FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[127]This name, in full, is uMpanza, not iMpanza or Impanza, as sometimes written.[128]Cf. Wat Tyler's, Jack Cade's, and Monmouth's Rebellions in England.[129]Zibebu's loyalty was never doubted for a moment. His name is mentioned here only because of his exceptionally fine qualities as a military commander.[130]One often hears Bambata's people spoken ofa ba seNgome= the Ngome people. The reason is this. At the base of Ngome, a prominent little hill, three miles east of Mpanza valley, Mancinza and previous Chiefs of this section of the tribe lived for two or more generations.[131]Tolobolais to deliver to a girl's father the cattle or other property required by custom to be so handed over as part of the marriage settlement, viz.lobolo. These cattle are not purchase price or barter, but merely consideration or compensation for loss of the girl's services, as well as a visible guarantee of intention on the part of the bridegroom to treat his wife at all times fairly and justly under the Zulu system of life.[132]"The runner that took the duiker for his model." The duiker is a small antelope.[133]This farm, in 1881, belonged to the Swiss Mission Society. It was bonded to the Standard Bank, when a rent of £1 per hut was charged by the trustees. Later on, it was sold to Messrs. Theunis Nel and Gabriel Botha.[134]There is a standing rule that no Native may appear in a European town unless clothed from neck to knee.[135]Dilke.[136]A week before, Clarke had been sent with a strong force to make the arrest. On his reaching Greytown, arrangements were made for a night raid on Bambata's kraal, but, owing to Chief Sibindi informing the Secretary for Native Affairs that Bambata would probably cause trouble if raided, Clarke was directed to refrain from executing the warrant, although he had gone to the trouble of ascertaining that the Chief was at his kraal and could have been secured with comparative ease.[137]The sending of Ngqengqengqe to summon Bambata and the inciting of Bambata to rebel were emphatically denied by Dinuzulu. Dinuzulu's connection with the Rebellion will be dealt with later.One of Bambata's children died at Usutu during their stay there.[138]Thong of cow or ox-hide.[139]It was generally known Cakijana was one of Dinuzulu's personal attendants.[140]It is the custom for Zulus to shout their war-cry on charging. "Usutu" was the one belonging to Dinuzulu's followers, he having inherited it from his father Cetshwayo. Dinuzulu's principal kraal, it will be remembered, bore the same name. Bambata's men had not used this cry before the occasion in question.[141]It is, however, fair to add that Mansel had had no time to ascertain the enemy's strength, which, seeing the size of the tribe, might have been anything between 150 and 600.[142]It was not known until after the column got to camp that this man was missing.[143]He was known also by the names Sukabekuluma (he who goes off whilst they are still talking); Dakwaukwesuta (he who becomes drunk on getting a full meal); and Gwazakanjani (how do you stab?). One of his praises was:uSigilamikuba, ku vel'izindaba= The one whose pranks give rise to matters for consideration.

[127]This name, in full, is uMpanza, not iMpanza or Impanza, as sometimes written.

[128]Cf. Wat Tyler's, Jack Cade's, and Monmouth's Rebellions in England.

[129]Zibebu's loyalty was never doubted for a moment. His name is mentioned here only because of his exceptionally fine qualities as a military commander.

[130]One often hears Bambata's people spoken ofa ba seNgome= the Ngome people. The reason is this. At the base of Ngome, a prominent little hill, three miles east of Mpanza valley, Mancinza and previous Chiefs of this section of the tribe lived for two or more generations.

[131]Tolobolais to deliver to a girl's father the cattle or other property required by custom to be so handed over as part of the marriage settlement, viz.lobolo. These cattle are not purchase price or barter, but merely consideration or compensation for loss of the girl's services, as well as a visible guarantee of intention on the part of the bridegroom to treat his wife at all times fairly and justly under the Zulu system of life.

[132]"The runner that took the duiker for his model." The duiker is a small antelope.

[133]This farm, in 1881, belonged to the Swiss Mission Society. It was bonded to the Standard Bank, when a rent of £1 per hut was charged by the trustees. Later on, it was sold to Messrs. Theunis Nel and Gabriel Botha.

[134]There is a standing rule that no Native may appear in a European town unless clothed from neck to knee.

[135]Dilke.

[136]A week before, Clarke had been sent with a strong force to make the arrest. On his reaching Greytown, arrangements were made for a night raid on Bambata's kraal, but, owing to Chief Sibindi informing the Secretary for Native Affairs that Bambata would probably cause trouble if raided, Clarke was directed to refrain from executing the warrant, although he had gone to the trouble of ascertaining that the Chief was at his kraal and could have been secured with comparative ease.

[137]The sending of Ngqengqengqe to summon Bambata and the inciting of Bambata to rebel were emphatically denied by Dinuzulu. Dinuzulu's connection with the Rebellion will be dealt with later.One of Bambata's children died at Usutu during their stay there.

[137]The sending of Ngqengqengqe to summon Bambata and the inciting of Bambata to rebel were emphatically denied by Dinuzulu. Dinuzulu's connection with the Rebellion will be dealt with later.

One of Bambata's children died at Usutu during their stay there.

[138]Thong of cow or ox-hide.

[139]It was generally known Cakijana was one of Dinuzulu's personal attendants.

[140]It is the custom for Zulus to shout their war-cry on charging. "Usutu" was the one belonging to Dinuzulu's followers, he having inherited it from his father Cetshwayo. Dinuzulu's principal kraal, it will be remembered, bore the same name. Bambata's men had not used this cry before the occasion in question.

[141]It is, however, fair to add that Mansel had had no time to ascertain the enemy's strength, which, seeing the size of the tribe, might have been anything between 150 and 600.

[142]It was not known until after the column got to camp that this man was missing.

[143]He was known also by the names Sukabekuluma (he who goes off whilst they are still talking); Dakwaukwesuta (he who becomes drunk on getting a full meal); and Gwazakanjani (how do you stab?). One of his praises was:uSigilamikuba, ku vel'izindaba= The one whose pranks give rise to matters for consideration.

