The French loss has been computed at nearly fifty thousand men during the campaign.
Of the French generals, De Lobau (Mouton), Compans, Duhesme and Cambronne were made prisoners; and Girard, Devaux, Letort, Penne, Michel, Aix and Baudouin killed.
Perhaps we cannot arrive at a more accurate notion of the loss of the enemy than that conveyed by Ney, in his speech in the Chamber of Peers, four days after the battle, to which the reader’s notice is drawn (page 207): “Not a man of the guard will ever rally more. I myself witnessed their total extermination: they are annihilated.” And everybody knows that Napoleon always husbanded the guard, at the cost of all his other troops. “Their total extermination” implies then that the whole army was utterly routed.
The slaughter, in the absence of official reports, must be left to be computed by the sober judgment of the reader.
The French force detached under Grouchy to observe the Prussians amounted to thirty-two thousand men, and a hundred and four guns.
POSITIONS OF THE ALLIED ARTILLERY TOWARDS THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE.
On the right, close to the Nivelles road, the Brunswick guns. Stretching towards the left, major Bull’s (howitzers), captain N. Ramsey’s, major Webber Smith’s, captain Mercer’s, major Symper’s (German), captain Sandham’s, major Beane’s batteries; and captain Bolton’s, at the angle between Adam’s left and Maitland’s right. Captain Sinclair’s battery. Major Vandersmissen’s batteries, at the interval between Halkett’s brigade. Major Lloyd’s, major sir H. Ross’s batteries. Major sir R. Gardner’s battery, advancing. Major Whinyate’s (rocket), major Braun’s (German), major Rogers’ batteries. A Dutch-Belgian battery. Major Rettberg’s (German), just relieved by a Prussian battery. A Dutch-Belgian battery. Major Kuhlman’s and captain Cleeve’s (German) batteries, advancing on the high-road, after refitting. Five Dutch-Belgian guns near Ditmers’ brigade.
ARTILLERY TAKEN BY THE ALLIED ARMY AT WATERLOO.
Exclusive of those taken by the Prussians, on the field and in the pursuit.
Our readers will give us credit for having observed a strict impartiality throughout our narrative of the battle; and in the same spirit would we desire to discuss those questions relating to it, which have given rise to so many false and exaggerated statements.
The first subject of controversy we shall notice, is the strange, but oft repeated charge, against Wellington’s military judgment, in choosing his position in front of Mont-St.-Jean, with a forest in his rear,in case of defeat. I must be excused if I show some little indignation at the repetition of this charge; a British soldier must be allowed to be as jealous of the fame of his illustrious commander, as our gallant opponents were of that of their idolized Napoleon. Well, what is the charge? That the Waterloo position was not well chosen for a retreat, having defiles and a wood in its rear.
We begin our examination of this point by remarking that Wellington chose the position, not in a hurry, nor because he was forced to do so, but most deliberately, and after havingthoroughly reconnoitred it. He chose it with the conviction that he could well maintain it until the Prussians could form a junction with him; this accomplished, he knew that the French would not have a single chance left. He had but one apprehension; namely, that the enemy would push on by Hal, and turn the allied right. But Napoleon’s holding us too cheap, his impetuosity, or his desperation, brought him headlong upon our chosen position: the very best for our purposes between Charleroi and Brussels. Let the event assist the impartial reader in deciding which commander showed the better judgment in selecting his ground for action. But as far as the Duke is concerned, it is quite unnecessary to say anything in his defence. Nor should we have attempted to give a description of the Waterloo position, but for the judgment of Napoleon, at least as coming to us through the generals de Montholon, Gourgaud, de Las-Cases, Mr. O’Meara, etc., being so directly at variance with that practicality shown by the duke of Wellington, who, we supposed, had previously both taken up and successfully defended too many positions, not to know the local requisites of a good one, and particularly as opposed to a French army. Waterloo was not fixed upon at the spur of the moment, as I have elsewhere shown; in addition to which, the Duke, his staff, and most of our generals were so often over the ground before the battle, that the farmers complained of the damage done thereby to their crops. It may be well to observe, for the information of those who are unacquainted with the position and localities, that the main-road from the field of Waterloo to Brussels is a very wide and well paved one. The road to the capital by Braine-l’Alleud and Alsemberg is also paved[82]. Several cross-roads, in rear of our position, likewise traverse the forest of Soigne, and communicate with the high-road between this and Brussels. The trees of the forest, and the hedges, banks, and buildings on the sides of the roads, would have afforded excellent protection to light troops covering a retreat, and have materially aided to keep the pursuing enemy at bay. Closein rear of the allied army and along the verge of the wood, was a most advantageous ridge, which might have offered an excellent second position, and from whence the guns could command everything within their range. The forest of Soigne itself, composed of lofty trees, afforded a shelter which resolute men could not be easily driven from: being nearly free from underwood, it was everywhere passable for broken infantry and cavalry, and from which no earthly force could have dislodged us, unless we willed it. When the duke of Wellington, some years after the battle, was asked what he would have done, had he been driven from his position at Waterloo, his Grace replied, “I should have gone into the wood.” The impartial opinion of the celebrated and able military writer Jomini may with propriety be here cited:
