CHAPTER VII.

[238:1]Apol. i. 3, 39, Oxf. tr.

[241:1]Julian ap. Cyril, pp. 39, 194, 206, 335. Epp. pp. 305, 429, 438, ed. Spanh.

[242:1]Niebuhr ascribes it to the beginning of the tenth.

[245:1]Sirm. Opp. ii. p. 225, ed. Ven.

[247:1]Proph. Office, p. 132 [Via Media, vol. i. p. 109].

[247:2][Since the publication of this volume in 1845, a writer in a Conservative periodical of great name has considered that no happier designation could be bestowed upon us than that which heathen statesmen gave to the first Christians, "enemies of the human race." What a remarkable witness to our identity with the Church of St. Paul ("a pestilent fellow, and a mover of sedition throughout the world"), of St. Ignatius, St. Polycarp, and the other Martyrs! In this matter, Conservative politicians join with Liberals, and with the movement parties in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, in their view of our religion. "The Catholics," says theQuarterly Reviewfor January, 1873, pp. 181-2, "wherever they are numerous and powerful in a Protestant nation,compel(sic) as it were by a law of their being, that nation to treat them with stern repression and control. . . . Catholicism, if it be true to itself, and its mission,cannot(sic) . . . wherever and whenever the opportunity is afforded it, abstain from claiming, working for, and grasping that supremacy and paramount influence and control, which it conscientiously believes to be its inalienable and universal due. . . . By the force of circumstances, by the inexorable logic of its claims, it must be the intestine foe or the disturbing element of every state in which it does not bear sway; and . . . it must now stand out in the estimate of all Protestants, Patriots and Thinkers" (philosophers and historians, as Tacitus?) "as thehostis humani generis(sic), &c."]

[254:1]De Præscr. Hær. 41, Oxf. tr.

[254:2]χρονῖται.

[256:1]Cat. xviii. 26.

[257:1]Contr. Ep. Manich. 5.

[257:2]Origen, Opp. t. i. p. 809.

[258:1]Strom. vii. 17.

[258:2]c. Tryph. 35.

[258:3]Instit. 4. 30.

[259:1]Hær. 42, p. 366.

[259:2]In Lucif. fin.

[259:3]The Oxford translation is used.

[263:1]Rationabilis; apparently an allusion to the civil officer calledCatholicusorRationalis, receiver-general.

[263:2]Ad. Parm. ii. init.

[264:1]De Unit. Eccles. 6.

[265:1]Contr. Cresc. iv. 75; also iii. 77.

[266:1]Antiq. ii. 4, § 5.

[267:1]Antiq. 5, § 3. [Bingham apparently in this passage is indirectly replying to the Catholic argument for the Pope's Supremacy drawn from the titles and acts ascribed to him in antiquity; but that argument is cumulative in character, being part of a whole body of proof; and there is moreover a great difference between a rhetorical discourse and a synodal enunciation as at Chalcedon.]

[268:1]Ad Demetr. 4, &c. Oxf. Tr.

[268:2]Hist. ch. xv.

[269:1]De Unit. 5, 12.

[269:2]Chrys. in Eph. iv.

[269:3]De Baptism. i. 10.

[269:4]c. Ep. Parm. i. 7.

[269:5]De Schism. Donat. i. 10.

[270:1]Cat. xvi. 10.

[270:2]De Fid. ad Petr. 39. [82.]

[270:3][Of course this solemn truth must not be taken apart from the words of the present Pope, Pius IX., concerning invincible ignorance: "Notum nobis vobisque est, eos, qui invincibili circa sanctissimam nostram religionem ignorantiâ laborant, quique naturalem legem ejusque præcepta in omnium cordibus a Deo insculpta sedulo servantes, ac Deo obedire parati, honestam rectamque vitam agunt, posse, divinæ lucis et gratiæ operante virtute, æternam consequi vitam, cùm Deus, qui omnium mentes, animos, cogitationes, habitusque planè intuetur, scrutatur et noscit, pro summâ suâ bonitate et clementia, minimè patiatur quempiam æternis puniri suppliciis, qui voluntariæ culpæ reatum non habeat."]

[272:1]Epp. 43, 52, 57, 76, 105, 112, 141, 144.

[276:1]De Gubern. Dei, vii. p. 142. Elsewhere, "Apud Aquitanicos quæ civitas in locupletissimâ ac nobilissimâ sui parte non quasi lupanar fuit? Quis potentum ac divitum non in luto libidinis vixit? Haud multum matrona abest à vilitate servarum, ubi paterfamilias ancillarum maritus est? Quis autem Aquitanorum divitum non hoc fuit?" (pp. 134, 135.) "Offenduntur barbari ipsi impuritatibus nostris. Esse inter Gothos non licet scortatorem Gothum; soli inter eos præjudicio nationis ac nominis permittuntur impuri esse Romani" (p. 137). "Quid? Hispanias nonne vel eadem vel majora forsitan vitia perdiderunt? . . . Accessit hoc ad manifestandam illic impudicitiæ damnationem, ut Wandalis potissimum, id est, pudicis barbaris traderentur" (p. 137). Of Africa and Carthage, "In urbe Christianâ, in urbe ecclesiasticâ, . . . viri in semetipsis feminas profitebantur," &c. (p. 152).