FLIGHT OF BAMBATA TO NKANDHLA FORESTS.—FIRST STEPS TAKEN TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION.—ZULU CUSTOMS.

Onthe day following the ambuscade in the valley, Mansel moved his camp from Botha's to Warwick's farm (Burrup's),i.e.on to high, open ground, slightly nearer Greytown, and awaited reinforcements. Bambata remained in Mpanza valley. He dispatched messengers forthwith to each of the Chiefs Silwana, Sibindi and Gayede, calling on them to render assistance; at the same time, he informed them he had been to Dinuzulu, who had promised to co-operate as soon as the ball had been set rolling. He warned them that, in case of refusal, they would incur "the Prince's" displeasure, and draw an attack by the army the latter was about to bring into the field. The two that went to Silwana were promptly arrested by that Chief and conveyed to the Magistrate at Weenen; Sibindi did likewise with the man sent to him.

Although Bambata was, through his mother, nearly related to Silwana, it was the height of absurdity to think that the latter, the most powerful Chief of Natal, whose grandfather had, in years gone by, formed a not unworthy opponent of Tshaka himself, would risk his position and the well-being of his tribe, by responding, at a moment's notice, to a summons from a Chief like Bambata, even though accompanied by a threat from the representative of the House that slew his father Gabangaye at Isandhlwana in 1879.[144]

Finding he was not likely to obtain support locally, although general sympathy in his cause was not wanting, Bambata decided, most probably in accordance with a preconcerted plan, to move across the Tugela to the famous Nkandhla forests, commonly known by the Natives as falling within Chief Sigananda's ward. He declared he had been directed to do this by Dinuzulu.

The rebel ringleader lost no time, owing to the following developments: No sooner was the news of the Mpanza affair flashed to Pietermaritzburg, than the Commandant re-mobilized the U.M.R., N.F.A. (B Battery, four 15 pdrs.), a company of the D.L.I., with signallers, and Greytown Reserves (120)—brigading these arms with the Natal Police Field Force. Colonel Leuchars was placed in command and ordered to deal with the situation. The artillery and D.L.I. referred to left Durban at 7.30 a.m. on the 5th, and arrived at Greytown by 6.30 p.m. the same day. The other corps mobilized with similar alacrity.

Leuchars moved out the following morning at 9 and, after joining the N.P. and Nongqai at mid-day, remained in camp the rest of the day. Bambata would naturally have received early information of the arrival of these reinforcements.

After considering the position by the light of the intelligence available, Leuchars decided to surround Mpanza valley at dawn on the 7th. His dispositions were as follows: N.P. and Z.N.P. to occupy a long hill to the south-east and overlooking Marshall's hotel, the remainder of the force to proceed to high ground to the west of Bambata's position in Mpanza valley.

At 8 p.m., Leuchars moved out with the latter portion of the column. It was, however, not until 2.30 a.m., after a nine-mile march, that the position overlooking the valley on the west could be reached. Early the same morning, Mansel proceeded with the police along the main road towards Marshall's hotel, whilst Clarke, with a detachment, advanced to a position on hills (on the south) overlooking Mpanza valley, and midway between Leuchars and Mansel.

At 9 a.m. two guns opened fire on kraals in the valley at a range of 3,000 yards, the other two did likewise at 10.30 a.m. from a high position on the north side of the valley. Clarke, in the meantime, opened with a Maxim at other kraals about 1,200 to 1,500 yards off. Not a Native, however, was to be seen.

The Reserves, under Chief Leader John Nel, who did not join Leuchars till 9 a.m. that morning,[145]held ground on a spur to the north-west of the valley, where a Native, evidently a spy, was shot as he tried to escape over the wooded hills towards Mooi River.

The loyal Chief Sibindi, who had been ordered on the 4th to guard the border as well as the Tugela drifts, co-operated generally on the east with his levy of about 1,000 men. His orders were to advance as far as the Biggarsberg main road, about a mile from Bambata's hiding-place, as soon as the guns opened fire.

A report came in about noon that Bambata had vacated his ward, proceeded south-east on to the high veld, and then turned into Gayede's ward. There being no confirmation of this, Leuchars continued the operations. He subsequently withdrew to bivouack for the night at Warwick's farm.[146]

On the following day (Sunday), Sibindi was sent back into the thorns, supported by a squadron U.M.R. (100), under Major S. Carter, with instructions to complete the bush driving. The Reserves occupied a ridge north-west of Mpanza valley. Owing to Sibindi's men being too tired, on reaching Marshall's hotel at 4 p.m., to go further that day, Carter camped with him on an old mealie garden immediately behind Marshall's. By 9 a.m. on the 9th, all the troops being in position, Bambata's stronghold, about three miles north-west of Marshall's, was surrounded. It was found vacated, with evidences about it of quite recent occupation by a considerable force. The rough andvery thickly-wooded country in the neighbourhood of Mpanza was thoroughly scoured in different directions on the 9th, 10th and other days; the kraals of rebels were burnt and their stock seized. Many, who had, in various ways, managed to hold aloof from the insurgents, were met with. In consequence of being at their kraals within the area of operations, notwithstanding warning to be outside, several narrowly escaped being shot. The crops, not having quite matured, had not been reaped. Those belonging to, and abandoned by, the rebels, were given to the loyalists. The Reserves were demobilized on the 10th, whilst the artillery and infantry withdrew to Greytown on the same day, followed by the U.M.R. on the 11th.

The intelligence that Bambata had fled to Zululand had been fully confirmed by the 10th. The advisability of pursuing the fugitives was thereupon considered by Leuchars. Quick pursuit is undoubtedly in accordance with Native tactics on such occasions, but Leuchars believed it was part of the rebels' plans to decoy his force to Nkandhla and thereby afford the remainder and larger portion of Bambata's tribe, say, in combination with Silwana's people, an opportunity of attacking Greytown and the many outlying European homesteads. Proof of the possibility of such attack lay in the fact of Bambata's force having concealed itself a few weeks previously in Layman's trees, on the day other members of the tribe went to pay the poll tax in Greytown.

