306Ibid. viii. p. 146, a. 36-b. 19. This is a subtle distinction. He says that desire must be defined (not desire ofthe pleasurable, but) desire ofpleasure: we desirethe pleasurablefor the sake ofpleasure. He admits, however, that there are cases in which the argument will not hold: σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι ἥδεσθαι μᾶλλον βούλονται ἢ πεπαῦσθαι ἡδόμενοι· ὥστε τὸ ἐνεργεῖν μᾶλλον τέλος ἂν ποιοῖντο τοῦ ἐνηργηκέναι.
306Ibid. viii. p. 146, a. 36-b. 19. This is a subtle distinction. He says that desire must be defined (not desire ofthe pleasurable, but) desire ofpleasure: we desirethe pleasurablefor the sake ofpleasure. He admits, however, that there are cases in which the argument will not hold: σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι ἥδεσθαι μᾶλλον βούλονται ἢ πεπαῦσθαι ἡδόμενοι· ὥστε τὸ ἐνεργεῖν μᾶλλον τέλος ἂν ποιοῖντο τοῦ ἐνηργηκέναι.
19. The definition ought not to omit any of the differentiæ of the definiend; if any be omitted, the real essence is not declared. Here then is a defect in the definition, which it is your business always to assail on its defective side.307Thus, if the definiend be arelatumcorresponding, not to some correlate absolutely but, to some correlate specially quantified or qualified, the definition ought to enunciate such quantification or qualification; if it does not, it is open to attack.
307Ibid. b. 20: πάλιν ἐπ’ ἐνίων εἰ μὴ διώρικε τοῦ πόσου, ἢ ποίου, ἢ ποῦ, ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς, — ἀπολείπων γὰρ διαφορὰν ἡντινοῦν οὐ λέγει τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι·δεῖ δ’ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιχειρεῖν.
307Ibid. b. 20: πάλιν ἐπ’ ἐνίων εἰ μὴ διώρικε τοῦ πόσου, ἢ ποίου, ἢ ποῦ, ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς, — ἀπολείπων γὰρ διαφορὰν ἡντινοῦν οὐ λέγει τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι·δεῖ δ’ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιχειρεῖν.
20. Suppose that the definiend is one of the appetites, relative to anappetitumas correlate, a mode of the good or agreeable. You will take notice whether the definition given thereof enunciates the correlate as only an apparent mode of good: if it does not, you have alocusfor attacking it. But if it does, and if the definer be one who believes in the Platonic Ideas, you may attack him by showing that his definition will not square with that doctrine. For the definition as so given will not suit for theideal or generic appetite — the Self-appetite; which correlates with the ideal or generic good — the Self-good. In this no distinction is admissible of real and apparent: a Self-apparent-good is an absurdity.308
308Topic. VI. viii. p. 146, b. 36-p. 147, a. 11. ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἀποδῷ τὸ εἰρημένον, ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδη ἀκτέον τὸν τιθέμενον ἰδέας εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἰδέα φαινομένου οὐδενός, τὸ δ’ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ εἶδος δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, οἷον αὐτὴ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ ἡδέος καὶ αὐτὴ βούλησις αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔσται οὖν φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ οὐδὲ φαινομένου ἡδέος· ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ.Compare Plato, Parmenides, pp. 133-134, where this doctrine that if therelatumbe an Idea (sensu Platonico), thecorrelatummust also be an Idea, is enunciated and pushed to its consequences: ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὑτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δή τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, &c. — αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστι, &c. (133, C-E.)
308Topic. VI. viii. p. 146, b. 36-p. 147, a. 11. ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἀποδῷ τὸ εἰρημένον, ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδη ἀκτέον τὸν τιθέμενον ἰδέας εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἰδέα φαινομένου οὐδενός, τὸ δ’ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ εἶδος δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, οἷον αὐτὴ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ ἡδέος καὶ αὐτὴ βούλησις αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔσται οὖν φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ οὐδὲ φαινομένου ἡδέος· ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ.
Compare Plato, Parmenides, pp. 133-134, where this doctrine that if therelatumbe an Idea (sensu Platonico), thecorrelatummust also be an Idea, is enunciated and pushed to its consequences: ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὑτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δή τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, &c. — αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστι, &c. (133, C-E.)