[276:2]Dunham, Hist. Spain, vol. i. p. 112.

[277:1]Aguirr. Concil. t. 2, p. 191.

[277:2]Dunham, p. 125.

[277:3]Hist. Franc. iii. 10.

[277:4]Ch. 39.

[278:1]Greg. Dial. iii. 30.

[278:2]Ibid. 20.

[278:3]Gibbon, Hist. ch. 37.

[279:1]De Glor. Mart. i. 25.

[279:2]Ibid. 80.

[279:3]Ibid. 79.

[279:4]Vict. Vit. i. 14.

[280:1]De Gub. D. iv. p. 73.

[280:2]Ibid. v. p. 88.

[280:3]Epp. i. 31.

[280:4]Hist. vi. 23.

[280:5]Cf. Assem. t. i. p. 351, not. 4, t. 3, p. 393.

[280:6]Baron. Ann. 432, 47.

[280:7]Gibbon, Hist. ch. 36.

[281:1]Baron. Ann. 471, 18.

[281:2]Vict. Vit. iv. 4.

[281:3]Vict. Vit. ii. 3-15.

[282:1]Aguirr. Conc. t. 2, p. 262.

[282:2]Aguirr. ibid. p. 232.

[282:3]Theod. Hist. v. 2.

[282:4]c. Ruff. i. 4.

[283:1]Ep. 15.

[283:2]Ep. 16.

[284:1]Aug. Epp. 43. 7.

[286:1]Assem. iii. p. 68.

[287:1]Ibid. t. 3, p. 84, note 3.

[287:2]Wegnern, Proleg. in Theod. Opp. p. ix.

[287:3]De Ephrem Syr. p. 61.

[288:1]Lengerke, de Ephrem Syr. pp. 73-75.

[289:1]δεσπότου, vid. La Croze, Thesaur. Ep. t. 3, § 145.

[289:2]Montf. Coll. Nov. t. 2, p. 227.

[290:1]Rosenmuller, Hist. Interpr. t. 3, p. 278.

[290:2]Lengerke, de Ephr. Syr. pp. 165-167.

[290:3]Ernest. de Proph. Mess. p. 462.

[291:1]Eccl. Theol. iii. 12.

[291:2]Professor Lee's Serm. Oct. 1838, pp. 144-152.

[291:3]Noris. Opp. t. 2, p. 112.

[291:4]Augusti. Euseb. Em. Opp.

[291:5]Asseman. Bibl. Or. p. cmxxv.

[291:6]Hoffman, Gram. Syr. Proleg. § 4.

[291:7]The educated Persians were also acquainted with Syriac. Assem. t. i. p. 351, not.

[292:1]Asseman., p. lxx.

[292:2]Euseb. Præp. vi. 10.

[292:3]Tillemont, Mem. t. 7, p. 77.

[293:1]Gibbon, ch. 47.

[294:1]Asseman. p. lxxviii.

[294:2]Gibbon, ibid.

[294:3]Asseman. t. 2, p. 403, t. 3, p. 393.

[295:1]Asseman. t. 3, p. 67.

[296:1]Gibbon, ibid.

[296:2]Assem. p. lxxvi.

[296:3]Ibid. t. 3, p. 441.

[297:1]Ch. 47.

[298:1]Fleur. Hist. xxvii. 29.

[299:1]Gibbon, ch. 47.

[300:1]Concil. Hard. t. 2, p. 127.

[301:1]Petav. de Incarn. iv. 6, § 4.

[301:2]Concil. Hard. t. 2, p. 168.

[301:3]Vid. the Author's Athan. trans. [ed. 1881, vol. ii. pp. 331-333, 426-429, and on the general subject his Theol. Tracts, art. v.]

[302:1]Fleury, Oxf. tr. xxvii. 39.

[302:2]Ibid. 41. In like manner, St. Athanasius in the foregoing age had said, "The faith confessed at Nicæa by the Fathers, according to the Scriptures, is sufficient for the overthrow of all misbelief." ad Epict. init. Elsewhere, however, he explains his statement, "The decrees of Nicæa are right and sufficient for the overthrow of all heresy,especiallythe Arian," ad. Max. fin. St. Gregory Nazianzen, in like manner, appeals to Nicæa; but he "adds an explanation on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit which was left deficient by the Fathers, because the question had not then been raised." Ep. 102, init. This exclusive maintenance, and yet extension of the Creed, according to the exigences of the times, is instanced in other Fathers. Vid. Athan. tr. [ed. 1881, vol. ii. p. 82.]

