CHAPTER IV.
Superstitious Notions.—Abolition of Duelling.—Interference of Providence.—Challenge to the Ordeal.—The Trial.—Conviction of the Offender.—Uncertainty of the Ordeal.—Ineffectual Prohibition.—Check against Slander.—Exclusion from Society.—Absurd Alternative.—Personal Courage.—Imputation of Cowardice.—Public Opinion.—War between Nations.—Challenges.—Fear of Disgrace.
Mr. Adamson afterwards proceeded to relate the circumstances connected with the cavern. Many superstitious notions, it seems, and much tendency to give credit to tales of supernatural mystery had been brought from Europe by several of the original settlers, trained as they had been in the then prevailing credulity, and many of them tinctured with fanaticism. It is not to be wondered therefore, that, ignorant as they were of physical phenomena, several should have given more or less credit to the reports of the natives respecting evil demons dwelling in these caverns; the dangerous nature of themhaving been proved in some instances by fatal experience.
The employment of one of them for the purpose of an ordeal originated long after. “It ought in the first place to be acknowledged,” said Mr. Adamson, “that the barbarian institution of duels did exist among us, though now long since exploded.”
They were not of common occurrence; but he added that his father distinctly remembered as a boy the final abolition of the practice, in the manner about to be related. The duel was regarded—and such is well known to have been its original design—as a kind of ordeal, as a solemn appeal to Heaven, which it was supposed would not fail to interfere in support of the rightful combatant.
And here Mr. Sibthorpe had the candour to interpose a remark, that, thoughduelshave long since ceased to be considered in that light, the general principle is very far from being exploded among a large proportion of our own countrymen, who frequently apply the terms “providential,” and even “miraculous,” to the detection of murderers; the frustration ofschemes of injustice; the escape of pious men from dangers of shipwreck or fire, &c. and who speak of pestilential diseases, conflagrations, and other fatal accidents, as judgments from Heaven on the sufferers; evidently referring to a supposed special interference of Providence to allot temporal successes or adversities according to the deserts of the parties; and often setting down as little better than an atheist any one who questions such a doctrine.
“Now,” said he, “if it be admitted that there is a special and extraordinary interference of Providence for the immediate temporal punishment of the wicked, and for the securing of success to a righteous cause, there seems no reason why this should not be looked for in the case of a judicial combat. Our ancestors were at least as wise as we, and more consistent, if we deride or reprobate the idea of a special interposition of Providence in the case of a single combat, while we look for it in allothercases. And you well know,” added he to Mr. Jones, “how strongly the doctrine I allude to is set forth in newspapers—in magazines—in publications of various descriptions, and, not least,in the nursery-books which are first put into the hands of children.”
This could not be denied. “Well, such,” continued Mr. Adamson, “had been our belief as well as yours. But while the trial by single combat was retained under an altered character, the other kinds of ordeal—such as the hot ploughshare, &c. to which women, as well as men, had in former times been exposed—fell completely into desuetude.”
Among the Southlanders the institution was, by an accidental circumstance, reintroduced. It seems that a woman, named Margaret Brucker, had been grossly defamed by a neighbour, and being highly indignant at the imputations cast on her virtue, and conscious of perfect innocence, she appealed to the judgment of Heaven, and challenged her accuser to accompany her publicly along the mountain side, by what was afterwards called the ‘Ordeal Path,’ to pass by the goblin cavern, the one viewed by our travellers. She professed her full confidence that her innocence would protect her from the demons residing there, and that the false accusation would be visited bya divine judgment on her who had devised it. Margaret appears to have been a perfectly sincere enthusiast, and to have possessed that fervid eloquence which is the result of genuine strong feeling. This, together with youth, beauty, and the sympathy excited by her distress of mind, operated so strongly on the superstitious feelings of the people that they vehemently seconded her proposal; and the woman who had accused her dared not refuse the trial.
The parties accordingly set forth, attended by a great concourse of eager spectators, who ranged themselves on the edge of the cliff overhanging the cavern in breathless expectation of the results. The magistrates had only ventured to exert their authority so far as to require that ropes should be let down from the top of the cliff, and secured by straps to the body of each of the women, so that in case of danger they might be safely drawn up.
Margaret, with a firm and undaunted step, walked unhurt close along the mouth of the cavern. Her companion, who had been observed to become pale and agitated as theyapproached the scene of trial, sank down insensible at the entrance of the cavern. The mingled shouts of wonder, alarm, horror, and exultation proceeding from the spectators of this complete fulfilment of the prophecy may easily be imagined. The fainting victim was drawn up by the rope to the top of the cliff, to all appearance dead. By sprinkling her with water, however, she gradually revived; and on being restored to her senses and speech, confessed, with much awe and contrition, the entire falsity of the stories she had circulated, and which she had fabricated through jealousy. She acknowledged, and no doubt fully believed, that she had been struck down by the demon of the goblin cavern as a just judgment on her calumny. Of course Margaret Brucker was venerated as little less than a prophetess, and the ordeal rose into high and general repute.
