APPENDIX I

UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE PRODUCTION FOR THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICE

The best rapid survey of the organization of the United States Air Service and the part which it played in the Great War, as well as statistics touching upon the materials used in aircraft production, the number of planes and engines made, and also the number of machines used for training purposes, and actually put into service at the front, is contained in the following extracts from the reports of Secretary Baker, Justice Charles E. Hughes, General Pershing, and Major-General William L. Kenly.

SECRETARY BAKER’S AIR SERVICE REPORT

In his annual report for 1918, released December 5, the Secretary of War reported on the Air Service as follows:

Air ServiceORGANIZATIONThe Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, which had charge of the production and operation of military aircraft at the outbreak of the war, was created on July 18, 1914. To assist in outlining America’s aviation program, the Aircraft Production Board was appointed by the Council of National Defense in May, 1917. In October, 1917, the Aircraft Board, acting in an advisory capacity to the Signal Corps and the Navy, was created by act of Congress. In April, 1918, the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps was separated into two distinct departments, Mr. John D. Ryan being placed in charge of aircraft productionand Brig.-Gen. W. L. Kenly in charge of military aeronautics. Under the powers granted in the Overman Bill, a further reorganization was effected by Presidential order in May, 1918, whereby aircraft production and military aeronautics were completely divorced from the Signal Corps and established in separate bureaus. This arrangement continued until August, when the present air service, under Mr. Ryan as Second Assistant Secretary of War, was established, combining under one head the administration of aviation personnel and equipment.RAW MATERIALS SECUREDOne of the most important problems which confronted the aircraft organization from the start was the obtaining of sufficient spruce and fir for ourselves and our allies. To facilitate the work, battalions were organized under military discipline and placed in the forests of the western coast. A government plant and kiln were erected to cut and dry lumber before shipment, thus saving valuable freight space. To November 11, 1918, the date the armistice was signed, the total quantity of spruce and fir shipped amounted to approximately 174,000,000 feet, of which more than two-thirds went to the Allies.The shortage of linen stimulated the search for a substitute possessing the qualities necessary in fabric used for covering aeroplane wings. Extensive experiments were made with a cotton product which proved so successful that it is now used for all types of training and service planes.To meet the extensive demands for a high-grade lubricating oil, castor beans were imported from India and a large acreage planted in this country. Meanwhile research work with mineral oils was carried on intensively, with the result that a lubricant was developed which proved satisfactory in practically every type of aeroplane motor, except the rotary motor, in which castor oil is still preferred.PRODUCTION OF TRAINING PLANES AND ENGINESWhen war was declared the United States possessed less than 300 training planes, all of inferior types. Deliveries of improved models were begun as early as June, 1917. Up to November 11, 1918, over 5,300 had been produced, including 1,600 of a type which was temporarily abandoned on account of unsatisfactory engines.Planes for advanced training purposes were produced in quantity early in 1918; up to the signing of the armistice about 2,500 were delivered. Approximately the same number was purchased overseas for training the units with the Expeditionary Force.Several new models, to be used for training pursuit pilots, are under development.Within three months after the declaration of war extensive orders were placed for two types of elementary training engines. Quantity production was reached within a short time. In all about 10,500 have been delivered, sufficient to constitute a satisfactory reserve for some time to come.Of the advanced training engines, the three important models were of foreign design, and the success achieved in securing quantity production is a gratifying commentary on the manufacturing ability of this country. The total production up to November 11 was approximately 5,200.PRODUCTION OF SERVICE PLANESThe experience acquired during the operations on the Mexican border demonstrated the unsuitability of the planes then used by the American Army. Shortly after the declaration of war, a commission was sent abroad to select types of foreign service planes to be put into production in this country. We were confronted with the necessity of redesigning these models to take the Liberty motor, as foreign engine production was insufficient to meet the great demands of the Allies. The first successful type of plane to come into quantity production was a modification of the British De Haviland 4—an observation and day bombing plane. The first deliveries were made in February, 1918. In May, production began to increase rapidly, and by October a monthly output of 1,200 had been reached. Approximately 1,900 were shipped to the Expeditionary Force prior to the termination of hostilities.The Handley Page night bomber, used extensively by the British, was redesigned to take two Liberty motors. Parts for approximately 100 planes have been shipped to England for assembly.Table 20 shows the status of American production of service planes by quarterly periods.Table 20.—Service planes produced in the United States in 1918:Name of planeJan. 31 toMar. 31Apr. 1 toJune 30July 1 toSept.30Oct. 1 toNov. 8TotalDe Haviland 4145151,1651,4933,187Handley Page......1001101A total of 2,676 pursuit, observation, and day bombing planes, with spare engines, were delivered to the Expeditionary Force by the French Government for the equipment of our forces overseas.Considerable progress was made in the adaptation of other types of foreign planes to the American-made engines, and in the development of new designs. The U. S. D. 9A, embodying some improvements over the De Haviland 4, was expected to come into quantity production in the near future. The Bristol Fighter, a British plane, was redesignedto take the Liberty 8 and the Hispano-Suiza 300 h. p. engines. A force of Italian engineers and skilled workmen was brought to America to redesign the Caproni night bomber to take three Liberty motors, and successful trial flights of this machine have been made.Several new models are under experimentation. Chief of these is the Le Père two-seater fighter, designed around the Liberty motor, the performance of which is highly satisfactory. Several of these planes were sent overseas to be tested at the front.PRODUCTION OF SERVICE ENGINESIn view of the rapid progress in military aeronautics, the necessity for the development of a high-powered motor adaptable to American methods of quantity production was early recognized. The result of the efforts to meet this need was the Liberty motor—America’s chief contribution to aviation, and one of the great achievements of the war. After this motor emerged from the experimental stage, production increased with great rapidity, the October output reaching 4,200, or nearly one-third of the total production up to the signing of the armistice. The factories engaged in the manufacture of this motor, and their total production to November 8, are listed in Table 21.Table 21.—Production of Liberty motor to November 8, 1918, by factories:Packard Motor Car Co.4,654Lincoln Motor Corporation3,720Ford Motor Corporation3,025General Motors Corporation1,554Nordyke & Marmon Co.433———Total13,386Of this total, 9,834 were high-compression, or army type, and 3,572 low-compression, or navy type, the latter being used in seaplanes and large night bombers.In addition to those installed in planes, about 3,500 Liberty engines were shipped overseas, to be used as spares and for delivery to the Allies.Other types of service engines, including the Hispano-Suiza 300 h. p., the Bugatti, and the Liberty 8-cylinder, were under development when hostilities ceased. The Hispano-Suiza 180 h. p. had already reached quantity production. Nearly 500 engines of this type were produced, about half of which were shipped to France and England for use in foreign-built pursuit planes.Table 22 gives a résumé of the production of service engines by quarterly periods:Table 22.—Production of service engines in 1918.Name of engineJan. 1 toMar. 31Apr. 1 to,June 30July 1 toSept.30Oct. 1 toNov. 8TotalLiberty 12, Army1221,4934,1164,0939,824Liberty 12, Navy1426331,7101,0873,572Hispano-Suiza 180 h.p.......185284469IMPROVEMENT IN INSTRUMENTS AND ACCESSORIESFew facilities existed for the manufacture of many of the delicate instruments and intricate mechanisms going into the equipment of every battle-plane. The courage and determination with which these most difficult problems were met and solved will form one of the bright pages in the archives of American industry.One of the most important outgrowths of the research work which the war stimulated was the development of voice command in formation flying by means of wireless devices. The great significance of this invention will be appreciated when it is realized that the leader of a formation has heretofore been dependent on signals for conveying instructions to the individual units of the squadron.TRAINING OF PERSONNELAfter the declaration of war the construction of training fields proceeded with such rapidity that the demand for training equipment greatly exceeded the output. Since the latter part of 1917, however, the supply of elementary training planes and engines has been more than sufficient to meet the demands, while the situation as regards certain types of planes for advanced training has greatly improved. Approximately 17,000 cadets were graduated from ground schools; 8,602 reserve military aviators were graduated from elementary training schools; and 4,028 aviators completed the course in advanced training provided in this country. Pending the provision of adequate equipment for specialized advanced training, the policy was adopted of sending students overseas for a short finishing course before going into action. The shortage of skilled mechanics with sufficient knowledge of aeroplanes and motors was met by the establishment of training schools from which over 14,000 mechanics were graduated.At the cessation of hostilities there were in training as aviators in the United States 6,528 men, of whom 22 per cent were in ground schools, 37 per cent in elementary schools, and 41 per cent in advanced training schools. The number of men in training as aviator mechanics was 2,154.

