CHAPTER XI.

146Ibid. i. p. 164, a. 21: λέγωμεν, ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων.

Aristotle distinguishes, in clear and explicit language, a science which he terms Wisdom, Philosophy, or First Philosophy; the subject-matter of which he declares to beEns quatenusEns, together with the concomitants belonging to it as such. With this Ontology the treatise entitled Metaphysica purports to deal, and the larger portion of it does really so deal. At the same time, the line that parts off Ontology from Logic (Analytic and Dialectic) on the one hand, and from Physics on the other, is not always clearly marked. For, though the whole process of Syllogism, employed both in Analytic and Dialectic, involves and depends upon the Maxim of Contradiction, yet the discussion of this Maxim is declared to belong to First Philosophy;1while not only the four Aristotelian varieties of Cause or Condition, and the distinction between Potential and Actual, but also the abstractions Form, Matter and Privation, which play so capital a part in the Metaphysica, are equally essential and equally appealed to in the Physica.2

1Metaphys.Γ.iii. p. 1005, a 19-b. 11. Whether that discussion properly belongs toPhilosophia Prima, or not, stands as the first Ἀπορία enumerated in the list which occupies BookB.in that treatise, p. 995, b. 4-13; compareK.i. p. 1059, a. 24.

2Physica, I. pp. 190-191; II. p. 194, b. 20, seq.; Metaph.A.p. 983, a. 33; Alexander ad Metaphys.Δ.p. 306, ed. Bonitz; p. 689, b. Schol. Br.

If we include both what is treated in the Analytica Posteriora (the scientific explanation of Essence and Definition) and what is treated in the Physica, we shall find that nearly all the expository processes employed in the Metaphysica are employed also in these two treatises. To look upon the general notion as a cause, and to treat it as a creative force (der schÃ¶pferische Wesensbegriff, to use the phrase of Prantl and other German logicians3), belongs alike to the Physica and to the Analytica Posteriora. The characteristic distinction of the treatise entitled Metaphysica is, that it is all-comprehensive in respect to the ground covered; that the expository process is applied,not exclusively to any separate branch ofEns, but toEnsas a wholequatenus Ensâ€” to all the varieties ofEnsthat admit of scientific treatment at all;4that the same abstractions and analytical distinctions, which, both in the Analytica and in the Physica, are indicated and made to serve an explanatory purpose, up to a certain point â€” are in the Metaphysica sometimes assumed as already familiar, sometimes followed out with nicer accuracy and subtlety.5Indeed both the Physica and the Metaphysica, as we read them in Aristotle, would be considered in modern times as belonging alike to the department of Metaphysics.

3Seech. viii. pp. 240seq. of the present work, with the citations in noteb,p. 252, from Prantl and Rassow.

4Metaphys.Γ.i. p. 1003, a. 21: ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθâ€™ αὑτό. Αὕτη δâ€™ ἐστὶν οὐδεμίᾳ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἡ αὐτή. οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖκαθόλουπερὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμόμεναι, &c.

5Metaphys.Λ.vii. p. 1073, a. with Bonitzâ€™s Comment. pp. 504-505. Physica, I. ix. p. 192, a. 34: περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀρχῆς, πότερον μία ἢ πολλαὶ καὶ τίς ἢ τίνες εἰσί, διâ€™ ἀκριβείας τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἐστὶ διορίσαι, ὥστâ€™ εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν ἀποκείσθω. Compare Physic. I. viii. p. 191, b. 29, and Weisse, Aristoteles Physik, p. 285.About the Metaphysica, as carrying out and completing the exposition of the Analytica Posteriora, see Metaphys.Z.xii. p. 1037, b. 8: νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν πρῶτον, ἐφâ€™ ὅσον ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς περὶ ὁρισμοῦ μὴ εἴρηται (Analyt. Post. II. vi. p. 92, a. 32; see noteb,p. 243).

About the Metaphysica, as carrying out and completing the exposition of the Analytica Posteriora, see Metaphys.Z.xii. p. 1037, b. 8: νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν πρῶτον, ἐφâ€™ ὅσον ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς περὶ ὁρισμοῦ μὴ εἴρηται (Analyt. Post. II. vi. p. 92, a. 32; see noteb,p. 243).