Several, indeed, of the more sagacious entertained at the time the opinion which it would then have been most discreditable to avow, but which has long since become universal, that the one party escaped unhurt because she walkederect across the opening of the cavern, the noxious gas being so heavy that its influence does not usually extend much more than one or two feet above the surface of the ground; and that the other, through the agitation of conscious guilt and superstitious terror, either turned giddy, or stumbled over a stone, and falling down, was immediately exposed to the full current of the vapour. This is agreeable to what is found to take place in the celebrated Grotto del Cane, which is entered with impunity by men, but is fatal to a dog (whose head is so much nearer to the ground) if the poor beast is compelled to remain over one of the fissures from which the gas issues.
The ordeal, however, was a very uncertain one, from the variations occurring in the quantity of vapour emitted. Sometimes both parties were suffocated, and oftener both escaped unhurt; and in some instances, as might have been expected, it happened that a person whose character had been cleared by the ordeal, was afterwards, by circumstances subsequently brought to light, proved, or violently suspected, to have been guilty.
Instances of this kind, in conjunction with the advancement of intellectual culture, gradually weakened, in progress of time, the belief in the supernatural character of the ordeal. It was, however, for a long time, frequently appealed to, both by women and men, from all the states; and, in spite of laws which were passed, but which it was found impossible fully to enforce, prohibiting any such trial, and denouncing as murder the offence of being accessary to any one’s exposure to it in case of a fatal result,—the custom still received the sanction of many who disavowed all belief of miraculous interference in the case of such trials.
“They defended,” said Mr. Adamson, “by nearly the same arguments as I have lately heard from you, both duels, such as you apply the name to, and these which were always very justly regarded as a kind of duel; since there is no essential difference between calling on your adversary to stand a pistol-shot or a poisonous blast. It was conducive, they contended, to the preservation of good manners, and of a high and delicate sense of honour in both sexes, that a man should be restrained fromungentlemanly behaviour, and from lightly taxing another with it, by the apprehension of personal danger; and that female purity should be guarded in like manner. ‘It is,’ they said, ‘a useful additional check against lying, for instance, and against rashly charging another with being a liar, to reflect on the probable consequence of being called on to face the sword or pistol, or the goblin cavern of Mount Peril. And it is but fair, that a woman also should recollect that levity of conduct, or wanton slander, may occasion her to be required to undergo a similar danger.’ There were not wanting many who reprobated this doctrine, and urged such arguments on the other side respecting the wickedness and the absurdity of the custom as we have lately heard from Mr. Jones. But they were urged with as little practical effect as they appear to have had among you. At length, several persons of the higher classes, and remarkable for correctness of life, refinement of manners, and cultivated understanding, formed themselves into an association and declared strenuous war against every kind of duel, including,as has been said, under that name the ordeal of the cavern, which they contended against on entirely new grounds.
“They did not confine themselves to such topics as had been before, again and again, urged without effect; but maintained that the practice tended to defeat the very end proposed, and to lower (instead of raising, as was pretended) the tone of manners in the society. ‘If,’ they said, ‘there were no such custom, then, any one, whether man or woman, who transgressed the rules which public opinion had sanctioned in the circle of society in which he or she moved, would at once be excluded from that circle. And the apprehension of this exclusion, of thus losing caste, and being sent to Coventry, which is the ultimate penalty that such a society can inflict for a breach of its rules, would be the best preventive of any violation of them,—the best preservative of the tone of the society, that it is possible to attain. If, under such a system, any one insulted another, he would be regarded as an ill-mannered brute, and excluded from good company: a woman who displayed levity of conduct wouldbe at once excluded from reputable society: any one, man or woman, who should bring rash imputations against a neighbour, would be shunned as a slanderer: and so of the rest. But under the system of duelling, society offers analternative; the only effect of which, as far as it operates, is unmixed evil. Instead of saying, absolutely, you must abstain from brutal insolence of demeanour, on pain of being excluded from our circle, it says, you musteitherabstain from insolence,orbe ready to expose your life; instead of requiring a woman to abstain from levity of conduct, and defamatory language, on pain of forfeiting the countenance of respectable people, it proposes the alternative ofeitherobserving those rules,orthe being prepared to encounter the ordeal; and the result is, that those who possess personal intrepidity will often be enabled to transgress with impunity those rules of good society, which the duelling system professes to enforce. Nay more; the system tends to invest with a certain degree of dignity, arising from our admiration of personal courage, such conduct as would otherwise excite only unmitigatedabhorrence and contempt. An insolent man, for instance, if by his insolence he braved no danger but that of expulsion from good company, would be simply despised: but since he also, under the other system, braves the danger of death, he obtains some degree of honour for his intrepidity. And though some may be deterred from such conduct by the fear of a challenge, others, on the contrary, may be encouraged to it, by a desire of displaying valour; especially if they have reason to think, from what they know of the other party, that a challenge willnotensue, and that they shall enjoy their triumph unmolested.
