this time, many of the troops had arrived, there was a large gathering of spectators when the interview took place. The Commandant said he was glad Dinuzulu had had the good sense to surrender because, had he not done so, it would have been necessary to enforce the orders of the Government, when many innocent people might have been injured. There had been various murders of black as well as white people going on in the country. The Government was determined to put a stop to such crimes. Dinuzulu had evidently been exercising an evil influence in the country, and had become a menace to law and order. The three columns then in Zululand and Vryheid district had, he was told, entered Zululand to put an end to the disorder, and would not leave until all the prevailing unrest had disappeared.

The Chief replied that he could not imagine what offence he had committed. That he should be charged with high treason, as he had been informed was the case, was ridiculous. How could a man like himself think of taking up arms against the Government? Where was he to procure the men wherewith to oppose his father? He requested to be informed of the specific accusations that had been made against him. These, said the Commandant, were known to the Government, and would be communicated in due course by the proper authorities. It was on these that the warrant for his arrest had been issued. The Government would, no doubt, arrange for a fair andimpartial trial by civil tribunal, and ample time would be afforded within which to prepare a defence.

Dinuzulu maintained that, ever since his return from St. Helena, he had conducted himself in a proper manner. He was surprised to learn that he was regarded as exerting a harmful influence. Moreover, it was strange that he, who was nothing more than a Chief, with jurisdiction confined to a limited and definite area, could be said to have exerted an influence throughout the entire country.

Neither Mankulumana nor the other two Natives made any remarks at the interview, which lasted about forty minutes.

No sooner was it noised abroad in the tribe that their Chief had been put under arrest than the principal men collected and proceeded in a body, on the 10th, to the magistracy. There were between 200 and 300 present. They said they had come to ask why Dinuzulu had been arrested. After the foregoing interview, they were called up. They sat in a semi-circle as Sir Duncan McKenzie addressed them from the verandah of the court-house. His remarks were similar to those he had just made to the Chief himself. The Government, he said, was tired of the murders that had been and were still going on, and its determination to put a stop thereto was apparent from the fact of troops having been sent into the country. Full powers had been given him to act as he saw fit, and he intended to exercise them should necessity arise. Martial law had been proclaimed, hence it was very lucky that the event, of which they all knew,[324]had taken place, for had the troops been obliged to go into the field, many innocent people might have lost their lives. Many of those present were no doubt averse to being dragged into matters of that kind. All who were loyal to the Government would be supported. Some eighteen months before, when in command at Nkandhla, he had dealt somewhat leniently with the insurgents. Had a single shot been fired at Nongoma, and had there been a recrudescence of rebellion, he would have been obliged to act in a far more drasticmanner, hence it was extremely fortunate things had turned out as they had done. He concluded by advising all to go back to their homes and live there quietly and peaceably.

Whilst negotiations for the surrender were in progress, intelligence was received that Dinuzulu was either forwarding, or had already forwarded, his guns to certain Chiefs of Vryheid and Ngotshe districts for concealment. There was, moreover, ground for believing that certain Natives in the same districts had recently taken up arms at his request. For these reasons, the Northern Districts, with the exception of Utrecht, were, on the application of the Commandant, also placed under martial law on the 9th, to enable him to deal with all Natives concerned.

With the object of obtaining full information of what was occurring in Vryheid district and Usutu kraal, the Minister of Justice (Hon. T.F. Carter, K.C.), proceeded to Nongoma, reaching there on the 12th.

As it was not unlikely that a few of the rebels of 1906 were still in hiding at or near Usutu, and that firearms were also concealed there, arrangements were made for a surprise visit to the notorious kraal. McKenzie arranged to converge thereon from different directions. The three columns employed, under Lieut.-Cols. Arnott, Weighton and Mackay, left Nongoma at different times on the night of the 12th. The night was misty and dark, especially as the grass of much of the area traversed had been recently burnt. The intention was that the columns should arrive simultaneously at the kraal, viz. at daybreak. The only one, however, that arrived in time, was that which took the nearest, though not the easiest, route. The reason for the delay on the part of two of the columns was the steep, rugged and trackless country through which they had had to march.

It was soon manifest that every care had been taken to remove as many traces of incriminating evidence as possible.

USUTU KRAAL, DINUZULU'S PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE.Dinuzulu's quarters are behind the trees on the left.

