134Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. pp. 428, 429; Simplikius ad Categor. fol. 43, A: κἀκεῖνο ἄτοπον τὸ σύνθετα ποιεῖν τὰ γένη ἐκ προτέρων τινῶν καὶ δευτέρων ὡς τὸ πρός τι ἐκ ποιοῦ καὶ πρός τι. Cf. Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25-29.Porphyry appears to include all συμβεβηκότα under ποιὸν and πὼς ἔχον: he gives as examples of the latter, what Aristotle would have assigned to the Category κεῖσθαι (Eisagoge, cc. 2, 10; Schol. Br. p. 1, b. 32, p. 5, a. 30).
134Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. pp. 428, 429; Simplikius ad Categor. fol. 43, A: κἀκεῖνο ἄτοπον τὸ σύνθετα ποιεῖν τὰ γένη ἐκ προτέρων τινῶν καὶ δευτέρων ὡς τὸ πρός τι ἐκ ποιοῦ καὶ πρός τι. Cf. Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25-29.
Porphyry appears to include all συμβεβηκότα under ποιὸν and πὼς ἔχον: he gives as examples of the latter, what Aristotle would have assigned to the Category κεῖσθαι (Eisagoge, cc. 2, 10; Schol. Br. p. 1, b. 32, p. 5, a. 30).
In comparing the ten Aristotelian with the four Stoic Categories we see that the first great difference is in the extent and comprehension ofQuale, which Aristotle restricts on one side (by distinguishing from itEssentia Secunda), and enlarges on the other (by including in it many attributes accidental and foreign to the Essence). The second difference is, that the Stoics did not subdivide their third Category, but included therein all the matter of six Aristotelian Categories,135and much of the matter of the AristotelianQuale. Both schemes agree on two points:— 1. In taking as the point of departure the concrete, particular, individual, Substance. 2. In the narrow, restricted, inadequate conception formed of the Relative —Ad Aliquid.
135Plotinus (Ennead. vi. 1. 80) disapproves greatly the number of disparates ranked under τὸ πὼς ἔχον, which has (he contends) no discoverable unity as a generic term. It is curious to see how he cites the Aristotelian Categories, as if the decuple distinction which they marked out were indefeasible.Simplikius says that the Stoics distinguished between τὸ πρός τι and τὸ πρός τι πὼς ἔχον; and Trendelenburg, (pp. 228, 229) explains and illustrate this distinction, which, however, appears to be very obscure.
135Plotinus (Ennead. vi. 1. 80) disapproves greatly the number of disparates ranked under τὸ πὼς ἔχον, which has (he contends) no discoverable unity as a generic term. It is curious to see how he cites the Aristotelian Categories, as if the decuple distinction which they marked out were indefeasible.
Simplikius says that the Stoics distinguished between τὸ πρός τι and τὸ πρός τι πὼς ἔχον; and Trendelenburg, (pp. 228, 229) explains and illustrate this distinction, which, however, appears to be very obscure.
Plotinus himself recognizes fiveSummaorPrima Genera,136(hedoes not call them Categories)Ens,Motus,Quies,Idem,Diversum; the same as those enumerated in the Platonic Sophistes. He does not admitQuantum,Quale, orAd Aliquid, to bePrima Genera; still less the other Aristotelian Categories. Moreover, he insists emphatically on the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible world, which distinction he censures Aristotle for neglecting. His fiveGenerahe applies directly and principally to the intelligible world. For the sensible world he admits ultimately five Catgories;SubstantiaorEssentia(though he conceives this as fluctuating between Form, Matter, and the Compound of the two),Ad Aliquid,Quantum,Quale,Motus. But he doubts whetherQuantum,Quale, andMotus, are not comprehended inAd Aliquid.137He considers, moreover, that Sensible Substance is not Substance, properly speaking, but only an imitation thereof; a congeries of non-substantial elements, qualities and matter.138Dexippus,139in answering the objections of Plotinus, insists much on the difference between Aristotle’s point of view in the Categoriæ, in the Physica, and in the Metaphysica. In the Categoriæ, Aristotle dwells mainly on sensible substances (such as the vulgar understand) and the modes of naming and describing them.
136Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 2, 8, 14, 16.
136Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 2, 8, 14, 16.
137Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 3. 3. ἢ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὰ πρός τι· περιεκτικὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον. His idea of Relation is more comprehensive than that of Aristotle, for he declares that terms, propositions, discourse, &c., are πρός τι· καθ’ ὃ σημαντικά (vi. 3. 19).
137Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 3. 3. ἢ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὰ πρός τι· περιεκτικὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον. His idea of Relation is more comprehensive than that of Aristotle, for he declares that terms, propositions, discourse, &c., are πρός τι· καθ’ ὃ σημαντικά (vi. 3. 19).
138Ibid. vi. 3. 8-15.
138Ibid. vi. 3. 8-15.
