FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[2]"Der Anarchismus und seine Traeger" pp. 124, 125, 127; Reichesberg p. 27.[3]Lenz p. 3.[4]Bernatzik pp. 2, 3.[5]Lenz p. 5.[6]Crispi.[7]Van Hamel p. 112.[8]Adler p. 321.[9]Reichesberg p. 13.[10]Stammler pp. 2, 4, 34, 36; Lenz pp. 1, 4.[11]Silió p. 145; Garraud p. 12; Reichesberg p. 16; Tripels p. 253.[12]Bernstein p. 359; Bernatzik p. 3.[13]Reichesberg p. 30.[14]Lombroso p. 31.[15]Silió p. 145; Dubois p. 213.[16]Lombroso p. 31; Proal p. 50.[17]Rienzi p. 9; Stammler pp. 28-31; Merlino pp. 18, 27; Shaw p. 23.[18]"Die historische Entwickelung des Anarchismus" p. 16; Zenker p. 161.[19]Garraud p. 6; Lenz p. 5.[20]Sernicoli vol. 2 p. 116; Garraud p. 2; Reichesberg p. 38; Van Hamel p. 113.[21]Garraud pp. 10, 11; Lombroso p. 34; Ferri p. 257.[22]Mackay "Magazin" pp. 913-915; "Anarchisten" pp. 239-243.[23]Zenker pp. 203, 204.

[2]"Der Anarchismus und seine Traeger" pp. 124, 125, 127; Reichesberg p. 27.

[3]Lenz p. 3.

[4]Bernatzik pp. 2, 3.

[5]Lenz p. 5.

[6]Crispi.

[7]Van Hamel p. 112.

[8]Adler p. 321.

[9]Reichesberg p. 13.

[10]Stammler pp. 2, 4, 34, 36; Lenz pp. 1, 4.

[11]Silió p. 145; Garraud p. 12; Reichesberg p. 16; Tripels p. 253.

[12]Bernstein p. 359; Bernatzik p. 3.

[13]Reichesberg p. 30.

[14]Lombroso p. 31.

[15]Silió p. 145; Dubois p. 213.

[16]Lombroso p. 31; Proal p. 50.

[17]Rienzi p. 9; Stammler pp. 28-31; Merlino pp. 18, 27; Shaw p. 23.

[18]"Die historische Entwickelung des Anarchismus" p. 16; Zenker p. 161.

[19]Garraud p. 6; Lenz p. 5.

[20]Sernicoli vol. 2 p. 116; Garraud p. 2; Reichesberg p. 38; Van Hamel p. 113.

[21]Garraud pp. 10, 11; Lombroso p. 34; Ferri p. 257.

[22]Mackay "Magazin" pp. 913-915; "Anarchisten" pp. 239-243.

[23]Zenker pp. 203, 204.

The problem for our study is, to get determinate concepts of Anarchism and its species. As soon as such determinate concepts are attained, Anarchism is scientifically known. For their determination is not only conditioned on a comprehensive view of all the individual phenomena of Anarchism; it also brings together the results of this comprehensive view, and assigns to them a place in the totality of our knowledge.

The problem of getting determinate concepts of Anarchism and its species seems at a first glance perfectly clear. But the apparent clearness vanishes on closer examination.

For there rises first the question, what shall be the starting-point of our study? The answer will be given, "Anarchistic teachings." But there is by no means an agreement as to what teachings are Anarchistic; one man designates as "Anarchistic" these teachings, another those; and of the teachings themselves a part designate themselves as Anarchistic, a part do not. How can one take any of them as Anarchistic teachings for a starting-point, without applying that very concept of Anarchism which he has yet to determine?

Then rises the further question, what is the goal of the study? The answer will be given, "the conceptsof Anarchism and its species." But we see daily that different men define in quite different ways the concept of an object which they yet conceive in the same way. One says that law is the general will; another, that it is a mass of precepts which limit a man's natural liberty for other men's sake; a third, that it is the ordering of the life of the nation (or of the community of nations) to maintain God's order of the world. They all know that a definition should state the proximate genus and the distinctive marks of the species, but this knowledge does them little good. So it seems that the goal of the study does still require elucidation.

Lastly rises the question, what is the way to this goal? Any one who has ever observed the conflict of opinions in the intellectual sciences knows well, on the one hand, how utterly we lack a recognized method for the solution of problems; and, on the other hand, how necessary it is in any study to get clearly in mind the method that is to be used.

2. Our study can come to a more precise specification of its problem. The problem is to put concepts in the place of non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species.

Every concept-determining study faces the problem of comprehending conceptually an object that was first comprehended non-conceptually, and therefore of putting a concept in the place of non-conceptual notions of an object. This problem finds a specially clear expression in the concept-determining judgment (the definition), which puts in immediate juxtaposition, in its subject some non-conceptual notion of an object,and in its predicate a conceptual notion of the same object.

Accordingly, the study that is to determine the concepts of Anarchism and its species has for its problem to comprehend conceptually objects that are first comprehended in non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species; and therefore, to put concepts in the place of these non-conceptual notions.

