CHAPTER XII.

64Aristot. Metaph.Γ.iii. p. 1005, a. 19-b. 11.

65See Aristot. De Divinat. per Somnum, i. p. 462, b. 15; De CÅ“lo, I. iii. p. 270, b. 3, 20; Metaphys.A.ii. p. 982, a. 4-14. Alexander ap. Scholia, p. 525, b. 36, Br.: ἐν πᾶσιν ἔθος ἀεὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς καὶ φυσικαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων προλήψεσιν ἀρχαῖς εἰς τὰ δεικνύμενα πρὸς αὐτοῦ χρῆσθαι.

66Aristot. Metaph.A.vi. p. 987, a. 32;M.iv. p. 1078, b. 12. That Platoâ€™sPhilosophia Primainvolved a partial coincidence with that of Herakleitus is here distinctly announced by Aristotle: that it also included an intimate conjunction or fusion of Parmenides with Herakleitus is made out in the ingenious Dissertation of Herbart, De Platonici Systematis Fundamento, GÃ¶ttingen (1805), which winds up with the following epigrammatic sentence as result (p. 50):â€” â€œDivide Heracliti γένεσιν οὐσίᾳ Parmenidis, et habebis Ideas Platonicas.â€� Compare Plato, Republic VII. p. 515, seq.

67Aristot. Metaph.M.iv. p. 1078, b. 17, seq.; ix. p. 1086, a. 37: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καθâ€™ ἕκαστα ῥεῖν ἐνόμιζον (Platonici) καὶ μένειν οὐθὲν αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ καθόλου παρὰ ταῦτα εἶναί τε καὶ ἕτερόν τι εἶναι. τοῦτο δâ€™, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἐκίνησε μὲν Σωκράτης διὰ τοὺς ὁρισμούς, οὐ μὴν ἐχώρισέ γε τῶν καθâ€™ ἕκαστον. καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἐνόησεν οὐ χωρίσας.

The Maxim of Contradiction, which Aristotle proclaims as the first and firmestprincipiumof syllogizing, may be found perpetually applied to particular cases throughout the Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Sokratic dialogues of Plato. Indeed the Elenchus for which Sokrates was so distinguished, is nothing more than an ever-renewed and ingenious application of it; illustrating the painful and humiliating effect produced even upon common minds by the shock of a plain contradiction, when a respondent, having at first confidently laid down some universal affirmative, finds himself unexpectedly compelled to admit, in some particular case, the contradictory negative. As against a Herakleitean, who saw no difficulty in believing both sides of the contradiction to be true at once, the Sokratic Elenchus would have been powerless. What Aristotle did was, to abstract and elicit the general rules of the process; to classify propositions according to their logical value, in such manner that he could formulate clearly the structure of the two propositions between which an exact contradictory antitheses subsisted. The important logical distinctions between propositionscontradictoryand propositionscontrary, was first clearly enunciated by Aristotle; and, until this had been done, the Maxim of Contradiction could not have been laid down in a defensible manner. Indeed we may remark that, while this Maxim is first promulgated as a formula of First Philosophy in BookΓ.of the Metaphysica, it had already been tacitly assumed and applied by Aristotle throughout the DeInterpretatione, Analytica, and Topica, as if it were obvious and uncontested. The First Philosophy of Aristotle was adapted to the conditions of ordinary colloquy as amended and tested by Sokrates, furnishing the theoretical basis of his practical Logic.