Leuchars, however, had other and broader grounds for advising against troops being sent from Natal at this critical moment. To have withdrawn a large portion of the Active Militia would have been to place all civilized portions of the Colony in jeopardy, especially as no Imperial troops were available. The Matabeles, it will be remembered, rose in rebellion in 1896 when the greater portion of the Chartered Company's forces were absent in connection with the Jameson Raid (December, 1895).[147]

The ways and means of dealing with the situation at Nkandhla were fully considered by the Commandant and the Government, when it was decided to employ irregular troops in Zululand, and so obviate as much as possible the necessity of withdrawing the local Militia. Hence the Commandant's instructions to Leuchars were to remain where he was.

Journeying due east, concealed by the dense bush and rugged hills everywhere to be met with, Bambata, after emerging from the valleys, passed through a farm gate, and, travelling a short distance along a road, branched off to the left, making down through Chief Gayede's location and along the lower part of the Dimane stream, a tributary of the Tugela. He had about 150 men with him, including Magwababa (then a prisoner), Mgombana, Cakijana and Moses. It was when he had well-nigh reached the Tugela river that the guns above referred to were heard by the party booming in the distance. Magwababa, on account of having a bad knee, had, by that time, fallen into the rear. In addition to tying him, the rebels had, with a stone, struck and bruised the inner side of his knee, to prevent his running away. About noon on Saturday, he succeeded in eluding his guards; he made his way direct to the Krantzkop magistracy, and was shortly afterwards conveyed from there to Greytown by post-cart. Although a list of the rebels with Bambata had already been partially obtained, Magwababa helped to complete it, besides giving other useful information.

Near the Tugela Rand, and about ten miles from Krantzkop, the fugitives, about noon, came to a store in charge of one John Jenner. Their behaviour was orderly. After the main body had passed the store, which it did forthwith, one who appeared to be an induna, purchased a pair of long stockings, a white handkerchief, also two bottles of lemonade. A few, who were in rear, stayed about fifteen minutes, when they moved on after the others in the direction of the Tugela. It was noticed that the men, who were not known by the storekeeper to be from Mpanza, had eight or ten guns of various kinds,whilst others carried shields and assegais. Two only were mounted. A number had white ostrich feathers stuck in their hair. They had pushed on quickly, because afraid of being overtaken.

Proceeding down the Dimane by footpaths, they crossed the Tugela into Chief Mpumela's ward by the Mtambo drift, probably less frequented by Europeans than any between the junction of the Tugela with the Buffalo and Middle Drift. It is about equidistant from the only two drifts possible for wheeled transport in that section of the river, being not less than fifteen miles from each, and in a mountainous, rocky, unsurveyed and unknown region. The party crossed whilst Leuchars' artillery was still engaged firing at various targets in Mpanza valley. Thus Leuchars did not get the report of Bambata's alleged escape until after the latter had entered Zululand!

Bambata went at once to Ntshelela's kraal,[148]where he demanded a beast, threatening to drive the whole herd home and help himself unless the owner complied. The latter selected a young animal; but Bambata, dissatisfied with what he considered the man's niggardly disposition, immediately chose one of the largest; this he then shot on the spot. The flesh was partaken of by the fugitives who, late the same afternoon (7th), passed on to the kraal of Mangati, another son of Godide. Mangati gave them a goat.

After passing the night at Mangati's, the party pushed on, early on Sunday morning, viâ certain kraals, to that of Simoyi in the mouth of Mome gorge, on the edge of the Nkandhla forests, and within a mile of the ancient and redoubtable stronghold.[149]The journey from Mpanza to the Mome, forty to fifty miles, for the most part over extremely rugged country, had been performed within about thirty-six hours, including rests. And so the torchthat had been lit in Natal, with surprisingly small loss to the insurgents, was swiftly carried with audacity and success into a district whose people had no cause whatever of grievance against the Government peculiar to themselves.

Sigananda's people had, indeed, as recently as the preceding January, expostulated with the Magistrate in a violent and disrespectful manner because required to pay the poll tax. They were brought to trial, but discharged with a caution.[150]Difficulty had also been experienced in procuring (as had previously been done from time to time) a few labourers for the Public Works department. The Magistrate had been obliged to inflict a small fine on the Chief's principal son, Ndabaningi, for neglecting to obey a summons. As regards Sigananda himself, it was found that, on account of his great age, he was no longer capable of satisfactorily managing the tribe. The Commissioner for Native Affairs (Mr., now Sir, Charles Saunders, K.C.M.G.), accordingly visited Empandhleni on the 2nd April and discussed the position with Ndabaningi, who represented the Chief, and the indunas, when the meeting concurred with the Commissioner in thinking that Ndabaningi should be authorized to act on behalf of his father. "I told the indunas," says Mr. Saunders, "that there was no objection on my part to recommending Ndabaningi's appointment, but before submitting such a recommendation for the consideration of Government, it was necessary that the question beconsidered by Sigananda and the heads of the tribe who, if they were of the same opinion, should make a formal representation in this respect to me at Eshowe on my return from the Usutu kraal, whence I was then proceeding."[151]