3. But our study may specify its problem still more precisely, though at first only on the negative side. The problem is not to put concepts in the place of all notions that appear as non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species.

Any concept can comprehend conceptually only one object, not another object together with this. The concept of health cannot be at the same time the concept of life, nor the concept of the horse that of the mammal.

But in the non-conceptual notions that appear as notions of Anarchism and its species there are comprehended very different objects. To be sure, the object of all these notions is on the one hand a genus that is formed by the common qualities of certain teachings, and on the other hand the species of this genus, which are formed by the addition of sundry peculiarities to these common qualities. But still these notions have in view very different groups of teachings with their common and special qualities, some perhaps only the teachings of Kropotkin and Most, others only the teachings of Stirner, Tucker, and Mackay, others again the teachings of both sets of authors.

If one proposed to put concepts in the place of all the non-conceptual notions which appear as notions of Anarchism and its species, these concepts would have to comprehend at once the common and special qualities of quite different groups of teachings, of which groups one might embrace only the teachings of Kropotkin and Most, another only those of Stirner, Tucker, and Mackay, a third both. But this is impossible: the concepts of Anarchism and its species can comprehend only the common and special qualities of a single group of teachings; therefore our study cannot put concepts in the place of all the notions that appear as notions of Anarchism and its species.

4. By completing on the affirmative side this negative specification of its problem, our study can arrive at a still more precise specification of this problem. The problem is to put concepts in the place of those non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species, having in view one and the same group of teachings, which are most widely diffused among the men who at present are scientifically concerned with Anarchism.

Because the only possible problem for our study is to put concepts in the place of part of the notions that appear as non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species,—to wit, only in the place of such notions as have in view one and the same group of teachings with its common and special qualities,—therefore we must divide into classes, according to the groups of teachings that they severally have in view, the notions that appear as notions of Anarchism and its species, and we must choose the class whose notionsare to be replaced by concepts.

The choice of the class must depend on the kind of men for whom the study is meant. For the study of a concept is of value only for those who non-conceptually apprehend the object of the concept, since the concept takes the place of their notions only. For those who form a non-conceptual notion of space, the concept of morality is so far meaningless; and just as meaningless, for those who mean by Anarchism what the teachings of Proudhon and Stirner have in common, is the concept of what is common to the teachings of Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin, and Kropotkin.

But the men for whom this study is meant are those who at present are scientifically concerned with Anarchism. If all these, in their notions of Anarchism and its species, had in view one and the same group of teachings, then the problem for our study would be to put concepts in the place of this set of notions. Since this is not the case, the only possible problem for our study is to put concepts in the place of that set of notions which has in view a group of teachings that the greatest possible number of the men at present scientifically concerned with Anarchism have in view in their non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species.

In accordance with what has been said, the starting-point of our study must be those non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species, having in view one and the same group of teachings, which are most widely diffused among the men who at present arescientifically concerned with Anarchism.

1. How can it be known what group of teachings the non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species most widely diffused among the men at present scientifically concerned with Anarchism have in view?

First and foremost, this may be seen from utterances regarding particular Anarchistic teachings, and from lists and descriptions of such teachings.

We may assume that a man regards as Anarchistic those teachings which he designates as Anarchistic, and, further, those teachings which are likewise characterized by the common qualities of these. We may further assume that a man does not regard as Anarchistic those teachings which he in any form contrasts with the Anarchistic teachings, nor, if he undertakes to catalogue or describe the whole body of Anarchistic teachings, those teachings unknown to him which are not characterized by the common qualities of the teachings he catalogues or describes.

What group of teachings those non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species which are most widely diffused among the men at present scientifically concerned with Anarchism have in view, may be seen secondly from the definitions of Anarchism and from other utterances about it. We may doubtingly assume that a man regards as Anarchistic those teachings which come under his definition of Anarchism, or for which his utterances about Anarchism hold good; and, on the contrary, that he does not regard as Anarchistic those teachings which do not come under that definition, or for which these utterances do not hold good.

When these two means of knowledge lead to contradictions, the former must be decisive. For, if a man so defines Anarchism, or so speaks of Anarchism, that on this basis teachings which he declares non-Anarchistic manifest themselves to be Anarchistic,—and perhaps other teachings, which he counts among the Anarchistic, to be non-Anarchistic,—this can be due only to his not being conscious of the scope of his general pronouncements; therefore it is only from his treatment of the individual teachings that one can find out his opinion of these.

2. These means of knowledge inform us what group of teachings the non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species most widely diffused among the men at present scientifically concerned with Anarchism have in view.

We learn, first, that the teachings of certain particular men are recognized as Anarchistic teachings by the greater part of those who at present are scientifically concerned with Anarchism.

We learn, second, that by the greater part of those who at present are scientifically concerned with Anarchism the teachings of these men are recognized as Anarchistic teachings only in so far as they relate to law, the State, and property; but not in so far as they may be concerned with the law, State, or property of a particular legal system or a particular group of legal systems, nor in so far as they regard other objects, such as religion, the family, art.

