For several centuries, the stronger nations of Europe protected the weaker, and the matter was carried so far, that the weak powers generally gained the most. Prussia and Sardinia are two examples of nations rising by political connections; and though the system is lately changed, and Poland has been despoiled and divided amongst nations, to each of which it was superior in power only two centuries ago, and though Holland and Switzerland groan under the yoke of France, yet, it is to be hoped, the old system is not abandoned, otherwise there will be no end to the encroachments of the great powers on the smaller.The means of communicating, between nations, are now easy; they have felt the advantage of preserving a sort of balance, {152} and the ad----{152} The expression, balance of power, gives a false idea. It seems to imply, that alliances in Europe were so nicely arranged, as to make the force of nations, in opposite interests, equal; but this never was the case for half an hour, nor was it ever intended. The whole [end of page #184] that is meant, is to prevent the present order from being overturned, by one nation annihilating or subduing another; and then, by their united strength, swallowing up a third, as was the case with the Romans.-=-vantages are so great, that they probably never will be entirely abandoned, though we have strong proofs, of late years, that they are not always held very sacred.The chart subjoined to this, giving a statistical representation of the powers of Europe, shews nearly in what manner power is distributed at this time; the population and extent are there represented with accuracy: these are the foundation of power; and the amount of the revenue may be said to shew the means, which a nation has of exerting that power. (For the description and explanation see the page opposite the chart). [Transcriber's note: seemingly a reference to Chart No. 2; the explanation in fact appears on page 190.]The balance of power, however well attended to, could not prevent the decline of a nation from interior causes. It may prevent the operation of exterior causes from pushing a nation to the extreme of humiliation, by taking advantage of its internal situation. But the decline of almost every nation has commenced within its own bosom, and has been completed by causes acting from without.The common termination of the interior causes of decline is revolt, or a division into parties, when the party that has the disadvantage generally calls in some neighbour to its aid. This is the most miserable fate that can befal =sic= a country, and no punishment is sufficiently severe for the men, who have so far lost every sentiment of patriotism as to have recourse to such a step.The exterior causes of decline, namely, rivalship in peace and the combined efforts of enemies in war may be considered as irresistible, if the government, which has the direction of a nation, does not act wisely; but, if it does, they may be put at defiance. If a nation preserves its interior sources of prosperity, and acts with moderation and firmness towards others, their envy and efforts will be without effect, and need never be a cause of much uneasiness.In its relation to other nations, the government of a country acts like an individual. The first thing is to regulate its interior affairs, and, the next is, in treating with others, to consider circumstances, and take justice and moderation for a rule of conduct. [end of page #185]The circuitous politics attributed to ambassadors, who represent states, is a common theme of invective: as custom has established it as a sort of rule, in all such transactions as they conduct, to conceal a part of what is meant, to demand more than is expected to be obtained, and offer less than is intended to be given, there is no immediate remedy; but this is only in the mode and manner of treating, and does not necessarily imply unfair intention. If it has become a custom to ask three by way of obtaining two, and of offering only two to prevent the necessity of giving four, (which would be expected if three, the number intended to be given, were offered at first) it is an abuse of language, in so far that what is expressed is neither meant by one, nor understood by the other to be meant; but, it is nothing more: neither is it a custom void of meaning; it is founded on the nature of man.If men were perfect, and capable of seeing at one view what was fair, each might come prepared to ask exactly what he wanted, and determined not to yield any thing; and it would result from their being perfect, that each would just demand what was right, and the other was disposed to give; but, as men are not perfect, and as it is the inclination and even the duty of each to obtain the most favourable terms he can, (and as he does not see exactly what is right,) he naturally demands more than he has a right to expect, or than the other is disposed to give. If ambassadors met together with a determination to speak explicitly at first, and with a determination not to recede, the consequence would probably be, that they would not treat at all, so that the mode of receding a little does not absolutely imply that more is asked than is wished for, but that each party over-rates its own pretensions, in order to obtain what is right.One thing is certain, that the treaties that have been the best observed have been those founded on equity, where the contracting parties were neither of them under the influence of fear or necessity.The exterior dangers of a country are not only more simple in their nature than the interior ones, but, being less silent and gradual in their progress have been more noticed by historians.Even the ambitious rapacity of the Romans was first directed [end of page #186] against Carthage, on account of its pride and injustice in attacking other states; and, in the history of the nations of the world, there is scarcely a single example of national prosperity being unattended with some degree of pride, arrogance, and injustice; nor can it easily be otherwise, for, notwithstanding all the boasted law of nations, power seems amongst them to be one of the principal claims on which right is founded, though, in the moral nature of things, power and right have not the most distant connection.It is then an object for those who govern nations, in the first place, to counteract as much as possible the internal tendency to decline, arising from the causes that have been enumerated; and, after having done that, to regulate their conduct with regard to other nations, so as to protect themselves from those external causes of decline, on the existence of which they have no direct influence, but which are not capable of producing any great effect, unless favoured by the internal state of the country, and by the unwise conduct of those by whom it is governed.