Air Service

ORGANIZATION

The Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, which had charge of the production and operation of military aircraft at the outbreak of the war, was created on July 18, 1914. To assist in outlining America’s aviation program, the Aircraft Production Board was appointed by the Council of National Defense in May, 1917. In October, 1917, the Aircraft Board, acting in an advisory capacity to the Signal Corps and the Navy, was created by act of Congress. In April, 1918, the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps was separated into two distinct departments, Mr. John D. Ryan being placed in charge of aircraft productionand Brig.-Gen. W. L. Kenly in charge of military aeronautics. Under the powers granted in the Overman Bill, a further reorganization was effected by Presidential order in May, 1918, whereby aircraft production and military aeronautics were completely divorced from the Signal Corps and established in separate bureaus. This arrangement continued until August, when the present air service, under Mr. Ryan as Second Assistant Secretary of War, was established, combining under one head the administration of aviation personnel and equipment.

RAW MATERIALS SECURED

One of the most important problems which confronted the aircraft organization from the start was the obtaining of sufficient spruce and fir for ourselves and our allies. To facilitate the work, battalions were organized under military discipline and placed in the forests of the western coast. A government plant and kiln were erected to cut and dry lumber before shipment, thus saving valuable freight space. To November 11, 1918, the date the armistice was signed, the total quantity of spruce and fir shipped amounted to approximately 174,000,000 feet, of which more than two-thirds went to the Allies.

The shortage of linen stimulated the search for a substitute possessing the qualities necessary in fabric used for covering aeroplane wings. Extensive experiments were made with a cotton product which proved so successful that it is now used for all types of training and service planes.

To meet the extensive demands for a high-grade lubricating oil, castor beans were imported from India and a large acreage planted in this country. Meanwhile research work with mineral oils was carried on intensively, with the result that a lubricant was developed which proved satisfactory in practically every type of aeroplane motor, except the rotary motor, in which castor oil is still preferred.

PRODUCTION OF TRAINING PLANES AND ENGINES

When war was declared the United States possessed less than 300 training planes, all of inferior types. Deliveries of improved models were begun as early as June, 1917. Up to November 11, 1918, over 5,300 had been produced, including 1,600 of a type which was temporarily abandoned on account of unsatisfactory engines.

Planes for advanced training purposes were produced in quantity early in 1918; up to the signing of the armistice about 2,500 were delivered. Approximately the same number was purchased overseas for training the units with the Expeditionary Force.

Several new models, to be used for training pursuit pilots, are under development.

Within three months after the declaration of war extensive orders were placed for two types of elementary training engines. Quantity production was reached within a short time. In all about 10,500 have been delivered, sufficient to constitute a satisfactory reserve for some time to come.

Of the advanced training engines, the three important models were of foreign design, and the success achieved in securing quantity production is a gratifying commentary on the manufacturing ability of this country. The total production up to November 11 was approximately 5,200.

PRODUCTION OF SERVICE PLANES

The experience acquired during the operations on the Mexican border demonstrated the unsuitability of the planes then used by the American Army. Shortly after the declaration of war, a commission was sent abroad to select types of foreign service planes to be put into production in this country. We were confronted with the necessity of redesigning these models to take the Liberty motor, as foreign engine production was insufficient to meet the great demands of the Allies. The first successful type of plane to come into quantity production was a modification of the British De Haviland 4—an observation and day bombing plane. The first deliveries were made in February, 1918. In May, production began to increase rapidly, and by October a monthly output of 1,200 had been reached. Approximately 1,900 were shipped to the Expeditionary Force prior to the termination of hostilities.

The Handley Page night bomber, used extensively by the British, was redesigned to take two Liberty motors. Parts for approximately 100 planes have been shipped to England for assembly.

Table 20 shows the status of American production of service planes by quarterly periods.

Table 20.—Service planes produced in the United States in 1918:

A total of 2,676 pursuit, observation, and day bombing planes, with spare engines, were delivered to the Expeditionary Force by the French Government for the equipment of our forces overseas.

Considerable progress was made in the adaptation of other types of foreign planes to the American-made engines, and in the development of new designs. The U. S. D. 9A, embodying some improvements over the De Haviland 4, was expected to come into quantity production in the near future. The Bristol Fighter, a British plane, was redesignedto take the Liberty 8 and the Hispano-Suiza 300 h. p. engines. A force of Italian engineers and skilled workmen was brought to America to redesign the Caproni night bomber to take three Liberty motors, and successful trial flights of this machine have been made.