Among the recognized Anarchistic teachings seven are particularly prominent: to wit, the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin,Tucker, and Tolstoi. They all manifest themselves to be Anarchistic teachings according to the greater part of the definitions of Anarchism, and of other scientific utterances about it. They all display the qualities that are common to the doctrines treated of in most descriptions of Anarchism. Some of them, be it one or another, are put in the foreground in almost every work on Anarchism. Of no one of them is it denied, to an extent worth mentioning, that it is an Anarchistic teaching.

In accordance with what has been said, the goal of our study must be to determine, first, the concept of the genus which is constituted by the common qualities of those teachings which the greater part of the men at present scientifically concerned with Anarchism recognize as Anarchistic teachings; second, the concepts of the species of this genus, which are formed by the accession of any specialties to those common qualities.

1. The first thing toward a concept is that an object be apprehended as clearly and purely as possible.

In non-conceptual notions an object is not apprehended with all possible clearness. In our non-conceptual notions of gold we most commonly make clear to ourselves only a few qualities of gold; one of us, perhaps, thinks mainly of the color and the lustre, another of the color and malleability, a third of some other qualities. But in the concept of gold color, lustre, malleability, hardness, solubility, fusibility, specific gravity, atomic weight, and all other qualities of gold, must be apprehended as clearly as possible.

Nor is an object apprehended in all possible purity in our non-conceptual notions. We introduce into our non-conceptual notions of gold many things that do not belong among the qualities of gold; one, perhaps, thinks of the present value of gold, another of golden dishes, a third of some sort of gold coin. But all these alien adjuncts must be kept away from the concept of gold.

So the first goal of our study is to describe as clearly as possible on the one side, and as purely as possible on the other, the common qualities of those teachings which the greater part of the men at present scientifically concerned with Anarchism recognize as Anarchistic teachings, and the specialties of all the teachings which display these common qualities.

2. It is further requisite for a concept that an object should have its place assigned as well as possible in the total realm of our experience,—that is, in a system of species and genera which embraces our total experience.

In non-conceptual notions an object does not have its place assigned in the total realm of our experience, but arbitrarily in one of the many genera in which it can be placed according to its various qualities. One of us, perhaps, thinks of gold as a species of the genus "yellow bodies," another as a species of the genus "malleable bodies," a third as a species of some other genus. But the concept of gold must assign it a place in a system of species and genera that embraces our whole experience,—a place in the genus "metals."

So a further goal of our study is to assign a place as well as possible in the total realm of our experience(that is, in a system of species and genera which embraces our total experience) for the common qualities of those teachings which the greater part of the men at present scientifically concerned with Anarchism recognize as Anarchistic teachings, and for the specialties of all the teachings that display these common qualities.

In accordance with what has been said, the way that our study must take to go from its starting-point to its goal will be in three parts. First, the concepts of law, the State, and property must be determined. Next, it must be ascertained what the Anarchistic teachings assert about law, the State, and property. Finally, after removing some errors, we must get determinate concepts of Anarchism and its species.

1. First, we must get determinate concepts of law, the State, and property; and this must be of law, the State, and property in general, not of the law, State, or property of a particular legal system or a particular family of legal systems.

Law, the State, and property, in this sense, are the objects about which the doctrines which are to be examined in their common and special qualities make assertions. Before the fact of any assertions about an object can be ascertained,—not to say, before the common and special qualities of these assertions can be brought out and assigned to a place in the total realm of our experience,—we must get a determinate concept of this object itself. Hence the first thing that must be done is to determine the concepts of law, the State, and property (chapter II).

2. Next, it must be ascertained what the Anarchistic teachings assert about law, the State, and property;—that is, the recognized Anarchistic teachings, and also those teachings which likewise display the qualities common to these.

What the recognized Anarchistic teachings say, must be ascertained in order to determine the concept of Anarchism. What all the teachings that display the common qualities of the recognized Anarchistic teachings say, must be ascertained in order that we may get determinate concepts of the species of Anarchism.

So each of these teachings must be questioned regarding its relation to law, the State, and property. These questions must be preceded by the question on what foundation the teaching rests, and must be followed by the question how it conceives the process of its realization.

It is impossible to present here all recognized Anarchistic teachings, not to say all Anarchistic teachings. Therefore our study limits itself to the presentation of seven especially prominent teachings (chapters III to IX), and then, from this standpoint, seeks to get a view of the totality of recognized Anarchistic teachings and of all Anarchistic teachings (chapter X).

The teachings presented are presented in their own words,[24]but according to a uniform system: the first, for security against the importation of alien thoughts; the second, to avoid the uncomparable juxtapositionof fundamentally different courses of thought. They have been compelled to give definite replies to definite questions; it was indeed necessary in many cases to bring the answers together in tiny fragments from the most various writings, to sift them so far as they contradicted each other, and to explain them so far as they deviated from ordinary language. Thus Tolstoi's strictly logical structure of thought and Bakunin's confused talk, Kropotkin's discussions full of glowing philanthropy and Stirner's self-pleasing smartness, come before our eyes directly and yet in comparable form.

