CHAPTER IX.
Prediction Office.—Prophecies.—Useful Register.—Political Bustlers.—Disposal of Land.—Rents.—Laws of Tenantry.—Government Loans.
Among the other political curiosities, as they may be called, which came to the knowledge of the travellers, was a most whimsical institution, existing in several of the states, called a “prediction office;” viz. an establishment consisting of two or three inspectors and a few clerks, appointed to receive from any one, on payment of a trifling fee, any sealed-upprediction, to be opened at a time specified by the party himself. His name is to be signed to the predictionwithin; and on the outer cover is inscribed the date of its delivery, and the time when the seal is to be broken. There is no pretence made to supernatural prophetic powers; only, to supposed political sagacity.
At stated times, the inspectors break the seal of those papers whose term is elapsed, and examine the contents. In a great majority of cases, as might be expected, these predictions turn out either false, nugatory, or undecided: false, if contradicted by events; nugatory, if containing nothing but what had been naturally and generally anticipated by all,—like our almanacks, which foretell showers in April, heat in summer, and cold in winter; or undecided, when proceeding hypothetically on someconditionwhich does not take place,—as when a man foretells thatifsuch a measure be adopted, so and so will ensue; if then the measure isnotadopted, the prediction remains undecided. But here and there a case occurs in which a man has foretold truly something not generally expected, and the foreseeing of which evinces, accordingly, more or less of sagacity. In such a case he is summoned to receive an honourable certificate to that effect. And the travellers were assured that some of their most eminent men, who afterwards attained to offices of dignity and trust, had been first called into notice from obscurityby means of this office. The other predictions are kept and registered, but not made public, except when the author of any of them is named as a candidate for any public office.
Previously to any such appointment, the inspectors are bound to look over their register, and produce, as a set-off against a candidate’s claims, any unsuccessful prediction he may have sent in. “Oh that he were here,” exclaims Mr. Sibthorpe, “‘to write me down an ass!’ Many a man there is to whom we have committed important public trusts, who, if such an institution had existed among us, would be found to have formally recorded, under the influence of self-conceit, his own incapacity.” He seems to consider this portion of the effects of the plan as hardly less useful than the other,—the establishment of the claims of some to superior foresight.
“There is,” he adds, “among our political bustlers usually a great squabble when any event takes place on the question, whether any one, and who, may claim the honour of having foreseen it; and ill-founded claims are often admitted. Moreover, a prediction publicly utteredwill often have had, or be supposed to have had, a great share in bringing about its own fulfilment. He who gives out, for instance, that the people will certainly be dissatisfied with such and such a law, is, in this, doing his utmost tomakethem dissatisfied. And this being the case in all unfavourable, as well as favourable, predictions, some men lose their deserved credit for political sagacity through their fear of contributing to produce the evils they apprehend; while others, again, do contribute to evil results by their incapacity to keep their anticipations locked up in their own bosoms, and by their dread of not obtaining deserved credit. For such men, this office,” says he, “provides a relief like that which the servant of King Midas found by telling his secret to the hole he dug in the ground; only there are here no whispering reeds to divulge it.”
The mode in which the states that have considerable tracts of uncleared land in their territory usually dispose of these from time to time, struck the travellers as judicious and simple.When, from increasing population, a demand arises for a fresh portion of land requiring to be cleared and brought into cultivation, each person who desires to become a settler rents from the state (which, as has been before observed, is always held to be the sole proprietor in fee-simple of its whole territory,) a suitable allotment, at a rent which is always very small, and often merely nominal. He obtains a lease of this for a term of years,—commonly twenty-one,—either at this nominal rent for the whole term, or with a trifling increase for the last seven or fourteen years of it. At the end of the term, it isdividedbetween him and the state; part being made over to him in perpetuity, (subject to the general land-tax, or government-rent, as it is called,) and the other part reverting to the state. The proportions vary according as the expenses of reclaiming the land are greater or less. If the requisite outlay is considerable, the settler retains, perhaps, two-thirds, or even three-fourths, of the allotment; if the reverse, his share will be half, or one-third. In all cases, the proportions in which it is to be divided are a matter ofexpress agreement previously to his first entering on the farm. Then, in order to secure a fair division of the land in respect ofquality,—that the more fertile and the poorer land, the more and the less improved, may be duly apportioned,—recourse is had to the obvious plan of “one to divide and the other to choose.”
