185Aristot. De Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, a. 26: ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος· ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἓν ὄντων. — Metaphysica,Θ.x. p. 1051, b. 31: περὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι, ἀλλ’ ἢ νοεῖν ἢ μή.
185Aristot. De Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, a. 26: ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος· ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἓν ὄντων. — Metaphysica,Θ.x. p. 1051, b. 31: περὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι, ἀλλ’ ἢ νοεῖν ἢ μή.
186Aristot. De Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, b. 29. This portion of the treatise is peculiarly confused and difficult to understand.
186Aristot. De Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, b. 29. This portion of the treatise is peculiarly confused and difficult to understand.
One of the chief functions that Aristotle assigns to Noûs, or the noëtic function, is that theprincipiaof demonstration and knowledge belong to it; and not merely theprincipia, but also, in cases of action preceded by deliberation and balance of motives, the ultimate application ofprincipiato action. So that he styles Noûs both beginning and end; also the beginning of the beginning; and, moreover, he declares it to be always right and unerring — equal to Science and even more than Science.187These are high praises, conveying little information, and not reconcilable with other passages wherein he speaks of the exercise of the noëtic function (τὸ νοεῖν) as sometimes right, sometimes wrong.188But, for the question of psychology, the point to be determined is, in what sense he meant thatprincipiabelonged to Noûs. He certainly did not mean that the first principles of reasoning were novelties originated, suggested, or introduced into the soul by noëtic influence. Not only he does not say this, but he takes pains to impress the exact contrary. In passages cited a few pages back, he declares that Noûs in entering the soul brings nothing whatever with it; that it is an universal potentiality — a capacity in regard to truth, but nothing more;189that it is in fact a capacity not merely for comparing and judging (to both of which he recognizes even the sentient soul as competent), but also for combining many into one, and resolving the apparent one into several; for abstracting, generalizing,and selecting among the phantasms present, which of them should be attended to, and which should be left out of attention.190Such is his opinion about the noëtic function; and he states explicitly that the abstract and universal not only arise from the concrete and particular, but are inseparable from the same really — separable only logically.
187Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. VI. xii. p. 1143, a. 25, b. 10: διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς. — Analyt. Post. II. xviii. p. 100, b. 5.
187Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. VI. xii. p. 1143, a. 25, b. 10: διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς. — Analyt. Post. II. xviii. p. 100, b. 5.
188Aristot. De Animâ, III. iii. p. 427, b. 8: ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς — διανοεῖσθαι δ’ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ψευδῶς.
188Aristot. De Animâ, III. iii. p. 427, b. 8: ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς — διανοεῖσθαι δ’ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ψευδῶς.
189Ibid. I. ii. p. 404, a. 30, where he censures Demokritus: οὐ δὴ χρῆται τῷ νῷ ὡς δυνάμει τινὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν. — Compare ibid. III. iv. p. 429, a. 21, b. 30.
189Ibid. I. ii. p. 404, a. 30, where he censures Demokritus: οὐ δὴ χρῆται τῷ νῷ ὡς δυνάμει τινὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν. — Compare ibid. III. iv. p. 429, a. 21, b. 30.
190Aristot. De Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, b. 5: τὸ δὲ ἓν ποιοῦν, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς ἕκαστον. — Ibid. xi. p. 434, a. 9.
190Aristot. De Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, b. 5: τὸ δὲ ἓν ποιοῦν, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς ἕκαστον. — Ibid. xi. p. 434, a. 9.
He describes, at the end of the Analytica Posteriora and elsewhere, the steps whereby the mind ascends gradually from sense, memory, and experience, to general principles. And he indicates a curious contrast between these and the noëtic functions. Sense, memory, phantasy, reminiscence, are movements of the body as well as of the soul; our thoughts and feelings come and go, none of them remaining long. But the noëtic process is the reverse of this; it is an arrest of all this mental movement, a detention of the fugitive thoughts, a subsidence from perturbation — so that the attention dwells steadily and for some time on the same matters.191Analysis, selection, and concentration of attention, are the real characteristics of the Aristotelian Noûs. It is not (as some philosophers have thought) a source of new general truths, let into the soul by a separate door, and independent of experience as well as transcending experience.
191Aristot. Physica, VII. iii. p. 247, b. 9: ἡ δ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λῆψις τῆς ἐπιστήμης γένεσις οὐκ ἔστιν· τῷ γὰρ ἠρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λέγομεν. — Also De Animâ, I. iii. p. 407, b. 32, and the remarkable passage in the Analytica Poster. II. xviii. p. 100, a. 3-b. 5.
191Aristot. Physica, VII. iii. p. 247, b. 9: ἡ δ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λῆψις τῆς ἐπιστήμης γένεσις οὐκ ἔστιν· τῷ γὰρ ἠρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λέγομεν. — Also De Animâ, I. iii. p. 407, b. 32, and the remarkable passage in the Analytica Poster. II. xviii. p. 100, a. 3-b. 5.
Passing now to the Emotions, we find that these are not systematically classified and analysed by Aristotle, as belonging to a scheme of Psychology; though he treats them incidentally, with great ability and acuteness, both in his Ethics, where he regards them as auxiliaries or impediments to a rational plan of life, and in his Rhetoric, where he touches upon their operation as it bears on oratorical effect. He introduces however in his Psychology some answer to the question, What is it that produces local movement in the animal body? He replies that movement is produced both by Noûs and by Appetite.
Speaking strictly, we ought to call Appetite alone the direct producing cause, acted upon by theappetitum, which is here thePrimum Movens Immobile. But thisappetitumcannot act without coming into the intellectual sphere, as something seen, imagined, cogitated.192In this case the Noûs or Intellect is stimulated through appetite, and operates in subordination thereto.Such is the Intellect, considered as Practical, the principle or determining cause of which is theappetitumor object of desire; the Intellect manifesting itself only for the sake of some end, to be attained or avoided. Herein it is distinguished altogether from the Theoretical Noûs or Intellect, which does not concern itself with anyexpetendaorfugiendaand does not meddle with conduct. Theappetitumis good, real or apparent, in so far as it can be achieved by our actions. Often we have contradictory appetites; and, in such cases, the Intellect is active generally as a force resisting the present and caring for the future. But Appetite or Desire, being an energy including both soul and body, is the real and appropriate cause that determines us to local movement, often even against strong opposition from the Intellect.193
192Aristot. De Animâ, III. x. p. 433, b. 11: πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν (τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι).
192Aristot. De Animâ, III. x. p. 433, b. 11: πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν (τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι).
193Aristot. De Animâ, III. x. p. 433, a. 25, b. 19: διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις, &c.
193Aristot. De Animâ, III. x. p. 433, a. 25, b. 19: διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις, &c.
