As they had neither arts nor commerce, and but very little territory, plunder was their means of subsistence; it was to them a regular source of wealth, and it was distributed with perfect impartiality; they were in fact an association; the wealth of the public, and of the individual, were, to a certain degree, the same; they were as an incorporated company, in which private interest conspired with the love of their country to forward the general interest.Plundering and pillage, as well as the modes of dividing the spoil, were reduced to system and method; and the religious observation of oaths was conducive to the success of both. Every soldier was sworn to be faithful to his country, both in fighting its battles, and in giving a rigid account of whatever might be the fruits of the contest. [end of page #28]The moveables and lands taken from an enemy were sold for the benefit of the public; the former went wholly for that purpose, and the latter were divided into two equal portions; one of which, like the moveables, went into the general stock, the other was distributed to the poorer citizens, at the price of a small acknowledgement.The consequence of this system was, a perpetual state of warfare; in which it was clear that the armies must obtain a superiority over neighbours, who but occasionally employed themselves in acts of hostility.From such a plan of operations it naturally followed that they must either have been subdued altogether, or come off in general with some advantage, otherwise it would have been impossible to proceed. Of this they seem to have been fully sensible; for, with them, it was a maxim never to conclude peace unless they were victorious, and never to treat with an enemy on their own territory.Acting in this manner, and engaging in wars with different nations, unconnected with each other by treaties of alliance; without any common interest, or even any knowledge of each others =sic= affairs; ignorant, in general, even of what was going on, the Romans had, in most cases, a great advantage over those with whom they had to contend.There were in Italy some very warlike people, and those were nearest to Rome itself. The contest with those was long obstinate, and repeatedly renewed; but still the system of conquest was followed; and at last prevailed.The consular government was favourable, also, for perpetual warfare. Those temporary chief magistrates did not enjoy their dignity long enough to become torpid or careless, but were interested in distinguishing themselves by the activity of their conduct while in office; whereas, in hereditary power, or elective monarchy, the personal feelings of the chief, which must have an influence upon the conduct of a nation, must sometimes, happily for mankind, lead him to seek peace and quietness. {27}---{27} During the interruption of consular government, by the decemvirs, though they did not reign long, the energy of the people was suspended, and their enemies found them much less difficult to resist.-=-[end of page #29]Even when the Gauls burned the city, the Romans yielded no advantages in treaty; they abandoned it to its fate, retired to Veii, and renewed the war.In the art of war, the Romans had those advantages which men generally possess in whatever is the natural bent of their genius, and their constant occupation. Every thing that continual attention, experience, or example, could do to increase their success was attended to; and their hardy manner of education and living, with constant exercise, enabled them to practice =sic= what other men were unable to perform.They accustomed themselves to heavier armour than any other nation. Their rate of marching was between four and five miles an hour, for four or five hours together, loaded with a weight of above 60lb. Their weapons for exercising were double the usual weight, and they were inured to running and leaping when completely armed.The success of the Romans in Europe was not sufficiently rapid, nor were the nations they conquered sufficiently rich to bring on that luxury and relaxation of discipline, which were the consequences in those victories obtained in Egypt, Syria, and Greece; nor were the soldiers the only persons inured to such exercises, for the Roman citizens practised the same at home, in the Campus Martius.No people educated with less hardiness of body, or a less firm attachment to their country, could have undergone, or would have submitted, to the terrible fatigues of a Roman soldier, which were such, that, even at a very late period of the republic, they were known to ask as a favour to be conducted to battle, as a relief from the fatigues they were made to undergo in the camp. {28}In addition to this unremitting and very severe discipline, and to the inventions of many weapons, machines, and stratagems, unknown to other nations, they had the great wisdom to examine very carefully, if they found an enemy enjoy any advantage, in what that advantage consisted. If it arose from any fault of their own, it was rectified---{28} This happened under Sylla, in the war against Mithridates, which immediately preceded the fall of the republic.-=-[end of page #30]without delay; and if it arose from any new mode of fighting, or superior weapons, they adopted methods with such promptitude that the advantage was only once in favour of the enemy. {29}The Asiatic methods of fighting with elephants, though new, never disconcerted them twice. If they knew of any superior art that they could imitate, it was done; and when the advantage arose from natural circumstances, and they could not themselves become masters of the art, they took other methods. Expert slingers from the Balearian Islands, and bowmen from Crete, were added to their legions; as, in modern times, field-ordnance and riflemen are added to ours.It is impossible not to view with astonishment and admiration such wise conduct in such haughty men, whose simple citizens treated the sovereigns of other nations as equals; but that greatness of mind had a well-founded cause. They knew that the physical powers of men are limited, and that to obtain a victory with the greatest ease possible it was necessary to join together all the advantages that could be obtained; they knew, also, that war is altogether a trial of force, and a trial of skill, and that neither of the contending parties can act by rule, but must be guided by circumstances and the conduct of the enemy. {30}This conduct of the Romans in war was supported by the laws at home. The equal distribution of lands, their contempt for commerce and luxury, preserved the population of the country in that state where good soldiers are to be obtained. The wealthy, in any state, cannot be numerous; neither are they hardy to bear the fatigue. Their servants, and the idle, the indolent, and unprincipled persons they have about them are totally unfit, and a wretched populace, degraded by want, or inured to ease and plenty are equally unfit.---{29} This conduct appears the more admirable to those who live in the present times that in the revolutionary war with the French, who invented a number of new methods of fighting, and had recourse to new stratagems, the regular generals opposed to them never altered their modes of warfare, but let themselves be beat in the most regular way possible. One single general (the Archduke Charles) did not think himself above the circumstances of the case, and his success was proportioned to his merit.{30} The copying the form and structure of a Carthaginian galley that was stranded.