Chapter 40

51Ibid. viii. p. 170, a. 10.

52Metaphys.K.viii. p. 1064, b. 26: τοῦτο δὲ (τὸ συμβεβηκός) οὐδεμία ζητεῖ τῶν ὁμολογουμένως οὐσῶν ἐπιστημῶν,πλὴν ἡ σοφιστικήÂ· περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ αὕτη μόνη πραγματεύεται. Compare Analyt. Poster. I. ii. p. 71, b. 10.

53Topic. I, i. p. 100, b. 26: οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἔνδοξον καὶ ἔστιν ἔνδοξον. οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν λεγομένων ἔνδοξων ἐπιπόλαιον ἔχει παντελῶς τὴν φαντασίαν, καθάπερ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων ἀρχὰς συμβέβηκεν ἔχεινÂ· παραχρῆμα γὰρ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς καὶ μικρὰ συνορᾶν δυναμένοις κατάδηλος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ ψευδοῦς ἐστὶ φύσις. It is by reference to this distinction between ἔνδοξα which are genuine and ἔνδοξα which are only such in appearance that the Scholiast (p. 306, b. 40) explains the meaning of Aristotle in the eleventh chapter of Sophistici Elenchi: ὁ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα θεωρῶν τὰ κοινὰ διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ τοῦτο φαινομένως ποιῶν σοφιστικός (p. 171, b. 6-20). I confess that I attach no distinct meaning to the words κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα θεωρῶν τὰ κοινὰ, which characterizes the Dialectician as contrasted with the Sophist; nor can I learn much from the notes either of Waitz, or of Mr. Poste (p. 129, seq.) on the passage. Take for example the last half of the Parmenides of Plato, or BookB.of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Are we to say that in these two compositions Plato and Aristotle speculate on to τὰ κοινὰ κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα, or that they do so only in appearance?

54Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35; i. p. 165, a. 21-31.

Now, in regard to the distinction of aim or disposition drawn by Aristotle between the dialectical disputant and the litigious or sophistic disputant, we see at once, as was before suggested, that it lies apart from the critical estimate of art, science, or philosophy; and that it belongs, so far as it is well founded, to the estimate of individuals ethically and politically, as worthy men or patriotic citizens. Whether Euripides or Sophokles composed finer tragedies (as we find argued in the RanÃ¦ of Aristophanes), must be decided by examining the tragedies themselves, not by enquiring whether one of them was vain and greedy of money, the other free from these blemishes. A theorist who is laying down general principles of Rhetoric, and illustrating them by the study of Ã†schines and Demosthenes, will appreciate the oration against Ktesiphon and the oration De CoronÃ¢ in their character of compositions intended for a particular purpose. For Rhetoric it is of no moment whether Ã†schines was venal or disinterested â€” a malignant rival or an honest patriot; this is an enquiry important indeed, but belonging to the historian and not to the rhetorical theorist. WhetherAristotle was or was not guided, in his animadversions on Plato, by an unworthy and captious jealousy of his master, is an interesting question in reference to his character; but our appreciation of his philosophy must proceed upon an examination, not of his motives but, of his doctrines and reasonings as we find them. A good argument is not deprived of its force when enunciated by a knave, nor is a bad argument rendered good because it proceeds from a virtuous man. Indeed, so far as the character of the speaker counts at all, in falsifying the fair logical estimate of an argument, it operates in a direction opposite to that here indicated by Aristotle. The same argument in the mouth of one who is esteemed and admired counts for more than its worth; in the mouth of a person of low character it counts for less than it is worth.55To distribute arguments into two classes â€” those employed by persons of dishonourable character and those employed by honourable men â€” is a departure from the scientific character of Logic.

55Eurip. Hecub. 293.τὸ δâ€™ ἀξίωμα, κἂν καῶς λέγῃς, τὸ σὸνπείσειÂ· λόγος γὰρ ἔκ τâ€™ ἀδοξούντων ἰὼνκἂκ τῶν δοκούντων αὐτὸς οὐ ταὐτὸν σθένει.Aristot. Rhetoric. I. ii. p. 1356, a. 5-15.

55Eurip. Hecub. 293.

