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CONTENTSBOOK ICHAPTER ITHEFUNDAMENTALERRORINMODERNSOCIOLOGICALSTUDYScience during the middle of this century excited popular interest mainly on account of its bearing on the doctrines of Christianity •3Its popularity is now beginning to depend on its bearing not on religious problems, but on social •3Science itself is undergoing a corresponding change •4Its characteristic aim during the middle of the century was to deal with physical and physiological evolution •4Its characteristic aim now is to deal with the evolution of society •5Social science itself is not wholly new •5What is new is the application to it of the evolutionary theory •6This excites men by suggesting great social changes in the future, •7which will give a speculative meaning to the history of humanity, •8or secure for men now existing, or for their children, practical social advantages •8Men have thus a double reason for being interested in social science, and sociologists a double reason for studying it; •9and it has attracted a number of men of genius, who have applied to it methods learned in the school of physical science •9Yet despite their genius and their diligence, all parties complain that the results of their study are inconclusive •10Professor Marshall and Mr. Kidd, for instance, complain of the fact, but can suggest no explanation of it •10What can the explanation be? •11The answer will be found in the fact just referred to—that social science attempts to answer two distinct sets of questions; •12and one set—namely, the speculative—it has answered with great success; •12it has failed only in attempting to answer practical questions •13Now the phenomena with which it has dealt successfully are phenomena of social aggregates, considered as wholes; •13but the practical problems of to-day, with which it has dealt unsuccessfully, arise out of the conflict between different parts of aggregates •15Social science has failed as apracticalguide because it has not recognised this distinction; •16and hence arise most of the errors of the political philosophy of this century •16CHAPTER IITHEATTEMPTTO MERGE THEGREATMANIN THEAGGREGATEWhatever may be done by some men, or classes of men, sociologists are at present accustomed to attribute toman•17Mr. Kidd’sSocial Evolution, for instance, is based entirely on this procedure •17He quotes with approval two other writers who have been guilty of it; •18who both attribute tomanwhat is done by only a few men; •19and the consequences of their reasoning are ludicrous •20Mr. Kidd’s reasoning itself is not less ludicrous. The first half of his argument is that religion prompts the few to surrender advantages to the many, which, if they chose to do so, they could keep •21The second half is that the many could have taken these advantages from the few, and that religion alone prevented them from doing so •21This contradiction is entirely due to the fact that, having first divided the social aggregate into two classes, he then obliterates his division, and thinks of them both as “man” •22Mr. Kidd’s confusion is the result of no accidental error. It is the inevitable result of a radically fallacious method; •24and of this method the chief exponent is Mr. Herbert Spencer, •24as a short summary of his arguments will show •25Mr. Spencer starts with saying that the chief impediment to social science is the great-man theory; •25for, if the appearance of the great man is incalculable, progress, if it depends on him, must be incalculable also; •26but if the great man is not a miraculous apparition, he owes his greatness to causes outside himself; •27and it is these causes which really produce the effects of which he is the proximate initiator •27These effects, therefore, are to be explained by reference not to the great man, but to the causes that are behind the great man •28The true causes, says Mr. Spencer, of all social phenomena are physical environment and men’s natural character •29The first physical cause of progress was an exceptionally fertile soil •29and an exceptionally bracing climate •29All the conquering races came from fertile and bracing regions •30There were other regions more fertile, but these were enervating; and hence the inhabitants of the former enslaved the weaker inhabitants of the latter •30Again, division of labour, on which industrial progress depends, was caused by difference in the products of different localities, •31which led to the localisation of industries •32The localisation of industries in its turn led to road-making; •33and roads made possible the centralisation of authority and interchange of ideas •33Next, as to men’s natural character, which is the other cause of progress, •33their primitive character did not fit them to progress, •34till it was gradually improved by the evolution of marriage and the family—especially of monogamy •34Monogamy represents the survival of the fittest kind of sexual union •35It developed the affections and the practice of efficient co-operation •35The family being established, the nation gradually rose from it •36One family increased, and gave rise to many families, which were obliged, in order to get food, to separate into different groups; •36and the recompounding of these groups, for purposes of defence or aggression, formed the nation; •37all government being in its origin military •37But as the arts of life progress, industry emancipates itself from governmental control, and becomes its own master, and also forms the basis of political democracy •37Now, if we consider all these conclusions of Mr. Spencer’s, •39we shall find them to be all conclusions about aggregates as wholes, not about parts of aggregates •39The only differences recognised by him between men are differences between one homogeneous aggregate and another, •40and differences between similar men who happen to be occupied differently •41But, as has already been said, the social problems of to-day arise out of a conflict between different parts of the same aggregate; therefore the phenomena of the aggregate as a whole do not help us •42The conflict between the parts of the aggregate arises from inequalities of position •43of which Mr. Spencer’s sociology takes no account •44Social problems arise out of the desire of those whose