Aristotle thus concludes his scheme of Psychology, comprehending all plants as well as all animals; a scheme differing in this respect, as well as in others, from the schemes of those that had preceded him, and founded upon the peculiar principles of his own First Philosophy. Soul is to organized body as Form to Matter, as Actualizer to the Potential; not similar or homogeneous, but correlative; the two being only separable as distinct logical points of view in regard to one and the same integer or individual. Aristotle recognizes many different varieties of Soul, or rather many distinct functions of the same soul, from the lowest or most universal, to the highest or most peculiar and privileged; but the higher functions presuppose or depend upon the lower, as conditions; while the same principle of Relativity pervades them all. He brings this principle prominently forward, when he is summing up194in the third or last book of the treatise De Animâ:—“The Soul is in a certain way all existent things; for all of them are either Perceivables or Cogitables; and the Cogitant Soul is in a certain way the matters cogitated, while the Percipient Soul is in a certain way the matters perceived.� The Percipient and itsPercepta— the Cogitant and itsCogitata— each implies and correlates with the other: the Percipient is the highest Form of allPercepta; the Cogitant is the Form of Forms, or the highest of all Forms, cogitable or perceivable.195The Percipient or Cogitant Subject is thus conceivedonly in relation to the Objects perceived or cogitated, while these Objects again are presented as essentially correlative to the Subject. The realities of Nature are particulars, exhibiting Form and Matter in one: though, for purposes of scientific study — of assimilation and distinction — it is necessary to consider each of the two abstractedly from the other.
194Ibid. viii. p. 431, b. 20, seq.: νῦν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαντες, εἴπωμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα. ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά.
194Ibid. viii. p. 431, b. 20, seq.: νῦν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαντες, εἴπωμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα. ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά.
195Ibid. p. 432, a. 2: ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν.
195Ibid. p. 432, a. 2: ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν.
The Ethics of Aristotle presuppose certain conditions in the persons to whom they are addressed, without which they cannot be read with profit. They presuppose a certain training, both moral and intellectual, in the pupil.
First, the reason of the pupil must be so far developed, as that he shall be capable of conceiving the idea of a scheme of life and action, and of regulating his momentary impulses more or less by a reference to this standard. He must not live by passion, obeying without reflection the appetite of the moment, and thinking only of grasping at this immediate satisfaction. The habit must have been formed of referring each separate desire to some rational measure, and of acting or refraining to act according as such a comparison may dictate. Next, a certain experience must have been acquired concerning human affairs, and concerning the actions of men with their causes and consequences. Upon these topics all the reasonings and all the illustrations contained in every theory of Ethics must necessarily turn: so that a person thoroughly inexperienced would be incompetent to understand them.
For both these two reasons, no youthful person, nor any person of mature years whose mind is still tainted with the defects of youth, can be a competent learner of Ethics or Politics (Eth. Nic. i. 7. Compare vii. 8). Such a pupil will neither appreciate the reasonings, nor obey the precepts (i. 3).
Again, a person cannot receive instruction in Ethics with advantage unless he has been subjected to a good practical discipline, so as to have acquired habits of virtuous action, and to have been taught to feel pleasure and pain on becoming occasions and in reference to becoming objects. Unless the circumstances by which he has been surrounded and the treatment which he has received, have been such as to implant in him a certain vein of sentiment and to give a certain direction to his factitious pleasures and pains — unless obedience to rightprecepts has to a certain degree been made habitual with him — he will not be able to imbibe, still less to become attached to, even theprincipiaof ethical reasoning (Eth. Nic. i. 4. 7). The well-trained man, who has already acquired virtuous habits, has within himself the ἀρχὴ, or beginning, from which happiness proceeds: he may do very well, even though the reason on which these habits were formed should never become known to him: but he will at least readily apprehend and understand the reason when it is announced. The ἀρχαὶ or beginnings to which ethical philosophy points and from whence the conduct which it enjoins is derived, are obtained only by habituation, not by induction nor by perception, like other ἀρχαί: and we ought in all our investigations to look after the ἀρχὴ in the way which the special nature of the subject requires, and to be very careful to define it well (i. 4, i. 7).
In considering Aristotle’s doctrine respecting the ἀρχαὶ of ethical and political science, and the way in which they are to be discovered and made available, we should keep in mind that he announces the end and object of these sciences to be, not merely the enlargement of human knowledge, but the determination of human conduct towards certain objects: not theory, but practice: not to teach us what virtue is, but to induce us to practise it — “Since then the present science is not concerned with speculation,like the others. For here we enquire, not in order that we may know what virtue is, but in order that we may become good, otherwise there would be no profit in the enquiryâ€� (ii. 2.Seealso i. 2, i. 5, vi. 5).
The remarks which Aristotle makes about the different ways of finding out and arriving at ἀρχαὶ, are curious. Some principles or beginnings are obtained byinduction— others byperception— others by habituation in a certain way — others again in other ways. Other modes of arriving at ἀρχαὶ are noticed by the philosopher himself in other places. For example, the ἀρχαὶ of demonstrative science are said to be discovered by intellect (νοῦς) — vi. 6-7. There is a passage however in vi. 8 in which he seems to say that the ἀρχαὶ of the wise man (σόφος) and the natural man (φυσικὸς) are derived from experience: which I find it difficult to reconcile with the preceding chapters, where he calls wisdom a compound of intellect and science (ἐπιστήμη), and where he gives Thales and Anaxagoras as specimens of wise men. By vi. 6 — it seems that wisdom has reference to matters of demonstrative science: how then can it be true that a youth may be a mathematician without being a wise man?
Moreover, Aristotle takes much pains, at the commencementof his treatise on Ethics, to set forth the inherent intricacy and obscurity of the subject, and to induce the reader to be satisfied with conclusions not absolutely demonstrative. He repeats this observation several times — a sufficient proof that the evidence for his own opinions did not appear to himself altogether satisfactory (Eth. Nic. i. 3, i. 7, ii. 2). The completeness of the proof (he says) must be determined by the subject-matter: a man of cultivated mind will not ask for better proof than the nature of the case admits: and human action, to which all ethical theory relates, is essentially fluctuating and uncertain in its consequences, so that every general proposition which can be affirmed or denied concerning it, is subject to more or less of exception. If this degree of uncertainty attaches even to general reasonings on ethical subjects, the particular applications of these reasonings are still more open to mistake: the agent must always determine for himself at the moment, according to the circumstances of the case, without the possibility of sheltering himself under technical rules of universal application: just as the physician or the pilot is obliged to do in the course of his profession. “Now the actions and the interests of men exhibit no fixed rule, just like the conditions of health. And if this is the case with the universal theory, still more does the theory that refers to particular acts present nothing that can be accurately fixed; for it falls not under any art or any system, but the actors themselves must always consider what suits the occasion, just as happens in the physician’s and the pilot’s art. But though this is the case with the theory at present,we must try to give it some assistanceâ€� (πειρατίον βοηθεῖν). — Eth. Nic. 2.