“We have said that one of the essentials in a position is, that it should offer the means of retreat; which brings us to the consideration of a question created by the battle of Waterloo. Supposing an army to be posted in front of a forest, having a good road behind its centre and each of its wings; would it be compromised, as Napoleon asserts, in the event of its losing the battle? For my own part, I think, on the contrary, that such a position would be more favourable for retreating, than if the country were perfectly open; since a beaten army cannot traverse a plain without being exposed to the utmost danger. Doubtless, if the retreat should degenerate into a disorderly flight, a portion of the guns remaining in battery in front of the forest would probably be lost; but the infantry, the cavalry, and the rest of the artillery, would be able to retire with as much facility as across a plain. But if, on the contrary, the retreat takes place with order, nothing can possibly protect it better than a forest: provided always, there exist at least two good roads behind the lines; that the enemy be not allowed to press too close, before the requisite measures preparatory to retiring are thought of; and that no lateral movement shall enable the enemy to anticipate the army at the outlets from the forest, as happened at Hohenlinden. It would also greatly tend to secure the retreat, if, as was the case at Waterloo, the forest should form a concave line behind the centre; for such a bend would then become a regularplaced’armes, in which to collect the troops and afford time to file them successively into the high-road[83]”.
General Jomini’s doctrine, with the grounds on which it clearly rests, will have more weight with the honest reader, (be he a military man or a civilian, Frenchman or an Englishman,) than the fond opinions of Napoleon’s admirers.
Let us now turn to the Duke of Wellington’s plans and expectations, and we shall have ample evidence of his quick perception, consummate skill and unrivalled judgment.
The Duke was at Vienna at the moment the news reached him of Bonaparte’s escape from Elba, and of his landing in France. The following letter records the first impressions made by this event in the Austrian capital, and the full conviction which Wellington immediately felt, that the enemy of Europe’s peace would be speedily overthrown.
To Viscount Castlereagh, K. G.
“Vienna, March 12th, 1815.“MY LORD,“I received here, on the 7th instant, a dispatch from lord Burghersh, of the 1st, giving an account that Bonaparte had quitted the island of Elba, with all his civil and military officers, and about twelve hundred troops, on the 26th of February. I immediately communicated this account to the emperors of Austria and Russia, to the king of Prussia, and to the ministers of the different powers, and I found among all one prevailing sentiment, of a determination to unite their efforts to support the system established by the peace of Paris.“As it was uncertain to what quarter Bonaparte had gone, whether he would not return to Elba, or would even land on any part of the continent, it was agreed that it was best to postpone the adoption of any measure till his farther progress should be ascertained; and we have since received accounts from Genoa, stating that he had landed in France, near Cannes, on the 1st of March; had attempted to get possession of Antibes, and had been repulsed, and that he was on his march towards Grasse.“No accounts had been received at Paris as late as the middle of the day of the 5th, of his having quitted Elba, nor any accounts, from any quarter, of his farther progress.“In the mean time, the sovereigns, and all persons assembled here, are impressed with the importance of the crisis which this circumstance occasions in the affairs of the world. All are desirous of bringing to an early conclusion the business of the Congress, in order that the whole and undivided attention and exertion of all may be directed against the common enemy; and I do not entertain the smallest doubt that, even if Bonaparte should be able to form a party for himself in France, capable of making head against the legitimate government of that country, such a force will be assembled by the powers of Europe, directed by such a spirit in their councils, as must get the better of him.“The emperors of Austria and Russia and the king of Prussia have dispatched letters to the king of France, to place at his Majesty’s disposal all their respective forces; and Austrian and Prussian officers are dispatched with the letters, with powers to order the movement of the troops of their respective countries placed on the French frontiers, at the suggestion of the king of France.“The plenipotentiaries of the eight powers who signed the treaty of Paris, assembled this evening, and have resolved to publish a declaration, in which they will, in the name of their sovereigns, declare their firm resolution to maintain the peace and all its articles, with all their force, if necessary. I enclose the draught of what is proposed to be published, which, with the alteration of some expressions and the omission of one or two paragraphs, will, I believe, be adopted.“Upon the whole, I assure your Lordship that I am perfectly satisfied with the spirit which prevails here upon this occasion; and I do not entertain the smallest doubt that, if unfortunately it should be possible for Bonaparte to hold at all against the king of France, he must fall under the cordially united efforts of the sovereigns of Europe.“I have the honour to be, etc.“Wellington.”