τὸ δâ€™ ἀξίωμα, κἂν καῶς λέγῃς, τὸ σὸνπείσειÂ· λόγος γὰρ ἔκ τâ€™ ἀδοξούντων ἰὼνκἂκ τῶν δοκούντων αὐτὸς οὐ ταὐτὸν σθένει.

Aristot. Rhetoric. I. ii. p. 1356, a. 5-15.

As to the other part of the case (if it is still necessary to recur to it), touching the peculiarity of the matter of sophistical arguments, the inconsistency of Aristotle is most apparent. In enumerating the Sophistical Refutations he tells us that these fallacies are indeed sometimes palpable and easily detected, but that they are often very difficult to detect and very misleading; that an unprepared hearer will generally be imposed upon by several of them, and even a scientific hearer by some; and that, even where the fallacy does not actually deceive, the proper mode of meeting and exposing it will not occur unless to one previously exercised in Dialectic.56That FallaciesIn Dictione, taken as a class (though these are what he declares to be the most usualmodus operandiof the sham dialecticians called Sophists57), often passed unperceived, and were hard to solve and elucidate even when perceived â€” we know to have been his opinion; for it is not only in the Topica and Sophistici Elenchi, but also in the Metaphysica and other works,58that he takes pains to analyse and discriminate the several distinct meaningsborne by terms familiar to every one, such asidem,unum,pulchrum,bonum,amare,album,acutum, &c., which terms therefore, when employed in argument, were always liable to introduce a fallacy of Equivocation or Amphiboly. He tells us the like in specifying the seven FallaciesExtra Dictionem: that they also were often unnoticed, and required vigilant practice to see through and solve. The description in detail, therefore, which Aristotle gives (in Sophistici Elenchi) of the working process peculiar to the litigious Sophist, is completely at variance with the definition which he had given of the sophistic syllogism at the commencement of the Topica. That definition is indeed suitable for thetype-specimenswhich he and other logicians give to illustrate this or that class of Fallacies: the type-specimen produced must carry absurdity on the face of it, so that the reader may at first sight recognize it as a fallacy; and he may even find difficulty in believing that any one can really be imposed upon by such trifling. But, though suitable for the type-specimen taken separately, this definition fails in the essential character which Aristotle postulates for a definition, since it is quite untrue and unsuitable for numerous instances of the class intended to be illustrated.59Aristotle was the first who attempted to distribute Fallacies into classes, such that, while in each class there were certain specimens palpably stamped with the fallacious character, there were also in each class an indefinite multitude of analogous cases wherein the fallacious character did not reveal itself openly or easily, but required attentive consideration to detect it, often indeed remaining undetected, and producing its natural fruit of error and confusion. This was one of his many great merits in regard to Logic; and the classification of Fallacies (modified as to details) has passed to all subsequent logicians, so that we find difficulty in understanding that the contemporaries of Sokrates and Plato had no idea of it. But the value of his service to Logic would be much lessened, if all fallacies were sophistic syllogisms, intended to deceive but never really deceiving, corresponding to his definition at the beginning of the Topica; if (as he tells us in the Sophistici Elenchi) they were only impudent forgeries put in circulation by a set of professional knaves called Sophists; and if all non-sophistical dialecticians, and all the world without, could betrusted as speaking correctly by nature and as never falling into them.

56Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 5-15, b. 5-35. καὶ λανθάνει πολλάκις οὐχ ἧττον αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐρωτῶντας τὸ τοιοῦτον. â€” vii. p. 169, a. 22-30, b. 8-15: ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν. â€” xv. p. 175, a. 20.

57Ibid. i. p. 165, a. 2-20.

58Topic. I. vii. p. 103, a. 6-39; p. 106, b. 3-9; p. 107, a. 12, b. 7: πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς λόγοις λανθάνει παρακολουθοῦν τὸ ὁμώνυμον. Cf. Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 33; V. ii. p. 129, b. 30, seq.; VI. x. p. 148, a. 23, seq. Soph. El. x. p. 171, a. 17.Compare also BookΔ.of the Metaphysica, and the frequent recognition and analysis τῶν πολλάκῶς λεγομένων throughout the other Books of the Metaphysica.