[303:1]Fleury, ibid. 27.

[304:1]Concil. Hard. t. 2, p. 141. [A negative is omitted in the Greek, but inserted in the Latin.]

[304:2]Supr. p. 245.

[304:3]Ad Const. ii. 9. Vid. Athan. tr. [ed. 1881, vol. ii. p. 261.]

[305:1]Concil. Hard. t. 2, p. 162.

[307:1]Fleury, Hist. Oxf. tr. xxvii. 37.

[307:2]Ep. 116.

[307:3]Conc. Hard. t. 2, p. 36.

[308:1]Ep. 43.

[308:2]Fleury, Hist. Oxf. tr. xxviii. 17, notel.

[308:3]Concil. Hard. t. 2, p. 68.

[308:4]Fleury, Oxf. tr. xxviii. 2, 3.

[310:1]Ibid. 20.

[311:1]Conc. Hard. t. 2, p. 656.

[312:1][Can any so grave anex partecharge as this be urged against the recent Vatican Council?]

[313:1]I cannot find my reference for this fact; the sketch is formed from notes made some years since, though I have now verified them.

[313:2]Leont. de Sect. v. p. 512.

[313:3]Concil. Hard. t. 2, p. 99, vid. also p. 418.

[313:4]Renaud. Patr. Alex. p. 115.

[313:5]Assem. t. 2, pp. 133-137.

[315:1]Leont. de Sect. vii. pp. 521, 2.

[315:2]Fac. i. 5, circ. init.

[315:3]Hodeg. 20, p. 319.

[317:1]i. e.Arianism in the East: "Sanctiores aures plebis quam corda sunt sacerdotum." S. Hil. contr. Auxent. 6. It requires some research to account for its hold on the barbarians. Vid.supr.pp. 274, 5.

[317:2]Gibbon, ch. 47.

[317:3]Assem. t. 2, de Monoph. circ. fin.

[318:1]Leont. Sect. v. init.

[318:2]Tillemont, t. 15, p. 784.

[319:1]Tillemont, Mem. t. 15, pp. 790-811.

[320:1]Gibbon, Hist. ch. 36, fin.

[321:1]Gibbon, Hist. ch. 36, fin.

[321:2]Gibbon, Hist. ch. 47.

[322:1][The above sketch has run to great length, yet it is only part of what might be set down in evidence of the wonderful identity of type which characterizes the Catholic Church from first to last. I have confined myself for the most part to her political aspect; but a parallel illustration might be drawn simply from her doctrinal, or from her devotional. As to her devotional aspect, Cardinal Wiseman has shown its identity in the fifth compared with the nineteenth century, in an article of theDublin Review, quoted in part inVia Media, vol. ii. p. 378. Indeed it is confessed on all hands, as by Middleton, Gibbon, &c., that from the time of Constantine to their own, the system and the phenomena of worship in Christendom, from Moscow to Spain, and from Ireland to Chili, is one and the same. I have myself paralleled Medieval Europe with modern Belgium or Italy, in point of ethical character in "Difficulties of Anglicans," vol. i. Lecture ix., referring the identity to the operation of a principle, insisted on presently, the Supremacy of Faith. And so again, as to the system of Catholic doctrine, the type of the Religion remains the same, because it has developed according to the "analogy of faith," as is observed inApol., p. 196, "The idea of the Blessed Virgin was, as it were,magnifiedin the Church of Rome, as time went on, but so wereallthe Christian ideas, as that of the Blessed Eucharist," &c.]

It appears then that there has been a certain general type of Christianity in every age, by which it is known at first sight, differing from itself only as what is young differs from what is mature, or as found in Europe or in America, so that it is named at once and without hesitation, as forms of nature are recognized by experts in physical science; or as some work of literature or art is assigned to its right author by the critic, difficult as may be the analysis of that specific impression by which he is enabled to do so. And it appears that this type has remained entire from first to last, in spite of that process of development which seems to be attributed by all parties, for good or bad, to the doctrines, rites, and usages in which Christianity consists; or, in other words, that the changes which have taken place in Christianity have not been such as to destroy that type,—that is, that they are not corruptions, because they are consistent with that type. Here then, in thepreservation of type, we have a first Note of the fidelity of the existing developments of Christianity. Let us now proceed to a second.

When developments in Christianity are spoken of, it issometimes supposed that they are deductions and diversions made at random, according to accident or the caprice of individuals; whereas it is because they have been conducted all along on definite and continuous principles that the type of the Religion has remained from first to last unalterable. What then are the principles under which the developments have been made? I will enumerate some obvious ones.