But, as Aristotle tells us, there were several philosophers and dialecticians who did not recognize the Maxim; maintaining that the same proposition might be at once true and false â€” that it was possible for the same thing both to be and not to be. How is he to deal with these opponents? He admits that he cannot demonstrate the Maxim against them, and that any attempt to do this would involvePetitio Principii. But he contends for the possibility of demonstrating it in a peculiar way â€”refutativelyorindirectly; that is, provided that the opponents can be induced to grant (not indeed the truth of any proposition, to the exclusion of its contradictory antithesis, which concession he admits would involvePetitio Principii, but) the fixed and uniform signification of terms and propositions. Aristotle contends that the opponents ought to grant thus much, under penalty of being excluded from discussion as incapables or mere plants.68I do not imagine that the opponents themselves would have felt obliged to grant as much as he here demands. Theonus probandilay upon him, as advancing a positive theory; and he would have found his indirect or refutative demonstration not more available in convincing them than a direct or ordinary demonstration. Against respondents who proclaim as their thesis the negative of the Maxim of Contradiction, refutation and demonstration are equally impossible. No dialectical discussion could ever lead to any result; for you can never prove more against them than what their own thesis unequivocally avows.69As against Herakleitus and Anaxagoras, I do not think that Aristotleâ€™s qualified vindication of the Maxim has any effective bearing.

68Aristot. Metaph.Γ.iv. p. 1006, a. 11, seq.

69Ibid. a. 26: ἀναιρῶν γὰρ λόγον ὑπομένει λόγον. â€” p. 1008, a. 30.

But Aristotle is quite right in saying that neither dialectical debate nor demonstration can be carried on unless terms and propositions be defined, and unless to each term there be assigned one special signification, or a limited number of special significations â€” excluding a certain number of others. This demand for definitions, and also the multiplied use of inductive interrogations, keeping the Universal implicated with and dependent upon its particulars â€” are the innovations which Aristotle expressly places to the credit of Sokrates. The Sokratic Elenchusoperated by first obtaining from the respondent a definition, and then testing it through a variety of particulars: when the test brought out a negative as against the pre-asserted affirmative, the contradiction between the two was felt as an intellectual shock by the respondent, rendering it impossible to believe both at once; and the unrivalled acuteness of Sokrates was exhibited in rendering such shock peculiarly pungent and humiliating. But the Sokratic Elenchus presupposes this psychological fact, common to most minds, ordinary as well as superior, â€” the intellectual shock felt when incompatible beliefs are presented to the mind at once. If the collocutors of Sokrates had not been so constituted by nature, the magic of his colloquy would have been unfelt and inoperative. Against a Herakleitean, who professed to feel no difficulty in believing both sides of a contradiction at once, he could have effected nothing: and if not he, still less any other dialectician. Proof and disproof, as distinguished one from the other, would have had no meaning; dialectical debate would have led to no result.

Thus, then, although Aristotle was the first to enunciate the Maxim of Contradiction in general terms, after having previously originated that logical distinction of contrary and contradictory Propositions and doctrine of legitimateAntiphasiswhich rendered such enunciation possible, â€” yet, when he tries to uphold it against dissentients, it cannot be said that he has correctly estimated the logical position of those whom he was opposing, or the real extent to which the defence of the Maxim can be carried without incurring the charge ofPetitio Principii. As against Protagoras, no defence was needed, for the Protagorean â€œHomo Mensuraâ€� is not incompatible with the Maxim of Contradiction; while, as against Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, &c., no defence was practicable, and the attempt of Aristotle to construct one appears to me a failure. All that can be really done in the way of defence is, to prove the Maxim in its general enunciation by an appeal to particular cases: if your opponent is willing to grant these particular cases, you establish the general Maxim against him by way of Induction; if he will not grant them, you cannot prove the general Maxim at all. Suppose you are attempting to prove to an Herakleitean that an universal affirmative and its contradictory particular negative cannot be both true at once. You begin by asking him about particular cases, Whether it is possible that the two propositions â€” All men are mortal, and, Some men are not mortal â€” can both be true at once? If he admits that these two propositions cannot both be true at once, if he admits the like with regard to other similarpairs of contradictories, and if he can suggest no similar pair in which both propositions are true at once, then you may consider yourself as having furnished a sufficient inductive proof, and you may call upon him to admit the Maxim of Contradiction in its general enunciation. But, if he will not admit it in the particular cases which you tender, or if, while admitting it in these, he himself can tender other cases in which he considers it inadmissible, then you have effected nothing sufficient to establish the general Maxim against him. The case is not susceptible of any other or better proof. It is in vain that Aristotle tries to diversify the absurdity, and to follow it out into collateral absurd consequences. If the Herakleitean does not feel any repulsive shock of contradiction in a definite particular case, if he directly announces that he believes the two propositions to be both at once true, then the collateral inconsistencies and derivative absurdities, which Aristotle multiplies against him, will not shock him more than the direct contradiction in its naked form. Neither the general reasoning of Aristotle, nor the Elenchus of Sokrates brought to bear in particular cases, would make any impression upon him; since he will not comply with either of the two conditions required for the Sokratic Elenchus: he will neither declare definitions, nor give suitable point and sequence to inductive interrogatories.