========Digression concerning the Importance of Public Revenue.No state, what ever its wealth may be, can possess power, unless a certain portion of that wealth is applicable to public purposes. As the want of revenue has not been a very common cause of weakness, we shall give, as an example, the almost solitary, but very strong, case of Poland. Its feebleness, in repelling the attacks of its enemies, was occasioned, in a great measure, by want of revenue. It was with far superior population, with more fertile soil, and a people no way inferior in bravery, greatly inferior in actual exertion to Prussia. When, at last, the Poles, seeing their danger, united together, and were willing to make every personal exertion and sacrifice, to preserve their country, they had no means of executing their good intentions. They had not kept up an army when it was not wanted, and they could not, on the emergency, create one when it was become necessary. [end of page #187]The definition given of power makes it a relative thing, and, therefore, the revenue necessary to maintain that power or force must be relative also; it, therefore, depends on circumstances, what is to be considered as a sufficient or insufficient revenue.If the United States of America were accessible with ease to European nations, or if they had powerful neighbours on their own soil, they would find their present revenues quite unequal to preserving their independence; but, as it is, perhaps they are the most wealthy civilized nation in the world, if an excess of revenue constitutes wealth.In Europe, whatever nations are unable to keep up forces sufficient to make those exertions which, according to their alliances and dangers, may be necessary, they are weak from want of revenue, and ought to augment it.In the course of making greater exertions than the revenues would bear, some nations have contracted debts. It is not the purpose here to enter into the complication such debts occasion, and the alterations they make on the revenue, and the disposal of the revenue of a country; but, so far as that subject is yet understood, it appears that the clear revenue, after paying the interest of the debt, ought to be as great as it would be altogether, if there were no debt; that is to say, after paying interest, there ought to remain a sufficient surplus to pay all the expenses necessary for government and defence.The money that goes for the payment of interest has some tendency to increase the influence of government at home, but is of no manner of use with regard to enemies.From the statistical chart here annexed, which shews the relative proportion of the revenues of all the nations in Europe, as well as their actual amount, it is perfectly clear, that, great and extensive as the Russian empire is, it will not be very powerful until its revenues are considerably increased.The great value of money, and the prices of provisions, and many sorts of warlike stores, enable great armies to be maintained in that country, even with small revenues; but the Russians can make no great effort, at a distance from home, till their revenues are augmented.The revenues of Spain are considerable; but the free revenue is not, [end of page #188] and it has no credit to supply the place. The same thing may be said of Portugal; and if England had no credit, it would be in the same situation; but as it has better credit than any nation ever had, so, likewise, it is the only one whose efforts have never been in any way, or at any time, either restricted or suspended, for want of money to carry them into effect.The Dutch were, at one time, situated nearly as England is now; they had not sufficient free revenue, but they had good credit; of which, however, they were not willing to make the necessary use, and the French marched into Amsterdam with greater ease than the Russians did into Warsaw.The greatest victories of the French, during the revolution, were gained at a time when her regular revenues were inconsiderable, and when she was in a state of absolute bankruptcy. This is considered by some as a proof that force is independent of revenue, and that Frederick the Great was mistaken in saying, that money was the sinews of war; but this case has been misunderstood as well as misrepresented.Though, in general, regular resources for money are necessary to support war, and regular resources imply revenue, it never was asserted, that, if irregular resources could be obtained, they would not answer the same purpose, so long as they lasted. During the first five years of the French revolution, a sum equal to at least four hundred millions sterling was consumed, besides what was pillaged from the enemy. So that at the time that France was without regular revenue, she was actually expending seventy-five millions sterling per annum: a sum greater than any other nation ever had at its disposal.The impossibility of such a resource continuing is of no importance in the present argument, although it is luckily of very great importance to the peace of mankind. France supported war, for a certain time, by consuming capital, and without revenue, but not without money; so that what his Prussian Majesty said, stands uncontroverted, and the necessity of revenue, regular and durable, for the maintenance of regular and durable force, is established beyond the power of contradiction. [end of page #189]EXPLANATION OF STATISTICAL CHART, NO. 2.In this chart, the different nations of Europe are represented by circles, bearing the proportion of their relative extent. This is done in order to give a better idea of the proportions than a geographical map, where the dissimilar and irregular forms prevent the eye from making a comparison.The graduated scale of lines represents millions of pounds sterling; and the red lines, that rise on the left of each circle, express the number of inhabitants in millions, which may be known by observing at what cross-line the red one stops.The yellow lines, on the right of the circles, shew the amount of revenue in pounds sterling.The nations stained green, are maritime powers; those stained pale red, are only powerful by land.The dotted lines, to connect the extremities of the lines of population and revenue, serve, by their descent from right to left, or from left to right, to shew how revenue and population are proportioned to each other.The impression made by this chart is such, that it is impossible not to see by what means Sweden and Denmark are of little importance, as to wealth or power; for, though population and territory are the original foundation of power, finances are the means of exerting it.What must the consequences be if the Russian empire should one day become like other nations? If ever that should happen, it either will be divided, or it will crush all Europe.The prodigious territory of Russia, and the immense revenues of England, are the most astonishing things represented in that chart; they are out of all proportion to the rest. [end of page #190]=========BOOK III.=========CHAP. I.Result of the foregoing Inquiry applied to Britain.-- Its present State, in what its Wealth consists, illustrated by a Chart, shewing the Increase of Revenue and Commerce.HAVING now taken a view, and inquired into the causes that have ruined nations that have been great and wealthy, from the earliest to the present time; having also inquired into the causes that naturally will operate where those did not, and that would, at a later period, have produced the same effect; it is now the business to examine how far and in what way the result of the inquiry applies to the British empire.The power and wealth of Britain, according to the definition given at the beginning of this work, are founded not on conquests, extent of territory, superior population, or a more favourable soil or climate, or even in bravery; for in those it is but on a par with other nations.The only natural advantages of Britain are, its insular situation and the disposition of the people, and the excellent form of its government.From the two first have arisen that good government, commerce, and industry; and on those have arisen again a great naval power, and an uncommon degree of wealth.In arms, it does not appear that England is so powerful by land, in proportion as in former times: her power must then be considered as a naval power, and that founded principally on commerce. {153}---{153} Our last brilliant achievements by land were under the Duke of Marlborough; but even then, with allies to assist, we were but a balance to France. Before the conquest, England seems to have been far below the level of most other nations, as a power by land. Soon after [end of page #191] she appears to have risen above France, and other nations, or they probably rather sunk; but, ever since England became formidable at sea, she has lost her superiority in the army; although she has never sunk under the level, and never, in any instance, were her armies beat when the numbers were equal to those of the enemy.