62Aristot. De Animâ, II. xii. p. 424, a. 19.
62Aristot. De Animâ, II. xii. p. 424, a. 19.
63Ibid. a. 24: αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις, &c. — III. xii. p. 434, a. 29.
63Ibid. a. 24: αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις, &c. — III. xii. p. 434, a. 29.
64Ibid. III. ii. p. 425, b. 25: ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ’ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. — II. v. p. 418, a. 3: τὸ δ’ αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, — πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ’ ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο. Also p. 417, a. 7, 14, 20.There were conflicting doctrines current in Aristotle’s time: some said that, for an agent to act upon a patient, there must belikenessbetween the two; others said that there must beunlikeness. Aristotle dissents from both, and adopts a sort of intermediate doctrine.
64Ibid. III. ii. p. 425, b. 25: ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ’ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. — II. v. p. 418, a. 3: τὸ δ’ αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, — πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ’ ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο. Also p. 417, a. 7, 14, 20.
There were conflicting doctrines current in Aristotle’s time: some said that, for an agent to act upon a patient, there must belikenessbetween the two; others said that there must beunlikeness. Aristotle dissents from both, and adopts a sort of intermediate doctrine.
The sentient soul is communicated by the male parent in the act of generation,65and is complete from the moment of birth, not requiring a process of teaching after birth; the sentient subject becomes at once and instantly, in regard to sense, on a level with one that has attained a certain actuality of cognition, but is not at the moment reflecting upon thecognitum. Potentiality and Actuality are in fact distinguishable into lower and higher degrees; the Potential that has been actualized in a first or lower stage, is still a Potential relatively to higher stages of Actuality.66The Potential may be acted upon in two opposite ways; either by deadening and extinguishing it, or by developing and carrying it forward to realization. The sentient soul, when asleep or inert, requires a cause to stimulate it into actual seeing or hearing; the noëtic or cognizant soul, under like circumstances, must also be stimulated into actual meditation on itscognitum. But there is this difference between the two. The sentient soul communes with particulars; the noëtic soul withuniversals. The sentient soul derives its stimulus from without, and from some of the individual objects, tangible, visible, or audible; but the noëtic soul is put into action by the abstract and universal, which is in a certain sensewithinthe soul itself; so that a man can at any time meditate on what he pleases, but he cannot see or hear what he pleases, or anything except such visible or audible objects as are at hand.67
65Aristot. De Gener. Animal. II. v. p. 741, a. 13, b. 7; De Animâ, II. v. p. 417, b. 17.
65Aristot. De Gener. Animal. II. v. p. 741, a. 13, b. 7; De Animâ, II. v. p. 417, b. 17.
66Aristot. De Animâ, II. v. p. 417, b. 18-32. See above, p. 457,notea.The extent of Potentiality, or the partial Actuality, which Aristotle claims for the sentient soul even at birth, deserves to be kept in mind; we shall contrast it presently with what he says about the Noûs.
66Aristot. De Animâ, II. v. p. 417, b. 18-32. See above, p. 457,notea.
The extent of Potentiality, or the partial Actuality, which Aristotle claims for the sentient soul even at birth, deserves to be kept in mind; we shall contrast it presently with what he says about the Noûs.
67Aristot. De Animâ, II. v. p. 417, b. 22: αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι, τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ δ’ ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου· ταῦτα δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ πώς ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ. III. iii. p. 427, b. 18.
67Aristot. De Animâ, II. v. p. 417, b. 22: αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι, τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ δ’ ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου· ταῦτα δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ πώς ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ. III. iii. p. 427, b. 18.
We have already remarked, that in many animals the sentient soul is little developed; being confined in some to the sense of touch (which can never be wanting),68and in others to touch and taste. But even this minimum of sense — though small, if compared with the variety of senses in man — is a prodigious step in advance of plants; it comprises a certain cognition, and within its own sphere it is always critical, comparing, discriminative.69The sentient soul possesses this discriminative faculty in common with the noëtic soul or Intelligence, though applied to different objects and purposes; and possesses such faculty, because it is itself a mean or middle term between the two sensible extremes of which it takes cognizance, — hot and cold, hard and soft, wet and dry, white and black, acute and grave, bitter and sweet, light and darkness, visible and invisible, tangible and intangible, &c. We feel no sensation at all when the object touched is exactly of the same temperature with ourselves, neither hotter nor colder; the sentient soul, being a mean between the two extremes, is stimulated to assimilate itself for the time to either of them, according as it is acted upon from without. It thus makes comparison of each with the other, and of both with its own mean.70Lastly, the sentient faculty in the soul is really one and indivisible, though distinguishable logically or by abstraction into different genera and species.71Of that faculty the central physical organ is the heart, which contains the congenital or animal spirit. The Aristotelian psychology is here remarkable, affirming as it does the essential relativity of allphenomena of sense to the appreciative condition of the sentient; as well as the constant implication of intellectual and discriminative comparison among them.