-=-[end of page #31]It has been a favourite opinion among many writers on political economy that artists and workmen are cowardly and unfit for soldiers; but experience does not warrant that conclusion; though it is certain that, according to the manner the Romans carried on war, the bodily fatigue was greater than men bred up promiscuously to trades of different sorts could in general undergo.So long as the Romans had enemies to contend with, from whom they obtained little, the manners and laws, the mode of education, and the government of their country, remained pure as at first. Their business, indeed, became more easy; for the terror of their name, their inflexibility, and the superior means they had of bringing their powers into action, all served to facilitate their conquests. But when they conquered Carthage, and begun =sic= to taste the fruits of wealth, their ground-work altered by degrees, and the superstructure became less solid. {31}Wealth, as we have already seen, was confined to Asia and Africa, and of it the Carthaginians possessed a great share. It has long been the opinion adopted by writers on those subjects that the Carthaginians, as being a commercial and a trading nation, were quite an unequal match for the Romans; that in Rome all was virtue, public spirit, and every thing that was great and noble, while at Carthage all was venal, vile, and selfish. A spirit of war and conquest reigned, say they, in one place together with a spirit of glory, in the other a spirit of gain presided over private actions and public counsels.This is all very true, and very well said, with respect to the fact, but with respect to the cause there is one of the greatest errors into which a number of men of discernment and ability have ever fallen. {32}The true state of the case is easily to be understood, if we only---{31} It will be seen, in the subsequent part of this inquiry, that, in the present mode of warfare, the Romans would not have had equal advantage. -- Skill, and not personal strength, is now the great object, and money to purchase arms and ammunition is the next.{32} M. Montesquieu, notwithstanding his very superior knowledge, accuracy, and acuteness, enlarges upon this subject; and never takes any notice of the corrupt, mercenary, and degraded state into which Rome fell when it became as rich as Carthage.-=-[end of page #32]throw aside, for a moment, the favour for the brave warrior, and the dislike to the selfish trader. The fact was, that Rome, in the days of its vigour, when it was poor, attacked Carthage in the days of its wealth and of its decline; but let us compare Carthage before its fall to Rome in the time of the Gordians, of Maximus, or Gallus, and see which was most vile, most venal, or most cowardly. This would at least be a fair comparison; and nothing relative to the two cities is more certain, than that Rome became far more degraded, in the character both of citizens and soldiers, than ever Carthage was.Wealth procured by commerce, far from degrading a nation more than wealth procured by conquest, does not degrade it near so much; and the reason is easily understood. Whenever a commercial nation becomes too corrupted and luxurious, its wealth vanishes, and the evil corrects itself. Whereas, a country that lives by tribute received from others, may continue for a considerable while to enjoy its revenues. This is so evident, that it would be absurd to enlarge on the subject.The reduction of Carthage, and the wealth it produced at Rome, soon brought on a change in the education, the nature, and the manner of acting, both in private life and public concerns. The conquest of Greece, Syria, and Egypt, completed the business; and the same people who had conquered every enemy, while they retained their poverty and simplicity, were themselves conquered, when they became rich and luxurious.. =sic=After the fall of Carthage {33}, Rome was fundamentally changed; but the armies still continued to act. Their ambition was now strengthened by avarice, and became ten times more active and dangerous to other nations. They then carried on war in every direction, and neither the riches of the East, nor the poverty of the North, could secure other nations from the joint effects of ambition and avarice.But the Romans did not only get gold and wealth by their con----{33} Considering circumstances, it is wonderful that the Carthaginians made so excellent a stand against the Romans: for a long time they were victorious; they fought excellently, even at the battle of Zama. The Romans could not say so much for themselves, when afterwards they were attacked by the barbarians.-=-[end of page #33]quests; they became corrupted by adopting the manners of the inhabitants of countries that had long been drowned in every voluptuous pleasure. Then it was that they ceased to trust so much to their bravery for their conquests; they began to employ politics and intrigue to divide their enemies. With the poorer states, they found gold a very useful weapon, and, with the richer, they employed weapons of iron.The terror of the Roman name, the actual force that they could exert against a powerful enemy, and the facility with which a weak one could be silenced, till a proper opportunity arrived for his destruction, were all calculated, and force and fraud were both called into action.Whatever truth or honour the Romans had amongst themselves, they at least had none towards other nations. They, in the most wanton manner, interfered in every quarrel between strangers; and, whenever it suited their conveniency to make war, they begun without almost being at the pains to search for a pretext. They set themselves up above all opinion, while, at the same time, they required all nations to submit to theirs.In a city where all great offices were elective, the evil effects of the introduction of riches were soon displayed. The first great changes were, that the people became corrupted, dependent, and degraded; fortunes became unequally divided; the provinces groaned under the heavy contributions of generals and proconsuls; and, at last, the country splitting into factions, the government was overturned.The splendour of Rome augmented, as a fiery meteor shines most bright before it falls; but the means by which it obtained the ascendency over other nations had long been at an end.The same laws that had been found excellent, when the state was small and poor, did not answer now that it had become great and splendid. The freedom of the city, and the title and privileges of a Roman citizen had been very widely extended; they were therefore become an illusion, and a very dangerous one for the public weal; they served as a foundation for cabal and intrigue of every description.Towards the latter days, after all those internal causes of decline, which are common to other nations had rendered Rome feeble, several [end of page #34] external ones began to act.The provinces became exhausted, and those who ruled them gradually retained more and more of the money. {34} Thus, while the oppression of the provinces was augmenting, the resources of the state were daily on the decline.The first effect of conquests had been to free the people at home from taxes; and when, in a state of poverty and simplicity, the effect was advantageous and tended to preserve that spirit by which the Roman empire aggrandized itself. After wealth flowed in from the destruction of Carthage, donations and shews were in use. The Roman populace, idle and degraded, clamoured for corn and public games. It is almost as difficult to conceive the degree to which the character of the people was degraded, as it is to give credit to the wealth and luxury of the great, in the latter days of the empire.Agriculture was neglected; and the masters of the world, who had obtained every thing for which they contended, while they preserved their purity of manners, now became unable either to govern others, to protect themselves, or even to provide food. Sicily and Africa supplied the Roman people with bread, long before the empire had become feeble, and even at the very time when it is reckoned to have been in its greatest splendour in the Augustan age. {35} The cause of its decline was fixed beyond the power of human nature to counteract: it began by unnerving the human character, and therefore its progress was accelerated and became irresistible.Of all the nations, into which luxury is introduced, none feels its effects---{34} The detached facts related of the wealth of the governors of provinces, compared with the poverty of the state, are, if not incredible, at least, difficult to conceive. They are, however, too well attested to admit of a doubt, though the details are not sufficiently circumstantial to enable us to know exactly how they happened.{35} In the time of Augustus, the people depended on the supplies from Sicily and Egypt, in so complete a manner, that, if those failed, there was no remedy; and, at one time, when there was only a sufficient quantity of grain for twenty-four hours, that emperor was determined to have put an end to his existence: but the supply arrived in time. Such is the terrible situation into which a people is thrown, when agriculture and industry are abandoned, and when the population becomes too great for the production of the country!! This, however, was a very recent change. Till some time after the conquest of Egypt, Greece, and Sicily, it could not have happened.