Friday, January 6.

Yeas.—Willis Alston, jun., Nathaniel Alexander, Simeon Baldwin, George W. Campbell, John Campbell, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, John Dennis, Thomas Dwight, James Elliot, Edwin Gray, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, John A. Hanna, Seth Hastings, James Holland, David Hough, Benjamin Huger, Joseph Lewis, jun., Henry W. Livingston, Thomas Lowndes, Matthew Lyon, Nahum Mitchell, James Mott, Thomas Plater, Samuel D. Purviance, Erastus Root, Tompson J. Skinner, John Cotton Smith, John Smith of Virginia, Joseph Stanton, William Stedman,James Stephenson, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Samuel Thatcher, David Thomas, George Tibbits, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Daniel C. Verplanck, Peleg Wadsworth, Matthew Walton, Lemuel Williams, Marmaduke Williams, Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynns.Nays.—David Bard, George Michael Bedinger, William Blackledge, Adam Boyd, John Boyle, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, William Butler, Joseph Clay, John Clopton, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, William Dickson, Peter Early, Ebenezer Elmer, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, James Gillespie, Andrew Gregg, Thomas Griffin, Samuel Hammond, Josiah Hasbrouck, William Hoge, David Holmes, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, John B. C. Lucas, Andrew McCord, David Meriwether, Samuel L. Mitchill, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Patterson, Oliver Phelps, John Randolph, jun., Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John Smilie, John Smith of New York, Richard Stanford, John Stewart, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, Isaac Van Horne, Joseph B. Varnum, John Whitehill, and Richard Wynn.

Nays.—David Bard, George Michael Bedinger, William Blackledge, Adam Boyd, John Boyle, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, William Butler, Joseph Clay, John Clopton, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, William Dickson, Peter Early, Ebenezer Elmer, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, James Gillespie, Andrew Gregg, Thomas Griffin, Samuel Hammond, Josiah Hasbrouck, William Hoge, David Holmes, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, John B. C. Lucas, Andrew McCord, David Meriwether, Samuel L. Mitchill, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Patterson, Oliver Phelps, John Randolph, jun., Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John Smilie, John Smith of New York, Richard Stanford, John Stewart, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, Isaac Van Horne, Joseph B. Varnum, John Whitehill, and Richard Wynn.

The question of postponement recurring,

Mr.Hugerconsidered the course contemplated by the resolution as improper, unparliamentary, and unprecedented. To make up his mind on the course proper to be pursued, he was in favor of the postponement.

Mr.Hollandobserved that he had moved an adjournment to allow those gentlemen time for reflection who had not yet made up their minds on the propriety of the motion. He was himself of this number. Having been allowed no time for reflection, he did not feel perfectly satisfied with the appointment of a committee of inquiry before any facts had been substantiated. Desiring further time to form his judgment, and seeing no occasion for precipitation, he should vote in favor of a postponement.

Mr.G. W. Campbell.—I will not, at this late hour, detain the House with the expression of my ideas in detail. I am as desirous as any member of this House that the streams of justice should flow pure and unsullied, as on their purity depend the safety and liberties of the people of the United States. But when we are about to enter into measures for preserving them clear, we owe it to ourselves to preserve order in our conduct, and to act in such a manner as we shall be able to justify to our constituents. Every member of this House, on such an occasion, ought to be as cautious in his proceeding as a judge in delivering his opinions, lest, while we are condemning the conduct of the judge, we ourselves go astray from our duty. For this reason, I am against the adoption of a measure which may throw a censure on a character invested by the United States with high authority, until I am convinced we have sufficient grounds for doing so. The resolution on the table can have but one object, to wit: the direction of an inquiry whether sufficient evidence can be procured to authorize an impeachment. I conceive that this House cannot proceed in any other way. I am therefore of opinion, that, before the vote for an inquiry, there ought to be probable grounds that facts exist that authorize an impeachment, and that evidence can be procured of their existence. I am not prepared to say, from any thing which has been adduced, that such evidence does exist. I conceive that until probable grounds are shown, we ought not to authorize such a procedure, inasmuch as it may establish a precedent that we may hereafter regret—a precedent which will put it in the power of any member to move and obtain an inquiry into the conduct of the President, a judge, or any other officer under the Government. Under these circumstances, I am not prepared to say this is the regular course of proceeding. I do not profess to have much knowledge of parliamentary proceedings, and have therefore waited, before I expressed my opinions, to hear such precedents as gentlemen could adduce. Having heard none, I conclude none exist.

I conceive that the act of this House, in voting for a committee of inquiry, is equivalent to the expression of the opinion that they have evidence of the probable grounds of the guilt of the judge. The gentleman from Virginia has told us that the powers of this House are, in some degree, like those of a grand jury. I agree that they have all the powers of a grand jury, and it is on this ground that I deny the power now contended for. I say that a grand jury has no right to send for testimony: they have only a right to receive testimony from any one of their body, and to receive such witnesses as the court may send them. If, then, there be evidence in the present case, let us act upon it, even though it beex parte, and although that might, perhaps, be going too far.

I repeat it, I have heard no statement satisfactory to my mind that there are probable grounds for proceeding in this business. It is true, the gentleman from Pennsylvania has made a statement, but that statement appears to me to depend not so much on facts as on opinions; and it is not my wish to decide on the propriety of the conduct of the judge until the facts are before us. It is certain that a judge has a right to control counsel, and to say when his mind is made up, while it is also his duty to hear the allegations that shall be made.

In addition to these reasons for a postponement, I am also in favor of it, because, whenever a sincere desire exists to gain information, which can only be done by allowing further time, I shall always be in favor of it, when no material injury can result from the indulgence.

Mr.Mott.—I am in favor of the postponement, because I wish time for consideration, and because I am against the resolution itself. I think it is improper to go into such an inquiry before specific charges are laid before the House, when it will be proper for the House to consider whether those charges are sufficient to sustain an impeachment; then it will be proper to proceed, and not till then. No charges have yetbeen laid before the House: we have only been told by one member that he is satisfied sufficient grounds exist.