68Ibid. III. xii. p. 434, b. 23: φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ ἁφῆς εἶναι ζῷον.
68Ibid. III. xii. p. 434, b. 23: φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ ἁφῆς εἶναι ζῷον.
69Ibid. ix. p. 432, a. 16: τῷ κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ αἰσθήσεως. — III. iii. p. 427, a. 20; p. 426, b. 10-15. De Generat. Animal. I. xxiii. p. 731, a. 30-b. 5; De Somno et Vigil. i. p. 458,b. 2. The sentient faculty is called δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικήν in Analyt. Poster. II. xix. p. 99, b. 35.
69Ibid. ix. p. 432, a. 16: τῷ κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ αἰσθήσεως. — III. iii. p. 427, a. 20; p. 426, b. 10-15. De Generat. Animal. I. xxiii. p. 731, a. 30-b. 5; De Somno et Vigil. i. p. 458,b. 2. The sentient faculty is called δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικήν in Analyt. Poster. II. xix. p. 99, b. 35.
70Aristot. De Animâ, II. x. p. 422, a. 20; ix. p. 421, b. 4-11; xi. p. 424, a. 5: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά â€” τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν. III. vii. p. 431, a. 10: ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα. III. xiii. p. 435, a. 21.He remarks that plants have no similar μεσότης — II. xii. p. 424, b. 1.
70Aristot. De Animâ, II. x. p. 422, a. 20; ix. p. 421, b. 4-11; xi. p. 424, a. 5: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά â€” τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν. III. vii. p. 431, a. 10: ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα. III. xiii. p. 435, a. 21.
He remarks that plants have no similar μεσότης — II. xii. p. 424, b. 1.
71Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vii. p. 449, a. 8, 17. De Motu Animal. x. p. 703, a. 15. De Somno et Vigil. ii. p. 455, a. 15, 21, 35; p. 456, a. 5. De Juventute et Senect. p. 467, b. 27; p. 469, a. 4-12.
71Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vii. p. 449, a. 8, 17. De Motu Animal. x. p. 703, a. 15. De Somno et Vigil. ii. p. 455, a. 15, 21, 35; p. 456, a. 5. De Juventute et Senect. p. 467, b. 27; p. 469, a. 4-12.
All the objects generating sensible perception, are magnitudes.72Some perceptions are peculiar to one sense alone, as colour to the eye, &c. Upon these we never make mistakes directly; in other words, we always judge rightly what is the colour or what is the sound, though we are often deceived in judging what the thing coloured is, or where the sonorous object is.73There are, however, some perceivables not peculiar to any one sense alone, but appreciable by two or more; though chiefly and best by the sense of vision; such are motion, rest, number, figure, magnitude. Here the appreciation becomes less accurate, yet it is still made directly by sense.74But there are yet other matters that, though not directly affecting sense, are perceived indirectly, or by way of accompaniment to what is directly perceived. Thus we see a white object; nothing else affecting our senseexceptits whiteness. Beyond this, however, we judge and declare, that the object so seen is the son of Kleon. This is a judgment obtained indirectly, or by way of accompaniment; byaccident, so to speak, inasmuch as the same does not accompany all sensations of white. It is here that we are most liable to error.75
72Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vii. p. 449, a. 20: τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν ἐστὶ μέγεθος.
72Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vii. p. 449, a. 20: τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν ἐστὶ μέγεθος.
73Aristot. De Animâ, II. vi. p. 418, a. 10-16.
73Aristot. De Animâ, II. vi. p. 418, a. 10-16.
74Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, i. p. 437, a. 8; iv. p. 442, b. 4-12. He says in this last passage, that the common perceivables are appreciableat least by both sight and touch— if not by all the senses.
74Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, i. p. 437, a. 8; iv. p. 442, b. 4-12. He says in this last passage, that the common perceivables are appreciableat least by both sight and touch— if not by all the senses.
75Aristot. De Animâ, II. vi. p. 418, a. 7-25: λέγεται δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τριχῶς, ὧν δύο μὲν καθ’ αὑτά φαμεν αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἓν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Also, III. i. p. 425, b. 24; iii. p. 428, b. 18-25.
75Aristot. De Animâ, II. vi. p. 418, a. 7-25: λέγεται δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τριχῶς, ὧν δύο μὲν καθ’ αὑτά φαμεν αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἓν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Also, III. i. p. 425, b. 24; iii. p. 428, b. 18-25.