-=-[end of page #35]so severely as one where it comes by conquest. A people of conquerors, who are wealthy, must, at all events, be under military authority, and that is never a desirable circumstance; depending also on revenues which come without the aid of industry, they must become doubly degraded.With such a people, it would be fair to compare the Carthaginians before their fall; for, to say nothing more than that the principle of traffic and commerce is founded on morality and virtue, in comparison to that trade of pillage which robbed and ruined all nations; the physical situation of the Carthaginians was preferable to that of the Romans in the days of their decline. This is evident, from the noble struggle that the former made, and the contemptible manner in which the mistress of the world terminated her career.Montesquieu bewails the fate of a monarch, who is oppressed by a party that prevails after his fall. His enemies are his historians; and this reflection is employed in mitigation of the crimes imputed to Tarquin; but, surely, if true, on that occasion, it is no less so with respect to Carthage. All the historians that give us the character of the two nations were Romans and of the victorious party; yet most of them are more equitable than the historians of modern times, for they had not seen their own country in its last state of degradation and misery. Those who now make the comparison have proper materials; and it is the business of the writers of history to free it from the errors into which cotemporary =sic= authors fall, whether from prejudice, or from want of knowing those events which happened after their days.In the case of the Roman historians, the error arose from a combination of three different causes. In the first place, they compared Rome in its healthy days and its vigour, to Carthage in its decline. -- They were, next to that, led into an error, by not knowing that all countries that have been long rich are liable to the same evils as Carthage. And, last of all, they wrote with a spirit of party, and a prediliction =sic= in favour of Rome. These three causes are certain; and, perhaps, there was another. It is possible they did not dare to speak the truth, if they did know it.It is true, that the human mind is not proof against the effect pro- [end of page #36] duced by what is splendid and brilliant; and that success in all cases diminishes, and, in some, does away the reproach naturally attached to criminality. It is also to be admitted, that in the Roman character there was a degree of courage and magnanimity that commands admiration, though the end to which it was applied was in itself detestable. Even in individual life (moral principle apart) there is something that diminishes the horror attendant on injustice and rapacity, when accompanied with courage and prodigality.It is no less true, that the manners of commercial men, though their views are legitimate and their means fair, are prejudicial to them in the opinion of others. Individuals, gaining money by commerce, may sometimes have the splendour and magnanimity of princes; but nations that depend only on commerce for wealth never can. No nation, while it continues great or wealthy, can rid itself of the characteristic manners that attend the way in which it obtains its wealth and greatness. Merchants owe their wealth to a strict adherence to their interest, and they cannot help shewing it.The cruelties of the Spaniards have not excited the detestation they deserved, because they were accompanied with courage, and crowned with success; and that nation found means, in the midst of the most horrible of human crimes, to preserve an appearance of greatness and dignity of character. But the Dutch, who have gained wealth, like the Carthaginians, and though they were conquerors, never quitted the character of merchants, and they never possessed dignity of character, though they triumphed by virtue, perseverance, and bravery, over that very Spain which did preserve her dignity.It is much more difficult to reconcile the character of trading nations with the qualities that are improperly called great, than that of any other. A commercial nation naturally will be just; it may be generous; but it never can become extravagant and wasteful; neither can it be incumbered with the lazy and the idle; for the moment that either of these takes place, commerce flies to another habitation. {36}---{36} It follows, from this, that a commercial people never become so degraded as those who obtain wealth by other means; but, then, it also follows, that they exist a much shorter time after they become so, and that wealth and power leave them much more speedily.-=-[end of page #37]The purpose of this inquiry being, to examine the effects of wealth, and its operation in the decline of nations; it appears to be of considerable importance to remove the error, in which historians and other writers have so long persevered, relative to the two greatest republics of antiquity; particularly as their example applies the most readily, and is the most frequently applied to two rival nations of modern times; although the parallel is extremely imperfect in almost every particular, and in some directly inadmissible. {37}It cannot but be attended with some advantage to set this matter right. It may, perhaps, tend in some degree to prevent the French from attempting to imitate the Romans, when we shew them that a state, whether a whole people, or a single city, exempted from taxes, and living by the tribute of other countries, must, at all events, be dependent on its armies. In short, military government and tributary revenue are inseparable. We see how closely they were connected in ancient Rome. It is fit that its imitators should know at what rate they pay (and in what coin) for those exemptions from taxes, occasioned by the burthens imposed upon other nations.In general we find, that all nations are inclined to push to the extreme those means by which they have attained wealth or power; and it will also be found that their ruin is thereby brought on with greater rapidity.---{37} The reader must see the allusion is to England and France; but, in point of time, their situation is absolutely different. France is farther advanced in luxury than England. Rome was far behind Carthage. The Romans exceeded their rivals in perseverance; in following up their plans, and in attention to their liberty. The contrary is the case with France and England.The French, indeed, resemble the Romans in restlessness and ambition; but not in their mode of exerting the former, or of gratifying the latter: the resemblance, therefore, is a very faint one, even where it does hold at all. The English, in whatever they may resemble the Carthaginians, such as they have been represented, neither do it in their want of faith and honour, nor in their progress towards decline. The different wars with Rome, in which Carthage came off a loser and became tributary, though only for a limited time, were not the only causes of its decline. The trade of Alexandria, which was better situated for commerce, had diminished the resources of Carthage; so that it was, in every sense of the word, a falling nation. It will be seen, in the subsequent part of this inquiry, how, from the different modes of making war and also the different effects of wealth in the present times, the comparison is still less founded.