The Tuchun of Shantung was bulky, coarse-looking. I had some idea of his views on representative government from his inaugural address to the Shantung Assembly. "Gentlemen," the Tuchun said with genial frankness, "you resemble birds who are in a large cage together. If you behave well, and sing songs that are pleasing, we shall feed you; otherwise, you shall have to go without food."
Several of the Tuchuns called on me by appointment, and later I gave them a formal reception, at which I saw all who had come to Peking, observed their personalities, and tried to fathom the source of their personal prominence and power. I talked with them individually and in groups, chiefly about the progress of the war and the relative strength of the combatants. My guests were full of smiles and good cheer, particularly did the Tuchun of Fukien radiate joy. In their sociability they were true Chinese, and here, where they had been received with the military honours due to their position and in the spirit of hospitality, they could show themselves in a more amiable light than when maintaining their power in their provinces. To a brief speech of welcome which I made when they had all arrived General Hsu Shu-cheng replied with a most emphatic expression of friendship for America.
That so many of these governors should have risen from the lowliest position was indeed strong evidence of the underlying democracy of Chinese life. But that a mere handful of men should wield such power, each in his province, did not bespeak strength in representative government.
Some of the military commanders were men of education, although most of them had risen from very modest surroundings: Yen Hsi-shan, of Shansi; Chu Jui, of Chekiang; Tang Chi-yao, of Yunnan; Chen Kuang-yuan, of Kiangsi; Ni Tze-chung, of Anhwei; Li Shun, of Nanking, a fisherman's son; Li Ho-chi of Fukien, Tien Chung-yu of Kalgan, both of middle-class families—all these were fair scholars. General Wu Pei-fu, who rose from the post of a private in the Chino-Japanese War, had through great intelligence and industry acquired a good education, as likewise had General Feng Yu-hsiang; both of these generals professed the Christian religion. President Feng Kuo-chang came of a poor family, and as a young man played a fiddle in a small local theatre.
Among the other Tuchuns were many to whom the Chinese applied the proverb: "A good man will never become a soldier." These men, indeed, deserve credit for having risen from their original state as coolies, bandits, or horse-thieves, but they often owe their prominence to qualities which by no means make for the good of the state. Chang Tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria, commenced his career as a bandit; he was pardoned by Chao Er-shun, and became a government officer. Chang Huai-chi was a coolie, and never got much education. Tsao Kun, of Chihli, was a huckster. Wang Chan-yuan was a hostler. The trio, Chang Hsun, Lu Yung-ting, and Mu Yung-hsing, headed the so-called Black Flag Band; at one time the partners put up fifty thousand taels to enable Chang Hsun to buy himself an office and become respectable. But he spent it all in high living. With the antecedents of some of these men one marvels not only at the position they have acquired, but at the personal polish and air of refinement of many of them.
All of them dealt with political power as a commodity, secured through the use of money and soldiers. They were somewhat like thecondottieriof the Italian renaissance, looking ahead only to the goal of their personal ambition for wealth and power. Even among these militarists, however, there were those who gave some attention to matters of public policy, and the idea of national welfare and unity hadbegun to dawn upon their consciousness. Moreover, in them I felt a mixture of the old and the new. They had suddenly come into great power, thought in terms of airplanes and modern armaments, but had as yet few other modern ideas to inspire their action with anything beyond personal motives. In their human qualities, however, several of them excelled; and some, even, showed a real spirit of public service and ability as administrators.
The Japanese Government was still trying to get China into the war, and its minister called on President Li to urge it. I talked on May 9th with the President, who said that he favoured a declaration of war provided parliament was not overridden in the process. Then I saw the Premier. "If parliament is obstinate," General Tuan said bluntly, "it will be dissolved."
I told him it would make a very bad impression in the United States and with other Western powers if parliament were ignored in so important a matter. I knew that parliament did not oppose declaring war, but desired to control the war policy. "But," the Premier urged, "the opposition of parliament disregards national interests. It desires merely to secure partisan advantage." Tuan discussed the attitude of Japan. "The Japanese have assured me," he declared, "that if I follow a strong policy I may count on their support. Now circumstances force the Chinese Government to be friendly to Japan. Of course, I will not give up any valuable rights to anybody, and I will strengthen China in every way so that resistance may be offered to any attempted injustice."
Ironically, he asked whether confidence could be placed in the southern leaders of the Kuo Min Tang. "I have proof," he continued, "that both Sun Yat-sen and Tsen Liang-kuang have given written assurances to the Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai that if either of them becomes President of China he will conclude a treaty granting to Japan rights of supervision of military and administrative affairs more extensivethan those sought in Group V of the twenty-one demands." So each party believed the worst of the other.
Events were tending to a climax. The Government was demoralized. Doctor Chen was in prison; Mr. Li Ching-hsi, a nephew of Li Hung-chang, who was to take Chen's place, would not assume office while affairs remained so unsettled. The Ministry of Communications was in charge of an underling. The Minister of Education, who also acted as Minister of the Interior, was seriously ill. The Kuo Min Tang ministers had lost their influence with their party in parliament because of their failure effectively to oppose the Tuchuns' policy. It was believed that the Tuchuns, with the followers of General Tuan, were planning acoupagainst Parliament.
In the midst of this I had a personal chat with Chen Lu, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, at an evening reception at the British Legation. I told him of my surprise that the Tuchuns, instead of attending to the urgent business in their provinces, should be gathered here, interfering with the Central Government. I let it be distinctly understood that any movement to overthrow parliament in order to carry out the war policy could not be expected to receive the sympathy of the United States. The vice-minister was in close touch with the Tuchuns. I expected that he would repeat my remarks to them. He did.
As I was leaving the Chancery a few evenings later Mr. Roy Anderson appeared with the news that something was happening and drove me over to the railway station. We went through the Chenmen gate. Along the main street were many carts rapidly driven, loaded with military stores and household goods. Automobiles were rushing by them to the station. On the platform was a turmoil of troops busily transferring the various military possessions to cars. In a parlour car our friends the Tuchuns were assembling. I left Mr. Anderson there to observe and to get information.
It appeared that the Tuchuns had all of a sudden decidedto leave Peking for their various capitals, taking their bodyguards with them. Two or three were to remain in Tientsin a little longer to watch developments. Their precipitous exit seemed to indicate that President Li had at last got the upper hand.
As a farewell courtesy to Doctor Willoughby, the American legal adviser, the President had invited him and me to luncheon on the following day. President Li was cheerful. The discomfiture of the Tuchuns filled him with glee. "All danger is passed," he announced; "I will dismiss General Tuan, appoint a new cabinet, and have parliament decide the war question without compulsion."
In order to inform myself as to what was behind the President's confidence, I asked him what he had to put in the place of his cabinet and General Tuan, and whether he believed that the Government could be carried on without the concurrence of that important party.
"Oh, yes," the President assured me, "it is all arranged."
Pressing him a little further, and asking upon whom, in particular, he was relying, to my unspeakable surprise, he said: "General Chang Hsun will assist me."
Now General Chang Hsun was an old-time bandit and militarist. His ideas were devoid of any understanding of representative institutions. It passed my power of imagination to see how reliance could be placed in this general for the vindication of parliament. As I looked dubious, the President repeated: "Yes, you may believe me. I can rely on General Chang Hsun."