Among the five senses, Aristotle distinguishes two as operating by direct contact between subject and object (touch, taste); three as operating through an external intervening medium (vision, smell, taste). He begins with Vision, which he regards as possessing most completely the nature and characteristics of a sense.76The direct and proper object of vision is colour. Now colour operates upon the eye not immediately (for, if the coloured object be placed in contact with the eye, there will be no vision), but by causing movements or perturbations in the external intervening medium, air or water, which affect the sense through an appropriate agency of their own.77Thisagency is, according to Aristotle, the Diaphanous or Transparent. When actual or in energy, the transparent is called light; when potential or in capacity only, it is called darkness. The eye is of watery structure, apt for receiving these impressions.78It is the presence either of fire, or of something analogous to the celestial body, that calls forth the diaphanous from the state of potentiality into that of actuality or light; in which latter condition it is stimulated by colour. The diaphanous, whether as light or as darkness, is a peculiar nature or accompaniment, not substantive in itself, but inherent chiefly in the First or Celestial Body, yet also in air, water, glass, precious stones, and in all bodies to a greater or less degree.79The diaphanous passes at once and simultaneously, in one place as well as in another, from potentiality to actuality — from darkness to light. Light does not take time to travel from one place to another, as sound and smell do.80The diaphanous is not a body, nor effluvium from a body, nor any one of the elements: it is of an adjective character — a certain agency or attribute pervading or belonging to bodies, along with their extension.81Colour marks and defines the surface of the bodyquâdiaphanous, as figure defines itquâextended. Colour makes the diaphanous itself visible, and its own varieties visible through the diaphanous. Air and water are transparent throughout, though with an ill-defined superficial colour. White and black, as colours in solid bodies, correspond to the condition of light or darkness in air. There are some luminous objects visible in the dark, as fire, fungous matter, eyes, and scales of fish, &c., though they have no appropriate colour.82There areseven species or varieties of colours, but all of them proceed from white and black, blended in different proportions, or seen one through another; white and black are the two extremes, the other varieties being intermediate between them.
76Aristot. De Animâ, III. iii. p. 429, a. 2: ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἰσθησίς ἐστιν. Also Metaphysica,A.init.
76Aristot. De Animâ, III. iii. p. 429, a. 2: ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἰσθησίς ἐστιν. Also Metaphysica,A.init.
77Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 419, a. 12, 14, 19; Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, iii. p. 440, a. 18: ὥστ’ εὐθὺς κρεῖττον φάναι, τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ γίνεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ ταῖς ἀποῤῥοίαις. — Ib. ii. p. 438, b. 3: εἴτε φῶς εἴτ’ ἀήρ ἐστι τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ὁρωμένου καὶ τοῦ ὄμματος, ἡ διὰ τούτου κίνησίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιοῦσα τὸ ὁρᾶν.
77Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 419, a. 12, 14, 19; Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, iii. p. 440, a. 18: ὥστ’ εὐθὺς κρεῖττον φάναι, τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ γίνεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ ταῖς ἀποῤῥοίαις. — Ib. ii. p. 438, b. 3: εἴτε φῶς εἴτ’ ἀήρ ἐστι τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ὁρωμένου καὶ τοῦ ὄμματος, ἡ διὰ τούτου κίνησίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιοῦσα τὸ ὁρᾶν.
78Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 419, a. 9: τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ χρώματι εἶναι, τὸ κινητικῷ εἶναι τοῦ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς φῶς ἐστίν. — Ib. ii. p. 418, b. 11-17: ὅταν ᾖ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου οἷον τὸ ἄνω σῶμα· — πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ.
78Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 419, a. 9: τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ χρώματι εἶναι, τὸ κινητικῷ εἶναι τοῦ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς φῶς ἐστίν. — Ib. ii. p. 418, b. 11-17: ὅταν ᾖ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου οἷον τὸ ἄνω σῶμα· — πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ.
79Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 418, b. 4. De Sensu et Sensili, ii. p. 438, a. 14, b. 7; iii. p. 439, a. 21, seq.: ὃ δὲ λέγομεν διαφανές, οὐκ ἔστιν ἴδιον ἀέρος ἢ ὕδατος, οὐδ’ ἄλλου τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων σωμάτων, ἀλλά τίς ἐστὶ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ δύναμις, ἣ χωριστὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐν τούτοις δ’ ἐστί, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν ἐνυπάρχει, τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον τοῖς δ’ ἧττον.
79Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 418, b. 4. De Sensu et Sensili, ii. p. 438, a. 14, b. 7; iii. p. 439, a. 21, seq.: ὃ δὲ λέγομεν διαφανές, οὐκ ἔστιν ἴδιον ἀέρος ἢ ὕδατος, οὐδ’ ἄλλου τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων σωμάτων, ἀλλά τίς ἐστὶ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ δύναμις, ἣ χωριστὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐν τούτοις δ’ ἐστί, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν ἐνυπάρχει, τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον τοῖς δ’ ἧττον.
80Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vi. p. 446, a. 23, seq., b. 27: τῷ εἶναι γάρ τι φῶς ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὐ κίνησίς τις. Empedokles affirmed that light travelling from the Sun reached the intervening space before it came to the earth; Aristotle contradicts him.
80Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vi. p. 446, a. 23, seq., b. 27: τῷ εἶναι γάρ τι φῶς ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὐ κίνησίς τις. Empedokles affirmed that light travelling from the Sun reached the intervening space before it came to the earth; Aristotle contradicts him.
81Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 418, b. 18: ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος στέρησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἐκ διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡτούτου παρουσίαφῶς ἐστίν. — Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, iii. p. 439, a. 26: ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ φωτὸς φύσις ἐν ἀὀρίστῳ τῷ διαφανεῖ ἐστίν· τοῦ δ’ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι διαφανοῦς τὸ ἔσχατον, ὅτι μὲν εἴη ἄν τι, δῆλον· ὅτι δὲ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ χρῶμα, ἔκ τῶν συμβαινόντων φανερόν. — ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος πέρατι, ἀλλ’ οὔ τι τὸ τοῦ σώματος πέρας, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν δεῖ νομίζειν, ἥπερ καὶ ἔξω χρωματίζεται, ταύτην καὶ ἐντός.
81Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 418, b. 18: ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος στέρησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἐκ διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡτούτου παρουσίαφῶς ἐστίν. — Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, iii. p. 439, a. 26: ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ φωτὸς φύσις ἐν ἀὀρίστῳ τῷ διαφανεῖ ἐστίν· τοῦ δ’ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι διαφανοῦς τὸ ἔσχατον, ὅτι μὲν εἴη ἄν τι, δῆλον· ὅτι δὲ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ χρῶμα, ἔκ τῶν συμβαινόντων φανερόν. — ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος πέρατι, ἀλλ’ οὔ τι τὸ τοῦ σώματος πέρας, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν δεῖ νομίζειν, ἥπερ καὶ ἔξω χρωματίζεται, ταύτην καὶ ἐντός.
82Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 419, a. 2-25; Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, iv. p. 442, a. 20, — seven colours.
82Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 419, a. 2-25; Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, iv. p. 442, a. 20, — seven colours.
The same necessity for an intervening medium external to the subject, as in the case of vision, prevails also in the senses of hearing and smell. If the audible or odorous object be placed in contact with its organ of sense, there will be no hearing or smell. Whenever we hear or smell any object, there must be interposed between us and the object a suitable medium that shall be affected first; while the organ of sense will be affected secondarily through that medium. Air is the medium in regard to sound, both air and water in regard to smell; but there seems besides (analogous to the transparent in regard to vision) a special agency called the Trans-Sonant, which pervades air and enables it to transmit sound; and certainly another special agency called the Trans-Olfacient, which pervades both air and water, and enables them to transmit smell.83(It seems thus that something like a luminiferous ether — extended, mobile, and permeating bodies, yet still incorporeal in itself — was an hypothesis as old as Aristotle; and one other ether besides, analogous in property and purpose — an odoriferous ether; perhaps a third or soniferous ether, but this is less distinctly specified by Aristotle.)
83Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 419, a. 25-35; De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 442, b. 30; Themistius ad Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii., viii. p. 115, Spengel. Of the three names, τὸ διαφανές — τὸ διηχές — τὸ δίοσμον, the last two are not distinctly stated by Aristotle, but are said to have been first applied by Theophrastus after him. See the notes of Trendelenburg and Torstrick; the latter supposes Themistius to have had before him a fuller and better text of Aristotle than that which we now possess, which seems corrupt. In our present text, the transparent as well as the trans-olfacient ether are clearly indicated, the trans-sonant not clearly.
83Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 419, a. 25-35; De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 442, b. 30; Themistius ad Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii., viii. p. 115, Spengel. Of the three names, τὸ διαφανές — τὸ διηχές — τὸ δίοσμον, the last two are not distinctly stated by Aristotle, but are said to have been first applied by Theophrastus after him. See the notes of Trendelenburg and Torstrick; the latter supposes Themistius to have had before him a fuller and better text of Aristotle than that which we now possess, which seems corrupt. In our present text, the transparent as well as the trans-olfacient ether are clearly indicated, the trans-sonant not clearly.