positions are inferior to have their positions changed; •45and the practical question is, is the change they desire possible? •45To answer this question we must examine into the causes why such and such individuals are in inferior, and others in superior positions •46Are inequalities in position due to alterable and accidental circumstances? •47Or are they due to congenital inequalities which no one can ever do away with? •47Social inequalities are partly due to circumstances; •48but most people will admit that congenital inequalities in talent have much to do with them •48Why then insist on this fact? •49Because this fact is precisely what our contemporary sociologists ignore, •49as Mr. Spencer shows us by his distinct admissions and assertions, as well as by the character of his conclusions •50His condemnation of the great-man theory is a removal of all congenital inequalities from his field of study; •51and he actually defines an aggregate as being composed ofapproximately equal units•52His failure and that of others, as practical sociologists, arises from their building on this false hypothesis •53CHAPTER IIIGREATMEN,AS THE TRUECAUSEOFPROGRESSThe ignoring of natural inequalities is a deliberate procedure. Let us see how it is defended •55Let us examine Mr. Spencer’s defence of it •55He defends it in two ways; •55(1) by saying that the great man does not really do what he seems to do; •55(2) by saying that what he seems to do is not really much •56He admits that the great man does do something exceptional in war; •57but denies that he does anything exceptional in the sphere of peaceful progress •57But how does the great man fulfil his function in war? By ordering others •58The great man, in peace, does precisely the same thing •59Mr. Spencer, for example, orders the compositors who put his books into type •59The inventor orders the men by whom his inventions are manufactured •60The great man of business orders his employees •61The hotel-keeper orders his staff •62All these men resemble the great military commander; and if the latter is a social cause, so are the former •63Next, as to the contention that the great man is the proximate cause only, and not the true cause— •63This, as Mr. Spencer and three popular writers of to-day show us, •64resolves itself into four arguments: •65(1) That every first discovery involves all that have gone before it; •66(2) that the discoverer’s ability itself is the product of past circumstances; •66(3) that often the same discovery is made by several men at once; •66(4) that the difference between the great and the ordinary man is slight •66Simultaneous discovery only shows that several great men, instead of one, are greater than others •67The extent of the great man’s superiority depends on how it is measured •68It may be slight to the speculative philosopher, but to the practical man it is all-important •69As for the two other arguments, which admit the great man’s greatness, but deny that it is his own, •71they are both true speculatively, but are practically untrue, or irrelevant; •71just as statements of averages and classification of goods may be true and relevant for one purpose, and false and irrelevant for another •72Thus the argument that the great man owes his faculties to his ancestors, and through his ancestors to the society which helped to develop his ancestors, though a speculative truism, •73leads to nothing but absurdities if we apply it to practical life •74For if the great workers owe their greatness to the whole of past society, the men who shirk work owe their idleness to it; and if the former deserve no reward, the latter deserve no punishment •75The same argument applies to morals; and if accepted, we should have to admit that nobody really did, or was really responsible for, anything •76Finally, let us take the argument that most of what the great man does depends on past discoveries and past achievements, to which he does but add a little •77If this argument means anything, it must mean that greatness is commoner than it is vulgarly thought •78But is this the case? Does Shakespeare’s debt to his antecedents make Shakespeares more numerous? •79Shakespeare’s contemporaries had the same national antecedents that he had; but they could not do what he did •80Men inherit the past only in so far as they can assimilate it •80Socialists say that inventions once made become common property •81This is absolutely untrue •81The discoveries and inventions of the past are the property of those only who can absorb and use them •82Thus the introduction of the past into the question leaves the differences between the great man and others undiminished •82If the ordinary man does anything, the great man does a great deal more •83and in practical reasoning he is a true cause for the sociologist •83And, curiously enough, Mr. Spencer unconsciously admits this •84He declares that the Napoleonic wars were entirely due to the maleficent greatness of Napoleon •84He defends patents because they represent thevery substance of the inventor’s own mind; •86and he attributes the modern improvement in steel manufacture to Sir H. Bessemer •87So much, then, being established, we must consider two difficulties suggested by it •88CHAPTER IVTHEGREATMANAS DISTINGUISHED FROM THEPHYSIOLOGICALLYFITTESTSURVIVORIt may be objected that modern sociology does not, as here asserted, neglect the great man, for it adopts the doctrine of the survival of the fittest •89It may be asked, on the other hand, what place the great man has in an exclusively evolutionary theory of progress •90The fittest survivor is not the same as the great man •90He plays a part in progress, but not the same part •90The fittest men, by surviving, raise the general level of the race, and promote progress only in this way •91The great man promotes progress by being superior to his contemporaries •92The movement of progress is double; •93one movement being very slow, the other rapid •93The survival of the fittest causes the slow movement •93The rapid movement is caused by the great man •95Next, as to evolution—what does the word mean? •95Its great practical characteristic, as put forward by Darwin, is that it is opposed to the doctrine of design, or divine intention; •96and yet, according to Darwin, species resulted from the