The kraal, which was situated on a small hill in a long, well-watered and fertile valley, was roughly dividedinto three parts: (a) Dinuzulu's private dwelling-houses, visitors' house, secretary's hut, etc.; (b) his mother's hut, and the harem; (c) the indunas' huts and military barracks. Apart from these, were small kraals and isolated huts within a radius of three hundred yards of, and immediately connected with, Usutu. On a high hill, nearly a mile from and overlooking Usutu, was a small fort erected by Dinuzulu some years before, but which, owing to having been recently struck by lightning, had apparently been abandoned. A considerable number of trees had been planted, but it was clear the establishment had, on the whole, been sadly neglected; it was overgrown with weeds, not so numerous as to be beyond the powers of one or two boys to have kept down. The buildings, too, were out of repair. None, except the round brick hut, known as the secretary's office, seemed to have been well constructed, whilst not much more than the foundations of what once promised to be a more commodious and imposing structure had been built. The other huts about the grounds were small, of ordinary wattles and thatch, and also required attention. Those belonging to the 'regiments' stood on the eastern slopes of the hill, and were probably not as many as sixty in number.

The occupants of the huts, as well as about a score in the harem, were semi-civilized and, for the most part, poorly clad. This refers to the men, as well as the women and children. Altogether the kraal, if kraal it could be called, and its inmates, gave one the impression more of indolence than of health and activity. Briefly, Dinuzulu's residence fell far short of what might have been expected of one who had acquired so great a reputation amongst the Natives of Natal, Zululand and elsewhere.

After the people had been made to collect at one place, Dinuzulu's apartments were entered and thoroughly searched. Such articles as letters, also some small and large shields, were removed for purposes of evidence. The barracks, too, were searched, though not the Chief's mother's hut or the harem.

As it was supposed that rebels might still be living atUsutu, Bambata's son, Ndabayake, accompanied the troops. Opportunities were afforded him of examining those present, about 200 in number. No rebels, however, could be detected. Nor, in spite of thorough investigation, could any firearms be found, except two shot guns and a rifle, all evidently lawfully held. The residents were all exceedingly reticent. Although pressed, Dinuzulu's wives even denied that Bambata's wife and children had ever been or lived at Usutu, or that they knew anything whatever of Bambata, Cakijana or any other rebel having been harboured there.

It was carefully explained to the occupants, including others who arrived during the day, why the troops had come into the country, many of the former not having been present at the magistracy on the 10th. They and the rest of the tribe were directed to bring all their guns and assegais to Nongoma on the following Sunday, failing which, the troops would come and look for them. Dinuzulu, the Commandant went on to say, would be sent out of the country for trial, and would never return. Shortly after the meeting, the columns returned to Nongoma.

During the Chief's detention at Nongoma, his secretary attempted to pass a letter out of the gaol to his lawyer, Mr. Renaud. Although, with the assistance of Native warders, who happened to be members of Dinuzulu's tribe, it succeeded in getting outside, it was intercepted by the authorities, upon which the warders concerned were severely punished. It can be seen from this incident that the influence exerted by Dinuzulu on people of his own race was remarkably subtle and far-reaching, and this was afterwards found to be the case whatever tribe they belonged to and wherever he happened to be confined.

There being no necessity for detaining him at Nongoma beyond a few days, arrangements were made for his removal to Pietermaritzburg, in order that a preliminary examination might be begun as soon as possible. Such examination, which is of a formal character, is invariably held in the case of a person charged with a serious offence. An escort of 100 N.R.R., 100 N.N.C.(Hoare) and a battery of N.F.A. (Wilson), under Major J. Fraser, N.R.R., having been provided, Dinuzulu and his attendants left Nongoma by mule cart and waggons on the 14then routefor Pietermaritzburg, viâ Hlabisa and Somkele. He reached his destination a couple of days later, no incident of any importance having occurred on the way.

With the surrender and removal, the principal object of the expedition had been accomplished. There remained: (a) the securing of unregistered firearms known to have been secreted by Dinuzulu at Usutu; (b) the calling in of those belonging to other members of the Usutu tribe, and other tribes closely connected therewith, notably some of those which lived in Ngotshe and Vryheid districts; and (c) the arrest of various outstanding rebels. Many of the notorious and other rebels, who had been deliberately harboured by Dinuzulu, had been obliged, in consequence of his arrest, to disperse in various directions. It afterwards transpired that, on the 9th, a couple of hours before his surrender, Dinuzulu had addressed them in the following terms: "I am going, men; here is a letter from the white people calling me on account of the ... Chiefs who have been killed.... I now tell you all to scatter and go and hide with your relatives, you must not be arrested here.... I will send and let you know if the white people are going to come down to search this place."[325]

As it was considered the foregoing objects could be effected with a much smaller force than was then in the field, the escort in charge of Dinuzulu received orders to demobilize on reaching its destination.

The arrangements for dealing with the Zululand situation had included the locating of a column at Vryheid. This column, formed on the 10th December, consisted of N.D.M.R. and Utrecht, Newcastle (town and district), Vryheid and Ladysmith (town) Reserves, with Lieut.-Col. B. Crompton, D.S.O., in command, and Capt. O. Schuller as Adjutant. As, however, Dinuzulu's arrest had taken place quietly, the necessity for the column soon ceased to exist. It was demobilized on the 18th.