-=-{Here appears at page 192 the second chart, entitled"ChartRepresenting theExtent, Population & Revenue-of the-PRINCIPAL NATIONS in EUROPE- in 1804 - byW. Playfair"}As such then we have only to examine the foundation on which she stands, and find in what she is vulnerable.We must first begin with the interior situation, to follow the same order that has been attended to in the rest of the work.Changes of manners, habits of education, and the natural effects of luxury, are as likely to operate on the British empire, as on some others which they have destroyed.From the unequal division of property, there is perhaps less danger, but from the employment of capital there is more than almost in any other nation.From the abuses of law and public institutions andl'esprit du corps, we run a very great risk; more indeed than under an arbitrary government or even a republic. These last are the dangers that most seriously threaten a nation living under a mixed government.As to the produce of the soil becoming unequal to the maintenance of a people addicted to luxurious habits, we have much also to fear from that: the operation is begun, and its effects will soon be most serious: they are already felt, and very visible.From taxation, unproductive and idle people, we have more to fear than most nations; and from an alteration in the manner of thinking, and persons and property leaving the nation, we have as much as any other nation, according to the degree of wealth that we possess; so that, upon the whole, the interior causes of decline are such as it is extremely necessary to guard against in the most attentive manner.In respect to the exterior causes, we are exempt entirely from some, from others we are not; and, in one case, we have exterior causes for hope that no nation ever yet had.The advancement of other nations, their enmity and envy, are full as likely to operate against this nation as against any other that ever existed; but as we owe none of our superiority to geographical situa- [end of page #192] tion like the Greek islands, the Delta of Egypt, and borders of the Mediterranean Sea, we run no risk of any discovery in geography, or in navigation, operating much to our disadvantage.We are not so far advanced before other nations in arts as to have any great reason to dread that their advancement will be our ruin; but still we must allow, that a number of external causes may combine to bring us to their level, when the effects of our present wealth may soon operate in reducing us under it.Since, then, commerce is the foundation of our wealth, and since our power, which is naval, is built upon commerce, let us begin with taking a view of its present situation.The increase of the trade of Britain to foreign parts, within these last fifteen years, though a very natural effect of the causes that have operated during that period, is not itself a natural increase, because the causes that produced it are uncommon, temporary, and unnatural.The East and West India trades have been both lost to France and Holland. The French, before the revolution, had a greater share of the West India trade than ever we had, and they could undersell us in foreign markets.The Dutch and French together had a very great share of the commerce of the East; this partly accounts for the rapid increase of English commerce since they lost theirs. Besides, the French nation itself, which formerly consumed scarcely any English manufactures, and supplied Germany, and many parts of Europe, with its own, has been employed for several years in consuming its manufactured stock, eating up its capital, and ruining its own manufactories; so that France itself, Germany, and a great portion of the continent, have been obliged to apply to Britain, both for manufactures and colonial produce, as well as for the goods that come from India.Add to this, that capital on the continent of Europe has suffered an unexampled diminution, from a variety of causes. A great part has been consumed in France, and in all the countries into which her armies have penetrated, particularly in Holland; and that confidence, [end of page #193] which serves in place of capital, has been impaired in all countries, and ruined in many.It has already been shewn that the want of capital prevents a poor nation from supplying itself, and furnishes a rich one with the means of supplying it, and, as it were, extorting usury from it by giving credit. The misfortunes of the continent had, by this means, all of them a direct tendency to advance the commercial prosperity of England; but still the matter does not rest even here, for the real capital that fled from the continent of Europe has, in part, taken refuge in England. We have risen, (for the moment,) by their depression; and though the advantage will be of some duration, yet we ought not to consider it as permanent. {154}Those causes have operated, as indeed might be expected, in a most powerful manner, but that operation has already begun to cease. In such uncommon and unexampled circumstances as the present, it is impossible to forsee =sic= what may happen, yet it is scarcely possible to suppose things will remain as they are. Terror and alarm are too painful to continue their action long on the human mind; and even if the cause were not diminished, the effect would become less violent with time and custom. Again, we are not to suppose, that such times as those of 1793 and 1794 are ever to return, therefore the alarm will be diminished, new capital will rise up, and, as security of private property is now understood to be the basis of all wealth and prosperity, confidence will be restored by degrees.The increase of trade is not then to be expected from the same causes that have of late operated with so rapid and powerful an effect: on the contrary, they may be expected so far to cease, as to occasion a diminution of our exports.This will, however, be counteracted by some circumstances, while others will tend to augment the violence of its effects.The trade with the American States and with Russia increase, from---{154} As one proof of capital taking refuge in England, the sudden rise of stock, during the first three years of the French revolution, may be adduced, without fear of being contradicted as to the fact, or the assigned cause controverted. [end of page #194]-=-no temporary or fallacious cause. In the former country, population very rapidly increases, and, in the latter, wealth and civilization, which have a similar effect {155} upon the wants of a nation. These are in favour of a manufacturing country, like England.These two are not only, then, permanent, but augmenting causes for our commerce; {156} they are causes that augment rapidly, and may, with proper care, be carried to a great extent.The superiority in the West India trade is so far of a permanent nature, that France will never again be a formidable rival there. St. Domingo is not only lost, but probably lost for ever, while it is expected that Britain may retain her islands. This trade, then, may be set down as permanent; that is to say, that there does not seem to be any immediate cause for its decline; {157} and the government of this country is sufficiently aware of consequences not to neglect taking every precaution possible.The East India trade does not, indeed, appear equally secure. There we are powerfully rivalled by the Americans, and the merchants of other countries; but, on the other hand, the demand for the produce of Asia is augmenting rapidly all over the continent of Europe; so that perhaps we may be able to maintain our ground, even though other nations regain part of the trade they have lost.To remain, then, in the situation in which we are, with respect to---{155} The great augmentation of fine fertile territory, in America, will retard the progress of manufactures and commerce in that country, by employing the capital and attention of the inhabitants on agriculture. This may be the case for half a century, and, if England improves, the circumstances may continue to operate in favour of British manufactures for many centuries to come.