Nor is anything gained, as Aristotle supposes, by reminding the Herakleitean of his own practice in the daily concerns of life and in conversation with common persons: that he feeds himself with bread to-day, in the confidence that it has the same properties as it had yesterday;70that, if he wishes either to give or to obtain information, the speech which he utters or that which he acts upon must be either affirmative or negative. He will admit that he acts in this way, but he will tell you that he has no certainty of being right; that the negative may be true as well as the affirmative. He will grant that there is an inconsistency between such acts of detail and the principles of the Herakleitean doctrine, which recognize no real stability of any thing, but only perpetual flux or process; but inconsistency in detail will not induce him to set aside his principles. The truth is, that neither Herakleitus, nor Parmenides, nor Anaxagoras, nor Pythagoras, gave themselves much trouble to reconcile Philosophy with facts of detail. Each fastened upon some grand and impressive primary hypothesis, illustrated it by a few obvious facts in harmony therewith, and disregarded altogether the massof contradictory facts. That a favourite hypothesis should contradict physical details, was noway shocking to them. Both the painful feeling accompanying that shock, and the disposition to test the value of the hypothesis by its consistency with inductive details, became first developed and attended to in the dialectical age, mainly through the working of Sokrates. The Analytic and the First Philosophy of Aristotle were constructed after the time of Sokrates, and with regard, in a very great degree, to the Sokratic tests and conditions â€” to the indispensable necessity for definite subjects and predicates, capable of standing the inductive scrutiny of particulars. In this respect thePhilosophia Primaof Aristotle stands distinguished from that of any of the earlier philosophers, and even from that of Plato. He departed from Plato by recognizing theHoc Aliquidor the definite Individual, with its essential Predicates, as the foundation of the Universal, and by applying his analytical factors of Form and Matter to the intellectual generation of the Individual (τὸ σύνολον â€” τὸ συναμφότερον); and thus he devised a First Philosophy conformable to the habits of common speech as rectified by the critical scrutiny of Sokrates. We shall see this in the next Chapter. * * * *

70Aristot. Metaph.K.vi. p. 1063, a. 31.

[The Authorâ€™s MS. breaks off here. What follows on the next page, as Chapter XII, is the exposition of Aristotleâ€™s Psychology, originally contributed to the third edition of Professor Bainâ€™s work â€˜The Senses and the Intellect,â€™ in 1868.]

To understand Aristotleâ€™s Psychology, we must look at it in comparison with the views of other ancient Greek philosophers on the same subject, as far as our knowledge will permit. Of these ancient philosophers, none have been preserved to us except Plato, and to a certain extent Epikurus, reckoning the poem of Lucretius as a complement to the epistolary remnants of Epikurus himself. The predecessors of Aristotle (apart from Plato) are known only through small fragments from themselves, and imperfect notices by others; among which notices the best are from Aristotle himself.