The primary distinction and classification recognized by Aristotle among Sciences or Cognitions, is, that of (1) Theoretical, (2) Practical, (3) Artistic or Constructive.6Of these three divisions, the second and third alike comprise both intelligence and action, but the two are distinguished from each other by this â€” that in the Artistic there is always some assignable product which the agency leaves behind independent of itself, whereas in the Practical no such independent result remains,7but the agency itself, together with the purpose (or intellectual and volitional condition) of the agent, is every thing. The division named Theoretical comprises intelligence alone â€” intelligence ofprincipia, causes and constituent elements. Here again we find a tripartite classification. The highest and most universal of all Theoretical Sciences is recognized by Aristotle as Ontology (First Philosophy, sometimes called by him Theology) which deals with allEnsuniversallyquatenus Ens, and with thePrima Moventia, themselves immoveable, of the entire Kosmos. The two other heads of Theoretical Science are Mathematics and Physics; each of them special and limited, as compared with Ontology. In Physics we scientifically study natural bodies with their motions, changes, and phenomena; bodies in which Form always appears implicated with Matter, and in which the principle of motion or change is immanentand indwelling (i.e., dependent only on the universalPrima Moventia, and not impressed from without by a special agency, as in works of human art). In Mathematics, we study immoveable and unchangeable numbers and magnitudes, apart from the bodies to which they belong; not that they can ever be really separated from such bodies, but we intellectually abstract them, or consider them apart.8

6Metaphys.E.i. p. 1025, b. 25.

7Ibid. b. 22.

8Metaphys.E.i. p. 1026;K.vii. p. 1064, a. 28-b. 14;M.iii. pp. 1077-1078; Bonitz, Commentar. p. 284.

Such is Aristotleâ€™s tripartite distribution of Theoretical or Contemplative Science. In introducing us to the study of First Philosophy, he begins by clearing up the meaning of the termEns. It is a term of many distinct significations; being neither univocal, nor altogether equivocal, but something intermediate between the two, or multivocal. It is not a generic whole, distributed exhaustively among correlative species marked off by an assignable difference:9it is an analogical whole, including several genera distinct from each other at the beginning, though all of them branches derivative from one and the same root; all of them connected by some sort of analogy or common relation to that one root, yet not necessarily connected with each other by any direct or special tie.

9Metaphys.Γ.ii. p. 1003, a. 33-p. 1004, a. 5: τὸ δâ€™ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως â€” ὑπάρχει γὰρ εὐθὺς γένη ἔχοντα τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν.CompareK.iii. p. 1060, b. 32. See also above,ch. iii. p. 60, of the present work.

9Metaphys.Γ.ii. p. 1003, a. 33-p. 1004, a. 5: τὸ δâ€™ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως â€” ὑπάρχει γὰρ εὐθὺς γένη ἔχοντα τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν.

CompareK.iii. p. 1060, b. 32. See also above,ch. iii. p. 60, of the present work.

Of these various significations, he enumerates, as we have already seen, four:â€” (1)Enswhich is merely concomitant with, dependent upon, or related to, anotherEnsas terminus; (2)Ensin the sense of the True, opposed toNon-Ensin the sense of the False; (3)Ensaccording to each of the Ten Categories; (4)Enspotentially, as contrasted withEnsactually. But among these four heads, the two last only are matters upon which science is attainable, in the opinion of Aristotle. To these two, accordingly, heconfinesOntology or First Philosophy. They are the only two that have an objective, self-standing, independent, nature.

That which falls under the first head (Ens per Accidens) is essentially indeterminate; and its causes, being alike indeterminate, are out of the reach of science. So also is that which falls under the second head â€”Ens tanquam verum, contrasted withNon-Ens tanquam falsum. This has no independent standing, but results from an internal act of the judging or believing mind, combining two elements, or disjoining two elements, in a way conformable to, or non-conformable to, real fact. The truecombination or disjunction is a variety ofEns; the false combination or disjunction is a variety ofNon-Ens. This mental act varies both in different individuals, and at different times with the same individual, according to a multitude of causes often unassignable. Accordingly, it does not fall under Ontological Science, nor can we discover any causes or principles determining it.10When Aristotle says that the two first heads are out of the reach of science, or not proper subjects of science, he means that their firstprincipia, causes, or deepest foundations, cannot be discovered and assigned; for it is in determining theseprincipiaand causes that true scientific cognition consists.11