{156} The ports in the Black Sea add a new district to the commercial world, which, in course of time, must greatly increase the demand for such articles, as a civilized people consume. The fineness of the climate and of the country will enable the inhabitants to gratify the taste which civilization will bring along with it.{157} It would be quite foreign to the end of this inquiry to examine into the interior state of the West India islands, or as to their continuing subject to Great Britain. This is entirely a political affair, unconnected with commerce, though its effects on it would be prodigious. [end of page #195]-=-foreign trade, we must exert ourselves; those external causes that have forced trade upon us, for these last fifteen years, being but of a temporary nature.In order to be more sensible of this necessity, let us consider a few other circumstances.The wealth of England, which was the envy of Europe, even previous to the American war, in which we stood single-handed and alone (having the three most powerful maritime nations against us, and none to take our part) has now become more conspicuous, and much more likely to excite envy.Not only the situation of Britain is much more exalted, but the other nations feel a comparison that is infinitely more humiliating; add to this, that old attachments, and a regard to the laws of nations, and to a balance of power in Europe, are much enfeebled, or rather nearly done away.Britain has alone, for some time, stood forward to resist the innovations and power of France; and, after having at first subsidized every nation that would fight in the common cause, it has alone maintained the common right itself, thereby adding a double humiliation to those who wanted means of assisting, or whose courage had failed.France, with all its acquisition of territory and alliance, with all that influence over neutral nations, which terror of its arms inspires, will never cease to combat the prosperity of England. Some other nations, through envy or shame, stimulated by a hope of partaking in the wealth that England loses, will either sit passive or assist. {158}The East India trade is that which excites the greatest portion of envy, and it will be difficult to resist its effects. This superior degree of envy is occasioned by three principal causes:The splendid establishments of the East India company, its fleets,---{158} Gratitude, some will say, may prevent this; but nations have no gratitude, they only know their interest, and nothing retrospective is any motive for action. We need not search into remote periods for proofs of this, see Holland, Spain, Russia, &c. during the latter part of the last war. [end of page #196]-=-and the fact that it is the greatest commercial company that does now, or ever did, exist, constitute the first cause, not only for envy, but for a wish to participate in the trade.The second cause arises from the extent of our possessions, the immensity of the territorial revenues, and the evident injustice of a company of merchants becoming sovereigns, and holding the ancient princes of the East, and the successors of the Great Mogul, as tributary vassals. {159}It is in vain that we say the people are happier than they were before we did them the honour to become their masters. Whether this is true or not, there is no means of proving it, besides there can be no right established by London merchants to force the inhabitants of Hindostan to become happy, whether they will or not.The same pretence has been used by the French, in subduing Flanders and Brabant, in governing Holland and Switzerland; but they have not been able to obtain credit. The regular governments, who partitioned Poland, have pretended the same thing; and our slave-merchants and planters give very positive assurances that the negroes toiling on the West India plantations are much happier than they were in their own country; yet, in defiance of all this cloud of witnesses, there is something in the human breast that resists and rejects such evidence; evidence doubtful, on account of the quarter from whence it comes, and the interests of the witnesses, as well as con----{159} However we may look upon this, other nations certainly see the matter as iniquitous and unjust; and it is well known with what feelings such a belief is entertained.Though the revolutions in Farther Asia have not made any part of the basis of our inquiry, yet it is impossible, having mentioned the Mogul empire, not to notice its rapid and terrible fall. In 1707, only ninety-eight years ago, the Great Mogul ruled over a country equal in extent, and little inferior in population, to France, Spain, Germany, and England. His revenues amounted to thirty-two millions sterling, which, at that time, was nearly equal to the whole revenues of all the monarchs of Europe. He is now circumscribed to a territory less than the smallest county in England, and is the vassal at will of a company of English merchants, who, with all their greatness, do not divide profits equal to one week of his former revenues! [end of page #197]-=-trary to the natural feelings of beings endowed with the power of reason; at variance, also, with an opinion of a very ancient origin, "that coercion and force are enemies to enjoyment."In defiance, then, of our assertions, the other nations of Europe will and do view this acquired territory with anger, as well as envy; and, though it is true, that, out of the immense revenues that arise to the company, they divide little profit, though their debts are annually augmenting, yet individual Englishmen, it must be admitted, bring home great fortunes.This fact is not to be denied, and is so much the worse, that though a government even of merchants may be supposed to obtain revenues fairly, individuals, who rapidly acquire great wealth are always supposed to do it by extortion or unfair means. {160}The third cause for envy is of great antiquity. The commerce of the East, from the earliest ages, has been that which has enriched all the nations that ever possessed it; and, consequently, has been a perpetual cause of envy and contention, as we have already seen, in its proper place. For all those reasons, not one of which we can remove entirely, the East India trade is a particular object of envy; and, unless great care is taken, will entail the same danger on this country, as it has on all those that ever possessed it. Tyre and Sidon, in Syria, Alexandria, in Egypt, Venice, Genoa, the Hans Towns, and Portugal, have all been raised and ruined by this trade, which seems to---{160} So far back as 1793, Mr. Dundas estimated the sums remitted by individuals at an annual million; add to this, plunder arising from war, (which is become as natural a state in India as peace,) and we shall see that now the revenues and establishments are nearly doubled. The following will not be an unfair estimate:
For several centuries, the stronger nations of Europe protected the weaker, and the matter was carried so far, that the weak powers generally gained the most. Prussia and Sardinia are two examples of nations rising by political connections; and though the system is lately changed, and Poland has been despoiled and divided amongst nations, to each of which it was superior in power only two centuries ago, and though Holland and Switzerland groan under the yoke of France, yet, it is to be hoped, the old system is not abandoned, otherwise there will be no end to the encroachments of the great powers on the smaller.