The last words cited are remarkable. They seem to indicate, that Aristotle regarded the successful prosecution of ethical enquiries as all but desperate. He had previously said (i. 3) — “There is so much difference of opinion and so much error respecting what is honourable and just, of which political science treats, that these properties of human action seem to exist merely by positive legal appointment, and not by nature. And there is the same sort of error respecting what things are good, because many persons have sustained injury from them, some having already been brought to destruction through their wealth, others through their courage.�
One cannot but remark how entirely this is at variance with the notion of a moral sense or instinct, or an intuitive knowledge of what is right and wrong. Aristotle most truly observes that the details of our daily behaviour are subject to such an infinite variety of modifications, that no pre-established rules can bedelivered to guide them: we must act with reference to the occasion and the circumstances. Some few rules may indeed be laid down, admitting of very few exceptions: but the vast majority of our proceedings cannot be subjected to any rule whatever, except to the grand and all-comprehensive rule, if we are indeed so to call it, of conforming to the ultimate standard of morality.
Supposing the conditions above indicated to be realized — supposing a certain degree of experience in human affairs, of rational self-government, and of habitual obedience to good rules of action, to be already established in the pupil’s mind, the theory of ethics may then be unfolded to him with great advantage (i. 3). It is not meant to be implied that a man must have previously acquired the perfection of practical reason and virtue before he acquaints himself with ethical theory; but he must have proceeded a certain way towards the acquisition.
Ethics, as Aristotle conceives them, are a science closely analogous to if not a subordinate branch of Politics. (I do not however think that he employs the word Ἠθικὴ in the same distinct and substantive meaning as πολιτικὴ (ἐπιστήμη), although he several times mentions τὰ ἠθικὰ and ἠθικοὶ λόγοι.) Ethical science is for the individual what political science is for the community (i. 2).
In every variety of human action, in each separate art and science, the agents, individual or collective, propose to themselves the attainment of somegoodas the end and object of their proceedings. Ends are multifarious, and good things are multifarious: but good, under one shape or another, is always the thing desired by every one, and the determining cause of human action (οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται) — i. 1.
Sometimes the action itself, or the exercise of the powers implied in the action, is the end sought, without anything beyond. Sometimes there is an ulterior end, or substantive business, to be accomplished by means of the action and lying beyond it. In this latter class of cases, the ulterior end is the real good: better than the course of action used to accomplish it — “the external results are naturally (πέφυκε) better than the course of actionâ€� (i. 1). Taking this as a general position, it is subject to many exceptions: but the word πέφυκε seems to signify only that such is naturally and ordinarily the case, not that the reverse never occurs.
Again some ends are comprehensive and supreme; others, partial and subordinate. The subordinate ends are considered with reference to the supreme, and pursued as means to theiraccomplishment. Thus the end of the bridle-maker is subservient to that of the horseman, and the various operations of war to the general scheme of the commander. The supreme, orarchitectonic, ends, are superior in eligibility to the subordinate, orministerial, which, indeed, are pursued only for the sake of the former.
One end (or onegood), as subordinate, is thus included in another end (or another good) as supreme. The same end may be supreme with regard to one end different from itself, and subordinate with regard to another. The end of the general is supreme with reference to that of the soldier or the maker of arms, subordinate with reference to that of the statesman. In this scale of comprehensiveness of ends there is no definite limit; we may suppose ends more and more comprehensive as we please, and we come from thence to form the idea of one most comprehensive and sovereign end, which includes under it every other without exception — with reference to which all other ends stand in the relation either of parts or of means — and which is itself never in any case pursued for the sake of any other or independent end. The end thus conceived is theSovereign Good of man, orThe Good—The Summum Bonum— Τἀγαθὸν — Τὸ ἄριστον — Τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν (i. 2).
To comprehend, to define, and to prescribe means for realizing the Sovereign Good, is the object ofPolitical Science, the paramount and most architectonic Science of all, with regard to which all other Sciences are simply ministerial. It is the business of the political ruler to regulate the application of all other Sciences with reference to the production of this his End — to determine how far each shall be learnt and in what manner each shall be brought into practice — to enforce or forbid any system of human action according as it tends to promote the accomplishment of his supreme purpose — the Sovereign Good of the Community. Strategical, rhetorical, economical, science, are all to be applied so far as they conduce to this purpose and no farther: they are all simply ministerial; political science is supreme and self-determining (i. 2).
WhatPolitical Scienceis for the community,Ethical Scienceis for the individual citizen. By this it is not meant that the individual is to be abstracted from society or considered as living apart from society: but simply that human action and human feeling is to be looked at from the point of view of the individual, mainly and primarily — and from the point of view of the society, only in a secondary manner: while in political science, the reverse is the case — our point of view is, first as regards thesociety; — next, and subordinate to that, as regards the individual citizen (SeeEth. Nic. vii. 8).
The object of the Ethical Science is, the Supreme Good of the individual citizen — the End of all Ends, with reference to his desires, his actions, and his feelings — the end which he seeks for itself and without any ulterior aim — the end which comprehends all his other ends as merely partial or instrumental and determines their comparative value in his estimation (i. 2, i. 4).
It is evident that this conception of an End of all Ends is what Kant would call anIdea— nothing precisely conformable to it, in its full extent, can ever exist in reality. No individual has ever been found, or ever will be found, with a mind so trained as to make every separate and particular desire subservient to some general preconceived End however comprehensive. But it is equally certain that this subordination of Ends one to another is a process performed to a greater or less degree in every one’s mind, even in that of the rudest savage. No man can blindly and undistinguishingly follow every immediate impulse: the impulse, whatever it be, when it arises, must be considered more or less as it bears upon other pursuits and other objects of desire. This is an indispensable condition even of the most imperfect form of social existence. In civilized society, we find the process carried very far indeed in the minds of the greater number of individuals. Every man has in his view certain leading Ends, such as the maintenance of his proper position in society, the acquisition of professional success, the making of his fortune, the prosecution of his studies, &c., each of which is essentially paramount and architectonic, and with reference to which a thousand other ends are simply subordinate and ministerial. Suppose this process to be pushed farther, and you arrive at the idea of an End still more comprehensive, embracing every other end which the individual can aspire to, and forming the central point of an all-comprehensive scheme of life. Such a maximum, never actually attainable, but constantly approachable, in reality, forms the Object of Ethical Science.Quorsum victuri gignimur!