It was not what Chang Hsun stood for that the President relied on, but on his enmity to General Tuan. Li Yuan-hung, though quite modern in his conception of government, in this instance followed a strong Chinese instinct which aims to prevail by setting off strong individuals against each other.
After I had heard that the dismissal of General Tuan hadbeen announced, General Chin Yun-peng called on me. He was agitated and much worried. "Do you not think that General Tuan should leave Peking?" he asked. "His enemies will undoubtedly wish to take his life."
I tried to cheer him up by telling him that in a modern government such ups and downs must be expected. "Let the other side now develop their policy, and show what they can do; let General Tuan use this time for quiet recuperation, after the strain he has been through. Then," I said, "the time will come again when Tuan will be called back to power." The eyes of the good general lit up with gratitude. General Ni Tze-chung, most notorious and active among the military party, declared on the 26th of May that the dismissal of General Tuan had been illegal. His province of Anhwei disapproved; it would act independently of the Central Government.
This was the crucial point in the development of the situation.
Expert observers said that had the President immediately dismissed Ni and ordered his punishment, appointing a junior commander in his place, the rest of the militarists would have fallen away from Ni, and the President could have dealt with them individually. Instead, he was persuaded to send a conciliatory letter to General Ni.
This, of course, confirmed the leadership of Ni over the military party; further, it encouraged the majority of the Tuchuns to declare their independence.
A so-called provisional government was set up at Tientsin. The older and wiser heads of the military party, men like General Tuan Chi-jui and Mr. Hsu Shih-chang, held themselves entirely aloof from this new organization.
General Ni Tze-chung was the leading spirit. By dint of force the so-called government helped itself to the deposits of the Chinese Government in the Tientsin branch of the Bank of China. The men greatly in evidence were the members ofthe pro-Japanese clique, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin and General Hsu Shu-cheng. General Aoki, the Japanese military adviser to the Government, was also on the ground.
In Peking a paralysis crept over the Government. The President lost his advantage as quickly as he had gained it. On the railways all orders of the Tuchuns for transportation were implicitly obeyed. When at this time the question of the movement of revolutionary troops and their stationing at Tientsin and along the railway came up, the Japanese minister persisted in the position that it would be highly undesirable to make any objection on the ground of any possible conflict with the protection of the railway by foreign troops. Two months before, the Japanese Legation had strongly objected to the stationing of a few government troops along the same railway.
The President issued a mandate inviting Chang Hsun to Peking as arbitrator.
When I interviewed the President, he looked disconsolate His youthful English secretary, Mr. Kuo, tried his best to give a more cheerful and confident note to Li's conversation, but Doctor Tenney, who was with me, easily compared the President's doleful Chinese with the more buoyant English translation.
The plan of the Tuchuns was directed toward isolating and strangling Peking. They controlled the railways leading there, and were preventing the shipment of foodstuffs. The ministry that controlled the railways, it must be remembered, was controlled by Japanese influence. Constitutional government in China was paralyzed through the lack of military and financial authority.
The war issue worried the Chinese. First, they feared that the militarist party would take advantage of it, through the support of Japanese influence, to fasten its hold upon China; second, that China might by the Allies be made a field in which to seek compensations. But if local political troubleshad not entirely upset the situation, it might have been possible to arrange for a joint declaration of the powers that would have allayed suspicion and made it feasible for China to enter the war with a sense of security.
Dr. Wu Ting-fang, acting on the suggestion of Mr. Lenox Simpson and liberal-minded Chinese publicists, made a move to have the American Government do something. He sent advices to Minister Koo in Washington telling him about General Ni and his leadership of the revolt of the Tuchuns. The southern provinces were still loyal to the President and parliament, and the civil and commercial population disapproved of the rebellion. President Wilson and Secretary Lansing were asked to make a statement in behalf of representative government in China. This was followed by a direct appeal to President Wilson.
But the American Government had already instructed me on the 5th of June to communicate to the Chinese Government a statement evincing a sincere desire for internal political harmony. The question of China's entry into the war, it said, was secondary to continuing the political unity of China and the laying aside of factional disputes. I accompanied it orally with a personal statement that the United States conceived the war to be one for the principles of democracy; that it would deplore any construction of its invitation which would lend itself to the idea that it contemplated any coercion or restriction upon Chinese freedom of action. I made plain that no matter how much the United States wished the coöperation of China in the war, it did not desire to bring this about by using the political dissensions or working with any one faction in disregard of parliament.
General Tuan Chi-jui at once stated to Doctor Ferguson, who unofficially informed him of the American note at Tientsin, that he had totally withdrawn from all politics. The Chinese press gave a very favourable reception to the note; the Chinese people welcomed America's advice. GeneralFeng Kuo-chang, later when he had become President, spoke of the note to me, and remarked on the salutary influence it had wielded upon public opinion in China.
While the political dissensions in the Chinese state were too personal to be overcome by any friendly suggestions from the outside, nevertheless the American note had set up a standard for all the Chinese. It had, furthermore, given convincing proof of the fact that the true interests of China were impartially weighed by the American Government, and were not entirely subordinated to any war policy which America might desire to advance. From all parts of China came expressions of gratitude and satisfaction that the American Government should have spoken to China so justly and truly. The Chinese appreciated the spirit of justice of the American Government in not desiring to have the war issue used for the purposes of enabling any faction or party to override the free determination of the Chinese Government and people. As America was itself at war and would therefore have welcomed coöperation, this just policy particularly impressed the Chinese.
The Japanese press both in Japan and China immediately launched forth into a bitter invective against the American action. The United States should have consulted Japan. Its action constituted interference in the domestic affairs of China. "If China listens to advice from America," a Japanese major-general declared in an excited speech at a dinner in Peking on the 7th of June, "she will have Japan to deal with."
The Japanese ambassador at Washington protested informally. Had not Secretary Bryan, in a note dated the 13th of March, 1915, recognized the special and close relations, political and economic, between Japan and China? It was impossible that the American minister at Peking was taking a part in political affairs in China, but the Japanese public was sensitive about the note sent by the AmericanGovernment to China. Would it not be useful if the American Government would confirm Mr. Bryan's statement?
The reply to this communication did not come until the 6th of July. Mr. Bryan's statement, the reply said, referred only to the special relations created by territorial contiguity in certain parts of China. Even with respect to them it in no way admitted that the United States might not in future be justified in expressing itself relative to questions that might arise between China and Japan. The United States could not be indifferent to matters affecting the welfare of the Chinese people, such as the unrest in China.
The first detachments of Chang Hsun's troops arrived in Peking on the 9th of June. Chang Hsun's theory was that it is the business of a trooper to make himself terrible. These wild horsemen, wearing loose-fitting black uniforms, with their cues rolled up on the back of the head, rode about Peking with the air of conquerors. The "Mediator" was coming with sufficient military force to back his judgment.