Several new models are under experimentation. Chief of these is the Le Père two-seater fighter, designed around the Liberty motor, the performance of which is highly satisfactory. Several of these planes were sent overseas to be tested at the front.

PRODUCTION OF SERVICE ENGINES

In view of the rapid progress in military aeronautics, the necessity for the development of a high-powered motor adaptable to American methods of quantity production was early recognized. The result of the efforts to meet this need was the Liberty motor—America’s chief contribution to aviation, and one of the great achievements of the war. After this motor emerged from the experimental stage, production increased with great rapidity, the October output reaching 4,200, or nearly one-third of the total production up to the signing of the armistice. The factories engaged in the manufacture of this motor, and their total production to November 8, are listed in Table 21.

Table 21.—Production of Liberty motor to November 8, 1918, by factories:

Of this total, 9,834 were high-compression, or army type, and 3,572 low-compression, or navy type, the latter being used in seaplanes and large night bombers.

In addition to those installed in planes, about 3,500 Liberty engines were shipped overseas, to be used as spares and for delivery to the Allies.

Other types of service engines, including the Hispano-Suiza 300 h. p., the Bugatti, and the Liberty 8-cylinder, were under development when hostilities ceased. The Hispano-Suiza 180 h. p. had already reached quantity production. Nearly 500 engines of this type were produced, about half of which were shipped to France and England for use in foreign-built pursuit planes.

Table 22 gives a résumé of the production of service engines by quarterly periods:

Table 22.—Production of service engines in 1918.

IMPROVEMENT IN INSTRUMENTS AND ACCESSORIES

Few facilities existed for the manufacture of many of the delicate instruments and intricate mechanisms going into the equipment of every battle-plane. The courage and determination with which these most difficult problems were met and solved will form one of the bright pages in the archives of American industry.

One of the most important outgrowths of the research work which the war stimulated was the development of voice command in formation flying by means of wireless devices. The great significance of this invention will be appreciated when it is realized that the leader of a formation has heretofore been dependent on signals for conveying instructions to the individual units of the squadron.

TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

After the declaration of war the construction of training fields proceeded with such rapidity that the demand for training equipment greatly exceeded the output. Since the latter part of 1917, however, the supply of elementary training planes and engines has been more than sufficient to meet the demands, while the situation as regards certain types of planes for advanced training has greatly improved. Approximately 17,000 cadets were graduated from ground schools; 8,602 reserve military aviators were graduated from elementary training schools; and 4,028 aviators completed the course in advanced training provided in this country. Pending the provision of adequate equipment for specialized advanced training, the policy was adopted of sending students overseas for a short finishing course before going into action. The shortage of skilled mechanics with sufficient knowledge of aeroplanes and motors was met by the establishment of training schools from which over 14,000 mechanics were graduated.

At the cessation of hostilities there were in training as aviators in the United States 6,528 men, of whom 22 per cent were in ground schools, 37 per cent in elementary schools, and 41 per cent in advanced training schools. The number of men in training as aviator mechanics was 2,154.

FORCES AT THE FRONTEarly in 1918 the first squadrons composed of American personnel provided with French planes appeared at the front. The number was increased as rapidly as equipment could be obtained. On September 30, the date of the latest available information, there were 32 squadrons at the front; of these 15 were pursuit, 13 observation, and 4 bombing. The first squadron equipped with American planes reached the front in the latter part of July.LOSSES IN BATTLE AND IN TRAININGThough the casualties in the air force were small as compared with the total strength, the casualty rate of the flying personnel at the front was somewhat above the artillery and infantry rates. The reported battle fatalities up to October 24 were 128 and accident fatalities overseas 244. The results of Allied and American experience at the front indicate that two aviators lose their lives in accidents for each aviator killed in battle. The fatalities at training fields in the United States to October 24th were 262.[A later official report gave the total U. S. aviators lost in combat as 171, and those killed by accident as 554.]COMMISSIONED AND ENLISTED STRENGTHOn America’s entrance into the war, the personnel of the Air Service consisted of 65 officers and 1,120 men. When the armistice was signed the total strength was slightly over 190,000, comprising about 20,000 commissioned officers, over 6,000 cadets under training, and 164,000 enlisted men. In addition to the cadets under training, the flying personnel was composed of about 11,000 officers, of whom approximately 42 per cent were with the Expeditionary Force when hostilities ceased. The Air Service constituted slightly over 5 per cent of the total strength of the Army.

FORCES AT THE FRONT

Early in 1918 the first squadrons composed of American personnel provided with French planes appeared at the front. The number was increased as rapidly as equipment could be obtained. On September 30, the date of the latest available information, there were 32 squadrons at the front; of these 15 were pursuit, 13 observation, and 4 bombing. The first squadron equipped with American planes reached the front in the latter part of July.

LOSSES IN BATTLE AND IN TRAINING

Though the casualties in the air force were small as compared with the total strength, the casualty rate of the flying personnel at the front was somewhat above the artillery and infantry rates. The reported battle fatalities up to October 24 were 128 and accident fatalities overseas 244. The results of Allied and American experience at the front indicate that two aviators lose their lives in accidents for each aviator killed in battle. The fatalities at training fields in the United States to October 24th were 262.

[A later official report gave the total U. S. aviators lost in combat as 171, and those killed by accident as 554.]

COMMISSIONED AND ENLISTED STRENGTH

On America’s entrance into the war, the personnel of the Air Service consisted of 65 officers and 1,120 men. When the armistice was signed the total strength was slightly over 190,000, comprising about 20,000 commissioned officers, over 6,000 cadets under training, and 164,000 enlisted men. In addition to the cadets under training, the flying personnel was composed of about 11,000 officers, of whom approximately 42 per cent were with the Expeditionary Force when hostilities ceased. The Air Service constituted slightly over 5 per cent of the total strength of the Army.