What is the Supreme Good — the End of all Ends? How are we to determine wherein it consists, or by what means it is to be attained — at least, as nearly attained as the limitations of human condition permit? Ethical Science professes to point out what the end ought to be — Ethical precepts are suggestions for making the closest approaches to it which are practicable. Even to understand what the end is, is a considerable acquisition: since we thus know the precise point to aim at, even if we cannot hit it (i. 2).
The approaches which different men make towards forming this idea, of an End of Ends or of a Supreme Good, differ most essentially: although there seems a verbal agreement between them. Every man speaks ofHappinessas his End of Ends (ὀνόματι ὁμολογεῖται, i. 4): he wishes to live well or to do well, which he considers to be the same as being happy. But men disagree exceedingly in their opinions as to that which constitutes happiness: nay the same man sometimes places it in one thing, sometimes in another — in health or in riches, according as he happens to be sick or poor.
There are however three grand divisions, in one or other of which the opinions of the great majority of mankind may be distributed. Some think that happiness consists in a life of bodily pleasure (βίος ἀπολαυστικός): others, in a life of successful political action or ambition (βίος πολιτικός): others again, in a life of speculative study and the acquisition of knowledge (βίος θεωρητικός). He will not consent to number the life of the (χρηματιστὴς) money-maker among them because he attains his end at the expense of other people and by a force upon their inclinations (this at least seems the sense of the words — ὁ γὰρ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τίς ἐστι), and because wealth can never be the good, seeing that it is merely useful for the sake of ulterior objects.
(The reason which Aristotle gives for discarding from his catalogue the life of themoney-seeker, while he admits that of thepleasure-seekerand thehonour-seeker, appears a very inconclusive one. He believed them to be all equally mistaken in reference to real happiness: the two last just as much as the first: and certainly, if we look to prevalence in the world and number of adherents, the creed of the first is at least equal to that of the two last.)
The first of the three is the opinion of the mass, countenanced by many Sovereigns such as Sardanapalus — it is more suitable to animals than to men, in the judgment of Aristotle (i. 5).
Honour and glory — the reward of political ambition, cannot be the sovereign good, because it is a possession which the person honoured can never be sure of retaining: for it depends more upon the persons by whom he is honoured than upon himself, while the ideas which we form of the sovereign good suppose it to be something intimately belonging to us and hard to be withdrawn (i. 5). Moreover those who aspire to honour, desire it not so much on its own account as in order that they may have confidence in their own virtue: so that it seems even in their estimation as if virtue were the higher aim of the two. Buteven virtue itself (meaning thereby the simple possession of virtue as distinguished from the active habitual exercise of it) cannot be the sovereign good: for the virtuous man may pass his life in sleep or in inaction — or he may encounter intolerable suffering and calamity (i. 5).
Besides, Happiness as we conceive it, is an End perfect, final, comprehensive and all-sufficient — an end which we always seek on its own account and never with a view to anything ulterior. But neither honour, nor pleasure, nor intelligence, nor virtue, deserves these epithets: each is an end special, insufficient, and not final — for each is sought partly indeed on its own account, but partly also on account of its tendency to promote what we suppose to be our happiness (i. 7). The latter is the only end always sought exclusively for itself: including as it always does and must do, the happiness of a man’s relatives, his children and his countrymen, or of all with whom he has sympathies; so that if attained, it would render his life desirable and wanting for nothing — ὃ μονούμενον, αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ (i. 7).
The remark which Aristotle here makes in respect to the final aim or happiness of an individual — viz., that it includes the happiness of his family and his countrymen and of those with whom he has sympathies — deserves careful attention. It shows at once the largeness and the benevolence of his conceptions. We arrive thus at the same end as that proposed by political science — the happiness of the community: but we reach it by a different road, starting from the point of view of the individual citizen.
Having shown that this Happiness, which is “our being’s end and aim,â€� does not consist in any special acquisition such as pleasure, or glory, or intelligence, or virtue, Aristotle adopts a different method to show wherein it does consist. Every artist and every professional man (he says — i. 7), the painter, the musician, &c., has his peculiar business to do, and theGoodof each artist consists in doing his business well and appropriately. Each separate portion of man, the eye, the hand and the foot, has its peculiar function: and in analogy with both these, man as such has his business and function, in the complete performance of which human Good consists. What is the business and peculiar function of Man, as Man? Not simply Life, for that he has in common with the entire vegetable and animal world: nor a mere sensitive Life, for that he has in common with all Animals: it must be something which he has, apart both from plants and animals — viz., an active life in conformitywith reason (πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος); or the exercise of Reason as a directing and superintending force, and the exercise of the appetites, passions, and capacities, in a manner conformable to Reason. This is the special and peculiar business of man: it is what every man performs either well or ill: and thevirtueof a man is that whereby he is enabled to perform it well. The Supreme Good of humanity, therefore, consisting as it does in the due performance of this special business of man, is to be found in the virtuous activity of our rational and appetitive soul: assuming always a life of the ordinary length, without which no degree of mental perfection would suffice to attain the object. The full position will then stand thus — “Happiness, or the highest good of a human being, consists in the working of the soul and in a course of action, pursuant to reason and conformable to virtue, throughout the full continuance of life.â€�
(The argument respecting a man’s proper business (ἔργον) and virtue (ἀρετὴ) seems to be borrowed from Plato — Republic, i. c. 23, p. 352; c. 24, p. 353. Compare also Xenophon — Memorabilia, iv. 2, 14.)
This explanation is delivered by Aristotle as a mere outline, which he seems to think that any one may easily fill up (i. 7). And he warns us not to require a greater degree of precision than the subject admits of: since we ought to be content with a rough approximation to the truth, and with conclusions which are not universally true, but only true in the majority of instances, such being the nature of the premisses with which we deal (i. 3).
Having determined in this manner what Happiness or the Supreme Good consists in, Aristotle next shows that the explanation which he gives of it conforms in a great degree to the opinions previously delivered by eminent philosophers, and fulfils at least all the requisite conditions which have ever been supposed to belong to Happiness (i. 8). All philosophers have from very early times agreed in distributing good things into three classes —Mental,Corporeal, andExternal. Now the first of these classes is incomparably the highest and most essentiallygoodof the three: and the explanation which Aristotle gives of happiness ranks it in the first class.
Again, various definitions of happiness have been delivered by eminent authorities more or less ancient (πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοί). Eudoxus laid down the principle that happiness consists in pleasure: others have maintained the opinion that it is entirely independent both of pleasure and pain — that the former is nogood, and the latter no evil (i. 12, vii. 11-13, x. 1. 2). Some have placed happiness in virtue: others in prudence: others in a certain sort of wisdom (σοφία τις): others have added to the definition this condition, that pleasure or external prosperity should be coupled with the above-mentioned objects (i. 8). The moral doctrines propounded by Zeno and Epicurus were therefore in no way new: how far the reasonings by which these philosophers sustained them were new we cannot judge accurately, from the loss of the treatises of Eudoxus and others to which Aristotle makes reference.