10Aristot. Met.E.iv. p. 1027, b. 17;Θ.p. 1051, b. 2; p. 1052, a. 17-30;K.viii. p. 1065, a. 21.There remains much obscurity about this meaning ofEns(Ensὡς ἀληθές), even after the Scholia of Alexander (p. 701, a. 10, Sch. Brand.), and the instructive comments of Bonitz, Schwegler, and Brentano (Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, ch. iii. pp. 21-39).The foundation of this meaning ofEnslies in the legitimateAntiphasis, and the proper division thereof (τὸ δὲ σύνολον περὶ μερισμὸν ἀντιφάσεως, p. 1027, b. 20). It is a first principle (p. 1005, b. 30) that, if one member of theAntiphasismust be affirmed as true, the other must be denied as false. If we fix upon the right combination to affirm, we saythe thing that is: if we fix upon the wrong combination and affirm it, we saythe thing that is not(p. 1012, b. 10). â€œFalsehood and Truth (Aristotle says,E.iv. p. 1027, b. 25) are not in things but in our mental combination; and as regards simple (uncombined) matters and essences, they are not even in our mental combination:â€� οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κακὸν εὐθὺς ψεῦδος, ἀλλâ€™ ἐν διανοίᾳÂ· περὶ δὲ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστιν οὐδâ€™ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ. Compare Bonitz (ad Ar. Metaph.Z.iv. p. 1030, a.), p. 310, Comm.In regard tocogitabiliaâ€” simple, indivisible, uncompounded â€” there is no combination or disjunction; therefore, strictly speaking, neither truth nor falsehood (Aristot. De AnimÃ¢, III. vi. p. 430, a. 26; also Categor. x. p. 13, b. 10). The intellect either apprehends these simple elements, or it does not apprehend them; there is no διάνοια concerned. Not to apprehend them is ignorance, ἄγνοια, which sometimes loosely passes under the title of ψεῦδος (Schwegler, Comm. Pt. II., p. 32).

10Aristot. Met.E.iv. p. 1027, b. 17;Θ.p. 1051, b. 2; p. 1052, a. 17-30;K.viii. p. 1065, a. 21.

There remains much obscurity about this meaning ofEns(Ensὡς ἀληθές), even after the Scholia of Alexander (p. 701, a. 10, Sch. Brand.), and the instructive comments of Bonitz, Schwegler, and Brentano (Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, ch. iii. pp. 21-39).

The foundation of this meaning ofEnslies in the legitimateAntiphasis, and the proper division thereof (τὸ δὲ σύνολον περὶ μερισμὸν ἀντιφάσεως, p. 1027, b. 20). It is a first principle (p. 1005, b. 30) that, if one member of theAntiphasismust be affirmed as true, the other must be denied as false. If we fix upon the right combination to affirm, we saythe thing that is: if we fix upon the wrong combination and affirm it, we saythe thing that is not(p. 1012, b. 10). â€œFalsehood and Truth (Aristotle says,E.iv. p. 1027, b. 25) are not in things but in our mental combination; and as regards simple (uncombined) matters and essences, they are not even in our mental combination:â€� οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κακὸν εὐθὺς ψεῦδος, ἀλλâ€™ ἐν διανοίᾳÂ· περὶ δὲ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστιν οὐδâ€™ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ. Compare Bonitz (ad Ar. Metaph.Z.iv. p. 1030, a.), p. 310, Comm.

In regard tocogitabiliaâ€” simple, indivisible, uncompounded â€” there is no combination or disjunction; therefore, strictly speaking, neither truth nor falsehood (Aristot. De AnimÃ¢, III. vi. p. 430, a. 26; also Categor. x. p. 13, b. 10). The intellect either apprehends these simple elements, or it does not apprehend them; there is no διάνοια concerned. Not to apprehend them is ignorance, ἄγνοια, which sometimes loosely passes under the title of ψεῦδος (Schwegler, Comm. Pt. II., p. 32).