Mr. J.Randolphwas sorry to be obliged to trespass again on the patience of the House, but the direct application made to him by the gentlemen from Tennessee and South Carolina, imposed upon him the necessity of stating his reasons for proceeding in what they were pleased to term so precipitate a manner. They ask, why not have laid the resolution on the table by way of notice to the House? Because, sir, I cannot in a matter of extreme delicacy make the opinions of other gentlemen the standard of my own actions. I should have conceived the character implicated in the resolution as having just cause of complaint against me, had I not been ready to decide in a moment on it, and did I not press its immediate decision. I should have deemed it an act of cruel injustice to have hung the inquiry over his head even for a day. I should have expected the reproach of setting suspicions afloat whilst I avoided examination into them; for I should have deserved it, had I pursued the course which gentlemen wish to adopt. I can see no difference between hanging up this motion for a day or a year but the mere difference of time. What is the object to be obtained? Do we wait for evidence, or any information, which will assist us in forming a correct opinion? Not at all. To-morrow the question will recur upon us—“Is it proper, from what has already appeared, to institute an inquiry into the conduct of this officer?” And this we are as competent to decide at this moment as at any future day. When, however, gentlemen consider a resolution to make inquiry the same as an inquiry already had, I am not surprised at finding myself opposed to them in opinion. I repeat that all their arguments are applicable to a motion of impeachment only. But it seems that no precedents have been adduced, and time is wanted to hunt them up. Gentlemen should recollect that but two cases of impeachment have taken place under this Government; one of a Senator from Tennessee, the other of a district judge of New Hampshire. By what precedents were the proceedings in these cases regulated? How is it possible in a Government hardly in its teens, where new cases must daily occur, as its various functions are called into exercise, to find precedents? It did so happen, in the case of the Senator from Tennessee, that the information on which his impeachment was grounded came from the Executive. But suppose that information had not been communicated by the Executive? Would that have precluded all inquiry? Suppose, too, in the case of Mr. Pickering, that no information had been received from the Executive, and that a gentleman from New Hampshire had risen and said, “However painful the task, I deem it my duty to state that the conduct of the judge of the district in which I reside, has been such as renders him unfit for the important station which he holds, and I therefore move for an inquiry into his conduct.” Would the House have denied the inquiry? Will they rely altogether on the attorney of the district, whose interest it is to be well with the judge, and whose patience must be worn out with his misconduct before he will undertake to call the attention of Government to it? Are gentlemen aware of the delicate situation in which those officers are placed? Suppose information had been given to a member of the malfeasance of a judge by a person who should say: “It is not pleasant to originate accusations; those who come forward in these cases undertake an invidious task; while therefore I wish my name not to be mentioned, I shall be ready, when called upon by proper authority, to give my testimony.” This is a hypothetical case, but one by no means improbable. Would it not be a point of honor not to expose the name of the informant?

But, say gentlemen, the charge is of a general nature. While I do not admit the force of this remark, supposing it to be correct, I deny that it is a general charge. The inquiry is general, but it is founded on a statement made by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. I made no other statement. I have said that I believed there existed grounds of impeachment. What they are I shall not state here. They may be those exhibited by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, or they may be others. Will gentlemen assert that the statement of facts made by the gentleman from Pennsylvania will not, if true, warrant an impeachment? What does it amount to? A person under a criminal prosecution, having a constitutional right to the aid of counsel in his defence, has, by the arbitrary and vexatious conduct of the court, been denied this right. Such is the nature of the charge. Has it come to this, that an unrighteous judge may condemn whom he pleases to an ignominious death, without a hearing, in the teeth of the constitution and laws, and that such proceedings should find advocates here? Shall we be told that judges have certain rights, and, whatever the constitution or laws may declare to the contrary, we must continue to travel in the go-cart of precedent, and the injured remain unredressed? No, sir, let us throw aside these leading-strings and crutches of precedent, and march with a firm step to the object before us.

As to the motion of postponement, Mr. R. said it was of little consequence to him whether it prevailed or not. On a charge of specific malfeasance, he thought it impossible to refuse an inquiry. Whatever should be the result, he should rest satisfied with having discharged his duty to the House and to the nation. Believing the circumstances to demand inquiry, he had made it. Without circulating whispers of reproach, he had given the person implicated that opportunity of vindicating his character which he himself should require if he stood in the same unfortunate situation.

The committee rose, and the House adjourned.

Mr.Bard.—For many reasons this House must have been justly surprised by a recent measure of one of the Southern States. The impressions, however, which that measure gave my mind, were deep and painful. Had I been informed that some formidable foreign power had invaded our country, I would not, I ought not, to be more alarmed than on hearing that South Carolina had repealed her law prohibiting the importation of slaves.

In the one case we would know what to do. The emergency itself would inspire exertion, and suggest suitable means of repelling the attack. But here we are nonplussed, and find ourselves without resource. Our hands are tied, and we are obliged to stand confounded, while we see the flood-gate opened, and pouring incalculable miseries into our country. By the repeal of that law, fresh activity is given to the horrid traffic, which has been long since seriously regretted by the wise and humane, but none have been able to devise an adequate remedy to its dreadful consequences.

Congress has but little power, or rather they have no power to prevent the growth of the evil. To impose a tax on imported slaves is the extent of their power; but every one must see that it is infinitely disproportionate to what the morality, the interest, the peace, and safety, of individuals, and of the public, at this moment, demand. And though in regard to their present case the power of the General Government may be insufficient to check the mischief, yet I hope they are disposed to discourage it, as far as they are authorized by the constitution. Therefore I beg leave to offer the House the following resolution:

“Resolved, That a tax of ten dollars be imposed upon every slave imported into the United States.”

Ordered to lie on the table.

The House resumed the consideration of the motion of the fifth instant, “for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States,” and the said motion, as originally proposed, being again read, in the words following, to wit:

“Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and to report their opinion whether the said Samuel Chase hath so acted in his judicial capacity, as to require the interposition of the constitutional power of this House:”

A motion was made and seconded to amend the same, by inserting, after the words “one of the Associate Justices of the United States,” the following words, “and of Richard Peters, District Judge of the district of Pennsylvania.”

Mr.Smilie.—When the motion now under consideration was made yesterday, I should have felt surprised at the course which the debate took, had I not often witnessed such things in former times. It seems to be considered as improper that a gentleman should bring forward a motion for an inquiry into the official conduct of a public officer, and expect the House to comply with his request, unless he should at the same time produce such evidence as shall prove the facts charged. If this course of proceeding be correct, I have ever been in error. What does the gentleman from Virginia ask? Suppose he has taken exception to the conduct of the judge from some facts which have come to his own knowledge. Under such circumstances it will be allowed that it is the duty of the House to make the inquiry. When the question shall be whether an impeachment shall be preferred, it will be proper that evidence should be produced. But now only a committee is asked to receive evidence, and to determine whether it be such as in their opinion will afford grounds for an impeachment. It is impossible for me to conceive any way that can be pursued which will be more favorable to the person whose character is implicated, than that which is proposed. It is merely to inquire whether such facts can be sustained as will afford grounds for an impeachment. Certainly in this stage of the business it is not necessary to produce evidence to the House, as the House are not competent to receive testimony, which a committee is. It is a rule of this House that so much respect is due to a member, that if he states that he possesses information proper to be communicated to the House, but which in his opinion ought not to be done but with closed doors, that, in such case, the doors shall be shut without any vote of the House.

Surely, then, on the request of a member for a committee of inquiry, that measure ought to be adopted. This, in my opinion, is the best course that can be pursued for the person implicated. There is, it is true, thereby expressed an opinion of some one member that this judge has done wrong. So far his character is implicated; this is the only possible way in which it is implicated. The committee are to inquire whether there are grounds for an impeachment or not. If they report that there are not grounds, the accusation will be dismissed; and if the report is that there are grounds, the House will at once perceive the necessity of taking this step to ascertain their existence.

Another ground of resistance is taken. It is said there are precedents for this proceeding. I believe that all precedents must have an origin; and that one person has as good a right to establish them as another. Our Government is young, and only two cases of impeachment have occurred under it. Most of our precedents respecting parliamentary proceedings are borrowed from England, and, if precedents are necessary in this affair, we must resort to that country for them. My opinion is that they are not necessary, and that common sense and thereason of the thing are all that are necessary to guide our decision in this case. There is, however, in the British annals, no deficiency of precedents. The first I shall mention is to be found in the case of the Earl of Strafford. I may be told that this precedent was established in turbulent times: I may also be told of the improper mode of proceeding. I do not pretend to vindicate the whole course of procedure. I think it was wrong. But with regard to the first stages of the business, I believe them to have been correct. It will be seen that, in that instance, a more direct mode was pursued than is proposed in the present case.