Now, in so far as virtue is introduced, the explanation of Happiness given by Aristotle coincides with these philosophers and improves upon them by substituting the active exercise of virtuous habits in place of the mere possession of virtue. And in regard to pleasure, the man who has once acquired habits of virtuous agency stands in no need of pleasure from without, as a foreign accessory: for he finds pleasure in his own behaviour, and he would not be denominated virtuous unless he did so: “Now (he says) their life stands in no need of pleasure, like an extraneous appendage, but has pleasure in itself� (ii. 8). Again, ii. 3, he says that “the symptom of a perfect habit is the pleasure or pain which ensues upon the performance of the acts in which the habit consists: for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and rejoices in doing so, is temperate, while he who does it reluctantly and painfully, is intemperate. And the man who sustains dangers with pleasure, or at least without pain, is courageous: if with pain, he is a coward. For ethical virtue has reference to our pleasures and pains: it is on account of pleasure that we commit vicious acts, and on account of pain that we shrink from virtuous performances. Wherefore, as Plato directs, we ought to be trained at once from our infancy by some means or other so as to feel pleasure and pain from the proper sources: for that is the right education.�
Moreover, the man who is in the active exercise of virtue derives his pleasure from the performance of that which is the appropriate business of humanity, so that all his pleasures areconformable to the pleasures natural to manand therefore consistent with each other: whereas the pleasures of most people are contradictory and inconsistent with each other, because they are not conformable to our nature (i. 8).
It is not easy to understand perfectly what Aristotle means by saying that the things agreeable to the majority of mankind are not things agreeable by nature. The construction above put upon this expression seems the only plausible one — thatthose pleasures which inhere in the performance of the appropriate business of man, are to be considered as our natural pleasures; those which do not so inhere, as not natural pleasures: inasmuch as they arise out of circumstances foreign to the performance of our appropriate business.
This however hardly consists with the explanation which Aristotle gives of τὸ φύσει — in another place and with reference to another subject. In the Magna Moralia (i. 34, pp. 1194-1195 Bek.), in distinguishing betweennaturaljustice (τὸ δίκαιον φύσει) andconventionaljustice (τὸ δίκαιον νόμῳ), he tells us thatthe naturally justis that which most commonly remains just. (Similarly Ethic. Eudem. iv. 14, p. 1217 Bek.) That which exists by nature (he says) may be changed by art and practice; the left hand may by these means be rendered as strong as the right in particular cases, but if in the greater number of cases and for the longer portion of time the left remains left and the right remains right, this is to be considered as existing by nature.
If we are to consider that arrangement as natural which we find to prevail in the greatest number of cases and for the greatest length of time, then undoubtedly the pleasures arising out of virtuous active behaviour must be regarded as less natural than those other pleasures which Aristotle admits to form the enjoyment of the majority of mankind.
But again there is a third passage, respecting nature and natural arrangements, which appears scarcely reconcilable with either of the two opinions just noticed. In Eth. Nicom. ii. 1: “Ethical virtue is a result of habit, whence it is evident that not one of the ethical virtues exists in us by nature. For none of those things which exist by nature is altered by habit. For example, the stone which naturally moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if a man should endeavour so to habituate it by throwing it upwards ten thousand times; nor in like manner fire downwards: nor can any other of the things formed by nature in one way be changed by habit to any other than that natural way. Virtues therefore are not generated in us eitherbynature, orcontraryto nature; but we are formed by nature so as to be capable of receiving them, and we are perfected in them through the influence of habit.�
If it be true that nothing which exists in one manner by nature can be changed by habit so as to exist in another manner, I do not see how the assertion contained in the passage above cited out of the Magna Moralia can be reconciled with it, where we are told — “For even things which existby nature partake of change. Thus if we all should practise throwing with the lefthand, we should become ambidextrous: but still it is the left hand by nature, and the right hand is not the less better by nature than the left, although we should do everything with the left as we do with the right.� (Mag. Mor. i. 34,ut sup.) In the one case he illustrates the meaning of natural properties by the comparative aptitudes of the right and left hand: in the other by the downward tendency of the stone. The idea is plainly different in the one case and in the other.
On the other hand, there seems to be not less variance between the one passage quoted out of the Nicomacheian Ethics and the other. For in the passage last quoted, we are told that none of the ethical virtues is generated in us by nature — neither by nature, nor contrary to nature: nature makes us fit to receive them, habit introduces and creates them — an observation perfectly true and accurate. But if this was the sentiment of Aristotle, how could he also believe that the pleasures arising out of the active manifestation of ethical virtue were the natural pleasures of man? If ethical virtue does not come by nature, the pleasures belonging to it cannot come by nature either.
On the whole, these three passages present a variance which I am unable to reconcile in the meaning which Aristotle annexes to the very equivocal word —nature.
Although Aristotle tells us that the active exercise of the functions of the soul according to virtue confers happiness, yet he admits that a certain measure of external comfort and advantages must be superadded as an indispensable auxiliary and instrument. Disgusting ugliness, bad health, low birth, loss of friends and relatives or vicious conduct of friends and relatives, together with many other misfortunes, are sufficient to sully the blessed condition of the most virtuous man (ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον — i. 8) — for which reason it is that some persons have ranked both virtue and good fortune as co-ordinate ingredients equally essential to happiness: and have doubted also whether it can ever be acquired either by teaching, or by training, or by any other method except chance or Divine inspiration. To suppose that so magnificent a boon is conferred by chance, would be an absurdity: it is a boon not unworthy indeed of the Divine nature to confer; but still the magnificence of it will appear equally great and equally undeniable, if we suppose it to be acquired by teaching or training. And this is really the proper account to give of the way in which Happiness is acquired: for the grand and primary element in it, is the virtuous agency of the soul, which is undoubtedly acquired by training: while external advantages, though indispensable up to a certainlimit, are acquired only as secondary helps and instruments. The creation of these virtuous habits among the citizens is one of the chief objects of political science and legislation: when once acquired, they are the most lasting and ineffaceable of all human possessions: and as they are created by special training, they may be imparted to every man not disqualified by some natural defect of organization, and may thus be widely diffused throughout the community (i. 9).
This is an important property. If happiness be supposed to be derived from the possession of wealth or honour or power, it can only be possessed by a small number of persons. For these three considered as objects of human desire, are essentially comparative. A man does not think himself rich, or honoured, or powerful, unless he becomes so to a degree above the multitude of his companions and neighbours.