On the 15th December, the Natal Carbineers, under Weighton, left Nongoma and, moving viâ Ngome forest[326]and Louwsburg through Ngotshe district—dealingen routewith allegations against two important Chiefs of that part, Mapovela and Maboko—reached Vryheid on the 22nd.

As directed by McKenzie at Usutu kraal on the 13th, about 500 members of Dinuzulu's tribe came during the same day to hand in their guns and assegais, when, on the advice of Sir Charles Saunders (whose presence at this time at Nongoma was most opportune), it was arranged that control of the tribe, until the Government's pleasure had been ascertained, should be carried on by certain twenty-one headmen, whose names were publicly announced. Only twenty-four guns were handed in. Not many assegais were brought, owing to a misunderstanding.

In consequence of Dinuzulu's having been arrested and to their being subjected to other inconveniences through the arrival of the troops, members of the Usutu party became much incensed with such rebels as had been harboured at Usutu and elsewhere in the tribe. It was to them that they attributed the misfortunes which had come upon Dinuzulu and themselves. So angry were they that it was commonly reported that any rebel not leaving forthwith would be stabbed to death. If Dinuzulu had beena "father" to them, the tribe was not prepared to extend the same consideration.

The U.M.R. (Newmarch) and B.M.R. (Arnott) remained at Nongoma on Weighton's moving to Vryheid, but, after marching out on two occasions to search for concealed arms, they left the magistracy on the 20th viâ Somkele to demobilize in Natal.

Instructions were, at the same time, issued for the whole of the Police force to remain in Zululand, subject to such dispositions as the Commandant might wish to make. The Chiefs, moreover, were held responsible for the "maintenance of law and order, for the delivering up to the authorities of all persons implicated in or suspected of crime, and for the surrender of all unregistered firearms."

By the 22nd, the Active Militia actually in the field, including detachments of departmental corps, numbered 1,102 (all ranks), with 156 Militia Reserves, stationed at Weenen, Estcourt and Krantzkop.

One would have thought that the invasion of Zululand by over 2,000 troops would have disturbed the aborigines far more than it did, especially as the object was to arrest Dinuzulu. The effect produced, however, was of an exactly opposite character. This can only be explained in one way, namely, that Dinuzulu was universally known by Natives to be really harbouring rebels and believed to be secretly planning the murders of various loyalists. They, in short, had had enough of Dinuzulu, and were only too glad to see the troops arrive and carry him off. There had been peace for some years when, in 1889, he was removed to St. Helena, and a similar prospect seemed once more to be within view. He had deceived the rebels by not actively and openly supporting them at Nkandhla, as he had promised to do, or was understood by them to have promised to do, and now he or his immediate attendants (presumably on his instructions), were causing loyalists to be shot down in cold blood. As that was not a rôle that had ever been played by a Zulu king, it is not surprising that the great majority were relieved and even rejoiced to get rid of the man.

With Zululand once more in a peaceful and settled condition, the Commandant left Nongoma with his staff and an escort of Natal Police (25) for Vryheid, viâ Ngome forest. After reaching Vryheid on the 22nd, simultaneously with the Carbineers, he proceeded by train to Pietermaritzburg, for the purpose of discussing the situation with the Government. The intention of the latter was that all firearms belonging to Chiefs known to be more or less associated with Dinuzulu were to be called in. For this purpose, as the Active Militia were demobilizing, it became necessary to form a Militia Composite Regiment. The Natal Carbineers were the last Militia corps to demobilize. This they did at Christmas, except about seventy men who had, at Vryheid, joined the force referred to.

One of the reasons for calling so strong a force into the field at the beginning of December was, as has already been observed, because the most powerful Natal Chief, Silwana, was believed to have assumed a menacing attitude. The evidence against him, though strong, was, however, much less conclusive than that against Dinuzulu. As the arrest of the latter Chief, as well as of his brother-in-law, Maboko, and his indunas, Makulumana and Mgwaqo, immediately created a profound impression throughout Natal and Zululand, the Government was of opinion that such incidents were sufficient to serve as a warning, not only to Silwana but to all similarly disposed Chiefs. The project, therefore, of invading his district was abandoned.[327]

The M.C.R., 500 strong, was placed under the command of Major Colin Wilson, N.F.A., with Major J.W.V. Montgomery, N.C., as Adjutant. Moving from Vryheid on the 2nd January, the force camped near Mr. C. Birkenstock's residence at Hlobane. Patrols were sent out toCeza on the border of Zululand and to Ntabankulu. The Commandant arrived at the camp on the 7th. Further efforts were made in various directions to find guns that were unlawfully held. On the 14th, the regiment moved to Louwsburg in Ngotshe district, and from there, on the 17th, to Nyalisa police camp. At Louwsburg and Nyalisa (the latter place is some thirty miles from the Ubombo mountains), the Chiefs were ordered to bring in all their unregistered guns. The order was immediately complied with.