In the TimÃ¦us of Plato we find Psychology, in a very large and comprehensive sense, identified with Kosmology. The Kosmos, a scheme of rotatory spheres, has both a soul and a body: of the two, the soul is the prior, grander, and predominant, though both of them are constructed or put together by the Divine Architect or Demiurgus. The kosmical soul, rooted at the centre, and stretched from thence through and around the whole, is endued with self-movement, and with the power of initiating movement in the kosmical body; moreover, being cognitive as well as motive, it includes in itself three ingredients mixed together:â€”(1) The Same â€” the indivisible and unchangeable essence of Ideas; (2) The Diverse â€” the Plural â€” the divisible bodies or elements; (3) A Compound, formed of both these ingredients melted into one. As the kosmical soul is intended to know all the three â€”Idem,Diversum, andIdemwithDiversumin one, so it must comprise in its own nature all the three ingredients, according to the received Axiom â€” Like knows like â€” Like is known by Like. The ingredients are blended together according to a scale of harmonic proportion. The elementIdemis placed in an even and undivided rotation of the outer or sidereal sphere of the Kosmos; the elementDiversumis distributed among the rotations, all oblique, of the seven interior planetary spheres, that is, the five planets, with the Sun and Moon. Impressions of identity and diversity, derived eitherfrom the ideal and indivisible, or from the sensible and divisible, are thus circulated by the kosmical soul throughout its own entire range, yet without either voice or sound. Reason and Science are propagated by the circle ofIdem: Sense and Opinion, by those ofDiversum. When these last-mentioned circles are in right movement, the opinions circulated are true and trustworthy.1

1See this doctrine of the TimÃ¦us more fully expounded in â€˜Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,â€™ III. xxxvi.pp. 250-256, seq.

It is thus that Plato begins his Psychology with Kosmology: the Kosmos is in his view a divine immortal being or animal, composed of a spherical rotatory body and a rational soul, cognitive as well as motive. Among the tenants of this Kosmos are included, not only gods, who dwell in the peripheral or celestial regions, but also men, birds, quadrupeds, and fishes. These four inhabit the more central or lower regions of air, earth, and water. In describing men and the inferior animals, Plato takes his departure from the divine Kosmos, and proceeds downwards by successive stages of increasing degeneracy and corruption. The cranium of man was constructed as a little Kosmos, including in itself an immortal rational soul, composed of the same materials, though diluted and adulterated, as the kosmical soul; and moving with the like rotations, though disturbed and irregular, suited to a rational soul. This cranium, for wise purposes which Plato indicates, was elevated by the gods upon a tall body, with attached limbs for motion in different directions â€” forward, backward, upward, downward, to the right and left.2Within this body were included two inferior and mortal souls: one in the thoracic region near the heart, the other lower down, below the diaphragm, in the abdominal region; but both of them fastened or rooted in the spinal marrow or cord, which formed a continuous line with the brain above. These two souls were both emotional; the higher orthoracicsoul being the seat of courage, energy, anger, &c., while to the lower orabdominalsoul belonged appetite, desires, love of gain, &c. Both of them were intended as companions and adjuncts, yet in the relation of dependence and obedience, to therationalsoul in the cranium above; which, though unavoidably debased and perturbed by such unworthy companionship, was protected partially against the contagion by the difference of location, the neck being built up as an isthmus of separation between the two. The thoracic soul, the seat of courage, was placed nearer to thehead, in order that it might be the medium for transmitting influence from the cranial soul above, to the abdominal soul below; which last was at once the least worthy and the most difficult to control. The heart, being the initial point of the veins, received the orders and inspirations of the cranial soul, transmitting them onward through its many blood-channels to all the sensitive parts of the body; which were thus rendered obedient, as far as possible, to the authority of manâ€™s rational nature.3The unity or communication of the three souls was kept up through the continuity of the cerebro-spinal column.

2Plato, TimÃ¦us, p. 44, E.; â€˜Plato and Other Comp. of Sokr.â€™, III. xxxvi.p. 264.

3Plato, TimÃ¦us, p. 70; â€˜Plato and Other Comp. of Sokr.â€™, III.pp. 271-272.

