BOOK IION RHETORIC
Rhetoricheld a position in the ancient world that the modern reader has difficulty in understanding. Democratic government, including the popular administration of justice, at a time when all discussion was necessarily oral, created an ideal condition in Athens and the other Greek states for the development of oratory. In the life of the Roman republic, too, there was enough of the popular element to make public speaking of the greatest importance. The art of rhetoric was therefore in close touch with the real interests of life. It was not merely a school discipline, but a preparation for a definite activity that held a high place in the esteem of the people, and it embodied a set of sensible ideas on public speaking in which the tendency to over-elaboration and artificiality characteristic of scholastic disciplines was kept in check by the wholesome influences that came from practical application.
With the establishment of the Roman Empire public discussion of political matters quickly disappeared, and forensic oratory for the same reason tended to decline. Thus the chief element which had given vitality to ancient rhetoric was eliminated. Roman oratory, however, died hard. It nursed itself on various pretences and shows. Much of the old interest in oratory turned back on rhetoric, which was thus exposed to a double danger, as an educational discipline that had lost connection with practical lifeand as a subject that had become too fashionable. When once the new influence had gained headway a strong tendency to artificiality was revealed. Rhetoric became scholastic and ridiculously overburdened with classification and terminology; it grew more lifeless as it grew more systematic. Interest then gradually subsided. Treatises grew shorter and drier, and consisted largely of long lists of terms defined without critical understanding of their meaning. The subject now held its place by the mere force of authority.
This was the state of rhetoric in Isidore’s time, and his treatment reflects the condition to which it had been reduced. He says that “it is easy for the reader to admire but impossible to understand” the books on rhetoric, and, further, that when they are laid aside “all recollection vanishes.” From a writer with this attitude little need be expected. His few miserable pages, compared with Quintilian’s interesting treatise, measure fully the decline of rhetoric during the first six centuries A.D. What Isidore gives is merely a summary, so cursory and disjointed that it frequently cannot be understood without liberal reference to the fuller treatises of his predecessors.
In Isidore’sDe Rhetoricapractically the whole of Cassiodorus’ text-book on this subject is incorporated without acknowledgment. Two authorities, Victorinus and Cicero, are quoted,[190]but on referring to Cassiodorus it becomesplain that even here Isidore is merely copying his authority’s citation of authority. However his brief chapter on law cannot be paralleled in any extant treatise before his time and its insertion must be credited to his initiative.
Chapter 1. On rhetoric and its name.
1. Rhetoric is the science of speaking well in civil questions for the purpose of persuading to what is just and good. It is called rhetoric in the Greek ἀπὸ τοῦ ῥητορίζειν, that is, from eloquence of speech. For speech among the Greeks is called ῥῆσις, and the orator ῥήτωρ.
2. Rhetoric is allied to the grammatic art. For in grammar we learn the science of speaking correctly, and in rhetoric we discover in what way to express what we have learned.
Chapter 2. On the discoverers of the art of rhetoric.
1. This discipline was invented by Gorgias, Aristotle and Hermagoras among the Greeks, and translated into Latin by Tullius and Quintilian, but with such eloquence and varietythat it is easy for the reader to admire, impossible to understand.
2. For while he holds the parchment the connected discourse as it were cleaves to his memory, but presently when it is laid aside all recollection vanishes. Perfect knowledge of this discipline makes the orator.
Chapter 3. On the name of the orator and the parts of rhetoric.
1. The orator is the good man skilled in speaking. ‘The good man’ means nature, character, accomplishments (artibus). ‘Skilled in speaking’ means studied eloquence, which consists of five parts: invention, ordering, diction and style, memory, delivery, and the purpose, which is to persuade of something.
2. Skill in speaking consists in three things: nature, learning, practise; nature, that is, talent; learning, knowledge; practice, continuous labor. These are the things that are looked to not only in the orator but in every artist with a view to accomplishment.
Chapter 4. The three kinds of causes.
1. There are three kinds of causes: deliberative, epideictic, judicial. The deliberative kind is that in which there is a discussion as to what ought or ought not to be done in regard to any of the practical affairs of life. The epideictic, in which a character is shown to be praiseworthy or reprehensible.
2. The judicial, in which opinion as to reward or punishment with reference to an act of an individual is given.
Chapter 16. Style and diction.