They must be many and positive, as well as obvious, if they are to be effective; thus the Society of Friends seems in the course of years to have changed its type in consequence of its scarcity of principles, a fanatical spiritualism and an intense secularity, types simply contrary to each other, being alike consistent with its main principle, "Forms of worship are Antichristian." Christianity, on the other hand, has principles so distinctive, numerous, various, and operative, as to be unlike any other religious, ethical, or political system that the world has ever seen, unlike, not only in character, but in persistence in that character. I cannot attempt here to enumerate more than a few by way of illustration.

For the convenience of arrangement, I will consider the Incarnation the central truth of the gospel, and the source whence we are to draw out its principles. This great doctrine is unequivocally announced in numberless passages of the New Testament, especially by St. John and St. Paul; as is familiar to us all: "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth." "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life, that declare we to you." "For ye know the grace of our Lord JesusChrist, that, though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might be rich." "Not I, but Christ liveth in me, and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself for me."

In such passages as these we have

1. The principle ofdogma, that is, supernatural truths irrevocably committed to human language, imperfect because it is human, but definitive and necessary because given from above.

2. The principle offaith, which is the correlative of dogma, being the absolute acceptance of the divine Word with an internal assent, in opposition to the informations, if such, of sight and reason.

3. Faith, being an act of the intellect, opens a way for inquiry, comparison and inference, that is, for science in religion, in subservience to itself; this is the principle oftheology.

4. The doctrine of the Incarnation is the announcement of a divine gift conveyed in a material and visible medium, it being thus that heaven and earth are in the Incarnation united. That is, it establishes in the very idea of Christianity thesacramentalprinciple as its characteristic.

5. Another principle involved in the doctrine of the Incarnation, viewed as taught or as dogmatic, is the necessary use of language, e. g. of the text of Scripture, in a second ormystical sense. Words must be made to express new ideas, and are invested with a sacramental office.

6. It is our Lord's intention in His Incarnation to make us what He is Himself; this is the principle ofgrace, which is not only holy but sanctifying.

7. It cannot elevate and change us without mortifying our lower nature:—here is the principle ofasceticism.

8. And, involved in this death of the natural man, is necessarily a revelation of themalignity of sin, in corroboration of the forebodings of conscience.

9. Also by the fact of an Incarnation we are taught that matter is an essential part of us, and, as well as mind, iscapable of sanctification.

Here are nine specimens of Christian principles out of the many[326:1]which might be enumerated, and will any one say that they have not been retained in vigorous action in the Church at all times amid whatever development of doctrine Christianity has experienced, so as even to be the very instruments of that development, and as patent, and as operative, in the Latin and Greek Christianity of this day as they were in the beginning?

This continuous identity of principles in ecclesiastical action has been seen in part in treating of the Note of Unity of type, and will be seen also in the Notes which follow; however, as some direct account of them, in illustration, may be desirable, I will single out four as specimens,—Faith, Theology, Scripture, and Dogma.

This principle which, as we have already seen, was so great a jest to Celsus and Julian, is of the following kind:—Thatbelief in Christianity is in itself better than unbelief; that faith, though an intellectual action, is ethical in its origin; that it is safer to believe; that we must begin with believing; that as for the reasons of believing, they are for the most part implicit, and need be but slightly recognized by the mind that is under their influence; that they consist moreover rather of presumptions and ventures after the truth than of accurate and complete proofs; and that probable arguments, under the scrutiny and sanction of a prudent judgment, are sufficient for conclusions which we even embrace as most certain, and turn to the most important uses.

Antagonistic to this is the principle that doctrines are only so far to be considered true as they are logically demonstrated. This is the assertion of Locke, who says in defence of it,—"Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper object of Faith; but, whether it be a divine revelation or no, reason must judge." Now, if he merely means that proofs can be given for Revelation, and that Reason comes in logical order before Faith, such a doctrine is in no sense uncatholic; but he certainly holds that for an individual to act on Faith without proof, or to make Faith a personal principle of conduct for themselves, without waiting till they have got their reasons accurately drawn out and serviceable for controversy, is enthusiastic and absurd. "How a man may know whether he be [a lover of truth for truth's sake] is worth inquiry; and I think there is this one unerring mark of it, viz. the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon, will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent, it is plain, receives not truth in the love of it; loves not truth for truth's sake, but for some other by-end."

