Throughout the land the spirit of the American people has been aroused and an intense desire to render some service that will give proof of their patriotism is moving every heart. As not more than one million of our citizens can be utilized to serve in the Army and Navy of the United States and be given the privilege of risking their lives on behalf of our beloved country, it is the duty of all the rest to do something to help those who are at the front. Sickness and discomforts can only be prevented by the hearty coöperation of those who remain at home.To give every one a chance to share in the defense of our country:I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, and President of the American National Red Cross, do appoint and proclaim that May 30th, 1917, be dedicated, in addition to our devotion on that day to those who have heretofore sacrificed their lives on the altars of our country, as a Red Cross day on which all our citizens should give, according to the measure of their ability, their money and their time to the American National Red Cross for the general purposes of the Society, and especially for the comfort of our armed forces, the care of those dependent upon them, and the relief of war sufferers in foreign lands. We must perform this duty generously and not stintingly. No less than fifty million dollars should satisfy American pride.
Throughout the land the spirit of the American people has been aroused and an intense desire to render some service that will give proof of their patriotism is moving every heart. As not more than one million of our citizens can be utilized to serve in the Army and Navy of the United States and be given the privilege of risking their lives on behalf of our beloved country, it is the duty of all the rest to do something to help those who are at the front. Sickness and discomforts can only be prevented by the hearty coöperation of those who remain at home.
To give every one a chance to share in the defense of our country:
I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, and President of the American National Red Cross, do appoint and proclaim that May 30th, 1917, be dedicated, in addition to our devotion on that day to those who have heretofore sacrificed their lives on the altars of our country, as a Red Cross day on which all our citizens should give, according to the measure of their ability, their money and their time to the American National Red Cross for the general purposes of the Society, and especially for the comfort of our armed forces, the care of those dependent upon them, and the relief of war sufferers in foreign lands. We must perform this duty generously and not stintingly. No less than fifty million dollars should satisfy American pride.
In a few minutes, his stenographer supplied us with typewritten copies, and within another hour, Mr. Tumulty, the President’s secretary, with whom we left the draft, had promised to bring it to Mr. Wilson’s attention that night. The following morning it was delivered to us, bearing the President’s signature. The confidence in America’s generosity was more than justified, as the Red Cross drive brought in 110 million dollars.
In the following month (May, 1917) I had a curious experience with the ineptitude that able men sometimes display in public affairs. In that month a number of gentlemen gathered for the purpose of formulating a plan for a government-backed campaign to inform the American people more fully regarding the European situation, our aims in the war, and our proposed methods of waging the war. This meeting was one of the first steps taken in the direction which ultimately led to the formation of the Bureau of Public Information, which performed the dual function of distributing government war publicity in this country and American war propaganda abroad. This was a non-partisan gathering, and the following gentlemen were present: Charles E. Hughes, Thomas L. Chadbourne, Jr., John Purroy Mitchel, Hon. William R. Willcox, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, William Hamlin Childs, George W. Perkins, Frank Munsey, Willard D. Straight, William A. Prendergast, Robert Adamson, and myself. We had a very interesting discussion, and at the close, Vance McCormick and I were appointed a committee to submit the results to the President. That evening, Frank Munsey called me up on the telephone and after a great panegyric of John Wanamaker, and enlarging upon his vast experience as an advertiser and publicity man, and as though he were delivering a nominating speech, suggested Mr. Wanamaker as War Publicity Director. I curtly answered that he would not do. He then veered over into a similar and extended eulogy of George W. Perkins who, he declared, and with some justice, was one of the great experts in the securing of publicity. I was really taken aback that a man of Mr. Munsey’s acuteness should suggest to me that I propose one of these two men, both of whom had so openly and unflinchingly attacked President Wilson during the recent campaign. I reminded him that Mr. Wanamaker had paid for lavish advertisements to bring about the defeat of President Wilson. Then my sense of humour overcame my annoyance: the very absurdity of his suggestions was irresistibly funny, and I asked Mr. Munsey why he did not suggest George Harvey as his third choice and so complete the trinity of Wilson’s strongest opponents in the publicity line.
Another episode, as felicitous as this one was inept, occurred in this same month. The occasion was the reception which New York City gave to Marshal Joffre, René Viviani, and Arthur J. Balfour, who were visiting this country as the heads of the French and British mission sent to express the appreciation of their governments upon our entrance into the war, and to advise with us upon the best means of making our military alliance effective. New York City enthusiastically welcomed both its distinguishedguests, and Mayor Mitchel and his Reception Committee were happy at the opportunity to give these visitors the freedom of the city. To prevent any possibility of wounded susceptibilities, by seeming preference of one guest over another, separate ceremonies were arranged for each.
At all these ceremonies, including the reception of the men at the dock, and even at the special dinner given to a select seventy at Sherry’s, the lead was always given to that great citizen and grand old man of American private and public life, the late Joseph H. Choate. There never was any doubt as to who should be selected to match the generations of culture and statecraft so ably represented by Balfour, the nephew of Salisbury, the vivid French eloquence so charmingly illustrated by Viviani, and the French eminence in the art of war which Marshal Joffre, the hero of the Marne, so adequately typified. Joseph H. Choate was preëminently the man whom we could proudly call upon; who in his own person combined all the requisites of social grace, intellectual power, and international distinction.
The climax of the entertainments offered our guests was a great dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria, at which Mr. Choate presided. As I was also a member of all the committees, and was in addition an ex-Ambassador, I was constantly at his side. I know of no one, either in my own experience or in history, who at that advanced age, was his equal in youthful energy, in ebullition of spirits, in consummate geniality, and spontaneity of wit; nor any one who so wonderfully combined the learned lawyer, the able diplomat, and the democratic citizen. He was universally recognized as the “highest type of living American,” and we were proud to match him against the world.