The means of communicating, between nations, are now easy; they have felt the advantage of preserving a sort of balance, {152} and the ad-
---
{152} The expression, balance of power, gives a false idea. It seems to imply, that alliances in Europe were so nicely arranged, as to make the force of nations, in opposite interests, equal; but this never was the case for half an hour, nor was it ever intended. The whole [end of page #184] that is meant, is to prevent the present order from being overturned, by one nation annihilating or subduing another; and then, by their united strength, swallowing up a third, as was the case with the Romans.
-=-
vantages are so great, that they probably never will be entirely abandoned, though we have strong proofs, of late years, that they are not always held very sacred.
The chart subjoined to this, giving a statistical representation of the powers of Europe, shews nearly in what manner power is distributed at this time; the population and extent are there represented with accuracy: these are the foundation of power; and the amount of the revenue may be said to shew the means, which a nation has of exerting that power. (For the description and explanation see the page opposite the chart). [Transcriber's note: seemingly a reference to Chart No. 2; the explanation in fact appears on page 190.]
The balance of power, however well attended to, could not prevent the decline of a nation from interior causes. It may prevent the operation of exterior causes from pushing a nation to the extreme of humiliation, by taking advantage of its internal situation. But the decline of almost every nation has commenced within its own bosom, and has been completed by causes acting from without.
The common termination of the interior causes of decline is revolt, or a division into parties, when the party that has the disadvantage generally calls in some neighbour to its aid. This is the most miserable fate that can befal =sic= a country, and no punishment is sufficiently severe for the men, who have so far lost every sentiment of patriotism as to have recourse to such a step.
The exterior causes of decline, namely, rivalship in peace and the combined efforts of enemies in war may be considered as irresistible, if the government, which has the direction of a nation, does not act wisely; but, if it does, they may be put at defiance. If a nation preserves its interior sources of prosperity, and acts with moderation and firmness towards others, their envy and efforts will be without effect, and need never be a cause of much uneasiness.
In its relation to other nations, the government of a country acts like an individual. The first thing is to regulate its interior affairs, and, the next is, in treating with others, to consider circumstances, and take justice and moderation for a rule of conduct. [end of page #185]
The circuitous politics attributed to ambassadors, who represent states, is a common theme of invective: as custom has established it as a sort of rule, in all such transactions as they conduct, to conceal a part of what is meant, to demand more than is expected to be obtained, and offer less than is intended to be given, there is no immediate remedy; but this is only in the mode and manner of treating, and does not necessarily imply unfair intention. If it has become a custom to ask three by way of obtaining two, and of offering only two to prevent the necessity of giving four, (which would be expected if three, the number intended to be given, were offered at first) it is an abuse of language, in so far that what is expressed is neither meant by one, nor understood by the other to be meant; but, it is nothing more: neither is it a custom void of meaning; it is founded on the nature of man.
If men were perfect, and capable of seeing at one view what was fair, each might come prepared to ask exactly what he wanted, and determined not to yield any thing; and it would result from their being perfect, that each would just demand what was right, and the other was disposed to give; but, as men are not perfect, and as it is the inclination and even the duty of each to obtain the most favourable terms he can, (and as he does not see exactly what is right,) he naturally demands more than he has a right to expect, or than the other is disposed to give. If ambassadors met together with a determination to speak explicitly at first, and with a determination not to recede, the consequence would probably be, that they would not treat at all, so that the mode of receding a little does not absolutely imply that more is asked than is wished for, but that each party over-rates its own pretensions, in order to obtain what is right.
One thing is certain, that the treaties that have been the best observed have been those founded on equity, where the contracting parties were neither of them under the influence of fear or necessity.
The exterior dangers of a country are not only more simple in their nature than the interior ones, but, being less silent and gradual in their progress have been more noticed by historians.
Even the ambitious rapacity of the Romans was first directed [end of page #186] against Carthage, on account of its pride and injustice in attacking other states; and, in the history of the nations of the world, there is scarcely a single example of national prosperity being unattended with some degree of pride, arrogance, and injustice; nor can it easily be otherwise, for, notwithstanding all the boasted law of nations, power seems amongst them to be one of the principal claims on which right is founded, though, in the moral nature of things, power and right have not the most distant connection.
It is then an object for those who govern nations, in the first place, to counteract as much as possible the internal tendency to decline, arising from the causes that have been enumerated; and, after having done that, to regulate their conduct with regard to other nations, so as to protect themselves from those external causes of decline, on the existence of which they have no direct influence, but which are not capable of producing any great effect, unless favoured by the internal state of the country, and by the unwise conduct of those by whom it is governed.
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Digression concerning the Importance of Public Revenue.
No state, what ever its wealth may be, can possess power, unless a certain portion of that wealth is applicable to public purposes. As the want of revenue has not been a very common cause of weakness, we shall give, as an example, the almost solitary, but very strong, case of Poland. Its feebleness, in repelling the attacks of its enemies, was occasioned, in a great measure, by want of revenue. It was with far superior population, with more fertile soil, and a people no way inferior in bravery, greatly inferior in actual exertion to Prussia. When, at last, the Poles, seeing their danger, united together, and were willing to make every personal exertion and sacrifice, to preserve their country, they had no means of executing their good intentions. They had not kept up an army when it was not wanted, and they could not, on the emergency, create one when it was become necessary. [end of page #187]
The definition given of power makes it a relative thing, and, therefore, the revenue necessary to maintain that power or force must be relative also; it, therefore, depends on circumstances, what is to be considered as a sufficient or insufficient revenue.