Compare also BookΔ.of the Metaphysica, and the frequent recognition and analysis τῶν πολλάκῶς λεγομένων throughout the other Books of the Metaphysica.

59Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 26: δεῖ γὰρ τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμὸν κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀληθεύεσθαι. â€” VI. x. p. 148, x. p. 148, b. 2: δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ συνώνυμον ἐφαρμόττειν.Whoever reads the Sixth Book of the Topica, wherein Aristotle indicates to the questionerLocifor impugning a definition, will see how little this definition of the Sophistic Syllogism will stand such attacks.

59Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 26: δεῖ γὰρ τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμὸν κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀληθεύεσθαι. â€” VI. x. p. 148, x. p. 148, b. 2: δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ συνώνυμον ἐφαρμόττειν.

Whoever reads the Sixth Book of the Topica, wherein Aristotle indicates to the questionerLocifor impugning a definition, will see how little this definition of the Sophistic Syllogism will stand such attacks.

The appeal made by Aristotle to a difference of character and motives as the distinction between the Dialectician and the Sophist is all the more misplaced, because he himself lays down as the essential feature of Dialectic generally, that it is a match or contention between two rivals, each anxious to obtain the victory. It is like a match at chess between two expert players, or a fencing-match between two celebrated masters at arms. Its very nature is to be an attack and defence, in which each combatant resorts to stratagem, and each outwits the other if he can. Whether the match is played for money or for nothing â€” whether the contentious spirit is more or less intense â€” does not concern the theorist on dialectical procedure. It is indispensable that both the questioner and the respondent should exert their full force, the one in thrusting, the other in parrying: if they do not, the purpose of Dialectic, which is the common business of both, will not be attained. That purpose is clearly declared by Aristotle. It is not didactic: he distinguishes it expressly from teaching,60where one man who knows communicates such knowledge to an ignorant pupil. It is gymnastic, exercising the promptitude and invention of both parties; or peirastic, testing whether the respondent knows a given thesis in such manner as to avoid being driven into answers inconsistent with each other or notoriously false.61Each party seeks, not to help or enlighten but, to puzzle and defeat the other. As at chess or in fencing, to mask oneâ€™s projects and deceive the adversary is essential to the work and to its purpose; each expects it from the other, and undertakes to meet and parry it. The theses debated were always such that arguments might be found both for the affirmative and for the negative.

60Soph. El. ii. p. 165, b. 1-5; x. p. 171, a. 32-b. 2. Cf. Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 25.

61Topic. I. i. p. 100, a. 20; VIII. i. p. 155, b. 10-28.