When he made his speech with Joffre, Viviani, and Balfour at his side, and delivered that famous message to the officials at Washington: “For God’s sake, hurry up,” and was greeted with the thunderous applause that followed, he reached the pinnacle of his career. As he stood there looking at that audience, radiating forth one of his beaming smiles, full of human sympathy, of hope and faith in America, it thrilled the audience and gave to the British and French representatives an unmistakable assurance that America was with them, and would stay with them to the finish. It was a glorious and most fitting close to Choate’s great career to be permitted to use his last thoughts and energies, in his eighty-fourth year, for the welfare of his country. A few days later, while the effect of his last speech was still penetrating into the farthest corners of the earth, he passed away, mourned by all.
In June, 1917, the President asked me to go abroad upon a secret diplomatic errand, which I am not even yet at liberty to disclose, further than to say that I learned that what the President hoped for could not be accomplished, and after a few days I proceeded to Paris.
This was one of the great hours of history. General Pershing had arrived with his little staff of officers and a few regiments of American Regular soldiers. This was America’s first pledge toward the promise of military aid, which was speedily to be redeemed in terms of two millions of American troops in France, and final victory in the war. I dined with Ambassador Sharp; and in his home I met General Pershing, Thomas Nelson Page, our Ambassador to Italy, and other prominent Americans. I renewed old acquaintances in the American colony at Paris, and soon learned the immense significance of the appearance of our soldiers in France. It was now the middle of July, and only a little earlier the French people had almost seemed to falter in their struggle. France seemed to have been bled white by three years of devastating war. Frenchmen were saying that it was as well to die on their doorsteps as to be led to useless slaughter at the front. The French Government was making a final desperate effort to restore the nation’s confidence. Joffre in May had pleaded at Washington for American troops—“No matter how few you send, only give us the sight of Americans in uniform on the streets of Paris.”
I now had the privilege of watching, from the most favourable point of vantage, a critical test of the national psychology which the French Government made in July, 1917. With a profound sense of dramatic values, they had arranged that the American troops should be exhibited to the French public on their Independence Day, July 14th, as units of a great patriotic parade. To make sure that they might accurately gauge the psychological effect, the President’s reviewing stand was placed in Vincennes, where the people had suffered greatly from the privations of the war, and where disaffection was rife. I received an invitation to witness the parade from the President’s reviewing stand, and Ambassador Sharp, General Pershing, and I were the only Americans so favoured. We were arranged around President Poincaré, with Monsieur Painlevé, Minister of War, and others. M. Painlevé afterward told me that he and the President of the Republic had headed the procession while it was passing through the poorer quarters of the city, to test the attitude of the people before they had tasted the enthusiasm which the sight of troops would naturally arouse, and that they had been encouraged by receiving everywhere a cordial and even a hearty reception. Nevertheless, I could plainly see the evidences of nervousness amongst the French officials—a nervousness which grew more intense as the military parade approached. It was somewhat relieved as the French soldiers marched by, and were greeted by the hearty cheers of the people. It disappeared entirely when our splendid Americans swung past the reviewing stand. The enthusiasm of the spectators then passed all bounds. To the French officials this approval of the populace meant relief from a heart-breaking anxiety: to us Americans who stood with them it was an occasion for patriotic pride. To see the flag of our young nation in this old capital of Europe, and behind it those two thousand splendid examples of our young manhood, so erect in carriage, and so lithe in motion—their faces so eager and intelligent—their whole bearing so proudly representative of the millions that were to follow them, and to see how much their presence meant to rulers and people alike—all this made a picture that filled us with happiness. The effect upon the French nation was instantaneous and electrical. From despair, they changed overnight to fresh hope and confidence. Though they then only hoped for one third of a million reinforcements within a year, and little dreamed of the marvel which was actually performed of bringing two million men speedily to France, they were nevertheless enthusiastic over the prospect. Responsible Frenchmen urged me to advise President Wilson to assert himself at once as the leader of the whole alliance against Germany; and responsible Britons soon afterward added that they, as well as the French, would welcome a unified control of the Allies’ political policy with President Wilson in command. I think it profoundly significant, in view of the later course of events, that the European nations thus early conceded the necessity that Americans should lead.
I was still further informed of the real thoughts of the French officials when a few days later I dined with Painlevé, who spoke with deep appreciation of the help which America was beginning now to extend. He spoke quite freely of the recent disaffection that had come among the French people after three years of terrible fighting andheavy losses, and with gratification of the change that had come over public opinion with the arrival of the American troops. He covered at length the dangerous situation on the Russian front, the blunder committed at the beginning of the war in the failure of the Entente fleet properly to pursue theGoebenand theBreslau, the capture of which would have kept Turkey out of the war and spared them the difficult problem of the Balkans. He discussed also the difficulties of the French in governing their colonies and dependencies; and, with special significance, he declared that negotiations for peace with Germany could not be commenced before the complete evacuation of all the territory then occupied by the enemy.
Painlevé was especially solicitous regarding our ability to solve the problem of transportation of men and munitions to France. He was concerned over our ability to drill into a real army more than two hundred and fifty thousand men within a year. He asked eagerly about President Wilson’s character, especially whether I thought he had the determination which, now that we had entered the war, would cause him to see it through with energy. He feared, from the hesitancy that we had displayed before entering, that we might be planning a lukewarm effort. He was delighted when I assured him of the iron resolution of President Wilson, and of the habit of the American people, once aroused, to see a fight through to the finish.
In the course of that evening (Saturday), he asked me whether I had posted myself on the military conditions in France. I told him I had projected a trip to the British front, and was only waiting for the arrangements to be completed. He asked me whether I would not like to see something else in the meantime, and I replied that I should like very much to see the French front, and especially to visit the parts of Alsace which the Frenchhad at last reunited to France. He was somewhat taken aback when, having asked me when I should like to go, I replied on the following Monday. Nevertheless, he proved himself possessed of a capacity for prompt action and execution. At ten o’clock on Monday morning, there appeared at my hotel a very dapper French officer. He saluted, introduced himself as Captain Jaubert of General Headquarters, and added: “At your command. I am to accompany you on your mission—your visit to the front.” A few moments later, a heavy-set, very intelligent-looking man, in the garb of a chauffeur, presented himself, likewise came to attention, saluted, and informed us that the car was ready. Shortly thereafter, we were on our way.