But, though by these arrangements the higher soul in the cranium was enabled to control to a certain extent its inferior allies, it was itself much disturbed and contaminated by their reaction. The violence of passion and appetite, the constant processes of nutrition and sensation pervading the whole body, the multifarious movements of the limbs and trunk, in all varieties of direction, â€” these causes all contributed to agitate and to confuse the rotations of the cranial soul, perverting the arithmetical proportions and harmony belonging to them. The circles of Same and Diverse were made to convey false information; and the soul, for some time after its first junction with the body, became destitute of intelligence.4In mature life, indeed, the violence of the disturbing causes abates, and the man may become more and more intelligent, especially if placed under appropriate training and education. But in many cases no such improvement took place, and the rational soul of man was irrecoverably spoiled; so that new and worse breeds were formed, by successive steps of degeneracy. The first stage, and the least amount of degeneracy, was exhibited in the formation of woman; the original type of man not having included diversity of sex. By farther steps of degradation, in different ways, the inferior animals were formed â€” birds, quadrupeds, and fishes.5In each of these, the rational soul became weaker and worse; its circular rotations ceased with the disappearance of the spherical cranium, and animal appetites with sensational agitations were left without control. As man, with his two emotional souls and body joined on to the rational soul and cranium, was a debased copy of the perfect rational soul andsphericalbody of the divine Kosmos, so the other inhabitants of the Kosmos proceeded from still farther debasement and disrationalization of the original type of man.

4Plato, TimÃ¦us, pp. 43-44; â€˜Plato and Other Comp. of Sokr.â€™, III.pp. 262-264.

5Plato, TimÃ¦us, p. 91; â€˜Plato and Other Comp. of Sokr.â€™,pp. 281-282.

Such is the view of Psychology given by Plato in the TimÃ¦us; beginning with the divine Kosmos, and passing downwards from thence to the triple soul of man, as well as to the various still lower successors of degenerated man. It is to be remarked that Plato, though he puts soul as prior to body in dignity and power, and as having for its functions to control and move body, yet always conceives soul as attached to body, and never as altogether detached, not even in the divine Kosmos. The soul, in Platoâ€™s view, is self-moving and self-moved: it is bothPrimum Mobilein itself, andPrimum Movensas to the body; it has itself the corporeal properties of being extended and moved, and it has body implicated with it besides.

The theory above described, in so far as it attributes to the soul rational constituent elements (Idem,Diversum), continuous magnitude, and circular rotations, was peculiar to Plato, and is criticized by Aristotle as the peculiarity of his master.6But several other philosophers agreed with Plato in considering self-motion, together with motive causality and faculties perceptive and cognitive, to be essential characteristics of soul. AlkmÃ¦on declared the soul to be in perpetual motion, like all the celestial bodies; hence it was also immortal, as they were.7Herakleitus described it as the subtlest of elements, and as perpetually fluent; hence it was enabled to know other things, all of which were in flux and change. Diogenes of Apollonia affirmed that the element constituent of soul was air, at once mobile, all-penetrating, and intelligent. Demokritus declared that among the infinite diversity of atoms those of spherical figure were the constituents both of the element fire and of the soul: the spherical atoms were by reason of their figure the most apt and rapid in moving; it was their nature never to be at rest, and they imparted motion to everything else.8Anaxagoras affirmed soul to be radically and essentially distinct from every thing else, but to be the great primary source of motion, and to be endued with cognitive power, though at the same time not suffering impressions from without.9Empedokles considered soul to be a compound of the four elements â€” fire, water, air, earth; with love and hatred as principles of motion, the former producing aggregation of elements, the latter, disgregation: by means of each element the soul became cognizant of the like element in the Kosmos. Some Pythagoreans lookedupon the soul as an aggregate of particles of extreme subtlety, which pervaded the air and were in perpetual agitation. Other Pythagoreans, however, declared it to be an harmonious or proportional mixture of contrary elements and qualities; hence its universality of cognition, extending to all.10

6Aristot. De AnimÃ¢, I. iii. p. 407, a. 2.

7Ibid. ii. p. 405, a. 29.

8Ibid. p. 404, a. 8; p. 405, a. 22; p. 406, b. 17.