139The second and third books of Dexippus’s Dialogue contain his answers to many of the objections urged by Plotinus. Aristotle, in the Categoriæ (Dexippus says), accommodates himself both to the received manner of speaking and to the simple or ordinary conception of οὐσία entertained by youth or unphilosophical men — οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε περὶ τῶν γενῶν τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας νῦν αὐτῷ πρόκειται λέγειν· στοχάζεται γὰρ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἁπλουστέροις ἐπακολουθεῖν δυναμένων (p. 49). Compare also pp. 50-54, where Dexippus contrasts the more abstruse handling which we read in the Physica and Metaphysica, with the more obvious and unpretending thoughts worked out by Aristotle in the Categoriæ. Dexippus gives an interesting piece of advice to his pupil, that he should vary his mode of discussing these topics, according as his companions are philosophical or otherwise — ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ καλὲ κἀγαθὲ Σέλευκε, δογματικώτερον πρὸς Πλωτῖνον ἀπαντῶ, σὺ δέ, ἐπεὶ βαθύτεραί πως εἰσὶν αἱ λύσεις αὗται, πρὸς μὲν τοῦς ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὁρμωμένους ταῖς τοιαύταις ἀπαντήσεσι χρῶ, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὀλίγα ἐπισταμένους τῶν δογμάτων ταῖς προχείροις χρῶ διαλύσεσιν, ἐκεῖνο λέγων,ὅτι περὶ πόδα ποιεῖσθαι ἔθος τὰς ἀκροάσεις Ἀριστοτέλει·διὸ καὶ νῦν οὐδὲν ἔξωθεν ἐπεισάγει τῶν ἀνωτέρω κειμένων φιλοσοφημάτων, &c. (pp. 50, 51).
139The second and third books of Dexippus’s Dialogue contain his answers to many of the objections urged by Plotinus. Aristotle, in the Categoriæ (Dexippus says), accommodates himself both to the received manner of speaking and to the simple or ordinary conception of οὐσία entertained by youth or unphilosophical men — οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε περὶ τῶν γενῶν τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας νῦν αὐτῷ πρόκειται λέγειν· στοχάζεται γὰρ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἁπλουστέροις ἐπακολουθεῖν δυναμένων (p. 49). Compare also pp. 50-54, where Dexippus contrasts the more abstruse handling which we read in the Physica and Metaphysica, with the more obvious and unpretending thoughts worked out by Aristotle in the Categoriæ. Dexippus gives an interesting piece of advice to his pupil, that he should vary his mode of discussing these topics, according as his companions are philosophical or otherwise — ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ καλὲ κἀγαθὲ Σέλευκε, δογματικώτερον πρὸς Πλωτῖνον ἀπαντῶ, σὺ δέ, ἐπεὶ βαθύτεραί πως εἰσὶν αἱ λύσεις αὗται, πρὸς μὲν τοῦς ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὁρμωμένους ταῖς τοιαύταις ἀπαντήσεσι χρῶ, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὀλίγα ἐπισταμένους τῶν δογμάτων ταῖς προχείροις χρῶ διαλύσεσιν, ἐκεῖνο λέγων,ὅτι περὶ πόδα ποιεῖσθαι ἔθος τὰς ἀκροάσεις Ἀριστοτέλει·διὸ καὶ νῦν οὐδὲν ἔξωθεν ἐπεισάγει τῶν ἀνωτέρω κειμένων φιλοσοφημάτων, &c. (pp. 50, 51).
Galen also recognizes five Categories; but not the same five as Plotinus. He makes a new list, formed partly out of the Aristotelian ten, partly out of the Stoic four:— Οὐσία, ποσόν, ποιόν,πρός τι, πρό τι πὼς ἔχον.140
140Schol. ad Categor. p. 49, a. 30.
140Schol. ad Categor. p. 49, a. 30.
The latter portion of this Aristotelian treatise, on the Categories or Predicaments, consists of an Appendix, usually knownunder the title of ‘Post-Predicamenta;’141wherein the following terms or notions are analysed and explained —Opposita,Prius,Simul,Motus,Habere.
141Andronikus and other commentators supposed the Post-Predicamenta to have been appended to the Categoriæ by some later hand. Most of the commentators dissented from this view. The distinctions and explanations seem all Aristotelian.
141Andronikus and other commentators supposed the Post-Predicamenta to have been appended to the Categoriæ by some later hand. Most of the commentators dissented from this view. The distinctions and explanations seem all Aristotelian.
OfOpposita, Aristotle reckons four modes, analogous to each other, yet not different species under the same genus:142— 1.Relative-Opposita—RelatumandCorrelatum. 2.Contraria. 3.HabitusandPrivatio. 4.AffirmatioandNegatio.
142Categ. p. 11, b. 16: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ποσαχῶς εἴωθεν ἀντικεῖσθαι ῥητέον. See Simpl. in Schol. p. 81, a. 37-b. 24. Whether Aristotle reckoned τὰ ἀντικείμενα a true genus or not, was debated among the commentators. The word ποσαχῶς implies that he did not; and he treats even the term ἐναντία as a πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον, though it is less wide in its application than ἀντικείμενα, which includesRelata(Metaphys.I. p. 1055, a. 17). He even treats στέρησις as a πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον (p. 1055, a. 34).Αἱ ἀντιθέσεις τέσσαρες, the four distinct varieties of τὰ ἀντικείμενα are enumerated by Aristotle in various other places:— Topic. ii. p. 109, b. 17; p. 113, b. 15; Metaphys.I. p. 1055, a. 38. In Metaphys.Δ. p. 1018, a. 20, two other varieties are added. Bonitz observes (ad Metaph. p. 247) that Aristotle seems to treat this quadripartite distribution ofOpposita, “tanquam certum et exploratum, pariter ac causarum numerum,â€� &c.
142Categ. p. 11, b. 16: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ποσαχῶς εἴωθεν ἀντικεῖσθαι ῥητέον. See Simpl. in Schol. p. 81, a. 37-b. 24. Whether Aristotle reckoned τὰ ἀντικείμενα a true genus or not, was debated among the commentators. The word ποσαχῶς implies that he did not; and he treats even the term ἐναντία as a πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον, though it is less wide in its application than ἀντικείμενα, which includesRelata(Metaphys.I. p. 1055, a. 17). He even treats στέρησις as a πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον (p. 1055, a. 34).
Αἱ ἀντιθέσεις τέσσαρες, the four distinct varieties of τὰ ἀντικείμενα are enumerated by Aristotle in various other places:— Topic. ii. p. 109, b. 17; p. 113, b. 15; Metaphys.I. p. 1055, a. 38. In Metaphys.Δ. p. 1018, a. 20, two other varieties are added. Bonitz observes (ad Metaph. p. 247) that Aristotle seems to treat this quadripartite distribution ofOpposita, “tanquam certum et exploratum, pariter ac causarum numerum,â€� &c.
These four modes of opposition have passed from the Categoriæ of Aristotle into all or most of the modern treatises on Logic. The three last of the four are usefully classed together, and illustrated by their contrasts with each other. But as to the first of the four, I cannot think that Aristotle has been happy in the place which he has assigned to it. To treatRelativaas a variety ofOpposita, appears to me an inversion of the true order of classification; placing the more comprehensive term in subordination to the less comprehensive. Instead of saying that Relatives are a variety of the Opposite, we ought rather to say that Opposites are varieties of the Relative. We have here another proof of what has been remarked a few pages above; the narrow and inadequate conception which Aristotle formed of hisAd Aliquidor the Relative; restricting it to cases in which the describing phrase is grammatically elliptical.143The three classes last-mentioned by Aristotle(1.Contraria, 2.HabitusandPrivatio, 3.AffirmatioandNegatio) are trulyOpposita; in each there is a different mode of opposition, which it is good to distinguish from the others. But theRelatumand itsCorrelatum, as such, are not necessarilyOppositeat all; they are compared or conceived in conjunction with each other; while a name, called relative, which connotes such comparison, &c., is bestowed upon each.Oppositafall under this general description, as parts (together with other parts notOpposita) of a larger whole. They ought properly to be calledOpposite-Relativa: the phraseRelative-Opposita, as applied to Relatives generally, being discontinued as incorrect.144
143Categ. p. 11, b. 24.Ammonius and Simplikius inform us that there was much debate among the commentators about these four alleged varieties of ἀντικείμενα; also, that even Aristotle himself had composed a special treatise (not now extant), Περὶ τῶν Ἀντικειμένων, full of perplexing ἀπορίαι, which the Stoics afterwards discussed without solving (Schol. p. 83, a. 15-48). Herminus and others seem to have felt the difficulty of calling all Relatives ἀντικείμενα; for they admitted that the antithesis between the Relative and its Correlate was of gentler character, not conflicting, but reciprocally sustaining. Alexander ingeniously comparedRelatumand itsCorrelatumto the opposite rafters of a roof, each supporting the other (μαλακώτερα καὶ ἧττον μαχόμενα ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις, ὡςκαὶ ἀμφιβάλεσθαι εἰ εἰσὶν ἀντικείμενα σώζοντα ἄλληλα·ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δείκνυσιν Ἀλέξανδρος ὅτι ἀντικείμενα, ὃς καὶ τὰ λαβδοειδῆ ξύλα παραδεῖγμα λαμβάνει, &c., Schol. p. 81, b. 32; p. 82, a. 15, b. 20). This is an undue enlargement of the meaning ofOpposita, by taking in the literal material sense as an adjunct to the logical. On the contrary, the Stoics are alleged to have worked out the views of Aristotle about ἐναντία, but to have restricted the meaning ofἀντικείμεναto contradictory opposition,i. e.to Affirmative and Negative Propositions with the same subject and predicate (Schol. p. 83, b. 11; p. 87, a. 29). In Metaphysica,A. 983, a. 31, Aristotle calls the final cause (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τἀγαθόν) τὴν ἀντικειμένην αἰτίαν to the cause (among his four), τὸὅθενἡ κίνησις. This is a misleading phrase; the two are not opposed, but mutually implicated and correlative.
143Categ. p. 11, b. 24.
Ammonius and Simplikius inform us that there was much debate among the commentators about these four alleged varieties of ἀντικείμενα; also, that even Aristotle himself had composed a special treatise (not now extant), Περὶ τῶν Ἀντικειμένων, full of perplexing ἀπορίαι, which the Stoics afterwards discussed without solving (Schol. p. 83, a. 15-48). Herminus and others seem to have felt the difficulty of calling all Relatives ἀντικείμενα; for they admitted that the antithesis between the Relative and its Correlate was of gentler character, not conflicting, but reciprocally sustaining. Alexander ingeniously comparedRelatumand itsCorrelatumto the opposite rafters of a roof, each supporting the other (μαλακώτερα καὶ ἧττον μαχόμενα ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις, ὡςκαὶ ἀμφιβάλεσθαι εἰ εἰσὶν ἀντικείμενα σώζοντα ἄλληλα·ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δείκνυσιν Ἀλέξανδρος ὅτι ἀντικείμενα, ὃς καὶ τὰ λαβδοειδῆ ξύλα παραδεῖγμα λαμβάνει, &c., Schol. p. 81, b. 32; p. 82, a. 15, b. 20). This is an undue enlargement of the meaning ofOpposita, by taking in the literal material sense as an adjunct to the logical. On the contrary, the Stoics are alleged to have worked out the views of Aristotle about ἐναντία, but to have restricted the meaning ofἀντικείμεναto contradictory opposition,i. e.to Affirmative and Negative Propositions with the same subject and predicate (Schol. p. 83, b. 11; p. 87, a. 29). In Metaphysica,A. 983, a. 31, Aristotle calls the final cause (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τἀγαθόν) τὴν ἀντικειμένην αἰτίαν to the cause (among his four), τὸὅθενἡ κίνησις. This is a misleading phrase; the two are not opposed, but mutually implicated and correlative.
144See the just and comprehensive definition of Relative Names given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, Book I. chap. ii. § 7, p. 46.After reading that definition, the inconvenience of ranking Relatives as a species or variety of Opposites, will be seen at once.
144See the just and comprehensive definition of Relative Names given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, Book I. chap. ii. § 7, p. 46.
After reading that definition, the inconvenience of ranking Relatives as a species or variety of Opposites, will be seen at once.
FromOppositaAristotle passes toPriusandSimul; with the different modes of each.145SuccessiveandSynchronous, are the two most general classes under which facts or events can be cast. They include between them all that is meant by Order in Time. They admit of no definition, and can be explained only by appeal to immediate consciousness in particular cases. Priority and Simultaneity, in this direct and primary sense, are among the clearest and most impressive notions of the human mind. But Aristotle recognizes four additional meanings of these same words, which he distinguishes from the primary, in the same way as he distinguishes (in the ten Categories) the different meanings ofEssentia, in a gradually descending scale of analogy. The secondaryPriusis that which does not reciprocate according to the order of existence with itsPosterius; where thePosteriuspresupposes thePrius, while thePriusdoes not presuppose thePosterius: for example, given two, the existence of one is necessarily implied; but given one, the existence of two is not implied.146The tertiaryPriusis that which comes first in the arrangements of science or discourse: as, in geometry, point and line are prior as compared with the diagrams anddemonstrations; in writing, letters are prior as compared with syllables; in speeches, the proem is prior as compared with the exposition. A fourth mode ofPrius(which is the most remote and far-fetched) is, that the better and more honourable isprius naturâ. Still a fifth mode is, when, of two Relatives which reciprocate with each other as to existence, one is cause and the other effect: in such a case, the cause is said to be prior by nature to the effect.147For example, if it be a fact that Caius exists, the proposition “Caius exists,� is a true proposition; andvice versâ, if the proposition “Caius exists� is a true proposition, it is a fact that Caius exists. But though from eitherofthese you can infer the other, the truth of the proposition is the effect, and not the cause, of the reality of the fact. Hence it is correct to say that the latter isprius naturâ, and the formerposterius naturâ.
145Categ. p. 14, a. 26, seq.
145Categ. p. 14, a. 26, seq.
146Ibid. p. 14, a. 29, seq. This second mode ofPriusis entitled by Alexander (see Schol. (ad Metaphys.Δ.) p. 707, b. 7, Brandis) πρότερον τῇ φύσει. But Aristotle does not so call it here; he reserves that title for the fourth and fifth modes.It appears that debates, Περὶ Προτέρου καὶ Ὑστέρου were frequent in the dialectic schools of Aristotle’s day as well as debates, Περὶ Ταὐτοῦ καὶ Ἑτέρου, Περὶ Ὁμοίου καὶ Ἀνομοίου, Περὶ Ταὐτότητος καὶ Ἐναντιότητος (Arist. Metaph.B.p. 995, b. 20).
146Ibid. p. 14, a. 29, seq. This second mode ofPriusis entitled by Alexander (see Schol. (ad Metaphys.Δ.) p. 707, b. 7, Brandis) πρότερον τῇ φύσει. But Aristotle does not so call it here; he reserves that title for the fourth and fifth modes.
It appears that debates, Περὶ Προτέρου καὶ Ὑστέρου were frequent in the dialectic schools of Aristotle’s day as well as debates, Περὶ Ταὐτοῦ καὶ Ἑτέρου, Περὶ Ὁμοίου καὶ Ἀνομοίου, Περὶ Ταὐτότητος καὶ Ἐναντιότητος (Arist. Metaph.B.p. 995, b. 20).
147Aristot. Categ. p. 14, b. 10.
147Aristot. Categ. p. 14, b. 10.