Our party consisted of Captain Jaubert, my old friend Schmavonian of the American Embassy at Constantinople, Professor Herbert Adams Gibbons, and myself. Our first objective was Gondrecourt, the camp and headquarters of the then tiny American Expeditionary Force. Our route took us through that part of the battlefield of the Marne which was nearest to Paris, and as we sped along, Jaubert explained to us, by means of sketches traced on the window glass with his forefinger, the tactics of that battle.
Arrived at Gondrecourt, we saw a splendid sight. Here were American boys in American uniform, with American automobiles and other equipment. It gave us a keen sense of home. Captain Jaubert, whom I had by this time discovered to be not only a captain but a marquis, and a nephew of the Duke of Montebello, soon located the headquarters of General Sibert. We were here invited to dine with General Ponydreguin, the commander of the famous “Blue Devils,” a very charming gentleman. He commanded the French troops in this neighbourhood, as General Sibert commanded the Americans. After dinner, we adjourned to the camp headquarters, which Ifound these two gentlemen shared. As neither spoke the other’s language, it was amusing to see them, while using an interpreter to converse with each other, carry through the French politenesses of direct conversation, smiling at each other, and bowing and courtesying, General Sibert especially finding it difficult to accommodate his rather formal American manner to the livelier conventions of Continental usage.
After a tour of inspection, on the following morning, of the interesting activities of the camp, we proceeded on our way to Domremy, the birthplace of Joan of Arc, where I wished to visit the church, which is a shrine to her memory. By this time I had discovered not only that my escort was a marquis, but, more surprising, that our chauffeur had been in private life a member of the Paris Bourse. The car in which we were riding belonged to him, and he had volunteered to do his bit for his country by putting the car at the Government’s service, and offering himself as its chauffeur. Captain Jaubert, in accordance with military traditions of discipline, had treated him, a mere sergeant, as impersonally as if he were another piece of the car’s mechanism. When we drew up at Joan of Arc’s Chapel, and dismounted to enter, I saw by his expression that he was as eager as I to see the interior of this famous shrine. The yearning look on his face, as he stood before the portals, which an absurd military convention forbade him to enter in company with us, who were no better than he, was too much for me to withstand. I asked Captain Jaubert to relax the rigours of discipline for the moment, and allow him to accompany us. The Captain acquiesced with characteristic French politeness, though I suspected he did not especially relish it; but the chauffeur’s appreciation was sufficient recompense for whatever slight damage was done to military tradition. The Captain himself had a fair grievance against militaryfate: he was a graduate of St. Cyr and had resigned from the army during the Dreyfus episode, with the result that he had had to reënter the army as a captain, while most of his classmates at the Military School were at least colonels and many of them generals.
That night we reached Thann. We arrived about nightfall, and were met at the town boundary by the Mayor. He invited us to spend the night with him at his suburban home, as it was not safe for us to sleep in the town. I was ushered into the best room in his house, and found that the mirror in the bathroom, as well as the tub, was almost demolished. The Mayor explained that this damage had been done during the week, and that he had not had time to repair it. The next day was a great Catholic holiday, Assumption Day, and we were invited to attend the services at the church of St. Theobald. This spectacle was intensely interesting, because the parents of these people, though French by origin and sympathy, had been compelled by the Germans to rear their children in the German tongue, and consequently, though the first sermon of the celebration was delivered in French by a chaplain of the French army, a second sermon was then delivered in German by an old abbé. The French general explained to me that he saw no reason why he should deprive the inhabitants of the town of their religious comfort simply because they could not understand French.
At one o’clock we were entertained at the hotel by the two oldest inhabitants and most respected citizens of the town, Messieurs Weber and Groshents. At this luncheon they paid me one of the most touching compliments I have ever received in my life. They were men of about seventy. Both had been of age during the Franco-Prussian War, and both had continued throughout the forty-three years of the German occupation, since that war, tobe unconquerably French in their patriotism. During the luncheon, while the conversation was lagging, owing to my insufficient knowledge of French, the two old men whispered to each other for a few minutes, and then one of them, Mr. Weber, turned to me, and said in German: “We have just released each other from the vows we made in 1871, that we would never again speak German in public. But we want to enjoy your company and we want so much to hear you talk to us, that we think we are justified in suspending our agreement.”
We then had a most delightful conversation. Mr. Weber told me how, in 1871, he had taken the French flag which had flown over the City Hall until the German occupation, and secreted it in the back of a sofa in his parlour, and how he had taken the flag staff and hidden it in his garret. Then, when the French entered the town in 1914, he ripped open the sofa, took out the flag, fastened it back on its staff, and at seventy years of age had proudly presented it to President Poincaré in celebration of the return of Alsace to France.
Leaving these delightful old gentlemen and their quaint city of Thann, we motored southward. At dinner next evening we were entertained by the Mayor of Mazevant, Count de Witt Guizot. After a very pleasant evening with him, and as we were about to take our leave, I inquired if he were related to Francis P. G. Guizot, the famous historian. He smiled, and replied: “Slightly; he was my grandfather.”
Another day of interesting travel took us through the Alsatian provinces to Belfort, and there we abandoned the automobile, and returned by train to Paris.
A few days later I had the pleasure of renewing my acquaintance with Marshal Joffre, which I had first made at the civic receptions in New York. I called upon him at his headquarters at the Military School in Paris. Marshal Foch had succeeded him as Commander-in-Chief of the French armies, and Joffre was now engaged chiefly in training staff officers, and in advising the High Command when his judgment was needed in council. The Marshal gave me, with great frankness, his ideas upon what America should do to make effective our military participation in the war.