9Ibid. p. 405, a. 13, b. 19.

10Aristot. De AnimÃ¢, I. ii. p. 404, a. 16; p. 407, b. 27.

A peculiar theory was delivered by Xenokrates (who, having been fellow-pupil with Aristotle under Plato, afterwards conducted the Platonic School, during all the time that Aristotle taught at the Lykeium), which Aristotle declares to involve greater difficulty than any of the others. Xenokrates described the soul as â€œa number (a monad or indivisible unit) moving itself.â€�11He retained the self-moving property which Plato had declared to be characteristic of the soul, while he departed from Platoâ€™s doctrine of a soul with continuous extension. He thus fell back upon the Pythagorean idea of number as the fundamental essence. Aristotle impugns, as alike untenable, both the two properties here alleged â€” number and self-motion. If the monad both moves and is moved (he argues), it cannot be indivisible; if it be moved, it must have position, or must be a point; but the motion of a point is a line, without any of that variety that constitutes life. How can the soul be a monad? or, if it be, what difference can exist between one soul and another, since monads cannot differ from each other except in position? How comes it that some bodies have souls and others not? and how, upon this theory, can we explain the fact that many animated bodies, both plants and animals, will remain alive after being divided, the monadic soul thus exhibiting itself as many and diverse? Besides, the monad set up by Xenokrates is hardly distinguishable from the highly attenuated body or spherical atom recognized by Demokritus as the origin or beginning of bodily motion.12

11Ibid. iv. p. 408, b. 32.

12Ibid. p. 409, b. 12.

These and other arguments are employed by Aristotle to refute the theory of Xenokrates. In fact, he rejects all the theories then current. After having dismissed the self-motor doctrine, he proceeds to impugn the views of those who declared the soul to be a compound of all the four elements, in order that they might account for its percipient and cognitive faculties upon the maxim then very generally admitted13â€” That like is perceived and known by like. This theory, the principal champion of which was Empedokles, appears to Aristotle inadmissible. You say (he remarks) that like knows like; howdoes this consist with your other doctrine, that like cannot act upon, or suffer from, like, especially as you consider that both in perception and in cognition the percipient and cognizant suffers or is acted upon?14Various parts of the cognizant subject, such as bone, hair, ligaments, &c., are destitute of perception and cognition; how then can we know anything about bone, hair, and ligaments, since we cannot know them by like?15Suppose the soul to be compounded of all the four elements; this may explain how it comes to know the four elements, themselves, but not how it comes to know all the combinations of the four; now innumerable combinations of the four are comprised among thecognita. We must assume that the soul contains in itself not merely the four elements, but also the laws or definite proportions wherein they can combine; and this is affirmed by no one.16Moreover,Ensis an equivocal, or at least a multivocal, term; there areEntiabelonging to each of the ten Categories. Now the soul cannot include in itself all the ten, for the different Categories have no elements in common; in whichever Category you rank the soul, it will know (by virtue of likeness) thecognitabelonging to that category, but it will not know thecognitabelonging to the other nine.17Besides, even if we grant that the soul includes all the four elements, where is the cementing principle that combines all the four into one? The elements are merely matter; and what holds them together must be the really potent principle of soul; but of this no explanation is given.18

13Ibid. v. p. 409, b. 29.

14Aristot. De AnimÃ¢, I. v. p. 410, a. 25.

15Ibid. a. 30.

16Ibid. p. 409, b. 28; p. 410, a. 12.

17Ibid. p. 410, a. 20.

18Ibid. p. 410, b. 10.