-=-[end of page #38]Had the Romans stopped the career of conquest at an earlier period, they probably would not have so soon sunk into a state of corruption. It is very probable, that if Caesar had never attempted the useless conquest of Britain, he never would have succeeded in conquering the liberties of his own country. The reputation of having conquered an island, and the passage of the British Channel, made way for the passage of the Rubicon, and the battle of Pharsalia.Conquerors must be paid as well as common soldiers: and though every man may have his price, and money and dignities may be a sufficient reward for the most part, there are some who despise any reward under that of royal power. -- Caesar was one of those men; and both ancient and modern history shew, that though, perhaps, in his abilities, he has had no equal, there have been others who have rated theirs at as high a price.The Romans at last became sensible, when too late, that they had pushed the spirit of conquest too far; and, as they had something great in all they did, they had the magnanimity to retract their error.The greatest extent of the Roman empire being from the north of England to the Gulf of Persia, they consequently abandoned Britain, and those conquests in Asia, which were the most difficult to keep. The river Euphrates became the boundary, the Emperor Adrian having, in a voluntary manner, given up all the country to the north of that river, situated on its left bank.The decline of the empire might have been as regular as the rise of the republic, had it not been for the different characters of the emperors; some of whom did honour to human nature, from their possessing almost every virtue, while others were such monsters, that their crimes excite the highest degree of horror and indignation, and are almost beyond credibility.It is but justice to the Romans to observe, that though they robbed and conquered, yet their policy was to instruct, improve, and civilize those whom they had robbed and conquered, wherever they stood in want of it. They aimed, in every case, at making the most of the circumstances in which they were placed, and they very truly conceived, that it was more profitable and advantageous, to rule over a civilized than a rude people. [end of page #39]After the great influx of wealth had corrupted Rome, its public expenses increased at an enormous rate, till at last that portion of the tribute exacted from the provinces, which it pleased the armies and the generals to remit to Rome, became unequal to the expenditure. Taxation of every kind then became necessary, in Italy itself, and the evils that attend the multiplication of imposts were greatly augmented by the ignorant manner in which they were laid on, by men who understood little but military affairs, added to the severe manner in which were they =sic= levied by a rude, imperious, and debauched soldiery.The characters of soldier and citizen, which had been so long united, ceased to have any connection. Soon after this, the corruption of manners became general; and, at last, the Romans unable to find soldiers amongst themselves, were obliged to retain barbarians to fight in their defence, {38} and to bribe the Persians, and other nations, to leave them in a state of tranquility.No nation that ever yet submitted to pay tribute, has long preserved its independence. The Romans knew this well; and if any one, having had recourse to that expedient, has escaped ruin, it has been from some other circumstance than its own exertion; or it has sometimes been the effort of despair when pushed to extremity.Though, in many respects, Montesquieu's opinion of the affairs of Rome is by no means to be taken, yet his short account of the whole is unexceptionally just."Take," says that able and profound writer, "this compendium of the Roman history. The Romans subdued all nations by their maxims; but, when they had succeeded in doing so, they could no longer preserve their republican form of government. It was necessary to change the plan, and maxims contrary to their first, being introduced, they were divested of all their grandeur."This was literally the case; but then it is clear that this compendium, only includes the secondary causes, and their effects; for the perseverance in maxims till they had obtained their end, and then changing---{38} This is exactly one of the charges brought against the Carthaginians in the last Punic war.-=-[end of page #40]them, which was not an act of the will, must have been occasioned by some cause inherent in their situation, which had gradually changed.In searching for this cause we shall be very much assisted, and the conclusion will be rendered more certain, by observing in what particular circumstances, they resembled other nations who had undergone a similar changes. =sic=In doing this, we find the inquiry wonderfully abridged indeed, and the conclusion reduced nearly to a mathematical certainty, by observing that the change of maxims, that is to say, the change in ways of thinking, whenever it has taken place, has followed soon after the introduction of wealth and refinement, which change manners, and consequently maxims.Wealth, acquired by conquest, was incompatible with that austere virtue and independent principle which form the basis of republican prosperity.As all public employments were obtained by the favour of the people; and as all wealth and power were obtained by the channels of public employment; bribery and corruption, which cannot take place in a poor republic, became very common in this wealthy one; so that this republican government, so constituted, lost all those advantages it possessed while it was poor.Had the murderers of Julius Caesar, either understood the real corruption of the commonwealth, or foreseen that a new master would rise up, they would never have destroyed that admirable man. Had Rome not been ready to receive a master, Julius Caesar, with all his ambition, would never have grasped at the crown.In nations that obtain wealth by commerce, manufactures, or any other means than by conquests, the corruption of the state is not naturally so great. The wealth originates in the people, and not in the state; and, besides that they are more difficult to purchase, there is less means of doing so, and less inducement; neither can they, being the sources of wealth themselves, become so idle and corrupted. {39}---{39} The wild and ungovernable direction that the French revolution took originated chiefly in the creation of assignats, which not only exempted the people from taxes at first, but had the effect of producing an artificial and temporary degree of wealth, that [end of page #41] enabled vast numbers, either in the pay of others, or at their own expense, to make cabals and politics their whole study. Rome never was in such a licentious state, because, before the citizens got into that situation, the military power was established.-=-In the ancient nations that fell one after another, we have seen the young and vigorous subdue the more wealthy and luxurious; or we have seen superior art and skill get the better of valour and ignorance; but, in the fall of the Roman empire, the art and skill were all on the side of those who fell, and the vigour of those who conquered was not so powerful an agent as the very low and degraded state into which the masters of the world had themselves fallen.It is by no means consistent with the plan of this work, nor is it any way necessary for the inquiry, to enter into the particular details of the degraded and miserable state to which the Romans were reduced; insomuch, that those who emigrated previously to its fall, and settled amongst barbarous nations, found themselves more happy than they had been, being freed from taxation and a variety of oppressions.Though the Roman people are, of all others, those whose rise and fall are the most distinctly known; yet, in some circumstances, their case does not apply to nations in general. Had they cultivated commerce and the arts, with the same success that they pursued conquest, they must have become wealthy at a much earlier period, and they would not have found themselves in possession of an almost boundless empire, composed of different nations, subdued by force, and requiring force to be preserved.The decline of nations, who become rich by means of industry, may be natural; but, the fall of a nation, owing its greatness to the subjugation of others, must be necessary. Human affairs are too complicated and varied to admit of perfect equality, and the relative situations of mankind are always changing; yet, in some instances, perhaps, changes might be obviated, or protracted, by timely preventives. But there is no possibility of keeping them long in so unnatural a situation, as that of a nation of wealthy and idle people, ruling over and keeping in subjection others who are more hardy, poorer, and more virtuous, than themselves.Before the western empire fell, the following causes of its weakness were arrived at a great height. [end of page #42]Manners were corrupted to the highest degree; there was neither public nor private virtue; intrigue, cabal, and money, did every thing.Property was all in the hands of a few; the great mass of the people were wretchedly poor, mutinous, and idle.