The precedent I allude to will be found in Hume’s History, vol. 2, page 249. That historian says,—“A concerted attack was made upon the Earl of Strafford in the House of Commons. It was led by Pym, who, after expatiating on a long list of popular grievances, added, ‘we must inquire from what fountain these waters of bitterness flow; and though, doubtless, many evil councillors will be found to have contributed their endeavors, yet is there one who challenges the infamous pre-eminence, and who, by his courage, enterprise, and capacity, is entitled to the first place among these betrayers of their country. He is the Earl of Strafford, the Lieutenant of Ireland, and President of the Council of York, who, in both places, and in all other provinces where he has been intrusted with authority, has raised ample monuments of tyranny, and will appear, from a survey of his actions, to be the chief promoter of every arbitrary council.’ Many others entered into the same topics, and it was moved that Strafford should be impeached. Lord Falkland alone, though the known enemy of Strafford, entreated the House not to act with precipitation. But Pym replied that delay would blast all their hopes; without further debate the impeachment was voted, and Pym was chosen to carry it up to the Lords.”

In this case it does not appear that any evidence was called for; a member of the House of Commons got up and declared his opinion of that officer, and the same session an impeachment was voted. This course of proceeding is very different from that now proposed. I will now refer to a more modern precedent which at the time does not appear to have been objected to. It occurred in the reign of George I., and will be found stated in Russel’s “Modern Europe,” vol. 4, page 398.

“A new Parliament was called in which the interest of the Whigs predominated, and a secret committee, chosen by ballot, was appointed to examine all the papers, and inquire into all the negotiations relative to the late peace, as well as the cessation of arms by which it was preceded. The Committee of Secrecy prosecuted their inquiry with the greatest eagerness, and, in consequence of their report, the Commons resolved to impeach Lord Bolingbroke, the Earl of Oxford, and the Duke of Ormond, of high treason.”

One circumstance is worthy of attention. A cause of dissatisfaction at the conduct of the judge has undoubtedly prevailed. Whether he is wrongfully accused I will not say; but the dissatisfaction is manifest; for the representatives of two respectable States lately came forward and opposed his being assigned to circuits which embraced their States. This single fact ought to make an impression on the House.

It is alleged that there is no proof before the House; but one thing is notorious—is universally known. It is this, that this man (Fries) was tried before that judge for his life, and was tried without being heard. This fact cannot be disputed. When we consider the importance of the life of a citizen, and know that such an event has taken place, is it not the duty of the only body competent to inquire into the fact? With other gentlemen, I believe that the fountains of justice ought to be kept pure; I believe also that the judges are like other men, and that like them they are subject to the common frailties of human nature; and I do believe that when the frailties of human nature produce such effects, the House cannot be justified to themselves or their country without making an inquiry. Our duty to our country calls for it; our duty to the man who is implicated also calls for it. If innocent, a proper regard to his character claims it; and his friend from Maryland informs us that he will rejoice at this opportunity of coming forward and vindicating himself. If, then, the inquiry be equally necessary for placing the character of the man upon its proper footing, and for preserving the purity of justice, how can the House resist it?

Mr.Dennissaid he had only expressed an opinion that such an investigation would be rather solicited than avoided by Judge Chase.

Mr.Leib.—I am by no means an enemy to inquiry, but I am not a friend to the partiality of this resolution. We are told that it is grounded on the misconduct of the Circuit Court in Philadelphia on the trial of Fries. If one judge of that court was guilty of misconduct, the other attending judge must have been equally guilty. The conduct complained of was the act of the court, and not of an individual judge. This resolution ought therefore to embrace both the attending judges. My opinion is that both are criminal, and ought to be brought to the bar of justice. I therefore move an amendment of the resolution by introducing the name of Richard Peters, so as to embrace an inquiry into the conduct of both judges, and call for the yeas and nays on the amendment.

Mr.J. Randolph.—I wish to state for the information of those gentlemen who were not in the last Congress, that the gentleman from Pennsylvania, whose statement, thus made, is the groundwork of the present inquiry, did not offer any matter which tended to impeach the conduct of Mr. Peters, while there was a specific charge of misconduct brought against the other judge. In consequence of this charge I conceived it my duty to make an inquiry into theofficial conduct of Judge Chase. I mention this circumstance to show that however the charge of partiality may apply to the resolution, it cannot apply to the mover.

Mr.Leib.—I do not charge the mover with partiality, but the resolution with embracing one judge instead of two. Judge Peters was on the bench at the time. This outrage upon justice was the act of the court. How the conduct, therefore, of one judge shall claim investigation, while that of the other is passed over in silence, to me is mysterious. I think impartial justice calls for an investigation into the conduct of both.

Mr.Smiliesaid there could be no doubt that if the court was agreed, Judge Peters had been equally guilty of misconduct. On the trial of Fries, Mr. Chase presided, and Mr. Peters attended. If Judge Peters concurred in the decision, he was equally culpable.

Mr.Nicholson.—This resolution is grounded upon a statement made during the last session, by a member from Pennsylvania, implicating the character of one of the justices of the Supreme Court. Upon information thus given, my friend from Virginia has thought himself bound to bring the business before the House, that an inquiry may be made into his conduct. For myself I will never hesitate, I care not who the person implicated may be, and however exalted his station, to give my vote for inquiring into his official conduct, when a member of this House rises in his place, and states that, in his opinion, he has been guilty of misconduct. For this reason I shall vote for the amendment; it having been stated by a member that Judge Peters was on the bench and did concur with Judge Chase.

And on the question that the House do agree on the said amendment, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 79, nays 37, as follows:

Yeas.—Willis Alston, jun., Nathaniel Alexander, Phanuel Bishop, William Blackledge, John Boyle, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, William Butler, John Campbell, Joseph Clay, John Clopton, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, John Dennis, William Dickson, Peter Early, James Elliot, Ebenezer Elmer, John W. Eppes, William Eustis, William Findlay, James Gillespie, Edwin Gray, Andrew Gregg, Thomas Griffin, John A. Hanna, Josiah Hasbrouck, Seth Hastings, William Hoge, James Holland, David Holmes, Benjamin Huger, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, Joseph Lewis, jun., Thomas Lowndes, John B. C. Lucas, Andrew McCord, David Meriwether, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, John Patterson, Oliver Phelps, John Randolph, jun., Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Erastus Root, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer Seaver, Tompson J. Skinner, James Sloan, John Smilie, John Smith of Virginia, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, James Stevenson, John Stewart, David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Isaac Van Horne, Joseph B. Varnum, Daniel C. Verplanck, Marmaduke Williams, Richard Wynn, Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynns.Nays.—Simeon Baldwin, David Bard, George Michael Bedinger, Silas Betton, Adam Boyd, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, David Hough, Samuel Hunt, Thomas Lewis, Henry W. Livingston, William McCreery, Nahum Mitchell, Samuel L. Mitchill, James Mott, Beriah Palmer, Thomas Plater, Samuel D. Purviance, Joshua Sands, John Cotton Smith, John Smith of New York, Henry Southard, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Samuel Thatcher, George Tibbits, Abram Trigg, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Peleg Wadsworth, John Whitehill, and Lemuel Williams.