When General Chang himself arrived, the streets from the railway station to the Mediator's house in the Manchu city were entirely shut off. Mounted troopers blocked the way as my automobile came along a side street to cross one of these thoroughfares. They nearly collided with the front of my machine, drew their guns, and would not budge. To explain to them my right to pass would have meant sending someone to the Foreign Office; even then in order to go on I might have to run over them, for the Foreign Office, undoubtedly, meant nothing at all to them. I told my companion not to let them know my position. We tried to pass through on the ground that we had business on the other side, but they reared their horses up and down, and nearly came into the machine with us. We were held up until the great man had arrived and had raced from the station to his residence.
When I was with Dr. Wu Ting-fang a few days later thecard of a secretary of the cabinet was brought in. I knew that he was trying to induce Doctor Wu to sign a decree dissolving parliament. I had heard in the morning that President Li had finally caved in; for Chang Hsun's first prescription for restoring China was to declare that parliament must be dissolved. The President relied on Chang's assistance. He could not help himself, he must accept the dictation of the man he had summoned.
I rejoined a friend who awaited me outside in the automobile. He had just overheard the chauffeur of the cabinet secretary and the doorman of the Foreign Office. The chauffeur had said: "Is your old man going to sign up? You had better see to it that he does, else something might happen to him."
These subordinates were keeping their eyes open.
The Japanese minister, on whom I called that morning, said to me: "General Chang's mediation is the last hope of peace. It is desirable that parliament be gotten rid of, it is obstructive, and makes the doing of business well-nigh impossible."
Dr. Wu Ting-fang stood out against countersigning the mandate that would dissolve the parliament. In matters of spiritualism, vegetarianism, and longevity, I had perhaps not always been able to take him quite seriously. But I admired his quiet courage in not allowing himself to be bowled over, after even President Li had given in. Before daylight on the 13th of June Doctor Wu was roused from his bed and now asked to countersign a Presidential mandate designating the jovial General Chiang Chao-tsung, commander of the Peking gendarmerie, to act as Premier, and accepting Doctor Wu's resignation. Before daybreak General Chiang signed the mandate dissolving parliament. The President consented to its issue, for he had been told it would be impossible to prevent disturbances in Peking unless this were done.
So wore on the early summer of 1917. Affairs seemed to have arrived at a stalemate.
CHAPTER XXIII
AN EMPEROR FOR A DAY
My family had gone to Peitaiho for the summer. I was staying at the residence alone with Mr. F.L. Belin, who had recently come to Peking to join my staff. I slept rather late on Sunday, July 1st, as the morning was cool. When Kao, the first boy, came in to take orders he appeared excited and cried: "Emperor has come back again!"
I did not immediately grasp the significance of this astonishing announcement; but he went on volubly telling me that it was true, that the Emperor had returned, that all the people were hanging out the yellow dragon flag. I sent out for information and soon learned that the little emperor, in some mysterious way, had been restored during the night.
The monarchical movement came as a complete surprise to everybody, for it was entirely the personal act of General Chang Hsun. The men whose names were recited in his proclamations as assisting him had known nothing about it; it was undreamed of even by those who found themselves forced to assist, such as the Chief of Staff and the heads of the gendarmerie and of the police.
Kang Yu-wei, the "Modern Sage" of China, arrived in Peking on June 29th, and with him the restoration was planned. Kang Yu-wei, who had been the leader of the first reform movement in 1898, when he made a stand against absolutism, had always remained a consistent believer in constitutional monarchy. He encouraged Chang Hsun with philosophical theory, and wrote all his edicts for him. The two believed that the Imperial restoration would immediately bring to the active support of the Government all the militarygovernors, whose true sentiments were notoriously imperialistic. Their consent was taken for granted, and the edicts, as drawn up, expressly assumed that it had been given.
It became known to me that Chang Hsun had also discussed the possibility of an Imperial restoration with the Japanese minister. The latter expressed the opinion that the movement should not be undertaken without first making sure of the assent of the chief military leaders. Chang Hsun had no doubt of this support; he evidently regarded the advice of the Japanese minister as encouraging, and believed that his movement would have diplomatic countenance.
Chang Hsun had his intimate advisers, particularly Kang Yu-wei, draw up the requisite Imperial edicts on the 30th of June. In these it was stated that leading governors, like Feng Kuo-chang, Lu Yung-ting, and others of equal prominence, had petitioned for the restoration of the monarchy. Lists of appointments to the highest positions in the Central Government and the provinces were prepared. The existing military governors were in most cases reappointed. In the Central Government the important men designated were Hsu Shih-chang as Guardian of the Emperor, Liang Tun-yen as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Chu Chi-pao as Minister of the Interior. Wang Shih-chen was retained as Chief of the General Staff.
As an amazing instance of how consent was taken for granted, it was recited in an Imperial edict that President Li Yuan-hung had himself petitioned for the reëstablishment of the Empire; this edict appointed Li a duke of the first class.
So soon as these edicts were prepared and ready for presentation, a dinner was arranged for the evening of the same day, to which the heads of the Peking military and police establishments were invited. They met at the Kiangsu Guild Hall. After great quantities of wine had been consumed, Chang Hsun broached his project for the salvation of China, stating that all preparations had been made and that military and diplomatic support was assured. Then, pointing to the Chief of Staff, he said: "Of course, you are supporting the movement."
General Wang, completely taken aback, saw no way to refuse—since he was in the presence of an accomplished fact. In the same way the consent of General Chiang, head of the gendarmerie, and of General Wu, head of the police, was obtained.
Thus the enterprise was launched. Chang Hsun directed General Wang and four others to proceed immediately to the residence of President Li, to wake him up, and to obtain his consent to a memorial asking for reëstablishment of the monarchy. Chang Hsun himself proceeded to the Imperial City. Not being able to obtain the support of the Imperial dukes for his movement, he had lavishly bribed the eunuchs in charge of the palace, who opened the gates for him and his retinue, and took him to the private residence of the young Emperor. Chang Hsun prostrated himself, and informed the Emperor that the whole nation demanded his return to the throne. Thereupon he took the frightened boy to the great throne room, and, in the presence of his retainers and members of the Imperial Family, who had been summoned, formally enthroned the Emperor. Then the edicts which had been prepared were formally sealed.
As may be imagined, there were some comic incidents. A rather distinguished man had been summoned by the Premier to discuss with the President his assumption of one of the cabinet portfolios. A Chinese friend of mine who had just heard of the restoration saw him at the hotel about ten o'clock in the morning. On being asked what was his errand in Peking, the distinguished personage stated confidentially that he was awaiting a carriage to take him to the President's palace. "There is no President," he was told. "This is now an Empire; the Emperor was enthroned at fouro'clock this morning." The great man's astonishment was amusing.
As the military chiefs were deceived on the preceding night, so Peking was deceived for one day. As the news spread, the population showed an almost joyous excitement. Everywhere the yellow dragon flags appeared, soon the entire city took on a festive appearance. Revived memories of past splendour seemingly made the population of Peking imperialist to a man. But the height of this movement was reached as early as the morning of the 2nd of July.
I had avoided receiving General Chang Hsun. Mr. Liang Tung-yen came to assume office as Minister for Foreign Affairs; I also abstained from seeing him, as well as the rest of General Chang's ministers, asking Doctor Tenney to talk with those who presented themselves. Mr. Liang had always been an imperialist, and was in high spirits, believing that at last China was saved. He had been led to believe that the foreign diplomats would readily recognize the restoration.