In addition to disarmament, useful work was done in these and other parts of the country in tracing rebels, cautioning those who had harboured them, as well as generally restoring public confidence. The troops received every encouragement and hospitality from the various Boer farms visited. The same occurred in Paulpietersburg and Luneberg districts during January and February. The determination that had been shown in calling in the firearms produced a salutary effect in every tribe, with the result that the weapons were promptly handed in by those from whom, at the conclusion of the Boer War, it was supposed they had all been taken. On no occasion was the slightest opposition met with, although, of course, there was sometimes considerable reluctance. This was no doubt due to the firmness, perseverance and discretion displayed by Sir Duncan McKenzie. The work, was, however, put a stop to before half of it had been completed. An opportunity more favourable to such enterprise will probably not again present itself for years. Illicit possession of firearms by barbarians is most effectively and satisfactorily coped with during the operation of martial law.

By the 17th February, some 130 unregistered firearms of various patterns had been handed in to the M.C.R. in Vryheid and Ngotshe districts alone, whilst the general aggregate for the Northern Districts and Zululand was over 400. Had the same policy been quietly and yet firmly pursued in parts of Zululand other than Nongoma district, it is certain better results would have been obtained than by leaving the matter to be dealt with byordinary police methods. It was because the police were thought capable of carrying out this difficult duty under the common law, that the M.C.R. was disbanded at the end of February. And yet, on the 12th of that month, the total number of unregistered guns that had been collected without the direct assistance of the Militia, from the whole of Zululand, minus Nongoma, was but twenty-two. That result alone was sufficient to condemn the adoption of a policy of leniency. As it is, the uncollected arms remain for use on other occasions! It was to the unregistered firearms in possession of the Natives that all our gun-shot casualties during the Rebellion, and the various murders thereafter, were due.[328]

A very smart piece of work was carried out by the Police Reserves on the 1st January, 1908. Intelligence had been received at Nongoma that a number of rebel desperadoes were living in broken country at the junction of the Black Umfolozi and Mbekamuzi rivers. Dimmick took the N.P. Reserves out at 1.15 a.m. on the day in question. Fairlie, after the waggon drift had been reached (soon after 5 a.m.), was sent with a couple of troops down the left bank of the former river, whilst Dimmick, joined by Lindsay with a detachment from Mahlabatini, took up positions along the road between the two streams. Fairlie's report is: "Having crossed the Ivuna, near the junction of that river, and reached some high ground, I noticed some fires some three miles to my right front, on the north side of the Umfolozi, where it takes a big bend to the south. I sent to inform you (i.e.Dimmick) of this, also stating that Mciteki's men had not arrived as had been arranged,[329]and asking for reinforcements, as I concluded from the amount of smoke from the fires mentioned that the people we were in search of were in the vicinity. At 8.15 a.m. my messenger returned, but I waited until 9 a.m. for reinforcements; longer delay I consideredwould be inadvisable. I, therefore, proceeded with the men I had with me in the direction of the fires.... After going some distance, I linked the horses and went on foot, with about twenty-five men, and having traversed about two miles, sighted some shelters, which I advanced on in a half-circle. We were then sighted by the inmates, of whom I saw six. I called on them to stand in the Native language. This order was repeated by several Natives with me, and also by the Europeans who had a knowledge of the language. The inhabitants referred to made a bolt for it. Two were shot, and I am bound to conclude that the other four were wounded. We pursued some considerable distance without result, and then returned to the shelters and found two dead bodies. By the side of each was a magazine rifle, magazines charged and cut-offs open.[330]One had a cartridge half in the breech, and both appeared to have been fired recently." The killed turned out to be notorious rebels, for whom search had long been made. One of them, Mqumbeyana, was, it turned out, the man who was in command of theimpithat attacked Royston's Horse at Manzipambana on the 3rd June, 1906. He is said to have killed a trooper on that occasion and seized his magazine rifle, possibly the very one in his possession when shot by Fairlie's party.

Other important miscellaneous work connected with the Rebellion or Dinuzulu's case was done by the Police during the year. They were, for instance, remarkably successful in capturing at Johannesburg and elsewhere, and bringing to justice, the murderers of Sitshitshili, Mpumela and two or three others previously referred to. These arrests were effected before the end of February, and prior to the withdrawal of martial law.

By the middle of March, so many of the outstanding rebels had either surrendered or been captured, that the Governor was advised to release about 2,000 of those still in gaol, leaving only 116, that is, men who had been convicted of serious offences.

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