If the United States of America were accessible with ease to European nations, or if they had powerful neighbours on their own soil, they would find their present revenues quite unequal to preserving their independence; but, as it is, perhaps they are the most wealthy civilized nation in the world, if an excess of revenue constitutes wealth.
In Europe, whatever nations are unable to keep up forces sufficient to make those exertions which, according to their alliances and dangers, may be necessary, they are weak from want of revenue, and ought to augment it.
In the course of making greater exertions than the revenues would bear, some nations have contracted debts. It is not the purpose here to enter into the complication such debts occasion, and the alterations they make on the revenue, and the disposal of the revenue of a country; but, so far as that subject is yet understood, it appears that the clear revenue, after paying the interest of the debt, ought to be as great as it would be altogether, if there were no debt; that is to say, after paying interest, there ought to remain a sufficient surplus to pay all the expenses necessary for government and defence.
The money that goes for the payment of interest has some tendency to increase the influence of government at home, but is of no manner of use with regard to enemies.
From the statistical chart here annexed, which shews the relative proportion of the revenues of all the nations in Europe, as well as their actual amount, it is perfectly clear, that, great and extensive as the Russian empire is, it will not be very powerful until its revenues are considerably increased.
The great value of money, and the prices of provisions, and many sorts of warlike stores, enable great armies to be maintained in that country, even with small revenues; but the Russians can make no great effort, at a distance from home, till their revenues are augmented.
The revenues of Spain are considerable; but the free revenue is not, [end of page #188] and it has no credit to supply the place. The same thing may be said of Portugal; and if England had no credit, it would be in the same situation; but as it has better credit than any nation ever had, so, likewise, it is the only one whose efforts have never been in any way, or at any time, either restricted or suspended, for want of money to carry them into effect.
The Dutch were, at one time, situated nearly as England is now; they had not sufficient free revenue, but they had good credit; of which, however, they were not willing to make the necessary use, and the French marched into Amsterdam with greater ease than the Russians did into Warsaw.
The greatest victories of the French, during the revolution, were gained at a time when her regular revenues were inconsiderable, and when she was in a state of absolute bankruptcy. This is considered by some as a proof that force is independent of revenue, and that Frederick the Great was mistaken in saying, that money was the sinews of war; but this case has been misunderstood as well as misrepresented.
Though, in general, regular resources for money are necessary to support war, and regular resources imply revenue, it never was asserted, that, if irregular resources could be obtained, they would not answer the same purpose, so long as they lasted. During the first five years of the French revolution, a sum equal to at least four hundred millions sterling was consumed, besides what was pillaged from the enemy. So that at the time that France was without regular revenue, she was actually expending seventy-five millions sterling per annum: a sum greater than any other nation ever had at its disposal.
The impossibility of such a resource continuing is of no importance in the present argument, although it is luckily of very great importance to the peace of mankind. France supported war, for a certain time, by consuming capital, and without revenue, but not without money; so that what his Prussian Majesty said, stands uncontroverted, and the necessity of revenue, regular and durable, for the maintenance of regular and durable force, is established beyond the power of contradiction. [end of page #189]
EXPLANATION OF STATISTICAL CHART, NO. 2.
In this chart, the different nations of Europe are represented by circles, bearing the proportion of their relative extent. This is done in order to give a better idea of the proportions than a geographical map, where the dissimilar and irregular forms prevent the eye from making a comparison.
The graduated scale of lines represents millions of pounds sterling; and the red lines, that rise on the left of each circle, express the number of inhabitants in millions, which may be known by observing at what cross-line the red one stops.
The yellow lines, on the right of the circles, shew the amount of revenue in pounds sterling.
The nations stained green, are maritime powers; those stained pale red, are only powerful by land.
The dotted lines, to connect the extremities of the lines of population and revenue, serve, by their descent from right to left, or from left to right, to shew how revenue and population are proportioned to each other.
The impression made by this chart is such, that it is impossible not to see by what means Sweden and Denmark are of little importance, as to wealth or power; for, though population and territory are the original foundation of power, finances are the means of exerting it.
What must the consequences be if the Russian empire should one day become like other nations? If ever that should happen, it either will be divided, or it will crush all Europe.
The prodigious territory of Russia, and the immense revenues of England, are the most astonishing things represented in that chart; they are out of all proportion to the rest. [end of page #190]
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BOOK III.
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CHAP. I.
Result of the foregoing Inquiry applied to Britain.-- Its present State, in what its Wealth consists, illustrated by a Chart, shewing the Increase of Revenue and Commerce.
HAVING now taken a view, and inquired into the causes that have ruined nations that have been great and wealthy, from the earliest to the present time; having also inquired into the causes that naturally will operate where those did not, and that would, at a later period, have produced the same effect; it is now the business to examine how far and in what way the result of the inquiry applies to the British empire.
The power and wealth of Britain, according to the definition given at the beginning of this work, are founded not on conquests, extent of territory, superior population, or a more favourable soil or climate, or even in bravery; for in those it is but on a par with other nations.
The only natural advantages of Britain are, its insular situation and the disposition of the people, and the excellent form of its government.
From the two first have arisen that good government, commerce, and industry; and on those have arisen again a great naval power, and an uncommon degree of wealth.
In arms, it does not appear that England is so powerful by land, in proportion as in former times: her power must then be considered as a naval power, and that founded principally on commerce. {153}
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{153} Our last brilliant achievements by land were under the Duke of Marlborough; but even then, with allies to assist, we were but a balance to France. Before the conquest, England seems to have been far below the level of most other nations, as a power by land. Soon after [end of page #191] she appears to have risen above France, and other nations, or they probably rather sunk; but, ever since England became formidable at sea, she has lost her superiority in the army; although she has never sunk under the level, and never, in any instance, were her armies beat when the numbers were equal to those of the enemy.