Immediately after our interview I had a memorandum prepared by the gentleman who acted as my interpreter, from which I have made the following extracts:
In the present warfare there is a most vital need for artillery officers and for general staff officers. The American Department of War must realize this. It is not enough to have the men, the other officers, and even the equipment. The framework of the army is far from being complete or efficacious before you have a sufficient number of trained artillery and general staff officers. In order to train these officers for active field service, they should be sent to France. They can at once be sent to the front where for a week or two they can see the work done there. The general staff officers can then attend courses in the general staff school, and the artillery officers can be attached to French artillery regiments until they are thoroughly familiarized with the work.Besides the artillery and general staff officers, the Marshal advises to send in turns a certain number out of the two hundred newly promoted American generals to join the French divisions, army corps, or armies where they can obtain very valuable practical information most useful to them when they take over commands in the field.The Marshal said that he had something very delicate to add. He had come to know that in America there was a certain class of officers whom he would call “the old officers”—those who would like to see all promotions and appointments made solely on the basis of seniority. Between these old officers, and the younger officers, the Marshal understood, there was or there might be friction. The Marshal said that in an emergency like the present the things to be taken into consideration are efficiency and ability. When he took over the command, the same question came up in France. The Marshal did not hesitate to drop from the ranks a large number of officers and to appoint in their stead younger and more capable men, without takinginto consideration the seniority of the former. Without clearly stating it, the Marshal very delicately left the impression that in his opinion politics should play no part in military appointments.The Marshal said that twice he had Mr. Roosevelt next to him at dinner in America. Mr. Roosevelt seemed anxious to come to France with some volunteers and fight against the Germans, and he (Mr. Roosevelt) would be satisfied by being only second in command under a general. Marshal Joffre was not of the opinion that the realization of Mr. Roosevelt’s plan could be of great service and therefore desired to dissuade him from attempting to carry out his plan. So the Marshal told Mr. Roosevelt, “My Colonel, whatever you may be, you cannot be second!”In recapitulating, the Marshal said, “Do not wait until you are entirely readyin America. You should not attempt to act before you are ready, but there are things which you can do at once by degrees, little by little, while you are preparing yourselves. Send officers to be instructed for the artillery and General Staff services, send some generals, and put them at once in contact with our generals at the front. Let a regiment or a battalion go to the trenches. From time to time send some men over.” The Marshal’s idea seemed to be that while the main preparation and equipment should be carried out in America, some men and officers should be sent over for instruction in France, and the arrival from time to time of men and officers would create a favourable impression on the minds of the French who would see that America was doing something.The Marshal spoke very highly of General Pershing.
In the present warfare there is a most vital need for artillery officers and for general staff officers. The American Department of War must realize this. It is not enough to have the men, the other officers, and even the equipment. The framework of the army is far from being complete or efficacious before you have a sufficient number of trained artillery and general staff officers. In order to train these officers for active field service, they should be sent to France. They can at once be sent to the front where for a week or two they can see the work done there. The general staff officers can then attend courses in the general staff school, and the artillery officers can be attached to French artillery regiments until they are thoroughly familiarized with the work.
Besides the artillery and general staff officers, the Marshal advises to send in turns a certain number out of the two hundred newly promoted American generals to join the French divisions, army corps, or armies where they can obtain very valuable practical information most useful to them when they take over commands in the field.
The Marshal said that he had something very delicate to add. He had come to know that in America there was a certain class of officers whom he would call “the old officers”—those who would like to see all promotions and appointments made solely on the basis of seniority. Between these old officers, and the younger officers, the Marshal understood, there was or there might be friction. The Marshal said that in an emergency like the present the things to be taken into consideration are efficiency and ability. When he took over the command, the same question came up in France. The Marshal did not hesitate to drop from the ranks a large number of officers and to appoint in their stead younger and more capable men, without takinginto consideration the seniority of the former. Without clearly stating it, the Marshal very delicately left the impression that in his opinion politics should play no part in military appointments.
The Marshal said that twice he had Mr. Roosevelt next to him at dinner in America. Mr. Roosevelt seemed anxious to come to France with some volunteers and fight against the Germans, and he (Mr. Roosevelt) would be satisfied by being only second in command under a general. Marshal Joffre was not of the opinion that the realization of Mr. Roosevelt’s plan could be of great service and therefore desired to dissuade him from attempting to carry out his plan. So the Marshal told Mr. Roosevelt, “My Colonel, whatever you may be, you cannot be second!”
In recapitulating, the Marshal said, “Do not wait until you are entirely readyin America. You should not attempt to act before you are ready, but there are things which you can do at once by degrees, little by little, while you are preparing yourselves. Send officers to be instructed for the artillery and General Staff services, send some generals, and put them at once in contact with our generals at the front. Let a regiment or a battalion go to the trenches. From time to time send some men over.” The Marshal’s idea seemed to be that while the main preparation and equipment should be carried out in America, some men and officers should be sent over for instruction in France, and the arrival from time to time of men and officers would create a favourable impression on the minds of the French who would see that America was doing something.
The Marshal spoke very highly of General Pershing.
Two days before my conversation with Marshal Joffre, I had arranged a dinner in honour of General Pershing. On the morning of that day, however, I received a letter from his secretary postponing the engagement. It read as follows:
American Expeditionary ForceOffice of the Commanding GeneralSaturday, August 18, 1917.My dear Mr. Morgenthau:General Pershing has requested me to inform you that much to his regret he will be unable to dine with you and Mrs. Morgenthau this evening. The General has had an engagement of long standing totake a particular trip with General Petain when the latter was able to arrange it. This morning General Petain has just sent General Pershing word that he has made all arrangements for them to leave this afternoon. So under the circumstances the General hopes you will understand why he is unable to be with you this evening.Very sincerely,W. C. Eustis,Secretary.
American Expeditionary ForceOffice of the Commanding GeneralSaturday, August 18, 1917.
My dear Mr. Morgenthau:
General Pershing has requested me to inform you that much to his regret he will be unable to dine with you and Mrs. Morgenthau this evening. The General has had an engagement of long standing totake a particular trip with General Petain when the latter was able to arrange it. This morning General Petain has just sent General Pershing word that he has made all arrangements for them to leave this afternoon. So under the circumstances the General hopes you will understand why he is unable to be with you this evening.
Very sincerely,W. C. Eustis,Secretary.
When we met at dinner, four days later, the true meaning of this letter was revealed. General Pershing explained that “his engagement of long standing to take a particular trip,” when translated, meant that General Petain had promised him to let him witness the battle at Verdun the first time active operations were resumed there. On the morning of our first appointment, General Petain had sent General Pershing word to come to Verdun at once, and Pershing had, of course, cancelled all conflicting engagements, and left for the front. He described to us what he had seen at Verdun, and spoke with the eloquence and enthusiasm of a boy who has just seen his first Big League game of baseball. Pershing gave us a vivid picture of a modern battle. He had accompanied General Petain to an observation dugout, where they could see the battle through the telescopes, as well as keep in touch with its multitudinous operations by telephone. The General in command of the division at this point was receiving messages from all parts of the battlefield, and transmitting them to Petain. Word would come that X had taken another hill, and Petain would tell him to hold it or to move on, making his decisions for the various parts of the battlefield in accordance with his general plan of military action.
General Pershing was especially interested in a double coincidence of this visit. The Division Commander in the dugout was General Gouraud. Oddly enough, GeneralGouraud had been the French military attaché in Tokio when Pershing was American attaché at the same point. In the dugout they fell to comparing notes on their experiences together in Japan in 1905. General Pershing recalled that one of their acquaintances there had been the German attaché, whom they had both detested. “By the way,” he inquired of Gouraud, “what has become of that little German, Von Etzel, that we used to know in Tokio?” “Come here,” Gouraud replied, “and look through this telescope. That is Von Etzel’s army retreating.”
Three days later, my eagerly anticipated trip to the British front was undertaken. Schmavonian again accompanied me. Lord Esher, who had arranged this trip for me on behalf of the British, introduced to me Captain Townroe of the British General Headquarters Staff, a fine, determined gentleman, who had been the private secretary of Lord Derby during the recruiting period in England and was the author of a popular play called “Nations at War.” General Pershing had kindly designated Captain Quekemeyer, then as now his personalaide, to accompany us as an American representative. They first escorted us to an old château occupying the land where the battle of Agincourt was fought. First we visited two American regiments of engineers. It was a great revelation to see how two or three West Point officers had been able to whip into perfect shape 1,200 civilians and out of them to create splendid regiments. General Biddle escorted me to their headquarters, and we reviewed the regiments. We then went to Roisel where we visited the 12th U. S. Engineers. They were just making camp. Their colonel apologized for the chaotic condition of affairs. I kept looking at him, thinking that I had met him before. At length I made a few inquiries of him as to his antecedents, and where I could have met him, when suddenly, having penetrated through the years
Mr. Morgenthau as one of the group of financiers, doctors, and sociologists who organized the international association of Red Cross societies at Cannes in 1919
Mr. Morgenthau as one of the group of financiers, doctors, and sociologists who organized the international association of Red Cross societies at Cannes in 1919
Mr. Morgenthau as one of the group of financiers, doctors, and sociologists who organized the international association of Red Cross societies at Cannes in 1919
which had left its marks upon him, it dawned upon me that this man, Colonel C. M. Townsend, was the same Townsend that had attended the College of the City of New York with me in 1870, and we had not seen each other once in the ensuing forty-seven years! This was one of the most remarkable feats that my memory ever surprised me with.
When we returned to the château that evening, our genial host, Colonel Roberts, introduced us to a number of British writers who had arrived that day. Lovat Fraser, then leading editor of the LondonTimes; C. J. Beattie, the night editor of theDaily Mail; L. Cope Crawford, of the LondonMorning Post; H. B. Tourtel, of theDaily Express; Sydney Low, and a few others. After supper, we sat in the parlour in the old château, with its engravings by Wilkie on the walls, and the old furniture, etc., and were reminded that it was right on the battlefield of Agincourt. I listened to Sydney Low’s story of his writing “The Conquest of Attila,” who was assisted in his war by the Ostrogoths (Austrians) and opposed by the Franks, Visigoths, etc., and how Attila had said that God would help him to destroy the Christians, and he would be a scourge to them and sack their cities, or, as Low put it, “just like Emperor William, who told his army to act like the Huns, and they are doing it.”
Another evening, we had discussions with some of the British labour leaders, who had come over to visit the front under the direction of Mr. J. E. Baker of the Ministry of Munitions. They were amazed when I told them that it was ridiculous to think that democracy could be established in a few years. They were really surprised to think that twenty-five years was inadequate to reform the world.
Another evening, Colonel Roberts asked me whether he could invite Major Tibbetts who was then in commandof Tank Town, which they called the headquarters of the Tank Corps in that neighbourhood, as the Major was very anxious to meet me. I told him I had never heard of the Major, but that I should be very glad to meet him. It turned out that Major Tibbetts was in command of one of the landing parties at the Dardanelles and that he was most desirous to ascertain what took place on the Turkish side of the lines at that time. So here we sat in France and completely dovetailed our two stories into each other. He told me of his experiences—how he, with his party, had reached the cliffs, and had to dig themselves in, and the Turks were pushing them hard, while the British ships were attacking the Turks on the beach, and they were suspended between the two fires, totally ignorant of the actual state of affairs, while we in Constantinople were wondering why those two detachments had not coöperated. He explained it, but as his explanation was rather confidential, I do not care to repeat it.
One day, General Charters, who was in charge of the Intelligence Department, came to see me, and asked me whether I was perfectly satisfied with my programme. I looked at him quizzically and said: “Satisfied? Yes. Perfectly? No.” He said: “What else do you want?” I told him that I had heard so much recently of the activities of Sir Arthur Currie, that I was anxious to meet him. He told me that it was impossible, as General Currie was then conducting the attack on Lens. I said to him: “Look here, General, when I took charge of British affairs in Constantinople, and found that the secretaries and clerks were much inclined promptly to say ‘No’ to all requests from British citizens, I promulgated Order No. 1, which was, that no one but myself could say ‘No’ to any request from any citizen of any country whose affairs we had taken charge of, and, furthermore, that I would not say ‘No’ unless I had firstreceived a ‘No’ from the Grand Vizier, or from the State Department in Washington.”
General Charters said: “I am on, sir,” and left the room. He came back in twenty minutes, and said: “Sir Arthur Currie most cordially invites you to lunch with him to-morrow at one o’clock.” I said: “Accepted with great pleasure; but tell me, how did you do it?” He said: “I called up Sir Douglas Haig, and told him your story. He called up Sir Arthur Currie, and the invitation was, as you see, promptly extended.”