According to Aristotle himself, therefore, the Dialectician is agonistic and eristic, just as much as the Sophist. If the one tries to entrap his opponent for the purpose of victory, so also does the other: the line which Aristotle draws between them is one not founded upon any real distinction between two purposes and modes of procedure, but is merely verbal and sentimental; putting aside under a discredited title what he himself disliked. He admits that the dialectical questioner, whenever the thesis which he undertakes to refute is true, can never refute it except by inducing the respondent to concede what is false; that, evenwhere the thesis is false, he often can only refute it by some other incompatible falsehood, because he cannot obtain from the respondent better premisses; that, where the thesis is probable and conformable to received opinion, his only way of refuting it is by entrapping the respondent into concessions paradoxical and contrary to received opinion.62But these ends â€” fallacious refutation, falsehood, and paradox â€” are the very same as those which Aristotle (in the Sophistici Elenchi)63sets forth as the peculiar characteristics of the litigious Sophist. And the improving intellectual tendencies which he ascribes to Sophistic, are almost identical with those attributed to Dialectic, being declared in very similar words.64That there were dialecticians of every degree of merit, in the time of Aristotle, cannot be doubted; some clever and ready, others stupid and destitute of invention. But that there were any two classes of dialecticians such as he describes and contrasts â€” one heretical class, called Sophists, who purposely and habitually employed the thirteen fallacious refutations, and another orthodox class who purposely avoided or habitually abstained from them â€” we may most reasonably doubt. If the argument in the Sophistici Elenchi is good at all, it is good against all Dialectic. The Sophist, as Aristotle describes him, is only the Dialectician looked at on the unfavourable side and painted by an enemy. We know that there were in Greece many enemies of Dialectic generally; the intense antipathy inspired by the cross-examining colloquy of Sokrates, and attested by his own declarations, is a sufficient proof of this. The enemies of Sokrates depicted him â€” as Aristotle depicts the Sophist in the Sophistici Elenchi â€” as a clever fabricator of fallacious contradictions and puzzles; to which Aristotle adds the farther charge (advanced by Plato before him) against the Sophist, of arguing for lucre â€” which is an irrelevant charge, travelling out of the region of art, and bearing on the personal character of the individual. If the sophistical stratagems were discreditable and mischievous when exhibited for money, they would be no less such if exhibited gratuitously. The sophistical discourse is not (as Aristotle would have us believe) generically distinguishable from the dialectical;65nor is Sophistic an art distinct from Dialectic while adjoining to it, but an inseparable portion of the tissue of Dialectic itself.66If the Sophist passed himself off asknowing what he did not really know, so also did the Dialectician; as we know from the testimony of Sokrates, the most consummate master of the art. The conflict of two minds each taking advantage of the misconceptions, short-comings, and blindness of the other, is the essential feature of Dialectic as Aristotle conceives it; to which the eight books of his Topica are adapted, with their multiplicity of distinctions and precepts both for attack and defence. There cannot be a game of chess without stratagems, nor a fencing-match without feints; the power of such aggressive deception is one characteristic mark of a good player. Those who teach or theorize on the game do not seek to exclude stratagem, but furnish precautions to prevent it from succeeding. Mastery of the art assumes skill in defence as well as in attack.

62Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 24.

63Soph. El. iii. p. 165, b. 14.

64Compare Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26-b. 4, with Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16.

65Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 32; xxxiv. p. 183, b. 1.

66Plato, Apol. Sokrat. p. 23, A.Compare this with Aristot. Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 30.

66Plato, Apol. Sokrat. p. 23, A.

Compare this with Aristot. Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 30.

Doubtless there are rules that require to be observed in the dialectical attack and defence, as there are rules for all other matches such as chess or fencing. I should have been glad if Aristotle had given a precise and tenable explanation what these rules were. He describes the Sophist as one who plays the game unfairly; but we have already seen that the ends pursued by the Dialectician generally are hardly at all distinguishable from those aimed at by the Sophist. If we look to the account of the means employed by one and the other, we shall in like manner fail to see how any real line can be drawn between them.

Thus, one proceeding declared to be characteristic of the Sophist is â€” that he puts multiplied questions apparently at random, without any visible bearing on the thesis; practising a sort of fishing examination, in order to obtain some answer of which he may take advantage.67But, when we turn to the Eighth Book of the Topica, we find Aristotle expressly recommending the like manÅ“uvre to the Dialectician; advising him to conceal as much as possible the scheme and intended series of his questions â€” to begin as far as possible apart from the thesis, to put the questions in a succession designedly incoherent and unintelligible, and to obtain (what, if obtained, ensured complete success) the full extent of premisses necessary for his final refutative syllogism, without the respondent being aware that he had conceded them.68The questioner is farther advised to throwthe respondent off his guard by affecting indifference whether each question is answered affirmatively or negatively, and by occasionally taking objection against himself, in order that he may create the impression of a strictly honest purpose.69If we compare the interrogative procedure which Aristotle recommends to the Dialectician with that which he blames in the Sophist, we shall find that the former is even a greater refinement of deception than the latter.

67Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 9-25.Aristotle treats the Sophists as guilty of dishonourable proceeding herein â€” δύνανται δὲ νῦν ἧττονκατουργεῖνδιὰ τούτων ἢ πρότερον. The very same charge was urged against the dialectic of Sokrates by his opponents: Plato, Hippias Minor, p. 373 â€” ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης ἀεὶ ταράττει ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἔοικεν ὥσπερ κακουργοῦντι. Compare Plato, Gorgias, pp. 461, B., 482, E., 483, A.

67Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 9-25.