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{Here appears at page 192 the second chart, entitled
"Chart
Representing the
Extent, Population & Revenue
-of the-
PRINCIPAL NATIONS in EUROPE
- in 1804 - by
W. Playfair"}
As such then we have only to examine the foundation on which she stands, and find in what she is vulnerable.
We must first begin with the interior situation, to follow the same order that has been attended to in the rest of the work.
Changes of manners, habits of education, and the natural effects of luxury, are as likely to operate on the British empire, as on some others which they have destroyed.
From the unequal division of property, there is perhaps less danger, but from the employment of capital there is more than almost in any other nation.
From the abuses of law and public institutions andl'esprit du corps, we run a very great risk; more indeed than under an arbitrary government or even a republic. These last are the dangers that most seriously threaten a nation living under a mixed government.
As to the produce of the soil becoming unequal to the maintenance of a people addicted to luxurious habits, we have much also to fear from that: the operation is begun, and its effects will soon be most serious: they are already felt, and very visible.
From taxation, unproductive and idle people, we have more to fear than most nations; and from an alteration in the manner of thinking, and persons and property leaving the nation, we have as much as any other nation, according to the degree of wealth that we possess; so that, upon the whole, the interior causes of decline are such as it is extremely necessary to guard against in the most attentive manner.
In respect to the exterior causes, we are exempt entirely from some, from others we are not; and, in one case, we have exterior causes for hope that no nation ever yet had.
The advancement of other nations, their enmity and envy, are full as likely to operate against this nation as against any other that ever existed; but as we owe none of our superiority to geographical situa- [end of page #192] tion like the Greek islands, the Delta of Egypt, and borders of the Mediterranean Sea, we run no risk of any discovery in geography, or in navigation, operating much to our disadvantage.
We are not so far advanced before other nations in arts as to have any great reason to dread that their advancement will be our ruin; but still we must allow, that a number of external causes may combine to bring us to their level, when the effects of our present wealth may soon operate in reducing us under it.
Since, then, commerce is the foundation of our wealth, and since our power, which is naval, is built upon commerce, let us begin with taking a view of its present situation.
The increase of the trade of Britain to foreign parts, within these last fifteen years, though a very natural effect of the causes that have operated during that period, is not itself a natural increase, because the causes that produced it are uncommon, temporary, and unnatural.
The East and West India trades have been both lost to France and Holland. The French, before the revolution, had a greater share of the West India trade than ever we had, and they could undersell us in foreign markets.
The Dutch and French together had a very great share of the commerce of the East; this partly accounts for the rapid increase of English commerce since they lost theirs. Besides, the French nation itself, which formerly consumed scarcely any English manufactures, and supplied Germany, and many parts of Europe, with its own, has been employed for several years in consuming its manufactured stock, eating up its capital, and ruining its own manufactories; so that France itself, Germany, and a great portion of the continent, have been obliged to apply to Britain, both for manufactures and colonial produce, as well as for the goods that come from India.
Add to this, that capital on the continent of Europe has suffered an unexampled diminution, from a variety of causes. A great part has been consumed in France, and in all the countries into which her armies have penetrated, particularly in Holland; and that confidence, [end of page #193] which serves in place of capital, has been impaired in all countries, and ruined in many.
It has already been shewn that the want of capital prevents a poor nation from supplying itself, and furnishes a rich one with the means of supplying it, and, as it were, extorting usury from it by giving credit. The misfortunes of the continent had, by this means, all of them a direct tendency to advance the commercial prosperity of England; but still the matter does not rest even here, for the real capital that fled from the continent of Europe has, in part, taken refuge in England. We have risen, (for the moment,) by their depression; and though the advantage will be of some duration, yet we ought not to consider it as permanent. {154}
Those causes have operated, as indeed might be expected, in a most powerful manner, but that operation has already begun to cease. In such uncommon and unexampled circumstances as the present, it is impossible to forsee =sic= what may happen, yet it is scarcely possible to suppose things will remain as they are. Terror and alarm are too painful to continue their action long on the human mind; and even if the cause were not diminished, the effect would become less violent with time and custom. Again, we are not to suppose, that such times as those of 1793 and 1794 are ever to return, therefore the alarm will be diminished, new capital will rise up, and, as security of private property is now understood to be the basis of all wealth and prosperity, confidence will be restored by degrees.
The increase of trade is not then to be expected from the same causes that have of late operated with so rapid and powerful an effect: on the contrary, they may be expected so far to cease, as to occasion a diminution of our exports.
This will, however, be counteracted by some circumstances, while others will tend to augment the violence of its effects.
The trade with the American States and with Russia increase, from
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{154} As one proof of capital taking refuge in England, the sudden rise of stock, during the first three years of the French revolution, may be adduced, without fear of being contradicted as to the fact, or the assigned cause controverted. [end of page #194]
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no temporary or fallacious cause. In the former country, population very rapidly increases, and, in the latter, wealth and civilization, which have a similar effect {155} upon the wants of a nation. These are in favour of a manufacturing country, like England.
These two are not only, then, permanent, but augmenting causes for our commerce; {156} they are causes that augment rapidly, and may, with proper care, be carried to a great extent.
The superiority in the West India trade is so far of a permanent nature, that France will never again be a formidable rival there. St. Domingo is not only lost, but probably lost for ever, while it is expected that Britain may retain her islands. This trade, then, may be set down as permanent; that is to say, that there does not seem to be any immediate cause for its decline; {157} and the government of this country is sufficiently aware of consequences not to neglect taking every precaution possible.
The East India trade does not, indeed, appear equally secure. There we are powerfully rivalled by the Americans, and the merchants of other countries; but, on the other hand, the demand for the produce of Asia is augmenting rapidly all over the continent of Europe; so that perhaps we may be able to maintain our ground, even though other nations regain part of the trade they have lost.