When F.E. van Rooyen, Chief Leader of the Krantzkop Reserves, heard on the 6th that Leuchars proposed operating at Mpanza on the following day, he arranged with about twenty of his men, not then mobilized and but few of them armed, to go and watch the operations. They left an hour before dawn. Just after sunrise, they ascertained that a body of Natives had been seen the same morning making towards the Dimane stream. On further investigation, it transpired that the party consisted of Bambata's people. The Magistrate, on being advised, wired the information to headquarters. Van Rooyen volunteered, if reinforced, to follow up and contain the rebels. The offer was accepted, and support promised. He was accordingly instructed to mobilize. At 9.30 a.m. on the 8th, the fifty-four men that had come in, left and, crossing the Tugela at Watton's drift, were not long in finding unmistakable traces of the fugitives. It seemed at first as if they had made for the Qudeni forests.[152]Van Rooyen went on to Ntingwe store, actually crossing, without knowing it, the route that had been taken the day before by Bambata. He at once communicated his intelligence to the Magistrate, Empandhleni, and, leaving Ntingwe at 2 a.m. on the 9th, reached Empandhleni with his men at 6 a.m. Shortly after his arrival, word came that Bambata was encamped at the Mome gorge. By this time, about thirty of the Z.M.R. had mobilized and were at Empandhleni. Van Rooyen proposed that the rebels should be at once attacked. To this course, the commanding officer (Major W.A. Vanderplank), who arrived in the evening, would not agree, on the ground that the local Chiefs had not been ordered to arm. Van Rooyenmade other efforts in the direction of aggressive action by European troops, but, meeting with no success, left with his men on the morning of the 10th to protect the European families at Krantzkop against a possible rising in that part of the country.

After serving under Leuchars from the 5th to 7th, Mansel decided to detach himself and to follow Bambata. His strength then was 175 N.P. and 77 Nongqai. He advised Leuchars of what he was doing, but asked approval of action which, as a matter of fact, had already been taken before the commanding officer had sanctioned it. But, although getting away from Leuchars as quickly as Van Rooyen did from Krantzkop, Mansel did not reach Empandhleni until at least three and a half days after the former, although the distances travelled were about the same. One of the reasons for this delay was that he had waggons with him. These, on getting near Fort Yolland, branched off and made for Empandhleni viâ Eshowe and Melmoth, leaving Mansel, with the main portion of the force, to go on direct to Empandhleni. As, at this time, there was no reason whatever for anticipating attack along the route selected for the waggons, it is difficult to understand why the entire column should have been kept back as escort to the waggons, instead of pushing forward to contain the enemy.

By midnight on the 7th, instructions had been sent from Eshowe to the Magistrates concerned to warn all Chiefs of Nkandhla, Eshowe and Nqutu districts to arrest the fugitives should they enter any of their wards.

Immediately the Nkandhla Magistrate (Mr. B. Colenbrander) heard, as he did on Sunday, the 8th, that the rebels had entered his district—at first he supposed they were making for Qudeni forests—he sent word by Native runners to the Chiefs likely to be concerned, notably Mpumela, Ndube and Mbuzo, directing them to arm and arrest the law-breakers, then correctly said to be at or near a mountain called Kotongweni. Each complied the same day, but, before they had learnt what Bambata's real destination was, the latter had left Kotongweni,passed from kraal to kraal in the manner described, entered the ward of another Chief, Sigananda, and taken refuge in his notorious stronghold. The Magistrate was instructed by the Commissioner the same afternoon "to arm all the Natives in his district to assist in capturing Bambata," and to direct the tribes nearest the magistracy to protect that place during the night. The latter order was complied with.

It may be of interest to indicate what was spontaneously done by Natives through whose kraals or lands the strange body of men passed on their way to the Mome.

Ntshelela at once reported the fact to the Magistrate. Mangati, and two other kraal-owners, although all men of rank, took no such action, but, associating themselves with others, merely sent a report to the Chief (Sigananda). They, moreover, at once adopted a friendly attitude towards the rebels, notwithstanding that the latter bore indications of their recent conflict with the police—they carried a number of guns, two or three of which had manifestly belonged to Europeans, and even wore the helmet of a European trooper. They had also the moustache of the unfortunate man whose body had not at once been recovered, cut off and carried to induce others to take up arms against the white man.

Whilst Bambata was halting at a kraal near Mome, a few Natives came up, among them one named Muntumuni. On glancing about, Muntumuni espied Bambata. He immediately exclaimed in a loud tone: "Who is it dares to allow a reprobate to set foot here? Bambata is very well known to me. When serving as a policeman at Greytown, I found him constantly being arrested for thieving European cattle!" This was said in the rebel's hearing. Bambata turned and looked at the speaker, but said nothing. Those of Zululand who were present silenced the ex-constable and, after an interval, sent him and another to advise Sigananda, then at his Enhlweni kraal,[153]near the Mome waterfall, of Bambata's arrival, and of the circumstances under which he had come. Muntumuni went and, after delivering the message, said to the Chief that it would be criminal if he failed to notify Bambata's arrival to the Magistrate. Sigananda asked how it was that, after being sent to report the arrival, Bambata being a protégé of Dinuzulu, the messenger should advise conflicting action to be taken? "Go and report to the Magistrate yourself," said the Chief. The messenger went. At the magistracy he was presented with a coat and assegais. He returned with instructions that Sigananda was to arrest and bring Bambata to the court-house. Sigananda now blamed himself for having sent the report. He said to Muntumuni, "I personally know nothing whatever of Bambata, I have never set eyes on him. It was you who suggested reporting. It is all your affair. It, therefore, devolves on you to produce and hand the man over to the European authorities, foryoudeclared you had seen him." The messenger found himself in a dilemma. The majority of the tribe condemned him. They kept on asking what business it was of his to make the communication. Although declaring the Chief had sent him, the latter repudiated having done so. On being asked, later on, by the Magistrate to indicate where Bambata was, Muntumuni said Sigananda did not know. "But you came here to say he had been seen, didn't you?" "Yes." "Did you not see him?" "Yes, I did." "When Sigananda sent you, was not Bambata with Sigananda?" "No." "Where was he then?" "I saw him when he arrived, he was then on his way to the Mome. It was at that stage I was sent to report to my Chief." When the messenger returned to his kraal, he was ostracized. Unable to submit to the treatment, he presently threw in his lot with the very man he had declared was a criminal and an outlaw.[154]

BAMBATA (on the right)with Attendant.CAKIJANA,One of Dinuzulu's Attendants.SIGANANDA,Chief; age 96 years.MANGATI.REBEL RINGLEADERS.