21. Again, suppose that the definiend is a habit or disposition. You will examine how far the definition fits as applied to the individual person who has the habit; and how far it fits when taken in comparison with subjects contrary or congeneric. Every such definition, if good, implies in a certain way the definition of the contrary: he who defines cognition furnishes by implication the definition of ignorance.309
309Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, a. 12-22.
309Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, a. 12-22.
22. Or suppose the definiend to be a genericrelatum, and the definition to enunciate its generic correlate. You must call to mind the specific terms comprehended under these two generic terms, and observe whether they fit on to each other respectively. If they do not, the definition is faulty.310
310Ibid. a. 23-28.
310Ibid. a. 23-28.
23. You will farther examine whether the Opposite of the definition will serve as definition to the Opposite of the definiend, as the definition of half is opposite to the definition of double; thus, if double is that which exceeds equality, half is that which is exceeded by equality. The like is true of Contraries: if the profitable be that which is productive of good, the hurtful will be that which is productive of evil or destructive of good. If, on trying the contraries, you find that this will not hold, the definition originally given will be found unsatisfactory.311In defining the privative contrary of any term, a man cannot avoid enunciating in the definition the term of which it is the privative: but he is not allowed to define the term itself by means of its privative. To define equality — that which is contrary to inequality, is improper. You will require him at once to define inequality; and his definition must be — the privation of equality.Substitute this definition of the term inequality, in place of that term itself, in the above-named definition of equality: and the last definition will then run as follows: Equality is that which is contrary to the privation of equality. Here the definiend is enunciated as a part of the definition of itself; a proof that the original definition — Equality is the contrary of inequality — is itself wrong.312
311Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, a. 29-b. 4.We most remember that Aristotle, classifyingRelataas one species under the genusOpposita, treats double and half asOpposita,i.e.Relative-Opposita. I have already said that I think this classification improper, and thatOppositaought to be ranked as a species under the genusRelata.
311Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, a. 29-b. 4.
We most remember that Aristotle, classifyingRelataas one species under the genusOpposita, treats double and half asOpposita,i.e.Relative-Opposita. I have already said that I think this classification improper, and thatOppositaought to be ranked as a species under the genusRelata.
312Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, b. 4-25.
312Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, b. 4-25.
24. When the definiend is a Privative Term, the definition given ought to enunciate that which it is, and that of which it is the privation; also that subject in which it resides naturally and in the first instance. In defining ignorance, the definition must enunciate not privation only, but privation of knowledge; nor will this be sufficient unless it be added that the privation of knowledge is in the rational department of the soul (ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ). Privation of knowledge in the soul or in the man, will not suffice; because neither of these subjects is that in which the attribute resides in the first instance: the rational department of the soul must be named by itself, as being the primary subject of the attribute. If the definition be wanting in any of these conditions, you will have an argument for impeaching it.313
313Ibid. b. 26-p. 148, a. 2.
313Ibid. b. 26-p. 148, a. 2.
25. A term that is privative in form may sometimes be used in the sense of mere negation, not in that of privation. If this term be defined generally by privation, the definition will not include the merely negative sense, and will therefore be impeachable. The only general explanation attainable is that by pure negation, which is common both to the negative and the privative. Thus, if the respondent defines ignorance — privation of knowledge, such privation can be predicated only of subjects whose nature it is to have knowledge or who might be expected to have it: such privation cannot be predicated of infants, or of inanimate objects like stones. To include these, ignorance must be explained as the mere negation or non-existence of knowledge; the definition thereof by privation is inadequate.314
314Ibid. p. 148, a. 3-9: ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴ λεγομένου κατὰ στέρησιν στερήσει ὡρίσατο, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγνοίας δόξειεν ἂν ὑπάρχειν ἡ τοιαύτη ἁμαρτία τοῖς μὴ κατ’ ἀπόφασιν τὴν ἄγνοιαν λέγουσιν.Waitz says in note, p. 503:— “Sensus loci hic est. Peccant qui per privationem ignorantiam definientes non eam ignorantiam definire voluerunt quæ est κατ’ ἀπόφασιν, sed eam quæ est κατὰ διάθεσιν.â€� Compare Analyt. Poster. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 23.
