FOOTNOTES:[59]This force was never employed but in cases of great emergency. Had it been brought forward earlier and before the Prussians arrived, deployed into line out of range of our musketry, and supported by cavalry before that arm was so much cut up, certainly Napoleon would have stood a better chance. No doubt the attack ought to have been made earlier, or not at all.The Duke says, “Had they forced our position, instead of taking advantage of it and pressing on they must have turned round to face the Prussians, who were at that time in great force pressing the enemy’s right and rear.”Looking at the relative situations of Plancenoit, Mont-St.-Jean, and the French army, reckless as Napoleon had doubtless then become, it is still surprising he made the attack.[60]Seethe prince de la Moskowa’s letter to the duc d’Otrante, Appendix,No. V, p. 253.[61]“Up, guards, and at them!” or, “Up, guards, make ready!” what an idea of mutual confidence between the general and his men, does that simple order convey!No haranguing, which, if it excites the soldiers, also expresses a doubt of their exertions; nothing of that kind was considered necessary, but a command, which, from its very simplicity, shows the entire conviction, in the mind of him who gave it, that it would be most effectually obeyed.[62]A column or columns advancing to an attack, although steady as on parade, on nearing the line of a cool determined enemy, must be quickly shattered by the converging fire, which would drop their leading and flank files, the only men that can really use their muskets; confused by different words of command from various officers, often enveloped in smoke and crowded together, the pressure is such, that every movement augments disorder and confusion. The imposing advance of large masses has often intimidated an enemy, notwithstanding they are only really formidable in the imagination, until deployed into line, during which evolution, a good volley, resolutely followed up by the application of the cold steel, would overthrow the best troops that ever pulled a trigger.The Duke says, “Napoleon did not manœuvre at all; he just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style.” (Letter to Lord Beresford, July 2d, 1815, in the Appendix,No. II, p. 218.)I will not go so far as to say that moving forward in any other formation would have gained them the battle, but I do think the old style of advancing in columns did not give them a chance.[63]From the circumstance of the columns of the Imperial guard making their attack at the point of our line which ran curving forward, they must have become, on crowning the allied position, exposed to a cross-fire of all arms, which may be thus described:Halkett’s left and Vandersmissen’s batteries formed the left of the curve, whilst the immediate right of it consisted of Halkett’s right, our guards and Napier’s battery, whose right was brought rather forward; thus the fires were diagonal, that is, the two fires evidently crossed.It is therefore not astonishing that the veterans of a hundred fights gave way under this, to use their own words,effroyable(dreadful) cross-fire upon both front and flank.[64]Had the enemy’s cavalry really been at hand, the remaining few fine fellows under Halkett must have been annihilated. This confusion and giving way, together with that on the immediate left of the brigade, as well as the disorder on its immediate right, at about the same time, and at so critical a juncture, might have caused the most serious consequences; but, thanks to the zeal and energy of the superior officers, as well as to the coolness, alacrity and discipline of our troops, they soon reformed with much steadiness and regularity, and aided by Vandersmissen’s and Bolton’s iron hail from their double-charged guns, the withering fire of Adam’s light-bobs upon the enemy’s left flank, together with that of our guards upon their front, our struggle terminated most satisfactorily.[65]Their advance proves that this momentary confusion but little affected them.[66]A portion of this force might have been advantageously employed against us with their cavalry. Husbanding them so long, was, I suspect, an error of no small magnitude.[67]For positions of all the armies at this period,seePlan.[68]Some French writers state that this hitherto victorious column was seized with a panic. If so, it was not to be wondered at: a crowd of men, heaped helplessly together, exposed to an incessant cross-fire of musketry, round and grape-shot poured in like hail upon both front and flank, and our lines converging to enclose and bayonet them, was enough to occasion a panic. We may here observe, that the attack of the Imperial column is almost incredible, unaccompanied as it was and entirely unsupported by cavalry, with the flanks perpetually exposed, and never attempting to deploy into line, till fired into; halting to engage with musketry against troops in line. They sealed their own doom; for while utterly incapable of deploying or returning their enemy’s fire with any effect, they were attacked by our infantry and turned by our cavalry. I must leave to the talented military historians to prove that this attack displayed Napoleon’s former genius. The cause of the interval of some minutes between the two attacking columns, or why the attacks were not simultaneous, I am at a loss to explain; but it certainly was the cause of their being beaten in detail.[69]It is to be regretted that this gallant but inconstant soldier did not meet death here. It would have been far preferable to the end he afterwards found under the walls of the Luxemburg.[70]The French reserves were, for the most part, drawn up in chequer, presenting an irregular front, from la Belle-Alliance to the nearest enclosures of Hougoumont.
[59]This force was never employed but in cases of great emergency. Had it been brought forward earlier and before the Prussians arrived, deployed into line out of range of our musketry, and supported by cavalry before that arm was so much cut up, certainly Napoleon would have stood a better chance. No doubt the attack ought to have been made earlier, or not at all.The Duke says, “Had they forced our position, instead of taking advantage of it and pressing on they must have turned round to face the Prussians, who were at that time in great force pressing the enemy’s right and rear.”Looking at the relative situations of Plancenoit, Mont-St.-Jean, and the French army, reckless as Napoleon had doubtless then become, it is still surprising he made the attack.
[59]This force was never employed but in cases of great emergency. Had it been brought forward earlier and before the Prussians arrived, deployed into line out of range of our musketry, and supported by cavalry before that arm was so much cut up, certainly Napoleon would have stood a better chance. No doubt the attack ought to have been made earlier, or not at all.
The Duke says, “Had they forced our position, instead of taking advantage of it and pressing on they must have turned round to face the Prussians, who were at that time in great force pressing the enemy’s right and rear.”
Looking at the relative situations of Plancenoit, Mont-St.-Jean, and the French army, reckless as Napoleon had doubtless then become, it is still surprising he made the attack.
[60]Seethe prince de la Moskowa’s letter to the duc d’Otrante, Appendix,No. V, p. 253.
[60]Seethe prince de la Moskowa’s letter to the duc d’Otrante, Appendix,No. V, p. 253.
[61]“Up, guards, and at them!” or, “Up, guards, make ready!” what an idea of mutual confidence between the general and his men, does that simple order convey!No haranguing, which, if it excites the soldiers, also expresses a doubt of their exertions; nothing of that kind was considered necessary, but a command, which, from its very simplicity, shows the entire conviction, in the mind of him who gave it, that it would be most effectually obeyed.
[61]“Up, guards, and at them!” or, “Up, guards, make ready!” what an idea of mutual confidence between the general and his men, does that simple order convey!
No haranguing, which, if it excites the soldiers, also expresses a doubt of their exertions; nothing of that kind was considered necessary, but a command, which, from its very simplicity, shows the entire conviction, in the mind of him who gave it, that it would be most effectually obeyed.
[62]A column or columns advancing to an attack, although steady as on parade, on nearing the line of a cool determined enemy, must be quickly shattered by the converging fire, which would drop their leading and flank files, the only men that can really use their muskets; confused by different words of command from various officers, often enveloped in smoke and crowded together, the pressure is such, that every movement augments disorder and confusion. The imposing advance of large masses has often intimidated an enemy, notwithstanding they are only really formidable in the imagination, until deployed into line, during which evolution, a good volley, resolutely followed up by the application of the cold steel, would overthrow the best troops that ever pulled a trigger.The Duke says, “Napoleon did not manœuvre at all; he just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style.” (Letter to Lord Beresford, July 2d, 1815, in the Appendix,No. II, p. 218.)I will not go so far as to say that moving forward in any other formation would have gained them the battle, but I do think the old style of advancing in columns did not give them a chance.
[62]A column or columns advancing to an attack, although steady as on parade, on nearing the line of a cool determined enemy, must be quickly shattered by the converging fire, which would drop their leading and flank files, the only men that can really use their muskets; confused by different words of command from various officers, often enveloped in smoke and crowded together, the pressure is such, that every movement augments disorder and confusion. The imposing advance of large masses has often intimidated an enemy, notwithstanding they are only really formidable in the imagination, until deployed into line, during which evolution, a good volley, resolutely followed up by the application of the cold steel, would overthrow the best troops that ever pulled a trigger.
The Duke says, “Napoleon did not manœuvre at all; he just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style.” (Letter to Lord Beresford, July 2d, 1815, in the Appendix,No. II, p. 218.)
I will not go so far as to say that moving forward in any other formation would have gained them the battle, but I do think the old style of advancing in columns did not give them a chance.
[63]From the circumstance of the columns of the Imperial guard making their attack at the point of our line which ran curving forward, they must have become, on crowning the allied position, exposed to a cross-fire of all arms, which may be thus described:Halkett’s left and Vandersmissen’s batteries formed the left of the curve, whilst the immediate right of it consisted of Halkett’s right, our guards and Napier’s battery, whose right was brought rather forward; thus the fires were diagonal, that is, the two fires evidently crossed.It is therefore not astonishing that the veterans of a hundred fights gave way under this, to use their own words,effroyable(dreadful) cross-fire upon both front and flank.
[63]From the circumstance of the columns of the Imperial guard making their attack at the point of our line which ran curving forward, they must have become, on crowning the allied position, exposed to a cross-fire of all arms, which may be thus described:
Halkett’s left and Vandersmissen’s batteries formed the left of the curve, whilst the immediate right of it consisted of Halkett’s right, our guards and Napier’s battery, whose right was brought rather forward; thus the fires were diagonal, that is, the two fires evidently crossed.
It is therefore not astonishing that the veterans of a hundred fights gave way under this, to use their own words,effroyable(dreadful) cross-fire upon both front and flank.
[64]Had the enemy’s cavalry really been at hand, the remaining few fine fellows under Halkett must have been annihilated. This confusion and giving way, together with that on the immediate left of the brigade, as well as the disorder on its immediate right, at about the same time, and at so critical a juncture, might have caused the most serious consequences; but, thanks to the zeal and energy of the superior officers, as well as to the coolness, alacrity and discipline of our troops, they soon reformed with much steadiness and regularity, and aided by Vandersmissen’s and Bolton’s iron hail from their double-charged guns, the withering fire of Adam’s light-bobs upon the enemy’s left flank, together with that of our guards upon their front, our struggle terminated most satisfactorily.
[64]Had the enemy’s cavalry really been at hand, the remaining few fine fellows under Halkett must have been annihilated. This confusion and giving way, together with that on the immediate left of the brigade, as well as the disorder on its immediate right, at about the same time, and at so critical a juncture, might have caused the most serious consequences; but, thanks to the zeal and energy of the superior officers, as well as to the coolness, alacrity and discipline of our troops, they soon reformed with much steadiness and regularity, and aided by Vandersmissen’s and Bolton’s iron hail from their double-charged guns, the withering fire of Adam’s light-bobs upon the enemy’s left flank, together with that of our guards upon their front, our struggle terminated most satisfactorily.
[65]Their advance proves that this momentary confusion but little affected them.
[65]Their advance proves that this momentary confusion but little affected them.
[66]A portion of this force might have been advantageously employed against us with their cavalry. Husbanding them so long, was, I suspect, an error of no small magnitude.
[66]A portion of this force might have been advantageously employed against us with their cavalry. Husbanding them so long, was, I suspect, an error of no small magnitude.
[67]For positions of all the armies at this period,seePlan.
[67]For positions of all the armies at this period,seePlan.
[68]Some French writers state that this hitherto victorious column was seized with a panic. If so, it was not to be wondered at: a crowd of men, heaped helplessly together, exposed to an incessant cross-fire of musketry, round and grape-shot poured in like hail upon both front and flank, and our lines converging to enclose and bayonet them, was enough to occasion a panic. We may here observe, that the attack of the Imperial column is almost incredible, unaccompanied as it was and entirely unsupported by cavalry, with the flanks perpetually exposed, and never attempting to deploy into line, till fired into; halting to engage with musketry against troops in line. They sealed their own doom; for while utterly incapable of deploying or returning their enemy’s fire with any effect, they were attacked by our infantry and turned by our cavalry. I must leave to the talented military historians to prove that this attack displayed Napoleon’s former genius. The cause of the interval of some minutes between the two attacking columns, or why the attacks were not simultaneous, I am at a loss to explain; but it certainly was the cause of their being beaten in detail.
[68]Some French writers state that this hitherto victorious column was seized with a panic. If so, it was not to be wondered at: a crowd of men, heaped helplessly together, exposed to an incessant cross-fire of musketry, round and grape-shot poured in like hail upon both front and flank, and our lines converging to enclose and bayonet them, was enough to occasion a panic. We may here observe, that the attack of the Imperial column is almost incredible, unaccompanied as it was and entirely unsupported by cavalry, with the flanks perpetually exposed, and never attempting to deploy into line, till fired into; halting to engage with musketry against troops in line. They sealed their own doom; for while utterly incapable of deploying or returning their enemy’s fire with any effect, they were attacked by our infantry and turned by our cavalry. I must leave to the talented military historians to prove that this attack displayed Napoleon’s former genius. The cause of the interval of some minutes between the two attacking columns, or why the attacks were not simultaneous, I am at a loss to explain; but it certainly was the cause of their being beaten in detail.
[69]It is to be regretted that this gallant but inconstant soldier did not meet death here. It would have been far preferable to the end he afterwards found under the walls of the Luxemburg.
[69]It is to be regretted that this gallant but inconstant soldier did not meet death here. It would have been far preferable to the end he afterwards found under the walls of the Luxemburg.
[70]The French reserves were, for the most part, drawn up in chequer, presenting an irregular front, from la Belle-Alliance to the nearest enclosures of Hougoumont.
[70]The French reserves were, for the most part, drawn up in chequer, presenting an irregular front, from la Belle-Alliance to the nearest enclosures of Hougoumont.