The position at Nkandhla, between the 9th and the 16th, developed, from the Government's point of view, with extraordinary rapidity. Owing to its great importance and complexity, it will be well to consider it somewhat closely.

The Commissioner arrived at Empandhleni from Usutu at mid-day on the 9th, finding about thirty Z.M.R. and fifty-four Krantzkop Reserves already there. The same morning, reliable information came in from Sigananda that Bambata was in the Mome gorge. There was then no particular reason for supposing Sigananda was in collusion with Bambata. The Commissioner accordingly directed the former to try and induce Bambata to come out of the forests and then to effect his capture; failing that, to attempt to starve him. At the time, there was a general impression that when Bambata saw himself being surrounded, he would fly to other parts. The various Chiefs of Nkandhla district were, therefore, informed they would be held responsible should he escape through any of their wards. Under these circumstances, Mr. Saunders did not think it advisable for more Militia to be sent to Empandhleni. Having heard that Mansel was coming viâ Middle Drift, he advised that the force should remain in the neighbourhood of that drift in case Bambata should attempt escaping that way. It, moreover, appeared to him necessary for the Reserves and Z.M.R. to remain at the magistracy, as it was just possible Bambata might make a dash at that post, if undefended, to obtain arms and food. The strength of the Z.M.R. rose to 105 by the arrival, on the same day, of the headquarters squadron from Eshowe.

At mid-day on the 10th, reports as to Bambata's whereabouts were contradictory. Mr. Saunders was then not at all satisfied with Sigananda's behaviour, feeling that Bambata could by then have been captured had the tribe acted in abona-fidemanner. He had strong suspicions the Chief and the tribe were playing a double game.

On the Krantzkop Reserves leaving the same morning,the Commissioner recommended that the police at Middle Drift should move to Empandhleni as soon as possible.

Later reports on the 10th went to show that Sigananda and his people were professing to do their best to capture the rebel ringleader, but the Commissioner considered a day or two necessary to prove whether the people were really in earnest. By this time, all the other tribes in the district were under arms and watching their respective wards as directed.

The same evening Leuchars, having decided to abandon operations at Mpanza, suggested to the Commandant the mobilization of another force for the purpose of following Bambata. On being consulted, the Commissioner expressed the view, on the 11th, that "nothing can be gained at present by bringing a large white force here," nor would mounted men or artillery be "of much use," owing to the nature of the country. "With the Z.M.R. and Police Force in the district, I do not think further white troops are required at the present time." In consequence of this advice, Leuchars was instructed by the Commandant to remain in Greytown until the operations, then being carried on by him in the thorns in the neighbourhood of Mpanza, had been completed, after which he was to demobilize, viz. on the 13th or 14th.

On the afternoon of the 12th, the Commissioner reported that the forest was being driven by Sigananda's people. He was of the opinion that, although a strong force might be necessary, the sending thereof should be resorted to only after diplomatic measures had failed. It was on this day that Mansel and his men arrived at Empandhleni.

On the 15th, Mr. Saunders pointed out that, unless Sigananda accounted satisfactorily for Bambata and his followers by the following night, there would be no doubt that the tribe was in collusion with Bambata, and that it would be necessary to take strong measures forthwith to punish it. He agreed with Mansel and Vanderplank that, if operations were to be conducted against Bambata, a very much larger force than the one already there would be required. He added that he was in constant touch withDinuzulu and had no reason for suspecting that Chief's loyalty, or that he was assisting or encouraging Bambata.

The Commissioner reported on the 16th that he had had no message from Sigananda for some days. The messengers he had sent on the preceding day had returned to say the Chief had nothing to report. It was at this moment Mr. Saunders arrived at the conviction that Sigananda was acting in concert with Bambata, and had been deliberately harbouring him all along. He, thereupon, dropped all further communication with the Chief, and recommended strong measures being taken as soon as possible to severely punish him and his tribe. This, however, it was added, could only be done by considerably strengthening the European force and obtaining the assistance of loyal Natives. He reiterated his belief that Dinuzulu was not implicated in any way. At 6.15 p.m., information came in from different sources that Bambata, with the assistance of Sigananda, intended to attack the magistracy the same night. Sigananda had, by then, been joined by portions of Ndube's, Mpumela's and Gayede's tribes, the last-named a Natal Chief. At 7.30 p.m. the situation was reported as still more serious, especially as members of different tribes, including that of Siteku (Dinuzulu's uncle) had joined Sigananda. It was felt a large force should be sent up as speedily as possible to reinforce the loyal levies and restore public confidence. The rebel force estimated then to be at Nkandhla was 500 to 1,000.

As the supplies at Empandhleni appeared to be running short,[155]arrangements were promptly made by the Commandant for the dispatch of a convoy of forty waggons of provisions from Dundee, accompanied by an escort of 400 Natal Carbineers,[156]and one section B Battery, NatalField Artillery (Lieut. F.H. Acutt), under Lieut.-Col. D.W. Mackay. Such force could not, however, leave before the 20th.

The policy of calling on Sigananda, unaided by European troops, to arrest a well-armed body of desperadoes,[157]who had succeeded in taking possession of the great local stronghold, is not an easy one to defend, especially when it is borne in mind that Natives in all parts of Natal and Zululand had, for three or four months past, loudly complained of the poll tax, many in Zululand having still to pay. Only a fraction of what was due by Sigananda's people had been collected. It was known the majority considered it a tax that could not be borne in addition to other obligations. Moreover, the news of the Byrnetown outbreak in February; of the hostile demonstrations at such places as Mapumulo, Umzinto, Mid-Illovo, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, and at their own magistracy; of the movements of the Militia in the western and eastern portions of Natal; as well as of the successful assaults on the Magistrate's party on the 3rd, and on the large body of Police on the 4th, was all calculated to greatly unsettle the Native mind.