intention of each animal to live and propagate •96Species, therefore, according to the evolutionist, is the result of intention, but not the result intended •97Evolution, in fact, is the reasonable sequence of the unintended •97This is as true of social evolution as it is of biological •97Many of the social conditions of any age result from the past, but were intended by nobody in the past; •98for instance, many of the social effects of railways and cheap printing •98Therefore, whenever any great man produces some change intentionally he has to work with unintended materials •99We can see this in the progress of dramatic art; •99also in the progress of philosophy •100And yet in each case the intended elements are equal or are greater than the unintended •100We see the same thing in the history of theTimesprinting press •101It was the result of many kinds of unintended progress, constantly recombined by intention •102Evolution, in fact, is the unintended result of the intentions of great men •104The unintended or evolved element in progress is what concerns the speculative philosopher •105The intended element, which originates directly in the great man, is what is of interest for practical purposes •106BOOK IICHAPTER ITHENATUREAND THEDEGREESOF THESUPERIORITIESOFGREATMENThe causality of the great man being established, we must consider more precisely what greatness is •111Mr. Spencer will help us to a general definition of it •112He divides the human race into the clever, the ordinary, and the stupid •113Now if all the race were stupid, it is plain there would be no progress; •114nor would there be any if all the race were ordinary; •114therefore progress must be due to the clever, who are, as Mr. Spencer says, a “scattered few” •115This is the great-man theory reasonably stated •115For great men are not necessarily heroes, as Carlyle thought, •116nor divided absolutely from all other men •116Greatness is various in kind and degree, •117but, at all events, there is a certain minority of men who resemble each other in being more efficient than the majority •117We see this in poetry •118in singers, •118in the scholarship of boys at the same school, •119and similarly in practical life •119Enough men, as it is, have equal opportunities, to show how unequal men are in their powers of using them •120No doubt a man may be ordinary in one respect and great in another; •120but the majority are not great in any •121The measure of a man’s greatness as an agent of social progress is the overt results actually produced by him •121A selfish doctor, if successful, is greater than a devoted doctor, if unsuccessful •122The fact that many men who produce no social results seem better and more brilliant than many men who do produce them, makes some argue that these results require no greatness for their production •122But the most efficient forms of greatness have often nothing brilliant about them •123A lofty imagination is often the enemy to practical efficiency; •124and great efficiency is often independent of exceptional intellect •125Intellectisrequired for progress,e.g.in invention; •125but the inventor by himself is often helpless, •125and has to ally himself with men whose exceptional gifts are unimpressive and even vulgar •126Greatness is not one quality, but various combinations of many •127Greatness, then, is merely those qualities which, in any domain of progress, make the few more efficient than the many •127The great-man theory, then, merely asserts that if some men were not more efficient than most men, no progress would take place at all •128But great men, in spite of these differences, all promote progress in the same way •128CHAPTER IIPROGRESSTHERESULTOF ASTRUGGLENOT FORSURVIVAL,BUTFORDOMINATIONIn order to see how the great man promotes progress, we must consider that whilst the fittest survivor only promotes it •130by living, whilst others die, •130the great man promotes progress by helping others to live •131He promotes progress not by what he does himself, but by what he helps others to do •132We can see this by considering the progress of knowledge which, as J. S. Mill says, is the foundation of all progress •132But all progress in knowledge is the work of “decidedly exceptional individuals,” •134as Mill admits, though in curiously confused language •135Now how do the exceptional individuals, when they acquire knowledge, promote progress by doing so? •136They promote progress by conveying their knowledge to, and imposing their conclusions on, others •137A similar thing is true of invention, which is knowledge applied •138Invention promotes progress only because the inventor influences the actions of the workmen who make and use his machines •139The man of business ability promotes progress also only by so ordering others that the precise wants of the public are supplied •140And the same principle is obviously true in the domain of war, politics, and religion •141Greatness, however, is not in all cases equally beneficial •142The influence of some great men is more advantageous than that of others •143Progress, then, involves a struggle through which the fittest great men shall secure influence over others, and destroy the influence of the less fit •143We now come to another point of difference between the fittest great man and the fittest survivor •143The social counterpart to the Darwinian struggle for survival is to be found in the struggle of labourers to find employment •144But this is not the struggle to which historical progress is due •145For the most rapid progress has taken place without any increased fitness in the labourers •145The progressive struggle in industry is confined entirely to the employers; •146and in every domain of progress it is confined to the leaders, to the exclusion of those who are led •146In the progressive struggle between great men, the mass of the community play no part whatever •147Let us take, for instance, two rival hotel-keepers •148One becomes bankrupt, and the other takes over his hotel and his staff •148The sole struggle is between the employers, not the employed •148The staff of the unsuccessful hotel-keeper gain, not lose, by being employed by the successful •149Historical progress, then, results from a struggle not for subsistence, but for domination •149CHAPTER