Aristotle insists most earnestly that the only way of acquiring the character proper for happiness is by a course of early and incessant training in virtuous action. Moral teaching, he says, will do little or nothing, unless it be preceded by, or at least coupled with, moral training. Motives must be applied sufficient to ensure performance of what is virtuous and abstinence from what is vicious, until such a course of conduct becomes habitual, and until a disposition is created to persevere in them. It is the business of the politician and the legislator to employ their means of working upon the citizens for the purpose of enforcing this training. It is not with virtue (he says) as it is with those faculties which we receive ready-made from nature, as for example, the external senses. We do not acquire the faculty of sight by often seeing, but we have it from nature and then exercise it: whereas with regard to virtue, we obtain our virtues by means of a previous course of virtuous action, just as we learn other arts. For those things which we must learn in order to do, we learn by actually doing: thus by building we become builders, and by harping we become harpers: by doing just and temperate and courageous actions, we become just and temperate and courageous. All legislators try, some in a better and others in a worse manner, toethise(ἐθίζοντες) — to create habits among — the citizens for the purpose of making them good. “In one word habits are created by repeated action, wherefore our actions must be determined in a suitable way, for according as they differ, so will our habits differ. Nor is the difference small whether we areethisedin one way or in another, from our youth upwards: the difference is very great, or rather itis everythingâ€� (ii. 1).
Neither an ox, nor a horse, can acquire such habits, and therefore neither of them can be called happy: even a child cannot be called so, except from the hope and anticipation of what he will become in future years.
It may appear somewhat singular that Aristotle characterises a child as incapable of happiness, since in common language a child when healthy and well treated is described as peculiarly happy. But happiness, as Aristotle understands it, is something measured more by the estimate of the judicious spectator than by the sentiment of the man in whose bosom it resides. No person is entitled to be calledhappy, whom the intelligent and reflective observer does notmacarise(oreudæmonise), or whose condition he would not desire more or less to make his own. Now the life of a child, even though replete with all the enjoyments belonging to childhood, is not such as any person in the state of mind of a mature citizen could bring himself to accept (i. 10, x. 3). The test to which Aristotle appeals, either tacitly or openly, seems always to be the judgment of the serious man (i. 8, x. 5). It is no sufficient proof of happiness that the person who feels it is completely satisfied with his condition and does not desire anything beyond. Such self-satisfaction is indeed necessary, but is not by itself sufficient: it must be farther confirmed by the judgment of persons without — not of the multitude, who are apt to judge by a wrong standard — nor of princes, who are equally incompetent,and who have never tasted the relish of pure and liberal pleasures(x. 6) — but of the virtuous and worthy, who have arrived at the most perfect condition attainable by human beings (x. 5, x. 6, x. 8).
The different standard adopted by the many and by the more discerning few, in estimating human happiness, is again touched upon in Politica, vii. 1. It is in some respects treated more clearly and simply in this passage than in the Ethics. Both the Many and the Few (he says) agree that in order to constitute Happiness, there must be a coincidence of the three distinct kinds of Good things — The Mental — The Corporeal — The External. But with respect to the proportions in which the three ought to be intermingled, a difference of opinion arises. Most persons are satisfied with a very moderate portion of mental excellence, while they are immoderate in their desire for wealth and power (“For of virtue they think that they have a sufficiency, whatever be the quantity they have; but of wealth and possessions they seek the excess without bound.� — Pol. vii. 1). On the other hand, the opinion sanctioned by the few of a higher order of mind, and adopted by Aristotle, was, that Happinesswas possessed in a higher degree by those who were richly set forth with moral and intellectual excellence and only moderately provided with external advantages, than by those in regard to whom the proportion was reversed (ib.). The same difference of estimate, between the few and the many, is touched upon Polit. vii. 13, where he says that men in general esteem external advantages to be the causes of happiness: which is just as if they were to say that the cause why a musician played well was his lyre, and not his proficiency in the art.
In this chapter of the Politica (vii. 13), he refers to the Ethica in a singular manner. Having stated that the point of first importance is, to determine wherein happiness consists, he proceeds to say — “We have said also in the Ethics,if there be any good in that treatise(εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος), that it (happiness) is the active exertion and perfected habit of virtue.â€� — This is a singular expression — “if there be any good in the Ethicsâ€� — it seems rather to fall in with the several passages in that treatise in which he insists upon the inherent confusion and darkness of the subject-matter.
The definition of what happiness really is seems to be one of the weak points of Aristotle’s treatise. In a work addressed to the public, it is impossible to avoid making the public judges of the pleasure and pain, the happiness and unhappiness of individuals. A certain measure of self-esteem on the part of the individual, and a certain measure of esteem towards him on the part of persons without, come thus to be regarded as absolutely essential to existence. Without these, life would appear intolerable to any spectator without, though the individual himself might be degraded enough to cling to it. But these are secured by the ordinary morality of the age and of the locality. The question arises as to degrees of virtue beyond the ordinary level: Are we sure that such higher excellence contributes to the happiness of the individual who possesses it? Assuming that it does so contribute, are we certain that the accession of happiness which he thereby acquires is greater than he would have acquired by an increase of his wealth and power, his virtue remaining still at the ordinary level? These are points which Aristotle does not establish satisfactorily, although he professes to have done so: nor do I think that they are capable of being established. The only ground on which a moralist can inculcate aspirations after the higher degrees of virtue, is, the gain which thereby accrues to the happiness of others, not to that of the individual himself.
Aristotle appeals to God as a proof of the superiority of aninternal source of happiness to an external source — vii. 1, “using God as a witness who is happy and blessed, yet not through any external good, but through Himself and from His own nature.â€� Again, vii. 3, “For at leisure God would be happy, and the whole universe (κόσμος), who have no external actions except such as are proper to themselvesâ€� — in proof of the superiority of a life of study and speculation to a life of ambition and political activity. The same argument is insisted upon in Eth. Nic. x. 8. It is to be observed that the Κόσμος as well as God is here cited as experiencing happiness.
The analogy to which Aristotle appeals here is undoubtedly to a certain extent a just one. The most perfect happiness which we can conceive — our Idea, to use Kant’s phrase, of perfect happiness — is that of a being who is happy in and for his own nature, with the least possible aid from external circumstances — a being whose nature or habits dispose him only to acts, the simple performance of which confers happiness. But is this true of the perfectly virtuous nature and habits? Does the simple performance of the acts to which they dispose us, always confer happiness? Is not the existence of a very high standard of virtuous exigency in a man’s mind, a constant source of self-dissatisfaction, from the difficulty of acting up to his own ideas of what is becoming and commendable?
That the most virtuous nature is in itself and essentially the most happy nature, is a point highly questionable — to say the least of it: and even if we admit the fact, we must at the same time add that it cannot appear to be so to ordinary persons without. The internal pleasures of a highly virtuous man cannot be properly appreciated by any person not of similar character. So that unless a person be himself disposed to believe it, you could find no means of proving it to him. To a man not already virtuous, you cannot bring this argument persuasively home for the purpose of inducing him to become so.