11Metaphys.E.i. p. 1025, b. 3: αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητεῖται τῶν ὄντων, δῆλον δâ€™ ὅτι ᾗ ὄντα. â€” ὅλως δὲ πᾶσα διανοητικὴ ἢ μετέχουσά τι διανοίας περὶ αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἢ ἀκριβεστέρας ἢ ἁπλουστέρας.Compare Metaph.K.vii. p. 1063, b. 36; p. 1065, a. 8-26. Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9.

Compare Metaph.K.vii. p. 1063, b. 36; p. 1065, a. 8-26. Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9.

There remain, as matter proper for the investigation of First Philosophy, the two last-mentioned heads ofEns; viz.,Ensaccording to the Ten Categories, andEnspotential and actual. But, along with these, Aristotle includes another matter also; viz., the critical examination of the Axioms and highest generalities of syllogistic proof or Demonstration. He announces as the first principle of these Axioms â€” as the highest and firmest of all Principles â€” the Maxim of Contradiction:12The same predicatecannot both belong and not belong to the same subject, at the same time and in the same sense; or, You cannot both truly affirm, and truly deny, the same predicate respecting the same subject; or, The same proposition cannot be at once true and false. This Axiom is by nature the beginning or source of all the other Axioms. It stands first in the order of knowledge; and it neither rests upon nor involves any hypothesis.13

12Metaph.Γ.iii. p. 1005, b. 7, 17, 22, 34: αὕτη δὴ πασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιοτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν â€” φύσει γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιωμάτων αὕτη πάντων. â€” p. 1011, b. 13: βεβαιοτάτηδόξαπασῶν τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀληθεῖς ἅμα τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις â€” (He here applies the term δόξα to designate this fundamental maxim. This deserves notice, because of the antithesis, common with him elsewhere, between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη).

13Metaph.Γ.iii. p. 1005, b. 13-14: γνωριμωτάτην â€” ἀνυπόθετον.

The Syllogism is defined by Aristotle as consisting of premisses and a conclusion: if the two propositions called premisses be granted as true, a third as conclusion must for that reason be granted as true also.14The truth of the conclusion is affirmed conditionally on the truth of the premisses; and the rules of Syllogism set out those combinations of propositions in which such affirmation may be made legitimately. The rules of the Syllogism being thus the rules for such conditional affirmation, the Principle or Axiom thereof enunciates in the most general terms what is implied in all those rules, as essential to their validity. And, since the syllogistic or deductive process is applicable without exception to every variety of theScibile, Aristotle considers the Axioms or Principles thereof to come under the investigation of Ontology or First Philosophy. Thus it is, that he introduces us to the Maxim of Contradiction, and its supplement or correlative, the Maxim of the Excluded Middle.

14Analyt. Prior. I. i. p. 24, b. 18-20, et alib.

His vindication of these Axioms is very illustrative of the philosophy of his day. It cannot be too often impressed that he was the first either to formulate the precepts; or to ascend to the theory, of deductive reasoning; that he was the first to mark by appropriate terms the most important logical distinctions and characteristic attributes of propositions; that before his time, there was abundance of acute dialectic, but no attempt to set forth any critical scheme whereby the conclusions of such dialectic might be tested. Anterior to Sokrates, the cast of Grecian philosophy had been altogether either theological, or poetical, or physical, or at least some fusion of these three varieties into one. Sokrates was the first who broke ground for Logic â€” for testing the difference between good and bad ratiocination. He did this by enquiry as to the definition of general terms,15and by dialectical exposure of the ignorance generally prevalent among those who familiarly used them. Plato in hisSokratic dialogues followed in the same negative track; opening up many instructive points of view respecting the erroneous tendencies by which reasoners were misled, but not attempting any positive systematic analysis, nor propounding any intelligible scheme of his own for correction or avoidance of the like. If Sokrates and Plato, both of them active in exposing ratiocinative error and confusion, stopped short of any wide logical theory, still less were the physical philosophers likely to supply that deficiency. Aristotle tells us that several of them controverted the Maxim of Contradiction.16Herakleitus and his followers maintained the negative of it, distinctly and emphatically;17while the disciples of Parmenides, though less pronounced in their negative, could not have admitted it as universally true. Even Plato must be reckoned among those who, probably without having clearly stated to himself the Maxim in its universal terms, declared doctrines quite incompatible with it: the Platonic Parmenides affords a conspicuous example of contradictory conclusions deduced by elaborate reasoning and declared to be both of them firmly established.18Moreover, in the Sophistes,19Plato explains the negative proposition as expressing what is different from that which is denied, but nothing beyond; an explanation which, if admitted, would set aside the Maxim of Contradiction as invalid.