As they had neither arts nor commerce, and but very little territory, plunder was their means of subsistence; it was to them a regular source of wealth, and it was distributed with perfect impartiality; they were in fact an association; the wealth of the public, and of the individual, were, to a certain degree, the same; they were as an incorporated company, in which private interest conspired with the love of their country to forward the general interest.
Plundering and pillage, as well as the modes of dividing the spoil, were reduced to system and method; and the religious observation of oaths was conducive to the success of both. Every soldier was sworn to be faithful to his country, both in fighting its battles, and in giving a rigid account of whatever might be the fruits of the contest. [end of page #28]
The moveables and lands taken from an enemy were sold for the benefit of the public; the former went wholly for that purpose, and the latter were divided into two equal portions; one of which, like the moveables, went into the general stock, the other was distributed to the poorer citizens, at the price of a small acknowledgement.
The consequence of this system was, a perpetual state of warfare; in which it was clear that the armies must obtain a superiority over neighbours, who but occasionally employed themselves in acts of hostility.
From such a plan of operations it naturally followed that they must either have been subdued altogether, or come off in general with some advantage, otherwise it would have been impossible to proceed. Of this they seem to have been fully sensible; for, with them, it was a maxim never to conclude peace unless they were victorious, and never to treat with an enemy on their own territory.
Acting in this manner, and engaging in wars with different nations, unconnected with each other by treaties of alliance; without any common interest, or even any knowledge of each others =sic= affairs; ignorant, in general, even of what was going on, the Romans had, in most cases, a great advantage over those with whom they had to contend.
There were in Italy some very warlike people, and those were nearest to Rome itself. The contest with those was long obstinate, and repeatedly renewed; but still the system of conquest was followed; and at last prevailed.
The consular government was favourable, also, for perpetual warfare. Those temporary chief magistrates did not enjoy their dignity long enough to become torpid or careless, but were interested in distinguishing themselves by the activity of their conduct while in office; whereas, in hereditary power, or elective monarchy, the personal feelings of the chief, which must have an influence upon the conduct of a nation, must sometimes, happily for mankind, lead him to seek peace and quietness. {27}
---
{27} During the interruption of consular government, by the decemvirs, though they did not reign long, the energy of the people was suspended, and their enemies found them much less difficult to resist.
-=-
[end of page #29]
Even when the Gauls burned the city, the Romans yielded no advantages in treaty; they abandoned it to its fate, retired to Veii, and renewed the war.
In the art of war, the Romans had those advantages which men generally possess in whatever is the natural bent of their genius, and their constant occupation. Every thing that continual attention, experience, or example, could do to increase their success was attended to; and their hardy manner of education and living, with constant exercise, enabled them to practice =sic= what other men were unable to perform.
They accustomed themselves to heavier armour than any other nation. Their rate of marching was between four and five miles an hour, for four or five hours together, loaded with a weight of above 60lb. Their weapons for exercising were double the usual weight, and they were inured to running and leaping when completely armed.
The success of the Romans in Europe was not sufficiently rapid, nor were the nations they conquered sufficiently rich to bring on that luxury and relaxation of discipline, which were the consequences in those victories obtained in Egypt, Syria, and Greece; nor were the soldiers the only persons inured to such exercises, for the Roman citizens practised the same at home, in the Campus Martius.
No people educated with less hardiness of body, or a less firm attachment to their country, could have undergone, or would have submitted, to the terrible fatigues of a Roman soldier, which were such, that, even at a very late period of the republic, they were known to ask as a favour to be conducted to battle, as a relief from the fatigues they were made to undergo in the camp. {28}
In addition to this unremitting and very severe discipline, and to the inventions of many weapons, machines, and stratagems, unknown to other nations, they had the great wisdom to examine very carefully, if they found an enemy enjoy any advantage, in what that advantage consisted. If it arose from any fault of their own, it was rectified
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{28} This happened under Sylla, in the war against Mithridates, which immediately preceded the fall of the republic.
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without delay; and if it arose from any new mode of fighting, or superior weapons, they adopted methods with such promptitude that the advantage was only once in favour of the enemy. {29}
The Asiatic methods of fighting with elephants, though new, never disconcerted them twice. If they knew of any superior art that they could imitate, it was done; and when the advantage arose from natural circumstances, and they could not themselves become masters of the art, they took other methods. Expert slingers from the Balearian Islands, and bowmen from Crete, were added to their legions; as, in modern times, field-ordnance and riflemen are added to ours.
It is impossible not to view with astonishment and admiration such wise conduct in such haughty men, whose simple citizens treated the sovereigns of other nations as equals; but that greatness of mind had a well-founded cause. They knew that the physical powers of men are limited, and that to obtain a victory with the greatest ease possible it was necessary to join together all the advantages that could be obtained; they knew, also, that war is altogether a trial of force, and a trial of skill, and that neither of the contending parties can act by rule, but must be guided by circumstances and the conduct of the enemy. {30}
This conduct of the Romans in war was supported by the laws at home. The equal distribution of lands, their contempt for commerce and luxury, preserved the population of the country in that state where good soldiers are to be obtained. The wealthy, in any state, cannot be numerous; neither are they hardy to bear the fatigue. Their servants, and the idle, the indolent, and unprincipled persons they have about them are totally unfit, and a wretched populace, degraded by want, or inured to ease and plenty are equally unfit.
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{29} This conduct appears the more admirable to those who live in the present times that in the revolutionary war with the French, who invented a number of new methods of fighting, and had recourse to new stratagems, the regular generals opposed to them never altered their modes of warfare, but let themselves be beat in the most regular way possible. One single general (the Archduke Charles) did not think himself above the circumstances of the case, and his success was proportioned to his merit.
{30} The copying the form and structure of a Carthaginian galley that was stranded.
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It has been a favourite opinion among many writers on political economy that artists and workmen are cowardly and unfit for soldiers; but experience does not warrant that conclusion; though it is certain that, according to the manner the Romans carried on war, the bodily fatigue was greater than men bred up promiscuously to trades of different sorts could in general undergo.