2. One must use good Latin and speak to the point. He speaks good Latin who constantly uses the true and natural names of things, and is not at variance with the style and literary refinement of the present time. Let it not be enough for him to be careful of what he says, without saying it in a clear, attractive manner; nor that only, without saying what he says wittily also.
Chapter 21. On figures.
1. Speech is amplified and adorned by the use of figures. Since direct, unvaried speech creates a weariness and disgust both of speaking and hearing, it must be varied and turned into other forms, so that it may give renewed power to the speaker, and become more ornate and turn the judge from an aloof countenance and attention.
In tracing the fortunes of logic through the period of decadence and the dark ages the effect upon it of a transition from a pagan to a Christian environment need scarcely be taken into consideration. Such marks of degeneration as it shows must be attributed simply to the general decay of thought, which was marked in both pagan and Christian spheres. By its character logic was well adapted to pass from the service of Greek philosophy and science to that of Christian theology: it had been worked out mainly as a method of Greek science, which was especially backward in the fields where induction plays a large part; consequently the Greek logic is not inductive. It is the logic of universals ready-made, and it has nothing to do with their making; it receives universals as authoritative. It was therefore most welcome to Christian thinkers, since it was precisely adapted to “the task of drawing out the implications of dogmatic premises.”[224]
It was not until a very late period that logic appeared in the Latin language in the form of a school text. In fact, with the exception of Varro’s Dialectic in his “Nine Books of the Disciplines,” which has been lost, there were nowritings on logic in the Latin down to the fourth century. Instruction in the subject was apparently given in Greek and to but few pupils. In the fourth century, however, Greek was going out of use, and it became necessary, if logic was to be saved in the schools, to have Latin text-books.[225]The need was met by a line of text-writers, of whom Marius Victorinus (c. 350) was the first. The oldest Latin school-book on logic that has survived, however, is that of Martianus Capella. Neither he nor his two successors, Cassiodorus and Isidore, were versed in the subject; they were merely compilers of educational encyclopedias. Such was the perfunctory origin of the Latin text-books on logic.[226]
The reader of Isidore’s account of logic is struck by the enthusiasm displayed. Speaking of Aristotle’s Categories he says: “This work of Aristotle’s should be read attentively, since, just as is stated therein, all that a man says is included in the ten categories.”[227]Further on he quotes the saying that “Aristotle dipped his pen in intellect when he wrote thePerihermeniae.”[228]Again, a study of Apuleius “will introduce the reader advantageously with God’s help to great paths of understanding.”[229]All of these passages, however, come word for word from Cassiodorus.Isidore’s enthusiasm as well as his bibliography seems to lack genuineness.[230]
Book II, Chapter 22. On dialectic.
1. Dialectic is the discipline elaborated with a view of ascertaining the causes of things. In itself it is the sub-division of philosophy that is called logical,i.e., rational, capable of defining, enquiring and expressing precisely. For it teachesin the several kinds of questions how the true and false are separated by discussion.
2. The first philosophers used dialectic in their discourses, but they did not reduce it to the practical form of an art. After them Aristotle systematized the subject-matter of this branch of learning, and called it dialectic, because there is discussion of words (dictis) in it; for λεκτὸν meansdictio. And dialectic follows after the discipline of rhetoric because they have many things in common.
Chapter 23. On the difference between the dialectical and the rhetorical art.
1. Varro, in the nine books of theDisciplinae, distinguished dialectic and rhetoric by the following simile: “Dialectic and rhetoric are as in man’s hand the closed fist and the open palm, the former drawing words together, the latter scattering them.”
2. If dialectic is keener in expressing things precisely, rhetoric is more eloquent in persuading to the belief it desires. The former seldom appears in the schools, the latter goes without a break [from the schools] to the law-court. The former gets few students, the latter often whole peoples.
3. Before they come to the explanation of the Isagoge, philosophers are wont to give a definition of philosophy, in order that the things which concern it may be shown more easily.
Chapter 24. On the definition of philosophy.
1. Philosophy is the knowledge of things human and divine, united with a zeal for right living. It seems to consist of two things, knowledge and opinion.