GENERAL PERSHING’S REPORT

Secretary Baker’s report included a communication received from General Pershing in which he commented on aircraft and the Air Service as follows:

“Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries necessary for its conduct in the modern sense. Among our most important deficiencies in material were artillery, aviation, and tanks. In order to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted the offer of the French Government to provide us with the necessary artillery equipment.“In aviation we were in the same situation, and here again the French Government came to our aid until our own aviation program should be under way. We obtained from the French the necessary planes for training our personnel, and they have provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observation, and bombing planes. The first aeroplanes received from home arrived in May, and altogether we have received 1,379. The first American squadron completely equipped by American production, including aeroplanes, crossed the German lines on August 7, 1918.“It should be fully realized that the French Government has always taken a most liberal attitude and has been most anxious to give us every possible assistance in meeting our deficiencies in these as well as in other respects. Our dependence upon France for artillery, aviation, and tanks was, of course, due to the fact that our industries had not been exclusively devoted to military production. All credit is due our own manufacturers for their efforts to meet our requirements, as at the time the armistice was signed we were able to look forward to the early supply of practically all our necessities from our own factories.”

“In aviation we were in the same situation, and here again the French Government came to our aid until our own aviation program should be under way. We obtained from the French the necessary planes for training our personnel, and they have provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observation, and bombing planes. The first aeroplanes received from home arrived in May, and altogether we have received 1,379. The first American squadron completely equipped by American production, including aeroplanes, crossed the German lines on August 7, 1918.

“It should be fully realized that the French Government has always taken a most liberal attitude and has been most anxious to give us every possible assistance in meeting our deficiencies in these as well as in other respects. Our dependence upon France for artillery, aviation, and tanks was, of course, due to the fact that our industries had not been exclusively devoted to military production. All credit is due our own manufacturers for their efforts to meet our requirements, as at the time the armistice was signed we were able to look forward to the early supply of practically all our necessities from our own factories.”

THE HUGHES REPORT

The committee appointed by the President to investigate the charges of misappropriation of funds reported in November, 1918, on the number of training planes and engines built. Justice Chas. E. Hughes was chairman of the committee:

Aeroplanes and Engines Delivered During Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1918The reported deliveries of Aeroplanes and Engines made prior to June 30, 1918, are as follows:AEROPLANESElementary Training PlanesJN4-D2972SJ-11600——4572Advanced Training PlanesJN4-HTraining402Gunnery321JN6-HB100S4-B100S4-C73Penguin50——1046Combat and Bombing PlanesDeH-4529Bristol Fighter24——553——Total planes6171ENGINESElementary TrainingOX-55474A7a2188——7662Advanced TrainingHispano 150 H.P.2188Gnome 100 ”209Le Rhone 80 ”68Lawrence 28 ”114——2579Combat and BombingU. S. 12 Cylinder (Army Type)1615U. S. 12 Cylinder (Navy Type)775Hispano 300 H. P.2————2392

Aeroplanes and Engines Delivered During Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1918

The reported deliveries of Aeroplanes and Engines made prior to June 30, 1918, are as follows:

AEROPLANES

Elementary Training Planes

Advanced Training Planes

Combat and Bombing Planes

ENGINES

Elementary Training

Advanced Training

Combat and Bombing

NUMBER OF MACHINES AT THE FRONT

Report prepared by Statistics Branch, General Staff, War Department, March 22, 1919, concerning the 628 De Haviland 4 planes put in service at front before armistice.

The following table and diagram shows the status of production, shipments and use overseas of De Haviland 4 service planes at the date of the armistice:

Value of contracts cancelled and suspended exceed $480,000,000.

The following is a summary of the value of cancellations and suspensions of contracts to March 19, 1919:

THE SIXTY-FOUR AMERICAN ACES

The following official list gives the status of the sixty-four American aces—that is, aviators who had each downed five or more enemies by the time hostilities ceased:

Captain Edward V. Rickenbacker of Columbus, Ohio, famous as an automobile driver, was the premier “Ace” of the American air force in France, having twenty-six enemy planes to his credit.

First Lieutenant Frank Luke, Jr., of Phœnix, Ariz., who was killed in action May 19, 1918, was second on the list of “Aces,” with eighteen victories to his credit, and Major Victor Raoul Lufbery of Wallingford, Conn., also killed in action May 19, 1918, was third, with seventeen victories. Before joining the American Army, Major Lufbery was a member of the Lafayette Escadrille.

Captain Reed G. Landis of Chicago, son of Judge Landis, and First Lieutenant David E. Putnam, of Brookline, Mass., who was killed in action, had twelve victories each. The other “Aces,” with the number of victories credited to each, follow:

OTHER AMERICANS WHO ARE CREDITED WITHBRINGING DOWN ONE OR MOREPLANES

CITATIONS AND DECORATIONS OF MEMBERSOF THE U. S. ARMY AIR SERVICE

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

LEGION OF HONOR—FRENCH

(COMMANDER)

Charles T. Menoher, Major-General.William Mitchell, Brigadier-General.

CROIX DE GUERRE—FRENCH

ITALIAN CITATIONS

FRENCH CITATIONS

CROCE AL MERITO DI GUERRA—ITALIAN

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARYAERONAUTICS

War Department,

Office of the Director of Military Aeronautics,

November 3, 1918.

Sir: I have the honor to submit herewith the annual report of the Division of Military Aeronautics for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1918. Though the Division of Military Aeronautics was created only on April 24, 1917, it was agreed that the duties intrusted to it and previously carried out by the Signal Corps should be covered in this report in order to present a continuous story of the development of the personnel, training, and organizing phases of the present Air Service. Also it should be pointed out that operations on the front in France have been left largely to whatever report the American Expeditionary Force may deem wise.

The fiscal year 1917-18 saw aviation develop from a wholly subsidiary branch of the Army as the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps to a position of extreme and decisive importance as the Air Service, directly under the Chief of Staff. From the most insignificant beginnings it came within the year to be one of America’s major efforts in the war.

This is all the more surprising when America’s previous backwardness in aviation is considered. This country has stood practically still in aerial progress, while the war in Europe brought about an extraordinary advance. From all this the United States was entirely shut off up to the time it abandoned neutrality. So little exact knowledgewas available that the first American planes to go with the expedition into Mexico in March, 1916, were all rendered useless in accidents within a short time of arrival. There was practically no aviation technique here comparable to Europe’s, almost negligible manufacturing facilities, not a hundred trained flyers, and only the most rudimentary facilities for training. Moreover, no one had any adequate appreciation of the intricacy and skill required in the making of either an aeroplane or the training of a pilot.