“‘Moreover, the magnitude of the injuries which one person actually can do to another is infinitely enhanced by the system of duels, because every affront offered is thus made to carry with it an imputation on one’s personal courage, which can only be wiped out by the exposure of life. If, for instance, I am a man of uniform and scrupulous veracity, and some ill-mannered ruffian gives me the lie, then, supposing duels unknown, the attack recoils entirely on the assailant. He is incapable ofproving his charge—my life refutes it,—and the only result is thathe, not I, is set down as a liar, for having falsely called me a liar. But under the other system, I must go out and expose my life, or else I am disgraced—disgraced, not as aliar(forthatimputation, perhaps, is disbelieved after all), but as acoward, for not daring to risk my life in defence of my honour. And thus a person, who otherwise might have been incapable of doing me any serious hurt at all, has it in his power to propose to me at his pleasure the alternative of hazard to my life and violence to my conscience, or ignominy. A venom is thus added to the sting of the most contemptible insect.
“‘So much,’ said they, ‘for the protection thus provided for us against injuries the most painful to the feelings! Great part of the disgrace attaching to the authors of such injuries is removed; the injuries are probably rather increased than diminished in frequency; and in the pain they inflict, they are undoubtedly aggravated tenfold.’ With regard to the supposed necessity for a person’s thus vindicatinghis own honour in certain cases, on the ground that the parties have no common authority to appeal to, this they flatly denied. The public opinion of the society they belong to,isthat common authority. And that it is so, and is competent to decide effectually, is proved, they urged, by the very existence of duelling; for the duel itself is enforced by nothing else but public opinion. I am obliged, it is said, to challenge a man who has affronted me, because there is no authority to appeal to that will compel him to redress the injury. But what, then, compels him toacceptthe challenge? Nothing, but the knowledge that if he refused it, society would reject him as disgraced. Then, why should not society at once pronounce on him this sentence of disgrace for the affront itself, unless he makes a satisfactory submission? If he defies public opinion, and does not care for disgrace, he need not accept the challenge: if he does care for public opinion, then let the disgrace attach at once to the offering of the affront, instead of to the refusal of the challenge. It is manifest that those who have the power to propose thealternative, of either suffering disgrace or fighting, must have the power to discard the latter part of the alternative. Let society, therefore, but do its duty, and it is plain that it may, by a proper exertion of the power which it has, and which it actually exercises even now, restrain, and restrain much more effectually, without duelling, the very evils which duelling professes to remedy.
“As for the case of war between independent states, this,” observed Mr. Adamson, “by the way, is by no means a parallel to that of private duels. One nation does notsend a challengeto another; because, as the parties really have no common authority to refer to, the aggressors would of course decline the challenge, andwouldprefer enjoying unmolested the fruits of their injustice. The nation, therefore, which considers itself aggrieved has no other remedy than, after complaining and demanding redress in vain, to declare war, levy troops, and commence hostilities against its opponents without waiting for their consent; and this procedure would be parallel to the case of duels only, if these were quite of a differentcharacter from what they are. If it were customary for a man who had received an affront to declarewaragainst his neighbour, arm himself, andproceed to attackhim without asking his consent, this would correspond to a war between two states. But achallengeis quite a different thing; it is an invitation which a man may either accept or decline, to meet at a time and place settled by mutual agreement, where the parties, by common consent, expose themselves to a certain specified risk. Generally, the challenge is both sent and accepted, not from motives of revenge, but from fear of public censure: but universally, the party challenged might refuse it if he were willing to brave public censure.
“So far, therefore, is a duel from being a mode of repelling injury, which a man is driven to resort to through the want of any common authority to appeal to, that, on the contrary, every duel actually rests on a tacit appeal to such an authority—viz. to public opinion; since no one could compel another to afford him the satisfaction sought except through the influence of the fear of disgrace, the other beingat liberty to refuse the challenge if he dares to set public opinion at defiance. Every duel, therefore, whether actually taking place, or merely talked of and threatened, is itself a complete disproof of the plea onwhichduels are justified.”