So long as the Romans had enemies to contend with, from whom they obtained little, the manners and laws, the mode of education, and the government of their country, remained pure as at first. Their business, indeed, became more easy; for the terror of their name, their inflexibility, and the superior means they had of bringing their powers into action, all served to facilitate their conquests. But when they conquered Carthage, and begun =sic= to taste the fruits of wealth, their ground-work altered by degrees, and the superstructure became less solid. {31}
Wealth, as we have already seen, was confined to Asia and Africa, and of it the Carthaginians possessed a great share. It has long been the opinion adopted by writers on those subjects that the Carthaginians, as being a commercial and a trading nation, were quite an unequal match for the Romans; that in Rome all was virtue, public spirit, and every thing that was great and noble, while at Carthage all was venal, vile, and selfish. A spirit of war and conquest reigned, say they, in one place together with a spirit of glory, in the other a spirit of gain presided over private actions and public counsels.
This is all very true, and very well said, with respect to the fact, but with respect to the cause there is one of the greatest errors into which a number of men of discernment and ability have ever fallen. {32}
The true state of the case is easily to be understood, if we only
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{31} It will be seen, in the subsequent part of this inquiry, that, in the present mode of warfare, the Romans would not have had equal advantage. -- Skill, and not personal strength, is now the great object, and money to purchase arms and ammunition is the next.
{32} M. Montesquieu, notwithstanding his very superior knowledge, accuracy, and acuteness, enlarges upon this subject; and never takes any notice of the corrupt, mercenary, and degraded state into which Rome fell when it became as rich as Carthage.
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throw aside, for a moment, the favour for the brave warrior, and the dislike to the selfish trader. The fact was, that Rome, in the days of its vigour, when it was poor, attacked Carthage in the days of its wealth and of its decline; but let us compare Carthage before its fall to Rome in the time of the Gordians, of Maximus, or Gallus, and see which was most vile, most venal, or most cowardly. This would at least be a fair comparison; and nothing relative to the two cities is more certain, than that Rome became far more degraded, in the character both of citizens and soldiers, than ever Carthage was.
Wealth procured by commerce, far from degrading a nation more than wealth procured by conquest, does not degrade it near so much; and the reason is easily understood. Whenever a commercial nation becomes too corrupted and luxurious, its wealth vanishes, and the evil corrects itself. Whereas, a country that lives by tribute received from others, may continue for a considerable while to enjoy its revenues. This is so evident, that it would be absurd to enlarge on the subject.
The reduction of Carthage, and the wealth it produced at Rome, soon brought on a change in the education, the nature, and the manner of acting, both in private life and public concerns. The conquest of Greece, Syria, and Egypt, completed the business; and the same people who had conquered every enemy, while they retained their poverty and simplicity, were themselves conquered, when they became rich and luxurious.. =sic=
After the fall of Carthage {33}, Rome was fundamentally changed; but the armies still continued to act. Their ambition was now strengthened by avarice, and became ten times more active and dangerous to other nations. They then carried on war in every direction, and neither the riches of the East, nor the poverty of the North, could secure other nations from the joint effects of ambition and avarice.
But the Romans did not only get gold and wealth by their con-
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{33} Considering circumstances, it is wonderful that the Carthaginians made so excellent a stand against the Romans: for a long time they were victorious; they fought excellently, even at the battle of Zama. The Romans could not say so much for themselves, when afterwards they were attacked by the barbarians.
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quests; they became corrupted by adopting the manners of the inhabitants of countries that had long been drowned in every voluptuous pleasure. Then it was that they ceased to trust so much to their bravery for their conquests; they began to employ politics and intrigue to divide their enemies. With the poorer states, they found gold a very useful weapon, and, with the richer, they employed weapons of iron.
The terror of the Roman name, the actual force that they could exert against a powerful enemy, and the facility with which a weak one could be silenced, till a proper opportunity arrived for his destruction, were all calculated, and force and fraud were both called into action.
Whatever truth or honour the Romans had amongst themselves, they at least had none towards other nations. They, in the most wanton manner, interfered in every quarrel between strangers; and, whenever it suited their conveniency to make war, they begun without almost being at the pains to search for a pretext. They set themselves up above all opinion, while, at the same time, they required all nations to submit to theirs.
In a city where all great offices were elective, the evil effects of the introduction of riches were soon displayed. The first great changes were, that the people became corrupted, dependent, and degraded; fortunes became unequally divided; the provinces groaned under the heavy contributions of generals and proconsuls; and, at last, the country splitting into factions, the government was overturned.
The splendour of Rome augmented, as a fiery meteor shines most bright before it falls; but the means by which it obtained the ascendency over other nations had long been at an end.
The same laws that had been found excellent, when the state was small and poor, did not answer now that it had become great and splendid. The freedom of the city, and the title and privileges of a Roman citizen had been very widely extended; they were therefore become an illusion, and a very dangerous one for the public weal; they served as a foundation for cabal and intrigue of every description.
Towards the latter days, after all those internal causes of decline, which are common to other nations had rendered Rome feeble, several [end of page #34] external ones began to act.
The provinces became exhausted, and those who ruled them gradually retained more and more of the money. {34} Thus, while the oppression of the provinces was augmenting, the resources of the state were daily on the decline.
The first effect of conquests had been to free the people at home from taxes; and when, in a state of poverty and simplicity, the effect was advantageous and tended to preserve that spirit by which the Roman empire aggrandized itself. After wealth flowed in from the destruction of Carthage, donations and shews were in use. The Roman populace, idle and degraded, clamoured for corn and public games. It is almost as difficult to conceive the degree to which the character of the people was degraded, as it is to give credit to the wealth and luxury of the great, in the latter days of the empire.
Agriculture was neglected; and the masters of the world, who had obtained every thing for which they contended, while they preserved their purity of manners, now became unable either to govern others, to protect themselves, or even to provide food. Sicily and Africa supplied the Roman people with bread, long before the empire had become feeble, and even at the very time when it is reckoned to have been in its greatest splendour in the Augustan age. {35} The cause of its decline was fixed beyond the power of human nature to counteract: it began by unnerving the human character, and therefore its progress was accelerated and became irresistible.
Of all the nations, into which luxury is introduced, none feels its effects
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{34} The detached facts related of the wealth of the governors of provinces, compared with the poverty of the state, are, if not incredible, at least, difficult to conceive. They are, however, too well attested to admit of a doubt, though the details are not sufficiently circumstantial to enable us to know exactly how they happened.
{35} In the time of Augustus, the people depended on the supplies from Sicily and Egypt, in so complete a manner, that, if those failed, there was no remedy; and, at one time, when there was only a sufficient quantity of grain for twenty-four hours, that emperor was determined to have put an end to his existence: but the supply arrived in time. Such is the terrible situation into which a people is thrown, when agriculture and industry are abandoned, and when the population becomes too great for the production of the country!! This, however, was a very recent change. Till some time after the conquest of Egypt, Greece, and Sicily, it could not have happened.