15Aristot. Metaph.A.vi. p. 987, b. 1: Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος, καὶ περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντοςπρώτουτὴν διάνοιαν.

16Aristot. Metaph.Γ.iv. p. 1005, b. 35: εἰσὶ δέ τινες, οἵ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, αὐτοί τε ἐνδέχεσθαί φασι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν οὕτως. χρῶνται δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως.

17Ibid. iii. p. 1005, b. 25; v. p. 1010, a. 13; vi. p. 1011, a. 24.

18Plato, Republic. v. p. 479, A.; vii. p. 538, E. Compare also the conclusion of the Platonic Parmenides, and the elaborate dialectic or antinomies by which the contradictions involved in it are proved.

19Plato, Sophistes, p. 257, B.

While Aristotle mentions these various dissentients, and especially Herakleitus, he seems to imagine that they were not really in earnest20in their dissent. Yet he nevertheless goes at length into the case against them, as well as against others, who agreed with him in affirming the Maxim, but who undertook also to demonstrate it. Any such demonstration Aristotle declares to be impossible. The Maxim is assumed in all demonstrations; unless you grant it, no demonstration is valid; but it cannot be itself demonstrated. He had already laid down in the Analytica that the premisses for demonstration could not be carried back indefinitely, and that the attempt so to carry them back was unphilosophical.21There must be some primary, undemonstrabletruths; and the Maxim of Contradiction he ranks among the first. Still, though in attempting any formal demonstration of the Maxim you cannot avoid assuming the Maxim itself and thus falling intoPetitio Principii, Aristotle contends that you can demonstrate it in the way of refutation,22relatively to a given opponent, provided such opponent will not content himself with simply denying it, but will besides advance some affirmative thesis of his own, as a truth in which he believes; or provided he will even grant the fixed meaning of words, defining them in a manner significant alike to himself and to others, â€” each word to have either one fixed meaning, or a limited number of different meanings, clear and well defined.23It is impossible for two persons to converse, unless each understands the other. A word which conveys to the mind not one meaning, but a multitude of unconnected meanings, is for all useful purposes unmeaning.24If, therefore, the opponent once binds himself to an affirmative definition of any word, this definition may be truly predicated of thedefinitumas subject; while he must be considered as interdicting himself from predicating of the same subject the negative of that definition. But when you ask for the definition, your opponent must answer the question directly andbonÃ¢ fide. He must not enlarge his definition so as to include both the affirmative and negative of the same proposition; nor must he tack on to the real essence (declared in the definition) a multitude of unessential attributes. If he answers in this confused and perplexing manner, he must be treated as not answering at all, and as rendering philosophical discussion impossible.25Such a mode of speaking goes to disallow any ultimate essence or determinate subject, and shuts out all predication; for there cannot be an infinite regress of predicates upon predicates, and accidents upon accidents, without arriving at an ultimate substratum â€” Subject or Essence.26If, wherever you can truly affirm a predicate ofany subject, you can also truly deny the same predicate of the same subject, it is manifest that all subjects are one: there is nothing to discriminate man, horse, ship, wall, &c., from each other; every one speaks truth, and every one at the same time speaks falsehood; a man believes and disbelieves the same thing at the same time; or he neither believes nor disbelieves, and then his mind is blank, like a vegetable.27

20Aristot. Metaph.Γ.iii. p. 1005, b. 26;K.v. p. 1062, a. 32. Here Aristotle intimates that Herakleitus may have asserted what he did not believe; though we find him in another place citing Herakleitus as an example of those who adhered as obstinately to their opinions as other persons adhered to demonstrated truth (Ethic. Nik. VII. v. p. 1146, b. 30.).

21Aristot. Metaph.Γ.iv. p. 1006, a. 5: ἀξιοῦσι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδεικνύναι τινὲς διâ€™ ἀπαιδευσίανÂ· ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γιγνώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ.