Rather than repeat from memory the very interesting interview I had with Sir Arthur, I shall quote verbatim from the diary which I kept at the time, giving my impressions as they were written fresh at the moment:
August 25, 1917. Received by Currie, a fine, tall, well-set, calm, determined man. He was anxious to make sure of our names. Even there he showed his thoroughness. We repeated our names and handed him our cards. We were presented to his staff, Generals Radcliffe and Sinclair, Prince Arthur of Connaught, etc., and went straight to lunch, “hot curry,” liver and bacon, rice pudding, salad and fruit, being served. We discussed Turkish conditions, the price of land there, etc., Currie saying that their expected land grants would hardly be appreciated. We also discussed general affairs of war, Radcliffe and Connaught joining in the conversations, as they were anxious for facts about the Dardanelles and Bagdad.After luncheon, the General took us into his office from two to three o’clock. We talked of warfare, the battle of Lens while it was in progress. He said that he still had in his corps men who were very proud of their victorious record and tried to live up to it. He spoke fairly freely, and explained his method of leap-frog attack, laying great stress upon a full knowledge of the enemy’s position and strength, etc., when about to make an attack. His command had never failed to get their objective and retain it. Example of spirit of men: Two units who after capturing a height and then a quarry were driven out of latter and he was wondering what to do and studying the situation, when he heard that the men without waiting for orders, of their own initiative, attacked the quarry again, regainedit, and are now in possession of it. Currie bemoaned an accident to his ankle which he had sprained playing Badminton. He disliked going amongst men who were real casualties, while his injury was caused by a game. He favours reserving and using different and fresh troops for repelling counter-attacks and attributes much of his success to this policy. He has strong common sense. His men coöperate. Artillery answered S. O. S. call in thirty seconds, and thus helped to relieve infantry promptly. He favours light railways which he has greatly extended in this section. Carries two thousand tons a day on them instead of expected one hundred and fifty tons. Spirit of victory induces Smith, R. R. engineer, if requested by Jones Chief Gunner for more shells to make special tripsanshesitation. Canadians originated raiding trenches without capturing them.When complimented on calmness amidst storm, etc., as several generals and flyers were waiting outside to report and for conference for further action in battle in progress, he evidently was totally absorbed and enjoying our talk. He said: “The Great God has given me this calm nature, which prevents my becoming excited, and I use it to study everything which I think will help to lick the Boche.”He showed great confidence in the final issue of the war, and was delighted with the U. S. entry into it, and said: “I do not believe that God or Fate has brought English-speaking people together intending them to lose.” He objected to Canadians being treated patronizingly by the British, and he said: “England doesn’t want it, why should we? We are not fighting for England, but for the British Empire of which we are a part, and which we want perpetuated, and we are fighting for our skins.” He insisted upon the imperative need of a G. O. C. [General Officer Commanding] having undisputed and untrammelled power to send home incompetent officers and disregarding political influences. Men should only be sent against enemies with good leaders. It is strange all the generals speak of the Germans as “he” and “him.”Canada is provided with clothing and food by England. It pays them for everything. He recognized that the United States could not have entered earlier, as their people were not favourable. Hoped the U. S. would profit by their experience and avoid their mistakes. “The lessons of the war should teach the U. S. how to use their great power to advantage and secure permanent victory and peace.” He said he knew a great deal about the U. S., as he lived in Vancouver, and was a National Guardsman, colonel of a regiment, then had a brigade, a division, and now a corps.After our talk, we entered his Rolls Royce, and went to Vimy Ridge accompanied by G. S. O. No. 3 of the Corps, a fine intelligent fellow. We walked eight hundred yards over a long row of slats laid down for King George who made the same trip, and after passing through a trench, reached an observation tower. It had an opening about 8 ft. wide and was 20 inches in height, and was used by a sergeant and two assistants. Had powerful glasses and maps showing the country. We could see the Battle of Lens in its progress. The ground around it was pock-marked with shells. The panorama of the fight was thrilling to behold. It gave an impression of the enormity of the task to make any progress at all. We wore steel helmets and carried our gas masks with which we had practised in the auto, as we were well in the danger zone. Some shells dropped within 400 yards of us. The N. C. O. [non-commissioned officer] in charge pointed out some Boches running on the streets of Lens and also corpses lying in little gray heaps. Sixty-pounders and other shells were being hurled through the air above us right into Lens and Mericourt and in return the Germans were firing on Vimy. Two airplanes were flying right over the battlefield, with German shells exploding several hundred feet below them.
August 25, 1917. Received by Currie, a fine, tall, well-set, calm, determined man. He was anxious to make sure of our names. Even there he showed his thoroughness. We repeated our names and handed him our cards. We were presented to his staff, Generals Radcliffe and Sinclair, Prince Arthur of Connaught, etc., and went straight to lunch, “hot curry,” liver and bacon, rice pudding, salad and fruit, being served. We discussed Turkish conditions, the price of land there, etc., Currie saying that their expected land grants would hardly be appreciated. We also discussed general affairs of war, Radcliffe and Connaught joining in the conversations, as they were anxious for facts about the Dardanelles and Bagdad.
After luncheon, the General took us into his office from two to three o’clock. We talked of warfare, the battle of Lens while it was in progress. He said that he still had in his corps men who were very proud of their victorious record and tried to live up to it. He spoke fairly freely, and explained his method of leap-frog attack, laying great stress upon a full knowledge of the enemy’s position and strength, etc., when about to make an attack. His command had never failed to get their objective and retain it. Example of spirit of men: Two units who after capturing a height and then a quarry were driven out of latter and he was wondering what to do and studying the situation, when he heard that the men without waiting for orders, of their own initiative, attacked the quarry again, regainedit, and are now in possession of it. Currie bemoaned an accident to his ankle which he had sprained playing Badminton. He disliked going amongst men who were real casualties, while his injury was caused by a game. He favours reserving and using different and fresh troops for repelling counter-attacks and attributes much of his success to this policy. He has strong common sense. His men coöperate. Artillery answered S. O. S. call in thirty seconds, and thus helped to relieve infantry promptly. He favours light railways which he has greatly extended in this section. Carries two thousand tons a day on them instead of expected one hundred and fifty tons. Spirit of victory induces Smith, R. R. engineer, if requested by Jones Chief Gunner for more shells to make special tripsanshesitation. Canadians originated raiding trenches without capturing them.