It does not seem to have struck him that our "by-end" may be the desire to please our Maker, and that the defect of scientific proof may be made up to our reason by our love of Him. It does not seem to have struck him that such a philosophy as his cut off from the possibility and the privilege of faith all but the educated few, all but the learned, the clear-headed, the men of practised intellects and balanced minds, men who had leisure, who had opportunities of consulting others, and kind and wise friends to whom they deferred. How could a religion ever be Catholic, if it was to be called credulity or enthusiasm in the multitude to use those ready instruments of belief, which alone Providence had put into their power? On such philosophy as this, were it generally received, no great work ever would have been done for God's glory and the welfare of man. The "enthusiasm" against which Locke writes may do much harm, and act at times absurdly; but calculation never made a hero. However, it is not to our present purpose to examine this theory, and I have done so elsewhere.[328:1]Here I have but to show the unanimity of Catholics, ancient as well as modern, in their absolute rejection of it.

For instance, it is the very objection urged by Celsus, that Christians were but parallel to the credulous victims of jugglers or of devotees, who itinerated through the pagan population. He says "that some do not even wish to give or to receive a reason for their faith, but say, 'Do not inquire but believe,' and 'Thy faith will save thee;' and 'A bad thing is the world's wisdom, and foolishness is a good.'" How does Origen answer the charge? bydenying the fact, and speaking of the reason of each individual as demonstrating the divinity of the Scriptures, and Faith as coming after that argumentative process, as it is now popular to maintain? Far from it; he grants the fact alleged against the Church and defends it. He observes that, considering the engagements and the necessary ignorance of the multitude of men, it is a very happy circumstance that a substitute is provided for those philosophical exercises, which Christianity allows and encourages, but does not impose on the individual. "Which," he asks, "is the better, for them to believe without reason, and thus to reform any how and gain a benefit, from their belief in the punishment of sinners and the reward of well-doers, or to refuse to be converted on mere belief, or except they devote themselves to an intellectual inquiry?"[329:1]Such a provision then is a mark of divine wisdom and mercy. In like manner, St. Irenæus, after observing that the Jews had the evidence of prophecy, which the Gentiles had not, and that to the latter it was a foreign teaching and a new doctrine to be told that the gods of the Gentiles were not only not gods, but were idols of devils, and that in consequence St. Paul laboured more upon them, as needing it more, adds, "On the other hand, the faith of the Gentiles is thereby shown to be more generous, who followed the word of God without the assistance of Scriptures." To believe on less evidence was generous faith, not enthusiasm. And so again, Eusebius, while he contends of course that Christians are influenced by "no irrational faith," that is, by a faith which is capable of a logical basis, fully allows that in the individual believing, it is not necessarily or ordinarily based upon argument, and maintains that it is connected with that very "hope," and inclusively with that desire of the things beloved, which Locke in the aboveextract considers incompatible with the love of truth. "What do we find," he says, "but that the whole life of man is suspended on these two, hope and faith?"[330:1]

I do not mean of course that the Fathers were opposed to inquiries into the intellectual basis of Christianity, but that they held that men were not obliged to wait for logical proof before believing: on the contrary, that the majority were to believe first on presumptions and let the intellectual proof come as their reward.[330:2]

St. Augustine, who had tried both ways, strikingly contrasts them in hisDe Utilitate credendi, though his direct object in that work is to decide, not between Reason and Faith, but between Reason and Authority. He addresses in it a very dear friend, who, like himself, had become a Manichee, but who, with less happiness than his own, was still retained in the heresy. "The Manichees," he observes, "inveigh against those who, following the authority of the Catholic faith, fortify themselves in the first instance with believing, and before they are able to set eyes upon that truth, which is discerned by the pure soul, prepare themselves for a God who shall illuminate. You, Honoratus, know that nothing else was the cause of my falling into their hands, than their professing to put away Authority which was so terrible, and by absolute and simple Reason to lead their hearers to God's presence, and to rid them of all error. For what was there else that forced me, for nearly nine years, to slight the religion which was sown in me when a child by my parents, and to follow them and diligently attend their lectures, but their assertion that I was terrified by superstition, and was biddento have Faith before I had Reason, whereas they pressed no one to believe before the truth had been discussed and unravelled? Who would not be seduced by these promises, and especially a youth, such as they found me then, desirous of truth, nay conceited and forward, by reason of the disputations of certain men of school learning, with a contempt of old-wives' tales, and a desire of possessing and drinking that clear and unmixed truth which they promised me?"[331:1]

Presently he goes on to describe how he was reclaimed. He found the Manichees more successful in pulling down than in building up; he was disappointed in Faustus, whom he found eloquent and nothing besides. Upon this, he did not know what to hold, and was tempted to a general scepticism. At length he found he must be guided by Authority; then came the question, Which authority among so many teachers? He cried earnestly to God for help, and at last was led to the Catholic Church. He then returns to the question urged against that Church, that "she bids those who come to her believe," whereas heretics "boast that they do not impose a yoke of believing, but open a fountain of teaching." On which he observes, "True religion cannot in any manner be rightly embraced, without a belief in those things which each individual afterwards attains and perceives, if he behave himself well and shall deserve it, nor altogether without some weighty and imperative Authority."[331:2]