Aristotle treats the Sophists as guilty of dishonourable proceeding herein â€” δύνανται δὲ νῦν ἧττονκατουργεῖνδιὰ τούτων ἢ πρότερον. The very same charge was urged against the dialectic of Sokrates by his opponents: Plato, Hippias Minor, p. 373 â€” ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης ἀεὶ ταράττει ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἔοικεν ὥσπερ κακουργοῦντι. Compare Plato, Gorgias, pp. 461, B., 482, E., 483, A.

68Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 1.-p. 155, b. 30; p. 156, a. 5-22. Compare Analyt. Priora, II. xix. p. 66, a. 33.

69Topic. VIII. i. p. 156, b. 3, 17. Compare VIII. i. pp. 155-156, with Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 28.

The next trick which we find ascribed to the Sophist is â€” that he conducts the train of interrogation in such manner as to bring it upon a ground on which his memory is abundantly furnished with topics. Aristotle adds that this may be done well and honourably, or ill and dishonourably.70From his own admission we see that this practice was not peculiar to Sophists, but was common also to those whom he calls Dialecticians: like every other part of the procedure, it might be done well or ill; but wherein this difference consisted he does not further explain. Indeed, when we recollect that the elaborate details and classification of the Topica are mainly intended to furnish the memory with an abundant store of premisses well-arranged and ready for interrogation,71we may be sure that every Dialectician who had gone through the trouble of learning them would be impatient to apply them; and would make an opportunity for doing so, if none were spontaneously tendered to him. But, if the answers obtained were totally irrelevant to his final purpose of refuting the thesis, they would be nothing but embarrassment to him.72We must, therefore, understand that the questions put would be such as tended ultimately to introduce that refutative Syllogism which the questioner was bound to conclude with. If they were not, he was of course punished by failure.

70Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 26. In Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 20, Aristotle prescribes the same procedure to the Dialectician. See also Waitzâ€™s note on the passage.Alexander (in Scholia, p. 267, b. 8) tells us that it was customary for the Sophists to put questions lying away from the thesis, and he shows this by mentioning the Platonic Protagoras, in which he says that the Sophist Protagoras does so. But the illustration here produced does not serve Alexanderâ€™s purpose. The Sophist Protagoras (in the Platonic dialogue so called) is represented, not as shifting dialectic from one point to another, but as running away from it altogether into long discourse and continuous rhetoric (Plato, Protagor. pp. 333, 334, 335). In respect to the thesis started for debate, the dialectic of Sokrates departs from it as widely as that of Protagoras, and this is acknowledged at the close of the dialogue, p. 361. Compare â€˜Plato and the Other Companions of Sokratesâ€™, Vol. II. pp.53,59,70.

70Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 26. In Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 20, Aristotle prescribes the same procedure to the Dialectician. See also Waitzâ€™s note on the passage.

Alexander (in Scholia, p. 267, b. 8) tells us that it was customary for the Sophists to put questions lying away from the thesis, and he shows this by mentioning the Platonic Protagoras, in which he says that the Sophist Protagoras does so. But the illustration here produced does not serve Alexanderâ€™s purpose. The Sophist Protagoras (in the Platonic dialogue so called) is represented, not as shifting dialectic from one point to another, but as running away from it altogether into long discourse and continuous rhetoric (Plato, Protagor. pp. 333, 334, 335). In respect to the thesis started for debate, the dialectic of Sokrates departs from it as widely as that of Protagoras, and this is acknowledged at the close of the dialogue, p. 361. Compare â€˜Plato and the Other Companions of Sokratesâ€™, Vol. II. pp.53,59,70.

71Topic. I. v. p. 102, a. 13; I. xiii. p. 105, a. 22; VIII. xiv. p. 163, a. 31-b. 2.

72Aristotle himself observes this, Topic. II. v. p. 112, a. 14.

A third manÅ“uvre treated as peculiar to the Sophist is â€” thathe takes account of the particular philosophical sect to which the respondent belongs, and endeavours to bring out by interrogations whatever there may be paradoxical in the tenets of that sect.73But would not any expert Dialectician do just the same? What else would be done by Sokrates, if cross-examining an Anaxagorean or a Herakleitean? or by Aristotle himself, if interrogating a Platonist?

73Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 29.

Another proceeding treated as peculiar to the Sophist is â€” that he seeks to drive the respondent into a paradox, by bringing out in cross-examination certain well-known antitheses or contradictions which subsist together in the opinions of mankind. Thus, men profess in their public talk high principles of virtue; but secretly and at the bottom of their hearts they desire to get wealth or powerper fas et nefas. Again, there are two kinds of justice: one, that which is just by nature and in truth, such as wise men or philosophers approve; the other, that which is just according to law or custom, such as the multitude in this or in in some other society approve. There is, also, conflict between the authority of a father, and that of the wise; between justice and expediency; and as to whether it is more eligible to suffer wrong or to do wrong.74All these antitheses are presented to us in the Platonic Gorgias, to which (i.e., to the speech of Kallikles therein) Aristotle here makes reference; and he numbers it among the vices distinguishing the Sophist from the genuine Dialectician â€” to dwell upon such antitheses for the purpose of forcing the respondent into paradoxical answers. But, surely, the antitheses here fastened upon that obnoxious name are of a class utterly opposed to the class ofpseudo-probabilia, which he tells us are the peculiar game of the litigious Sophist, though every man of ordinary intelligence detects them at first sight as fallacies. They are all real and serious issues,75having plausible argumentsproandcon, debateable without end, and settled by every man for himself according to his own sentiment and predisposition. They are exactly the subject-matter best fitted for the acute Dialectician. No man would be allowed by Aristotle to deserve that title, if he omitted to raise and argue them, the thesis being supposed suitable.76Aristotle himself speaks often of the equivocalsense of the term justice â€” of the distinction between what is just by nature and what is just according to some local or peculiar sentiment.77The manÅ“uvre which Aristotle imputes to the Sophist being exactly the same as that which Kallikles imputes to Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias,78it is Sokrates, and not Kallikles, who serves here as illustrating what Aristotle calls a Sophist. Indeed, if we read the Gorgias, we shall find the Platonic Sokrates there represented as neglecting the difference between what is probable (conformable to received opinion) and what is paradoxical. He admits that he stands alone in his opinion, against all the world, and his opponents even imagine that he is bantering them; but he confides in his own individual reason and consistency, so as to be able to reduce all opponents dialectically to proved contradiction with themselves.79Himself maintaining a paradox, he constrains his respondent by acute dialectic to assent to it; which is exactly what Aristotle imputes to the Sophists of his day as a reproach.

74Ibid. b. 36-p. 173, a. 30.

75Rhetoric. II. xxv. p. 1402, a. 33: οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων, δοκοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν.A disputant who argued about these memorable ethical antitheses, must be allowed κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα θεωρεῖν τὰ κοινά, which is the characteristic feature assigned by Aristotle to the Dialectician, as contrasted with the Sophist (Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 5), in so far us I can understand the words κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα. Seenotebp. 394 supra.

75Rhetoric. II. xxv. p. 1402, a. 33: οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων, δοκοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν.

A disputant who argued about these memorable ethical antitheses, must be allowed κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα θεωρεῖν τὰ κοινά, which is the characteristic feature assigned by Aristotle to the Dialectician, as contrasted with the Sophist (Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 5), in so far us I can understand the words κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα. Seenotebp. 394 supra.

76Topic. I. iii. p. 101, a. 5-10. ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖν ἃ προαιρούμεθα.

77Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 25. Ethic. Nikom. V. x. p. 1134, b. 18; I. i. p. 1094, b. 15. Rhetoric. I. xiii. p. 1373, b. 5.

78Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-483. ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ (Sokrates) τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου.

79Plato, Gorgias, pp. 470, 472, 481, 482.