IIITHEMEANSBY WHICH THEGREATMANAPPLIES HISGREATNESSTOWEALTH-PRODUCTIONAll gain by the domination of the fittest, except the few who fail to secure power for themselves •151We must consider, however, that the great men who struggle for domination would not do so without some strong motive; •152and also that they cannot dominate others except by some particular means •153Now the question of motive we will treat of hereafter. At present we will confine ourselves to the question of means •153These vary in each domain of social activity •153In some they are too obvious to need discussion •154We need consider what they are only in the domains of politics and wealth-production •155The question is most important in its bearings on wealth-production •156The great man in wealth-production can influence the actions of others by two means only—by the slave-system and the wage-system •157The slave-system secures obedience by coercion, the wage-system by inducement •157Wage-capital, not fixed capital, gives the primary power to capitalism as a productive agent •158Wage-capital is an accumulation of the necessaries of life, •159owned or controlled by a few persons, •159and apportioned by them amongst many, on certain conditions •160Karl Marx entirely misunderstood what these conditions are •160The essence of these conditions is that the many shall be technically directed by the few •161The question of how much the few appropriate of the product is a separate question altogether •162Thecorvéesystem or slavery would make wage-capital superfluous; and this shows what the essential function of wage-capital is •162So-called “co-operation” is merely the wage-system disguised •163There are, then, only two alternatives—the wage-system and the slave-system; •164as we shall find by considering how the socialists can only escape the wage-system by substituting slavery •165For they would secure industrial obedience by coercion, •166not through the worker’s desire to earn his living. And this is the essence of slavery •166Next let us consider the means by which the great directors of industry compete against one another •167Under capitalism they do so, owing to the fact that the man who cannot direct industry so as to please the public loses his capital, and with it the means of direction •167The wage-system is the only efficient means of competition of this kind •168The socialists, though they affect to be opposed to competition altogether, •168re-introduce it into their own system, •170the only change being that it is associated with the slave-system, which is very cumbrous and inefficient •170Competition between employers, then, is a part of every system that permits of progress; •172and since the re-introduction of slavery is practically impossible, we must regard the wage-system as a permanent feature of progressive societies •172We might reduce society to ashes, but this system and capitalistic competition would arise out of them; •173for capitalistic competition means the domination of the fittest great men •174The industrial obedience of the many to the few is thefundamental condition of progress •174CHAPTER IVTHEMEANSBY WHICH THEGREATMANACQUIRESPOWERINPOLITICSIn discussing the means by which the great man wields power in politics, the debatable question differs from the question raised by his power in industry; •176for the points that are debated in the case of the great wealth-producer are admitted by all in the case of the governor •176The greatest democrat admits that the governor must be an exceptional man, •177and also that he must be chosen by elective competition •177There is a competitive element even in autocracies, •178and democracies are essentially competitive •178All parties also agree that laws must be enforced by pains and penalties •179Democrats are peculiar only in their theory that the sole greatness required in their governors is a perceptive and executive greatness, which will enable them to carry out the spontaneous wishes of the many •179This is the only point in which the democratic theory differs from the aristocratic •180The democratic ruler is, theoretically, a balance for weighing the wills of the many, •181or a machine for executing their “mandates”; •182and there are signs which might suggest that the few in politics are really becoming the mere instruments of the many •182But these signs are deceptive; for what seems the will of the many, really depends on the action of another minority •183Opinions, to derive power from the numbers who hold them, must be identical; •184but they seldom are identical till a few men have manipulated them •184Thus what seems to be the opinion of the many is generally dependent on the influence of a few •185The many, for instance, would never have had any opinions on Free Trade or Bimetallism if the few had not worked on them •185Popular opinion requires exceptional men, as nuclei, round which to form itself •187Thus even in what seems extremest democracy the few are essential •188Democrats, however, may argue that under democracy the few do, in the long-run, carry out the wishes of the many •188Even were this true, the current formulas of democracy would be false, for unequal men would be essential to executing the wishes of equals •189Now in reality the few are never mere passive agents; •189but nevertheless the many do impress their will on them to a great extent •190The question is towhatextent? •191This introduces us to a new side of the problem—the extent of the power of the many •191This is greater in politics than in industry; •192and yet when we think it over we shall see that it is great in most domains of activity •192We had to take it for granted at starting. We must now examine it •193BOOK IIICHAPTER IHOWTO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN THEPARTSCONTRIBUTED TO AJOINTPRODUCTBY THEFEWAND BY THEMANYMill declares that when two agencies are essential to producing an effect, their respective contributions to it cannot be discriminated •197Mill argues thus with special reference to land and labour; •198but he overlooks what in actual life is the main feature of the case •198The labour remaining the same, the product varies with the quality of the land •198The extra product resulting from labour on superior land is due to land, not labour •199This is easily proved by a number of analogous illustrations •199Mill errs by ignoring the changing character of the effect •201The case of labour directed by different great men is the same as the case of labour applied to different qualities of land. The great men produce the increment •202Labour, however, must be held to produce that minimum necessary to support the labourer, •203both in agriculture •203and in all kinds of production •204The great man produces the increment that would not be produced if his influence ceased •204Labour, it is true, is essential to the production of the increment also; •205but we cannot draw any conclusions from the hypothesis of labour ceasing; •205for the labourer would have to labour whether the great men were there or no •206The cessation of the great man’s influence is a practical alternative; the cessation of labour is not, •206as we see by frequent examples •206Thus the great man, in the most practical sense, produces what labour would not produce in his absence •208An analysis of practical reasoning as to causes generally will show us the truth of this •208For practical purposesthecause of an effect is that cause only which may or may not be present; •209as we see when men discuss the cause of a fire, •210or of the accuracy of a chronometer, •210or the causes of danger to a man hanging on to a rope •211But there is another means of discriminating between the products of exceptional men and ordinary men •212This is by an analysis of the faculties necessary to produce the product •213Are these faculties possessed by all, or by a few only? •213CHAPTER IITHENATUREANDSCOPEOF PURELYDEMOCRATICACTION,ORTHEACTIONOFAVERAGEMENINCO-OPERATIONCarlyle was wrong in his claim for the great man because he failed to note that his powers were conditioned by the capacities of the ordinary men influenced by him •215The socialists are wrong because, seeing that the many do something, they argue that they do everything •215What the many do is limited. We must see precisely what the limits are •216If a Russian conspirator employs a hundred workmen to dig what they think is a cellar, but is a mine for blowing up the Czar, •216the conspirator contributes the entire criminal character of the enterprise •217When a choir sings Handel’s music, Handel contributes the specific character of the sounds sung by them •217Let us turn to the facts of progress, •217and begin with economic progress and progress in knowledge •218In the case of economic progress we must apply the method of inquiring what is produced by labour with and without the assistance of the great man •218To the question of progress in knowledge we must apply the method of inquiring what faculties are involved in it •219These are faculties entirely confined to the few •219And now let us turn to political government •220What can the faculties of average men do when left to themselves? •220They can accomplish only the simplest actions, •220and formulate only the simplest demands •221The moment matters become at all complex the faculties of the exceptional man are required •221Now in any civilised country few governmental measures are really simple •222Exceptional men must simplify them for the many •222Thus the voice of the many, in all complex cases, echoes the voice of the few •223This, however, is not the end of the matter; •224for the details of governmental measures are not the whole of government •224The true power of democracy is to be seen in religious and family life •224Though the influence of the great man in religion is enormous, •225yet religions have only grown and endured because they touch the heart of the average man •225Christianity exemplifies this fact, •225and especially Catholicism •226The doctrines formulated by the aristocracy of Popes and Councils originated among the mass of common believers •227Theologians and councils merely reasoned on the materials thus given them •228Catholicism shows the great part played by the many so clearly, because the part played by the few is defined by it so sharply •228Catholicism, however, is only alluded to here because it illustrates the essential nature of truly democratic action •229Thus enlightened by it, let us turn back to family life •230Catholicism shows that democracy is a natural coincidence of conclusions •231The home life of a nation depends on the same coincidence, or on spontaneously similar propensities •231This truly democratic coincidence forces all governments to accommodate themselves to it •233The same democratic power determines the structure of our houses, •233and the furniture and other commodities in them, •234and indeed all economic products •234For though in the process of production the many are dependent on the few, •235(a fact which the powers of trade unionism do but make more apparent) •235yet it is the wants and tastes of the many which determine what shall be produced •238and though great men elicit these wants by first supplying them, •239the wants themselves must be latent in the nature of the many, and when once aroused are essentially democratic phenomena •239Thus though economic supply is aristocratic, economic demand is purely democratic •240The most gifted brewer cannot make the public drink beer they do not like •241Now in politics also there is a similar demand and supply; •242but the truly democratic demand in politics is not for laws •242The demand for laws is not the counterpart of a demand for commodities, for commodities are demanded for their own sake, laws for the sake of their results •243The demand for laws is like a demand that commodities shall be made by some special kind of machinery •243No one makes this latter demand. Economic demand is single; political demand is double •244Political democracy is vulgarly identified with the demand not for social goods, but for machinery •244But in so far as democracy is a demand not for goods but for machinery, it is not purely democratic •245The demands of the many are manipulated by the few •245Why, then, is democracy especially associated with the demand in which its power is least? •246Because it is the only sphere of activity in which the many can interfere with the machinery of supply at all; •246and they can interfere with it here because the effects of political government on life