To remain, then, in the situation in which we are, with respect to
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{155} The great augmentation of fine fertile territory, in America, will retard the progress of manufactures and commerce in that country, by employing the capital and attention of the inhabitants on agriculture. This may be the case for half a century, and, if England improves, the circumstances may continue to operate in favour of British manufactures for many centuries to come.
{156} The ports in the Black Sea add a new district to the commercial world, which, in course of time, must greatly increase the demand for such articles, as a civilized people consume. The fineness of the climate and of the country will enable the inhabitants to gratify the taste which civilization will bring along with it.
{157} It would be quite foreign to the end of this inquiry to examine into the interior state of the West India islands, or as to their continuing subject to Great Britain. This is entirely a political affair, unconnected with commerce, though its effects on it would be prodigious. [end of page #195]
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foreign trade, we must exert ourselves; those external causes that have forced trade upon us, for these last fifteen years, being but of a temporary nature.
In order to be more sensible of this necessity, let us consider a few other circumstances.
The wealth of England, which was the envy of Europe, even previous to the American war, in which we stood single-handed and alone (having the three most powerful maritime nations against us, and none to take our part) has now become more conspicuous, and much more likely to excite envy.
Not only the situation of Britain is much more exalted, but the other nations feel a comparison that is infinitely more humiliating; add to this, that old attachments, and a regard to the laws of nations, and to a balance of power in Europe, are much enfeebled, or rather nearly done away.
Britain has alone, for some time, stood forward to resist the innovations and power of France; and, after having at first subsidized every nation that would fight in the common cause, it has alone maintained the common right itself, thereby adding a double humiliation to those who wanted means of assisting, or whose courage had failed.
France, with all its acquisition of territory and alliance, with all that influence over neutral nations, which terror of its arms inspires, will never cease to combat the prosperity of England. Some other nations, through envy or shame, stimulated by a hope of partaking in the wealth that England loses, will either sit passive or assist. {158}
The East India trade is that which excites the greatest portion of envy, and it will be difficult to resist its effects. This superior degree of envy is occasioned by three principal causes:
The splendid establishments of the East India company, its fleets,
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{158} Gratitude, some will say, may prevent this; but nations have no gratitude, they only know their interest, and nothing retrospective is any motive for action. We need not search into remote periods for proofs of this, see Holland, Spain, Russia, &c. during the latter part of the last war. [end of page #196]
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and the fact that it is the greatest commercial company that does now, or ever did, exist, constitute the first cause, not only for envy, but for a wish to participate in the trade.
The second cause arises from the extent of our possessions, the immensity of the territorial revenues, and the evident injustice of a company of merchants becoming sovereigns, and holding the ancient princes of the East, and the successors of the Great Mogul, as tributary vassals. {159}
It is in vain that we say the people are happier than they were before we did them the honour to become their masters. Whether this is true or not, there is no means of proving it, besides there can be no right established by London merchants to force the inhabitants of Hindostan to become happy, whether they will or not.
The same pretence has been used by the French, in subduing Flanders and Brabant, in governing Holland and Switzerland; but they have not been able to obtain credit. The regular governments, who partitioned Poland, have pretended the same thing; and our slave-merchants and planters give very positive assurances that the negroes toiling on the West India plantations are much happier than they were in their own country; yet, in defiance of all this cloud of witnesses, there is something in the human breast that resists and rejects such evidence; evidence doubtful, on account of the quarter from whence it comes, and the interests of the witnesses, as well as con-
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{159} However we may look upon this, other nations certainly see the matter as iniquitous and unjust; and it is well known with what feelings such a belief is entertained.
Though the revolutions in Farther Asia have not made any part of the basis of our inquiry, yet it is impossible, having mentioned the Mogul empire, not to notice its rapid and terrible fall. In 1707, only ninety-eight years ago, the Great Mogul ruled over a country equal in extent, and little inferior in population, to France, Spain, Germany, and England. His revenues amounted to thirty-two millions sterling, which, at that time, was nearly equal to the whole revenues of all the monarchs of Europe. He is now circumscribed to a territory less than the smallest county in England, and is the vassal at will of a company of English merchants, who, with all their greatness, do not divide profits equal to one week of his former revenues! [end of page #197]
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trary to the natural feelings of beings endowed with the power of reason; at variance, also, with an opinion of a very ancient origin, "that coercion and force are enemies to enjoyment."
In defiance, then, of our assertions, the other nations of Europe will and do view this acquired territory with anger, as well as envy; and, though it is true, that, out of the immense revenues that arise to the company, they divide little profit, though their debts are annually augmenting, yet individual Englishmen, it must be admitted, bring home great fortunes.
This fact is not to be denied, and is so much the worse, that though a government even of merchants may be supposed to obtain revenues fairly, individuals, who rapidly acquire great wealth are always supposed to do it by extortion or unfair means. {160}
The third cause for envy is of great antiquity. The commerce of the East, from the earliest ages, has been that which has enriched all the nations that ever possessed it; and, consequently, has been a perpetual cause of envy and contention, as we have already seen, in its proper place. For all those reasons, not one of which we can remove entirely, the East India trade is a particular object of envy; and, unless great care is taken, will entail the same danger on this country, as it has on all those that ever possessed it. Tyre and Sidon, in Syria, Alexandria, in Egypt, Venice, Genoa, the Hans Towns, and Portugal, have all been raised and ruined by this trade, which seems to
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{160} So far back as 1793, Mr. Dundas estimated the sums remitted by individuals at an annual million; add to this, plunder arising from war, (which is become as natural a state in India as peace,) and we shall see that now the revenues and establishments are nearly doubled. The following will not be an unfair estimate: