6.—REALIZATION

The change which justice calls for is to come about in this way, that those men who have recognized the truth are to convince others how necessary the change is for the sake of justice, and that hereby, spontaneously, law is to transform itself, the State and property to drop away, and the new condition to appear.The new condition will appear "as soon as the idea is popularized";[187]that it may appear, we must "popularize the idea."[188]

I. Nothing is requisite but to convince men that justice commands the change.

1. Proudhon rejects all other methods. His doctrine is "in accord with the constitution and the laws."[189]"Accomplish the Revolution, they say, andafter this everything will be cleared up. As if the Revolution itself could be accomplished without a leading idea!"[190]"To secure justice to one's self by bloodshed is an extremity to which the Californians, gathered since yesterday to seek for gold, may be reduced; but may the luck of France preserve us from it!"[191]

"Despite the violence which we witness, I do not believe that hereafter liberty will need to use force to claim its rights and avenge its wrongs. Reason will serve us better; and patience, like the Revolution, is invincible."[192]

2. But how shall we convince men, "how popularize the idea, if thebourgeoisieremains hostile; if the populace, brutalized by servitude, full of prejudices and bad instincts, remains plunged in indifference; if the professors, the academicians, the press, are calumniating you; if the courts are truculent; if the powers that be muffle your voice? Don't worry. Just as the lack of ideas makes one lose the most promising games, war against ideas can only push forward the Revolution. Do you not see already that therégimeof authority, of inequality, of predestination, of eternal salvation, and of reasons of State, is daily becoming still more intolerable for the well-to-do classes, whose conscience and reason it tortures, than for the mass, whose stomach cries out against it?"[193]

3. The most effective means for convincing men, according to Proudhon, is to present to the people, within the State and without violating its law, "an example of centralization spontaneous, independent, and social," thus applying even now the principles of the future constitution of society.[194]"Rouse that collective action without which the condition of the people will forever be unhappy and its efforts powerless. Teach it to produce wealth and order with its own hands, without the help of the authorities."[195]

Proudhon sought to give such an example by the founding of the People's Bank.[196]

The People's Bank was to "insure work and prosperity to all producers by organizing them as beginning and end of production with regard to one another,—that is, as capitalists and as consumers."[197]

"The People's Bank was to be the property of all the citizens who accepted its services, who for this purpose furnished money to it if they thought that it could not yet for some time do without a metallic basis, and who, in every case, promised it their preference in discounting paper, and received its notes as cash. Accordingly the People's Bank, working for the profit of its customers themselves, had no occasion to take interest for its loans nor to charge a discount on commercial paper; it had only to take a very slight allowance to cover salaries and expenses. So credit wasGRATUITOUS!—The principle being realized, the consequences unfolded themselves adinfinitum."[198]

"So the People's Bank, giving an example ofpopular initiative alike in government and in public economy, which thenceforth were to be identified in a single synthesis, was becoming for theprolétariatat once the principle and the instrument of their emancipation; it was creating political and industrial liberty. And, as every philosophy and every religion is the metaphysical or symbolic expression of social economy, the People's Bank, changing the material basis of society, was ushering in the revolution of philosophy and religion; it was thus, at least, that its founders had conceived of it."[199]

All this can best be made clear by reproducing some provisions from the constitution of the People's Bank.

Art. 1. By these presents a commercial company is founded under the name ofSociété de la Banque du Peuple, consisting of Citizen Proudhon, here present, and the persons who shall give their assent to this constitution by becoming stockholders.Art. 3.... For the present the company will exist as a partnership in which Citizen Proudhon shall be general partner, and the other parties concerned shall be limited partners who shall in no case be responsible for more than the value of their shares.Art. 5.... The firm name shall be P. J. Proudhon & Co.Art. 6. Besides the members of the company proper, every citizen is invited to form a part of the People's Bank as a co-operator. For this it suffices to assent to the bank's constitution and to accept its paper.Art. 7. The People's Bank Company being capable of indefinite extension, its virtual duration is endless. However, to conform to the requirements of the law, it fixes its duration at ninety-nine years, which shall commence on the day of its definitive organization.Art. 9.... The People's Bank, having as itsbasisthe essential gratuitousness of credit and exchange, as itsobjectthe circulation, not the production, of values, and as itsmeansthemutual consent of producers and consumers, can and should work without capital.This end will be reached when the entire mass of producers and consumers shall have assented to the constitution of the company.Till then the People's Bank Company, having to conform to established custom and the requirements of law, and especially in order more effectively to invite citizens to join it, will provide itself with capital.Art. 10. The capital of the People's Bank shall be five million francs, divided into shares of five francs each.... The company shall be definitively organized, and its business shall begin, when ten thousand shares are taken.Art. 12. Stock shall be issued only at par. It shall bear no interest.Art. 15. The principal businesses of the People's Bank are, 1, to increase its cash on hand by issuing notes; 2, discounting endorsed commercial paper; 3, discounting accepted orders (commandes) and bills (factures); 4, loans on personal property; 5, loans on personal security; 6, advances on annuities and collateral security; 7, payments and collections; 8, advances to productive and industrial enterprises (la commande).To these departments the People's Bank will add: 9, the functions of a savings bank and endowment insurance; 10, insurance; 11, safe deposit vaults; 12, the service of the budget.[200]Art. 18. In distinction from ordinary bank notes, payable inspecieto some one'sorder, the paper of the People's Bank is an order for goods, vested with a social character, rendered perpetual, and is payable at sight by every stockholder and co-operator in theproductsorservicesof his industry or profession.Art. 21. Every co-operator agrees to trade by preference, for all goods which the company can offer him, with the co-operators of the bank, and to reserve his orders exclusively for his fellow stockholders and fellow co-operators.In return, every producer or tradesman co-operating with the bank agrees to furnish his goods to the other co-operators at a reduced price.Art. 62. The People's Bank has its headquarters in Paris.Its aim is, in the course of time, to establish a branch in everyarrondissementand a correspondent in every commune.Art. 63. As soon as circumstances permit, the present company shall be converted into a corporation, since this form allows us to realize, according to the wish of the founders, the threefold principle, first, of election; second, of the separation and the independence of the branches of work; third, of the personal responsibility of every employee.[201]

Art. 1. By these presents a commercial company is founded under the name ofSociété de la Banque du Peuple, consisting of Citizen Proudhon, here present, and the persons who shall give their assent to this constitution by becoming stockholders.

Art. 3.... For the present the company will exist as a partnership in which Citizen Proudhon shall be general partner, and the other parties concerned shall be limited partners who shall in no case be responsible for more than the value of their shares.

Art. 5.... The firm name shall be P. J. Proudhon & Co.

Art. 6. Besides the members of the company proper, every citizen is invited to form a part of the People's Bank as a co-operator. For this it suffices to assent to the bank's constitution and to accept its paper.

Art. 7. The People's Bank Company being capable of indefinite extension, its virtual duration is endless. However, to conform to the requirements of the law, it fixes its duration at ninety-nine years, which shall commence on the day of its definitive organization.

Art. 9.... The People's Bank, having as itsbasisthe essential gratuitousness of credit and exchange, as itsobjectthe circulation, not the production, of values, and as itsmeansthemutual consent of producers and consumers, can and should work without capital.

This end will be reached when the entire mass of producers and consumers shall have assented to the constitution of the company.

Till then the People's Bank Company, having to conform to established custom and the requirements of law, and especially in order more effectively to invite citizens to join it, will provide itself with capital.

Art. 10. The capital of the People's Bank shall be five million francs, divided into shares of five francs each.

... The company shall be definitively organized, and its business shall begin, when ten thousand shares are taken.

Art. 12. Stock shall be issued only at par. It shall bear no interest.

Art. 15. The principal businesses of the People's Bank are, 1, to increase its cash on hand by issuing notes; 2, discounting endorsed commercial paper; 3, discounting accepted orders (commandes) and bills (factures); 4, loans on personal property; 5, loans on personal security; 6, advances on annuities and collateral security; 7, payments and collections; 8, advances to productive and industrial enterprises (la commande).

To these departments the People's Bank will add: 9, the functions of a savings bank and endowment insurance; 10, insurance; 11, safe deposit vaults; 12, the service of the budget.[200]

Art. 18. In distinction from ordinary bank notes, payable inspecieto some one'sorder, the paper of the People's Bank is an order for goods, vested with a social character, rendered perpetual, and is payable at sight by every stockholder and co-operator in theproductsorservicesof his industry or profession.

Art. 21. Every co-operator agrees to trade by preference, for all goods which the company can offer him, with the co-operators of the bank, and to reserve his orders exclusively for his fellow stockholders and fellow co-operators.

In return, every producer or tradesman co-operating with the bank agrees to furnish his goods to the other co-operators at a reduced price.

Art. 62. The People's Bank has its headquarters in Paris.

Its aim is, in the course of time, to establish a branch in everyarrondissementand a correspondent in every commune.

Art. 63. As soon as circumstances permit, the present company shall be converted into a corporation, since this form allows us to realize, according to the wish of the founders, the threefold principle, first, of election; second, of the separation and the independence of the branches of work; third, of the personal responsibility of every employee.[201]

II. If once men are convinced that justice commands the change, then will "despotism fall of itself by its very uselessness."[202]The State and property disappear, law is transformed, and the new condition of things begins.

"The Revolution does not act after the fashion of the old governmental, aristocratic, or dynastic principle. It is Right, the balance of forces, equality. It has no conquests to pursue, no nations to reduce to servitude, no frontiers to defend, no fortresses to build, no armies to feed, no laurels to pluck, no preponderance to maintain. The might of its economic institutions, the gratuitousness of its credit, the brilliancy of its thought, are its sufficient means for converting the universe."[203]"The Revolution has for allies all who suffer oppression and exploitation; let it appear, and the universe stretches its arms to it."[204]

"I want the peaceable revolution. I want you to make the very institutions which I charge you to abolish, and the principles of law which you will have to complete, serve toward the realization of my wishes, so that the new society shall appear as the spontaneous, natural, and necessary development of the old, and that the Revolution, while abrogating the oldorder of things, shall nevertheless be the progress of that order."[205]"When the people, once enlightened regarding its true interests, declares its will not to reform the government but to revolutionize society,"[206]then "the dissolution of government in the economic organism"[207]will follow in a way about which one can at present only make guesses.[208]

FOOTNOTES:[125]Not (as stated by Diehl vol. 2 p. 116, Zenker p. 61) 1852.[126]Proudhon "Propriété" p. 295 [212. Bracketed references under Proudhon are to the collected edition of his "Œuvres complètes," Paris, 1866-83.—The passage quoted above is probably the first case in history where anybody called himself an Anarchist, though the word had long been in use as a term of reproach for enemies].[127]Pr. "Justice" 1. 182-3 [1. 224-5].[128]Pr. "Justice" 1. 184-5 [1. 227].[129]Ib.1. 73 [132? but there he saysmust be, notis].[130]Ib.1. 185 [1. 228].[131]Ib.1. 195 [1. 235].[132]Ib.1. 185 [1. 228].[133]Pr. "Justice" 1. 195 [1. 235].[134]Ib.3. 45 [3. 276, but with the bracketed sentence much abridged. For the phrase "rebel against right," remember that in Frenchrightandcommon laware one and the same word].[135]Pr. "Propriété" p. 18 [24-5].[136]Pr. "Idée" 147-8 [136-7][137]Ib.149 [138].[138]Pr. "Idée" pp. 149-50 [138].[139]Pr. "Principe" p. 64 [44].[140]Pr. "Idée" p. 235 [215].[141]Pr. "Principe" p. 64 [44].[142]Pr. "Idée" p. 343 [312].[143]Pr. "Idée" pp. 342-3 [311-12].[144]Pr. "Confessions" p. 8 [29].[145]Ib.p. 6 [23].[146]Pr. "Propriété" p. 301 [216].[147]Ib.pp. 298-9 [214].[148]Pr. "Solution" p. 54 [39].[149]Pr. "Confessions" p. 7 [24].[150]Ib.p. 7 [25-6].[151]Pr. "Propriété" p. 301 [216], "Confessions" p. 68 [192], "Solution" p. 119 [87].[152]Pr. "Principe" p. 67 [46].—Proudhon's teaching was not, as asserted by Diehl vol. 2 p. 116, vol. 3 pp. 166-7, and Zenker p. 61, Anarchism till 1852 and Federalism thenceforward; his Anarchism was Federalism from the start, only he later gave it the additional name of Federalism.[153]Pr. "Propriété" pp. XIX-XX [10-11].[154]Pr. "Idée" pp. 235-6 [215-16].[155]Pr. "Solution" p. 119 [87].[156]Pr. "Propriété" pp. 301-2 [216].[157]Pr. "Confessions" p. 65 [180-3; bracketed words a paraphrase.][158]Pr. "Confessions" pp. 65-6 [183-4, except bracketed words].[159]Ib.pp. 66-8 [185-9].[160]Pr. "Confessions" p. 68 [191-2].[161]Pfau pp. 227-31, Adler p. 372, Zenker pp. 26, 41, fail to see this, being influenced by the improper sense in which Proudhon uses the word "property" for a contractually guaranteed share of goods. [Eltzbacher's statement, on the other hand, is not so much drawn from Proudhon himself as deduced from a comparison of Eltzbacher's definition of property with the statement that Proudhon admits no law but the law of contract. I do not think this last statement is correct; I think Proudhon would have his voluntary contractual associations protect their members in certain definable respects—among others, in the possession of goods—against those who stood outside the contract as well as against those within. Then this would be, by Eltzbacher's definitions, both law and property.][162]Pr. "Contradictions" 2. 303-4 [2. 237-8].[163]Pr. "Propriété" pp. 285-90 [205-9].[164]Pr. "Propriété" p. 293 [211].[165]Ib.pp. 1-2 [13].[166]Ib.p. 283 [204].[167]Ib.p. 311 [223].[168]Ib.p. 311 [223].[169]Ib.p. 311 [223].[170]Ib.pp. XVIII-XIX [10; consult the passage].[171]Ib.pp. XIX-XX [11].[172]Pr. "Contradictions" 2. 234-5 [2. 184].[173]Pr. "Droit" p. 50 [230].[174]Pr. "Justice" 1. 302-3 [1. 324-5].[175]Ib.303 [1. 325].[176]Pr. "Idée" p. 235 [215]; "Principe" p. 64 [44].[177]Pr. "Contradictions" 1. 51 [1. 74].[178]Ib.1. 53 [1. 75].[179]Ib.1. 55. [1. 76-7].[180]Ib.1. 68 [1. 87].[181]Ib.1. 68 [1. 87].[182]Ib.1. 83 [1. 98-9].[183]Pr. "Justice" 1. 302-3 [1. 325].[184]Pr. "Contradictions" 2. 528 [2. 414].[185]Pr. "Organisation" p. 5 [93].[186]Pr. "Banque" pp. 3-4 [260].[187]Pr. "Justice" 1. 515 [2. 133].[188]Ib.1. 515 [2. 133].[189]Pr. "Confessions" p. 71 [201].[190]Pr. "Justice" 1, 515 [2, 133. Eltzbacher finds the sense "all will be enlightened" where I translate "everything will be cleared up." Eltzbacher's view of the sense—that to those who say "Enlightenment must come by the Revolution" Proudhon replies, "No, the Revolution must come by enlightenment"—correctly gives the thought brought out in the context].[191]Pr. "Justice" 1. 466 [2. 90].[192]Ib.1. 470-71 [2. 94].[193]Ib.1. 515 [2. 133-4].[194]Pr. "Confessions" p. 69 [196].[195]Ib.p. 72 [203].[196]Ib.p. 69 [196].[197]Ib.p. 69 [196].[198]Ib.pp. 69-70 [197].[199]Pr. "Confessions" p. 70 [197-8].[200][French dictionaries leave us somewhat in the lurch as to commercial usages which differ from the English. Eltzbacher translates 8, "investment as silent partner"; 12, "balancing accounts."][201]Pr. "Banque" pp. 5-20 [261-77].[202]Pr. "Confessions" p. 72 [202-3].[203]Pr. "Justice" 1. 509 [2. 128-9].[204]Ib.1. 510 [2. 129].[205]Pr. "Idée" pp. 196-7 [181].[206]Ib.p. 197 [181].[207]Ib.p. 277 [253].[208]Ib.pp. 195, 197 [180-81].

[125]Not (as stated by Diehl vol. 2 p. 116, Zenker p. 61) 1852.

[125]Not (as stated by Diehl vol. 2 p. 116, Zenker p. 61) 1852.

[126]Proudhon "Propriété" p. 295 [212. Bracketed references under Proudhon are to the collected edition of his "Œuvres complètes," Paris, 1866-83.—The passage quoted above is probably the first case in history where anybody called himself an Anarchist, though the word had long been in use as a term of reproach for enemies].

[126]Proudhon "Propriété" p. 295 [212. Bracketed references under Proudhon are to the collected edition of his "Œuvres complètes," Paris, 1866-83.—The passage quoted above is probably the first case in history where anybody called himself an Anarchist, though the word had long been in use as a term of reproach for enemies].

[127]Pr. "Justice" 1. 182-3 [1. 224-5].

[127]Pr. "Justice" 1. 182-3 [1. 224-5].

[128]Pr. "Justice" 1. 184-5 [1. 227].

[128]Pr. "Justice" 1. 184-5 [1. 227].

[129]Ib.1. 73 [132? but there he saysmust be, notis].

[129]Ib.1. 73 [132? but there he saysmust be, notis].

[130]Ib.1. 185 [1. 228].

[130]Ib.1. 185 [1. 228].

[131]Ib.1. 195 [1. 235].

[131]Ib.1. 195 [1. 235].

[132]Ib.1. 185 [1. 228].

[132]Ib.1. 185 [1. 228].

[133]Pr. "Justice" 1. 195 [1. 235].

[133]Pr. "Justice" 1. 195 [1. 235].

[134]Ib.3. 45 [3. 276, but with the bracketed sentence much abridged. For the phrase "rebel against right," remember that in Frenchrightandcommon laware one and the same word].

[134]Ib.3. 45 [3. 276, but with the bracketed sentence much abridged. For the phrase "rebel against right," remember that in Frenchrightandcommon laware one and the same word].

[135]Pr. "Propriété" p. 18 [24-5].

[135]Pr. "Propriété" p. 18 [24-5].

[136]Pr. "Idée" 147-8 [136-7]

[136]Pr. "Idée" 147-8 [136-7]

[137]Ib.149 [138].

[137]Ib.149 [138].

[138]Pr. "Idée" pp. 149-50 [138].

[138]Pr. "Idée" pp. 149-50 [138].

[139]Pr. "Principe" p. 64 [44].

[139]Pr. "Principe" p. 64 [44].

[140]Pr. "Idée" p. 235 [215].

[140]Pr. "Idée" p. 235 [215].

[141]Pr. "Principe" p. 64 [44].

[141]Pr. "Principe" p. 64 [44].

[142]Pr. "Idée" p. 343 [312].

[142]Pr. "Idée" p. 343 [312].

[143]Pr. "Idée" pp. 342-3 [311-12].

[143]Pr. "Idée" pp. 342-3 [311-12].

[144]Pr. "Confessions" p. 8 [29].

[144]Pr. "Confessions" p. 8 [29].

[145]Ib.p. 6 [23].

[145]Ib.p. 6 [23].

[146]Pr. "Propriété" p. 301 [216].

[146]Pr. "Propriété" p. 301 [216].

[147]Ib.pp. 298-9 [214].

[147]Ib.pp. 298-9 [214].

[148]Pr. "Solution" p. 54 [39].

[148]Pr. "Solution" p. 54 [39].

[149]Pr. "Confessions" p. 7 [24].

[149]Pr. "Confessions" p. 7 [24].

[150]Ib.p. 7 [25-6].

[150]Ib.p. 7 [25-6].

[151]Pr. "Propriété" p. 301 [216], "Confessions" p. 68 [192], "Solution" p. 119 [87].

[151]Pr. "Propriété" p. 301 [216], "Confessions" p. 68 [192], "Solution" p. 119 [87].

[152]Pr. "Principe" p. 67 [46].—Proudhon's teaching was not, as asserted by Diehl vol. 2 p. 116, vol. 3 pp. 166-7, and Zenker p. 61, Anarchism till 1852 and Federalism thenceforward; his Anarchism was Federalism from the start, only he later gave it the additional name of Federalism.

[152]Pr. "Principe" p. 67 [46].—Proudhon's teaching was not, as asserted by Diehl vol. 2 p. 116, vol. 3 pp. 166-7, and Zenker p. 61, Anarchism till 1852 and Federalism thenceforward; his Anarchism was Federalism from the start, only he later gave it the additional name of Federalism.

[153]Pr. "Propriété" pp. XIX-XX [10-11].

[153]Pr. "Propriété" pp. XIX-XX [10-11].

[154]Pr. "Idée" pp. 235-6 [215-16].

[154]Pr. "Idée" pp. 235-6 [215-16].

[155]Pr. "Solution" p. 119 [87].

[155]Pr. "Solution" p. 119 [87].

[156]Pr. "Propriété" pp. 301-2 [216].

[156]Pr. "Propriété" pp. 301-2 [216].

[157]Pr. "Confessions" p. 65 [180-3; bracketed words a paraphrase.]

[157]Pr. "Confessions" p. 65 [180-3; bracketed words a paraphrase.]

[158]Pr. "Confessions" pp. 65-6 [183-4, except bracketed words].

[158]Pr. "Confessions" pp. 65-6 [183-4, except bracketed words].

[159]Ib.pp. 66-8 [185-9].

[159]Ib.pp. 66-8 [185-9].

[160]Pr. "Confessions" p. 68 [191-2].

[160]Pr. "Confessions" p. 68 [191-2].

[161]Pfau pp. 227-31, Adler p. 372, Zenker pp. 26, 41, fail to see this, being influenced by the improper sense in which Proudhon uses the word "property" for a contractually guaranteed share of goods. [Eltzbacher's statement, on the other hand, is not so much drawn from Proudhon himself as deduced from a comparison of Eltzbacher's definition of property with the statement that Proudhon admits no law but the law of contract. I do not think this last statement is correct; I think Proudhon would have his voluntary contractual associations protect their members in certain definable respects—among others, in the possession of goods—against those who stood outside the contract as well as against those within. Then this would be, by Eltzbacher's definitions, both law and property.]

[161]Pfau pp. 227-31, Adler p. 372, Zenker pp. 26, 41, fail to see this, being influenced by the improper sense in which Proudhon uses the word "property" for a contractually guaranteed share of goods. [Eltzbacher's statement, on the other hand, is not so much drawn from Proudhon himself as deduced from a comparison of Eltzbacher's definition of property with the statement that Proudhon admits no law but the law of contract. I do not think this last statement is correct; I think Proudhon would have his voluntary contractual associations protect their members in certain definable respects—among others, in the possession of goods—against those who stood outside the contract as well as against those within. Then this would be, by Eltzbacher's definitions, both law and property.]

[162]Pr. "Contradictions" 2. 303-4 [2. 237-8].

[162]Pr. "Contradictions" 2. 303-4 [2. 237-8].

[163]Pr. "Propriété" pp. 285-90 [205-9].

[163]Pr. "Propriété" pp. 285-90 [205-9].

[164]Pr. "Propriété" p. 293 [211].

[164]Pr. "Propriété" p. 293 [211].

[165]Ib.pp. 1-2 [13].

[165]Ib.pp. 1-2 [13].

[166]Ib.p. 283 [204].

[166]Ib.p. 283 [204].

[167]Ib.p. 311 [223].

[167]Ib.p. 311 [223].

[168]Ib.p. 311 [223].

[168]Ib.p. 311 [223].

[169]Ib.p. 311 [223].

[169]Ib.p. 311 [223].

[170]Ib.pp. XVIII-XIX [10; consult the passage].

[170]Ib.pp. XVIII-XIX [10; consult the passage].

[171]Ib.pp. XIX-XX [11].

[171]Ib.pp. XIX-XX [11].

[172]Pr. "Contradictions" 2. 234-5 [2. 184].

[172]Pr. "Contradictions" 2. 234-5 [2. 184].

[173]Pr. "Droit" p. 50 [230].

[173]Pr. "Droit" p. 50 [230].

[174]Pr. "Justice" 1. 302-3 [1. 324-5].

[174]Pr. "Justice" 1. 302-3 [1. 324-5].

[175]Ib.303 [1. 325].

[175]Ib.303 [1. 325].

[176]Pr. "Idée" p. 235 [215]; "Principe" p. 64 [44].

[176]Pr. "Idée" p. 235 [215]; "Principe" p. 64 [44].

[177]Pr. "Contradictions" 1. 51 [1. 74].

[177]Pr. "Contradictions" 1. 51 [1. 74].

[178]Ib.1. 53 [1. 75].

[178]Ib.1. 53 [1. 75].

[179]Ib.1. 55. [1. 76-7].

[179]Ib.1. 55. [1. 76-7].

[180]Ib.1. 68 [1. 87].

[180]Ib.1. 68 [1. 87].

[181]Ib.1. 68 [1. 87].

[181]Ib.1. 68 [1. 87].

[182]Ib.1. 83 [1. 98-9].

[182]Ib.1. 83 [1. 98-9].

[183]Pr. "Justice" 1. 302-3 [1. 325].

[183]Pr. "Justice" 1. 302-3 [1. 325].

[184]Pr. "Contradictions" 2. 528 [2. 414].

[184]Pr. "Contradictions" 2. 528 [2. 414].

[185]Pr. "Organisation" p. 5 [93].

[185]Pr. "Organisation" p. 5 [93].

[186]Pr. "Banque" pp. 3-4 [260].

[186]Pr. "Banque" pp. 3-4 [260].

[187]Pr. "Justice" 1. 515 [2. 133].

[187]Pr. "Justice" 1. 515 [2. 133].

[188]Ib.1. 515 [2. 133].

[188]Ib.1. 515 [2. 133].

[189]Pr. "Confessions" p. 71 [201].

[189]Pr. "Confessions" p. 71 [201].

[190]Pr. "Justice" 1, 515 [2, 133. Eltzbacher finds the sense "all will be enlightened" where I translate "everything will be cleared up." Eltzbacher's view of the sense—that to those who say "Enlightenment must come by the Revolution" Proudhon replies, "No, the Revolution must come by enlightenment"—correctly gives the thought brought out in the context].

[190]Pr. "Justice" 1, 515 [2, 133. Eltzbacher finds the sense "all will be enlightened" where I translate "everything will be cleared up." Eltzbacher's view of the sense—that to those who say "Enlightenment must come by the Revolution" Proudhon replies, "No, the Revolution must come by enlightenment"—correctly gives the thought brought out in the context].

[191]Pr. "Justice" 1. 466 [2. 90].

[191]Pr. "Justice" 1. 466 [2. 90].

[192]Ib.1. 470-71 [2. 94].

[192]Ib.1. 470-71 [2. 94].

[193]Ib.1. 515 [2. 133-4].

[193]Ib.1. 515 [2. 133-4].

[194]Pr. "Confessions" p. 69 [196].

[194]Pr. "Confessions" p. 69 [196].

[195]Ib.p. 72 [203].

[195]Ib.p. 72 [203].

[196]Ib.p. 69 [196].

[196]Ib.p. 69 [196].

[197]Ib.p. 69 [196].

[197]Ib.p. 69 [196].

[198]Ib.pp. 69-70 [197].

[198]Ib.pp. 69-70 [197].

[199]Pr. "Confessions" p. 70 [197-8].

[199]Pr. "Confessions" p. 70 [197-8].

[200][French dictionaries leave us somewhat in the lurch as to commercial usages which differ from the English. Eltzbacher translates 8, "investment as silent partner"; 12, "balancing accounts."]

[200][French dictionaries leave us somewhat in the lurch as to commercial usages which differ from the English. Eltzbacher translates 8, "investment as silent partner"; 12, "balancing accounts."]

[201]Pr. "Banque" pp. 5-20 [261-77].

[201]Pr. "Banque" pp. 5-20 [261-77].

[202]Pr. "Confessions" p. 72 [202-3].

[202]Pr. "Confessions" p. 72 [202-3].

[203]Pr. "Justice" 1. 509 [2. 128-9].

[203]Pr. "Justice" 1. 509 [2. 128-9].

[204]Ib.1. 510 [2. 129].

[204]Ib.1. 510 [2. 129].

[205]Pr. "Idée" pp. 196-7 [181].

[205]Pr. "Idée" pp. 196-7 [181].

[206]Ib.p. 197 [181].

[206]Ib.p. 197 [181].

[207]Ib.p. 277 [253].

[207]Ib.p. 277 [253].

[208]Ib.pp. 195, 197 [180-81].

[208]Ib.pp. 195, 197 [180-81].

1. Johann Kaspar Schmidt was born in 1806, at Bayreuth in Bavaria. He studied philosophy and theology at Berlin from 1826 to 1828, at Erlangen from 1828 to 1829. In 1829 he interrupted his studies, made a prolonged tour through Germany, and then lived alternately at Koenigsberg and Kulm till 1832. From 1832 to 1834 he studied at Berlin again; in 1835 he passed his tests there asGymnasiallehrer. He received no government appointment, however, and in 1839 became teacher in a young ladies' seminary in Berlin. He gave up this place in 1844, but continued to live in Berlin, and died there in 1856.

In part under the pseudonym Max Stirner, in part anonymously, Schmidt published a small number of works, mostly of a philosophical nature.

2. Stirner's teaching about law, the State, and property is contained chiefly in his book "Der Einzige und sein Eigentum" (1845).

—But here arises the question, Can we speak of such a thing as a "teaching" of Stirner's?

Stirner recognizes noought. "Men are such as they should be—can be. What should they be? Surely not more than they can be! And what can they be? Not more, again, than they—can,i. e.than they have the ability, the strength, to be."[209]"A man is 'called' to nothing, and has no 'proper business,' no 'function,' as little as a plant or beast has a 'vocation.' He has not a vocation; but he has powers, which express themselves where they are, because their being consists only in their expression, and which can remain idle as little as life, which would no longer be life if it 'stood still' but for a second. Now one might cry to man, 'Use your power.' But this imperative would be given the meaning that it was man's proper business to use his power. It is not so. Rather, every one really does use his power, without first regarding this as his vocation; every one uses in every moment as much power as he possesses."[210]

Nay, Stirner acknowledges no such thing as truth. "Truths are phrases, ways of speaking, words (logos); brought into connection, or arranged by ranks and files, they form logic, science, philosophy."[211]"Nor is there a truth,—not right, not liberty, humanity, etc.,—which could subsist before me, and to which I would submit."[212]"If there is a single truth to which man must consecrate his life and his powers because he is man, then he is subjected to a rule, dominion, law, etc.; he is a man in service."[213]"As long as you believe in truth, you do not believe in yourself; you are a—servant, a—religious man. You aloneare truth; or rather, you are more than truth, which is nothing at all before you."[214]

If one chose to draw the extreme inference from this, Stirner's book would be only a self-avowal, an expression of thoughts without any claim to general validity; in it Stirner would not be informing us what he thinks to be true, or what in his opinion we ought to do, but only giving us an opportunity to observe the play of his ideas. Stirner did not draw this inference,[215]and one should not let the style of the book, which speaks mostly of Stirner's "I," lead him to think that Stirner did draw it. He calls that man "blinded, who wants to be only 'Man'."[216]He takes the floor against "the erroneous consciousness of not being able to entitle myself to as much as I want."[217]He mocks at our grandmothers' belief in ghosts.[218]He declares that "penalty must make room for satisfaction,"[219]that man "should defend himself against man."[220]And he asserts that "over the door of our time stands not Apollo's 'Know thyself,' but a 'Turn yourself to account!'"[221]So Stirner intends not only to give us information about his inward condition at the time he composed his book, but to tell us what he thinks to be true and what we ought to do; his book is not a mere self-avowal, but a scientific teaching.

3. Stirner does not call his teaching about law, the State, and property "Anarchism." He prefers to use the epithet "anarchic" to designate political liberalism, which he combats.[222]

According to Stirner the supreme law for each one of us is his own welfare.

What does one's own welfare mean? "Let us seek out the enjoyment of life!"[223]"Henceforth the question is not how one can acquire life, but how he can expend it, enjoy it; not how one is to produce in himself the true ego, but how he is to dissolve himself, to live himself out."[224]"If the enjoyment of life is to triumph over the longing or hope for life, it must overcome it in its double significance which Schiller brings out in 'The Ideal and Life'; it must crush spiritual and temporal poverty, abolish the ideal and—the want of daily bread. He who must lay out his life in prolonging life cannot enjoy it, and he who is still seeking his life does not have it, and can as little enjoy it; both are poor."[225]

Our own welfare is our supreme law. Stirner recognizes no duty.[226]"Whether what I think and do is Christian, what do I care? Whether it is human, humane, liberal, or unhuman, inhumane, illiberal, what do I ask about that? If only it aims at what I would have, if only I satisfy myself in it, then fit it with predicates as you like; it is all one to me."[227]"So then my relation to the world is this: I no longer do anything for it 'for God's sake', I do nothing 'for man's sake', but what I do I do 'for my sake'."[228]"Where the world comes in my way—and it comes in my way everywhere—I devour it to appease thehunger of my egoism. You are to me nothing but—my food, just as I also am fed upon and used up by you. We have only one relation to each other, that of utility, of usableness, of use."[229]"I too love men, not merely individuals, but every one. But I love them with the consciousness of egoism; I love them because love makes me happy, I love because love is natural to me, because it pleases me. I know no 'commandment of love'."[230]

I.Looking to each one's own welfare, Stirner rejects law, and that without any limitation to particular spatial or temporal conditions.

Law[231]exists not by the individual's recognizing it as favorable to his interests, but by his holding it sacred. "Who can ask about 'right' if he is not occupying the religious standpoint just like other people? Is not 'right' a religious concept,i. e.something sacred?"[232]"When the Revolution stampedliberty as a 'right' it took refuge in the religious sphere, in the region of the sacred, the ideal."[233]"I am to revere the sultanic law in a sultanate, the popular law in republics, the canon law in Catholic communities, etc. I am to subordinate myself to these laws, I am to count them sacred."[234]"The law is sacred, and he who outrages it is a criminal."[235]"There are no criminals except against something sacred";[236]crime falls when the sacred disappears.[237]Punishment has a meaning only in relation to something sacred.[238]"What does the priest who admonishes the criminal do? He sets forth to him the great wrong of having by his act desecrated that which was hallowed by the State, its property (in which, you will see, the lives of those who belong to the State must be included)."[239]

But law is no more sacred than it is favorable to the individual's welfare. "Right—is a delusion, bestowed by a ghost."[240]Men have "not recovered the mastery over the thought of 'right,' which they themselves created; their creature is running away with them."[241]"Let the individual man claim ever so many rights; what do I care for his right and his claim?"[242]I do not respect them.—"What you have the might to be you have the right to be. I deduce all right and all entitlement from myself; I am entitled to everything that I have might over. I am entitled to overthrow Zeus, Jehovah, God, etc., if I can; if I cannot, then these gods will always remain in the right and in the might as against me."[243]

"Right crumbles into its nothingness when it is swallowed up by force,"[244]"but with the concept the word too loses its meaning."[245]"The people will perhaps be against the blasphemer; hence a law against blasphemy. Shall I therefore not blaspheme? Is this law to be more to me than an order?"[246]"He who has might 'stands above the law'."[247]"The earth belongs to him who knows how to take it, or who does not let it be taken from him, does not let himself be deprived of it. If he appropriates it, then not merely the earth, but also the right to it, belongs to him. This is egoistic right;i. e., it suits me, therefore it is right."[248]

II.Self-welfare commands that in future it itself should be men's rule of action in place of the law.

Each of us is "unique,"[249]"a world's history for himself,"[250]and, when he "knows himself as unique,"[251]he is a "self-owner."[252]"God and mankind have made nothing their object, nothing but themselves. Let me then likewise make myself my object, who am, as well as God, the nothing of all else, who am my all, who am the Unique."[253]"Away then with every business that is not altogether my business! You think at least the 'good cause' must be my business? What good, what bad? Why, I myself am my business, and I am neither good nor bad. Neither has meaning for me. What is divine is God's business, what is human 'Man's.' My business is neither what is divine nor what is human, it isnot what is true, good, right, free, etc., but only what is mine; and it is no general business, but is—unique, as I am unique. Nothing is more to me than myself!"[254]

"What a difference between freedom and self-ownership! I am free from what I am rid of; I am owner of what I have in my power."[255]"My freedom becomes complete only when it is my—might; but by this I cease to be a mere freeman and become a self-owner."[256]"Each must say to himself, I am all to myself and I do all for my sake. If it ever became clear to you that God, the commandments, etc., do you only harm, that they encroach on you and ruin you, you would certainly cast them from you just as the Christians once condemned Apollo or Minerva or heathen morality."[257]"How one acts only from himself, and asks no questions about anything further, the Christians have made concrete in the idea of 'God.' He acts 'as pleases him'."[258]

"Might is a fine thing and useful for many things; for 'one gets farther with a handful of might than with a bagful of right.' You long for freedom? You fools! If you took might, freedom would come of itself. See, he who has might 'stands above the law.' How does this prospect taste to you, you 'law-abiding' people? But you have no taste!"[259]

I.Together with law Stirner necessarily has to reject also, just as unconditionally, the legal institutionwhich is called State.Without law the State is not possible. "'Respect for the statutes!' By this cement the whole fabric of the State is held together."[260]

The State as well as the law, then, exists, not by the individual's recognizing it as favorable to his welfare, but rather by his counting it sacred, by "our being entangled in the error that it is an I, as which it applies to itself the name of a 'moral, mystical, or political person.' I, who really am I, must pull off this lion's skin of the I from the parading thistle-eater."[261]The same holds good of the State as of the family. "If each one who belongs to the family is to recognize and maintain that family in its permanent existence, then to each the tie of blood must be sacred, and his feeling for it must be that of family piety, of respect for the ties of blood, whereby every blood-relative becomes hallowed to him. So, also, to every member of the State-community this community must be sacred, and the concept which is supreme to the State must be supreme to him too."[262]The State is "not only entitled, but compelled, to demand" this.[263]