Nays.—Simeon Baldwin, David Bard, George Michael Bedinger, Silas Betton, Adam Boyd, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, David Hough, Samuel Hunt, Thomas Lewis, Henry W. Livingston, William McCreery, Nahum Mitchell, Samuel L. Mitchill, James Mott, Beriah Palmer, Thomas Plater, Samuel D. Purviance, Joshua Sands, John Cotton Smith, John Smith of New York, Henry Southard, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Samuel Thatcher, George Tibbits, Abram Trigg, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Peleg Wadsworth, John Whitehill, and Lemuel Williams.

Mr.Lowndes.—Were I to be governed by considerations other than those resulting from a sense of duty, I should vote for this resolution, as I believe it would afford the character implicated the readiest mode of vindication. But I do not feel so high a respect for the opinion of any one member as to give up my opinion to his, as to the course most proper to be pursued on this occasion. The gentleman who has offered this resolution says, that the facts on which it is founded are within his own knowledge. Let the gentleman then lay them before the House. Otherwise we shall legislate, not on the facts before us, but merely on the opinion of a single member, on facts only known to himself. We are told that this motion is founded on the statement of an honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania. What is that statement? That one of the counsel in the trial of Fries informed him that the judge declared the counsel had no right to argue a point of law after the mind of the court was made up. I ask if any gentleman is prepared to say that the judge was wrong? I am not prepared to say so. While, too, I am unwilling to detract from the respect due to the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I am equally unwilling to subscribe to his opinions. He may have misconceived the information communicated to him. It is said that it is necessary to preserve pure the streams of justice. I agree in this remark, and I say that the resolution on the table goes to destroy the independence of the judges, and of consequence to pollute the streams of justice; to make the judges the flexible tools of this House. It is impossible that under such circumstances men of talents and integrity will take seats on the bench, when their character shall be liable to be scrutinized without any facts being previously adduced.

I think it absolutely necessary that this resolution should not pass. For if it passes, it will establish a precedent that any member may procure an investigating committee to inquire into the conduct of any executive or judicial officer merely upon his opinion, unsupported by facts, that such an inquiry is necessary. Suppose parties to be nearly equally divided; a member has only to propose an inquiry into the conduct of any officer to whom he may feel inimical, and thereby throw a cloud upon his character, andrender him the object of suspicion. Thus do I fear that this precedent will furnish the instrument of vengeance of one party against another. The price we pay for our liberties is the existence of parties among us; but it becomes us rather to restrain than to invigorate their passions. If we establish this precedent we shall render impeachment so easy, as greatly to facilitate the means of oppression.

Mr.Lowndesconcluded by saying, that in this affair he threw party considerations entirely out of view. He was personally unacquainted with Judge Chase, and if there was a single affidavit of his misconduct, the appointment of the committee of inquiry should have his vote; but that, under the circumstances attending it, he considered the measure improper in every point of view in which he could consider it.

Mr.Findlayobserved, that though the abstract right of the members to move for an inquiry into the conduct of public officers, in order to find whether presumptions against their character afforded ground for impeachment, was not expressly denied, yet the manner in which the opposition to the present resolution was conducted was equal to denying the right. He trusted, however, that the House would support this right, as it was one of the most important of any with which they were vested. It grew out of the power of impeachment, and it was necessary for the exercise of that power, and was justified by precedents. By the rules of the House any member has a right to have the doors shut, in order to move such a resolution as he thinks proper. This has been usual in cases of impeachment in Britain, from which we derive the forms of impeachment. There it has been common to shut the doors, and for a member to move for an impeachment of a public officer, and to procure the officer impeached to be taken into custody before there was time or opportunity to take any other testimony than the information stated by the member who moved the resolution, probably supported by public fame. Taking the party into custody was necessary to the circumstances of that country and the extent of punishment, which might not only affect the liberty and property, but even the life of the party found guilty. It was necessary, because of the influence of the powerful nobility, who might have it in their power to stand in their defence; but, as all the penalties in the power of this Government to inflict by impeachment only affect the official trust and character, taking into custody is unnecessary.

He observed, that the arguments in opposition to the resolution turned chiefly on the ground of expediency and of precedent.

In his opinion, it appeared not only expedient but necessary, from the notoriety of facts on which the resolution was founded; that they were publicly known and had impaired confidence in these judges, could not be denied. That it was known to Congress during the last session was acknowledged. It was not only known, but Congress acted on it. A bill was in progress before this House, appointing the attendance of judges to particular districts—the members of two respectable States, in which, by the bill, Judge Chase was appointed to attend, objected unanimously to that appointment, because they had not confidence in him; and the facts on which the resolution is founded were stated on the floor, upon which the House altered the bill and appointed another judge to that district. This was a strong testimony that Congress believed that this open expression of want of confidence in that gentleman was justified by the facts that had been stated. He said, that though he had not at that time a seat in the House, he had expected an inquiry to be made into the causes of this want of confidence at that time. Perhaps it was prevented by the shortness of the session.

It is expedient for the character of the gentlemen and for the public good; for the gentlemen themselves, if they are innocent or have acted on justifiable ground; it is necessary that their characters may be vindicated, and confidence in their public conduct restored. It is expedient for the public good, because if the judges are guilty in the manner stated—if they have justly lost the confidence of the people and of Congress, as it appears, by the transaction of last session, one of them has done, the case ought to be examined and the citizens protected; for if he was unfit to preside on the bench for one district, he is unfit to preside in another. It is expedient, in order to secure the confidence of the citizens in the Government itself.

But precedents are called for by the gentlemen opposed to the resolution, and several of them contend that such special facts should be stated as would be unexceptionable ground of impeachment, before the inquiry is gone into. A gentleman from Vermont, (Mr.Elliot,) who argued yesterday in favor of postponement for further information on the subject, in the same argument said that he never would agree to the appointment of a committee of inquiry, until the charges were first stated and proved to his satisfaction. Mr. F. said he was astonished at this inconsistency. If the facts were first stated and established, appointing a committee of inquiry would be an absurdity. What would they inquire after but what they already knew? That gentleman and others, in order to defeat the resolution, gave the object of it an odious designation: they called it an inquisition, and spoke of it in such terms as if it was the well-known Spanish law of that name. The character of that court was too well known to the members of this House to require definition; it was sufficient to say that in it witnesses were examined without the knowledge of the party accused; that it compelled the accused to give testimony against themselves, and had authority to pass sentence of the most dreadful kind, without appeal. The gentlemen knew that no such thing was intended by the resolution. The character of the judges had been impeached in public opinion by numerous citizens of all descriptions. Congresson that account gave a decisive testimony of want of confidence in one of them. The object of the resolution was to inquire whether there was a real foundation for this want of confidence and ill fame. If Congress did not make inquiry in such cases, who was to do it? It did not by the constitution belong to any other authority; every other method of proceeding would be as ingeniously objected to as the one proposed, by those who wished to prevent further proceedings in the case; denying the means of bringing forward impeachment, had the same effect as if the power of impeachment was renounced.

The power of this House has been asserted to be similar to that of a grand jury; this seems to be conceded on both sides, but though it bears a resemblance, it was not strictly so—it was more extensive. Grand juries were authorized to present such indictments or such complaint or information as were submitted to them by the Attorney General, or which they knew of their own knowledge. The attorney also inquires if there is probable ground for the complaint, and brings the witnesses before the jury, who examine them to establish the facts alleged; but this House has no officers authorized to make inquiry and bring forward the business in due form; therefore the House possess both the power of the Attorney General and the grand jury, with relation to impeachment; for where a power of decision is given, all the powers necessary to carry that decision into effect are implied. The making inquiry, procuring witnesses, or other testimony, and preparing the case in due form, is the object of the resolution; and if the House does not do it in this or some other such method, there is no other agent authorized to do it.