It was well known that, according to Zulu law, anyone harbouring a criminal was liable to the severest punishment, especially if the offender were a rebel. The principle of communal responsibility was applied, as a matter of course, by which the arrival of a stranger, reputed to be a criminal, had to be reported to the next senior officer. In this case, Bambata had gone, not to live at any particular kraal, but taken possession of the stronghold universally acknowledged to be that of Sigananda and his ancestors, and which fell well within the district assignedby Government for the occupation of that tribe. It, therefore, devolved on that Chief to inform his Magistrate. How he did this has already been seen. The attitude assumed by the Magistrate, and soon affirmed and adopted by the Commissioner, was that, as Bambata had taken refuge in the forests, Sigananda himself became personally responsible for his apprehension, notwithstanding that the outlaw had arrived with about 150 men, who, on the whole, were probably better armed, and known from the outset to be better armed, than any local levies could have been.

The order issued to Ndube, Mpumela and other Chiefs to "assist" in arresting the ringleader would also appear to have been wrong in principle, in the absence of arrangements for a European officer or force to be present to take charge of and support the levies.[158]After all, Bambata had struck his blow, not at the black man, but at the white. It was, therefore, the duty of the white man to at least assist the levies, and especially Sigananda.

There was, indeed, no evidence of previous collusion between Bambata and Sigananda. "At that time," wrote the Commissioner, "there was no ground for suspecting that Sigananda and his people would not loyally co-operate in effecting Bambata's capture."[159]Later on, allegations were made of Sigananda being in league with Dinuzulu, and of Bambata having been directed by Dinuzulu to start the Rebellion, but it must be remembered no onebelieved more implicitly in, and more staunchly and consistently defended, Dinuzulu's loyalty than did Mr. Saunders. When, on the 6th April, at Usutu kraal, he informed Dinuzulu and his indunas of the attack on the Police in Mpanza valley, he says "their frank demeanour left no doubt in my mind that these expressions were perfectly genuine, and that Dinuzulu and his people were not in any way associated with Bambata and his doings."[160]Even under these circumstances, assuming Dinuzulu to have been loyal, it is somewhat surprising to those who know anything of Native character and the facts, to find Sigananda and other Chiefs repeatedly pressed between the 9th and 16th to arrest a man who, from a purely Native point of view, had done no more than offer a vigorous protest to paying a tax which every Native, throughout the length and breadth of the country, also strongly resented.

By 6.45 p.m. on the 9th, practically the whole of the Zululand Mounted Rifles (105) had arrived at Empandhleni—mobilized under the authority given by law in such emergencies. This force was, on the 12th, increased to about 350 by the arrival of the Natal Police and Nongqai under Mansel.[161]The latter assumed command on arrival, and decided to remain in lager. All these men had assembled for a purpose. What was that purpose if not to arrest Bambata? If Mansel's object was to 'contain' the enemy, can it be said that there was any 'containing' between the 12th and 28th April (the day he moved to Fort Yolland) with the enemy comfortably ensconced in a forest and the Police as comfortably behind entanglements eleven miles off at Empandhleni?

Had Mansel, Vanderplank and van Rooyen been made to converge simultaneously on Cetshwayo's grave from Middle Drift, Fort Yolland and Empandhleni respectively, which could have been effected before mid-day on the10th,[162]supplies being at the same time pushed forward from Eshowe, and Sigananda's men ordered to assemble smartly at the same spot, together with those of adjoining Chiefs—McKenzie acted on these lines in Mveli's ward—or had aggressive action been taken in some other form, as advised at the time by van Rooyen, control would have been taken of the situationab initio, instead of, by merely marking time, practically encouraged members of surrounding tribes to rebel for fear of losing their stock through not conforming to Dinuzulu's alleged plan. Had a force established itself then at the grave, Bambata's men would have had no chance against it in the open country of that part. It was, subsequently, at the grave that a not much larger body than the one referred to for over a month defied a force at least three or four times its own strength, and concluded by, almost single-handed, entrapping and crushing it. Precautions could, at the same time, have been taken to prevent Bambata gaining any small advantage, which, exaggerated by the rebels, would have added considerably to his prestige.

Assuming it to have been desirable for van Rooyen, Vanderplank and Mansel to converge at the grave on the 10th or 11th, the order for such movement could not have been issued by the Commandant without fuller information than he then possessed, especially as the Commissioner was of the view that no European troops other than those already in Zululand were necessary at Nkandhla.

Had the troops converged as suggested, they might conceivably have succeeded in suppressing the Rebellion and saved the Colony over half a million of money, but to have done this would have meant practically ignoring a spirit of rebelliousness latent in many of the people, which might only have broken out in some other form in the near future.

Among the rebels, the position developed as follows: After Muntumuni had gone to report Bambata's arrival,the latter, as has been stated, marched to the mouth of Mome gorge and halted at the very kraal on and about whose site, but two months later, he found his Thermopylæ. The force, having regaled itself, passed up the gorge to the right side of the Mome stream near the waterfall, where, entering a dense forest, it concealed itself and proceeded to erect temporary shelters, known asamadhlangala.

It so happened that a European scout passed the same day along the top of Nomangci and Dhlabe, with a view to locating Bambata. He fell in with a resident Native, who said that, when rounding up his stock in the vicinity of the waterfall, he had come upon Bambata's party. Later on, it became known that this man had communicated information treated by Sigananda as secret; ten head of his cattle and one horse were thereupon seized by the Chief. Two were slaughtered and the horse appropriated; the rest of the stock was restored on his joining the rebels. One of Sigananda's own sons, too, who had reported to the Commissioner Bambata's being in the gorge, was fined and for some time detained as a prisoner.