2. It is knowledge when anything is known with definiteness; opinion, when a thing lurks as yet in uncertainty and seems in no way established, as for example, whether the sun is [only] as large as it seems or greater than all the earth; likewise whether the moon is a sphere or concave; and whether the stars adhere to the heavens or pass in free course through the air; of what size the heaven itself is and of whatmaterial it is composed; whether it is quiet and motionless or revolves with incredible speed; how great is the thickness of the earth, or on what foundations it continues poised and supported.
3. The word philosophy, translated into Latin, meansamor sapientiae. For the Greeks call amor φιλὸν, and sapientiae σοφίαν. The sub-division of philosophy is three-fold: first, natural philosophy, which in Greek is calledphysica, in which there is discussion of the search into nature; the second, moral, which in Greek is calledethica, in which the subject is morals; the third, rational, which in the Greek is calledlogica, in which the discussion is as to how the truth itself is to be sought in respect to the causes of things or the conduct of life.
4. In physics, then, the cause of inquiry, in ethics, the manner of living, in logic, the method of understanding, are concerned. Among the Greeks, Thales of Miletus, one of the seven wise men, was the first to search into natural philosophy. For this man first regarded with contemplative thought the causes of the heavens and the force of the things of nature. And this division of philosophy Plato afterward divided into four separate parts, namely, into arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy.
5. Socrates first established ethics with a view to correcting and ordering conduct, and he devoted all his attention to the discussion of right living, dividing it into the four virtues of the soul, namely, wisdom, justice, fortitude, temperance.
6. Wisdom is engaged with things, and by it the evil is distinguished from the good. Fortitude, by which adversity is endured with calmness. Temperance, by which lust and concupiscence are bridled. Justice, by which through righteous judgment his own is rendered to each.
7. Plato added logical philosophy, which is called rational, and by it he analyzed the causes of things and of conduct, and examined their force in a rational way, dividing it into dialectic and rhetoric. It is called logical, that is, rational, for among the Greeks λόγος means both word and reason.
8. The divine utterances also consist of these three kindsof philosophy. For they are wont to discuss nature, as in Genesis or Ecclesiastes; or conduct, as in Proverbs and here and there in all the books; or logic, instead of which our [philosophers] assert the claim of theology,[232]as in the Song of Songs or the Gospels.
9. Likewise some of the teachers have defined philosophy in its name and parts as follows: “Philosophy is the probable knowledge of divine and human affairs, as far as is possible for man.” Otherwise: “Philosophy is the art of arts and the science of sciences.” Again: “Philosophy is the meditation upon death, a definition which better suits the Christians, who trampling on worldly ambition, live in the intercourse of learning after the likeness of their future country.”
10. Others have defined the scheme of philosophy as made up of two parts, of which the former is contemplative, the latter practical. The contemplative (inspectiva) is divided into natural, theoretical, and divine. Theoretical is divided into four parts, into arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy.
11. Practical (actualis) philosophy is divided into moral, economic, and civil. Contemplative is the name given that in which, passing beyond the visible, we enjoy some contemplation of the divine and celestial, and behold them with the mind alone, since they pass beyond the bodily gaze.
12. Natural philosophy is the name given when the nature of each and every thing is discussed, since nothing arises contrary to nature in life, but each thing is assigned to those uses for which it was purposed by the Creator, unless perchance by God’s will it is shown that some miracle appears.
13. It is called divine philosophy when we discuss the ineffable nature of God or the spiritual beings that are in some degree of a lofty nature.
14. The science which considers abstract quantity is called theoretical. For that is called abstract quantity which we separate from the material, or from other accidents, by theintellect, and treat by reasoning alone, ase.g., equal, unequal, and other matters of this kind....
16. Further, that is called practical philosophy which by its workings makes problems clear, of which there are three parts, moral, economic, and civil. That is called moral by which an honorable custom (mos) of living is sought and practices tending to virtue are established. That is called economic (dispensativa) in which the order of domestic affairs is wisely arranged. That is called civil by which the advantage of a whole state is secured.
Chapter 25. On the Isagoges of Porphyry.
1. After the definitions of philosophy in which all things are embraced under general heads, let us now describe the Isagoges of Porphyry. Isagoge in the Greek meansintroductioin the Latin, being meant for those, it is plain, who are beginning philosophy, and containing an explanation of first principles. In regard to anything whatever it is made clear what its nature is, by unfailing definition of the substance.