In regard to prudence and temperance, indeed, qualities in the first instance beneficial to himself, it is clear that the more perfectly he possesses them, the greater and more assured will be his happiness. But in regard to virtuous qualities, beneficial in the first instance to others and not to himself, it can by no means be asserted that the person who possesses these qualities in the highest degree is happier than one who possesses them in a more moderate and ordinary degree.
Aristotle indeed says thatthe being justnecessarily includes the having pleasure in such behaviour: for we do not call a man just or liberal unless he has a pleasure in justice or liberality(Eth. Nic. i. 8). But this does not refute the supposition, that another man, less just or liberal than he, may enjoygreater happinessarising out of other tastes and other conduct.
In order to sustain the conclusion of Aristotle respecting the superior happiness of the virtuous man, it is necessary to assume that the pleasures of self-esteem and self-admiration are generically distinguished from other pleasures and entitled to a preference in the eyes of every right judging person. And Aristotle does seem to assume something of this nature. He says — x. 3 — “Or that pleasures differ in kind? For the pleasures arising from the honourable are different from those arising from the base; and it is not the case that the unjust man experiences the pleasure of the just, or he that is unmusical that of the musician.� The inherent difference between various pleasures is again touched upon x. 5 — “And since the functions differ in goodness and badness — some of them being objects of desire, others of them to be eschewed, and others of them neither — so is it likewise with the pleasures: for each function has its own pleasures. The pleasure then that is proper to the function of good is good, and that which is proper to the function of bad is bad; for the desires of things honourable are praiseworthy, those of things base are to be blamed. And the pleasures attaching to them are more proper to the functions than are the appetencies themselves.� In the next chapter, in that remarkable passage where he touches upon the predilections of men in power for the society of jesters and amusing companions (“The many have recourse to the amusements of those that are accounted happy�) — “For it is not in kingly power that you find either virtue or intellect, on which the higher functions of man depend. Nay, not if princeswho have never tasted the relish of pure and liberal pleasure, have recourse to the pleasures of the body, on which account these must be thought the more desirable. For children consider those things to be best that are held in honour among themselves.�
Here we have a marked distinction drawn between the different classes of pleasures — some being characterised as good, some bad, some indifferent. The best of all are those which the virtuous man enjoys, and whichheconsiders the best: the pleasures inseparably annexed to virtuous agency. These pleasures are thus assumed to be of a purer and more exalted character, and to deserve a decided preference over every other class of pleasures. And if this be assumed, the superior happiness of the virtuous man follows as a matter of course.
I should observe that Aristotle considers happiness to consist in the exercise of the faculties agreeably to virtue (ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετὴν) — thepleasure(ἡδονὴ) is something different from the exercise (ἐνέργεια) — inseparably attending it, indeed, yet not the same — “conjoined with the functions (ἐνεργείαις), and the two are so inseparable as to raise a question whether the function is not identical with the pleasureâ€� (x. 5). And he says, x. 7 — “We think that pleasure should be mixed up (παραμεμίχθαι) with happiness.â€�
It seems to be in the sense of self-esteem, which constitutes the distinctive mark of virtuous agency, that Aristotle supposes happiness to consist: the pleasure he supposes to be an inseparable concomitant, but yet not the same. The self-esteem is doubtless often felt in cases where a man is performing a painful duty — where the sum total of feelings accompanying the performance of the act is the very reverse of pleasurable. But still the self-esteem, or testimony of an approving conscience, isper sealways pleasurable, and is in fact the essential pleasure inherent in virtuous behaviour. I do not see the propriety of the distinction here taken by Aristotle. He puts it somewhat differently, Polit. vii. 1 — “Living happily consists either in joy or in virtue to men, or in both.� And Polit. viii. 5 — “For happiness is a compound of both these (honour and pleasure).� So Polit. viii. 3.
Happiness (again he says — Polit. vii. 13, p. 440 E. p. 286) consists in the perfect employment and active exercise of virtue: and thatabsolutely(or under the most favourable external conditions) — not under limitation (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) or subject to very trying and difficult circumstances. For a man of virtue may be so uncomfortably placed that he has no course open to him except a choice of evils, and can do nothing but make the best of a bad position. Such a man will conduct himself under the pressure of want or misfortune as well as his case admits: but happiness is out of his reach. (Compare Eth. Nic. i. 10.) To be happy, it is necessary that he should be so placed as to be capable of aspiring to the accomplishment of positive good and advantage — he must be admitted to contend for the great prizes, and to undertake actions which lead to new honours and to benefits previously unenjoyed: he must be relieved from the necessity of struggling against overwhelming calamities.
Aristotle tells us in the beginning of the Ethics (Eth. Nic. i. 3) — “But there is so much difference of opinion and so much error respecting what is honourable and just, of which political science treats, that these properties of human action seem toexist merely by positive legal appointment, and not by nature. And there is the same sort of error respecting what things are good.â€� If there be this widespread error and dissension among mankind with respect to the determining of what is good and just, what standard has Aristotle established for the purpose of correcting it? I do not find that he has established any standard, nor even that he has thought it necessary to make the attempt. There are indeed a great number of observations, and many most admirable observations in his Treatise, on the various branches of Virtue and Vice: many which tend to conduct the mind of the reader unconsciously to the proper standard: but no distinct announcement of any general principle, whereby a dispute between two dissentient moralists may be settled. When he places virtue in a certain mediocrity between excess on one side and defect on the other, this middle point is not in any way marked or discoverable: it is a point not fixed, but variable according to the position of the individual agent, and is to be determinable in every case by right reason and according to the judgment of the prudent man — “in the meanwith reference to ourselves, asit has been determined by reason, andas the prudent man(ὁ φρόνιμος)would determine itâ€� (Eth. Nic. ii. 6). But though the decision is thus vested in the prudent man, no mention is made of the principle which the appointed arbiter would follow in delivering his judgment, assuming a dispute to arise.
In a previous part of Chapter II., he defines “the mean with reference to ourselvesâ€� to be “that which neither exceeds, nor falls short of,the rule of propriety(τοῦ δέοντος). But this is not one, nor is it the same to all.â€�
To render this definition sufficient and satisfactory, Aristotle ought to have pointed out to us how we are to find out thatrule of propriety(τὸ δέον) which marks and constitutes the medium point, of actions and affections,in relation to ourselves— this medium point being in his opinionvirtue. To explain what is meant by a mediumin relation to ourselves, by the words τὸ δέον,the rule of propriety, is only a change of language, without any additional information.
Thus the capital problem of moral philosophy still remains unsolved.