As against this stagnation Europe’s progress in two and one-half years of war had been tremendous. The first planes to go to the front in 1914 had been few in number, unequipped with radio, machine guns, bombs, or photographic apparatus, and entirely unproved in military value. Their extraordinary success, however, in disclosing the size of the German concentration in Belgium at once brought them into a position of great importance. Very shortly radio was installed to replace signaling by dropping tinsel or making curious evolutions; the pistols of the pilots gave way to machine guns; the easy-going system of dropping bombs over the side was replaced by regular bombing planes, and the occasional taking of photographs by an intricate system of picturing every mile of the front. Engine power increased to 200, 300, 400, 500 horse power; huge planes with large carrying capacity were being developed for night-bombing; and operations were taking place by whole squadrons in various air strata—light, single-seater scouts around 15,000 to 20,000 feet, two-seater day bombers around 9,000 feet, and photographic and observation planes around 6,000 feet.

In contrast to all this development the United States at the time of its entry into the war stood very little ahead of where it had been before the world war broke out. Aviation, both in its personnel and its equipment, was included in that part of the Signal Corps known as the Aviation Section, which had been established by Congress July 18, 1914. Its chief was Maj. Gen. George O. Squier, who after four years as military attaché in London, had been put in charge of the Aviation Section in May, 1916, and made Chief Signal Officer on February 14, 1917, continuing to have charge of aviation through nearly the whole of the fiscal year. On April 6, 1917, the total assets on hand consisted of 65 officers, 1,120 men, two small flying fields, less than 300 very second-rate training planes, practically no manufacturing facilities, and only the most meagre technical information as to Europe’s startling developments.

The original American war program, based on an army of a million men, made aviation but a relatively insignificant part of the general military forces. This program, which represented the view of the General Staff before the arrival of the foreign missions, was met by two appropriations, $10,800,000 on May 12, 1917, and $43,450,000 on June 15, many times larger than any appropriations ever before made.

The British and French missions, however, arriving the last partof April, completely revolutionized this viewpoint. Supported by an urgent cable of May 24 from the premier of France, calling for 2,000 planes a month and a total of 5,000 pilots and 50,000 mechanicians, the $640,000,000 appropriation, the largest ever made by Congress for one specific purpose, was drawn up, put through the House of Representatives Military Affairs Committee in two meetings, the House itself in one, the Senate Military Affairs Committee in 45 minutes, and the Senate itself a week later, becoming law on July 24, 1917. On this date the present large program was really launched, two months and a half after the outbreak of war, and largely in response to allied appeals.

The rest of the fiscal year was taken up in amplifying and executing the lines of effort here laid down. Toward the end of the year, however, it became obvious that the system of organization of an Aviation Section as a subsidiary branch of the Signal Corps was not functioning efficiently. The British and French, perceiving that we were encountering the same kind of obstacles as theirs, strongly recommended a separate, independent air service similar to the air ministries they had been obliged to establish and which have worked so successfully since. As a result, a first step was taken in a rearrangement of duties designed to effect a greater independence and a greater concentration of authority when, on April 24, the War Department authorized the following statement:

“Mr. John D. Ryan has accepted the directorship of aircraft production for the Army.

“A reorganization of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps has been also effected, of which the principal elements are as follows:

“Gen. Squier, as Chief Signal Officer, will devote his attention to the administration of signals; a Division of Military Aeronautics is created, under the direction of Brig. Gen. William L. Kenly. The Aircraft Board, created by act of Congress, remains as an advisory body, as it has been in the past, with Mr. Ryan as its chairman. This arrangement is made with the entire concurrence of Mr. Howard Coffin, who remains a member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense and will render assistance and counsel to the Aircraft Board and Mr. Ryan.

“The Division of Military Aeronautics will have control of the training of aviators and military use of aircraft. The exact division of functions in the matter of designing and engineering will be worked out as experience determines between the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Division of Production.

“This announcement involves no change of personnel in the present Equipment Division of the Signal Corps, of which W. C. Potter is chief, and which will continue under his direction.”

This reorganization, however, was admittedly but the first step. The first action taken by the President under the broad powers of theOverman Act was to effect a still further reorganization by taking aviation entirely out of the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps, where it has been from its inception on July 18, 1914, and to set up two separate bureaus, one for securing and training the large flying and ground forces, and the other for providing planes, engines, and equipment.

The presidential order of May 21 covering this change follows:

“By virtue of the authority in me vested as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and by virtue of further authority upon me specifically conferred by ‘An act authorizing the President to coordinate or consolidate executive bureaus, agencies, and offices, and for other purposes, in the interest of economy and the more efficient concentration of the Government,’ approved May 20, 1918, I do hereby make and publish the following order:

“The powers heretofore conferred by law or by Executive order upon and the duties and functions heretofore performed by the Chief Signal Officer of the Army are hereby redistributed as follows:

“(1) The Chief Signal Officer of the Army shall have charge, under the direction of the Secretary of War, of all military signal duties, and of books, papers and devices connected therewith, including telegraph and telephone apparatus and the necessary meteorological instruments for use on target ranges, and other military uses; the construction, repair, and operation of military telegraph lines, and the duty of collecting and transmitting information for the Army by telegraph or otherwise, and all other duties usually pertaining to military signaling; and shall perform such other duties as now or are or shall hereafter be devolved by law or by Executive order upon said Chief Signal Officer which are not connected with the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps or with the purchase, manufacture, maintenance, and production of aircraft, and which are not hereinafter conferred, in special or general terms, upon other officers or agencies.

“(2) A Director of Military Aeronautics, selected and designated by the Commander in Chief of the Army, shall hereafter have charge, under the direction of the Secretary of War, of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps of the Army, and as such shall be, and he hereby is, charged with the duty of operating and maintaining or supervising the operation and maintenance of all military aircraft, including balloons and aeroplanes, all appliances pertaining to said aircraft and signaling apparatus of any kind when installed on said aircraft, and of training officers, enlisted men, and candidates for aviation service in matters pertaining to military aviation, and shall hereafter perform each and every function heretofore imposed upon and performed by the Chief Signal Officer of the Army in, or in connection with, the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, except such as pertains to thepurchase, manufacture, and production of aircraft and aircraft equipment and as is not hereinafter conferred, in special or general terms, upon the Bureau of Aircraft Production; and all aeroplanes now in use or completed and on hand and all material and parts, and all machinery, tools, appliances, and equipment held for use for the maintenance thereof; all lands, buildings, repair shops, warehouses, and all other property, real, personal, or mixed, heretofore used by the Signal Corps in, or in connection with, the operation and maintenance of aircraft and the training of officers, enlisted men, and candidates for aviation service, or procured and now held for such use by or under the jurisdiction and control of the Signal Corps of the Army; all books, records, files and office equipment heretofore used by the Signal Corps, in, or in connection with, such operation, maintenance, and training; and the entire personnel of the Signal Corps as at present assigned to, or engaged upon work in, or in connection with, such operation, maintenance, and training, is hereby transferred from the jurisdiction of the Chief Signal Office and placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Military Aeronautics; it being the intent hereof to transfer from the jurisdiction of the Chief Signal Officer to the jurisdiction of the said Director of Military Aeronautics every function, power, and duty conferred and imposed upon said Director of Military Aeronautics by subparagraph (2) of paragraph I hereof all property of every sort of nature used or procured for use in, or in connection with, the functions of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps placed in charge of the Director of Military Aeronautics by subparagraph (2) of paragraph I hereof, and the entire personnel of the Signal Corps in charge of the Director of Military Aeronautics by subparagraph (2) of paragraph I hereof.