When complimented on calmness amidst storm, etc., as several generals and flyers were waiting outside to report and for conference for further action in battle in progress, he evidently was totally absorbed and enjoying our talk. He said: “The Great God has given me this calm nature, which prevents my becoming excited, and I use it to study everything which I think will help to lick the Boche.”
He showed great confidence in the final issue of the war, and was delighted with the U. S. entry into it, and said: “I do not believe that God or Fate has brought English-speaking people together intending them to lose.” He objected to Canadians being treated patronizingly by the British, and he said: “England doesn’t want it, why should we? We are not fighting for England, but for the British Empire of which we are a part, and which we want perpetuated, and we are fighting for our skins.” He insisted upon the imperative need of a G. O. C. [General Officer Commanding] having undisputed and untrammelled power to send home incompetent officers and disregarding political influences. Men should only be sent against enemies with good leaders. It is strange all the generals speak of the Germans as “he” and “him.”
Canada is provided with clothing and food by England. It pays them for everything. He recognized that the United States could not have entered earlier, as their people were not favourable. Hoped the U. S. would profit by their experience and avoid their mistakes. “The lessons of the war should teach the U. S. how to use their great power to advantage and secure permanent victory and peace.” He said he knew a great deal about the U. S., as he lived in Vancouver, and was a National Guardsman, colonel of a regiment, then had a brigade, a division, and now a corps.
After our talk, we entered his Rolls Royce, and went to Vimy Ridge accompanied by G. S. O. No. 3 of the Corps, a fine intelligent fellow. We walked eight hundred yards over a long row of slats laid down for King George who made the same trip, and after passing through a trench, reached an observation tower. It had an opening about 8 ft. wide and was 20 inches in height, and was used by a sergeant and two assistants. Had powerful glasses and maps showing the country. We could see the Battle of Lens in its progress. The ground around it was pock-marked with shells. The panorama of the fight was thrilling to behold. It gave an impression of the enormity of the task to make any progress at all. We wore steel helmets and carried our gas masks with which we had practised in the auto, as we were well in the danger zone. Some shells dropped within 400 yards of us. The N. C. O. [non-commissioned officer] in charge pointed out some Boches running on the streets of Lens and also corpses lying in little gray heaps. Sixty-pounders and other shells were being hurled through the air above us right into Lens and Mericourt and in return the Germans were firing on Vimy. Two airplanes were flying right over the battlefield, with German shells exploding several hundred feet below them.
When I had started on this trip with Sir Douglas Haig as my chief objective, my wife had begged me to ascertain from Sir Douglas why he had not captured Lens. The reader will recall that, at that time, there were constant reports about the Battle of Lens, and it was very puzzling to us that, although the British seemed in complete control of the batteries around Lens, they hesitated about taking the town. Therefore, one of the first questions I put to Sir Douglas when I met him three days after my meeting with Currie, was the one entrusted to me by my wife, and in reply he explained to me that it was more efficacious to use Lens as a means of diminishing the Germans’ unused reserve than to take possession of it.
The full record of my meeting with Sir Douglas Haig, quoted from my diary, is as follows:
Tuesday, August 28, 1917: It rained hard. We left the Château at11A.M.... We had an accident with auto forty minutes from headquarters, were hastily transferred to another car, an open Sunbeam, with torn top which I had to hold down, raining, rushing madly, stopped by R. R. crossing, and once by a long line of troops, but we reached there at 1P.M.Sir Philip Sassoon, M. P., private secretary of Sir Douglas Haig, received us and ushered me into private room of D. H. We talked for ten minutes before, and forty minutes after, lunch, alone; most interesting and instructive. He showed me and explained maps of Ypres, Lens, etc., and lists of German divisions and the steady diminution, since April 15, of their unused reserves which declined from 44 to 5. He said that Germans having concluded that the French were used up and the British unprepared, commenced transporting troops to the Russian front, and among other things he wanted to save Russians, so he ordered attack on Lens and made attack on Ypres. He also wanted to convince Lloyd George and others of his capacity to push back the Germans and settle the war on western front. He thinks it wrong tactics to attempt to secure small victories at Gaza or Bagdad. The war can only be won by attacking the German army. The only place to reach them is at the western front. Germans will never admit or consider themselves defeated even if all their allies are whipped and forsake them. Hence everybody should concentrate attention here. Italians should also help....Thinks Germans are beginning to realize their position and possible defeat and great loss of economic position, and will in October or so offer peace terms, which it will be difficult to have French decline. He begs and urges that no early, incomplete peace be made, now being the day or time of reckoning. He thinks the Germans are much worse off than is known. He is positive that England will hold out until we can come to assist. He says it is unnecessary expense for us to prepare great airplane units, and that shelling German cities will not end war, or shorten it. It is right here, with artillery and infantry and of course a proper amount of airplanes, that work must be done.He believes that the U. S. is destined to play a very important part, but thinks we must admit it is also self-defense that prompts our actions, and not only the altruistic spirit. He said the French were not ready at Havre to receive U. S. troops, and it would be much more effective if U. S. troops joined them and received their hints in good English which they understood. He is pleased that U. S. troops believe in same system of warfare as English, offensive andhitting out and not defensive. He explained their method of attacking, their intention only to move far enough each time to secure a height and drive the Germans from points of advantage and be prepared for counter attacks and each time absorb some German divisions. Lays great stress on gradual diminution of German unused reserve division.Engineers built 600 miles of standard and narrow-gauge railroads. They have 600 locomotives and 6,000 cars. Shortage of freight cars was great handicap. They took old rails from England, South America, and U. S. to build these lines. He hopes we will send more railroad men and engineers. Quick transporting of men and material greatest help. He thinks war has at last given Great Britain an empire and hopes it will also give them the U. S. as a permanent ally. War must be won by Great Britain and U. S. jointly. Said their own experience will make them patient with us. Spoke most flatteringly of Pershing and our American troops. Thinks their temperament is so spirited and warlike.... He makes the impression of a determined experienced soldier, who has a well-defined plan which he is sure will lead to victory and wants everyone to adopt it and fight it out here in Flanders. He neither drank nor smoked at lunch.