Strong doubts as to the character of the movement became manifest on Monday, the 2nd of July. Tuan Chi-jui did not figure in the Imperial official lists. When asked about this, Chang Hsun declared that General Tuan was unimportant, having no troops under his command. But Liang Chi-chao had been playing cards with friends at about 2A.M.on the fateful night, when the news was telephoned to Tientsin. Liang immediately went to General Tuan's residence, where the latter was similarly engaged at cards. General Tuan, who was thoroughly weary of public affairs, was difficult to rouse; he begged to be spared the trouble of thinking of what might be occurring in Peking. More details came in, and it became apparent what a thoroughly one-man affair the movement was. Then Tuan roused himself.
Tuan was at that time actually only a private citizen, without authority or command. But I learned later that Liang Chi-chao had gone to Japanese friends for funds toenlist the military against the Imperial movement, and he got 1,000,000 yen as a loan to himself and General Tuan for this purpose. It was to be treated as a government loan upon restoration of normal conditions.
The two proceeded on Tuesday to Machang, where the Eighth Division had been encamped since the attempt to overawe President Li Yuan-hung. General Tuan, it was stated, felt nervous as to the outcome of his venture, but he called the commanders, declaring that he had always been opposed to a restoration of the monarchy, and that it was now being attempted by a single general. To resist this act he proposed to take command of the republican troops.
General Tuan was at once recognized as commander-in-chief. President Li, on his part, did not yield to the importunities of Chang Hsun. He gave out an absolute denial of the statement that he favoured the restoration. After issuing a mandate that turned over the Presidential powers to the Vice-President and appointed General Tuan Chi-jui Premier and Commander-in-Chief, he took refuge in the Legation Quarter. I sent a personal representative to General Tuan at Tientsin, who declared that he already had complete control of the military situation and could finish Chang Hsun inside of ten days.
As hostilities threatened in and around Peking, and as the danger of looting was always present, I discussed the precautions to be taken with several of my colleagues, and agreed with the Japanese minister that we would each bring a company of reinforcements from Tientsin. Meanwhile, the movements of Tuan's troops began. To hinder their advance, Chang Hsun's men broke the railway at a point about one third of the way from Peking to Tientsin.
Certain members of the diplomatic corps urged that we give notice that no fighting should take place on or near the railways. As we had made no objection to the bringing in of Chang Hsun's troops and to their being stationed in Pekingand along the railway, I took the position that we were not justified in objecting to the troops of the government to which we were accredited taking necessary action against Chang Hsun. We might, however, insist upon the right of keeping the railway open. This met with approval. On the 5th of July a demand was made upon the belligerent generals that the railway must be kept open, and that at least one train be allowed to pass in each direction every day.
The damaged line was reconstructed, and on July 6th, the American infantry arrived in Peking; on the 7th, the first trains travelled between Peking and Tientsin—one train actually passing between the armies during a battle. Fighting went on during these days between the troops of General Tuan, directly commanded by General Tuan Chi-kwei, and Chang Hsun's forces; there was much firing but small loss of life, and the latter's forces were finally driven back toward Peking. The troops of General Tsao Kun also advanced upon Peking from the west.
Mr. Grant, of the National Printing Bureau, on Friday rushed into the legation compound in his automobile, with the report that looting was going on in the southern part of the city. We ascended the wall. From the Chenmen Tower we saw excited groups moving up and down the main streets, but nothing was happening save the bringing in of a few wounded men. To investigate the cause of the excitement I went with Mr. Belin in our private rickshaws to the Chinese city, passing to the end of the broad Chenmen thoroughfare. The street was still crowded, the people were excited though well behaved; the shops all had their shutters up. Near the south end of the street some shopkeepers posted in front of their shops told us that the return of Chang Hsun's troops from outside the walls had been reported. Looting had been expected but had not taken place. We proceeded to the Temple of Heaven, where great crowds were walking about among the tents of the troops.On returning, we entered a shop to look at some antiques, remaining half an hour. When we came out our rickshaws had disappeared. Doctor Ferguson joined us as we searched for our men. Suddenly, Belin shouted to a rickshaw man, who with a dozen others was conveying some of Chang Hsun's petty officers southward. We insisted that the non-commissioned officer occupying the rickshaw get out, and he finally complied.
The rickshaws had been requisitioned by these bandits. Upon our return to the Legation, my rickshaw-runner had just arrived, excited to the point of tears. Our two coolies had drawn the men who originally commandeered them up to the Imperial City; there they were requisitioned again to convey other men back to the Temple of Heaven. But my man, when opposite the entrance to Legation Street, had upset his bandit into the road and made a quick entry into the Legation Quarter, where the angry and sputtering trooper dared not follow him. That the rickshaws belonging to foreigners should thus be pressed into service shows the disregard which these troopers had for everything but their own desires.
As we returned to the Legation we noticed a wonderful colour effect. Coal-black clouds were banked against the western sky, above which were lighter clouds or angry shreds of flaming colour. Against this the dark walls and towers of Peking stood out in sharp relief. In the streets the crowds still surged, in restless expectancy. Suddenly the sunset light disappeared; the sky became black with clouds; a sharp gust of wind whirled the dust of the Chinese city northward; then came a flash of lightning, a clap of thunder, and a heavy downpour, which cooled the excited heads and drove all to shelter. The late afternoon had been weird and fantastic, and appeared to presage the happening of still stranger things.
I was lunching with a friend at his race-course house onSunday, the 8th of July, when word was brought to me that a certain Colonel Hu, coming from Chang Hsun, had persuaded the French minister that the city was in imminent danger of sacking, fighting, and general disturbances. The only salvation, Colonel Hu had said, lay in asking Hsu Shi-chang to come from Tientsin to mediate. The French minister thereupon induced his Entente colleagues to agree to transmit a note to General Tuan Chi-jui urging him to prevail upon Hsu Chi-Chang to come as mediator. This seemed to me ill-advised. It meant, at a time when Chang Hsun was already as good as defeated, that he would be solemnly treated as entitled to dictate the terms and personnel of mediation by influential members of the diplomatic corps. I returned to Peking and saw my colleagues, urging my opinion strongly. The British chargé withdrew his consent; he had just received a telegram from his consul in Tientsin reporting that General Tuan was absolutely opposed to mediation. The action contemplated was not taken, though Chang Hsun persisted in his attempts to gain recognition from the diplomatic corps. The French minister, who hated Dr. Wu Ting-fang—this would explain his support of Chang Hsun—gradually came to see the obverse side of his policy as certain Germanic affiliations of Chang Hsun became known.
Kang Yu-wei presented himself at my house on the 8th, seeking refuge, and I assigned him rooms in one of our compounds. He informed me that Chang Hsun had had full assurances of support on the part of Hsu Chi-Chang and other important monarchists. Next day he informed me that Prince Tsai Tze was anxious to consult me.
I arranged to have the Prince come to the house assigned to Mr. Kang, where I had two hours' conversation with the Manchu and the sage. Kang Yu-wei commenced with a long disquisition on the advantages of a constitutional monarchy. He wished to explain his action and to prove to me that hewas not a reactionary, but was aiming only for progress under the monarchical form, which he considered most suitable to China.