But the State is not sacred. "The State's behavior is violence, and it calls its violence 'law', but that of the individual 'crime'."[264]If I do not do what it wishes, "then the State turns against me with all the force of its lion-paws and eagle-talons; for it is the king of beasts, it is lion and eagle."[265]"Even if you do overpower your opponent as a power, it does not follow that you are to him a hallowed authority,unless he is a degenerate. He does not owe you respect, and reverence, even if he will be wary of your might."[266]

Nor is the State favorable to the individual's welfare. "I am the mortal enemy of the State."[267]"The general welfare as such is not my welfare, but only the extremity of self-denial. The general welfare may exult aloud while I must lie like a hushed dog; the State may be in splendor while I starve."[268]"Every State is a despotism, whether the despot be one or many, or whether, as people usually conceive to be the case in a republic, all are masters,i. e.each tyrannizes over the others."[269]"Doubtless the State leaves the individuals as free play as possible, only they must not turn the play to earnest, must not forget it. The State has never any object but to limit the individual, to tame him, to subordinate him, to subject him to something general; it lasts only so long as the individual is not all in all, and is only the clear-cut limitation of me, my limitedness, my slavery."[270]

"A State never aims to bring about the free activity of individuals, but only that activity which is bound to the State's purpose."[271]"The State seeks to hinder every free activity by its censorship, its oversight, its police, and counts this hindering as its duty, because it is in truth a duty of self-preservation."[272]"I am not allowed to do all the work I can, but only so much as the State permits; I must not turn my thoughts to account, nor my work, nor, in general,anything that is mine."[273]"Pauperism is the valuelessness of Me, the phenomenon of my being unable to turn myself to account. Therefore State and pauperism are one and the same. The State does not let me attain my value, and exists only by my valuelessness; its goal is always to get some benefit out of me,i. e.to exploit me, to use me up, even if this using consisted only in my providing aproles(prolétariat); it wants me to be 'its creature'."[274]

"The State cannot brook man's standing in a direct relation to man; it must come between as a—mediator, it must—intervene. It tears man from man, to put itself as 'spirit' in the middle. The laborers who demand a higher wage are treated as criminals so soon as they want to get it by compulsion. What are they to do? Without compulsion they don't get it, and in compulsion the State sees a self-help, a price fixed by the ego, a real, free turning to account of one's property, which it cannot permit."[275]

II.Every man's own welfare demands that a social human life solely on the basis of its precepts should take the place of the State.Stirner calls this sort of social life "the union of egoists."[276]

1. Even after the State is abolished men are to live together in society. "Self-owners will fight for the unity which is their own will, for union."[277]But what is to keep men together in the union?

Not a promise, at any rate, "If I were bound to-day and hereafter to my will of yesterday," my willwould "be benumbed. My creature,viz., a particular expression of will, would have become my dominator. Because I was a fool yesterday I must remain such all my life."[278]"The union is my own creation, my creature, not sacred, not a spiritual power above my spirit, as little as any association of whatever sort. As I am not willing to be a slave to my maxims, but lay them bare to my constant criticism without any warrant, and admit no bail whatever for their continuance, so still less do I pledge myself to the union for my future and swear away my soul to it as men are said to do with the devil, and as is really the case with the State and all intellectual authority; but I am and remain more to myself than State, Church, God, and the like, and, consequently, also infinitely more than the union."[279]

Rather, men are to be held together in the union by the advantage which each individual has from the union at every moment. If I can "use" my fellow-men, "then I am likely to come to an understanding and unite myself with them, in order to strengthen my power by the agreement, and to do more by joint force than individual force could accomplish. In this joinder I see nothing at all else than a multiplication of my strength, and only so long as it is my multiplied strength do I retain it."[280]

Hence the union is something quite different from "that society which Communism means to found."[281]"You bring into the union your whole power, your ability, and assert yourself; in society you with your labor-strength are spent. In the former you liveegoistically, in the latter humanly,i. e.religiously, as a 'member in the body of this Lord'. You owe to society what you have, and are in duty bound to it, are—possessed by 'social duties'; you utilize the union, and, undutiful and unfaithful, give it up when you are no longer able to get any use out of it. If society is more than you, then it is of more consequence to you than yourself; the union is only your tool, or the sword with which you sharpen and enlarge your natural strength; the union exists for you and by you, society contrariwise claims you for itself and exists even without you; in short, society is sacred, the union is your own; society uses you up, you use up the union."[282]

2. But what form may such a social life take in detail? In reply to his critic, Moses Hess, Stirner gives some examples of unions that already exist.

"Perhaps at this moment children are running together under his window for a comradeship of play; let him look at them, and he will espy merry egoistic unions. Perhaps Hess has a friend or a sweetheart; then he may know how heart joins itself to heart, how two of them unite egoistically in order to have the enjoyment of each other, and how neither 'gets the worst of the bargain.' Perhaps he meets a few pleasant acquaintances on the street and is invited to accompany them into a wine-shop; does he go with them in order to do an act of kindness to them, or does he 'unite' with them because he promises himself enjoyment from it? Do they have to give him their best thanks for his 'self-sacrifice' or do theyknow that for an hour they formed an 'egoistic union' together?"[283]Stirner even thinks of a "German Union."[284]


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