22Aristot. Metaph.Γ.iv. p. 1006, a. 11: ἔστι δâ€™ ἀποδεῖξαι ἐλεγκτικῶς καὶ περὶ τούτου ὅτι ἀδύνατον, ἂν μόνον τι λέγῃ ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν. â€”K.v. p. 1062, a. 2: καὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, πρὸς τόνδε δâ€™ ἔστιν. â€” p. 1062,a.30.

23Ibid. Metaph.Γ.iv. p. 1006, a. 18-34. διαφέρει δâ€™ οὐθὲν οὔδâ€™ εἰ πλείω τις φαιή σημαίνειν, μόνον δὲ ὡρισμένα. â€”K.v. p. 1062, a. 12.

24Ibid.Γ.iv. p. 1006, b. 7: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἕν τι σημαίνειν οὐθὲν σημαίνειν ἐστίν, μὴ σημαινόντων δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνῄρηται τὸ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ πρὸς αὑτόνÂ· οὐθὲνγὰρἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἕν. â€”K.v. p. 1062, a. 20.

25Ibid.Γ.iv. p. 1006, b. 30-p. 1007, a. 20. συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἂν ἀποκρίνηται τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. ἐὰν δὲ προστιθῇ ἐρωτῶντος ἁπλῶς καὶ τὰς ἀποφάσεις, οὐκ ἀποκρίνεται τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. â€” ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτο ποιῇ, οὐ διαλέγεται.

26Ibid. p. 1007, a. 20-b. 19: ὅλως δâ€™ ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. â€” εἰ δὲ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται, οὐθὲν ἔσται πρῶτον τὸ καθâ€™ οὗ, εἰ ἀεὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καθâ€™ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς σημαίνει τὴν κατηγορίανÂ· ἀνάγκη ἄρα εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναιÂ· ἀλλâ€™ ἀδύνατον.

27Aristot. Met.Γ.iv. p. 1008, a. 18-b. 12: εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ ὅσα ἀποφῆσαι φάναι ἀνάγκη â€” πάντα δâ€™ ἂν εἴη ἕν â€” οὐθὲν διοίσει ἕτερον ἑτέρου â€” εἰ δὲ μηθὲν ὑπολαμβάνει ἀλλâ€™ ὁμοίως οἴεται καὶ οὐκ οἴεται, τί ἂν διαφερόντως ἔχοι τῶν φυτῶν;K.v. p. 1062, a. 28.

The man who professes this doctrine, however (continues Aristotle28), shows plainly by his conduct that his mind is not thus blank; that,in respect of the contradictory alternative, he does not believe either both sides or neither side, but believes one and disbelieves the other. When he feels hungry, and seeks what he knows to be palatable and wholesome, he avoids what he knows to be nasty and poisonous. He knows what is to be found in the market-place, and goes there to get it; he keeps clear of falling into a well or walking into the sea; he does not mistake a horse for a man. He may often find himself mistaken; but he shows by his conduct that he believes certain subjects to possess certain definite attributes, and not to possess others. Though we do not reach infallible truth, we obtain an approach to it, sometimes nearer, sometimes more remote; and we thus escape the extreme doctrine which forbids all definite affirmation.29

28Ibid.Γ.iv. p. 1008, b. 12-31;K.vi. p. 1063, a. 30.

29Ibid.Γ.iv. p. 1008, b. 36: εἰ οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον ἐγγύτερον, εἴη γε ἄν τι ἀληθὲς οὗ ἐγγύτερον τὸ μᾶλλον ἀληθέςÂ· κἂν εἰ μή ἐστιν, ἀλλâ€™ ἤδη γέ τι ἐστὶ βεβαιότερον καὶ ἀληθινώτερον, καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἴημεν τοῦ ἀκράτου καὶ κωλύοντός τι τῇ διανοίᾳ ὁρίσαι.