“Vienna, March 12th, 1815.
“MY LORD,
“I received here, on the 7th instant, a dispatch from lord Burghersh, of the 1st, giving an account that Bonaparte had quitted the island of Elba, with all his civil and military officers, and about twelve hundred troops, on the 26th of February. I immediately communicated this account to the emperors of Austria and Russia, to the king of Prussia, and to the ministers of the different powers, and I found among all one prevailing sentiment, of a determination to unite their efforts to support the system established by the peace of Paris.
“As it was uncertain to what quarter Bonaparte had gone, whether he would not return to Elba, or would even land on any part of the continent, it was agreed that it was best to postpone the adoption of any measure till his farther progress should be ascertained; and we have since received accounts from Genoa, stating that he had landed in France, near Cannes, on the 1st of March; had attempted to get possession of Antibes, and had been repulsed, and that he was on his march towards Grasse.
“No accounts had been received at Paris as late as the middle of the day of the 5th, of his having quitted Elba, nor any accounts, from any quarter, of his farther progress.
“In the mean time, the sovereigns, and all persons assembled here, are impressed with the importance of the crisis which this circumstance occasions in the affairs of the world. All are desirous of bringing to an early conclusion the business of the Congress, in order that the whole and undivided attention and exertion of all may be directed against the common enemy; and I do not entertain the smallest doubt that, even if Bonaparte should be able to form a party for himself in France, capable of making head against the legitimate government of that country, such a force will be assembled by the powers of Europe, directed by such a spirit in their councils, as must get the better of him.
“The emperors of Austria and Russia and the king of Prussia have dispatched letters to the king of France, to place at his Majesty’s disposal all their respective forces; and Austrian and Prussian officers are dispatched with the letters, with powers to order the movement of the troops of their respective countries placed on the French frontiers, at the suggestion of the king of France.
“The plenipotentiaries of the eight powers who signed the treaty of Paris, assembled this evening, and have resolved to publish a declaration, in which they will, in the name of their sovereigns, declare their firm resolution to maintain the peace and all its articles, with all their force, if necessary. I enclose the draught of what is proposed to be published, which, with the alteration of some expressions and the omission of one or two paragraphs, will, I believe, be adopted.
“Upon the whole, I assure your Lordship that I am perfectly satisfied with the spirit which prevails here upon this occasion; and I do not entertain the smallest doubt that, if unfortunately it should be possible for Bonaparte to hold at all against the king of France, he must fall under the cordially united efforts of the sovereigns of Europe.
“I have the honour to be, etc.“Wellington.”
The Duke, though strongly urged by the allied sovereigns of Austria, Prussia and Russia to start for the Netherlands, remained in Vienna until he had completed his duties at the Congress, and received orders from England to take the command of the troops assembling in the Low-Countries. He arrived at Brussels early in April. In less than twenty-four hours, he was master of the state of things, and immediately wrote the following dispatch
To General Kleist.
“Brussels, April 5th, 1815.“GENERAL,“I arrived here during last night: I have spent the day in endeavouring to make myself master of the state of affairs.“The reports respecting the situation, number and the intentions of the enemy are always excessively vague: but it appears to me we ought to be prepared against a surprise (coup de main) which he might be tempted to try at any moment.“There can be no doubt that it would be an immense advantage to him to make us retrograde with the troops which we have in front of Brussels; to drive before him the king of France and the Royal family, and to compel the king of the Netherlands, with his establishments newly formed here, to make a retreat. This would be a terrible blow in public opinion, both here and in France: and, according to his usual management, (allure), the news of his success would be known throughout France, whilst that of any reverse that might happen to him would be concealed from everybody.“After having placed 13,400 men as garrisons in Mons, Tournay, Ypres, Ostend, Nieuport and Antwerp, I can get together about 23,000 good troops, English and Hanoverian; amongst them about five thousand excellent cavalry. This number will be increased in a few days, especially in cavalry and artillery. I can also bring up 20,000 Dutch and Belgian troops, including two thousand cavalry; the whole having about sixty pieces of cannon.“My opinion is, that we ought to take measures to unite the whole Prussian army with this allied Anglo-Dutch armyin front of Brussels; and that, with this view, the troops under your Excellency’s command should, without loss of time, march along the Maese, and take up cantonments between Charleroi, Namur and Huy.“By this disposition, we shall be sure to save this country, so interesting to the allied powers: we shall cover the concentration of their forces on the Rhine; and we shall escape the evils which would inevitably result from a sudden retreat in our actual circumstances. At the same time, your Excellency would be just as able as you are in your present position, to march your troops to any point required by the service of the king; and we should have for our numerous cavalry a field of battle as favourable as any in the rear of Brussels.“I beg your Excellency to take these reasons into consideration, and to let me know your determination; in order that I may decide what measures I ought to take in case I should be attacked, if your Excellency should judge more fit to remain where you are.“I ought to apprize your Excellency, that the king of the Netherlands has given orders for providing your troops with all they may want upon their advance into this country.“Wellington.”
“Brussels, April 5th, 1815.
“GENERAL,
“I arrived here during last night: I have spent the day in endeavouring to make myself master of the state of affairs.
“The reports respecting the situation, number and the intentions of the enemy are always excessively vague: but it appears to me we ought to be prepared against a surprise (coup de main) which he might be tempted to try at any moment.
“There can be no doubt that it would be an immense advantage to him to make us retrograde with the troops which we have in front of Brussels; to drive before him the king of France and the Royal family, and to compel the king of the Netherlands, with his establishments newly formed here, to make a retreat. This would be a terrible blow in public opinion, both here and in France: and, according to his usual management, (allure), the news of his success would be known throughout France, whilst that of any reverse that might happen to him would be concealed from everybody.
“After having placed 13,400 men as garrisons in Mons, Tournay, Ypres, Ostend, Nieuport and Antwerp, I can get together about 23,000 good troops, English and Hanoverian; amongst them about five thousand excellent cavalry. This number will be increased in a few days, especially in cavalry and artillery. I can also bring up 20,000 Dutch and Belgian troops, including two thousand cavalry; the whole having about sixty pieces of cannon.
“My opinion is, that we ought to take measures to unite the whole Prussian army with this allied Anglo-Dutch armyin front of Brussels; and that, with this view, the troops under your Excellency’s command should, without loss of time, march along the Maese, and take up cantonments between Charleroi, Namur and Huy.
“By this disposition, we shall be sure to save this country, so interesting to the allied powers: we shall cover the concentration of their forces on the Rhine; and we shall escape the evils which would inevitably result from a sudden retreat in our actual circumstances. At the same time, your Excellency would be just as able as you are in your present position, to march your troops to any point required by the service of the king; and we should have for our numerous cavalry a field of battle as favourable as any in the rear of Brussels.
“I beg your Excellency to take these reasons into consideration, and to let me know your determination; in order that I may decide what measures I ought to take in case I should be attacked, if your Excellency should judge more fit to remain where you are.
“I ought to apprize your Excellency, that the king of the Netherlands has given orders for providing your troops with all they may want upon their advance into this country.
“Wellington.”
Our readers will remark in this letter the Duke’s prompt decision on the importance of an immediate junction of a large Prussian force with the British allied army, and of protecting Brussels at all hazards. We shall see how much stress Napoleon laid upon keeping the British and the Prussians apart, and upon making a dash at Brussels. These two great commanders then took the same view: but the Duke’s vigilance and energy baffled all Napoleon’s exertions against the English allied army and the city of Brussels: the Prussians would have suffered less at Ligny, if the Duke’s earnest entreaty for the earliest possible junction of the allies had been duly appreciated. Wellington also correctly anticipated, from the first moment, that Charleroi and its vicinity would probably be the point selected by Napoleon for his irruption into the Netherlands.
It seems from a letter dated 15th of April 1815, of the Duketo Gneisenau, that he had ascertained that two corps of the enemy, composed of 45,000 infantry and 7,200 cavalry, were in his front between the Sambre and the sea: he immediately set off to reconnoitre the whole frontier: this occupied him four days.