With respect to precedent and parliamentary usage, Mr. F. said he had formerly examined many, but was not prepared to state them at this time, and did not think them necessary on this occasion. In all the examples of impeachment by the British Parliament, from the reign of Henry VIII., when parliamentary power was reduced to a mere shadow, till the present time, when the parliamentary power has been amply enlarged and established, and their proceedings become more uniform, there will be shades of difference found in all of them, arising from various circumstances; we have few precedents of our own, and of these few none of them apply to the present case. It is the constitutional duty of this House to impeach, when impeachment is necessary, and of the Senate to decide on impeachments; but with respect to the manner in which each House should proceed, they are not trammelled by forms nor entangled in precedents.

There are, however, examples of proceedings both with the British Parliament and with us, as similar to the method now proposed as the various cases would admit. With ourselves, the case of the unfortunate Western expedition mentioned by my colleague (Mr.Gregg) yesterday, was much more to the purpose than the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr.Griswold) was willing to admit. Mr. F. said he had the honor to be one of the committee of inquiry which sat on that subject a great proportion of two sessions. The expedition was too late in setting out to the Indian country; they were said to have been illy provided with necessaries, and long detained for want of them; a large proportion of the army were killed or taken by the savages, and all the stores with the army left. The citizens were discontented, and numerous complaints were heard, but none knew with certainty whom to blame; a committee was appointed to examine witnesses and report the testimony to the House, in order to discover the party who had been to blame. Some had charged it on the commanding General, others on the Secretary of War, and others on the Commissary of Military Stores, and these last endeavored to wrest the blame from themselves and fix it on the General. It was certain that a great misfortune had happened, but it was not certain that any officer was to blame; no charge had been made to Congress against any officer, yet Congress thought proper to make an inquiry, and it was not opposed on account of want of form, or want of precedents, by any of the friends of the parties. Towards the close of the first session, the committee made a concise report, referring to a great amount of testimonies. Some of the parties implicated by the report thought themselves injured by it, and it was alleged that other witnesses ought to be examined. Consequently, at the next session, the business was recommitted to the same committee, and as it was near the close of the last session of that Congress, before all the witnesses were procured and examined, and the parties heard by the committee, each of the parties wrote and delivered to the committee a large book of explanations and defence. The committee reported a large wooden box full of testimony, of original letters and instructions, and the three books of explanations and defence accompanied with some observations. It was not possible for that Congress to enter on the business, and the cause being of a transient nature, and the parties who applied for the second inquiry not wishing a disclosure of the testimony, the business was not afterwards entered on; but the mass of testimony, &c., is yet in possession of Congress. This, it is presumed, applies well in favor of the present resolution.

Gentlemen object to the resolution because of the indelicacy of implicating the character of a judge. They seem to believe the character of a judge to be sacred and immaculate. But are not judges men? Are they not men subject to like passions and like feelings as other men? Judges and other official characters voluntarily surrender a part of the rights they enjoyed in common with other citizens, in return for the honors and emoluments of office; others have a right to the privilege of trial by jury, in the decision of all charges against them; but public officers, by accepting of office, subject themselves under this Government, to trial by impeachment.Subjecting judges to impeachment, indicates, unequivocally, a constitutional opinion that judges would be even more liable to transgress than other citizens, and might transgress in a more aggravated manner than mere citizens. This mode of trial, however, in this country, is become almost a harmless thing; it is deprived of more than half its terrors. It does not reach life or property, but only the official character.

Mr. F. said he was a friend to the independence of judges, but that all independence in all Governments had its limits and restraints. It was not provided for the aggrandizement of the judges, but for the protection of the citizens. So far as it is applicable to this purpose, it is necessary, but any further, it is injurious and subjected to restraint. Under no Government with which we are acquainted are the judges rendered so independent as that of the United States. In Britain, from which we have derived the mode of our judiciary, the judges were appointed during pleasure; till, little more than a century ago, they were rendered independent by the Revolution Parliament for the security of the people against the encroachments of the Monarch, and the overbearing influence of a very powerful nobility; and for this purpose it was not only salutary, but absolutely necessary. But even with that boasted independence, that Judiciary is subjected to restraints and modes of correction not provided in the Federal Constitution. The judges are liable to be removed from office by the vote of both Houses of Parliament, without trial. They are liable to be removed, or their standing changed by act of Parliament. That Parliament, on whose act their independence depends, can repeal the act; the two Houses of Parliament can make and unmake their Kings. They are also liable, by an act of attainder, not only to lose their office, but their estate, the honor of their families, and even their lives.

The Judiciaries in all the States of the Union are rendered less or more independent; some are appointed for shorter and some for longer periods. In New Jersey, they are appointed for seven years; they were so in Pennsylvania formerly; since the revision of the constitution they are appointed during good behavior; they are, however, subjected not only to removal by impeachment, but also by the vote of two-thirds of each House, for any cause which the House do not think a sufficient cause of impeachment; but in the Federal Government there is no method provided for removing them for the most scandalous indiscretions or incapacity, as even when they may unfortunately be under mental derangement, except by impeachment, which is inapplicable to official crimes, and conducted with tedious forms. The power of impeaching being the only shield provided by the Government for the protection of the citizens from judicial oppression, and this House being the only constitutional organ for obtaining information of official excesses, and bringing forward articles of impeachment, ought not to bind up their own hands from doing their duty, and this they will do if they reject the resolution now on the table.

But while the gentlemen consider the character of these judges so sacred that their conduct cannot be inquired into, notwithstanding such proofs of want of confidence in them, and that as a gentleman near me from South Carolina (Mr.Lowndes) has said that he is afraid of impeachment, and grounds his fears on the incapacity or the unfitness of the members of this House, or because the members of this House may abuse the power; Mr. F. asked, were not the members of this House selected and qualified for the discharge of this necessary duty? Were they not appointed by a respectable authority as the judges? Were they not under a solemn oath of office for the faithful discharge of this as well as every part of their high trust? And were they not protected by special privileges and protection during the discharge of their trust equally with the judges, and their stations as respectable as the judges’? They are not only protected from civil actions, but are not subjected to impeachment for misbehavior in office as the judges are. They are, in their official capacity, subjected only to the censure of public opinion. If this is true, it is improper, it is impolitic, for the members of this House to degrade their own character: it amounts to saying they are not capable of discharging the trust they are solemnly bound to discharge, and ought not to have been invested with. He knew, however, that this was only introduced as an excuse for unwillingness. But the same gentleman adds, as a reason for opposing the resolution, that he is not acquainted with the history of the business. That is probably the case with him and others, especially such as had not a seat in the last session of Congress, or who resided at a great distance from the scene alluded to in the resolution. Admitting this to be true, the best and the only regular way to become acquainted with the history of the case, is to carry the resolution into effect—to have a committee appointed with such power as would enable them to procure such information as that gentleman and every other member could depend on. The gentleman’s objection, in fact, is one of the strongest arguments in favor of the resolution. The gentleman from South Carolina has, however, offered one other objection to the resolution, which merits some notice. He has said that if a committee is appointed for the object proposed by the resolution, men of character and talents will not accept of appointments in the Judiciary. The solidity of this objection will be best examined by the test of observation and experience. It has been already mentioned that several States have appointed their supreme judges for short periods, and that others have vested the Legislature with the power of removing judges from office without impeachment, merely on their own opinion. Can the gentlemanfrom South Carolina say—can any member on this floor, where all the States are represented, say—that these States are deficient in judges of respectability and talents? They cannot say so—there is no such complaint. The Judiciary of New Jersey, where the judges are chosen but for seven years, is as respectable, and the application of her laws as well brought home to the security and happiness of her citizens as they are in the States where judges are appointed for life. The same may be asserted with confidence of the State of Pennsylvania before the revision of her constitution, as they are since. There is this difference, however: where they have been appointed for limited periods there have been no impeachments or removals, and generally, if not always, the judges were reappointed, and justice was well administered; but since they have been appointed for good behavior, there have, at least in Pennsylvania, been both, and more complaints of inattention, expense, and delays, in the administration of justice than had been formerly. Many of the judges, however, are very respectable, and enjoy a high degree of confidence, but not more confidence than they did before the change of the constitution. There has been no attempt to remove or impeach the judges of the Supreme Court of that State.