3. Finally, after removing widely diffused errors, we are to get determinate concepts of Anarchism and its species.

We must, therefore, on the basis of that knowledge of the Anarchistic teachings which we have acquired, clear away the most important errors about Anarchism and its species; and then we must determine what the Anarchistic teachings have in common, and what specialties are represented among them, and assign to both a place in the total realm of our experience. Then we have the concepts of Anarchism and its species (chapter XI).

FOOTNOTE:[24]Russian writings are cited from translations, which are cautiously revised where they seem too harsh.

[24]Russian writings are cited from translations, which are cautiously revised where they seem too harsh.

In this discussion we are to get determinate concepts of law, the State, and property in general, not of the law, State, and property of a particular legal system or of a particular family of legal systems. The concepts of law, State, and property are therefore to be determined as concepts of general jurisprudence, not as concepts of any particular jurisprudence.

1. By the concepts of law, State, and property one may understand, first, the concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a particular legal system.

These concepts of law, State, and property contain all the characteristics that belong to the substance of a particular legal system. They embrace only the substance of this system. They may, therefore, be called concepts of the science of this system. For we may designate as the science of a particular legal system that part of jurisprudence which concerns itself exclusively with the norms of a particular legal system.

The concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a legal system are distinguished from the concepts of law, State, and property in the sciences of other legal systems by this characteristic,—that they are concepts of norms of this particular system. From this characteristic we may deduce all the characteristics that result from the special substance of this system of law in contrast to other such systems. Theconcepts of property in the present laws of the German empire, of France, and of England are distinguished by the fact that they are concepts of norms of these three different legal systems. Consequently they are as different as are the norms of the present imperial-German, French, and English law on the subject of property. The concepts of law, State, and property in different legal systems are to each other as species-concepts which are subordinate to one and the same generic concept.

2. Second, one may understand by the concepts of law, State, and property the concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a particular family of laws.

These concepts of law, State, and property contain all the characteristics that belong to the common substance of the different legal systems of this family. They embrace only the common substance of the different systems of this family. They may, therefore, be called concepts of the science of this family of laws. For we may designate as the science of a particular family of laws that part of jurisprudence which deals exclusively with the norms of a particular family of legal systems, so far as these are not already dealt with by the sciences of the particular legal systems of this family.

The concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a family of laws are distinguished from the concepts of law, State, and property in the sciences of the legal systems that form the family by lacking the characteristic of being concepts of norms of these systems, and consequently lacking also all thecharacteristics which may be deduced from this characteristic according to the special substance of one or another legal system. The concept of the State in the science of present European law is distinguished from the concepts of the State in the sciences of present German, Russian, and Belgian law by not being a concept of norms of any one of these systems, and consequently by lacking all the characteristics that result from the special substance of the constitutional norms in force in Germany, Russia, and Belgium. Its relation to the concepts of the State in the science of these systems is that of a generic concept to subordinate species-concepts.

The concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a family of laws are distinguished from the concepts of law, State, and property in the sciences of other such families by this characteristic,—that they are concepts of norms of this particular family. From this characteristic we may deduce all the characteristics that are peculiar to the common substance of the different legal systems of this family in contrast to the common substance of the different legal systems of other families. The concept of the State in the science of present European law and the concept of the State in the science of European law in the year 1000 are distinguished by the fact that the one is a concept of constitutional norms that are in force in Europe to-day, the other of such as were in force in Europe then; consequently they are different in the same way as what the constitutional norms in force in Europe to-day have in common is different from what was common to the constitutional norms in force inEurope then. These concepts are to each other as species-concepts which are subordinate to one and the same generic concept.

3. Third, one may understand by the concepts of law, State, and property the concepts of law, State, and property in general jurisprudence.

These concepts of law, State, and property contain all the characteristics that belong to the common substance of the most different systems and families of laws. They embrace only what the norms of the most different systems and families of laws have in common. They may, therefore, be called concepts of general jurisprudence. For that part of jurisprudence which treats of legal norms without limitation to any particular system or family of laws, so far as these norms are not already treated by the sciences of the particular systems and families, may be designated as general jurisprudence.

The concepts of law, State, and property in general jurisprudence are distinguished from the concepts of law, State, and property in the particular jurisprudences by lacking the characteristic of being concepts of norms of one of these systems or at least one of these families of systems, and consequently lacking also all the characteristics which may be deduced from this characteristic according to the special substance of some system or family of laws. The concept of lawper seis distinguished from the concept of law in present European law and from the concept of law in the present law of the German empire by not being a concept of norms of that family of laws, not to say that particular system, and consequently by lackingall the characteristics that might belong to any peculiarities which might be common to all legal norms at present in force in Europe or in Germany. Its relation to the concepts of law in these particular jurisprudences is that of a generic concept to subordinate species-concepts.

4. In which of the senses here distinguished the concepts of law, State, and property should be defined in a particular case, and what matters should accordingly be taken into consideration in defining them, depends on the purpose of one's study.