“(3) An executive agency, known as the Bureau of Aircraft Production, is hereby established, and said agency shall exercise full, complete, and exclusive jurisdiction and control over the production of aeroplanes, aeroplane engines, and aircraft equipment for the use of the Army, and to that end shall forthwith assume control and jurisdiction over all pending Government projects having to do or connected with the production of aeroplanes, aeroplane engines, and aircraft equipment for the Army and heretofore conducted by the Signal Corps of the Army, under the jurisdiction of the Chief Signal Officer; and all material on hand for such production, all unfinished aeroplanes and aeroplane engines, and all unfinished, unattached, or unassembled aircraft equipment; all lands, buildings, factories, warehouses, machinery, tools, and appliances, and all other property, real, personal, or mixed, heretofore used in or in connection with such production, or procured and now held for such use, by or under the jurisdiction and control of the Signal Corps of the Army; all books, records, files, and office equipment used by the said Signal Corps in or in connection with such production; all rights under contracts made by the Signal Corps in or in connection with such production; and the entire personnel ofthe Signal Corps as at present assigned to or engaged upon work in or in connection with such production are hereby transferred from the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps and placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Aircraft Production, it being the intent thereof to transfer from the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps to the jurisdiction of the said Bureau of Aircraft Production every function, power, and duty connected with said production, all property of every sort or nature used or procured for use in or in connection with said production, and the entire personnel of the Signal Corps, as at present assigned to or engaged upon work in or in connection with such production.

“Such person as shall at the time be chairman of the Aircraft Board created by the act of Congress approved October 1, 1917, shall also be the executive officer of said Bureau of Aircraft Production, and he shall be, and he hereby is, designated as Director of Aircraft Production, and he shall, under the direction of the Secretary of War, have charge of the activities, personnel, and properties of said bureau.

“All unexpended funds of appropriations heretofore made for the Signal Corps of the Army and already specifically allotted for use in connection with the functions of the Signal Service as defined and limited by subparagraph (1) of Paragraph I hereof shall be and remain under the jurisdiction of the Chief Signal Officer; all such funds already specifically allotted for use in connection with the functions of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps as defined and limited by subparagraph (2) of Paragraph I hereof are hereby transferred to and placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Military Aeronautics for the purpose of meeting the obligations and expenditures authorized by said section; all such funds already specifically allotted for use in connection with the functions hereby bestowed upon the Bureau of Aircraft Production, as defined and limited by subparagraph (3) of Paragraph I hereof, are hereby transferred to and placed under the jurisdiction of said Director of Aircraft Production for the purpose of meeting the obligations and expenditures authorized by said bureau in carrying out the duties and functions hereby transferred to and bestowed upon said bureau; and in so far as such funds have not been already specifically allotted to the different fields of activity of the Signal Corps as heretofore existing, they shall now be allotted by the Secretary of War in such proportions as shall to him seem best intended to meet the requirements of the respective fields of former activity of the Signal Corps and the intention of Congress when making said appropriations, and the funds so allotted by the Secretary of War to meet expenditures in the field of activity of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps are hereby transferred to and placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Military Aeronautics for the purpose ofmeeting the obligations and expenditures authorized by said section; and the funds so allotted by the Secretary of War to meet the expenditures in that part of the field of activity of the Signal Corps, which includes the functions hereby transferred to the Bureau of Aircraft Production, are hereby transferred to and placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Aircraft Production for the purpose of meeting the obligations and expenditures authorized by said bureau.

III

“This order shall be and remain in full force and effect during the continuance of the present war and for six months after the termination thereof by the proclamation of the treaty of peace, or until theretofore amended, modified, or rescinded.

“Under this order Mr. John D. Ryan continued as Director of Aircraft Production and Maj. Gen. William L. Kenly became Director of Military Aeronautics.”

This division of responsibilities and functions gave a clearer conception of the unique duties of the Air Service in production of planes and training of pilots, and is significant, too, of the many tactical reasons which made it imperative for England and France to establish separate and independent air services.

The end of the fiscal year found this problem of higher organization one of the most important to be faced. An early defect discovered in the reorganization developed when there appeared to be inadequate liaison between the Bureau of Aircraft Production and the Division of Military Aeronautics. One was responsible for the production of planes, the other for their operation and military efficiency. The method of selecting a type to put into production and the final decision whether any plane produced was suitable for its military purposes or not, was undetermined. The situation of two sets of officials with equal authority in their respective fields of action, neither responsible to the other, at once demonstrated that neither could be held for the final production of an acceptable plane for the front. This was partially obviated by an agreement between the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production that the types of plane to be put into production must first be mutually agreed upon, and that before a plane could be sent to the front it should be given a military test and accepted by the Division of Military Aeronautics. But considerable time was lost before this policy was definitely arranged, a policy which might easily have at once been established by a unified department.

The personnel side of the air service, including the selection, training, organization, and operation of the flying forces, developed within the fiscal year 1917-18 into an educational system on a scale infinitely larger and more diverse than anyone had anticipated. Teaching mento fly, to send messages by wireless, to operate machine guns in the air, to know artillery fire by its bursts, and to travel hundreds of miles by compass, teaching other men to read the enemy’s strategy from aerial photographs, and still others to repair instruments, ignition systems, propellers, aeroplane wings, and motors, has required a network of flying fields and schools, a large instructional force, and a maze of equipment and curricula.

None of this, practically speaking, was on hand at the outbreak of the war, neither fields, instructors, curricula, nor, more serious than all, experience to show what was to be needed. This country had never trained an aviator sufficiently to meet the demands of overseas aerial warfare and had not the slightest knowledge of the instruction necessary for radio, photography, or enlisted personnel. Consequently, the first men largely taught themselves before teaching others, and experience led on from one course to the next.