It is remarkable that Aristotle in some parts of his treatise states very distinctly what this problem is, and what are the points essential to its solution: he speaks as if he were fully aware of that which was wanting to his own treatise, and as if he were preparing to supply the defect: but still the promise isnever realized. Take for example the beginning of Book VI. Eth. Nic.
“Since it has been already laid down, that we ought to choose the middle point and not either the excess or the defect — and since the middle point is that which right reason determines — let us distinguish what that is. For in all the mental habits which have been described, as well as in all others also, there is a certain aim, by a reference to which the rational being is guided either in relaxing or in restricting: and there is a certain definite boundary of those medial points, which we affirm to exist between excess and defect, determinable according to right reason. To speak thus, however, is indeed correct enough, but it gives no distinct information (οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές): for in all other modes of proceeding which are governed by scientific principles it is quite just to say that you ought neither to work nor to rest more than is sufficient nor less than is sufficient, but to a degree midway between the two and agreeably to right reason. But a man who has only this information would be no wiser than he was before it, any more than he would know what things he ought to apply to his body, by being simply told that he must apply such things as medical science and as the medical practitioner directed. Wherefore, with respect also to the habits of the soul we must not be content with merely giving a general statement in correct language, but we must farther discriminate what right reason is, and what is its definition.â€�
This is a very clear and candid statement of the grand and fundamental defect in Aristotle’s theory of Ethics. He says very truly that “there is a certain end and aim (σκόπος), to which a rational being has reference when he either restricts or relaxes any disposition.â€� It was incumbent on Aristotle to explain what this σκόπος was; but this he never does, though he seems so clearly to have felt the want of it. We might have supposed that after he had pointed out what was required to impart specific meaning to correct but vague generalities, he would have proceeded at once to fill up the acknowledged chasm in his theory: but instead of this, he enters into an analysis of the intellect, speculative and practical, and explains the varieties of intellectual, as contradistinguished from moral, excellence. This part of his work is highly valuable and instructive: but I cannot find that he ever again touches upon the σκόπος, which had been admitted to be as yet undetermined. In a certain sense, it is indeed true that he endeavours “to discriminate what right reason is, and what is its definition:â€� for he classifies the intellectual functions into intellect (νοῦς), science (ἐπιστήμη), wisdom(σοφία), art (τέχνη), prudence (φρόνησις): he states the general nature of each of these attributes, and the range of subjects to which it applies. He tells us that intellect and prudence have reference to human conduct — that prudence is “concerned with things just and honourable and good for manâ€� (vii. 12) — “with the things of man, and those things regarding which we deliberateâ€� (vii. 7) — “prudence must needs be a true habit according to reason, concerned with the good of manâ€� (vii. 5). In explaining what prudence is, he tells us that it isaccording to reason: in explaining what isright reason, he tells us that it isaccording to prudence. He thus seems to make use of each as a part of the definition of the other. But however this may be, certain it is that he never fulfils the expectation held out in the beginning of the Sixth Book, nor ever clears up the οὐδὲν σαφὲς there acknowledged.
There is one sentence at the beginning of vi. 5, which looks as if it conveyed additional information upon the difficulty in question — “Now it seems to belong to the prudent man to be able to deliberate aright concerning the things that are good and profitable to himself — not in part, as concerning the things that have a reference to health or strength — but concerning the things that refer to the whole ofliving wellâ€� (πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῇν). But this in point of fact explains nothing. Forliving wellis the same ashappiness: happiness isthe active exercise of the soul according to virtue: thereforevirtuemust be known, before we can know whatliving wellis.
I think that this σκόπος or end, which Aristotle alludes to in the beginning of the Sixth Book as not having been yet made clear, appears to be more distinctly brought out in a previous passage than it is in any portion of the Treatise after the beginning of the Sixth Book. In Book IV. 6, Aristotle treats of the virtues and defects connected with behaviour in social intercourse: theobsequiousat one extreme, thepeevishorquarrelsomeat the other: and the becoming medium, though it had no special name, which lay between them. Speaking of the person who adopts this becoming medium, he says — “We have said generally, then, that he will associate with people as he ought; and having, moreover, a constant reference to what is honourable and what is expedient, he will aim at not giving pain or at contributing pleasure.â€�
Again in regard to Temperance — iii. 11 — he states the σκόπος of the temperate man — “What things have a reference to health or vigour, and are agreeable, these he desires in measure and as he ought; as well as the other agreeable things that are notopposed to these, either as being contrary to what is honourable or as being beyond his fortune. For he that desires things agreeable, which yet are contrary to what is honourable or beyond his fortune, loves these pleasures more than they are worth. But not so with the temperate man who lives according to right reason.â€�
These passages are not very distinct, as an explanation of the proper σκόπος: but I cannot find any passages after the beginning of the Sixth Book which are more distinct than they: or perhaps, equally distinct.
In one passage of the Seventh Book, Aristotle refers, though somewhat obscurely, to the average degree of virtue exhibited by the mass of mankind as the standard to be consulted when we pronounce upon excess or defect (vii. 7).
Aristotle seems in some passages to indicate pleasure and pain as the end with reference to which actions or dispositions are denominatedgoodandevil. He says — vii. 11 — “To theorise respecting pleasure and pain, is the business of the political philosopher: for he is the architect of that end with reference to which we call each matter either absolutely good or absolutely evil. Moreover, it is indispensable to institute an enquiry respecting them: for we have explained ethical virtue and vice as referring to pleasures and pains: and most people affirm happiness to be coupled with pleasure: for which reason they have named τὸ μακάριον ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν.â€�
In Book VIII. 9-10, the σκόπος is indeed stated very clearly, butnot as such— not as if Aristotle intended to make it serve as such, or thought that it ought to form the basis upon which our estimate of what is the proper middle point should be found. In viii. 9-10, he tells us that all justice and benevolence (τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ φιλία) is a consequence and an incident of established communion among human beings (κοινωνία) — that the grand communion of all, which comprehends all the rest, is thePolitical Communion— that the end and object of thePolitical Communion, as well that for which it was originally created as that for which it subsists and continues, isthe common and lasting advantage(τὸ κοινῇ σύμφερον) — that all other communions, of relations, friends, fellow-soldiers, neighbours, &c., are portions of the all-comprehensive political communion, and aim at realizing some partial advantage to the constituent members. These chapters are very clear and very important, and they announce plainly enoughthe common and lasting interestas the foundation and measure of justice as well as of benevolence. But they do not apply the same measure, to the qualities whichhad been enumerated in the Books prior to the Sixth, as a means of ascertaining where the middle point is to be found which is alleged to constitute virtue. Nevertheless, Aristotle tells us that it is in the highest degree difficult to find the middle point which constitutes virtue (ii. 9).