314Ibid. p. 148, a. 3-9: ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴ λεγομένου κατὰ στέρησιν στερήσει ὡρίσατο, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγνοίας δόξειεν ἂν ὑπάρχειν ἡ τοιαύτη ἁμαρτία τοῖς μὴ κατ’ ἀπόφασιν τὴν ἄγνοιαν λέγουσιν.
Waitz says in note, p. 503:— “Sensus loci hic est. Peccant qui per privationem ignorantiam definientes non eam ignorantiam definire voluerunt quæ est κατ’ ἀπόφασιν, sed eam quæ est κατὰ διάθεσιν.â€� Compare Analyt. Poster. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 23.
26. If you are debating with one who holds the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, you will note whether any definition that he may give fits not only the definiend itself but also the Idea of the definiend. Thus, Plato in defining animal introduces mortalityas a part of his definition;315but mortality cannot be predicated of the Idea or generic animal — the Self-animal; therefore, you will have an argument against his definition. In like manner, if any active or passive attribute is brought into his definition, you will object that this cannot apply to the Ideas; which are avowedly impassive and unchangeable.316
315Topic. VI. x. p. 148, a. 15: οἷον ὡς Πλάτων ὁρίζεται τὸ θνητὸν προσάπτων ἐν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων ὁρισμοῖς.This may perhaps allude to Plato’s manner of speaking of ζῷα in Sophistes, p. 246, E., p. 265, C.; Timæus, p. 69, C.
315Topic. VI. x. p. 148, a. 15: οἷον ὡς Πλάτων ὁρίζεται τὸ θνητὸν προσάπτων ἐν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων ὁρισμοῖς.
This may perhaps allude to Plato’s manner of speaking of ζῷα in Sophistes, p. 246, E., p. 265, C.; Timæus, p. 69, C.
316Topica, VI. x. p. 148, a. 14-22. ἀπαθεῖς γὰρ καὶ ἀκίνητοι δοκοῦσιν αἱ ἰδέαι τοῖς λέγουσιν ἰδέας εἶναι.
316Topica, VI. x. p. 148, a. 14-22. ἀπαθεῖς γὰρ καὶ ἀκίνητοι δοκοῦσιν αἱ ἰδέαι τοῖς λέγουσιν ἰδέας εἶναι.
27. Anotherlocusfor counter-argument is, where the definiend is Equivocal or Analogous, while one and the same definition is made to apply to all its distinct meanings. Such a definition, pretending to fit all, will in reality fit none; nothing but an univocal term can come under one and the same definition. It is wrong to attempt to define an equivocal term.317When its equivocation is not obvious, the respondent will put it forward confidently as univocal; while you as assailant will expose the equivocation. Sometimes, indeed, a respondent may pretend that an univocal word is equivocal, or that an equivocal word is univocal, in the course of the debate. To obviate such misconception, you will do well to come to an agreement with him prior to the debate, or to determine by special antecedent reasonings what terms are univocal or equivocal; for at that early stage, when he does not foresee the consequence of your questions, he is more likely to concede what will facilitate your attack. In the absence of such preliminary agreement, if the respondent, when you have shown that his bad definition willnot apply universally, resorts to the pretence that the definiend, though really univocal, is equivocal, you will press him with the true definition of the part not included under his definition, and you will show that this true definition suits also for the remaining parts of the definiend. You will thus confute him by showing that, upon his original hypothesis, it must follow that there are two distinct definitions for the same definiend — the bad one which he has given, and the true one which you have constrained him to admit.318Perhaps, however, the term which he has undertaken to define may be really equivocal, and therefore indefinable; nevertheless, when you have shown the insufficiency of his definition, he may refuse to admit that the term is equivocal, but will deny a portion of its real meaning. You will then remind him that, as to the meaning of names, we must recognize tradition and custom without presuming to disturb it; but that, when we combine these names in our own discourse, we must beware of those equivocations which mislead the multitude.319
317Ibid. a. 23-37: ἔτι εἰ τῶν καθ’ ὁμωνυμίαν λεγομένων ἕνα λόγον ἁπάντων κοινὸν ἀπέδωκεν. — ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἧττον, εἰ ὁποτερωσοῦν πεποίηκεν, ἡμάρτηκεν.Aristotle here cites and censures the definition of life given by a philosopher named Dionysius; he remarks that life is an equivocal term, having one meaning in animals, another and a different one in plants. Dr. Whewell has remarked that even at the present day a good definition of life is matter of dispute, and still a desideratum with philosophers.Mr. John S. Mill adverts, in more than one portion of his ‘System of Logic’ (Bk. IV. ch. iii. s. 5, p. 222, seq.; Bk. V. ch. v. s. 8, p. 371), to the mistake and confusion arising from attempts to define Equivocal Terms. “The inquiries of Plato into the definitions of some of the most general terms of moral speculation, are characterized by Bacon as a far nearer approach to a true inductive method than is elsewhere to be found among the ancients, and are, indeed, almost perfect examples of the preparatory process of comparison and abstraction; but, from being unaware of the law just mentioned, he often wasted the powers of this great logical instrument on inquiries in which it could realize no result, since the phenomena, whose common properties he so elaborately endeavoured to detect, had not really any common properties. Bacon himself fell into the same error in his speculations on the nature of heat, in which he evidently confounded, under the name hot, classes of phenomena which had no property in common.â€� — “He occasionally proceeds like one who seeking for the cause of hardness, after examining that quality in iron, flint, and diamond, should expect to find that it is something that can be traced also in hard water, a hard knot, and a hard heart.â€�
317Ibid. a. 23-37: ἔτι εἰ τῶν καθ’ ὁμωνυμίαν λεγομένων ἕνα λόγον ἁπάντων κοινὸν ἀπέδωκεν. — ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἧττον, εἰ ὁποτερωσοῦν πεποίηκεν, ἡμάρτηκεν.
Aristotle here cites and censures the definition of life given by a philosopher named Dionysius; he remarks that life is an equivocal term, having one meaning in animals, another and a different one in plants. Dr. Whewell has remarked that even at the present day a good definition of life is matter of dispute, and still a desideratum with philosophers.
Mr. John S. Mill adverts, in more than one portion of his ‘System of Logic’ (Bk. IV. ch. iii. s. 5, p. 222, seq.; Bk. V. ch. v. s. 8, p. 371), to the mistake and confusion arising from attempts to define Equivocal Terms. “The inquiries of Plato into the definitions of some of the most general terms of moral speculation, are characterized by Bacon as a far nearer approach to a true inductive method than is elsewhere to be found among the ancients, and are, indeed, almost perfect examples of the preparatory process of comparison and abstraction; but, from being unaware of the law just mentioned, he often wasted the powers of this great logical instrument on inquiries in which it could realize no result, since the phenomena, whose common properties he so elaborately endeavoured to detect, had not really any common properties. Bacon himself fell into the same error in his speculations on the nature of heat, in which he evidently confounded, under the name hot, classes of phenomena which had no property in common.� — “He occasionally proceeds like one who seeking for the cause of hardness, after examining that quality in iron, flint, and diamond, should expect to find that it is something that can be traced also in hard water, a hard knot, and a hard heart.�
318Topic. VI. x. p. 148, a. 37, seq. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔνια λανθάνει τῶν ὁμωνύμων,ἐρωτῶντι μὲν ὡς συνωνύμοις χρηστέον,αὐτῷ δ’ ἀποκρινομένῳ διαιρετέον. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔνιοι τῶν ἀποκρινομένων τὸ μὲν συνώνυμον ὁμώνυμόν φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν μὴ ἐφαρμόττῃ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς λόγος, — προδιομολογητέον ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ προσυλλογιστέον ὅτι ὁμώνυμον ἢ συνώνυμον, ὁπότερον ἂν ᾖ·μᾶλλον γὰρ συγχωροῦσιν οὐ προορῶντες τὸ συμβησόμενον.These counsels of Aristotle are remarkable, as bearing on the details, and even the artifices, of dialectical debate.
318Topic. VI. x. p. 148, a. 37, seq. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔνια λανθάνει τῶν ὁμωνύμων,ἐρωτῶντι μὲν ὡς συνωνύμοις χρηστέον,αὐτῷ δ’ ἀποκρινομένῳ διαιρετέον. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔνιοι τῶν ἀποκρινομένων τὸ μὲν συνώνυμον ὁμώνυμόν φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν μὴ ἐφαρμόττῃ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς λόγος, — προδιομολογητέον ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ προσυλλογιστέον ὅτι ὁμώνυμον ἢ συνώνυμον, ὁπότερον ἂν ᾖ·μᾶλλον γὰρ συγχωροῦσιν οὐ προορῶντες τὸ συμβησόμενον.
These counsels of Aristotle are remarkable, as bearing on the details, and even the artifices, of dialectical debate.
319Topic. VI. x. p. 148, b. 16-22. ῥητέον πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὅτι τῇ μὲν ὀνομασίᾳ δεῖ χρῆσθαι τῇ παραδεδομένῃ καὶ παρεπομένῃ καὶ μὴ κινεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἔνια δ’ οὐ λεκτέον ὁμοίως τοῖς πολλοῖς.
319Topic. VI. x. p. 148, b. 16-22. ῥητέον πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὅτι τῇ μὲν ὀνομασίᾳ δεῖ χρῆσθαι τῇ παραδεδομένῃ καὶ παρεπομένῃ καὶ μὴ κινεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἔνια δ’ οὐ λεκτέον ὁμοίως τοῖς πολλοῖς.
28. If the definiend, of which a definition is tendered to you, is a compound, you may subtract from this definition the definition of one of the parts of the definiend, and then examine whether the remainder will suit as a definition of the remaining part of the definiend. If the remainder should not suit, this will show that the entire definition tendered is not tenable. Thus, if the definiend be a finite straight line, and if the definition tendered be, It is the boundary of a finite plane, of which (boundary) the middle covers or stands in the way of the extremities; you may subtract from this definition the definition of a finite line, viz., the boundary of a plane surface having boundaries, and the remainder of the definition ought then to suit for the remainder of the definiend. Now the remainder of the definiend is — straight; and the remainder of the definition is — that of which the middle covers or stands in the way of the extremities. But these two willnotsuit; for a line may be straight, yet infinite, in which case it will have neither middle nor extremities. Accordingly, since the remainder of the definitionwill not suit for the remainder of the definiend, this will serve as an argument that the entire definition tendered is not a good one.320
320Topic. VI. xi. p. 148, b. 23-32.
320Topic. VI. xi. p. 148, b. 23-32.
If the definiend be a compound, and if the definition contain no greater number of words than the definiend, the definition must be faulty; it will be nothing better than a substitution of words. Still more faulty will it be, if it substitutes rare and strange words in place of others which are known and familiar; or if it introduces a new word which signifies something different from that which it replaces.321
321Ibid. b. 32-p. 149, a. 13.
321Ibid. b. 32-p. 149, a. 13.
The definiend, being compound, will contain both a generic and a differential term. In general, the generic term will be the better known of the two; yet sometimes the other is the better known. Whichever of the two is the better known, the definer ought to choose that, if all that he aims at is a mere substitution of one name in place of another. But, if he aims at something more or at the substitution of an explanatory proposition in place of a name (without which there can be no true definition), he ought then to choose the differentia in preference to the genus; for the definition is produced for the purpose of imparting knowledge, and the differentia, being usually less known than the genus, stands most in need of extraneous help to cognition.322When the definition of the differentia has thus been tendered, you will examine whether it will be equally suitable for any other definiend also. If it be, you have an argument against the goodness of the definition. For example, the definition of odd number tendered to you may be — number having a middle. Here, since number is common both to the definiend and to the definition, having-a-middle is evidently put forward as the equivalent of odd. But this cannot stand as equivalent to odd; since various other subjects which are not odd (such, for example, as a body or a line), nevertheless have a middle. Since, then, we see that having-a-middle would be suitable in defining definiends which are not odd, it cannot be admitted, without some qualifying adjunct, as a good definition of odd. The adjunct annexed must declare in what sense middle is intended, since it is an equivocal phrase.323
322Ibid. p. 149, a. 14-28.
322Ibid. p. 149, a. 14-28.
323Ibid. a. 29-37.
323Ibid. a. 29-37.
29. If the definiend be a something really existent, the definition given of it ought not to be a proposition declaring an incompatible combination, such as neither does nor can exist. Some, for example, define white — colour mingled with fire; which isincompatible, since that which is incorporeal (colour) cannot be mingled with a body (fire).324
324Topic. VI. xii. p. 149, a. 38-b. 3.
324Topic. VI. xii. p. 149, a. 38-b. 3.
30. Again, suppose the definiend to be aRelatum: the correlate thereof must of course be declared in the definition. Care, however, must be taken that it shall be declared, not in vague generality but, distinctly and with proper specialization; otherwise, the definition will be incorrect either entirely or partially. Thus, if the respondent defines medicine — the science of the really existent, he is incorrect either wholly or partially. Therelatumought to reciprocate or to be co-extensive with its correlate.325When the correlate, however, is properly specialized in the definition, it may be declared under several different descriptions; for the same real thing may be at onceens,album,bonum. None of these descriptions will be incorrect. Yet, if the correlate is thus described in the definition of arelatum, the definition cannot be considered good or sufficient. For it applies to more things besides the definiend; and a good definition ought to reciprocate or to be co-extensive with its definiend.326
325Ibid. b. 4, seq.: ἔτι ὅσοι μὴ διαιροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς πρός τι πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ἐν πλείοσι περιλαβόντες εἶπαν, ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐπί τι ψεύδονται, οἷον εἴ τις τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην ὄντος εἶπεν — ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπειδὴ ἀντιστρέφει πάντα τὰ πρός τι.
325Ibid. b. 4, seq.: ἔτι ὅσοι μὴ διαιροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς πρός τι πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ἐν πλείοσι περιλαβόντες εἶπαν, ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐπί τι ψεύδονται, οἷον εἴ τις τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην ὄντος εἶπεν — ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπειδὴ ἀντιστρέφει πάντα τὰ πρός τι.
326Ibid. b. 12-23. ἔτι δ’ ἀδύνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον ἴδιον τοῦ ἀποδοθέντος εἶναι· — δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης ὁρισμός· ἴδιον γὰρ καὶ οὐ κοινὸν δεῖ τὸν ὁρισμὸν εἶναι.
326Ibid. b. 12-23. ἔτι δ’ ἀδύνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον ἴδιον τοῦ ἀποδοθέντος εἶναι· — δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης ὁρισμός· ἴδιον γὰρ καὶ οὐ κοινὸν δεῖ τὸν ὁρισμὸν εἶναι.
31. Another mistake in defining is committed, when a man defines, not the subject purely and simply but, the subject in a high measure of excellence. Sometimes the rhetor (e.g.) is defined — one who can perceive and produce without omission all that there is plausible in any cause; the thief is defined — one who takes away secretly what belongs to another. But these are the definitions, not of a rhetor and a thief generally but, of a skilful rhetor and skilful thief. The thief is one who is bent on taking away secretly, not one whodoestake away secretly.327
327Ibid. b. 24-30. οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρᾳ λαμβάνων, ἀλλ’ ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρᾳ λαμβάνειν, κλέπτης ἐστίν.
327Ibid. b. 24-30. οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρᾳ λαμβάνων, ἀλλ’ ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρᾳ λαμβάνειν, κλέπτης ἐστίν.
32. Again, another error consists in defining what is desirable in itself and on its own account, as if it were desirable as a means towards some other end — as productive or preservative thereof. For example, if a man defines justice — that which is preservative of the laws; or wisdom — that which is productive of happiness, he presents them as if they were desirable, not for themselves but, with reference to something different from themselves. This is a mistake; and it is not less a mistake, though very possibly the same subject may be desirable both foritself and for the sake of something else. For the definition ought to enunciate what is best in the definiend; and the best of everything resides most in its essence, not in what it is relatively to something else. It is better to be desirableper se, thanalterius causâ.328
328Topic. VI. xii. p. 149, b. 31-39. ἑκάστου γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ μάλιστα, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν εἶναι τοῦ δι’ ἕτερον, ὥστε τοῦτο καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἔδει μᾶλλον σημαίνειν.
328Topic. VI. xii. p. 149, b. 31-39. ἑκάστου γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ μάλιστα, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν εἶναι τοῦ δι’ ἕτερον, ὥστε τοῦτο καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἔδει μᾶλλον σημαίνειν.
33. Perhaps the definition tendered may be a complex proposition, enunciating two terms either jointly or severally, in one or other of three combinations. Either the definiend is A and B; or it is that which springs out of A and B; or it is A with B.329In each of these three cases you may find arguments for impugning the definition.
329Ibid. xiii. p. 150, a. 1-4: σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἴ τινος ὁρισμὸν ἀποδιδοὺς τάδε, ἢ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἢ τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε ὡρίσατο.
329Ibid. xiii. p. 150, a. 1-4: σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἴ τινος ὁρισμὸν ἀποδιδοὺς τάδε, ἢ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἢ τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε ὡρίσατο.
a.Thus, take the first of the three. Suppose the respondent to define justice by saying, It is temperance and courage. You may urge against him, that two men, one of whom is temperate without being courageous, while the other is courageous without being temperate, will be just together, though neither of them separately is just; nay, that each of them separately (the one being temperate and cowardly, the other courageous and intemperate), will be both just and unjust; since, if justice is temperance and courage, injustice will be intemperance and cowardice.330The definer is open to the farther objection that he treats enumeration of parts as identical with the whole; as if he defined a house — bricks and mortar, forgetting the peculiar mode of putting them together. Bricks and mortar may exist, and yet there may be no house.331
330Ibid. a. 4-14.
330Ibid. a. 4-14.
331Ibid. a. 15-21. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν μερῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸ ὅλον μὴ εἶναι· ὥστε οὐ ταὐτὸν τὰ μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ.
331Ibid. a. 15-21. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν μερῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸ ὅλον μὴ εἶναι· ὥστε οὐ ταὐτὸν τὰ μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ.
b.Next, suppose the definition to declare, that the definiend is that which springs from A and B — is a result or compound of A and B. You will then examine whether A and B are such as to yield any result; for some couples (as a line and a number) yield no result. Or, perhaps, the definiend may by its own nature inhere in some first subject, while A and B do not inhere in any one first subject, but one in the other; in which case the definition is assailable.332Or, even granting that it is the nature of A and B to inhere in the same first subject, you may find that that first subject is not the same as the one in which the definiend inheres. Now the whole cannot thus inhere in one, and the parts in another: you will here have a good objection.Or, perhaps, it may appear that, if the whole be destroyed, the parts will be destroyed also; which ought not to be, but the reverse; for, when the parts are destroyed, the whole must necessarily vanish. Or, perhaps, the definiend may be good or bad, while the parts of the definition (A and B) are neither one nor the other. (Yet this last is not a conclusive objection; for it will sometimes happen in compound medicines that each of the ingredients is good, while they are bad if given in conjunction.)333Or, perhaps, the whole may bear the same name as one of its parts: this, also, will render the definition impeachable. Still more will it be impeachable, if it enunciates simply a result or compound of A and B, without specifying the manner of composition; it ought to declare not merely the parts of the compound, but also the way in which they are put together to form the compound.334
332Ibid. a. 22-30. ἔτι εἰ τὸ μὲν ὡρισμένον ἐν ἑνί τινι πέφυκε τῷ πρώτῳ γίνεσθαι, ἐξ ὧν δ’ ἔφησεν αὐτὸ εἶναι, μὴ ἐν ἑνί τινι τῷ πρώτῳ, ἀλλ’ ἑκάτερον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ.
332Ibid. a. 22-30. ἔτι εἰ τὸ μὲν ὡρισμένον ἐν ἑνί τινι πέφυκε τῷ πρώτῳ γίνεσθαι, ἐξ ὧν δ’ ἔφησεν αὐτὸ εἶναι, μὴ ἐν ἑνί τινι τῷ πρώτῳ, ἀλλ’ ἑκάτερον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ.
333Topic. VI. xiii. p. 150, a. 30-b. 13.
333Topic. VI. xiii. p. 150, a. 30-b. 13.
334Ibid. b. 14-26. ἔτι εἰ μὴ εἴρηκε τὸν τρόπον τῆς συνθέσεως· &c.
334Ibid. b. 14-26. ἔτι εἰ μὴ εἴρηκε τὸν τρόπον τῆς συνθέσεως· &c.
c.Lastly, suppose the definition to declare that the definiend is A along with B. You will note, first, that this third head must be identical either with the first or with the second (e.g., honeywithwater means either honey and water, or the compound of honey with water); it will therefore be open to impeachment on one or other of the above-named grounds of objection, according as the respondent may admit.335You may also distinguish all the different senses in which one thing may be said to bewithanother (e.g., when the two are in the same recipient, justice and courage together in the soul; or in the same place; or in the same time), and you may be able to show that in none of these senses can the two parts of the definition be truly said to be one along with the other.336Or, if it be true that these two parts are co-existent in time, you may enquire whether they are not affirmed with relation to different correlates.E.g., The definition of courage may be tendered thus: Courage is daring along with right intelligence; upon which you may remark that daring may have reference to an act of spoliation, and that right intelligence may have reference to the preservation of health. Now a man who has both daring and right intelligence inthesesenses, cannot be termed courageous, and thus you will have an argument against the definition. And, even if they be affirmed with reference to the same correlate (e.g., the duties of a physician), a man who has both daring and right intelligencein reference to these duties will hardly be styled courageous; the term courage must be so defined as to have reference to its appropriate end;e.g., the dangers of war, or any still more public-spirited end.337Another mistake may, perhaps, be committed in this same sort of definition — A along with B; as when, for example, the definition tendered of anger is — pain along with the belief of being treated with contempt. What the definer really intends here is, that the pain arises from the belief of being treated with contempt. But this is not expressed by the terms of his definition, in any one of their admissible meanings.338
335Ibid. b. 27-32. ὥστ’ ἐὰν ὁποτερῳοῦν τῶν εἰρημένων ταὐτὸνὁμολογήσῃεἶναι τὸ τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε, ταὐτὰ ἁρμόσει λέγειν ἅπερ πρὸς ἑκάτερον τούτων ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηται.
335Ibid. b. 27-32. ὥστ’ ἐὰν ὁποτερῳοῦν τῶν εἰρημένων ταὐτὸνὁμολογήσῃεἶναι τὸ τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε, ταὐτὰ ἁρμόσει λέγειν ἅπερ πρὸς ἑκάτερον τούτων ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηται.
336Ibid. b. 32-39. ἢ ὡς ἔν τινι ταὐτῷ δεκτικῷ, &c.
336Ibid. b. 32-39. ἢ ὡς ἔν τινι ταὐτῷ δεκτικῷ, &c.
337Topic. VI. xiii. p. 151, a. 1-13. οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς ἕτερον αὐτων ἑκάτερον δεῖ λέγεσθαι οὔτε πρὸς ταὐτὸν τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας τέλος, οἷον πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους ἢ εἴ τι μᾶλλον τούτου τέλος.
337Topic. VI. xiii. p. 151, a. 1-13. οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς ἕτερον αὐτων ἑκάτερον δεῖ λέγεσθαι οὔτε πρὸς ταὐτὸν τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας τέλος, οἷον πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους ἢ εἴ τι μᾶλλον τούτου τέλος.
338Ibid. a. 14-19.
338Ibid. a. 14-19.
34. Perhaps the definition, while including two or more distinct parts, may be tendered in this form: The definiend is the composition of A and B;e.g., animal is the composition of soul and body. You will first note that the definer has not declared what sort of composition. There is a great difference between one mode of composition and another; the mode must be specialized. Both flesh and bone may be defined — a composition of fire, earth, and water; but one mode of composition makes flesh, another makes bone, out of these same elements. You may also take the farther objection that to define a compound as composition is erroneous; the two are essentially disparate, one of them being abstract, the other concrete.339
339Ibid. a. 20-31.
339Ibid. a. 20-31.
35. If the definiend be in its nature capable of receiving two contrary attributes, and if the respondent define it by one or other of them, you have an argument against him. If one of them is admissible, the other must be equally so; and upon this supposition there would be two distinct definitions of the same subject; which has been already declared impossible. Thus, it is wrong to define the soul as a substance which is recipient of knowledge; the soul is also recipient of ignorance.340