First, in the point of need, was that of flying fields. Two were in limited operation at the outbreak of war, San Diego and Mineola; three more were selected, cleared, equipped, and made ready for flying in six weeks’ time, and by the end of the year over a score were in operation all over the country. All were protected by a three-year lease with option to buy, if desired, at a fixed price. During the year also five supply depots, three concentration depots, three balloon camps, two repair depots, one experimental field, one radio laboratory, and one quarantine camp were built.

The selection of men for training as flyers was a complicated task, as the requirements were necessarily rigid. Volunteer examining boards of the highest medical skill were organized all over the country, 36 urban and 30 divisional boards, and a total of 38,777 men were examined to June 2, of whom nearly half, or 18,004, were disqualified. This naturally led to a high grade of personnel, and made the later training both more rapid and more efficient.

The first step in instruction was at one of the new “ground” schools opened on May 21 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cornell and Ohio State Universities and the Universities of Illinois, Texas, and California, with Princeton and the Georgia School of Technology added on July 5. Here, in eight weeks, under military discipline, the cadets were grounded in all the elements of aviation at a cost to the Government at first of $65 per pupil, and later $10 each for the first four weeks, and $5 weekly thereafter. By June 30, 1918, a total of 11,539 men were graduated to the flying fields and 3,129 were discharged for failure in studies, etc.

Next came the actual flying instruction, divided into two phases, primary and advanced. The former averaged about eight weeks, included ability to execute the simpler evolutions and cross-country flights, and led to an officer’s commission and the right to wear the Reserve Military Aviator’s wings. To June 30, 1918, 4,980 men hadbeen graduated as Reserve Military Aviators for final training, and about 400 had been disqualified as incapable of becoming flyers.

The advanced training, however, presented infinitely more difficulties. It was not nearly so simple to teach the more complex stunts, formation flying, aerial machine gunnery, bombing, and night flying, while at the same time the highly specialized equipment necessary required considerable time for manufacture. Nevertheless, advanced schools of the three types necessary were openeEarly western travels 1748-1846, volume 7 of 10d toward the end of the year 1918, with what equipment was available, and had graduated 110 bombers, 85 bombing pilots, 464 observers, 389 observer pilots, and 131 pursuit pilots by June 30, 1918.

The ideal arrangement in mind at the end of the year was to train each pilot completely on this side of the ocean, where facilities are very good, supplies in abundance, and information and experienced pilots from the front available in ever-increasing numbers. The flyers can then be organized into provisional squadrons and wings and given training as large units with their own administrative officers and enlisted personnel so that they will be able to go immediately to the front, after a month or so of transformation work in France, learning geography and familiarizing themselves with new types of planes. Plans are under way looking to the establishment of such wings and brigades in the United States with the end in view of furnishing complete and fully trained units to the American Expeditionary Force.

The whole training program was considerably held up by lack of equipment. Obviously it required far less time to select men for training than to build the fields, planes, and accessories necessary to train them. Primary training planes, the only type manufactured here before the war, soon became available in increasing numbers, till by the end of the year more were on hand than needed. The advanced training planes, however, presented problems wholly new to this country, so that primary planes had to be fitted with more powerful engines and equipment and made to serve the purpose. The first 16 single-seater pursuit planes were not delivered till January, 1918, the first bombers till March, and the first gunnery late in May.

During this fiscal year a grand total of 407,999 hours were flown by Army aviators in the United States, as contrasted with 745.5 hours in 1914 and 1,269 in 1915. In the single week ending June 30, 1918, a total of 19,560 hours were flown, or 15 times, for that single week, the number of the whole year three years before. This, at 75 miles an hour, is equivalent to over 30,000,000 miles, or 1,223 times around the Equator.

During it there were 152 fatalities, or 2,684 flying hours and 201,000 miles flown to each death. Of these, 86 were caused by stalls, when the plane, usually through some error by the pilot, lost its flying speed and dropped into a straight nose dive or turned into a tail spin, from which the pilot did not have the time or the skill to extricate it. Collisionswere responsible for 30 other accidents, often due to failure to fly according to the rules. Side-slips, the only other large cause of accidents, resulted in 10 deaths.

Regrettable as these accidents are, it is felt that, considering the newness of the science, the early state of development of the planes, the inexperience in instruction, and the necessity of teaching stunts in themselves rather dangerous, this number is not large. As a matter of actual statistics, fatalities in American training are less than half as large as those of the other allied countries.

Besides flyers, however, engineer officers to direct the upkeep of the equipment, supply officers to keep sufficient equipment on hand, and adjutants to keep the records and do other military work had to be especially trained. These men, absolutely essential to the maintenance of the Air Service organization, could be secured only after a detailed course of instruction. An engineers’ school, opened for a 12 weeks’ course at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on January 12, graduated 590 men and discharged 228 before June 30; a supply officers’ school, opened at the Georgia School of Technology, graduated 852 men and discharged 111 from an eight weeks’ course before it was closed on May 11; and an adjutants’ school, opened at Ohio State University on January 12, graduated 789 and discharged 97 men in an eight weeks’ course before it was closed June 22.

A six weeks’ course for armament officers and men to care for machine guns and bombs was opened at Fairfield, Ohio, on April 22, graduating 95 officers and 465 men by June 30, all of whom went forthwith overseas. Just at the end of the year a series of special schools in aerial gunnery were opened as the final step in the flyers’ training in this country, graduating 102 pilots, 111 observers, and 101 fighting observers by June 30. Also a special course for compass officers was opened at Camp Dick, Texas, on April 10, with 53 graduates, and another course at the same time for a score of navigation officers.

Radio also required very special instruction, with courses and instructors for all flyers through the various stages of their progress, for the receiving force on the ground, and for the men responsible for the upkeep of the radio equipment. At the outset, volunteer civilians, each with his own methods of instruction, stepped into the breach, but by the end of the year two radio officers, and four enlisted men’s schools were in operation with 49 and 329 graduates, respectively; radio officers and equipment had been sent to every field and ground school; and the courses for flyers had been standardized all the way through.