Tuesday, August 28, 1917: It rained hard. We left the Château at11A.M.... We had an accident with auto forty minutes from headquarters, were hastily transferred to another car, an open Sunbeam, with torn top which I had to hold down, raining, rushing madly, stopped by R. R. crossing, and once by a long line of troops, but we reached there at 1P.M.
Sir Philip Sassoon, M. P., private secretary of Sir Douglas Haig, received us and ushered me into private room of D. H. We talked for ten minutes before, and forty minutes after, lunch, alone; most interesting and instructive. He showed me and explained maps of Ypres, Lens, etc., and lists of German divisions and the steady diminution, since April 15, of their unused reserves which declined from 44 to 5. He said that Germans having concluded that the French were used up and the British unprepared, commenced transporting troops to the Russian front, and among other things he wanted to save Russians, so he ordered attack on Lens and made attack on Ypres. He also wanted to convince Lloyd George and others of his capacity to push back the Germans and settle the war on western front. He thinks it wrong tactics to attempt to secure small victories at Gaza or Bagdad. The war can only be won by attacking the German army. The only place to reach them is at the western front. Germans will never admit or consider themselves defeated even if all their allies are whipped and forsake them. Hence everybody should concentrate attention here. Italians should also help....
Thinks Germans are beginning to realize their position and possible defeat and great loss of economic position, and will in October or so offer peace terms, which it will be difficult to have French decline. He begs and urges that no early, incomplete peace be made, now being the day or time of reckoning. He thinks the Germans are much worse off than is known. He is positive that England will hold out until we can come to assist. He says it is unnecessary expense for us to prepare great airplane units, and that shelling German cities will not end war, or shorten it. It is right here, with artillery and infantry and of course a proper amount of airplanes, that work must be done.
He believes that the U. S. is destined to play a very important part, but thinks we must admit it is also self-defense that prompts our actions, and not only the altruistic spirit. He said the French were not ready at Havre to receive U. S. troops, and it would be much more effective if U. S. troops joined them and received their hints in good English which they understood. He is pleased that U. S. troops believe in same system of warfare as English, offensive andhitting out and not defensive. He explained their method of attacking, their intention only to move far enough each time to secure a height and drive the Germans from points of advantage and be prepared for counter attacks and each time absorb some German divisions. Lays great stress on gradual diminution of German unused reserve division.
Engineers built 600 miles of standard and narrow-gauge railroads. They have 600 locomotives and 6,000 cars. Shortage of freight cars was great handicap. They took old rails from England, South America, and U. S. to build these lines. He hopes we will send more railroad men and engineers. Quick transporting of men and material greatest help. He thinks war has at last given Great Britain an empire and hopes it will also give them the U. S. as a permanent ally. War must be won by Great Britain and U. S. jointly. Said their own experience will make them patient with us. Spoke most flatteringly of Pershing and our American troops. Thinks their temperament is so spirited and warlike.... He makes the impression of a determined experienced soldier, who has a well-defined plan which he is sure will lead to victory and wants everyone to adopt it and fight it out here in Flanders. He neither drank nor smoked at lunch.
From our luncheon with Sir Douglas Haig we returned at once to Paris. My diary for the next day contains the following:
Wednesday, August 29, 1917: Called at headquarters. Saw Col. Harbord, and then General Pershing.... Harbord told me French put Americans south of them and not next to English, because they, themselves, wanted to be defending Paris and did not want foreigners to determine destiny of France. It sounds plausible. He again suggested a visit from Baker, who could then talk more convincingly to Americans and would understand needs. Pershing told me that every sinew of his muscles, every artery leading to his heart, and all his energy and hours are devoted to working for success. He again expressed hope of United States fighting to the end. He spoke of needs of dockage for the ships, thinks it will require 30 to 40. Feels we need our own locomotives and cars to send men, etc., to front; claims our camps will be so located that we can send men to any part of lines. Shipping is needed to bring men over, and thentheir food and ammunition. He says nothing can be secured here—all must come over. Hopes seized German ships will answer; if not we should insist upon Allied ships, including Japan and Italy. It will take fully a year before we can be of much actual assistance.
Wednesday, August 29, 1917: Called at headquarters. Saw Col. Harbord, and then General Pershing.... Harbord told me French put Americans south of them and not next to English, because they, themselves, wanted to be defending Paris and did not want foreigners to determine destiny of France. It sounds plausible. He again suggested a visit from Baker, who could then talk more convincingly to Americans and would understand needs. Pershing told me that every sinew of his muscles, every artery leading to his heart, and all his energy and hours are devoted to working for success. He again expressed hope of United States fighting to the end. He spoke of needs of dockage for the ships, thinks it will require 30 to 40. Feels we need our own locomotives and cars to send men, etc., to front; claims our camps will be so located that we can send men to any part of lines. Shipping is needed to bring men over, and thentheir food and ammunition. He says nothing can be secured here—all must come over. Hopes seized German ships will answer; if not we should insist upon Allied ships, including Japan and Italy. It will take fully a year before we can be of much actual assistance.
A few days later, I sailed for America to make my report to President Wilson. It was my intention, upon my arrival in New York, to make this report in the form of a letter, and with this idea in mind, while still aboard ship, I wrote several drafts of it by hand, and in New York dictated a letter in final form to the President under date of September 15, 1917. I finally decided, however, that a verbal report was better, and consequently, I proceeded to Washington, and on September 19th, called on the President. I gave him at considerable length the information I had gathered. As our conversation, however, was simply a verbal enlargement of my letter of the 15th, I will quote that letter here. It is, I think, of some historical importance: