459Ibid. b. 17-26.
459Ibid. b. 17-26.
460Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 163, b. 27-33: á½Î¼Î¿Î¯Ï‰Ï‚ καὶ á¼Î½ τοῖς λόγοις τὸ Ï€ÏόχειÏον εἶναι πεÏὶ Ï„á½°Ï‚ á¼€Ïχὰς καὶ Ï„á½°Ï‚ Ï€Ïοτάσεις ἀπὸ στόματος á¼Î¾ÎµÏ€Î¯ÏƒÏ„ασθαι· ÎºÎ±Î¸Î¬Ï€ÎµÏ Î³á½°Ï á¼Î½ Ï„á¿· μνημονικῷ μόνον οἱ τόποι τεθÎντες εá½Î¸á½ºÏ‚ ποιοῦσιν αá½Ï„á½° μνημονεÏειν, καὶ ταῦτα ποιήσει συλλογιστικώτεÏον διὰ τὸ Ï€Ïὸς ὡÏισμÎνας αá½Ï„á½°Ï‚ βλÎπειν κατ’ á¼€Ïιθμόν· Ï€Ïότασίν τε κοινὴν μᾶλλον á¼¢ λόγον εἰς μνήμην θετÎον· á¼€Ïχῆς Î³á½°Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ὑποθÎσεως εá½Ï€Î¿Ïῆσαι μετÏίως χαλεπόν.
460Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 163, b. 27-33: á½Î¼Î¿Î¯Ï‰Ï‚ καὶ á¼Î½ τοῖς λόγοις τὸ Ï€ÏόχειÏον εἶναι πεÏὶ Ï„á½°Ï‚ á¼€Ïχὰς καὶ Ï„á½°Ï‚ Ï€Ïοτάσεις ἀπὸ στόματος á¼Î¾ÎµÏ€Î¯ÏƒÏ„ασθαι· ÎºÎ±Î¸Î¬Ï€ÎµÏ Î³á½°Ï á¼Î½ Ï„á¿· μνημονικῷ μόνον οἱ τόποι τεθÎντες εá½Î¸á½ºÏ‚ ποιοῦσιν αá½Ï„á½° μνημονεÏειν, καὶ ταῦτα ποιήσει συλλογιστικώτεÏον διὰ τὸ Ï€Ïὸς ὡÏισμÎνας αá½Ï„á½°Ï‚ βλÎπειν κατ’ á¼€Ïιθμόν· Ï€Ïότασίν τε κοινὴν μᾶλλον á¼¢ λόγον εἰς μνήμην θετÎον· á¼€Ïχῆς Î³á½°Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ὑποθÎσεως εá½Ï€Î¿Ïῆσαι μετÏίως χαλεπόν.
You ought also to accustom yourself to break down one reasoning into many; which will be done most easily when the theme of the reasoning is most universal. Conceal this purpose as well as you can; and in this view begin with those particulars which lie most remote from the subject in hand.461In recording arguments for your own instruction, you will generalize them as much as possible, though perhaps when spoken they may have been particular; for this is the best way to break down one into several. In conducting your own case as questioner you will avoid the higher generalities as much as you can.462But you must at the same time take care to keep up some common or general premisses throughout the discourse; for every syllogistic process, even where the conclusion is particular, implies this, and no syllogism is valid without it.463
461Ibid. b. 34.
461Ibid. b. 34.
462Ibid. p. 164, a. 2-7: δεῖ δὲ καὶ Ï„á½°Ï‚ ἀπομνημονεÏσεις καθόλου ποιεῖσθαι τῶν λόγων, κἂν á¾– διειλεγμÎνος á¼Ï€á½¶ μÎÏους·  αá½Ï„ὸν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα φεÏγειν á¼Ï€á½¶ τὸ καθόλου φÎÏειν τοὺς συλλογισμοÏÏ‚.This passage is to me obscure. I have given the best meaning which it seems to offer.
462Ibid. p. 164, a. 2-7: δεῖ δὲ καὶ Ï„á½°Ï‚ ἀπομνημονεÏσεις καθόλου ποιεῖσθαι τῶν λόγων, κἂν á¾– διειλεγμÎνος á¼Ï€á½¶ μÎÏους·  αá½Ï„ὸν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα φεÏγειν á¼Ï€á½¶ τὸ καθόλου φÎÏειν τοὺς συλλογισμοÏÏ‚.
This passage is to me obscure. I have given the best meaning which it seems to offer.
463Ibid. a. 8.
463Ibid. a. 8.
Exercise in inductive discourse is most suitable for a young beginner; exercise in deductive or syllogistic discourse, for skilful veterans. From those who are accomplished in the former you can learn the art of multiplying particular comparisons; from those who are accomplished in the latter you derive universal premisses; such being the strong points of each. When you go through a dialectical exercise, try to bring away with you for future use either some complete syllogism, or some solution of an apparent refutation, or a major premiss, or a well-sustained exceptional example (ἔνστασιν); note also whether either you or your respondent question correctly or otherwise, and on what reason such correctness or incorrectness turned.464It is the express purpose of dialectical exercise to acquire powerand facility in this procedure, especially as regards universal premisses and special exceptions. Indeed the main characteristic of the dialectician is to be apt at universal premisses, and apt at special exceptions. In the first of these two aptitudes he groups many particulars into one universal, without which he cannot make good his syllogism; in the second of the two he breaks up the one universal into many, distinguishing the separate constituents, and denying some while he affirms others.465
464Ibid. a. 12-19. ὅλως δ’ á¼Îº τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι διαλεγόμενον πειÏατÎον ἀποφÎÏεσθαι á¼¢ συλλογισμὸν πεÏὶ τινος, á¼¢ λÏσιν á¼¢ Ï€Ïότασιν á¼¢ ἔνστασιν, &c.
464Ibid. a. 12-19. ὅλως δ’ á¼Îº τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι διαλεγόμενον πειÏατÎον ἀποφÎÏεσθαι á¼¢ συλλογισμὸν πεÏὶ τινος, á¼¢ λÏσιν á¼¢ Ï€Ïότασιν á¼¢ ἔνστασιν, &c.
465Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 164, b. 2-6: ἔστι Î³á½°Ï á½¡Ï‚ á¼Ï€Î»á¿¶Ï‚ εἰπεῖν διαλεκτικὸς ὠπÏοτατικὸς καὶ á¼Î½ÏƒÏ„ατικός· ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν Ï€Ïοτείνεσθαι ἓν ποιεῖν Ï„á½° πλείω (δεῖγὰÏἓν ὅλως ληφθῆναι Ï€Ïὸς ὃ ὠλόγος), τὸ δ’ á¼Î½Î¯ÏƒÏ„ασθαι τὸ ἓν πολλά· á¼¢ Î³á½°Ï Î´Î¹Î±Î¹Ïεῖ á¼¢ ἀναιÏεῖ, τὸ μὲν διδοὺς τὸ δ’ οὒ τῶνπÏοτεινομÎνων.
465Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 164, b. 2-6: ἔστι Î³á½°Ï á½¡Ï‚ á¼Ï€Î»á¿¶Ï‚ εἰπεῖν διαλεκτικὸς ὠπÏοτατικὸς καὶ á¼Î½ÏƒÏ„ατικός· ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν Ï€Ïοτείνεσθαι ἓν ποιεῖν Ï„á½° πλείω (δεῖγὰÏἓν ὅλως ληφθῆναι Ï€Ïὸς ὃ ὠλόγος), τὸ δ’ á¼Î½Î¯ÏƒÏ„ασθαι τὸ ἓν πολλά· á¼¢ Î³á½°Ï Î´Î¹Î±Î¹Ïεῖ á¼¢ ἀναιÏεῖ, τὸ μὲν διδοὺς τὸ δ’ οὒ τῶνπÏοτεινομÎνων.
You must take care however not to carry on this exercise with every one, especially with a vulgar-minded man. With some persons the dispute cannot fail to take a discreditable turn. When the respondent tries to make a show of escaping by unworthy manœuvres, the questioner on his part must be unscrupulous also in syllogizing; but this is a disgraceful scene. To keep clear of such abusive discourse, you must be cautious not to discourse with commonplace, unprepared, respondents.466
466Ibid. b. 8-15: Ï€Ïὸς Î³á½°Ï Ï„á½¸Î½ πάντως πειÏώμενον φαίνεσθαι διαφεÏγειν, δίκαιον μὲν πάντως πειÏᾶσθαι συλλογίσασθαι, οá½Îº εὔσχημον δÎ.
466Ibid. b. 8-15: Ï€Ïὸς Î³á½°Ï Ï„á½¸Î½ πάντως πειÏώμενον φαίνεσθαι διαφεÏγειν, δίκαιον μὲν πάντως πειÏᾶσθαι συλλογίσασθαι, οá½Îº εὔσχημον δÎ.
The Sophist (according to Aristotle) is one whose professional occupation it is to make money by a delusive show of wisdom without the reality  by contriving to make others believe falsely that he possesses wisdom and knowledge. The abstract substantive nounSophistic, with the verbto practice as a Sophist(σοφιστεÏειν), expresses such profession and purpose.1This application of the term is derived from Plato, who has in various dialogues (Protagoras, Hippias, Euthydêmus, &c.) introduced Sokrates conversing with different professional Sophists, and who has, in a longer dialogue called Sophistes, attempted an elaborate definition of the intellectual peculiarities of the person so named. It is the actual argumentative procedure of the Sophist that Aristotle proposes to himself as the theme of this little treatise, appended to his general theory of the Syllogism; a treatise which, though forming properly the Ninth and concluding Book of the Topica, is commonly known as a separate appendix thereto, under the title of Sophistici Elenchi, or Sophistical Refutations.
1Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 21, 28, 32: ἔστι Î³á½°Ï á¼¡ σοφιστικὴ φαινομÎνη σοφία οὖσα δ’ οὔ, καὶ ὠσοφιστὴς χÏηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομÎνης σοφίας ἀλλ’ οá½Îº οὔσης·  ἀνάγκη οὖντοὺς βουλομÎνους σοφιστεÏειν τὸτῶν εἰÏημÎνων λόγων γÎνος ζητεῖν·  ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον λόγων γÎνος, καὶ ὅτι τοιαÏτης á¼Ï†Î¯ÎµÎ½Ï„αι δυνάμεωςοὓς καλοῦμεν σοφιστάς, δῆλον. Also xi. p. 171, b. 27.
1Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 21, 28, 32: ἔστι Î³á½°Ï á¼¡ σοφιστικὴ φαινομÎνη σοφία οὖσα δ’ οὔ, καὶ ὠσοφιστὴς χÏηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομÎνης σοφίας ἀλλ’ οá½Îº οὔσης·  ἀνάγκη οὖντοὺς βουλομÎνους σοφιστεÏειν τὸτῶν εἰÏημÎνων λόγων γÎνος ζητεῖν·  ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον λόγων γÎνος, καὶ ὅτι τοιαÏτης á¼Ï†Î¯ÎµÎ½Ï„αι δυνάμεωςοὓς καλοῦμεν σοφιστάς, δῆλον. Also xi. p. 171, b. 27.
The Sophistical Elenchus or Refutation, being a delusive semblance of refutation which imposes on ordinary men and induces them to accept it as real, cannot be properly understood without the theory of Elenchus in general; nor can this last be understood without the entire theory of the Syllogism, since the Elenchus is only one variety of Syllogism.2The Elenchus is a syllogism with a conclusion contradictory to or refutative of some enunciated thesis or proposition. Accordingly we must first understand the conditions of a good and valid Syllogism, before we study those of a valid Elenchus; these last, again,must be understood, before we enter on the distinctive attributes of the Pseudo-elenchus  the sophistical, invalid, or sham, refutation. In other words, an enumeration and classification of Fallacies forms the closing section of a treatise on Logic  according to the philosophical arrangement originating with Aristotle, and copied by most logicians after him.
2Ibid. x. p. 171, a. 1-5.
2Ibid. x. p. 171, a. 1-5.
Aristotle begins by distinguishing reality and mere deceptive appearance; and by stating that this distinction is found to prevail not less in syllogisms than in other matters. Next he designates a notorious class of persons, called Sophists, who made it their profession to study and practise the deceptive appearance of syllogizing; and he then proceeds to distinguish four species of debate: (1) Didactic; (2) Dialectic; (3) Peirastic; (4) Eristic or Sophistic.3In this quadruple arrangement, however, he is not consistent with his own definitions, when he ranks the four as distinct and co-ordinate species. The marked and special antithesis is between Didactic and Dialectic. Both Peirastic and Eristic fall as varieties or sub-species under the species Dialectic; and there is under the species Didactic a variety called Pseudo-graphic or Pseudo-didactic, which stands to Didactic in the same relation in which Eristic stands to Dialectic.4
3Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38: ἔστι δὴ τῶν á¼Î½ Ï„á¿· διαλÎγεσθαι λόγων Ï„ÎτταÏα γÎνη, διδασκαλικοὺ καὶ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ πειÏαστικοὶ καὶ á¼Ïιστικοί.
3Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38: ἔστι δὴ τῶν á¼Î½ Ï„á¿· διαλÎγεσθαι λόγων Ï„ÎτταÏα γÎνη, διδασκαλικοὺ καὶ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ πειÏαστικοὶ καὶ á¼Ïιστικοί.
4Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 34.
4Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 34.
Didactic discourse is not applicable to all matters indiscriminately, but only to certain special sciences; each of which has its own separate, undemonstrableprincipia, from which its conclusions, so far as true and valid, must be deduced. It supposes a teacher acquainted with theseprincipiaand deductions, talking with some one who being ignorant of them wishes to learn. The teacher puts questions, to which the learner makes the best answers that he can; and, if the answers are wrong, corrects them and proceeds to draw, according to syllogistic canons, conclusions from premisses which he himself knows to be the truth. These premisses the learner must believe upon the teacher’s authority. Properly speaking, indeed, the didactic process is not interrogative (in the same sense that Dialectic is): the teacher does not accept the learner’s answer and reason from it, if he thinks it wrong.5
5Ibid. xi. p. 172, a. 11: νῦν δ’ οá½Îº ἔστιν ὠδιαλεκτιὸς πεÏὶ γÎνος τι ὡÏισμÎνον, οá½Î´á½² δεικτικὸς οá½Î´ÎµÎ½ÏŒÏ‚, οá½Î´á½² τοιοῦτος οἷος ὠκαθόλου. οὔτε Î³Î¬Ï á¼ÏƒÏ„ιν ἅπαντα á¼Î½ ἑνί τινι γÎνει, οὔτε εἰ εἴη, οἷόν τε ὑπὸ Ï„á½°Ï‚ αá½Ï„á½°Ï‚ á¼€Ïχὰς εἶναι Ï„á½° ὄντα. ὥστ’ οá½Î´ÎµÎ¼Î¯Î± Ï„Îχνη τῶν δεικνυουσῶν τινὰ φÏσιν á¼Ïωτητική á¼ÏƒÏ„ιν· Î¿á½ Î³á½°Ï á¼”Î¾ÎµÏƒÏ„Î¹Î½ á½Ï€Î¿Ï„εÏονοῦν τῶν μοÏίων δοῦναι· συλλογισμὸς Î³á½°Ï Î¿á½ Î³Î¯Î½ÎµÏ„Î±Î¹ á¼Î¾ ἀμφοῖν. ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ á¼ÏωτηÏική á¼ÏƒÏ„ιν· εἰ δ’ á¼Î´ÎµÎ¯ÎºÎ½Ï…εν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τά γε Ï€Ïῶτα καὶ Ï„á½°Ï‚ οἰκείας á¼€Ïχάς, οá½Îº ἂν á¼ Ïώτα. μὴ διδόντος Î³á½°Ï Î¿á½Îº ἂν ἔτι εἶχεν á¼Î¾ ὧν ἔτι διαλÎξεται Ï€Ïὸς τὴν ἔνστασιν.When Aristotle, therefore, reckons λόγους διδασκαλικοÏÏ‚ as one of the four species τῶν á¼Î½ Ï„á¿· διαλÎγεσθαι λόγων (Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38), we must understand τὸ διαλÎγεσθαι in a very wide and vague sense, going much beyond the derivative noun διαλεκτική.
5Ibid. xi. p. 172, a. 11: νῦν δ’ οá½Îº ἔστιν ὠδιαλεκτιὸς πεÏὶ γÎνος τι ὡÏισμÎνον, οá½Î´á½² δεικτικὸς οá½Î´ÎµÎ½ÏŒÏ‚, οá½Î´á½² τοιοῦτος οἷος ὠκαθόλου. οὔτε Î³Î¬Ï á¼ÏƒÏ„ιν ἅπαντα á¼Î½ ἑνί τινι γÎνει, οὔτε εἰ εἴη, οἷόν τε ὑπὸ Ï„á½°Ï‚ αá½Ï„á½°Ï‚ á¼€Ïχὰς εἶναι Ï„á½° ὄντα. ὥστ’ οá½Î´ÎµÎ¼Î¯Î± Ï„Îχνη τῶν δεικνυουσῶν τινὰ φÏσιν á¼Ïωτητική á¼ÏƒÏ„ιν· Î¿á½ Î³á½°Ï á¼”Î¾ÎµÏƒÏ„Î¹Î½ á½Ï€Î¿Ï„εÏονοῦν τῶν μοÏίων δοῦναι· συλλογισμὸς Î³á½°Ï Î¿á½ Î³Î¯Î½ÎµÏ„Î±Î¹ á¼Î¾ ἀμφοῖν. ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ á¼ÏωτηÏική á¼ÏƒÏ„ιν· εἰ δ’ á¼Î´ÎµÎ¯ÎºÎ½Ï…εν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τά γε Ï€Ïῶτα καὶ Ï„á½°Ï‚ οἰκείας á¼€Ïχάς, οá½Îº ἂν á¼ Ïώτα. μὴ διδόντος Î³á½°Ï Î¿á½Îº ἂν ἔτι εἶχεν á¼Î¾ ὧν ἔτι διαλÎξεται Ï€Ïὸς τὴν ἔνστασιν.
When Aristotle, therefore, reckons λόγους διδασκαλικοÏÏ‚ as one of the four species τῶν á¼Î½ Ï„á¿· διαλÎγεσθαι λόγων (Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38), we must understand τὸ διαλÎγεσθαι in a very wide and vague sense, going much beyond the derivative noun διαλεκτική.
Dialectic, on the contrary, is applicable to all matters universally and indiscriminately, including even the undemonstrableprincipiawhich the teacher assumes as the highest premisses of his didactic syllogisms. It supposes, in place of teacher and learner, an interrogator (or opponent) and a respondent. The respondent declares a problem or thesis, which he undertakes to defend; while the other puts questions to him respecting it, with the purpose of compelling him either to contradict the thesis, or to contradict himself on some other point. The interrogator is allowed only to ask questions, and to deduce legitimate conclusions from the premisses granted by the respondent in answer: he is not permitted to introduce any other premisses. The premisses upon which the debate turns are understood all to be probable  opinions accredited either among an ordinary multitude or among a few wise men, but to have no higher authority. Accordingly there is often a conflict of argumentsproandcon, much diversified. The process is essentially controversial; and, if the questioner does not succeed in exposing a contradiction, the respondent is victorious, and remains in possession of the field.
Such is the capital antithesis, much dwelt upon by Aristotle, between Didactic and Dialectic. But that which he calls Peirastic, and that which he calls Eristic, are not species co-ordinate with and distinguished from Dialectic: they are peculiar aspects, subordinate varieties or modes, of Dialectic itself. Aristotle himself, indeed, admits Peirastic to be a mode or variety of Dialectic;6and the like is equally true respecting what he terms Eristic or Sophistic.
6Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 4-9: ἡ Î³á½°Ï Ï€ÎµÎ¹Ïαστική á¼ÏƒÏ„ι διαλεκτική τις, &c.  p. 172, a. 35: á½ Ï„Îχνῃ συλλογιστικῇ πειÏαστικός, διαλεκτικός.  viii. p. 169, b. 25: ἔστι δ’ ἡ πειÏαστικὴ μÎÏος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς.
6Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 4-9: ἡ Î³á½°Ï Ï€ÎµÎ¹Ïαστική á¼ÏƒÏ„ι διαλεκτική τις, &c.  p. 172, a. 35: á½ Ï„Îχνῃ συλλογιστικῇ πειÏαστικός, διαλεκτικός.  viii. p. 169, b. 25: ἔστι δ’ ἡ πειÏαστικὴ μÎÏος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς.
These subordinate distinctions turn upon the manner, the limitations, and the purpose, for and under which the dialectical process is conducted. Dialectic is essentially gymnastic and peirastic:7it may be looked at either as gymnastic, in reference to the two debaters, or as peirastic, in reference to the arguments and doctrines brought forward; intellectual exercise and stimulation of the two speakers and the auditors around beingeffected by testing and confronting various probable doctrines. It is the common purpose (κοινὸν á¼”Ïγον)8of the two champions, to improve and enlarge this exercise for the instruction of all, by following out a variety of logical consequences and logical repugnancies, bearing more or less directly on the thesis which the respondent chooses and undertakes to defend against a testing cross-examination. Certain rules and limitations are prescribed both for questioner and respondent; but, subject to these rules, each of them is bound to exert all his acuteness for the purpose of gaining victory; and, though one only can gain it, the debate may be well and creditably conducted on both sides. If the rules are not observed, if the assailing champion, bent upon victory at all cost, has recourse to dishonest interrogative tricks, or the defensive champion to perverse and obstructive negations, beyond the prescribed boundary, in that case the debate is called by Aristotleeristicorcontentious, from the unduepredominanceof the controversial spirit and purpose; alsosophistic, from the fact that there existed (as he asserts) a class or profession of persons called Sophists, who regularly studied and practised these culpable manÅ“uvres, first with a view to reputation, and ultimately with a view to pecuniary profit, being pretenders to knowledge and wisdom without any reality to justify them.9
7Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26, b. 2: Ï€Ïὸς γυμνασίαν  á¼Î¾ÎµÏ„αστικὴ Î³á½°Ï Î¿á½–ÏƒÎ±, &c. Compare also Topica, VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 25; xiv. p. 163, a. 29, p. 164, b. 1: τὸ δὲ γυμνάζεσθαι δυνάμεως χάÏιν, καὶ μάλιστα πεÏὶ Ï„á½°Ï‚ Ï€Ïοτάσεις καὶ á¼Î½ÏƒÏ„άσεις· ἔστι Î³á½°Ï á½¡Ï‚ á¼Ï€Î»á¿¶Ï‚ εἰπεῖν διαλεκτικὸς ὠπÏοτατικὸς καὶ á¼Î½ÏƒÏ„ατικός.
7Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26, b. 2: Ï€Ïὸς γυμνασίαν  á¼Î¾ÎµÏ„αστικὴ Î³á½°Ï Î¿á½–ÏƒÎ±, &c. Compare also Topica, VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 25; xiv. p. 163, a. 29, p. 164, b. 1: τὸ δὲ γυμνάζεσθαι δυνάμεως χάÏιν, καὶ μάλιστα πεÏὶ Ï„á½°Ï‚ Ï€Ïοτάσεις καὶ á¼Î½ÏƒÏ„άσεις· ἔστι Î³á½°Ï á½¡Ï‚ á¼Ï€Î»á¿¶Ï‚ εἰπεῖν διαλεκτικὸς ὠπÏοτατικὸς καὶ á¼Î½ÏƒÏ„ατικός.
8Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 20, 37.
8Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 20, 37.
9Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35: οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αá½Ï„ῆς χάÏιν τοιοῦτοι á¼Ïιστικοὶ ἄνθÏωποι καὶ φιλÎÏιδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ δόξης χάÏιν τῆς εἰς χÏηματισμὸν σοφιστικοί·  καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν αá½Ï„ῶν μÎν εἰσιν οἱ φιλÎÏιδες καὶ σοφισταί, ἀλλ’ οὠτῶν αá½Ï„ῶν ἕνεκεν. καὶ λόγος ὠαá½Ï„ὸς μὲν ἔσται σοφιστικὸς καὶ á¼Ïιστικός, ἀλλ’ οὠκατὰ ταυτόν, ἀλλ’ á¾— μὲν νίκης φαινομÎνης, á¼Ïιστικός, á¾— δὲ σοφίας, σοφιστικός. &c.
9Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35: οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αá½Ï„ῆς χάÏιν τοιοῦτοι á¼Ïιστικοὶ ἄνθÏωποι καὶ φιλÎÏιδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ δόξης χάÏιν τῆς εἰς χÏηματισμὸν σοφιστικοί·  καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν αá½Ï„ῶν μÎν εἰσιν οἱ φιλÎÏιδες καὶ σοφισταί, ἀλλ’ οὠτῶν αá½Ï„ῶν ἕνεκεν. καὶ λόγος ὠαá½Ï„ὸς μὲν ἔσται σοφιστικὸς καὶ á¼Ïιστικός, ἀλλ’ οὠκατὰ ταυτόν, ἀλλ’ á¾— μὲν νίκης φαινομÎνης, á¼Ïιστικός, á¾— δὲ σοφίας, σοφιστικός. &c.
We thus see plainly that Peirastic and Eristic are not to be ranked as two distinct species of discourse, co-ordinate with Didactic and Dialectic; but thatpeirasticis in fact an epithet applicable generally to Dialectic, bringing to view one of its useful and appropriate functions; whileeristicdesignates only a peculiar mode of conducting the process, the essential feature of which is that it is abusive or that it transgresses the rules and regulations. Still less ought Sophistic to be ranked as a distinct species; since it involves no intrinsic or intellectualdifferentia, but connotes only ethical and personal peculiarities ascribed to the Sophist, who is treated as an impostor practising dishonest tricks for the sake of pecuniary profit.10
10Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, b. 17: á½ Î³á½°Ï ÏƒÎ¿Ï†Î¹ÏƒÏ„Î¹Îºá½¸Ï‚ οá½Îº á¼Î½ τῇ δυνάμει, ἀλλ’ á¼Î½ τῇ Ï€ÏοαιÏÎσει·  σοφιστὴς μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ï€ÏοαίÏεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δ’ οὠκατὰ τὴν Ï€ÏοαίÏεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δÏναμιν. To the same purpose he speaks in Metaphys.Γ.ii. p. 1004, b. 25, distinguishing the Sophist by his Ï€ÏοαίÏεσις from the Dialectician, but recognizing that in point of δÏναμις both are alike. Mr. Poste observes justly (in Transl. of the Soph. El., notes, p. 99): “δÏναμις, capacity, is in the intellect; Ï€ÏοαίÏεσις, purpose, in the will. The antithesis between these terms may throw light on what Aristotle conceived to be the relation between Sophistic and Dialectic.… The powerplusthe will to deceive is called Sophistic; the power without the will, Dialectic (p. 100).�
10Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, b. 17: á½ Î³á½°Ï ÏƒÎ¿Ï†Î¹ÏƒÏ„Î¹Îºá½¸Ï‚ οá½Îº á¼Î½ τῇ δυνάμει, ἀλλ’ á¼Î½ τῇ Ï€ÏοαιÏÎσει·  σοφιστὴς μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ï€ÏοαίÏεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δ’ οὠκατὰ τὴν Ï€ÏοαίÏεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δÏναμιν. To the same purpose he speaks in Metaphys.Γ.ii. p. 1004, b. 25, distinguishing the Sophist by his Ï€ÏοαίÏεσις from the Dialectician, but recognizing that in point of δÏναμις both are alike. Mr. Poste observes justly (in Transl. of the Soph. El., notes, p. 99): “δÏναμις, capacity, is in the intellect; Ï€ÏοαίÏεσις, purpose, in the will. The antithesis between these terms may throw light on what Aristotle conceived to be the relation between Sophistic and Dialectic.… The powerplusthe will to deceive is called Sophistic; the power without the will, Dialectic (p. 100).�
While, however, we recognize as main logical distinctions only the two heads Didactic and Dialectic, we note another way that Aristotle has of bringing in what he calls Sophistic as a variety of the latter. Both in Didactic and Dialectic (he tells us) the speakers enunciate and prove their propositions by Syllogism; the didactic syllogism is derived from theprincipiabelonging specially to one particular science, and proceeds from premisses that are true to conclusions that are true; while the dialectic syllogism starts from probable premisses (i.e., accredited by the ordinary public or by a few wise men), and marches in correct form to conclusions that are probable. Now, corresponding to each of these two, Aristotle recognizes farther a sort of degenerate counterpart. To the didactic syllogism there corresponds thepseudographicsyllogism or theparalogism: which draws its premisses (as the didactic syllogism does) from the special matters of some given science,11yet which nevertheless has only the appearance of truth without the reality; either because it is incorrect in syllogistic form, or because the matter of the premisses (the major, the minor, or both) is untrue. To the dialectic syllogism in like manner, there corresponds theeristicorsophisticsyllogism: which is a good syllogism in appearance, but not in reality; either because it is incorrect in form, or because its premisses, in respect of their matter, appear to be probable without being really probable.12
11Topic. I. i. p. 101, a. 5-15. οἱ á¼Îº τῶν πεÏί τινας á¼Ï€Î¹ÏƒÏ„ήμας οἰκείων γινόμενοι παÏαλογισμοί, ÎºÎ±Î¸Î¬Ï€ÎµÏ á¼Ï€á½¶ τῆς γεωμετÏίας καὶ τῶν ταÏτῃ συγγενῶν συμβÎβηκεν ἔχειν·  á¼Îº τῶν οἰκείων μὲν τῇ á¼Ï€Î¹ÏƒÏ„ήμῃ λημμάτων, οá½Îº ἀληθῶν δÎ, τὸν συλλογισμὸν ποιεῖται.
11Topic. I. i. p. 101, a. 5-15. οἱ á¼Îº τῶν πεÏί τινας á¼Ï€Î¹ÏƒÏ„ήμας οἰκείων γινόμενοι παÏαλογισμοί, ÎºÎ±Î¸Î¬Ï€ÎµÏ á¼Ï€á½¶ τῆς γεωμετÏίας καὶ τῶν ταÏτῃ συγγενῶν συμβÎβηκεν ἔχειν·  á¼Îº τῶν οἰκείων μὲν τῇ á¼Ï€Î¹ÏƒÏ„ήμῃ λημμάτων, οá½Îº ἀληθῶν δÎ, τὸν συλλογισμὸν ποιεῖται.
12Ibid. p. 100, a. 31-p. 101, a. 16; Soph. El. i. p. 164, a. 20-b. 21.
12Ibid. p. 100, a. 31-p. 101, a. 16; Soph. El. i. p. 164, a. 20-b. 21.
One would suppose that the relation between the pseudo-didactic and the didactic syllogism, was the same as that between the pseudo-dialectic and the dialectic; so that, if the pseudo-dialectic deserved to be called sophistic or eristic, the pseudo-didactic would deserve these appellations also; especially, since the formal conditions of the syllogism are alike for both. This Aristotle does not admit, but draws instead a remarkable distinction. The Sophist (he says) is a dishonest man, making it his professional purpose to deceive; the pseudo-graphic man of science is honest always, though sometimes mistaken. So long as the pseudo-graphic syllogism keeps within the limits belonging to its own special science, it may be false, since thegeometer may be deceived even in his own science geometry,13but it cannot be sophistic or eristic; yet, whenever it transgresses those limits, even though it be true and though it solves the problem proposed, it deserves to be called by those two epithets. Thus, there were two distinct methods proposed for the quadrature of the circle  one by Hippokrates, on geometrical principles, the other by Bryson, upon principles extra-geometrical. Both demonstrations were false and unsuccessful; yet that of Hippokrates was not sophistic or eristic, because he kept within the sphere of geometry; while that of Bryson was so, because it travelled out of geometry. Nay more, this last would have been equally sophistic and eristic, and on the same ground, even if it had succeeded in solving the problem.14If indeed the pseudo-graphic syllogism be invalid in form, it must be considered as sophistic, even though within the proper scientific limits as to matter; but, if it be correct in form and within these same limits, then, however untrue its premisses may be, it is to be regarded as not sophistic or eristic.15
13Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 32.
13Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 32.
14Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 12-20: Ï„á½° Î³á½°Ï ÏˆÎµÏ…Î´Î¿Î³Ïαφήματα οá½Îº á¼Ïιστικά (κατὰ Î³á½°Ï Ï„á½° ὑπὸ τὴν Ï„Îχνην οἱ παÏαλογισμοί), οá½Î´Î γ’ εἴ τί á¼ÏƒÏ„ι ψευδογÏάφημα πεÏὶ ἀληθÎÏ‚, οἷον τὸ ἹπποκÏάτους á¼¢ ὠτετÏαγωνισμὸς ὠδιὰ τῶν μηνίσκων. ἀλλ’ ὡς Î’ÏÏσων á¼Ï„ετÏαγώνιζε τὸν κÏκλον,εἰ καὶ τετÏαγωνίζεται ὠκÏκλος,ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὠκατὰ τὸ Ï€Ïᾶγμα,διὰ τοῦτο σοφιστικός. Also p. 172, a. 1-8.
14Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 12-20: Ï„á½° Î³á½°Ï ÏˆÎµÏ…Î´Î¿Î³Ïαφήματα οá½Îº á¼Ïιστικά (κατὰ Î³á½°Ï Ï„á½° ὑπὸ τὴν Ï„Îχνην οἱ παÏαλογισμοί), οá½Î´Î γ’ εἴ τί á¼ÏƒÏ„ι ψευδογÏάφημα πεÏὶ ἀληθÎÏ‚, οἷον τὸ ἹπποκÏάτους á¼¢ ὠτετÏαγωνισμὸς ὠδιὰ τῶν μηνίσκων. ἀλλ’ ὡς Î’ÏÏσων á¼Ï„ετÏαγώνιζε τὸν κÏκλον,εἰ καὶ τετÏαγωνίζεται ὠκÏκλος,ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὠκατὰ τὸ Ï€Ïᾶγμα,διὰ τοῦτο σοφιστικός. Also p. 172, a. 1-8.
15Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 19-20. Compare Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 33: δεῖ δὲ τὸν καλῶς μεταβιβάζοντα διαλεκτικῶς καὶ μὴ á¼Ïιστικῶς μεταβιβάζειν, ÎºÎ±Î¸Î¬Ï€ÎµÏ Ï„á½¸Î½ γεωμÎÏ„Ïην γεωμετÏικῶς, ἄν τε ψεῦδος ἄν τ’ ἀληθὲς á¾– τὸ συμπεÏαινόμενον. Also Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 10.
15Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 19-20. Compare Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 33: δεῖ δὲ τὸν καλῶς μεταβιβάζοντα διαλεκτικῶς καὶ μὴ á¼Ïιστικῶς μεταβιβάζειν, ÎºÎ±Î¸Î¬Ï€ÎµÏ Ï„á½¸Î½ γεωμÎÏ„Ïην γεωμετÏικῶς, ἄν τε ψεῦδος ἄν τ’ ἀληθὲς á¾– τὸ συμπεÏαινόμενον. Also Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 10.
Such is the test whereby Aristotle distinguishes the sophistication of the didactic process from the legitimate working of that process. Now this same test cannot be applied to Dialectic, which has no appropriate or exclusive specialty of matters, but deals withOmne Scibile, universally and indiscriminately. Aristotle therefore puts the analogy in another way. Both in Didactic and in Dialectic the Sophist is one who sins against the fundamental conditions of the task which he undertakes; these conditions being, that in Didactic he shall confine himself to the matters and premisses of a given science,  in Dialectic, to matters probable of whatever kind they may be. Transgression of these conditions constitutes unfair and dishonest manœuvre, whether of teacher or questioner; like breach of the regulations on the part of competitors, bent on victory at all price, in the Olympic games. Aristotle ranks this dishonesty as a species, under the name of Sophistic or Eristic, admitting of being analysed and defined;16and his treatise on SophisticalRefutations is intended to describe and illustrate theLocibelonging to it, and contributing to its purpose.17
16Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 22: á½¥ÏƒÏ€ÎµÏ Î³á½°Ï á¼¡ á¼Î½ ἀγῶνι ἀδικία εἶδός τι ἔχει καὶ ἔστιν ἀδικομαχία τις, οὕτως á¼Î½ ἀντιλογίᾳ ἀδικομαχία ἡ á¼Ïιστική á¼ÏƒÏ„ιν· á¼ÎºÎµá¿– τε Î³á½°Ï Î¿á¼± πάντως νικᾶν Ï€ÏοαιÏοÏμενοι πάντων ἅπτονται, καὶ á¼Î½Ï„αῦθα οἱ á¼Ïιστικοί.
16Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 22: á½¥ÏƒÏ€ÎµÏ Î³á½°Ï á¼¡ á¼Î½ ἀγῶνι ἀδικία εἶδός τι ἔχει καὶ ἔστιν ἀδικομαχία τις, οὕτως á¼Î½ ἀντιλογίᾳ ἀδικομαχία ἡ á¼Ïιστική á¼ÏƒÏ„ιν· á¼ÎºÎµá¿– τε Î³á½°Ï Î¿á¼± πάντως νικᾶν Ï€ÏοαιÏοÏμενοι πάντων ἅπτονται, καὶ á¼Î½Ï„αῦθα οἱ á¼Ïιστικοί.
17Soph. El. ix. p. 170, a. 34: δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὠπάντων τῶν ἔλεγχων ἀλλὰ τῶν παÏá½° τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ληπτÎον τοὺς τόπους.
17Soph. El. ix. p. 170, a. 34: δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὠπάντων τῶν ἔλεγχων ἀλλὰ τῶν παÏá½° τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ληπτÎον τοὺς τόπους.
Fallacious dialectical refutation being thus referred altogether to dishonesty of purpose (either contentious or profit-seeking) and being assumed as unknown in fair dialectical debate, we have to see by what characteristic Aristotle discriminates fallacious premisses from fair and admissible premisses. Dialectic (he tells us) has for its appropriate matter probable premisses  beliefs accredited either by the multitude or by a wise few. But (he goes on to say) not everything which appears probable is really probable. Nothing that is really probable is a mere superficial fancy; wherever this last is the case, theprobabiliaare apparent only and not real; they have the character of falsehood stamped upon them, so as to be immediately manifest and obvious, even to persons of very narrow intelligence. It is such apparentprobabiliaas these, which make up the premisses of eristic or sophistic discourse, and upon which the sophistical or fallacious refutations turn.18
18Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 23: á¼Ïιστικὸς δ’ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς á½ á¼Îº φαινομÎνων á¼Î½Î´ÏŒÎ¾Ï‰Î½ μὴ ὄντων δÎ, καὶ á½ á¼Î¾ á¼Î½Î´ÏŒÎ¾Ï‰Î½ á¼¢ φαινομÎνων á¼Î½Î´ÏŒÎ¾Ï‰Î½ φαινόμενος. Î¿á½ Î³á½°Ï Ï€á¾¶Î½ τὸ φαινόμενον ἔνδοξον, καὶ ἔστιν ἔνδοξον. οá½Î¸á½²Î½ Î³á½°Ï Ï„á¿¶Î½ λεγομÎνων á¼Î½Î´ÏŒÎ¾Ï‰Î½ á¼Ï€Î¹Ï€ÏŒÎ»Î±Î¹Î¿Î½ ἔχει παντελῶς τὴν φαντασίαν, ÎºÎ±Î¸Î¬Ï€ÎµÏ Ï€ÎµÏὶ Ï„á½°Ï‚ τῶν á¼Ïιστικῶν λόγων á¼€Ïχὰς συμβÎβηκεν ἔχειν· παÏαχÏῆμα Î³á½°Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ὡς á¼Ï€á½¶ τὸ Ï€Î¿Î»Ï Ï„Î¿á¿–Ï‚ καὶ μικÏá½° συνοÏᾶν δυναμÎνοις κατάδηλος á¼Î½ αá½Ï„οῖς ἡ τοῦ ψεÏδους á¼ÏƒÏ„ὶ φÏσις. Compare Soph. El. ii. p. 165, b. 7.
18Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 23: á¼Ïιστικὸς δ’ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς á½ á¼Îº φαινομÎνων á¼Î½Î´ÏŒÎ¾Ï‰Î½ μὴ ὄντων δÎ, καὶ á½ á¼Î¾ á¼Î½Î´ÏŒÎ¾Ï‰Î½ á¼¢ φαινομÎνων á¼Î½Î´ÏŒÎ¾Ï‰Î½ φαινόμενος. Î¿á½ Î³á½°Ï Ï€á¾¶Î½ τὸ φαινόμενον ἔνδοξον, καὶ ἔστιν ἔνδοξον. οá½Î¸á½²Î½ Î³á½°Ï Ï„á¿¶Î½ λεγομÎνων á¼Î½Î´ÏŒÎ¾Ï‰Î½ á¼Ï€Î¹Ï€ÏŒÎ»Î±Î¹Î¿Î½ ἔχει παντελῶς τὴν φαντασίαν, ÎºÎ±Î¸Î¬Ï€ÎµÏ Ï€ÎµÏὶ Ï„á½°Ï‚ τῶν á¼Ïιστικῶν λόγων á¼€Ïχὰς συμβÎβηκεν ἔχειν· παÏαχÏῆμα Î³á½°Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ὡς á¼Ï€á½¶ τὸ Ï€Î¿Î»Ï Ï„Î¿á¿–Ï‚ καὶ μικÏá½° συνοÏᾶν δυναμÎνοις κατάδηλος á¼Î½ αá½Ï„οῖς ἡ τοῦ ψεÏδους á¼ÏƒÏ„ὶ φÏσις. Compare Soph. El. ii. p. 165, b. 7.
Aristotle thus draws a broad and marked line between Dialectic on the one hand, and Eristic or Sophistic on the other; and he treats the whole important doctrine of Logical Fallacies as coming under this latter department. The distinction that he draws between them is two-fold: first as to purpose, next as to subject-matter. On the part of the litigious or sophistical debater there is the illicit purpose of victory at all cost, or for profit; and probabilities merely apparent  such as any one may see not to be real probabilities  constitute the matter of his syllogisms.
Now, as to the distinction of purpose, we may put aside the idea of profit as having no essential connection with the question. It is quite possible to suppose the fair Dialectician, not less than the Sophist, as exhibiting his skill for pecuniary reward; while the eagerness for victory on both sides is absolutely indispensable even in well-conducted debate, in order that the appropriate stimulus and benefit of dialectical exercise may be realized. But, if the distinction of purpose and procedure, between the Dialectician and the Sophist, is thus undefined and unsatisfactory,still more unsatisfactory is the distinction of subject-matter. To discriminate between what is really probable (i.e., accredited either by the multitude or by a wise few), and what is only probable in appearance and not in reality  is a task of extreme difficulty. The explanation given by Aristotle himself19 when he describes the apparently probable as that which has only superficial show, and which the most ordinary intelligence discerns at once to be false  includes only the more gross and obvious fallacies, but leaves out all the rest. Nothing can be more incorrect than the assumption, in regard to fallacies generally, that the appearance of probability is too faint to impose upon any ordinary man. If all fallacies could be supposed to come under this definition, the theory of Fallacies would undoubtedly be worthless (as Mr. Poste suggests that it is, in the Preface to his translation of the Sophistici Elenchi); and the most dishonest Sophist would at any rate be harmless. But, in fact, Aristotle himself departs from this definition even in the beginning of the Sophistici Elenchi; for he there treats the sophistic syllogism and refutation as having a semblance of validity plausible enough to impose upon many persons, and to be difficult of detection; like base metals having the exterior appearance of gold and silver, and like men got up for the purpose of looking finer and stronger than they really are.20Here we have the eristic or sophistic syllogism presented as fallacious, yet as very likely to be mistaken for truth, by unprepared auditors, unless warning and precaution be applied; not (as it was set forth in the definition above cited) as bearing the plain and obvious stamp of falsehood, recognizable even by the vulgar. At the time when Aristotle constructed that definition, he probably had present to his mind such caricatures of dialectical questions as Plato (in the dialogue Euthydêmus) puts into the mouth of the Sophists Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus. And, since Aristotle chose to connect fallacious reasoning with dishonest purposes, and to announce it as employed exclusively by dishonest debaters, he seems to have found satisfaction in describing it as something which no honest man of ordinary understanding could accept as true: the Sophist being thus presented not merely as a knave but as a fool.
19Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 24, seq.
19Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 24, seq.
20Soph. El. i. p. 164, a. 23-b. 27. τὸν αá½Ï„ὸν δὲ Ï„Ïόπον καὶ συλλογισμὸς καὶ ἔλεγχος ὠμὲν ἔστιν, ὠδ’ οá½Îº ἔστι μÎν, φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀπειÏίαν· οἱ Î³á½°Ï á¼„Ï€ÎµÎ¹Ïοι á½¥ÏƒÏ€ÎµÏ á¼‚Î½ ἀπÎχοντες πόῤῥωθεν θεωÏοῦσιν.
20Soph. El. i. p. 164, a. 23-b. 27. τὸν αá½Ï„ὸν δὲ Ï„Ïόπον καὶ συλλογισμὸς καὶ ἔλεγχος ὠμὲν ἔστιν, ὠδ’ οá½Îº ἔστι μÎν, φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀπειÏίαν· οἱ Î³á½°Ï á¼„Ï€ÎµÎ¹Ïοι á½¥ÏƒÏ€ÎµÏ á¼‚Î½ ἀπÎχοντες πόῤῥωθεν θεωÏοῦσιν.
I think it a mistake on the part of Aristotle to treat the fallacies incidental to the human intellect as if they were mere traps laid by Sophists and litigants; and as if they would nevershow themselves, assuming dialectical debate to be conducted entirely with a view to its legitimate purposes of testing a thesis and following out argumentative consequences. It is true that, if there are infirmities incident to the human intellect, a dishonest disputant will be likely to take advantage of them. So far it may be well to note his presence. But the dishonest disputant does not originate these infirmities: he finds them already existing, and manifested undesignedly not merely in dialectical debate, but even in ordinary discourse. It is the business of those who theorize on the intellectual processes to specify and discriminate the Fallacies as liabilities to intellectual error among mankind in general, honest or dishonest, with a view to precaution against their occurrence, or correction if they do occur; not to present them as inventions of a class of professional cheats,21or as tares sown by the enemy in a field where the natural growth would be nothing but pure wheat.
21Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 19, seq.
21Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 19, seq.
In point of fact the actual classification of Fallacies given by Aristotle is far sounder than his announcement would lead us to expect. Though he entitles them Sophistical Refutations, describing them as intentionally cultivated and exclusively practised by professional Sophists for gain, or by unprincipled litigants for victory, yet he recognises them as often very difficult of detection, and as an essential portion of the theory of Dialectic generally.22The various general heads under which he distributes them are each characterized by intellectual or logical marks.