If, for example, the point is to describe scientifically the constitutional norms of the present law of the German empire, then the concept of the State as defined on this occasion must be a concept of the science of this particular legal system. For scientific work on the norms of a particular legal system requires that concepts be formed of the norms of just this system. Consequently the material to be taken into consideration will be only the constitutional norms of the present law of the German empire.—That the concepts defined in the scientific description of a system of law are in fact concepts of the science of this system may indeed seem obscure. For every concept of the science of any particular system of law may be defined as the concept of a species under the corresponding generic concept of general jurisprudence. We define this generic concept, say the concept of the State in general jurisprudence, and add the distinctive characteristic of the species-concept, that it is a concept of norms of this particular system of law, say of the present law of the German empire. And then weoften leave this additional characteristic unexpressed, where we think we may assume (as is the case in the scientific description of the norms of any particular system of law) that everybody will regard it as tacitly added. The consequence is that the definition given in the scientific description of a particular system of law looks, at a superficial glance, like the definition of a concept of general jurisprudence.

Or, if the point is to compare scientifically the norms of present European law regarding property, the concept of property as defined on this occasion must be a concept of the science of this particular family of laws. For the scientific comparison of norms of different legal systems demands that concepts of the sciences of these different legal systems be subordinately arranged under the corresponding concept of the science of the family of laws which is made up of these systems. Consequently the material to be taken into consideration will be only the norms of this family of laws.—Here again, indeed, it may seem obscure that the concepts defined are really concepts of the science of this family of laws. For the concepts that belong to the science of a family of laws may likewise be defined by defining the corresponding concepts of general jurisprudence and tacitly adding the characteristic of being concepts of norms of this particular family of laws.

Finally, if it comes to pass that the point is to compare scientifically what the norms of the most diverse systems of law have in common, the concept of law as defined on this occasion must be a concept of general jurisprudence. For the scientific comparisonof norms of the most diverse systems and families of laws demands that concepts which belong to the sciences of the most diverse systems and families of laws be subordinately arranged under the corresponding concept of general jurisprudence. Consequently the material to be taken into consideration will be the norms of the most diverse systems and families of laws.

Here,—where the point is to take the first step toward a scientific comprehension of teachings which pass judgment on law, the State, and property in general, not only on the law, State, or property of a particular system or family of laws,—the concepts of law, State, and property must necessarily be defined as concepts of general jurisprudence. For a scientific comprehension of teachings which deal with the common substance of the most diverse systems and families of laws demands that concepts of this common substance—consequently concepts belonging to general jurisprudence—be formed. Therefore we have to take into consideration, as our material, the norms (especially regarding the State and property) of the most diverse systems and families of laws.

Law is the body of legal norms. A legal norm is a norm which is based on the fact that men have the will to see a certain procedure generally observed within a circle which includes themselves.

1. A legal norm is a norm.

A norm is the idea of a correct procedure. A correct procedure means one that corresponds either tothe final purpose of all human procedure (unconditionally correct procedure,—for instance, respect for another's life), or at any rate to some accidental purpose (conditionally correct procedure,—for instance, the skilled handling of a picklock). And the idea of a correct procedure means that the unconditionally or conditionally correct procedure is to be thought of not as a fact but as a task, not as something real but as something to be realized; it does not mean that I shall in fact spare my enemy's life, but that I am to spare it—not how the thief really did use the picklock, but how he should have used it. The idea of a correct procedure is what we designate as an "ought": when I think of an "ought," I think of what has to be done in order to realize either the final purpose of all human procedure or some accidental personal purpose. All passing of judgment on past procedure is conditioned upon the idea of a correct procedure—only with regard to this idea can past procedure be described as good or bad, expedient or inexpedient; and so is all deliberation on future procedure—only with regard to this idea does one inquire whether it will be right, or at any rate expedient, to proceed in a given manner.

Every legal norm represents a procedure as correct, declares that it corresponds to a particular purpose. And it represents this correct procedure as an idea, designates it not as a fact but as a task, does not say that any one does proceed so but that one is to proceed so. Hence a legal norm is a norm.

2. A legal norm is a norm based on a human will.

A norm based on a human will is a norm by virtueof which one must proceed in a certain way in order that he may not put himself in opposition to the will of some particular men, and so be apprehended by the power which is at the service of these men. Such a norm, therefore, represents a procedure only as conditionally correct; to wit, as a means to the end (which we are perhaps pursuing or perhaps despising) of remaining in harmony with the will of certain men, and so being spared by the power which serves this will.

Every legal norm tells us that we must proceed in a certain way in order that we may not contravene the will of some particular men and then suffer under their power. Therefore it represents a procedure only as conditionally correct, and instructs us not as to what is good but only as to what is prescribed. Hence a legal norm is a norm based on a human will.

3. A legal norm is a norm based on the fact that men will to have a certain procedure for themselves and others.

A norm is based on the fact that men will to have a certain procedure for themselves and others when the will on which the norm is based has reference not only to others who do not will, but also, at the same time, to the willers themselves also; when, therefore, these not only will that others be subject to the norm but also will to be subject to it themselves.