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so severely as one where it comes by conquest. A people of conquerors, who are wealthy, must, at all events, be under military authority, and that is never a desirable circumstance; depending also on revenues which come without the aid of industry, they must become doubly degraded.
With such a people, it would be fair to compare the Carthaginians before their fall; for, to say nothing more than that the principle of traffic and commerce is founded on morality and virtue, in comparison to that trade of pillage which robbed and ruined all nations; the physical situation of the Carthaginians was preferable to that of the Romans in the days of their decline. This is evident, from the noble struggle that the former made, and the contemptible manner in which the mistress of the world terminated her career.
Montesquieu bewails the fate of a monarch, who is oppressed by a party that prevails after his fall. His enemies are his historians; and this reflection is employed in mitigation of the crimes imputed to Tarquin; but, surely, if true, on that occasion, it is no less so with respect to Carthage. All the historians that give us the character of the two nations were Romans and of the victorious party; yet most of them are more equitable than the historians of modern times, for they had not seen their own country in its last state of degradation and misery. Those who now make the comparison have proper materials; and it is the business of the writers of history to free it from the errors into which cotemporary =sic= authors fall, whether from prejudice, or from want of knowing those events which happened after their days.
In the case of the Roman historians, the error arose from a combination of three different causes. In the first place, they compared Rome in its healthy days and its vigour, to Carthage in its decline. -- They were, next to that, led into an error, by not knowing that all countries that have been long rich are liable to the same evils as Carthage. And, last of all, they wrote with a spirit of party, and a prediliction =sic= in favour of Rome. These three causes are certain; and, perhaps, there was another. It is possible they did not dare to speak the truth, if they did know it.
It is true, that the human mind is not proof against the effect pro- [end of page #36] duced by what is splendid and brilliant; and that success in all cases diminishes, and, in some, does away the reproach naturally attached to criminality. It is also to be admitted, that in the Roman character there was a degree of courage and magnanimity that commands admiration, though the end to which it was applied was in itself detestable. Even in individual life (moral principle apart) there is something that diminishes the horror attendant on injustice and rapacity, when accompanied with courage and prodigality.
It is no less true, that the manners of commercial men, though their views are legitimate and their means fair, are prejudicial to them in the opinion of others. Individuals, gaining money by commerce, may sometimes have the splendour and magnanimity of princes; but nations that depend only on commerce for wealth never can. No nation, while it continues great or wealthy, can rid itself of the characteristic manners that attend the way in which it obtains its wealth and greatness. Merchants owe their wealth to a strict adherence to their interest, and they cannot help shewing it.
The cruelties of the Spaniards have not excited the detestation they deserved, because they were accompanied with courage, and crowned with success; and that nation found means, in the midst of the most horrible of human crimes, to preserve an appearance of greatness and dignity of character. But the Dutch, who have gained wealth, like the Carthaginians, and though they were conquerors, never quitted the character of merchants, and they never possessed dignity of character, though they triumphed by virtue, perseverance, and bravery, over that very Spain which did preserve her dignity.
It is much more difficult to reconcile the character of trading nations with the qualities that are improperly called great, than that of any other. A commercial nation naturally will be just; it may be generous; but it never can become extravagant and wasteful; neither can it be incumbered with the lazy and the idle; for the moment that either of these takes place, commerce flies to another habitation. {36}
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{36} It follows, from this, that a commercial people never become so degraded as those who obtain wealth by other means; but, then, it also follows, that they exist a much shorter time after they become so, and that wealth and power leave them much more speedily.
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The purpose of this inquiry being, to examine the effects of wealth, and its operation in the decline of nations; it appears to be of considerable importance to remove the error, in which historians and other writers have so long persevered, relative to the two greatest republics of antiquity; particularly as their example applies the most readily, and is the most frequently applied to two rival nations of modern times; although the parallel is extremely imperfect in almost every particular, and in some directly inadmissible. {37}
It cannot but be attended with some advantage to set this matter right. It may, perhaps, tend in some degree to prevent the French from attempting to imitate the Romans, when we shew them that a state, whether a whole people, or a single city, exempted from taxes, and living by the tribute of other countries, must, at all events, be dependent on its armies. In short, military government and tributary revenue are inseparable. We see how closely they were connected in ancient Rome. It is fit that its imitators should know at what rate they pay (and in what coin) for those exemptions from taxes, occasioned by the burthens imposed upon other nations.
In general we find, that all nations are inclined to push to the extreme those means by which they have attained wealth or power; and it will also be found that their ruin is thereby brought on with greater rapidity.
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{37} The reader must see the allusion is to England and France; but, in point of time, their situation is absolutely different. France is farther advanced in luxury than England. Rome was far behind Carthage. The Romans exceeded their rivals in perseverance; in following up their plans, and in attention to their liberty. The contrary is the case with France and England.
The French, indeed, resemble the Romans in restlessness and ambition; but not in their mode of exerting the former, or of gratifying the latter: the resemblance, therefore, is a very faint one, even where it does hold at all. The English, in whatever they may resemble the Carthaginians, such as they have been represented, neither do it in their want of faith and honour, nor in their progress towards decline. The different wars with Rome, in which Carthage came off a loser and became tributary, though only for a limited time, were not the only causes of its decline. The trade of Alexandria, which was better situated for commerce, had diminished the resources of Carthage; so that it was, in every sense of the word, a falling nation. It will be seen, in the subsequent part of this inquiry, how, from the different modes of making war and also the different effects of wealth in the present times, the comparison is still less founded.
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Had the Romans stopped the career of conquest at an earlier period, they probably would not have so soon sunk into a state of corruption. It is very probable, that if Caesar had never attempted the useless conquest of Britain, he never would have succeeded in conquering the liberties of his own country. The reputation of having conquered an island, and the passage of the British Channel, made way for the passage of the Rubicon, and the battle of Pharsalia.
Conquerors must be paid as well as common soldiers: and though every man may have his price, and money and dignities may be a sufficient reward for the most part, there are some who despise any reward under that of royal power. -- Caesar was one of those men; and both ancient and modern history shew, that though, perhaps, in his abilities, he has had no equal, there have been others who have rated theirs at as high a price.