Sigananda, at this time, was still at Enhlweni kraal, not a mile and a half from Bambata's camp. On the 9th, fully aware that Bambata had taken refuge in the stronghold, he sent messengers to summon the more important men of the tribe. About sixty assembled; none of them were armed. Sigananda called aside eight or nine of the leading ones and informed them of Bambata's being in the stronghold, adding that a messenger from Mangati (present at time of speaking), had reported that Mangati had just been visited by Dinuzulu's messenger Cakijana, who declared he had been directed to accompany Bambata from Usutu and start a rebellion in Mpanza valley. Cakijana had afterwards passed on to a neighbouring Chief to try and persuade him to support Bambata. Sigananda's sons asked what right anyone had to authorize an outlaw they had received no official communication about to take refuge among them. They asked why, ifDinuzulu had ordered Bambata to rebel, the latter did not go to the man who had instigated him to do so. It appeared to them, moreover, that secret messages had passed between their father and Dinuzulu of which he had advised no one, otherwise Bambata and party would not have made direct for their district as they had done. One of those present, however, observed, "Are you going to take it on yourselves to refuse to have anything to do with a 'girl' who has come to engage herself to your father?" It soon became clear that Sigananda, notwithstanding his report to the Magistrate, was siding with Bambata, and was supported in that course by his confidant and adviser Lunyana, the keeper of Cetshwayo's grave. On someone declaring that the outlaw would bring ruin upon their district, Sigananda observed, "Yes, then some of you will have to die and leave your wives behind you."

No time was now lost by Sigananda in dispatching messengers to all parts of his ward, calling on the people to arm and bring their blankets with them. Notwithstanding further remonstrance on the following day (10th), Sigananda persisted in the course he had entered upon. He reproached those of his tribe, who, in 1888, when called on by the Government to attack Dinuzulu, had complied, whilst the majority remained loyal to the Zulu House.

On Sunday, Monday and Tuesday, Bambata lay concealed in the forest, but on Tuesday night, he emerged and openly joined those of Sigananda's tribe who had armed and assembled at Enhlweni in obedience to their Chief's orders, including a few from Mpumela's and Ndube's tribes. At this moment, however, a number of Sigananda's and Ndube's men broke away with their families and stock, disapproving of what was being done. It thus became noised abroad, far and wide, before dawn that Sigananda had openly thrown in his lot with the rebels.

Identification of his fortunes with those of Bambata had, however, still to be announced in a public manner. Bambata moved during the night, with his own two companies and such other rebels as remained, to the top of theridge behind Enhlweni. Many others arrived at this spot on the following morning from various parts until, about noon, the force was about 500 to 600. Nothing of special note seems to have occurred before noon, except that Sigananda sat openly alongside of, and conversed with, Bambata and the other ringleader Mangati. Bambata, a man of about 40 years of age, of dark complexion, with a rather tall athletic frame, wore a dark coat and trousers, boots, and a Natal Police (European) helmet, no doubt belonging to one of the men killed on the preceding Wednesday. A large ammunition belt was buckled round his waist, with a bandolier containing cartridges over the right shoulder. He also carried a modern rifle.

His men, of comparatively small build, dark and thickset, had for the most part, white ostrich feathers in their hair, plucked from a European-owned bird wilfully done to death by them in their ward just before their flight. They wore the ordinary Native attire, includingtshokobezibadges,[163]and each carried assegais, together with a large ox-hide shield. In their possession were eight guns, viz.: three magazine rifles, one Martini-Henry rifle, one double-barrelled gun, and three old muskets.

A black and white cow was soon observed being driven forward. This was presented to Bambata. The significance of the gift was that the Chief, acting on behalf of the tribe, regarded Bambata as a friend and desired to extend hospitality to him in the manner most approved by Native custom. It was now arranged that one of Bambata's men should shoot it. Two shots were fired, but the animal remained unharmed. Indeed, it had been intimated beforehand to those near by that, although fired at, the beast, because of having been charmed by Bambata, would not fall until Bambata himself had fired. Trueenough, on his taking the rifle and firing, it dropped dead, and rolled down the incline on which it had been standing. "A marvel! a mystery!" remarked the surprised on-lookers. "Clearly Bambata must be in possession of some wonderful charm!"[164]The animal was now skinned and consumed by the men from Mpanza.

Two messengers, who had been sent by Sigananda to the Commissioner, now arrived on the scene. They were taken aside by the Chief with a few others, when one of them reported that Mr. Saunders, on hearing of Sigananda's inability to find Bambata, had said he would not keep on sending messages, as it was absurd to suppose the outlaw's whereabouts could not be ascertained; he was known to have come into the midst of kraals, whose occupants, having feet, could detect with ease a track made by a couple of men, how much more that by a hundred, as well as a couple of horses![165]The Commissioner had also alluded to an upstart, Sitimela; to this man reference will be made further on.

All were now directed to move towards where Sigananda and his party were sitting, and there "to march together through one gate." This, however, was merely a metaphorical expression, there being no actual gate at the place. The expression had reference, as everyone at once guessed, to certain two Basuto doctors engaged, not many yards off, in preparing decoctions of various drugs calledizintelezi.[166]The meaning was that the men were all to walk past the doctors for the purpose of being treated in accordance with custom, in anticipation of coming warfare. There was a small fire close by, from which a large amount of smoke was ascending. The smoke was caused by green branches and leaves being burnt with a fatty substance thrown in by the medicos. The order was that Bambata's men should move off first in twos, followed byNdube's and Sigananda's men in like formation. When the first two came to the fire, they trod lightly in it, the man on the left with his right foot, and the one on the right with his left. In so doing, they passed through the smoke. Without halting, they passed slowly by the doctors, when they were simultaneously sprinkled by one of these by means of two black small brushes, apparently gnu-tails (one in each hand), previously dipped in a huge earthen-ware pot containing some caustic decoction. The men were told that they should not, after the sprinkling, rub their bodies with fat, as usual with Zulus, nor should they wash. Moving on, the leading couple came to the second doctor, who lifted to the mouth of each a ladle containing a different liquid, drawn from a pot on the ground at his side. Each warrior was instructed to take a mouthful, not to swallow, but to keep in his mouth until further directed. Similar procedure was followed in regard to every couple, until the wholeimpihad been dealt with.