This is a sort of article in a Philosophical Dictionary, tracing the various derivative senses of two very usual correlative phrases; and there is another article in the fourth book of the Metaphysica, where the derivations of the same terms are again traced out, though by roads considerably different.148The two terms are relatives;Priusimplies aPosterius, asSimulimplies anotherSimul; and it is an useful process to discriminate clearly the various meanings assigned to each. Aristotle has done this, not indeed clearly nor consistently with himself, but with an earnest desire to elucidate what he felt to be confused and perplexing. Yet there are few terms in his philosophy which are more misleading. Though he sets out, plainly and repeatedly the primary and literal sense of Priority, (the temporal or real), as discriminated from the various secondary and metaphorical senses, nevertheless when he comes to employ the termPriusin the course of his reasonings, he often does so without specifying in which sense he intends it to be understood. And as the literal sense (temporal or real priority) is the most present and familial to every man’s mind, so the term is often construed in this sense when it properly bears only the metaphorical sense. The confusion of logical or emotional priority (priority either in logical order of conception, or in esteem and respect) with priority in the order of time, involving separability of existence, is a frequent source of misunderstanding in the Aristotelian Physics andMetaphysics. The order of logical antecedence and sequence, or the fact of logical coexistence, is of great importance to be understood, with a view to the proof of truth, to the disproof of error, or to the systematization of our processes of thought; but we must keep in mind that what is prior in the logical order is not for that reason prior in temporal order, or separable in real existence, or fit to be appealed to as a real Cause or Agent.149
148Aristot. Metaphys.Δ. p. 1018, b. 11-p. 1019, a. 12. The article in the Metaphysica is better and fuller than that in the Categoriæ. In this last,Order in Placereceives no special recognition, while we find such recognition in the Metaphysica, and we find also fuller development of the varieties of the logical or intellectualPrius.
148Aristot. Metaphys.Δ. p. 1018, b. 11-p. 1019, a. 12. The article in the Metaphysica is better and fuller than that in the Categoriæ. In this last,Order in Placereceives no special recognition, while we find such recognition in the Metaphysica, and we find also fuller development of the varieties of the logical or intellectualPrius.
149In the language of Porphyry, προϋφέστηκε (priority in real existence) means nothing more than προε̈πινοεῖται (priority in the order of conception), Eisagoge, cc. xv., xvi.; Schol. Br. p. 6, a. 7-21.
149In the language of Porphyry, προϋφέστηκε (priority in real existence) means nothing more than προε̈πινοεῖται (priority in the order of conception), Eisagoge, cc. xv., xvi.; Schol. Br. p. 6, a. 7-21.
In the preceding chapter I enumerated and discussed what Aristotle calls the Categories. We shall now proceed to the work which stands second in the aggregate called the Organon — the treatise De Interpretatione.
We have already seen that the Aristotelian Ontology distinguishes one group of varieties ofEns(or different meanings of the termEns) as corresponding to the diversity of the ten Categories; while recognizing also another variety ofEnsasTruth, with its antithesisNon-EnsasFalsehood.1The former group was dealt with in the preceding chapter; the latter will form the subject of the present chapter. In both, indeed, Ontology is looked at as implicated with Logic; that is,Ensis considered as distributed under significant names, fit to be coupled in propositions. This is the common basis both of the Categoriæ and of the treatise De Interpretatione. The whole classification of the Categories rests on the assumption of the proposition with its constituent parts, and on the different relation borne by each of the ninegeneraof predicates towards their common Subject. But in the Categoriæ no account was taken of the distinction between truth and falsehood, in the application of these predicates to the Subject. If we say of Sokrates, that he is fair, pug-nosed, brave, wise, &c., we shall predicate truly; if we say that he is black, high-nosed, cowardly, stupid, &c., we shall predicate falsely; but in each case our predicates will belong to the same Category — that ofQuale. Whether we describe him as he now is, standing, talking, in the market-place at Athens; or whether we describe him as he is not, sitting down, singing, in Egypt — in both speeches, our predicates rank under the same Categories,Jacere,Agere,Ubi. No account is taken in the Categoriæ of the distinction between true and false application of predicates; we are only informed under whatnumber of general heads all our predicates must be included, whether our propositions be true or false in each particular case.
1See above in the preceding chapter,p. 60.
1See above in the preceding chapter,p. 60.
But this distinction betweentrueandfalse, which remained unnoticed in the Categoriæ, comes into the foreground in the treatise De Interpretatione. The Proposition, or enunciative speech,2is distinguished from other varieties of speech (interrogative, precative, imperative) by its communicating what is true or what is false. It is defined to be a complex significant speech, composed of two terms at least, each in itself significant, yet neither of them, separately taken, communicating truth or falsehood. The terms constituting the Proposition are declared to be a Noun in the nominative case, as Subject, and a Verb, as Predicate; this latter essentially connoting time, in order that the synthesis of the two may become the enunciation of a fact or quasi-fact, susceptible of being believed or disbelieved. All this mode of analysing a proposition, different from the analysis thereof given or implied in the Categoriæ, is conducted with a view to bring out prominently its function of imparting true or false information. The treatise called the Categoriæ is a theory of significant names subjicible and predicable, fit to serve as elements of propositions, but not yet looked at as put together into actual propositions; while in the treatise De Interpretatione they are assumed to be put together, and a theory is given of Propositions thus completed.
2Aristot. De Interpret. p. 17, a. 1: λόγος ἀποφαντικός.
2Aristot. De Interpret. p. 17, a. 1: λόγος ἀποφαντικός.
Words spoken are marks significant of mental impressions associated with them both by speaker and hearer; words written are symbols of those thus uttered. Both speech and writing differ in different nations, having no natural connection with the things signified. But these last, the affections or modifications of the mind, and the facts or objects of which they are representations or likenesses, are the same to all. Words are marks primarily and directly of the first, secondarily and indirectly of the second.3Aristotle thus recognizes these two aspects — first, the subjective, next the objective, as belonging, both of them conjointly, to significant language, yet as logically distinguishable; the former looking to the proximatecorrelatum, the latter to the ultimate.
3Ibid. p. 16, a. 3, seq. ὣν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτως, ταὐτὰ πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα, πράγματα ἤδη ταὐτά.
3Ibid. p. 16, a. 3, seq. ὣν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτως, ταὐτὰ πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα, πράγματα ἤδη ταὐτά.
For this doctrine, that the mental affections of mankind, and the things or facts which they represent, are the same everywhere, though the marks whereby they are signified differ, Aristotle refers us to his treatise De Animâ, to which he saysthat it properly belongs.4He thus recognizes the legitimate dependence of Logic on Psychology or Mental Philosophy.
4Aristot. De Interpret. p. 16, a. 8: περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτων εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς· ἄλλης γὰρ πραγματείας. It was upon this reference, mainly, that Andronikus the Rhodian rested his opinion, that the treatise De Interpretatione was not the work of Aristotle. Andronikus contended that there was nothing in the De Animâ to justify the reference. But Ammonius in his Scholia (p. 97, Brand.) makes a sufficient reply to the objection of Andronikus. The third book De Animâ (pp. 430, 431) lays down the doctrine here alluded to. Compare Torstrick’s Commentary, p. 210.
4Aristot. De Interpret. p. 16, a. 8: περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτων εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς· ἄλλης γὰρ πραγματείας. It was upon this reference, mainly, that Andronikus the Rhodian rested his opinion, that the treatise De Interpretatione was not the work of Aristotle. Andronikus contended that there was nothing in the De Animâ to justify the reference. But Ammonius in his Scholia (p. 97, Brand.) makes a sufficient reply to the objection of Andronikus. The third book De Animâ (pp. 430, 431) lays down the doctrine here alluded to. Compare Torstrick’s Commentary, p. 210.
That which is signified by words (either single or in combination) is some variety of these mental affections or of the facts which they represent. But the signification of a single Term is distinguished, in an important point, from the signification of that conjunction of terms which we call a Proposition. A noun, or a verb, belonging to the aggregate called a language, is associated with one and the same phantasm5or notion, without any conscious act of conjunction or disjunction, in the minds of speakers and hearers: when pronounced, it arrests for a certain time the flow of associated ideas, and determines the mind to dwell upon that particular group which is called its meaning.6But neither the noun nor the verb, singly taken, does more than this; neither one of them affirms, or denies, or communicates any information true or false. For this last purpose, we must conjoin the two together in a certain way, and make a Proposition. The signification of the Proposition is thus specifically distinct from that of either of its two component elements. It communicates what purports to be matter of fact, which may be either true or false; in other words, it implies in the speaker, and raises in the hearer, the state of belief or disbelief, which does not attach either to the noun or to the verb separately. Herein the Proposition is discriminated from other significant arrangements of words (precative, interrogative, which convey no truth or falsehood), as well as from its own component parts. Each of these parts, noun and verb, has a significance of its own; but these are the ultimate elements of speech, for the parts of the noun or of the verb have no significance at all. The Verb isdistinguished from the Noun by connoting time, and also by always serving as predicate to some noun as subject.7
5Ibid. p. 16, a. 13: τὰ μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ῥήματα ἔοικε τῷ ἄνευ διαιρέσεως καὶ συνθέσεως νοήματι, οἷον τὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ λευκόν, ὅταν μὴ προστέθῃ τι· οὔτε γὰρ ψεῦδος οὔτε ἀληθές πω.
5Ibid. p. 16, a. 13: τὰ μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ῥήματα ἔοικε τῷ ἄνευ διαιρέσεως καὶ συνθέσεως νοήματι, οἷον τὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ λευκόν, ὅταν μὴ προστέθῃ τι· οὔτε γὰρ ψεῦδος οὔτε ἀληθές πω.
6Ibid. p. 16, b. 19: αὐτὰ μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα τὰ ῥήματα ὀνόματά ἐστι καὶ σημαίνει τι (ἵστησι γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶὁ ἀκούσας ἠρέμησεν) ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐστὶν ἢ μή, οὔπω σημαίνει, &c.Compare Analyt. Poster. II. xix. pp. 99, 100, where the same doctrine occurs: the movement of association is stopped, and the mind is determined to dwell upon a certain idea; one among an aggregate of runaways being arrested in flight, another halts also, and so the rest in succession, until at length the Universal, or the sum total, is detained, or “stands stillâ€� as an object of attention. Also Aristot. Problem. p. 956, b. 39.