All this time the Prince was silent. He seemed greatly depressed, not inclined to say anything at first. After inquiries about his health, I asked him what he would like to say to me. With eyes of real sadness he looked me full in the face, saying: "What shall we do? My house has been drawn into this affair without our consent. It has been forced on us. We did not wish to depart from the agreements we had made with the Republic. But Chang Hsun would not listen to us. He thought he saw the only way. Now what shall we do?"
I told him that I appreciated the difficulty in which the Imperial Family found itself, but that I of course could not know the details of the situation sufficiently to give any opinion. One thing, however, seemed to me certain: if the leaders of the republican government knew the true attitude of the Imperial Family, and if the Emperor would formally and absolutely dissociate himself from the movement of Chang Hsun, I believed that they would not make the Imperial Family suffer. I asked him whether they had considered having the Emperor issue a decree, absolutely and for all time renouncing all rights to the throne and declaring his complete fealty to the Republic.
The Prince regarded me aghast. "Oh,no! No matter how desirable that might be from many points of view, it is not in the power of the Emperor to do it. The rights he has inherited are not his. They came to him in trust from his ancestors. He will have to maintain them, and hand them on to his descendants. He, and we of his family, shall not do anything to make these rights prevail against the State, but as the sons of our ancestors, we cannot repudiate them."
Never had I been so deeply impressed with the complexityof Chinese affairs as by this answer—an Imperial family maintaining traditions of empire in the midst of a republic, an emperor continuing to reside in the Imperial Palace, a neighbour of the republican President in his residence, and yet no desire to enter again into politics and to grasp the sovereign power! I could now understand why the Chinese had allowed the Emperor to remain in the palace; it was the house of his ancestors, from which he might not be driven. That common reverence was the one point of understanding between Chinese and Manchus.
Prince Tsai Tze evidently still hoped that Hsu Shih-Chang, the loyal friend of the Imperial Family, might be brought to Peking to mediate, and that he might be prevailed upon to preserve the favourable treatment hitherto accorded the Imperial Family. I could not give Prince Tsai Tze any encouragement on this point, on which I had very definite opinions, but had to content myself with general expressions of sincere sympathy with the strange fate of this family.
The question of mediation was again taken up by the diplomatic corps on the afternoon of this day. Some of the ministers feared that the city would suffer greatly if things should be allowed to go on. I was strongly of the opinion that our interference in this matter could have no good result, but would only further confuse and complicate the situation. For once, the Chinese must settle it themselves, regardless of any incidental inconvenience. From what I knew of the strength of the contending forces and of the whole situation, I had no doubt whatsoever that if left alone the republican forces would be easily successful and that there would be no disturbances. I was on principle against any action which would be in substance intervening in behalf of a general who had attacked the Republic and whom nothing could now save from overthrow except such diplomatic action.
I was approached on the 10th of July by a representativeof General Chiang, chief of the gendarmerie. He stated that it was desired to bring Chang Hsun into the American Legation, for his own safety though against his will, and that an agreement to this effect had been made among the different commanders. I stated that in the circumstances it would be better for the diplomatic corps to discuss what protection could be extended to Chang Hsun. An informal meeting was held, at which the British chargé agreed that he would receive Chang Hsun if he were brought in.
The legations were notified by General Tuan, late in the afternoon of July 11th, that during the night the troops would move against Chang Hsun's forces in the city, and bombardment of the Temple of Heaven and the quarters near the Imperial City held by Chang Hsun would begin at dawn on the 12th of July. In conjunction with the commandant of the legation guard, I sent notice to the American residents in the quarters particularly affected, directing them to seek safety. Eighteen refugees came to the Legation, where they were cared for during the day at the Students' Mess. A company of the Fifteenth Infantry, which had been brought up from Tientsin, was encamped in the compound in front of my residence, to which their tents and military equipment imparted an aspect of great military preparedness.
I was awakened at daybreak on July 12th by the sound of artillery and rifle fire. As the fighting commenced people went out of curiosity upon the city wall. But stray bullets frequently fell on the wall, and the commandant ordered it cleared. Unfortunately, several of these onlookers—among them three Americans—were injured. During the battle I received word from the Imperial tutors that the Dowager Empresses were preparing to bring the Emperor to my residence. Since the 9th of July they had wished to remove the Emperor to this legation for safety. While the Empresses and some of the dukes desired this, the eunuchs under Chang Hsun's influence opposed the removal. ThePrince Regent, also influenced by Chang Hsun, took the same view. Thus on various occasions the eunuchs, whose existence had almost been forgotten, came out on the stage of action in this curious affair.
About eleven o'clock, while the firing was at its height and after several bombs had been dropped from aeroplanes upon the Imperial City, telephone messages came to the effect that several friends of the Imperial Family and Doctor Ferguson of the Red Cross were about to rescue the Emperor from danger and bring him to the Legation. I had the house prepared. Half an hour later two automobiles with the Red Cross flag flying entered the legation compound. Mr. Belin ran to the door, expecting to see the Emperor and Empress emerging from the automobiles, but he returned with only Mr. Sun Pao-chi, who was shivering with excitement. I took him to the reception room and comforted him with tea. He still expected the Emperor to come. The automobiles left again for the Imperial Palace, but as the aeroplanes had ceased dropping bombs and the artillery fire was decreasing in violence, the people in the palace decided against carrying out the flight.
As I sat in the library all through the forenoon receiving reports and giving directions, there was a constant hissing of bullets and shells overhead. No shell dropped in our legation, although two or three fell in the British. The Chinese artillery fire was remarkably accurate. Sitting there and listening to the tumult of shouting and firing from the Chenmen gate and the volleys of guns and artillery exceeding in volume of sound any Fourth of July I had ever experienced, I felt thankful to have seen a day when the Chinese would stand up and fight out a big issue. I soon found that the battle was not commensurate with its sound.
Shortly before noon Chang Hsun was brought to the Dutch Legation, accompanied by a German employé of the Chinese police. Chang Hsun had been persuaded to comeby his generals almost with the use of force. He was still under the illusion that he could mediate. When the Dutch minister informed him that this was impossible, he wished to return to his troops. This, of course, could not be permitted.
Firing was violent from dawn until nearly noon. The field guns, machine guns, and rifles filled the air with enormous tumult, but from eleven o'clock on the firing gradually diminished, and it entirely ceased at four in the afternoon. Immediately thereafter I proceeded by motor car to the various centres of fighting. I found that Chang Hsun's house had been struck by several shells and that the indirect artillery firing of the government troops had been managed with considerable accuracy. The human dead had already been removed from the neighbourhood although numerous carcasses of horses remained. Thence I proceeded to the Temple of Heaven, where I was astonished to find Chang Hsun's troops encamped with all their guns and artillery, eating, drinking, and talking in the best of spirits. They told me that five of their men had been killed, and that their bodies were still there. The absence of visible results from the enormous expenditure of ammunition during the day was astonishing. I found, however, that the method of fighting employed by the troops was to creep up as closely as possible behind a high wall, and fire into the air in the general direction where the enemy might be. Hence, the bystanders were in rather greater danger than the combatants themselves. In fact, the total number of killed as a result of the fighting of July 12th was twenty-six; seventy-six were seriously wounded, and more than half of these were civilians.