To inquire into the conduct of the judges when confidence is evidently wanting, is the only true way to secure the respectability of the Judiciary. If that necessary confidence is withdrawn without cause, an official inquiry will restore confidence and the usefulness of the judges. This observation is supported by precedent and parliamentary usage. In that country from which precedents are so frequently sought, one precedent offers itself to recollection. In the year 1730, a committee of the British House of Commons was appointed to examine the jails. In the course of examination, the committee discovered that Sir Robert Eyres, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, a judge of very respectable character, was suspected, not of tyranny on the bench, or of putting any man’s life in jeopardy, but of having held an improper correspondence with a person confined for crime or misdemeanor, and this suspicion chiefly supported by anonymous letters. A committee of the House of Commons were appointed to make inquiry, and it was found, to the satisfaction of the committee and of the people, that the allegations on which the suspicion was founded were false, and the judge’s character was vindicated and restored.

Mr. F. said this precedent applied well to the present case. If the judges mentioned in the resolution had done their duty, their characters would be vindicated by the inquiry, and the public confidence in their integrity restored; if they were guilty, and not entitled to confidence, they ought to be removed from office, and neither the one nor the other could be done unless the inquiry proposed was authorized.

He said that the inquiry was necessary to secure the purity, honor, and usefulness of the Judiciary Department. If that House refused or neglected to exert the powers vested therein for securing public confidence in the Judiciary, unprincipled men would find means of recommending themselves to appointments, and would vitiate the streams where justice is expected to flow, and the citizens would be oppressed without the means or hopes of redress, and would feel the effects of tyrannical power in the administration of a government which, in its other departments, was the greatest and best of any in the world. Let proper inquiries be made where they are necessary; let the character of judges unjustly charged be vindicated, and the vicious and unworthy be removed, and improper characters will cease to intrude themselves; their friends will not dare to recommend, and Congress will have confidence that the laws which they pass will be applied agreeably to their genuine principles, to the protection and ease of the citizens; if we do not provide for this, we had better cease to make laws.

If virtuous men are appointed and the vicious discouraged, Congress may, from particular circumstances, be called on to make inquiries, but very rarely indeed to be employed in impeachments, (no men of real virtue and talents would refuse a seat on the bench for fear of inquiry or impeachment.) He said that the judges of the Supreme Court in the State he had the honor of representing, though they differed in political opinions, administered justice with such purity and diligence, that though some of them had been long in office, they enjoyed the confidence of the citizens, were in no danger of impeachment or removal by vote, and he believed would not shrink from inquiry if necessary. The more extensive the confidence of the citizens that was reposed in the Judiciary, the easier it would be to supply vacancies with men of character and talents. He said that among several other observations which occurred to his mind, with offering which he would not now detain the House, he had once thought of stating other charges against the official conduct of these judges, of which he had been well informed, but on due reflection he declined mentioning them, and thought it most for the public good to insist on the appointment demanded by a member on the responsibility of his own official character, and as a matter of right, and would do nothing that would impair the weight of the precedent that he hoped would be set by agreeing to the resolution as it stood.

Mr. F. said that having so long engaged the attention of the House he would conclude by observing, that as the case now stood it is proper for all the members to vote for the resolution; those that believed as he did, that there was a want of necessary confidence in those judges, and that this want of confidence was occasioned by their unauthorized and oppressive conduct, were obliged in conscience to vote for the inquiry; and every member who believed the judges to have done their duty, and that thepublic confidence is withdrawn from them without cause, are bound in duty to vote for the resolution, in order that the judges may have an opportunity to vindicate their character, that confidence in them being restored they may become useful to the public; therefore, in every light he could view it, he was convinced it was his duty to vote for the resolution, and would act accordingly.

Mr.Jackson.—As, Mr. Speaker, this subject is novel in its nature, and may be important in its consequences, I presume there exists a disposition to hear the reasoning which any gentleman may be disposed to offer upon it. It is with this view that I rise to express my opinion in favor of creating a committee of inquiry. I consider this House as the grand inquest of the nation, whose duty it is to inquire, on a proper representation, into the conduct of every official character under the Government. Like a grand jury, we ought, in my opinion, at the instance of any member, to send for all persons possessed of information calculated to throw light upon the conduct of any individual inculpated. A contrary doctrine would lead to the most unfortunate consequences. It would lead to this, that a minority would never be able to inquire into the conduct of a State offender, unless such inquiry were favored by the majority. As it is now contended that the inquiry is not a matter of right which any member may demand, but a matter of favor, to be granted according to the pleasure of the majority, it may be said that, if a majority favor an individual, he will always escape without an impeachment. But I believe otherwise; and that the Senate, like a virtuous judge, will not suffer an atom of prejudice or partiality to fall into the scales of justice.

But, say gentlemen, though it may be the duty of the House to impeach an officer, it is necessary that facts, warranting such an impeachment, should be first presented. This is not the course pursued in cases where a grand jury is called upon to act. If a murder is committed, it is their duty to inquire, and diligently inquire, who is guilty of the act, and to send for all persons capable of giving information respecting it. Such is the practice. If it shall be required to furnish facts, as is urged by gentlemen, the consequence will be that offences of the highest nature will be committed with impunity. It has been observed that it is odious to undertake the task of a public informer. But what the constitution and laws make our duty, so far from being odious, is honorable; because we thereby discharge a duty imposed upon us by our oaths, and because we show ourselves unawed by the vicious conduct of bad men. If the character of a public informer be odious, are we to expect that private individuals will come forward with affidavits? In such a case, to say the least of it, the duty would be of an unpleasant nature.

We have, in the course of this debate, been frequently called upon for precedents, and been told, that, when found, they ought to be adhered to. In a country from which we are accustomed to draw precedents—England—common report has been considered as a sufficient authority for similar inquiries. We do not, however, ask for an inquiry in this case on common report, but on the declaration of a member of this House, made in his place. Suppose there was no such declaration, has not a common report, from Maine to Georgia, condemned the conduct of the judge in the case of Fries and others, at Philadelphia, in the case of a grand jury in Delaware, whom he directed to inquire for seditious practices, and in the case of Callender, in Virginia? Has not the general sentiment of the country charged him with having, in these cases, abused his powers as a judge by tyrannizing over those who were brought before him? If we possess the right to inquire, on common report, surely we ought to institute this inquiry on the prevalence of so general a sentiment. To such an inquiry I would unhesitatingly agree, if the character of the President were implicated, the opinion of the gentleman from Vermont to the contrary notwithstanding. I would likewise agree to make the same inquiry in any other case; because the inquiry would redound to the honor of the individual implicated, if innocent; and because, if guilty, he ought to be punished.