After marching past, the men formed up in one large irregularly-shaped body, some hundred or so yards further on. What is known as anumkumbior circle was now ordered to be formed,[167]when Sigananda, accompanied by Mangati and one or two of his leading councillors, entered the ring. Bambata stood apart in front of, but close to, his own men, who also formed part of the enclosure. Everyone remained standing, including the ninety-six-year-old Chief. The last-mentioned addressed the gathering in these terms: "The drugs which have just been used on and about you all have the power of preventing bullets fired by Europeans from entering your bodies or doing injury of any kind. But there will be immunity only on certain conditions, which are that you abstain from womenfolk, and that you lie down to sleep, not on mats, but on the bare ground. Anyone who ignores these directions will render himself liable to injury or to be killed. From to-day, I have resolved to take up arms against the white man! The pass-word and countersign to be used when you happen to meet and interrogateothers, especially at night, is 'Wen' u tini?' (= You, what do you say?); the one addressed must then reply, 'Insumansumane!'" (= It's all tomfoolery!) After Sigananda had spoken, a Christian teacher named Paula endorsed what the Chief had said, laying stress on the efficacy of the drugs. "I have left my wife behind," he added, "also a waggon and oxen in Mpanza valley. Why did I come away? Because I had made up my mind to fight. The Government is casting aside its right of sovereignty and giving the same over to us. Here (pointing at them) are my tribesmen! These men will never turn back now, but will go resolutely forward. Once angered, they are implacable and continue long in their wrath."

A man, Mmangwana, one of those who had just come from the Commissioner, next mumbled, with the liquid he had sipped still in his mouth: "I cannot accept the assertion that anyone, on being struck by a bullet, will not be hurt or that a bullet will not enter. I never heard of such a thing. Is, then, a man's flesh made of iron? Did not a certain outlaw[168]not long ago find his way into the Umtetwa tribe and there bring about the ruin of a whole country-side? Did he not declare that, if the Europeans came to attack him, they would be stung by bees and wasps, and be bitten by snakes? And when they (Europeans) did come, were not many innocent people destroyed by the white people, whilst this fellow escaped scot free?"

The keeper of Cetshwayo's grave here remarked, also speaking with great difficulty, his mouth half-full of the talismanic draught, "How comes it, in these days, that when the King[169]sees fit to direct anything to be done, a lot of people come forward with all sorts of observations and criticisms? Who ever heard of presumption of this sort in former times?"

On the ring now breaking up, the whole party was led by Mangati to the top of the nearest mountain-top(Ndundumeni). Here they were told to cinsa, i.e. vigorously and defiantly spirt the charmed water from their mouths towards the objects of their wrath, shouting as they did so,Íwa Kingi!Íwa Mgungundhlovu!Íwa Mashiqela!(May the King fall![170]Fall, Pietermaritzburg! Fall, Saunders!) Everyone having uttered these imprecations, came down the hill and, the mist coming on, the gathering dispersed, with orders to meet on the following morning in the neighbourhood of the grave.[171]

When the rebels met as arranged, accompanied by Bambata, they erected otheramadhlangalaor temporary shelters of wattles and branches. Later the same day, probably the 16th, a body now between 700 and 1,000 strong, with Bambata and Mangati in command, marched up the ridge at the rear of Enhlweni towards Nomangci, with the intention of attacking the magistracy, or any of the small patrols that were then being sent out daily. Sigananda, hearing of this, ordered Bambata to desist until the messengers sent by him to Dinuzulu a couple of days before (to obtain confirmation of Cakijana's communication to Mangati regarding Dinuzulu's alleged wishes) had been received. Bambata returned to the grave, where he continued to camp undisturbed for at least a fortnight.

The decision of Sigananda to rebel is surprising when one considers that his district is one of the healthiest and most fertile in Zululand. In many respects it is an ideal place to live in, especially for Natives. Far from the larger European centres, it has an abundance of firewood, wattles, etc., and is, moreover, peculiarly favourable for raising stock. All these advantages became of no account as soon as the blighting word arrived from the royal house that Bambata was to be befriended. Dinuzulu's pleasure first, everything else nowhere. That was the sole cause of this remarkable defection. It can be explained in no other way. Where is the witchery that can be compared with this?

Between the 15th and 23rd, Sigananda sent messages to many neighbouring loyally-disposed Chiefs, urging them to rebel. Although a number of malcontents threw in their lot with the rebels, including members of the tribe of Siteku (Dinuzulu's uncle) and Chief Gayede (of Natal), the majority of the people remained loyal or neutral. Several, as far off as Mahlabatini, went further and offered their services to the Government against Bambata and Sigananda.

Two or three stores, close to the forests, were looted during this period (that at Sibudeni, as early as the 16th), besides cattle belonging to loyalists.

The two messengers that had been sent to Dinuzulu got back on the evening of the 23rd. Unfortunately, there was a difference between them as to the purport of 'the Prince's' message. One man, the senior, said Dinuzulu had denied all knowledge of Bambata's doings, and had remarked: "they have already begun fighting; let them do just what they want, it is no affair of mine. I do not want to be mixed up in the business." The other man, agreeing whilst in Sigananda's presence, afterwards went among the rebels and encouraged them by declaring that Dinuzulu'srealwish was that they should fight the white man. The construction put on the communication by the latter messenger was that which, readily finding favour, was accepted. These men, moreover, had heard of the Government having arranged with Dinuzulu on the 17th to allow Mankulumana to go and act as "peace-maker," a matter that will be noticed later. The second messenger interpreted Mankulumana's mission into his having been "bought by the Europeans"; his coming, therefore, was simply to try and hoodwink Bambata.

Mankulumana arrived at Empandhleni on the 23rd, and after interviewing the Commissioner for Native Affairs, proceeded, on the following morning, to see Sigananda.

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