These are specimens of the teaching of the Ancient Church on the subject of Faith and Reason; if, on the other hand, we would know what has been taught on the subject in those modern schools, in and through which the subsequent developments of Catholic doctrines haveproceeded, we may turn to the extracts made from their writings by Huet, in his "Essay on the Human Understanding;" and, in so doing, we need not perplex ourselves with the particular theory, true or not, for the sake of which he has collected them. Speaking of the weakness of the Understanding, Huet says,—

"God, by His goodness, repairs this defect of human nature, by granting us the inestimable gift of Faith, which confirms our staggering Reason, and corrects that perplexity of doubts which we must bring to the knowledge of things. For example: my reason not being able to inform me with absolute evidence, and perfect certainty, whether there are bodies, what was the origin of the world, and many other like things, after I had received the Faith, all those doubts vanish, as darkness at the rising of the sun. This made St. Thomas Aquinas say: 'It is necessary for man to receive as articles of Faith, not only the things which are above Reason, but even those that for their certainty may be known by Reason. For human Reason is very deficient in things divine; a sign of which we have from philosophers, who, in the search of human things by natural methods, have been deceived, and opposed each other on many heads. To the end then that men may have a certain and undoubted cognizance of God, it was necessary things divine should be taught them by way of Faith, as being revealed of God Himself, who cannot lie.'[332:1]. . . . .

"Then St. Thomas adds afterwards: 'No search by natural Reason is sufficient to make man know things divine, nor even those which we can prove by Reason.' And in another place he speaks thus: 'Things which may be proved demonstratively, as the Being of God, the Unity of the Godhead, and other points, are placed among articles we are to believe, because previous to other things thatare of Faith; and these must be presupposed, at least by such as have no demonstration of them.'

"What St. Thomas says of the cognizance of divine things extends also to the knowledge of human, according to the doctrine of Suarez. 'We often correct,' he says, 'the light of Nature by the light of Faith, even in things which seem to be first principles, as appears in this: those things that are the same to a third, are the same between themselves; which, if we have respect to the Trinity, ought to be restrained to finite things. And in other mysteries, especially in those of the Incarnation and the Eucharist, we use many other limitations, that nothing may be repugnant to the Faith. This is then an indication that the light of Faith is most certain, because founded on the first truth, which is God, to whom it's more impossible to deceive or be deceived than for the natural science of man to be mistaken and erroneous.'[333:1]. . . .

"If we hearken not to Reason, say you, you overthrow that great foundation of Religion which Reason has established in our understanding, viz. God is. To answer this objection, you must be told that men know God in two manners. By Reason, with entire human certainty; and by Faith, with absolute and divine certainty. Although by Reason we cannot acquire any knowledge more certain than that of the Being of God; insomuch that all the arguments, which the impious oppose to this knowledge are of no validity and easily refuted; nevertheless this certainty is not absolutely perfect[333:2]. . . . .

"Now although, to prove the existence of the Deity, we can bring arguments which, accumulated and connectedtogether, are not of less power to convince men than geometrical principles, and theorems deduced from them, and which are of entire human certainty, notwithstanding, because learned philosophers have openly opposed even these principles, 'tis clear we cannot, neither in the natural knowledge we have of God, which is acquired by Reason, nor in science founded on geometrical principles and theorems, find absolute and consummate certainty, but only that human certainty I have spoken of, to which nevertheless every wise man ought to submit his understanding. This being not repugnant to the testimony of the Book of Wisdom and the Epistle to the Romans, which declares that men who do not from the make of the world acknowledge the power and divinity of the Maker are senseless and inexcusable.

"For to use the terms of Vasquez: 'By these words the Holy Scripture means only that there has ever been a sufficient testimony of the Being of a God in the fabrick of the world, and in His other works, to make Him known unto men: but the Scripture is not under any concern whether this knowledge be evident or of greatest probability; for these terms are seen and understood, in their common and usual acceptation, to signify all the knowledge of the mind with a determined assent.' He adds after: 'For if any one should at this time deny Christ, that which would render him inexcusable would not be because he might have had an evident knowledge and reason for believing Him, but because he might have believed it by Faith and a prudential knowledge.'

"'Tis with reason then that Suarez teaches that 'the natural evidence of this principle, God is the first truth, who cannot be deceived, is not necessary, nor sufficient enough to make us believe by infused Faith, what God reveals.' He proves, by the testimony of experience, that it is not necessary; for ignorant and illiterate Christians,though they know nothing clearly and certainly of God, do believe nevertheless that God is. Even Christians of parts and learning, as St. Thomas has observed, believe that God is, before they know it by Reason. Suarez shows afterwards that the natural evidence of this principle is not sufficient, because divine Faith, which is infused into our understanding, cannot be bottomed upon human faith alone, how clear and firm soever it is, as upon a formal object, because an assent most firm, and of an order most noble and exalted, cannot derive its certainty from a more infirm assent.[335:1]. . . .