are less close and important than the effects of business management on business; •247and in any case the apparent power of the many is even here controlled by the few •247The power of the many is a power to determine the quality of civilisation and progress, not to produce them •248CHAPTER IIITHEQUALITIESOF THEORDINARYAS OPPOSED TO THEGREATMANIt will be objected that the conclusions reached in the last chapter derogate from the dignity of the average man •250But they do not really do so; •251for since the great man, as here technically defined, is the man who influences others so as to promote progress, •251the ordinary man, as opposed to him, need not be stupid •252He is merely the man whose talents do not increase the efficiency of other men •252Poets, in this technical sense, are ordinary men •252So are the most skilful manual workers, •253for very great manual skill does not promote progress or influence others, •254unless it can be metamorphosed into the shape of orders given to others •256Again, brilliance or charm in private life does not promote progress •256Therefore ordinary men, who do not promote progress, are not asserted to be lacking in high qualities •257Indeed, what is really interesting in human nature is the typical part of it, not the exceptional, •258as we may see by referring to art and poetry •258Average opinion also on social matters is for each class the wise opinion; •259and the average faculties shared by all are in one sense the test of truth •259Therefore in denying to the average man the powers that promote progress •260we are not degrading the average man. We are merely asserting that these powers form but a small part of life •260Socialists can object to this conclusion only because it establishes the claim of exceptional men to exceptional wealth •262They cannot have any theoretical objections to it, for they are beginning to recognise the importance of the exceptional man themselves, •263and only obscure the fact for purposes of popular agitation •264So far, however, as the reasoning of this book has gone already, no claim has been made for the great man to which socialists need object; •264for we have assumed that he keeps none of the exceptional wealth he makes, for himself, •265but that he works exactly on the terms the socialists would dictate to him •266It now remains to consider whether he would really do so •266BOOK IVCHAPTER ITHEDEPENDENCEOFEXCEPTIONALACTIONON THEATTAINABILITYOFEXCEPTIONALREWARD,OR THENECESSARYCORRESPONDENCEBETWEEN THEMOTIVESTOACTIONAND ITSRESULTS.Great men differ from ordinary men in degree only, not in kind, •271and the use of exceptional powers is conditioned like the use of ordinary powers •272Now let us take the most universal powers possessed by man, viz. those used in acquiring the simplest food •272Man’s powers in agriculture would be latent unless man wanted food and the earth’s surface were cultivable •272Thus the exercise of the simplest faculties depends on the want of some certain object, and the possibility of attaining it •273If this is true of the commonest faculties which aim at supplying necessaries, much more is it true of rare faculties which aim at producing superfluities •273Society, then, if great men are to work in it, must be so constituted as to make the reward they desire possible •274In so doing society makes a contract with its great men; •274and this is a contract which is being constantly revised •275The great men themselves are the ultimate fixers of their own price •276Here is the final proof that living great men, not past conditions, are the causespracticallyinvolved in progress •276Thus living great men are masters of the situation •277because no one can tell that they have exceptional powers till they choose to show them •277They cannot, therefore, be coerced from without, like ordinary workers •278They must beinducedto work by a reward •278which they themselves feel to be sufficient •279Hence the great man’s character and requirements impress themselves on the structure of society •279This is what socialists constantly forget •280and they propose to equalise matters by not offering great men any exceptional reward •281They forget to ask whether, under these circumstances, great men would exercise or reveal their exceptional powers at all •281Exceptional rewards are essential to exceptional action •282We must inquire what the required exceptional rewards are •283CHAPTER IITHEMOTIVESOF THEEXCEPTIONALWEALTH-PRODUCERSocialists, though often forgetting the necessity of exceptional motives, often remember it, •284and endeavour to show that socialistic society would have sufficient rewards to offer to its great men, •284such as the pleasure of doing good, of excelling, and of receiving honour •285The fundamental question is, will such rewards as these stimulate great men to wealth-production? •285Is the enjoyment of exceptional wealth superfluous as a motive to producing it? •286If it is so, it is for the socialists to prove that it is so; •286for they themselves admit that it has not been so in the past, and is not actually so now •287Are there any signs, then, that the desire for exceptional wealth is beginning to lose its power? •288We shall find that the socialists themselves maintain just the contrary; •288for they appeal to the desire of each producer to possess all he produces as the most universal and permanent desire in man; •289and never questioned this so long as they believed that the sole producer was the labourer •289They questioned the doctrine only when they came to see that the great man is a producer also; and they confine their questioning to his case •290But if the labourer desires to possess what he produces, much more will the great man do so; •290for even if he gives away what he produces, he desires to possess it first •291There is no sign, therefore, that the desire for exceptional wealth is losing force as a motive •292Are, then, other desires acquiring new force as motives to wealth-production? •292Are the joys of excelling, of benefiting others, or of being honoured by others, doing so? •293The desire of these joys is a motive to certain kinds of exceptional conduct •293It is a motive to benevolent action and religious work; •293But neither of these is the same thing as wealth-production •294It is a motive to artistic production, certainly, •294and also to scientific discovery; •295and works of art are wealth, and scientific discovery is the basis of industrial progress; •296but great art forms but a small part of wealth, •296and artistic effort other than the highest is motived by the desire of pecuniary reward, •297whilst scientific discoveries, though made generally from the desire for truth, are applied to wealth-production because the men who apply them desire wealth •297What, however, of the fact that the desire for honour makes the soldier work harder than any labourer? •298Why, the socialists ask, should not the same desire make the great wealth-producer work? •299Mr. Frederic Harrison has urged a similar argument •299The answer to this is that the work of the soldier is exceptional; •300and we cannot argue from it to the work of ordinary life •301The fighting instinct is inherent in the dominant races, •302in a way in which the industrial instinct is not •303And even in war those who make the prolonged intellectual efforts required, ask for themselves other rewards besides honour •303Still more will the great wealth-producers do so •304There is therefore nothing to show that these other motives will supersede the desire of wealth •304What they really do, and what socialists fail to see, is to mix with the desire for wealth, and add to its efficiency •304As the desire of wealth has mixed with other desires in men like Bacon, Rubens, etc. •305For in saying that the desire of wealth is essential as a motive to wealth-production we do not mean the desire of wealth for its own sake, •305or for the sake of physical gratification •306This forms a small part of its desirability •306It is desired mainly as a means to power, and to those very pleasures which socialists offer instead of it •307The great wealth-producers, susceptible to the motives on which socialists dwell, will desire exceptional wealth all the more because of them •308It is argued, however, by semi-socialists that the actual producer may be allowed the income he produces, but that this must end with his life, and not be passed on to his family as interest on bequeathed capital •309It is claimed that this arrangement would coincide with abstract justice, •310for it is argued that all wealth which is not worked for must be stolen •310This is utterly untrue, as the case of flocks and herds shows us; •311but the chief producer of wealth that is not worked for is capital, which is past productive ability stored up and externalised •311The dart of a savage hunter, •312the manure heap or cart horse of a peasant, •312are forms of capital which actually produce, and the product belongs to those who own them •313The same is the case with such capital as engines and manufacturing plant •313These implements are like a race of iron negroes, and are producers as truly as live negroes would be •314Indirectly, wage capital is also a producer in the same way •314And indeed, till they saw that this argument could be turned against themselves, it was strongly urged by the socialists •315Practically, however, the justification of income from capital •316rests on the fact that the power of capital to yield income is what mainly makes men anxious to produce it; •316since if income-yielding capital could not be acquired and amassed, wealthy men could make no provision for their families, •317nor could wealth give pleasure to those who might at any moment be beggars •318Moreover, if incomes were not heritable, wealth would produce none of those social results, such as continuous culture, etc., which make it valuable •319The wealth that ceased with the men that actually made it would produce a society of beasts •319Wealth is desirable because it is the physical basis of an enlarged life; •320and there must thus be continuity in the possession of wealth •320Hence the great wealth-producer demands the possession not only of what he produces directly, but of what he produces indirectly through his past products •321The majority not only may, but do, acquire a share of the increment produced by the great man; •322but whatever this share may be, it can never be such as to make social conditions equal •322CHAPTER IIIEQUALITYOFEDUCATIONALOPPORTUNITYThe wealthy class, owing to inheritance, is always much more numerous than the great men actually engaged at any given time in production •324But though inheritance gives a certain permanence to the wealthy class, the families belonging to it are constantly, if slowly, changing, •325and new men are constantly forcing their way into it •326Indeed the wealth of the country depends on the men potentially great as producers actualising their talents and producing the wealth that raises them •326It is therefore obvious that the wealth will increase in proportion as these potentially great men have the opportunity of actualising their productive powers •327It is impossible, however, to make opportunities absolutely equal •328The question is how near we can approach to equality •328In a country where these opportunities have been made artificially unequal there will be room for a great deal of equalisation •329But removing artificial impediments is only a negative kind of equalisation •329It is probable, however, that for the development of genius of the highest order this is all that is needful, •330and will secure the development of all the genius of the highest kind that exists •331But genius of a lesser kind, which would else be lost, may, no doubt, be elicited by positive educational help from the State; •332though the amount of such genius is overestimated by reformers, because they confuse talents rare in themselves with accomplishments that are only rare accidentally •332The latter can be increased indefinitely, the former not •333For real productive genius there is always room, •333but the economic utility of mere accomplishments is limited by the conditions of production at the time •333Thus to produce more possible clerks than are wanted merely lowers the wages of those employed, without increasing the utility of those who are not employed •334Still, within limits, educational help from the State does much to increase the supply of exceptional, though not great, talent •335But the main difficulty involved in the