Some philosophers have assumed (continues Aristotle) that soul pervades the whole Kosmos and its elements; and that it is inhaled by animals in respiration along with the air.19They forget that all plants, and even some animals, live without respiring at all; moreover, upon this theory, air and fire also, as possessing soul, and what is said to be a better soul, ought (if the phrase were permitted) to be regarded as animals. The soul of air or fire must be homogeneous in its parts; the souls of animals are not homogeneous, but involve several distinct parts or functions.20The soul perceives, cogitates, opines, feels, desires, repudiates; farther, it moves the body locally, and brings about the growth and decay of the body. Here we have a new mystery:21â€” Is the whole soul engaged in the performanceof each of these functions, or has it a separate part exclusively consecrated to each? If so, how many are the parts? Some philosophers (Plato among them) declare the soul to be divided, and that one part cogitates and cognizes, while another part desires. But upon that supposition what is it that holds these different parts together? Certainly not the body (which is Platoâ€™s theory); on the contrary, it is the soul that holds together the body; for, as soon as the soul is gone, the body rots and disappears.22If there be anything that keeps together the divers parts of the soul as one, that something must be the true and fundamental soul; and we ought not to speak of the soul as having parts, but as essentially one and indivisible, with several distinct faculties. Again, if we are to admit parts of the soul, does each part hold together a special part of the body, as the entire soul holds together the entire body? This seems impossible; for what part of the body can the NoÃ»s or Intellect (e.g.) be imagined to hold together? And, besides, several kinds of plants and of animals may be divided, yet so that each of the separate parts shall still continue to live; hence it is plain that the soul in each separate part is complete and homogeneous.23

19Ibid. ii. p. 404, a. 9: τοῦ ζῆν ὅρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοήν, &c. Compare the doctrine of Demokritus.

20Ibid. v. p. 411, a. 1, 8, 16.

21Ibid. a. 30.

22Aristot. De AnimÃ¢, I. v. p. 411, b. 8.

23Ibid. b. 15-27.

Aristotle thus rejects all the theories proposed by antecedent philosophers, but more especially the two following:â€”That the soul derives its cognitive powers from the fact of being compounded of the four elements; That the soul is self-moved. He pronounces it incorrect to say that the soul is moved at all.24He farther observes that none of the philosophers have kept in view either the full meaning or all the varieties of soul; and that none of these defective theories suffices for the purpose that every good and sufficient theory ought to serve, viz., not merely to define the essence of the soul, but also to define it in such a manner that the concomitant functions and affections of the soul shall all be deducible from it.25Lastly, he points out that most of his predecessors had considered that the prominent characteristics of soul were â€” to be motive and to be percipient:26while, in his opinion, neither of these two characteristics is universal or fundamental.

24Ibid. a. 25.

25Ibid. i. p. 402, b. 16, seq.; v. p. 409, b. 15.

26Ibid. ii. p. 403, b. 30.

Aristotle requires that a good theory of the soul shall explain alike the lowest vegetable soul, and the highest functions of the human or divine soul. And, in commenting on those theorists who declared that the essence of soul consisted in movement, heremarks that their theory fails altogether in regard to the NoÃ»s (or cogitative and intellective faculty of the human soul); the operation of which bears far greater analogy to rest or suspension of movement than to movement itself.27

27Aristot. De AnimÃ¢, I. iii. p. 407, a. 32: ἔτι δâ€™ ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἠρεμήσει τινὶ ἢ ἐπιστάσει μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει.

We shall now proceed to state how Aristotle steers clear (or at least believes himself to steer clear) of the defects that he has pointed out in the psychological theories of his predecessors. Instead of going back (like Empedokles, Plato, and others) to a time when the Kosmos did not yet exist, and giving us an hypothesis to explain how its parts came together or were put together, he takes the facts and objects of the Kosmos as they stand, and distributes them according to distinctive marks alike obvious, fundamental, and pervading; after which he seeks a mode of explanation in the principles of his own First Philosophy or Ontology. Whoever had studied the Organon and the Physica of Aristotle (apparently intended to be read prior to the treatise De AnimÃ¢) would be familiar with his distribution ofEntiainto ten Categories, of which Essence or Substance was the first and the fundamental. Of these Essences or Substances themostcomplete and recognized were physical or natural bodies; and among such bodies one of the most striking distinctions, was between those that had life and those that had it not. By life, Aristotle means keeping up the processes of nutrition, growth, and decay.28

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