Every legal norm, and of all norms only the legal norm, has the characteristic that the will on which it is based reaches beyond those whose will it is, and yet embraces them too. The rule, "Whoever takes from another a movable thing that is not his own, with the intent to appropriate it illegally, is punished withimprisonment for theft," is not only based on the will of men, but each of these men is also conscious that, while on the one hand the rule applies to other men, on the other hand it applies to himself.

Here it might be alleged that, after all, the mere fact of men's will to have a certain procedure for themselves and others does not always establish law; for example, the efforts of the Bonapartists do not establish the empire in France. But it is not when this bare will exists that law is established, but only when a norm is based on this will; that is, when it has in its service so great a power that it is competent to affect the behavior of the men to whom it relates. As soon as Bonapartism spreads so widely and in such circles that this takes place, the republic will fall and the empire will indeed become law in France.

One might further appeal to the fact that in unlimited monarchies (in Russia, for instance) the law is based solely on the will of one man, who is not himself subject to it. But Russian law is not based on the czar's will at all; the czar is a weak individual man, and his will in itself is totally unqualified to affect many millions of Russians in their procedure. Russian law is based rather on the will of all those Russians—peasants, soldiers, officials—who, for the most various reasons—patriotism, self-interest, superstition—will that what the czar wills shall be law in Russia. Their will is qualified to affect the procedure of the Russians; and, if they should ever grow so few that it would no longer have this qualification, then the czar's will would no longer be law in Russia, as the history of revolutions proves.

4. It has been asserted that legal norms have still other qualities.

It has been said, first, that it belongs to the essence of a legal norm to be enforceable, or even to be enforceable in a particular way, by judicial procedure, governmental force.

If by this we are to understand that conformity can always be enforced, we are met at once by the great number of cases in which this cannot be done. When a debtor is insolvent, or a murder has been committed, conformity to the violated legal norms cannot now be enforced after the fact, but their validity is not impaired by this.

If by enforceability we mean that conformity to a legal norm must be insured by other legal norms providing for the case of its violation, we need only go on from the insured to the insuring norms for a while, to come to norms for which conformity is not insured by any further legal norms. If one refuses to recognize these norms as legal norms, then neither can the norms which are insured by them rank as legal norms, and so, going back along the series, one has at last no legal norms left.

Only if one would understand by the enforceability of the legal norm that a will must have at its disposal a certain power in order that a legal norm may be based on it, one might certainly say in this sense that enforceability belongs to the essence of a legal norm. But this quality of the legal norm would be only such a quality as would be derivable from its quality of being a norm, and would therefore have no claim to be added as a further quality.

Again, it has been named an essential quality of a legal norm that it should be based on the will of a State. But even where we cannot speak of a State at all, among nomads for instance, there are yet legal norms. Besides, every State is itself a legal relation, established by legal norms, which consequently cannot be based on its will. And lastly, the norms of international law, which are intended to bind the will of States, cannot be based on the will of a State.

Finally, it has been asserted that it was essential to a legal norm that it should correspond to the moral law. If this were so, then among the different legal norms which to-day are in force one directly after the other in the same territory, or at the same time in different territories under the same circumstances, only one could in each case be regarded as a legal norm; for under the same circumstances there is only one moral right. Nor could one speak then of unrighteous legal norms, for if they were unrighteous they would not be legal norms. But in reality, even when legal norms determine conduct quite differently under the same circumstances, they are all nevertheless recognized as legal norms; nor is it doubted that there are bad legal norms as well as good.

5. As a norm based on the fact that men have the will to see a certain procedure generally observed within a circle which includes themselves, the legal norm is distinguished from all other objects, even from those that most resemble it.

By being based on the will of men it is distinguished from the moral law (the commandment of morality); this is not based on men's willing a certainprocedure, but on the fact that this procedure corresponds to the final purpose of all human procedure. The maxim, "Love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, pray for those who abuse and persecute you," is a moral law; so is the maxim, "Act so that the maxims of your will might at all times serve as the principles of a general legislation." For the correctness of such a procedure is not founded on the fact that other men will have it, but on the fact that it corresponds to the final purpose of all human procedure.

By being based on the will of men the legal norm is distinguished also from good manners; these are not based on the fact that men will a certain procedure, but on the fact that they themselves proceed in a certain way. It is manners that one goes to a ball in a dress coat and white gloves, uses his knife at table only for cutting, begs the daughter of the house for a dance or at least one round, takes leave of the master and mistress of the house, and lastly presses a tip into the servant's hand; for the correctness of such a behavior is not based on the fact that other men ask this of us,—to those who start a new fashion it is often actually unpleasant to find that the fashion is spreading to more extensive circles,—but solely on the fact that other men themselves behave so, and that we want "not to be peculiar," "not to make ourselves conspicuous," "to do like the rest," etc.

By being based on a will which relates at once to those whose will it is and to others whose will it is not, it is distinguished on the one hand from an arbitrary command, in which one's will applies only toothers, and on the other from a resolution, in which it applies only to himself. It is an arbitrary command when Cortes with his Spaniards commands the Mexicans to bring out their gold, or when a band of robbers forbids a frightened peasantry to betray their hiding-place; here a human will decides, indeed, but a will that relates only to other men, and not at the same time to those whose will it is. A resolution is presented when I have decided to get up at six every morning, or to leave off smoking, or to finish a piece of work within a specified time—here a human will is indeed the standard, but it relates only to him whose will it is, not at all to others.