2. For setting down first the genus, then the species, we subjoin also other things that are possibly related, and by setting aside common qualities we make distinctions, continually interposing differences until we arrive at the proper quality of that which we are examining, its meaning being made definite, as, for example:Homo est animal rationale, mortale, terrenum, bipes, risus capax.
3. When the genusanimalis mentioned the substance of man is declared. For with reference to man the genus is animal; but since it has a wide application, the species,terrenum, is added and now what belongs to the air or water is excluded. And a difference is added, as, for example,bipes, which is given on account of the animals that go on several feet. Likewiserationale, because of the animals which lack reason; andmortale, because man is not an angel.
4. Afterwards, when the common qualities had been set aside, the property was added at the end, for it is the characteristic of man alone to laugh. In this way the complete definition to indicate man was reached. Aristotle and Tullyheld that the full definition of this science consisted of genus and differences.
5. Later certain authorities, expressing their position more fully, in their teaching divided perfect substantial definition into five divisions, as if into five organic parts. And the first of these deals with genus, the second with species, the third with difference, the fourth with proper quality, the fifth with accident.
Chapter 26. On the categories of Aristotle.
1. Next follow the categories of Aristotle, which in Latin are calledpraedicamenta, within which all discourse is embraced throughout its various meanings.
5. There are ten sorts of categories, namely,substantia,quantitas,qualitas,relatio,situs,locus,tempus,habitus,agere,pati.
15. This work of Aristotle ought to be read with attention, since, as has been observed, whatever man speaks is included within the ten categories. It will help also to the understanding of the books that are devoted either to rhetoric or to logic.[233]
Chapter 27. On Interpretation (de Perihermeniis).
1. There follows next the book On Interpretation, which is extremely subtle and guarded in its various formulas and repetitions, of which it is said: “Aristotle when he wrote the Perihermeniae dipped his pen in intellect.”
Chapter 28. On syllogisms.
1. Next follow the syllogisms of dialectic, wherein the advantage and excellence of that whole art is exhibited, the inferences of which greatly aid the reader in searching out the truth, so that the common error of deceiving an adversary by the sophisms of false conclusions disappears.
2. There are three formulae of categorical syllogisms. To the first formula belong nine modes....
12. To the second formula belong four modes....
16. To the third formula belong six modes.
22. Let him who desires to understand fully these formulas of the categorical syllogisms read the book entitledApuleii Perihermeniae, and he will learn matters that are treated with subtlety.[234]And by their clearness and well-weighed character they will introduce the reader advantageously with God’s help to great paths of understanding. Now let us come to the hypothetical syllogisms in order.
23–25. The modes of the hypothetical syllogisms that have a conclusion are seven.... If anyone desires to know more fully the modes of the hypothetical syllogisms let him read Marius Victorinus’ book entitledDe Syllogismis Hypotheticis.[234]
26. Next let us approach the topic of dialectical definitions, which have such surpassing worth that they may rightly be called the clear manifestations of speech, and in a sense the guides to expression.
Chapter 29. On the division of definitions, abbreviated from the book of Marius Victorinus.
1. The definition of the philosophers is that which in describing things sets forth what the thing in itself is—not, of what sort it is—and how it ought to be made up of its parts. For it is a brief statement separating the nature of each thing from its class, and marking it off by its peculiar meaning. Definitions are divided into fifteen sorts. The first kind of definition is the substantial (οὐσιώδης), which is named definition in the proper and true sense, as, for example,Est homo animal rationale, mortale, risus disciplinaeque capax. This definition descends through species and differences and comes to the property, and expresses most fully what man is.
16. Now let us come to thetopica, which are the seats of arguments, the fountains of ideas, and the sources of speech.
Chapter 30. On the topics.
1.Topicais the science of finding arguments. The divisionof thetopicaor thelocifrom which arguments are derived is three-fold. For some inhere in the very thing that is under discussion; there are others, calledaffecta(closely connected), which are known to be derived in a certain sense from other things; others, which are taken from outside [the subject]....
18. It is clearly a wonderful thing that whatever the nimbleness and variety of the human mind could discover, searching for ideas in different cases, could have been gathered into unity; that free and spontaneous intelligence is limited. For wherever it turns, whatever thoughts it enters on, the mind must fall upon some of those that have been described.