The Chang Hsun contingents in the Temple of Heaven had hoisted the republican flag at 10A.M.An agreement was reached by which they were to be paid $60 per man upon the delivery of their arms. Chang Hsun's troops about theImperial City held out for a larger payment. To my astonishment, as late as Saturday, the 14th of July, I saw fully armed soldiers of Chang Hsun on guard at the central police headquarters. Asking the reason for this—for Chang Hsun's troops were supposedly routed in pitched battle on the 12th of July—I was told that the commanders had not yet settled upon the sum these contingents were to be paid. Eighty dollars per man was finally agreed upon, and by the 15th of July Chang Hsun's troops, deprived of their arms and their pigtails, had left Peking with their money, and were on their way to their rural homes in Shantung.
The dragon flags disappeared on the 12th of July as suddenly as they had appeared on the 2nd. The city quickly resumed its ordinary life.
The swift failure of Chang Hsun's enterprise was due to no inherent weakness of monarchical sentiment in north China. In fact, monarchist leanings among the northern military party are quite well known. It had been assumed that such a movement would be launched, and, if it had been more prudently planned and prepared, it might easily have succeeded, at least for a time. Its total failure was due to the fact that Chang Hsun, counting on monarchist tendencies among the northern military men, neglected to make those preparatory negotiations which would have turned the potential support into real strength. While this is true, there can be no doubt that Chang Hsun's failure gave an enormous setback to the cause of monarchism in China. After two failures to reëstablish the empire, ambitious men will think many times before embarking on such a venture again. Which is to say that the efforts to restore the Empire actually served to entrench more deeply the republican form of government.
CHAPTER XXIV
WAR WITH GERMANY: READJUSTMENTS
"It has been decided by the Chinese Government to declare war; on this very day the decision has been formally adopted by the cabinet."
Thus General Tuan Chi-jui, then Premier, conveyed to me on the 2nd of August the news of China's further entrance into world politics. I had known about this from other sources. General Tuan had announced it as his policy when I visited him on the 14th of July. He had then stated that Vice-President Feng Kuo-cheng would assume the functions of President, which President Li would relinquish, and that it would be a war government.
The American Government had held to its view that China should not be pressed to declare war. It believed that the breaking off of diplomatic relations, for the time being, was sufficient contribution to our cause in the war. But the Japanese, aided especially by the French, had strongly urged the Chinese Government to join them. Not until much later did the Chinese learn of secret treaties made between France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, giving assurance to the Japanese that no effective resistance would be offered by those powers to anything which Japan might desire in China at the end of the war.
In their ignorance of these secret arrangements, the Chinese thought that association with the war powers would put them on the footing of an ally. Also, doubtless, the militarist party surrounding Tuan hoped to increase its power through war activities. For my part, I allowed the Chinese to feel that the American Government, desiringthem to decide this question according to their own best judgment, hoped that a way might be found to bring the war situation into harmony with justice to China.
When he announced the cabinet's decision, Premier Tuan took up with me the matter of finance. He evidently expected that the American Government, or the Consortium, together with independent banks, would now furnish China the money needed for her war preparations. The powers were considering what assurances to offer. In previous discussions with Chinese officials I had repeatedly dwelt on the fact that should China take this step, she would be entitled to specific and strong assurances from the powers guaranteeing her political and administrative integrity, in terms that could not easily be evaded in future. I had made continued efforts to effect an agreement upon a declaration favourable to the full maintenance of the sovereign rights of China. My conversations with the Japanese minister during 1916 and 1917 had this in view. Now that China was considering entry into the war, I again suggested the desirability of such a declaration, and hinted to the Chinese officials that they might be successful upon this occasion in obtaining a statement which would fortify the sovereign rights of China and prevent the further growth of special privileges and spheres of influence.
My colleagues all appeared to be favourable to the idea. It would undoubtedly have been possible for the Chinese Government to secure such a specific and effective declaration. Instead, however, of taking advantage of the position which their readiness to declare war gave them, and boldly proposing such a declaration as a necessary condition, they became tangled up in long discussions. The substance originally proposed was worn down to a rather empty formula.
The first proposal was that the governments should declare their policy to "favour the independent development ofChina, and in no way to seek in China, either singly or jointly, advantages of the nature of territorial or preferential rights, whether local or general." The Chinese had suggested, in addition, a statement that the other governments would accord to China their full assistance, in order to "help it obtain the enjoyment of the advantages resulting from the equality of powers in their international relations." As finally adopted, the declaration simply gave assurance of friendly support in "allowing China to benefit in its international relations from the situation, and from the regard due a great country." Vague and unmeaning as it was, the latter term was undoubtedly flattering to Chineseamour propre. These assurances were given to China on August 14th, and the United States participated in them.
China's internal political situation had not improved greatly as a result of the overthrow of the monarchical movement. On his return to Peking as restorer of the republican government, General Tuan had the chance to rally all elements in Chinese politics to a policy of constructive action. With whom would he ally himself? As his distrust of the Kuo Min Tang was great, he constituted his new government without regard to that party, and sought instead to govern through a combination of the Chin Pu Tang and the so-called Communications Party. Of the latter the real leaders, Liang Shih-yi and his immediate associates, were still living in exile under the mandate issued by President Li. Mr. Tsao Ju-lin controlled the new wing of the Communications Party, and he had a disproportionate prominence through Japanese support. Both he and Liang Chi-chao, the leader of the Chin Pu Tang, were under the Japanese thumb. This influence could thus act strongly and extensively on Chinese affairs. It was a Japanese loan that had facilitated the overthrow of Chang Hsun and made the leadership of General Tuan possible.
These two factions, while they supported General Tuan,were mutually antagonistic. Mr. Liang Chi-chao is a literary man and a theorist. Long befriended by the Japanese, he doubtless believed himself to be a patriotic Chinese who was ready to use Japanese aid, but would not surrender any essential national rights. Not being a man of affairs, he may not always have seen the bearing upon the ultimate independence of China of the measures which he proposed. Some Chinese as well as foreigners thought him merely the venal instrument of Japan; others regarded him as essentially honest, but subject to being misled because of his theories. As Minister of Finance, his administration tended to bring about a great increase of Japanese influence in China.
Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, cynical, practical-minded, and keen, is a different type of man. He was closely associated with Mr. Lu Tsung-yu, himself the most pliable instrument of Japanese policy in China. Mr. Tsao was educated in Japan; one or more of his wives were Japanese, and in business and pleasure he was constantly in Japanese company. He was out-spokenly skeptical about his own country and about republican institutions.
The Government felt dependent upon assistance from abroad, for it had financial difficulties due to inherited burdens and present military expenses. It was made to believe that assistance could come only from the Japanese. The Americans had left the Consortium four years ago; they had every opportunity to interest themselves in China, but they had done nothing substantial beyond the loan of the Chicago bank. In China, the margin between tolerable existence and financial stress is so narrow that a few million dollars may wield an enormous influence for good or bad.