6. What is briefly summed up in the definition of the legal norm may, if one takes into account the explanations which have been given with this definition, be expanded as follows:

Men will that a given procedure be generally observed within a circle which includes themselves, and their power is so great that their will is competent to affect the men of this circle in their procedure. When such is the condition of things, a legal norm exists.

The State is a legal relation by virtue of which a supreme authority exists in a certain territory.

1. The State is a legal relation.

A legal relation is the relation, determined by legal norms, of an obligated party, one to whom a procedure is prescribed, to an entitled party, one for whose sake it is prescribed. Thus, for instance, the legal relation of a loan is a relation of the borrower,who is bound by the legal norms concerning loans, to the lender, for whose sake he is bound.

The State is the legal relation of all the men who by legal norms are subjected to a supreme territorial authority, to all those for whose sake they are subjected to it. Here the circle of the entitled and the obligated is one and the same; the State is a bond upon all in favor of all.

To this it might perhaps be objected that the State is not a legal relation but a person. But the two propositions, that an association of men is a person in the legal sense and that it is a legal relation, are quite compatible; nay, its attribute of personality is based mainly on its attribute of being a legal relation of a particular kind; law, in viewing the association in its outward relationships as a person, starts from the fact that men are bound together by a particular legal relation. A joint-stock corporation is a person not although, but because, it is a legal relation of a peculiar kind. And similarly, the fact that the State is a person is not only reconcilable with its being a legal relation, but is founded on its being a peculiar legal relation.

2. As to the conditions of its existence, this legal relation is involuntary.

A voluntary legal relation exists when legal norms make entrance into the relation conditional on actions of the obligated party, of which actions the purpose is to bring about the legal relation; for instance, entrance into the relation of tenancy is conditioned on agreeing to a lease.Per contra, an involuntary legal relation exists when legal norms do not make entranceinto the relation conditional on any such actions of the obligated party, as, for instance, a patent is not conditioned on any action of those who are bound by it, and the sentence of a criminal is at least not conditioned on any action whereby he intended to bring it about.

If the State were a voluntary legal relation, a supreme authority could exist only for those inhabitants of a territory who had acknowledged it. But the supreme authority exists for all inhabitants of the territory, whether they have acknowledged it or not; the legal relation is therefore involuntary.

3. The substance of this legal relation is, that a supreme authority exists in a territory.

An authority exists in a territory by virtue of a legal relation when, according to the legal norms which found the relation, the will of some men—or even merely of a man—is regulative for the inhabitants of this territory. A supreme authority exists in a territory by virtue of a legal relation when according to those norms the will of some men is finally regulative for the inhabitants of the territory,—that is, is decisive when authorities disagree. What we here designate as a supreme authority, therefore, is not the men on whose will the legal norms in force in a territory are based, but rather their highest agents, whose will they would have finally regulative within the territory.

What men it is whose will is finally regulative for the inhabitants of a territory by virtue of a legal relation—for instance, members of a royal family according to a certain order of inheritance, or personselected according to a certain election law—depends on the legal norms by which the legal relation is determined. On these legal norms, too, depends the question within what limits the will of these men is regulative. But this limited nature of the authority does not stand in the way of its being a supreme authority; the highest agent need not be an agent with unrestricted powers.

Here one might perhaps object that in federal States, in the German empire for instance, the individual States have not supreme authority. But in reality they have it. For, even if there are a multitude of subjects in reference to which the highest authority of the individual States of the German empire has to bow to the imperial authority, yet there are also subjects enough about which the highest authority of the individual States gives a final decision. As long as there are such subjects, a supreme authority exists in the individual States; if some day there should no longer be such, one could no longer speak of individual States.

4. As a legal relation, by virtue of which a supreme authority exists in a territory, the State is distinguished from all other objects, even from those that most resemble it.

By being a legal relation it is distinguished on the one hand from institutions such as would exist in a conceivable kingdom of God or of reason, on the basis of the moral law, and on the other hand from the dominion of a conqueror in the conquered country, which can never be anything but an arbitrary dominion.

Being an involuntary legal relation, the State is distinguished from a conceivable association of men who should set up a supreme authority among themselves by an agreement, as well as from leagues under international law, in which a supreme authority exists on the basis of an agreement.

The fact that by virtue of a legal relation an authority over a territory is given distinguishes the State from the tribal community of nomads and from the Church; for in the former there is given an authority over people of a certain descent, in the latter over people of a certain faith, but in neither over people of a certain territory. And finally, in the fact that this territorial authority is a supreme authority lies the difference between the State and towns, counties, or provinces; in the latter there is indeed a territorial authority instituted, but one that by the very intent of its institution must bow to a higher authority.