equalising of educational opportunity is not the production of good results, but the avoidance of bad •335The bad results are the stimulating of discontent, not in average men, but in men who are really exceptional •336but those exceptional gifts are ill-balanced or have some flaw in them •337For if education sets free and stimulates sound intellectual powers •337it will similarly stimulate intellects that are not sound, •338or wills, with no intellect to match, and will generate a desire for wealth in men who are not capable of creating it, •338and thus will merely produce needless misery and mischief •339Education, again, stimulates faculties that can really produce exceptional results, but not results that are complete •339The progressive struggle requires that the intellects of some should be stimulated, whose efforts fail •340But those failures that promote progress are failures that partially succeed •340But there are abortive talents which produce failures that have no relation to success. Those talents are purely mischievous; •341for example, the failure of the would-be artist, •341or that of the man who popularises wrong medical treatment •342But the commonest example of this kind of man is the socialistic agitator, •342who demands the redistribution of wealth, whilst absolutely powerless to produce it, •343and who consequently invents false theories about its production, which do nothing but demoralise those who are duped by them •343(though even these theories can be discussed with profit under certain circumstances) •344Men like these embody the two chief dangers of the equalisation of educational opportunity, •345namely, the rousing in the average man wants he cannot satisfy, and the stimulating of talents that are constitutionally imperfect •345The latter of these dangers is the source of the former •346It cannot be completely avoided, but the present theories of education tend to heighten, not to minimise it •346The current theory that all talents should be developed is false, •347so is the theory that all tastes should be cultivated in all alike. The education proper for the rich is not a type but an exception •347These false theories rest on the false belief that equal education could ever produce equal social conditions •348The majority of each class will remain in the class in which they were born •348Only the efficiently exceptional can rise out of their own class, •348and it is the ambition of the efficiently exceptional only that it is really desirable to stimulate •349The average man should be taught to aim at embellishing his position, not at escaping from it •349CHAPTER IVINEQUALITY,HAPPINESS,ANDPROGRESSThe radical politician will object to the foregoing conclusions in terms with which we are familiar •351The radical theorist will put the same objections more logically. If the desire of exceptional wealth is really the strongest motive, he will say that it follows that most men, since they cannot all be exceptionally rich, must always remain miserable •352Now the first answer to this is that the fact that all men will never be equally wealthy does not prevent the conditions of all men from improving absolutely •353Another answer is that if inequality in the possession of the most coveted prizes of life implies misery amongst the majority, this evil would be intensified rather than mitigated by socialists, who would substitute unequal honour for unequal wealth •354The final answer is that the unequal distribution of wealth has no natural tendency to cause unhappiness; •357for men’s desires vary. There is equality of desire for the necessaries of life only; for this desire rests on men’s physical natures, which are similar; •357but the desire for superfluities depends on their mental powers, which vary •358The special appeal of luxury is mainly to the mind and the imagination— •358the luxury, for instance, of a large house, •359or sleeping accommodation in a train •359Consequently the desire for luxury and wealth, like the pleasure they give, depends on peculiar mental powers or peculiar mental states •360Amongst most men the desire for wealth is naturally a speculative desire only •361It implies no pain caused by the want of wealth •361The desire ceases to be speculative and becomes a practical craving only when the imagination is exceptionally strong, and a strong belief is present that the attainment of wealth is possible •362The desire for wealth, in fact, is in proportion to each man’s belief that by him personally it is attainable •364This belief is naturally confined to men with exceptional imaginations and exceptional productive powers •365It only becomes general by the popularising of false theories which represent wealth as attainable by all, without exceptional talent or exceptional exertion •366It is roused, for instance, in a man who suddenly is told that he has a legal right to an estate which previously he never thought of coveting •366The socialistic teaching of to-day creates a spurious desire for wealth by its doctrines of impossible rights to it •367The practical craving for wealth is naturally confined to those who have some talent for creating it, and the pain caused by its absence is naturally confined to such men •368The socialistic theories merely cause a barren and artificial discontent, •368which interferes with that harmonious progress on which the welfare of the many depends •369These theories make enemies of classes who would otherwise be allies, and the cause of true social reform suffers incalculable injury •370The object of the present work is to show the fallacy of the theoretic basis of existing socialistic discontent and socialistic aspirations; •371and to show that the many are not a self-existent power, •372but depend for all the powers they possess on the co-operation of the few, •373whose rights are as sacred, and whose power is as great, as their own •375The recognition of the fact that the relations and positions of classes can never be fundamentally altered •376(especially when we consider the facts of history to which Karl Marx drew attention) •376shows us not only how chimerical are the hopes of the socialists, but what solid grounds there are for the hopes of more rational reformers •378

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