The Romans at last became sensible, when too late, that they had pushed the spirit of conquest too far; and, as they had something great in all they did, they had the magnanimity to retract their error.
The greatest extent of the Roman empire being from the north of England to the Gulf of Persia, they consequently abandoned Britain, and those conquests in Asia, which were the most difficult to keep. The river Euphrates became the boundary, the Emperor Adrian having, in a voluntary manner, given up all the country to the north of that river, situated on its left bank.
The decline of the empire might have been as regular as the rise of the republic, had it not been for the different characters of the emperors; some of whom did honour to human nature, from their possessing almost every virtue, while others were such monsters, that their crimes excite the highest degree of horror and indignation, and are almost beyond credibility.
It is but justice to the Romans to observe, that though they robbed and conquered, yet their policy was to instruct, improve, and civilize those whom they had robbed and conquered, wherever they stood in want of it. They aimed, in every case, at making the most of the circumstances in which they were placed, and they very truly conceived, that it was more profitable and advantageous, to rule over a civilized than a rude people. [end of page #39]
After the great influx of wealth had corrupted Rome, its public expenses increased at an enormous rate, till at last that portion of the tribute exacted from the provinces, which it pleased the armies and the generals to remit to Rome, became unequal to the expenditure. Taxation of every kind then became necessary, in Italy itself, and the evils that attend the multiplication of imposts were greatly augmented by the ignorant manner in which they were laid on, by men who understood little but military affairs, added to the severe manner in which were they =sic= levied by a rude, imperious, and debauched soldiery.
The characters of soldier and citizen, which had been so long united, ceased to have any connection. Soon after this, the corruption of manners became general; and, at last, the Romans unable to find soldiers amongst themselves, were obliged to retain barbarians to fight in their defence, {38} and to bribe the Persians, and other nations, to leave them in a state of tranquility.
No nation that ever yet submitted to pay tribute, has long preserved its independence. The Romans knew this well; and if any one, having had recourse to that expedient, has escaped ruin, it has been from some other circumstance than its own exertion; or it has sometimes been the effort of despair when pushed to extremity.
Though, in many respects, Montesquieu's opinion of the affairs of Rome is by no means to be taken, yet his short account of the whole is unexceptionally just.
"Take," says that able and profound writer, "this compendium of the Roman history. The Romans subdued all nations by their maxims; but, when they had succeeded in doing so, they could no longer preserve their republican form of government. It was necessary to change the plan, and maxims contrary to their first, being introduced, they were divested of all their grandeur."
This was literally the case; but then it is clear that this compendium, only includes the secondary causes, and their effects; for the perseverance in maxims till they had obtained their end, and then changing
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{38} This is exactly one of the charges brought against the Carthaginians in the last Punic war.
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them, which was not an act of the will, must have been occasioned by some cause inherent in their situation, which had gradually changed.
In searching for this cause we shall be very much assisted, and the conclusion will be rendered more certain, by observing in what particular circumstances, they resembled other nations who had undergone a similar changes. =sic=
In doing this, we find the inquiry wonderfully abridged indeed, and the conclusion reduced nearly to a mathematical certainty, by observing that the change of maxims, that is to say, the change in ways of thinking, whenever it has taken place, has followed soon after the introduction of wealth and refinement, which change manners, and consequently maxims.
Wealth, acquired by conquest, was incompatible with that austere virtue and independent principle which form the basis of republican prosperity.
As all public employments were obtained by the favour of the people; and as all wealth and power were obtained by the channels of public employment; bribery and corruption, which cannot take place in a poor republic, became very common in this wealthy one; so that this republican government, so constituted, lost all those advantages it possessed while it was poor.
Had the murderers of Julius Caesar, either understood the real corruption of the commonwealth, or foreseen that a new master would rise up, they would never have destroyed that admirable man. Had Rome not been ready to receive a master, Julius Caesar, with all his ambition, would never have grasped at the crown.
In nations that obtain wealth by commerce, manufactures, or any other means than by conquests, the corruption of the state is not naturally so great. The wealth originates in the people, and not in the state; and, besides that they are more difficult to purchase, there is less means of doing so, and less inducement; neither can they, being the sources of wealth themselves, become so idle and corrupted. {39}
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{39} The wild and ungovernable direction that the French revolution took originated chiefly in the creation of assignats, which not only exempted the people from taxes at first, but had the effect of producing an artificial and temporary degree of wealth, that [end of page #41] enabled vast numbers, either in the pay of others, or at their own expense, to make cabals and politics their whole study. Rome never was in such a licentious state, because, before the citizens got into that situation, the military power was established.
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In the ancient nations that fell one after another, we have seen the young and vigorous subdue the more wealthy and luxurious; or we have seen superior art and skill get the better of valour and ignorance; but, in the fall of the Roman empire, the art and skill were all on the side of those who fell, and the vigour of those who conquered was not so powerful an agent as the very low and degraded state into which the masters of the world had themselves fallen.
It is by no means consistent with the plan of this work, nor is it any way necessary for the inquiry, to enter into the particular details of the degraded and miserable state to which the Romans were reduced; insomuch, that those who emigrated previously to its fall, and settled amongst barbarous nations, found themselves more happy than they had been, being freed from taxation and a variety of oppressions.
Though the Roman people are, of all others, those whose rise and fall are the most distinctly known; yet, in some circumstances, their case does not apply to nations in general. Had they cultivated commerce and the arts, with the same success that they pursued conquest, they must have become wealthy at a much earlier period, and they would not have found themselves in possession of an almost boundless empire, composed of different nations, subdued by force, and requiring force to be preserved.
The decline of nations, who become rich by means of industry, may be natural; but, the fall of a nation, owing its greatness to the subjugation of others, must be necessary. Human affairs are too complicated and varied to admit of perfect equality, and the relative situations of mankind are always changing; yet, in some instances, perhaps, changes might be obviated, or protracted, by timely preventives. But there is no possibility of keeping them long in so unnatural a situation, as that of a nation of wealthy and idle people, ruling over and keeping in subjection others who are more hardy, poorer, and more virtuous, than themselves.
Before the western empire fell, the following causes of its weakness were arrived at a great height. [end of page #42]
Manners were corrupted to the highest degree; there was neither public nor private virtue; intrigue, cabal, and money, did every thing.
Property was all in the hands of a few; the great mass of the people were wretchedly poor, mutinous, and idle.