Aerial photography, which had developed during the war into an exact science, required similar triple instruction—that for observers to operate the cameras in the air, intelligence officers on the ground to interpret them, and enlisted men to aid in the developing, printing, and enlarging, and to keep the equipment in condition. Where the United States had not even a single aerial camera at the outbreak ofthe war, by the end of the year there had been opened on March 25 a large school for developers and printers at Rochester, N. Y., with 680 graduates by June 30, an officers’ school on January 6 at Cornell teaching map compilation and interpretation, and photographic “huts” with complete personnel and equipment for instruction at each of the flying fields.

One of the most serious problems, and one of late development, was that of enlisted men, the ground force needed to keep the planes and engines always in prime condition, repair minor breaks, tighten up wires, strengthen struts, and make sure that no airman went up in a faulty plane. This was work wholly new to American mechanics, and of a delicacy and carefulness to which they were quite unaccustomed. Moreover, mechanics of the skill required had largely been drained off by the draft, by enlistment, or by other war industries.

Consequently, a whole series of schools was necessary. At first, in the fall small detachments of mechanics were sent to various factories—ignition, magneto, propeller, welding, instruments, sail-making, cabinet work, copper work, machine guns, and motors to secure as much experience as possible. While about 2,000 men were being graduated from 17 courses at 34 different schools of this type, more fully worked out courses were established at five northern flying fields closed for flying during the winter. With 2,500 graduated here, still more detailed courses were opened at four large mechanics’ schools, which added another 5,000 men. By the end of the year two large and complete Government schools were in operation at Kelly Field, Texas, and St. Paul, Minn., capable of graduating 5,000 men every three months.

A noteworthy event of the year was the opening on May 15 of the first regular aerial mail service in the United States between New York, Philadelphia, and Washington. The Army furnished six planes and pilots, shortly doubled, for a daily round trip, carrying about 350 pounds of mail each way, and with a record of 50 minutes for the 90 miles between Philadelphia and New York, and 1 hour and 50 minutes for the 135 miles from Philadelphia to Washington. Ninety per cent of the trips were made successfully.

Another vitally important phase of the Air Service is that of ballooning, which during the war has been developing into a system of ever-watchful sentries on guard all the way from the North Sea to Switzerland. Less spectacular, perhaps, than the heavier-than-air work, this branch of the service has a quite indispensable function. The observer, swinging in a captive balloon at an altitude of a mile, 2 to 5 miles from the enemy’s lines, and with a range of vision of 8 miles in all directions, can make a far more detailed, minute-by-minute analysis of the enemy’s movements than the wider visioned but transitory aviator, and can maintain such a flow of minute information to the staff below that no important movement can take place unobserved within his view.

Here, also, at the outbreak of the war the United States was practically without facilities. The only school was at Fort Omaha, Nebr., recovered from complete abandonment the previous November, with accommodations for 15 officers and 400 men, and equipment of balloon shed, gas plant, two obsolete captive balloons, and some telephone material. The original program of August 13 necessitated a very large expansion, fully comparable to that in the heavier-than-air branch.

To meet the program the Fort Omaha school was enlarged in September to accommodate 61 officers and 1,200 men; on December 28 Camp John Wise was opened at San Antonio with a final capacity of 150 officers and 2,200 men, and special companies were sent to Fort Sill, Okla., for cooperation with the Coast Artillery. By June 30, 440 balloon officers had graduated, of whom 155 were fully qualified observers, and 73 had been sent overseas. The enlisted strength stood at 9,621 with 1,382 abroad.

Thus, by the end of the fiscal year, the Air Service had in operation an educational system complete in all the details necessary to man this intricate service. Fields, curricula, instructors, and equipment were on hand for the most diverse courses, and men were graduating in hundreds trained to all the difficulties of operating aeroplanes and translating their work into effective action. A total of 34,209 men had been graduated from the various courses, with 20,976 men enrolled in 50 schools of 16 different types.

Many outside bodies were called upon to cooperate in this development. Great Britain, France, and Italy all early established large aviation missions in Washington which brought their three years of experience to help solve problems confronted here for the first time. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the Bureau of Standards, and several joint Army and Navy Boards also added their information on the subject.

Nevertheless the work was carried out under extreme difficulties. Operation and production were not properly coordinated. Much time was lost in having to obtain the necessary authority to build a new field or secure increases in personnel, instead of being able to carry out a main program with full independence and authority. Moreover, experienced and trained personnel was lacking; work had to be done while the actual organization to do it was being built up; much time was lost in the expansion and moving about of offices in Washington, some half a dozen times; while officers were constantly being shifted between Washington, the fields, and overseas.

Meanwhile overseas, work of organization was similarly going on. Hardly six weeks after the United States entered the war, namely, on May 27, the first cadets sailed for France for training in the highly developed French flying schools, till by the end of the year nearly 2,500 men were under instruction in France, England, Italy, and Canada. The collapse of Russia, Italy’s serious defeat, and the weightthrown on the allied services made it impossible, unfortunately, for the Allies to meet the schedule of training planes necessary, so that many of these cadets, the most promising of America’s material, were in idleness for months. Nevertheless, what facilities were available greatly advanced America’s aerial preparation and helped relieve the shortage of equipment here. It was early in May, 1918, however, over a year after America’s entry into the war, that the first German plane fell victim to an aviator in the American service. About the same time 468 fully trained American aviators organized into 13 complete American squadrons or brigades with British and French squadrons were actually on the front, taking increasing toll of the enemy.

During the same time an enlisted force of 46,667 men had also been sent overseas. The first to go were sent to France to lay the foundations for the great organization soon to be built up, including training fields, assembly depots for American-built planes, and aerodromes near the front. Others were formed into service squadrons in England and France to be ready as soon as American pilots were trained into their own organizations. Still others went to relieve French skilled labor of unskilled work so that they could go back into aeroplane factories, while others went to England for the construction work necessary to carry out the night bombing program.

Consequently, by June 30, 1918, two large training organizations were in operation, the source of supply in this country training and organizing thousands of pilots and men in all sorts of tasks and the operation end overseas giving the final training in France, England, and Italy the fast moving of fully trained squadrons to the front.

Where, at the outbreak of the war, there had been but 65 officers in the Air Service, there were now 14,230; the enlisted strength, similarly, had jumped from 1,120 to 124,767; the number of men in or awaiting training for flyers from less than 100 to over 18,000. There were 4,872 officers and 46,667 enlisted men overseas. Indeed, the Air Service alone was by June 30, 1918, larger than the American Army at the outbreak of the war. While its development had been infinitely more complicated and much less rapid than expected, there is reason to believe that it is essentially sound.

William L. Kenly,Major-General, U. S. A.,Director of Military Aeronautics.

The Secretary of War.

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