"As touching the motives of credibility, which, preparing the mind to receive Faith, ought according to you to be not only certain by supreme and human certainty, but by supreme and absolute certainty, I will oppose Gabriel Biel to you, who pronounces that to receive Faith 'tis sufficient that the motives of credibility be proposed as probable. Do you believe that children, illiterate, gross, ignorant people, who have scarcely the use of Reason, and notwithstanding have received the gift of Faith, do most clearly and most steadfastly conceive those forementioned motives of credibility? No, without doubt; but the grace of God comes in to their assistance, and sustains the imbecility of Nature and Reason.

"This is the common opinion of divines. Reason has need of divine grace, not only in gross, illiterate persons, but even in those of parts and learning; for how clear-sighted soever that may be, yet it cannot make us have Faith, if celestial light does not illuminate us within, because, as I have said already, divine Faith being of a superior order cannot derive its efficacy from humanfaith."[336:1]"This is likewise the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas: 'The light of Faith makes things seen that are believed.' He says moreover, 'Believers have knowledge of the things of Faith, not in a demonstrative way, but so as by the light of Faith it appears to them that they ought to be believed.'"[336:2]

10.

It is evident what a special influence such doctrine as this must exert upon the theological method of those who hold it. Arguments will come to be considered as suggestions and guides rather than logical proofs; and developments as the slow, spontaneous, ethical growth, not the scientific and compulsory results, of existing opinions.

I have spoken and have still to speak of the action of logic, implicit and explicit, as a safeguard, and thereby a note, of legitimate developments of doctrine: but I am regarding it here as that continuous tradition and habit in the Church of a scientific analysis of all revealed truth, which is an ecclesiastical principle rather than a note of any kind, as not merely bearing upon the process of development, but applying to all religious teaching equally, and which is almost unknown beyond the pale of Christendom. Reason, thus considered, is subservient to faith, as handling, examining, explaining, recording, cataloguing, defending, the truths which faith, not reason, has gained for us, as providing an intellectual expression of supernatural facts, eliciting what is implicit, comparing, measuring, connecting each with each, and forming one and all into a theological system.

The first step in theology is investigation, an investigation arising out of the lively interest and devout welcome which the matters investigated claim of us; and, if Scripture teaches us the duty of faith, it teaches quite as distinctly that loving inquisitiveness which is the life of theSchola. It attributes that temper both to the Blessed Virgin and to the Angels. The Angels are said to have "desired to look into the mysteries of Revelation," and it is twice recorded of Mary that she "kept these things and pondered them in her heart." Moreover, her words to the Archangel, "How shall this be?" show that there is a questioning in matters revealed to us compatible with the fullest and most absolute faith. It has sometimes been said in defence and commendation of heretics that "their misbelief at least showed that they had thought upon the subject of religion;" this is an unseemly paradox,—at the same time there certainly is the opposite extreme of a readiness to receive any number of dogmas at a minute's warning, which, when it is witnessed, fairly creates a suspicion that they are merely professed with the tongue, not intelligently held. Our Lord gives no countenance to such lightness of mind; He calls on His disciples to use their reason, and to submit it. Nathanael's question "Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth?" did not prevent our Lord's praise of him as "an Israelite without guile." Nor did He blame Nicodemus, except for want of theological knowledge, on his asking "How can these things be?" Even towards St. Thomas He was gentle, as if towards one of those who had "eyes too tremblingly awake to bear with dimness for His sake." In like manner He praised the centurion when he argued himself into a confidence of divine help and relief from the analogy of his own profession; and left his captious enemies to prove for themselves from themission of the Baptist His own mission; and asked them "if David called Him Lord, how was He his Son?" and, when His disciples wished to have a particular matter taught them, chid them for their want of "understanding." And these are but some out of the various instances which He gives us of the same lesson.

Reason has ever been awake and in exercise in the Church after Him from the first. Scarcely were the Apostles withdrawn from the world, when the Martyr Ignatius, in his way to the Roman Amphitheatre, wrote his strikingly theological Epistles; he was followed by Irenæus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian; thus we are brought to the age of Athanasius and his contemporaries, and to Augustine. Then we pass on by Maximus and John Damascene to the Middle age, when theology was made still more scientific by the Schoolmen; nor has it become less so, by passing on from St. Thomas to the great Jesuit writers Suarez and Vasquez, and then to Lambertini.