By reference to the “SECRET MEMORANDUM” in the Appendix,No. 1, it may be seen how prompt, energetic and comprehensive were the measures resolved upon by the duke of Wellington. As early as the 30th of April, he wrote to lord Uxbridge, “All the dispositions are so made that the whole army can be collected in one short movement, with the Prussians on our left.”
One of Wellington’s difficulties in preparing for the contest, was the motley character of some of the foreign troops placed, or offered to be placed, under his command. Some Saxon troops in particular drew from him very severe, but characteristic strictures and contempt, as appears from the subjoined documents:
To the Earl of Clancarty, G. C. B.
“Brussels, May 3d, 1815.“The Saxons mutinied last night at Liège, and obliged poor old Blücher to quit the town; the cause of the mutiny was the order to divide the corps, and that the Prussian part, in which the guards were included, should take the oath of allegiance to the king of Prussia.“We hear of Bonaparte’s quitting Paris, and of the march of troops to this frontier, in order to attack us. I met Blücher at Tirlemont this day, and received from him the most satisfactory assurances of support.“For an action in Belgium I can now put seventy thousand men into the field, and Blücher eighty thousand; so that, I hope, we should give a good account even of Bonaparte.“I am not satisfied with our delays.“Wellington.”
“Brussels, May 3d, 1815.
“The Saxons mutinied last night at Liège, and obliged poor old Blücher to quit the town; the cause of the mutiny was the order to divide the corps, and that the Prussian part, in which the guards were included, should take the oath of allegiance to the king of Prussia.
“We hear of Bonaparte’s quitting Paris, and of the march of troops to this frontier, in order to attack us. I met Blücher at Tirlemont this day, and received from him the most satisfactory assurances of support.
“For an action in Belgium I can now put seventy thousand men into the field, and Blücher eighty thousand; so that, I hope, we should give a good account even of Bonaparte.
“I am not satisfied with our delays.
“Wellington.”
To Prince Hardenberg.
“Brussels, May 3d, 1815.“MY DEAR PRINCE,“I have received your letter of the 23d of April, and Iregret that there has been a difference of opinion about the troops to be sent to this army. I am perfectly indifferent as to whether I have many or few foreign soldiers under my orders, and as it appears that prince Blücher and the Prussian officers are not disposed to let me be beaten by superior numbers, I am satisfied.“As to the Saxons, your Highness will probably receive by this same opportunity the reports of their conduct yesterday evening: and as I have not enough of good troops to be able to detach any of them to watch a body of men disposed to mutiny, I think I shall do best in having nothing to do with such troops; and if they do not get out of the affair of last evening in an honourable manner, and consistently with the military character, in spite of my respect for the powers who have placed them at my disposal, I shall beg to decline taking them under my command.“Wellington.”
“Brussels, May 3d, 1815.
“MY DEAR PRINCE,
“I have received your letter of the 23d of April, and Iregret that there has been a difference of opinion about the troops to be sent to this army. I am perfectly indifferent as to whether I have many or few foreign soldiers under my orders, and as it appears that prince Blücher and the Prussian officers are not disposed to let me be beaten by superior numbers, I am satisfied.
“As to the Saxons, your Highness will probably receive by this same opportunity the reports of their conduct yesterday evening: and as I have not enough of good troops to be able to detach any of them to watch a body of men disposed to mutiny, I think I shall do best in having nothing to do with such troops; and if they do not get out of the affair of last evening in an honourable manner, and consistently with the military character, in spite of my respect for the powers who have placed them at my disposal, I shall beg to decline taking them under my command.
“Wellington.”
Writing to sir Henry Hardinge, two days afterwards, the Duke observes that:
“The Saxon troops, it is very obvious, will be of no use to anybody during the war; and our object must be to prevent them from doing mischief.... I do not think fourteen thousand men will have much weight in deciding the fate of the war. But the most fatal of all measures will be to have fourteen thousand men in the field who cannot be trusted; and who will require nearly as many more good troops to observe them.”
These Saxon mutineers were, at the suggestion of the Duke, immediately sent off as prisoners, through Holland and Hanover, into Prussia, by the orders of marshal Blücher. But for this foresight and determined maintenance of military discipline, much greater mischief would have ensued amongst certain contingents of the allied troops, who, as it was, by their doubtful attachment to the cause in which they were enlisted and unsoldierlike behaviour in the field, provoked many a hearty curse on the day of Waterloo.
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