These needs were accentuated because the southern republicans were holding aloof. They felt themselves excluded from the Government; they doubted GeneralTuan's honesty of purpose, and they planned to remain independent of the central authorities. From Shanghai Mr. C.T. Wang, the most prominent of the younger republicans, wrote that Tuan Chi-jui and his cabinet represented the reactionary element; that they were strongly backed by undesirable foreign influence, and that the latter would virtually control the Government. He ascribed to General Tuan the ambition of paving the way to make himself emperor. The opposition to Tuan, he said, would continue the fight until the Chinese Republic was indeed a republic. As to American action in China, he noted that America plays the game as a gentleman, therefore it is likely to be outmanœuvred by another country less squeamish about its methods. Another letter from Mr. C.C. Wu, dated July 19, 1917, I will give textually, in part:
... When General Tuan arrived at the head of his troops in Peking, he had a good opportunity to gain the goodwill and coöperation of the whole country if he had proclaimed his adherence to the constitution at present in force, and to reassemble the dissolved parliament in order that the Permanent Constitution may be completed and the organization of the future parliament provided for; in other words, that the basis for a legal and constitutional government may be found. Unfortunately, other counsels seem to have prevailed. Another assembly, without any semblance of legality, is to be convened and the future regulation of the Republic is to be left in its hands. This will only mean fresh internal dissension and strife. It is to be admitted that there is much fault to be found with the old parliament, but as I once told General Tuan, it is the name, the signboard, of parliament that we must respect.Meanwhile, the papers are full of the inquiry which the Entente Powers are alleged to have made in regard to the declaration of war against Germany, and the reply made by the Waichiao Pu that the step will be taken almost immediately. Now, it is unnecessary to tell you of my opinion in regard to this question ever since the interview we had on that fateful Sunday in February, of my firm conviction of the many advantages, both material and moral, that such a step would confer on China, nor of the efforts I have exerted in the cause. And my week's stay in Shanghai has not altered my opinion. At the same time I agree entirely with the viewexpressed in the note you recently presented to the Waichiao Pu on behalf of your government to the effect that the paramount need of the moment is the consolidation of the country and the establishment of an effective and responsible government, and that, compared with this, the demarche against Germany, desirable though it is, is of secondary importance. Indeed, it is nothing short of ridiculous to declare war against a foreign power when every man and every resource has to be kept in hand to meet possible civil strife and when the authority of the Central Government is effective in only a doubtful half of the country. It is difficult to see what benefit the Entente Powers expect to derive by urging such a government to take such a step, a step which is detrimental to the best interests of China and contrary to the good advice tendered by the U.S., with whom Great Britain, at least, associated herself. It is enough to make one almost suspect that it is for these very two reasons that the war measure is being urged on the Government.
... When General Tuan arrived at the head of his troops in Peking, he had a good opportunity to gain the goodwill and coöperation of the whole country if he had proclaimed his adherence to the constitution at present in force, and to reassemble the dissolved parliament in order that the Permanent Constitution may be completed and the organization of the future parliament provided for; in other words, that the basis for a legal and constitutional government may be found. Unfortunately, other counsels seem to have prevailed. Another assembly, without any semblance of legality, is to be convened and the future regulation of the Republic is to be left in its hands. This will only mean fresh internal dissension and strife. It is to be admitted that there is much fault to be found with the old parliament, but as I once told General Tuan, it is the name, the signboard, of parliament that we must respect.
Meanwhile, the papers are full of the inquiry which the Entente Powers are alleged to have made in regard to the declaration of war against Germany, and the reply made by the Waichiao Pu that the step will be taken almost immediately. Now, it is unnecessary to tell you of my opinion in regard to this question ever since the interview we had on that fateful Sunday in February, of my firm conviction of the many advantages, both material and moral, that such a step would confer on China, nor of the efforts I have exerted in the cause. And my week's stay in Shanghai has not altered my opinion. At the same time I agree entirely with the viewexpressed in the note you recently presented to the Waichiao Pu on behalf of your government to the effect that the paramount need of the moment is the consolidation of the country and the establishment of an effective and responsible government, and that, compared with this, the demarche against Germany, desirable though it is, is of secondary importance. Indeed, it is nothing short of ridiculous to declare war against a foreign power when every man and every resource has to be kept in hand to meet possible civil strife and when the authority of the Central Government is effective in only a doubtful half of the country. It is difficult to see what benefit the Entente Powers expect to derive by urging such a government to take such a step, a step which is detrimental to the best interests of China and contrary to the good advice tendered by the U.S., with whom Great Britain, at least, associated herself. It is enough to make one almost suspect that it is for these very two reasons that the war measure is being urged on the Government.
Quite plainly, the southern leaders believed that the party of General Tuan was in its war policy animated with the purpose of building up its power at the expense of the rest of the country—particularly of subduing the southern republicans. Even less unselfish purposes were attributed to those who based their policy on foreign financial support. In a speech in Parliament, Senator Kuang Yen-pao makes the officials who contract ill-advised public loans say: "We are planning for the conservation of the property of our sons and grandsons; why should we have compunctions about driving the whole people to the land of death? What matters the woe of the whole nation by the side of the joy and happiness of our own families?" But the southern leaders did not disavow the act of the Central Government in declaring war. Their political opposition continued; but they accepted the international action of Peking as binding on the whole country.
In such matters China has not the hard-and-fast ideas of sovereign authority and legality which reign in the West. It was therefore possible for a local government to be independent in most matters, and yet to allow itself to be guidedby the central authority in some. A declaration of independence by no means implies that there are no relationships whatever between the recalcitrant ones and the central authorities. For this reason, too, the visit of a foreign representative to any one of the governors who had declared his independence would not, as in other countries, be regarded as an affront to the Central Government. Circumstances might occur under which the Central Government itself might favour such a visit, as incidentally relieving the strain. I felt quite free to send attachés of the Legation to the governors of disaffected provinces, and should quite freely have gone myself.
In all my interviews with high officials the prime subject was finance. Not that China, as an associate in the war, was to get such aid—which was taken as a matter of course—but how it was forthcoming supplied the only question. Mr. Liang Chi-chao, Minister of Finance, who called on me on the 4th of August, talked in favour of a big loan by the Consortium. With this he hoped that the United States would again associate itself. When he spoke of independent American loans, I called his attention to the difficulty of concluding them or of calling up the option under the Chicago loan, unless there were a parliament whose authority was recognized by the country. Shortly after this I saw the Acting President, General Feng. "China," he said—undoubtedly to tell me something pleasant, but also because all Chinese do prefer association with America—"China has followed the United States in the policy of declaring war upon Germany. Now will not the United States independently finance China? Or, if that is out of the question, then, surely America will join the Consortium since that is the only way the Chinese Government can be safely and effectively supported."
"The republican form of government," he vowed, "is now eternally secure in China." I could not but remember hisprevious monarchist leanings. The Acting President spoke of General Tuan. "I have a very cordial understanding with the Premier," he assured me.
I went to the Premier on the 21st of August. In this discussion the Chinese iron industry came up. The Premier asked: "Why not go ahead with the development of mining and iron manufacture? Create a national Chinese iron industry, and it will form the basis of a general loan for industrial purposes." He thought, at first, that the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce should summon experts and start the enterprise. I told him about the enormous technical difficulties of such a project. Then he seemed to recognize that a contract with an experienced and powerful organization, which could be held responsible, would be more effective in establishing a national iron industry for China. "I am not sure about the ore deposits near Nanking," he added; "they may not be included in such coöperative enterprises."