Several passages have occurred in the foregoing Chapters, which serve to suggest another principle on which some words are now to be said. Theodore's exclusive adoption of the literal, and repudiation of the mystical interpretation of Holy Scripture, leads to the consideration of the latter, as one of the characteristic conditions or principles on which the teaching of the Church has ever proceeded. Thus Christianity developed, as we have incidentally seen, into the form, first, of a Catholic, then of a Papal Church. Now it was Scripture that was made the rule on which this development proceeded in each case, and Scripture moreover interpreted in a mystical sense; and,whereas at first certain texts were inconsistently confined to the letter, and a Millennium was in consequence expected, the very course of events, as time went on, interpreted the prophecies about the Church more truly, and that first in respect of her prerogative as occupying theorbis terrarum, next in support of the claims of the See of St. Peter. This is but one specimen of a certain law of Christian teaching, which is this,—a reference to Scripture throughout, and especially in its mystical sense.[339:1]

1. This is a characteristic which will become more and more evident to us, the more we look for it. The divines of the Church are in every age engaged in regulating themselves by Scripture, appealing to Scripture in proof of their conclusions, and exhorting and teaching in the thoughts and language of Scripture. Scripture may be said to be the medium in which the mind of the Church has energized and developed.[339:2]When St. Methodius would enforce the doctrine of vows of celibacy, he refers to the book of Numbers; and if St. Irenæus proclaims the dignity of St. Mary, it is from a comparison of St. Luke's Gospel with Genesis. And thus St. Cyprian, in his Testimonies, rests the prerogatives of martyrdom, asindeed the whole circle of Christian doctrine, on the declaration of certain texts; and, when in his letter to Antonian he seems to allude to Purgatory, he refers to our Lord's words about "the prison" and "paying the last farthing." And if St. Ignatius exhorts to unity, it is from St. Paul; and he quotes St. Luke against the Phantasiasts of his day. We have a first instance of this law in the Epistle of St. Polycarp, and a last in the practical works of St. Alphonso Liguori. St. Cyprian, or St. Ambrose, or St. Bede, or St. Bernard, or St. Carlo, or such popular books as Horstius'sParadisus Animæ, are specimens of a rule which is too obvious to need formal proof. It is exemplified in the theological decisions of St. Athanasius in the fourth century, and of St. Thomas in the thirteenth; in the structure of the Canon Law, and in the Bulls and Letters of Popes. It is instanced in the notion so long prevalent in the Church, which philosophers of this day do not allow us to forget, that all truth, all science, must be derived from the inspired volume. And it is recognized as well as exemplified; recognized as distinctly by writers of the Society of Jesus, as it is copiously exemplified by the Ante-nicene Fathers.

"Scriptures are called canonical," says Salmeron, "as having been received and set apart by the Church into the Canon of sacred books, and because they are to us a rule of right belief and good living; also because they ought to rule and moderate all other doctrines, laws, writings, whether ecclesiastical, apocryphal, or human. For as these agree with them, or at least do not disagree, so far are they admitted; but they are repudiated and reprobated so far as they differ from them even in the least matter."[340:1]Again: "The main subject of Scripture is nothing elsethan to treat of the God-Man, or the Man-God, Christ Jesus, not only in the New Testament, which is open, but in the Old. . . . . . . For whereas Scripture contains nothing but the precepts of belief and conduct, or faith and works, the end and the means towards it, the Creator and the creature, love of God and our neighbour, creation and redemption, and whereas all these are found in Christ, it follows that Christ is the proper subject of Canonical Scripture. For all matters of faith, whether concerning Creator or creatures, are recapitulated in Jesus, whom every heresy denies, according to that text, 'Every spirit that divides (solvit) Jesus is not of God;' for He as man is united to the Godhead, and as God to the manhood, to the Father from whom He is born, to the Holy Ghost who proceeds at once from Christ and the Father, to Mary his most Holy Mother, to the Church, to Scriptures, Sacraments, Saints, Angels, the Blessed, to Divine Grace, to the authority and ministers of the Church, so that it is rightly said that every heresy divides Jesus."[341:1]And again: "Holy Scripture is so fashioned and composed by the Holy Ghost as to be accommodated to all plans, times, persons, difficulties, dangers, diseases, the expulsion of evil, the obtaining of good, the stifling of errors, the establishment of doctrines, the ingrafting of virtues, the averting of vices. Hence it is deservedly compared by St. Basil to a dispensary which supplies various medicines against every complaint. From it did the Church in the age of Martyrs draw her firmness and fortitude; in the age of Doctors, her wisdom and light of knowledge; in the time of heretics, the overthrow of error; in time of prosperity, humility and moderation; fervour and diligence, in a lukewarm time; and in times of depravity and growing abuse, reformation from corrupt living and return to the first estate."[341:2]

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