Suppose, for instance, the tenant is to be entitled by his contract to one-half; then, at the end of his term, he divides his holding into any two portions, at his pleasure, and gives notice to the state-surveyors, who, after due inspection, assign one of them (whichever they please) to him. Besides this, however, it is very often made a separate point of special agreement in the first instance, that, at the end of his term, he shall have the option of obtaining, at an advantageous rate, a lease for a further term of the portion assigned to the state. He is to be allowed to hold it at a rent below the market price. Nodefinite sum, however, is fixed, and the land is offered to the highest bidder; but the tenant who shall have made such a contract as has been just alluded to, is to have a certainportion of his rent remitted,—suppose20, 30, or 40 per cent. according to the agreement. He is thus enabled,—supposing all parties to agree in their calculations of the land,—to outbid the rest. Suppose A. to be the former tenant, and that the bidders for the land do not offer quite so much as one hundred pounds rent for it, and that he is under agreement to have twenty per cent. remitted; if he then thinks the land worth eighty pounds, he may bid one hundred pounds, and will be the successful competitor. But should A. not think it worth while to pay so much as eighty pounds, while B. is willing to pay one hundred pounds, then B. obtains it. Any bidder, to whom the land is knocked down, forfeits a certain deposit in the event of his not completing the bargain.
This mode of procedure it was found necessary to introduce on account of the great and unexpected alterations in the value of land, which, in a new settlement especially, may take place by means of new towns, roads, and other improvements. A certainproportionof the market price, therefore, was fixed on, instead of a certaindefinite sum, as a more equitablemode of adjusting the amount of the advantage agreed for.
All rents, whether for lands or houses, and whether from a tenant of the state or of an individual, are payable a yearin advance; in other words, are payable, not for the year that ispast, but for the year that is to come.
[The rent, in short, is like the purchase-money of an estate, which is to be paidbeforethe title-deeds are delivered and the possession transferred.]
In like manner, with them, rent is thepurchase-moneyof the house or landfor one year; and the tenant has no claim upon it till that is paid. Rent, accordingly, is not recoverable or claimable as adebt; nor is there any such thing as distraining. It is, in fact, no debt; but at the end of the year, if the rent, or rather purchase-money, for theensuingyear have not been paid, the occupier ceases to have any interest in the land, and is exactly in the situation of a tenant whose lease has expired. If, however, he hasagreedto take the house or land at a certain annual rent for a term of years, and fails to fulfil the engagement, hemay be sued for a breach of contract, and, as in the case of any other breach of contract, will have to pay damages according to the circumstance of the case.
The travellers suggested, on this being first described, that it must be an inconvenience to a farmer to pay a sum of money out of his capital before he has got anything from his land. But they learned that, to prevent this, it is customary to let a farm for a term of years, and to fix the rent for thefirstyear (to a new tenant) at a mere nominal sum. “At the end of each year, therefore,” said they, “we have our rents coming in, just as you have in England; and if (as you say is common in England) the same tenant and his family continue to renew from time to time, the landlord is just in the same situation in both countries.
“It is only when there is occasion to get rid of a bad tenant, and put in a new one, that there need be any difference; and when that is the case, your landlord is not, by your account, always better off than ours; but, on the contrary, sometimes losesmorethanoneyear’srent, and incurs a great deal of trouble and law-expense besides.”
New settlers, becoming government-tenants under the arrangement above described, are sometimes in want of sufficient capital for the requisite improvements, especially irrigation, which is conducted on a great scale. In such cases, the state often advances a loan at moderate interest, secured on the land that is to be the tenant’s portion at the end of his term.
There are no usury laws in the country; every one lets either his land, his money, or any other property, on whatever terms the parties agree on.