Some predecessors of Aristotle had distinguished arguments or discourses into two separate classes â€” those addressed to the name, and those addressed to the thought.80This distinction Aristotle disapproves, denying certainly its pertinence and almost its reality. There can be no arguments addressed to the thought only, apart from the name: all of them must be addressed to the name, and through it to the thought.81Whether an argument is addressed to the thought or not, depends not upon any thing in the argument itself, but upon the meaning which one respondent or other may happen to attach to the words: if the respondent understands it as the questioner intended, it is addressed to the thought; if not, not.82To require that the questioner shall distinguish accurately the sense in which he puts the question, would, according to Aristotle, convert him into a teacher â€” would confound the line between Dialectic and Didactic.83And this may be granted; but not less, if Dialecticians are to refrain fromall those proceedings which Aristotle notes and condemns as peculiar to the Sophist, must they be held to pass into the attitude of teacher and learner; the questioner doing what he can, not to embarrass but, to enlighten and assist the respondent. The purpose of victory, and the stimulus of competition in the double function of question and answer (while entirely absent from Didactic), are quite as essential to the Dialectician as to the Sophist. That the Sophist seeks victory unscrupulously and at all cost, while the Dialectician respects certain rules and limits of the procedure â€” is a difference well deserving to be noticed; yet not adifferentiagiving name and essence to a new species. The unfair Dialectician is a Dialectician still; all his purposes remain the same, though the means whereby he pursues them are altered. This distinction of means between the two, Aristotle has taken very insufficient pains to point out. Rude and provocative manner, either on the part of questioner or respondent, and impudent assumption of concessions which have neither been asked nor granted, â€” these are justly enumerated as illustrations of unfair Dialectic.84But the enumeration is most incompletely performed; because Aristotle, in his anxiety to erect Sophistic into an art or procedure by itself, distinct from and alongside of Dialectic, has transferred to it much that belongs to fair and and admissible Dialectic. Hence the really unfair and objectionable means are not often brought into the foreground.

80Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 12: οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ τῶνἣν λέγουσι τινες, τὸ εἶναι τοὺς μὲν πρὸς τοὔνομα λόγους, ἑτέρους δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν.From this allusion (and other allusions also xvii. p. 176, a. 6; xx. p. 177, b. 8; xxii. p. 178, b. 10) to the doctrines of predecessors, we see that the assertion made by Aristotle (in the last chapter of Sophistici Elenchi) of his own originality, and of the absence of prior researches, must be taken with some indulgence.

80Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 12: οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ τῶνἣν λέγουσι τινες, τὸ εἶναι τοὺς μὲν πρὸς τοὔνομα λόγους, ἑτέρους δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν.

From this allusion (and other allusions also xvii. p. 176, a. 6; xx. p. 177, b. 8; xxii. p. 178, b. 10) to the doctrines of predecessors, we see that the assertion made by Aristotle (in the last chapter of Sophistici Elenchi) of his own originality, and of the absence of prior researches, must be taken with some indulgence.

81Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 23.

82Ibid. b. 28: οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἔστι τὸ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι, ἀλλâ€™ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἔχειν πως πρὸς τὰ δεδομένα.

83Ibid. p. 171, a. 28, seq.

84Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 22, b. 10.

Though Aristotle speaks so contemptuously about Sophistic, he nevertheless indicatesLoci(or general heads of subjects) to assist the sophistical questioner in attacking, and precepts to the sophistical respondent for warding off attack. On the whole, these precepts are not materially different from those laid out in the Topica for Dialectic; except that he gives greater prominence to Solecism and Tautology, as thrusts practised by the sophistical questioner. He insists upon the intellectual usefulness of practice in sophistical debate, hardly less than in what he calls dialectical, and, as was remarked, upon similar grounds.85He recommends it as valuable not only for imparting readiness and abundance in argument, but also for solitary meditation and for investigation of scientific truths. Without it (he declares) we cannot become familiar with the equivocations of terms and propositions, nor acquire the means of escaping them. If we allow ourselves to be entangled in them, without being aware of it, by others, we shall also be entangled in them when wepursue reflections of our own.86It is not enough to see generally that thereisa fallacy; we must farther learn to detect at once the precise seat of the fallacy, and to point out rapidly how it may be cleared up. This is the more difficult to do, because fallacies that we are thoroughly aware of will often escape our notice under inversion and substitution of words.87Unless we acquire promptitude by frequent exercise in such debates, we shall find ourselves always unprepared and behind-hand in each particular case of confusion. If we complain and condemn such debates generally, we shall appear to do so upon no better grounds than our own stupidity and incompetence.88

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