6Ibid. p. 16, b. 19: αὐτὰ μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα τὰ ῥήματα ὀνόματά ἐστι καὶ σημαίνει τι (ἵστησι γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶὁ ἀκούσας ἠρέμησεν) ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐστὶν ἢ μή, οὔπω σημαίνει, &c.
Compare Analyt. Poster. II. xix. pp. 99, 100, where the same doctrine occurs: the movement of association is stopped, and the mind is determined to dwell upon a certain idea; one among an aggregate of runaways being arrested in flight, another halts also, and so the rest in succession, until at length the Universal, or the sum total, is detained, or “stands still� as an object of attention. Also Aristot. Problem. p. 956, b. 39.
7Aristot. De Interpr. p. 16, b. 2, seq.
7Aristot. De Interpr. p. 16, b. 2, seq.
Aristotle intimates his opinion, distinctly and even repeatedly, upon the main question debated by Plato in the Kratylus. He lays it down that all significant speech is significant by convention only, and not by nature or as a natural instrument.8He tells us also that, in this treatise, he does not mean to treat of all significant speech, but only of that variety which is known asenunciative. This last, as declaring truth or falsehood, is the only part belonging to Logic as he conceives it; other modes of speech, the precative, imperative, interrogative, &c., belong more naturally to Rhetoric or Poetic.9Enunciative speech may be either simple or complex; it may be one enunciation, declaring one predicate (either in one word or in several words) of one subject; or it may comprise several such.10The conjunction of the predicate with the subject constitutes the variety of proposition called Affirmation; the disjunction of the same two is Negation or Denial.11But such conjunction or disjunction, operated by the cogitative act, between two mental states, takes place under the condition that, wherever conjunction may be enunciated, there also disjunction may be enunciated, andvice versâ. Whatever may be affirmed, it is possible also to deny; whatever may be denied, it is possible also to affirm.12
8Ibid. p. 16, a. 26; p. 17, a. 2.
8Ibid. p. 16, a. 26; p. 17, a. 2.
9Ibid. p. 17, a. 6:ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικὸς τῆς νῦν θεωρίας. See theScholionof Ammonius, pp. 95, 96, 108, a. 27. In the last passage, Ammonius refers to a passage in one of the lost works of Theophrastus, wherein that philosopher distinguished τὸν ἀποφαντικὸν λόγον from the other varieties of λόγος, by the difference of σχέσις: the ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος was πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, orobjective; the others were πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροωμένους,i.e.varying with the different varieties of hearers, orsubjective.
9Ibid. p. 17, a. 6:ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικὸς τῆς νῦν θεωρίας. See theScholionof Ammonius, pp. 95, 96, 108, a. 27. In the last passage, Ammonius refers to a passage in one of the lost works of Theophrastus, wherein that philosopher distinguished τὸν ἀποφαντικὸν λόγον from the other varieties of λόγος, by the difference of σχέσις: the ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος was πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, orobjective; the others were πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροωμένους,i.e.varying with the different varieties of hearers, orsubjective.
10Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.
10Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.
11Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.
11Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.
12Ibid. p. 17, a. 30: ἅπαν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο καὶ ὃ κατέφησέ τις ἀποφῆσαι, καὶ ὃ ἀπέφησέ τις καταφῆσαι.
12Ibid. p. 17, a. 30: ἅπαν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο καὶ ὃ κατέφησέ τις ἀποφῆσαι, καὶ ὃ ἀπέφησέ τις καταφῆσαι.
To every affirmative proposition there is thus opposed a contradictory negative proposition; to every negative a contradictory affirmative. This pair of contradictory opposites may be called anAntiphasis; always assuming that the predicate and subject of the two shall be really the same, without equivocation of terms — a proviso necessary to guard against troublesome puzzles started by Sophists.13And we must also distinguish these propositions opposite asContradictories, from propositions opposite asContraries. For this, it has to be observed that there is a distinction among things (πράγματα) as universal or singular,according as they are, in their nature, predicable of a number or not:homois an example of the first, andKalliasis an example of the second. When, now, we affirm a predicate universally, we must attach the mark of universality to the subject and not to the predicate; we must say, Every man is white, No man is white. We cannot attach the mark of universality to the predicate, and say, Every man is every animal; this would be untrue.14An affirmation, then, iscontradictorilyopposed to a negation, when one indicates that the subject is universally taken, and the other, that the subject is taken not universally,e.g. Omnis homo est albus,Non omnis homo est albus;Nullus homo est albus,Est aliquis homo albus. The opposition iscontrary, when the affirmation is universal, and the negation is also universal,i.e., when the subject is marked as universally taken in each: for example,Omnis homo est albus,Nullus homo est albus. Of these contrary opposites, both cannot be true, but both may be false. Contradictory opposites, on the other hand, while they cannot both be true, cannot both be false; one must be false and the other true. This holds also where the subject is a singular term, as Sokrates.15If, however, an universal term appear as subject in the propositionindefinitely, that is, without any mark of universality whatever,e.g.,Est albus homo,Non est albus homo, then the affirmative and negative are not necessarily either contrary or contradictory, though they may be so sometimes: there is no opposition, properly speaking, between them; both may alike be true. This last observation (says Aristotle) will seem strange, because many persons suppose thatNon est homo albusis equivalent toNullus homo est albus; but the meaning of the two is not the same, nor does the truth of the latter follow from that of the former,16sincehomoin the former may be construed as not universally taken.