5. What is briefly summed up in the definition of the State may be expanded as follows, if one takes into consideration on the one hand the previous definition of a legal norm and on the other hand the above explanations of the definition of the State:

Some inhabitants of a territory are so powerful that their will is competent to affect the inhabitants of this territory in their procedure, and these men will have it that for all the inhabitants of the territory, for themselves as well as for the rest, the will of men picked out in a certain way shall within certain limits be finally regulative. When such is the condition of things, a State exists.

Property is a legal relation, by virtue of which some one has, within a certain group of men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of a thing.

1. Property is a legal relation.

As has already been stated, a legal relation is the relation of an obligated party, one to whom a procedure is prescribed by legal norms, to an entitled party, one for whose sake it is prescribed.

Property is the legal relation of all the members of a group of men who by legal norms are excluded from ultimately disposing of a thing, to him—or to those—for whose sake they are excluded from it. Here the circle of the obligated is much broader than that of the entitled; the former embraces, say, all the inhabitants of a territory or all who belong to a tribe, the latter only those among them in whom certain further conditions (for instance, transfer, prescription, appropriation) are fulfilled.

2. As to the conditions of its existence, this legal relation is involuntary.

As discussion has already shown, a voluntary legal relation exists when legal norms make entrance into the relation conditional on actions of the obligated party, of which actions the purpose is to bring about the legal relation;per contra, an involuntary legal relation exists when legal norms do not make entrance into the relation conditional on any such actions of the obligated party.

If property were a voluntary legal relation, then there could be excluded from ultimately disposing of athing only those members of a group of men who had consented to this exclusion. But all members of the group—for instance, all the inhabitants of a territory, all who belong to a tribe—are excluded, whether they have consented or not.

3. The substance of this legal relation consists in some one's having, within a certain group of men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of a thing.

Some one's having, within a certain group of men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of a thing means that this group is excluded from the thing in his favor; that is, they must not hinder him from dealing with the thing according to his will, nor may they themselves deal with it against his will. Now, the exclusive disposition of a thing within a certain group of men may by virtue of a legal relation belong to several, part by part, in this way: that some—or one—of them have it in this or that particular respect (for instance, as to the usufruct), and one—or some—in all other respects which are not individually alienated. Whoever thus has, within a group of men, the exclusive disposition of a thing in all those respects which are not individually alienated, to him belongs, within that group, the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of the thing.

To whom this belongs by virtue of the legal relation—whether, for instance, it belongs among others to him who by labor has made a thing into some new thing—depends on the legal norms by which the legal relation is determined. On them also depends the question, within what limits this belongs to him: the dispository authority of him to whom the exclusivedisposition of a thing within a group of men ultimately belongs is limited not only by the dispository authority of those to whom the exclusive disposition within the group proximately belongs, but also by the limits within which such dispository authority is at all allowed to anybody in the group. Especially, it depends on these legal norms whether a privilege of exclusive ultimate disposition belongs to individuals as well as to corporations, or only to corporations, and whether it applies to every kind of things or only to one kind or another.

4. As a legal relation by virtue of which some one has, within a certain group of men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of a thing, property is distinguished from all other objects, even from those which most resemble it.

By being a legal relation it is distinguished from all the relations in which one has the exclusive ultimate disposition of a thing guaranteed to him solely by the reasonableness of the men who surround him, or solely by his own might, as might be the case in a conceivable kingdom of God or of reason, and as is often the case in a conquered country.

Being an involuntary legal relation, it is distinguished from those legal relations by virtue of which the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of a thing belongs to some one solely on the ground of a contract, and solely as against the other contracting parties.

That by virtue of this legal relation some one has, within a group of men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of a thing, distinguishes propertyfrom copyright, by virtue of which some one has exclusively, within a group of men, not the disposition of a thing, but somewhat else; and furthermore from rights in the property of others, by virtue of which some one has, within a group of men, the exclusive privilege of disposing of a thing, but not of ultimately disposing of it.

5. What is briefly summed up in the definition of property may be expanded as follows, if one takes into consideration on the one hand the previously given definition of a legal norm, and on the other the above explanations of the definition of property.

Some men are so powerful that their will is able to affect in its procedure a group of men which embraces them, and these men will have it that no member of this group shall, within certain limits, hinder a member picked out in a certain way from dealing with a thing according to his will, nor, within these limits, himself deal with the thing against the will of that member, so far as the will of another member is not already in particular respects regulative with respect to that thing equally with the will of that member. When such is the condition of things, property exists.

[Distinguishing the State from arbitrary dominion as he here does (p. 34), and then saying that Anarchism consists solely in the negation of the State, Eltzbacher implies the unsound conclusion that Anarchism does not involve the negation of arbitrary dominion. This is because he incautiously takes the word of the learned public that the only cardinal points of Anarchism are law, the State, and property, without making sure that those who say this are using the term "State" in the precise sense defined by him. But are not many of his "arbitrary commands" law and State by his definitions? Every robber in his band (p. 31) is as much required to keep the secret as are the peasantry, and under the same penalties. In restraining a subject population I restrict my liberty of emigration or investment, and forbid myself to be an accomplice in certain things.]

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