I am sorry my friend from Pennsylvania stated any facts, as I do not consider it necessary that the House should be acquainted with any facts to make this inquiry; and because I think the facts, stated as grounds of impeachment, are not such as will warrant an impeachment. I have always understood that it was the right of a judge to expound the law, and I have known frequent instances where the court have refused the counsel the liberty of discussing the law on points on which they have made up their minds. While I am free to declare that the conduct of the court in the trial of Fries is not, in my opinion, such as to require an impeachment, yet I am in favor of instituting the inquiry. But, say gentlemen, by the passage of this resolution, we shall censure the judge. I believe not. If I believed so, I would first require testimony; for I hold it a good principle, that no man ought to be condemned until he has been heard. In my opinion, this resolution will have no such tendency; as, if the judge has not been guilty of misconduct, the inquiry will redound to his honor, and as it is the duty of a virtuous man to demand an inquiry whenever charged with an offence.

Gentlemen, in opposition to this measure, say they wish to guard against suspicion. But suspicion has long since gone forth; has been heard and re-echoed from every part of the Union; and the only way of defeating it, if ill-founded, is to institute an inquiry, and if the character of the judge be innocent, to pronounce it so. I am surprised to find gentlemen, who profess a friendship for the character of one of the persons implicated, opposed to this inquiry, when theybelieve him innocent. I should suppose it their peculiar duty to call for the inquiry, that the accused might have an opportunity of proving to the world that his character has been assailed without cause.

Mr. R.Griswold.—After what has passed on this floor, there can be no doubt that the gentlemen whose characters are implicated by this resolution will ardently desire an investigation of their conduct; and if, on this floor, we were merely to consult our own wishes, we should unanimously agree on an investigation. But this is not our duty; our duty is to take on this, as well as on all other occasions, a correct course; to take those steps only which are warranted. It is because I doubt, after considerable deliberation, whether this course is warranted, that I am opposed to it. What, I ask, is the nature of the resolution on the table? It contains no charges against the judges implicated; it only proposes to raise a committee to inquire whether their official conduct has been such as to justify the interposition of the constitutional power of this House. If a committee of inquiry is raised, what will be their powers? One thing will certainly follow. They will be clothed with a power to send for persons, and probably for papers. Is it consistent with principle to appoint a committee, which, from its nature, must be secret, with power to ransack the country in the first instance for accusations against the judges, and then for proofs to support them? Is this correct? Are gentlemen prepared to say so? to seek for accusations, and then for proofs to support those accusations, against high officers of the Government? For one, I believe that this course is not correct. I believe it to be dangerous. I agree with the gentleman from Vermont, that it operates in the nature of an inquisition. A committee will be raised to act in secret, first to find an accusation, and next to prove it. If there is now any accusation against the judges, let it be made; let it be made on this floor; and, as the gentleman from New Jersey has observed, let us ascertain, if true, whether it will be a sufficient ground for an impeachment. This will be a correct course, and it will be the only safe course. If, on the contrary, we proceed in the manner proposed, it will be attended with this consequence: at the commencement of every session we shall raise a secret committee, to compose an inquisition, to ascertain whether there are not charges against some public officer, and to search for proofs to justify them. Is the Government of this country founded on this principle? I know that this secret course of procedure is practised by the Spanish Government, and by some others, but I never thought that it would be the practice of this Government. When a charge is made against a public officer, it ought to be boldly made. It ought to be made here, and should be committed to writing. Instead of this being done, there is no charge made. The resolution contains none. It is merely calculated to raise a secret committee. Why? Because the gentleman from Virginia is of opinion that it is proper. Is his opinion, or the opinion of any other gentleman, to govern this House? Are we brought to this? I trust this is not the case. I trust that gentlemen will think it necessary not only to consider his opinion, but to form their own. What can gentlemen say, if they agree to this resolution? That they voted to investigate the conduct of two judges. Why? Because the gentleman from Virginia says it is necessary to investigate. Why investigate? Because the gentleman demands it. This is the language of that gentleman yesterday. Because a gentleman of this House gives his opinion of the course proper to be pursued on this occasion, it does not follow that we are to be governed by it. We may respect it; but we must respect our own opinions still more, if we faithfully discharge our duty. I am sensible that some facts have been mentioned by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, or rather, that that gentleman has heard a story; but it is mere hearsay.

I ask, also, how this formidable charge has rested to this day? When and where did the transaction, on which it is founded, happen? In Philadelphia, and in the winter of the year 1800, when Congress were in session within twenty rods of the place where the court was held. The gentleman from Virginia, as well as other members on this floor, were then in the House. The case being, I believe, the only one in which there was a charge of treason, excited, in a considerable degree, the attention of members, many of whom attended the trial. How comes it, then, that this charge was not then made? If it shall be said the House did not interfere at that time because the criminal was lying under sentence of death, it will be recollected that, in 1801, Fries was pardoned. Why was not the inquiry then made? If it shall be said that it would have been imprudent to make it on account of the party then in power, why was it not made in the seventh Congress, when a change of men took place? How can gentlemen reconcile this great delay with the high regard they profess for the purity of the streams of justice, and for justice itself? For such is the respect they entertain for justice, that they have determined to bring to conviction this unjust and criminal judge. Gentlemen ought to account for this culpable neglect. It is impossible that they should have been ignorant of the trial of this man. It was not a sudden or a hidden thing, done in a corner; it was done in public, in the face of the Legislature, and yet it has slept to the present day. Under such circumstances, I submit it to the House, whether much respect ought to be paid to the hearsay of the gentleman from Pennsylvania. The very delay, and other circumstances attending this transaction, show that it is not of the serious nature contended. I therefore think that, if properly brought before the House, and suffered to rest upon proof, it would constitute no ground for impeachment.As to the proposed form of proceeding, if we examine precedents, we shall find that it is not warranted by them. None mentioned compare with the case under consideration. The precedent in the case of Lord Bolingbroke does not compare with that. In that case the House of Commons raised a secret committee to examine the negotiations made for a peace. The committee was not raised to impeach Lord Bolingbroke, but to investigate the negotiations of the Ministry; and on the disclosure of facts, which took place on that occasion, the impeachment was grounded. Such, also, was the case in the instance of the Western expedition. The House appointed a committee vested with general powers to inquire into the causes of its failure, without particular reference to the conduct of any person.