It is in this manner that Aristotle, vindicating the Maxims of Contradiction and of Excluded Middle as the highestprincipiaof syllogistic reasoning, disposes of the two contemporaneous dogmas that were most directly incompatible with these Maxims:â€” (1) The dogma of Herakleitus, who denied all duration or permanence of subject, recognizing nothing but perpetual process, flux, or change, each successive moment of which involved destruction and generation implicated with each other:Isandis notare both alike and conjointly true, while neither is true separately, to the exclusion of the other;30(2) The dogma ofAnaxagoras, who did not deny fixity or permanence of subject, but held that everything was mixed up with everything; that every subject had an infinite assemblage of contrary predicates, so that neither of them could be separately affirmed or separately denied: The truth lies in a third alternative or middle, between affirmation and denial.31

30Aristot. Met.A.vi. p. 987, a. 34;Γ.v. p. 1010, a. 12: Κράτυλος â€” ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐθὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι ὅτι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ ποτάμῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναιÂ· αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾤετο οὔδâ€™ ἁπάξ. Herakleitus adopted as his onefundamentumFire or Heat, as being the principle of mobility or change: χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς κινητικὴν ἔχοντι τῷ πυρὶ τὴν φύσιν â€” Metaph.A.iii. p. 984, b. 5. Ibid.K.v. p. 1062, a. 31-b. 10;K.x. p. 1067, a. 5;M.iv. p. 1078, b. 15.

31Aristot. Met.K.vi. p. 1063, b. 25;A.viii. p. 989, a. 31-b. 16. ὅτε γὰρ οὐθὲν ἦν ἀποκεκριμένον, δῆλον ὡς οὐθὲν ἦν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκείνης, λέγω δâ€™ οἷον ὅτι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν ἢ φαιὸν ἢ ἄλλο χρῶμα, ἀλλâ€™ ἄχρων ἦν ἐξ ἀνάγκηςÂ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄχυμον τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν ὁμοίων οὐθένÂ· οὔτε γὰρ ποιόν τι οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε τί. â€”Γ.iv. b. 1007, b. 25: καὶ γίγνεται δὴ τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματαÂ· ὥστε μηθὲν ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχειν. â€”Γ.viii. p. 1012, a. 24: ἔοικε δâ€™ ὁ μὲν Ἡρακλείτου λόγος, λέγων πάντα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἅπαντα ἀληθῆ ποιεῖν, ὁ δâ€™ Ἀναξαγόρου εἶναί τι μεταξὺ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, ὥστε πάντα ψευδῆÂ· ὅταν γὰρ μιχθῇ, οὔτâ€™ ἀγαθὸν οὔτâ€™ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μῖγμα, ὥστâ€™ οὐθὲν εἰπεῖν ἀληθές.

Having thus refuted these dogmas to his own satisfaction, Aristotle proceeds to impugn a third doctrine which he declares to be analogous to these two and to be equally in conflict with the two syllogisticprincipiawhich he is undertaking to vindicate. This third doctrine is the â€œHomo Mensuraâ€� of Protagoras: Man is the measure of all things â€” the measure of things existent as well as of things non-existent: To each individual that is true or false which he believes to be such, and for as long as he believes it. Aristotle contends that this doctrine is homogeneous with those of Herakleitus and Anaxagoras, and must stand or fall along with them; all three being alike adverse to the Maxim of Contradiction.32Herein he follows partially the example of Plato, who (in his TheÃ¦tÃªtus33), though not formally enunciating the Maxim of Contradiction, had declared the tenets of Protagoras to be coincident with or analogous to those of Herakleitus, and had impugned both one and the other by the same line of arguments. Protagoras agreed with Herakleitus (so Plato and Aristotle tell us) in declaring both affirmative and negative (in the contradictory alternative) to be at once and alike true; for he maintained that what any person believed was true, and that what any person disbelieved was false. Accordingly, since opinions altogether opposite and contradictory are held by different persons or by the same person at different times, both the affirmative and the negative of everyAntiphasismust be held as true alike;34in other words, all affirmations and all negations were at once true and false. Such co-existence or implication of contradictions is the main doctrine of Herakleitus.

32Aristot. MetΓ.v. p. 1009, a. 6: ἔστι δâ€™ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρου λόγος, καὶ ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως ἄμφω αὐτοὺς ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι.

33Aristotle refers here to Plato by name, Metaphys.Γ.v. p. 1010, b. 12.

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