I suspected that he was trying to get financial support from another source, and was leaving his hands free to make them a grant there. I put in acaveatagainst any grant of iron ores to foreign nationals. Americans had in the past been invariably informed that iron deposits could not be leased or granted to individuals because they had been reserved for national uses.
I visited General Tuan on August 22nd and found him more talkative, more anxious to discuss the general aspects of policies than ever before. "We must first of all establish the authority of the Central Government," he said; "this can be done only through a defeat of the opposition. My purpose is that military organization in China be made national and unified, in order that the peace of the country shall not at all times be upset by local military commanders. The military power thus unified I intend to take entirely out of politics and confine it to its specific military purposes.At present the military is used in factional and political disputes. When this is no longer possible, then we shall leave the public mind in civil life entirely free to settle all questions of the Constitution and of the public policy."
I believe the Premier was sincere in these views, and in his efforts to vindicate the authority of the National Government, but he thought only in terms of military authority. He did not realize what the organization of public opinion and of a civilian administration require. His opponents feared that a consolidated military power would be used by him, after all, to accomplish the reëstablishment of a military dictatorship, such as that of Yuan Shih-kai.
The personal wisdom and integrity of General Tuan commanded respect, but he was not fortunate in selecting his assistants. Both in Peking and in the provinces his immediate advisers gave him trouble. When he appointed General Fu Liang-tso governor of Hunan Province, he expected the ready settlement of all difficulties there; General Fu would know how to handle the situation. But the people of Hunan did not welcome General Fu. Soon his authority and that of the Central Government were questioned throughout that province. But the Premier never disavowed or deserted his representatives. He was loyal to them, which accounts for the strong personal influence which Tuan enjoyed.
The country could not be unified, of course, until railways were built, and representatives of the Chinese Government often approached me to ascertain Whether some action could not be taken in regard to the Hankow-Canton Railway, long delayed in construction. This trunk line would have joined the north and south. A trip from Peking to Canton by existing routes took from ten days to two weeks: by direct railway it should be possible to make it in two days. Not only the movement of passengers, but of mail and freight, would stimulate an intercourse that would be sure to overcome separatist tendencies. But China had entrusted the building of this railway to foreigners, who had played with the concession, had lost it, and, after reacquiring part of it, were now delaying its execution. Europe was preoccupied with the war. And now that China was herself entering the war, it seemed a prime need of national preparedness to have this comparatively short remaining gap in the communications of China filled out. Good friends of America among the officials—among them Mr. Pan Fu, Mr. T.C. Sun, the managing director of the Siems-Carey railway offices, and Mr. J.C. Ho—argued with me, as did their superiors, to have America lead in completing this essential highway of commerce.
CHAPTER XXV
THE CHINESE GO A-BORROWING
The time was come for China to put money in her purse. She was sure she could do it, and sure that the United States, her great, rich sponsor and friend, would help her to the means commensurate with her needs of development for war. A suggestion to this effect had been made to the Chinese minister at Washington by the Department of State. It was undreamt of that no assistance whatever could be given to China.
During the fall of 1917 all my powers were devoted to securing for our Far Eastern associate in the war the best form of American assistance. I wished to avoid, if possible, a loss of the chance for giving Chinese financial affairs a sound basis. Above all, it was essential to aid in steering China beyond earshot of the financial sirens that were luring her upon the Japanese rocks. China invited American leadership, relied upon it. No other nation in the circumstances could justly take exception to it. It involved no vast enterprise of immediately raising a huge army in China, but of preparing the way for such mobilization, if need should arise. This could be done by facilitating works which would endure and which would contribute to the welfare of China and the world, war or no war. It meant building means of communication and improving the food supply. It meant reconstruction after the war. It meant an expenditure of money that would be infinitesimal compared with the sums spent in Europe. America had lent billions to the Entente Allies; the hundred millions that would have served to make China fit were a mere trifle. Nor was itnecessary to insist upon independent American action in this matter. America's leadership in behalf of the common interest and in coöperation with her associates could produce the results desired of putting the situation in the Far East on a sound basis. I had always desired American independent enterprise in individual cases, free from all entanglements and semi-political arrangements with other nations, whose favour, fortunately, we did not require. But in the great task of the World War joint action with others was natural, and action in China, given only positive American leadership, could have produced fine results. The war powers did get together for some action. They suspended the Boxer indemnity payments for China, and she got the benefit of the twentieth ofad valoremduty which the treaties provided; on the basis of reckonings two decades back, the 5 per cent. had really shrunk to 3. To restore the rate fixed by the treaties was hardly a beginning of justice.
Here was China, ready, willing to take her part in the war. What should she do? In America the slogan: "Food Will Win the War" was in vogue, and China could furnish food. She could supply coolies, millions if necessary, as workmen and as soldiers. The war had proved that the training of men as soldiers could be a matter, not of years, but of months. Plans were drawn up, at first for hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers, then for half a million.
I urged my proposals on the State Department. The Canton-Hankow Railway needed finishing. The Chinese arsenals and shipyards could be refitted. I asked the consular officers and attachés for a rapid survey of China's food resources; their returns showed that a large surplus could be produced, if steps were taken at once to assure a market. The Chinese have a genius for growing food; among them they have the world's most skilful gardeners. But they needed added credit if they were to put in more seed and harvest bigger crops. In these estimates ProfessorTuck of Cornell, who was up in Manchuria, and Professor Bailey, in Nanking, gave their expert aid.
England and her European allies, it was determined, had "gone broke"; if there was to be a Consortium of lenders to China, would America lead the way? Liang Chi-chao, Minister of Finance, proposed it. There was China's public credit, with such vast human and material resources as to stagger belief, waiting to be organized. There was the supreme opportunity to send scattering all of the promoters of the unseemly scramble to get special advantages through Chinese financial deals. I spared no pains—for four years, indeed, I had laboured for this very thing—to impress upon America the new vision of a developed China. Two things halted action. Outside influences working in America itself were aimed to stop the free play of financial enterprise in China; next, there was the provincialism of the New York financiers. They would only follow where other nations led.
Then there was the alternative—coöperation between the war powers. By hoops and barrages of steel we were bound to our brothers of Britain, France, and Italy; Japan was an allied and associated power; at every point our gold and war bonds were mingled with theirs. We were powerful enough to hold our associates to a policy of developing China for the benefit of all participants; an end might be put there to "special interests." I suggested a new consortium on this basis.
I went to the Chinese President. "I know," he declared, "that America will spare no means whereby China may carry out her purpose to stand by the side of the Allies on the battlefields of Europe."
From the President I went to the Premier. By this time he was not so friendly. Time had elapsed; the glitter of Japanese money had been made to catch his eye. I inquired concerning the Japanese loan of 20,000,000 yen, and incidental arrangements connected therewith. "Does notChina need to keep a credit balance in a foreign country," he asked; "and would not the same arrangements be made with the United States if a loan were made there?" Curiously, he added, "There is no need, yet, of convoking parliament; no time has been set for it." A militarist leader, he was being comforted by hopes of Japanese backing. But he was quite willing to send a big army to Europe.