13Ibid. p. 17, a. 33:καὶ ἔστω ἀντίφασις τοῦτο, κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι.It seems (as Ammonius observes, Schol. p. 112, a. 33) that ἀντίφασις in this sense was a technical term, introduced by Aristotle.
13Ibid. p. 17, a. 33:καὶ ἔστω ἀντίφασις τοῦτο, κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι.
It seems (as Ammonius observes, Schol. p. 112, a. 33) that ἀντίφασις in this sense was a technical term, introduced by Aristotle.
14Aristot. De Interpr. p. 17, a. 37-b. 14: ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον (λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ’ ἕκαστον δὲ ὃ μὴ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος μὲν τῶν καθόλου, Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον)· &c. Ammonius (in Schol. p. 113, a. 38) says that what is predicated, either of many subjects or of one, must be μία φύσις.The warning against quantifying the predicate appears in this logical treatise of Aristotle, and is repeated in the Analytica Priora, I. xxvii. p. 43, b. 17. Here we have: οὐδεμία κατάφασις ἀληθὴς ἔσται, ἐν ᾗ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου τὸ καθόλου κατηγορεῖται, οἷον ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος πᾶν ζῷον (b. 14).
14Aristot. De Interpr. p. 17, a. 37-b. 14: ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον (λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ’ ἕκαστον δὲ ὃ μὴ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος μὲν τῶν καθόλου, Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον)· &c. Ammonius (in Schol. p. 113, a. 38) says that what is predicated, either of many subjects or of one, must be μία φύσις.
The warning against quantifying the predicate appears in this logical treatise of Aristotle, and is repeated in the Analytica Priora, I. xxvii. p. 43, b. 17. Here we have: οὐδεμία κατάφασις ἀληθὴς ἔσται, ἐν ᾗ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου τὸ καθόλου κατηγορεῖται, οἷον ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος πᾶν ζῷον (b. 14).
15Ibid. b. 16-29.
15Ibid. b. 16-29.
16Ibid. p. 17, b. 29-37. Mr. John Stuart Mill (System of Logic, Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 4) cites and approves Dr. Whately’s observation, that the recognition of a class of Propositions calledindefinite“is a solecism, of the same nature as that committed by grammarians when in their list of genders they enumerate thedoubtfulgender. The speakermust meanto assert the proposition either as an universal or as a particular proposition, though he has failed to declare which.�But Aristotle would not have admitted Dr. Whately’s doctrine, declaring what the speaker “must mean.� Aristotle fears that his class,indefinite, will appear impertinent, because many speakers are not conscious of any distinction or transition between the particular and the general. The looseness of ordinary speech and thought, which Logic is intended to bring to view and to guard against, was more present to his mind than to that of Dr. Whately: moreover, the forms of Greek speech favoured the ambiguity.Aristotle’s observation illustrates the deficiencies of common speaking, as to clearness and limitation of meaning, at the time when he began to theorize on propositions.I think that Whately’s assumption — “the speakermust mean� — is analogous to the assumption on which Sir W. Hamilton founds his proposal for explicit quantification of the predicate, viz., that the speakermust, implicitly or mentally, quantify the predicate; and that his speech ought to be such as to make such quantification explicit. Mr. Mill has shewn elsewhere that this assumption of Sir. W. Hamilton’s is incorrect.
16Ibid. p. 17, b. 29-37. Mr. John Stuart Mill (System of Logic, Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 4) cites and approves Dr. Whately’s observation, that the recognition of a class of Propositions calledindefinite“is a solecism, of the same nature as that committed by grammarians when in their list of genders they enumerate thedoubtfulgender. The speakermust meanto assert the proposition either as an universal or as a particular proposition, though he has failed to declare which.�
But Aristotle would not have admitted Dr. Whately’s doctrine, declaring what the speaker “must mean.� Aristotle fears that his class,indefinite, will appear impertinent, because many speakers are not conscious of any distinction or transition between the particular and the general. The looseness of ordinary speech and thought, which Logic is intended to bring to view and to guard against, was more present to his mind than to that of Dr. Whately: moreover, the forms of Greek speech favoured the ambiguity.
Aristotle’s observation illustrates the deficiencies of common speaking, as to clearness and limitation of meaning, at the time when he began to theorize on propositions.
I think that Whately’s assumption — “the speakermust mean� — is analogous to the assumption on which Sir W. Hamilton founds his proposal for explicit quantification of the predicate, viz., that the speakermust, implicitly or mentally, quantify the predicate; and that his speech ought to be such as to make such quantification explicit. Mr. Mill has shewn elsewhere that this assumption of Sir. W. Hamilton’s is incorrect.
It thus appears that there is always one negation corresponding to one and the same affirmation; making up together theAntiphasis, or pair of contradictory opposites, quite distinct from contrary opposites. Byoneaffirmation we mean, that in which there is one predicate only, and one subject only, whether taken universally or not universally:—