If we turn our attention to British precedents, we shall find that a committee has never failed to investigate the official conduct of any person contemplated to be impeached. In the case of Hastings, Mr. Burke came forward and moved an impeachment directly. In all cases this course has been pursued in the British House of Commons. So far as we have precedents in this country, a similar course has been pursued. In the instance of Governor Blount, the Executive transmitted documents to this House, which contained, as it was supposed, evidence of his guilt; they were referred to a committee to examine them, and also to determine whether it was proper to print them. The committee reported that, in their opinion, they contained evidence of his guilt, and he was impeached. In the case of Judge Pickering, the same course has been pursued. The Executive transmitted documents to the House which contained, as it was supposed, proofs of misconduct, and the House proceeded to an impeachment. These precedents confirm the principle of those drawn from the practice of the British House of Commons. What course is now proposed? Without any charge against the judges, without any man saying they are guilty of any misconduct, we are about to appoint a secret committee, to determine whether any charges can be made, and whether any proofs to support them can be found. Although I am willing that the conduct of these gentlemen shall be investigated, for I am sure they must desire it, and although I have no objection to impeach them, if gentlemen wish it, and exhibit proper proofs on which to ground it, yet I cannot consent to pursue a course so improper as that now proposed. For this reason I am against the resolution, not because I am hostile to an investigation, but because I cannot consent to the appointment of a secret committee to search, in the first instance, for an accusation, and to look for proofs to justify it.

Mr.Findlayrose to explain. He said it was not the object of the House, in their investigation of the causes of the failure of the Western expedition, to make new arrangements, but to inquire into the conduct of certain officers who had directed it, viz: the Secretary of War, the Commander-in-chief, and the Commissary.

Mr.Nicholsonsaid, he happened not to be in the House yesterday at the moment when the resolution under consideration was introduced; and when he entered he found the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. R.Griswold) on the floor, who concluded his remarks by moving a postponement. Mr. N. did not think it then correct to offer remarks upon the main question, but as the resolution itself was now under consideration, and the subject of no common nature, he could not think of passing a silent vote upon it.

When he rose to-day, for a few moments, on the motion to amend, by inserting the name of Judge Peters, he had then declared, and he now begged leave to repeat it, that whenever any member of the House should rise in his place and state that any officer of the Government had been guilty of official misconduct, he had no hesitation in saying, that he would consent to an inquiry. He cared not how exalted his station, or how far he was raised above the rest of the community; the very circumstance of his superior elevation would prove an additional incitement. Such, he said, was the nature of the Government, and so important the duty in this respect devolved upon the House of Representatives, that the conduct of the Chief Magistrate himself, as far as his vote could effect it, should be subjected to an inquiry whenever it was demanded by a member. The greater responsibility, the more easy and more simple should be the means of investigation. Were he, indeed, the friend, personal or political, of the officer charged, and he believed that impeachment would be the result of inquiry, it was possible that his feelings as a man might induce him to forget his duty as a Representative, and urge him to resist the inquiry; but, were he convinced of his innocence, he would do all in his power to promote it, in order that he might stand justified to the nation and to the world.

Upon the present occasion, he begged that he might not be understood to say that the offence with which these judges were charged, was such as would warrant an impeachment. But, while he meant not to commit himself on a question of such high moment, he could not avoid expressing his astonishment that the conduct stated should not only be defended upon the floor of the House, but entirely approved; that gentlemen should venture to declare that the court acted strictly in the line of their duty, in refusing to hear counsel on a point of law which involved the guilt or the innocence of the prisoner. A man was charged with the highest offence against the Government, and, if guilty, was subject to the severest and most ignominious punishment recognized by our laws. High treason was the crime, and death the penalty. The constitution declared that treason against the United States should consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies,giving them aid and comfort. The framers of the constitution intended to be as precise as possible in their definition of treason; they were anxious that no room should be left for doubt afterwards. They had seen to what an infinite variety of objects the crime of treason had been extended in England, and wisely confined it here to the only two offences which could be said to strike at the existence of the Government. The laws of the United States had declared that resistance to the execution of a law should only be considered as sedition, and had provided the punishment of fine and imprisonment. Fries was charged with resisting the execution of a law, and this offence the court determined to be treason, without hearing his counsel, and refused to permit them to address the jury on the subject, although the jury were the judges as well of the law as the fact. A resistance to the execution of a law, they construed to be treason, in the face of the act of Congress, which declared it to be a misdemeanor only, punishable with fine and imprisonment. These constructive treasons, he said, had been reprobated by the wise and good in all ages, and at a very early period in the history of English jurisprudence had received the pointed disapprobation of the Parliament. He adverted to what he called a wise and humane provision in the statute of Edward III., by which the judges were prohibited from declaring any thing to be treason not so expressly defined by the letter of the statute. That the court had given such an opinion, was not now, however, the point of charge against them; that they extended the doctrine of treason beyond both the letter and spirit of the constitution, was not now the foundation of the present motion. The accusation was that, in a case involving the life or death of a freeman, the party was condemned without a hearing; that he was denied the assistance of counsel, which was secured to him by the constitution of his country; that the right of the jury to decide both the law and the fact was refused; for it amounted to a refusal when the court would not permit the jury to be assisted by the arguments of counsel. He asked if gentlemen would consider it correct in a court, upon an indictment for murder, to prohibit the prisoner’s counsel from contending before the jury, that the offence charged amounted to manslaughter only? Surely not. The question, in the case of Fries was, whether the act of which he had been guilty amounted to treason, or to a misdemeanor? and this the court refused to suffer the jury to have an argument upon. He declared that, in all criminal prosecutions, the jury had a clear, undoubted right to decide, as well the law as the fact; they were not bound by the direction of the court; and that, in capital cases, it was a right which they ought always to exercise. But, in Fries’s case, the law was not permitted to be brought into the view of the jury by his counsel; the court denied to the prisoner the assistance of counsel, which was secured to him by the constitution, and he was condemned to an ignominious death, which he must have suffered but for the subsequent interference of the Executive. Mr. N. said, he had thought proper to make these remarks in answer to those gentlemen who had undertaken to pronounce the conduct of the court to be strictly correct. Although he did not mean to commit himself by declaring that this afforded sufficient ground for impeachment, yet he could not avoid saying, that the refusal to hear counsel in defence of the prisoner, did not meet his approbation.

The gentleman from Connecticut had doubted whether the present proceeding was conformable to principle. He thought that we ought to have the proof before we take any steps to procure it. Mr. N. begged leave to ask how proof was to be procured before inquiry was made? In what manner information was to be obtained before it was sought for? If a member had stated upon oath that a judge had been guilty of improper conduct, which would warrant an impeachment, the motion would not be, in the first instance, to inquire, but to impeach. If information was necessary, how was it to be procured? By sitting here, and writing for depositions to be sent in? Surely not. If a person was in the lobby, acquainted with all the facts, how were they to be communicated to the House? Was he to come to the bar, and offer a voluntary affidavit, or would it be correct to introduce him without any previous proceeding? In that case, would it not be necessary to declare, by a prior resolution, that we would commence an inquiry before testimony could be offered at the bar? If a member should state that a witness was at hand who could prove official misconduct in a judge, the correct course would be to introduce a resolution, declaring that the House would inquire, and it could not be resisted. What, he asked, was the proposed course? Instead of making the inquiry in the House, it was requested that it might be made by a committee. Instead of using our power to bring witnesses before us, it is proposed to authorize a committee to examine them. This would be more convenient and more proper. To bring them before the House would be attended with inconvenience, and unnecessary delay. He could not tell what the mode of proceeding before the House of Representatives would be, but, generally, he believed, it was the practice for a member to propound the question to the Speaker; the Speaker then to propound it to the witness; the answer to be made to the Speaker, and by him reverberated back again to the House. He asked, if the House would consent to this? If they would agree to a course of proceedings so tedious, so procrastinating, so evidently embarrassing? And yet this must be the course, unless that proposed was adopted.

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