Sound, according to Aristotle, arises from the shock of two or more solid bodies communicated to the air. It implies local movement in one at least of those bodies. Many soft bodies are incapable of making sound; those best suited for it are such as metals, hard in structure, smooth in surface, hollow in shape. The blow must be smart and quick, otherwise the air slips away and dissipates itself before the sound can be communicated to it.84Sound is communicated through the air to the organ of hearing; the air is onecontinuum(not composed of adjacent particles with interspaces), and a wave is propagated from itto the internal ear, which contains some air enclosed in the sinuous ducts within the membrane of the tympanum, congenitally attached to the organ itself, and endued with a certain animation.85This internal air within the ear, excited by the motion propagated from the external ear, causes hearing. The ear is enabled to appreciate accurately the movements of the external air, because it has itself little or no movement within. We cannot hear with any other part of the body; because it is only in the ear that nature has given us this stock of internal air. If water gets into the ear, we cannot hear at all; because the wave generated in the air without, cannot propagate itself within. Nor can we hear, if the membrane of the ear be disordered; any more than we can see, when the membrane of the eye is disordered.86
84Aristot. De Animâ,II. viii.p. 419, b. 4 seq. He calls air ψαθυρός, εὔθρυπτος (p. 420, a. 1-8), — εὐδιαίρετος, εὐόλισθος (Themistius, pp. 116, 117, Sp.) — “quod facilé diffluitâ€� (Trendelenburg, Comm. p. 384). He says that for sonorous purposes air ought to be ἀθροῦν — compact or dense: sound reverberates best from metals with smooth surface, p. 420, a. 25.
84Aristot. De Animâ,II. viii.p. 419, b. 4 seq. He calls air ψαθυρός, εὔθρυπτος (p. 420, a. 1-8), — εὐδιαίρετος, εὐόλισθος (Themistius, pp. 116, 117, Sp.) — “quod facilé diffluitâ€� (Trendelenburg, Comm. p. 384). He says that for sonorous purposes air ought to be ἀθροῦν — compact or dense: sound reverberates best from metals with smooth surface, p. 420, a. 25.
85Aristot. De Animâ, II. viii. p. 419, b. 34 seq.: οὗτος δ’ (ὁ ἀὴρ) ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν ἀκούειν, ὅταν κινηθῇ συνεχὴς καὶ εἷς· — ψοφητικὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ κινητικὸν ἑνὸς ἀέρος συνεχείᾳ μέχρις ἀκοῆς. ἀκοῇ δὲ συμφυὴς ἀήρ· διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀέρι εἶναι, κινουμένου τοῦ ἔξω τὸ εἴσω κινεῖ. διόπερ οὐ πάντῃ τὸ ζῷον ἀκούει, οὐδὲ πάντῃ διέρχεται ὁ ἀήρ· οὐ γὰρ πάντῃ ἔχει ἀέρα τὸ κινησόμενον μέρος καὶ ἔμψυχον. — διὰ τὰς ἕλικας (p. 420, a. 13).The text of this passage is not satisfactory. It has been much criticised as well as amended by Torstrick; see his Comment. p. 148 seq. I cannot approve his alteration of ἔμψυχον into ἔμψοφον.
85Aristot. De Animâ, II. viii. p. 419, b. 34 seq.: οὗτος δ’ (ὁ ἀὴρ) ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν ἀκούειν, ὅταν κινηθῇ συνεχὴς καὶ εἷς· — ψοφητικὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ κινητικὸν ἑνὸς ἀέρος συνεχείᾳ μέχρις ἀκοῆς. ἀκοῇ δὲ συμφυὴς ἀήρ· διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀέρι εἶναι, κινουμένου τοῦ ἔξω τὸ εἴσω κινεῖ. διόπερ οὐ πάντῃ τὸ ζῷον ἀκούει, οὐδὲ πάντῃ διέρχεται ὁ ἀήρ· οὐ γὰρ πάντῃ ἔχει ἀέρα τὸ κινησόμενον μέρος καὶ ἔμψυχον. — διὰ τὰς ἕλικας (p. 420, a. 13).
The text of this passage is not satisfactory. It has been much criticised as well as amended by Torstrick; see his Comment. p. 148 seq. I cannot approve his alteration of ἔμψυχον into ἔμψοφον.
86Aristot. De Animâ, II. viii. p. 420, a. 9: ὁ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐγκατῳκοδόμηται πρὸς τὸ ἀκίνητος εἶναι, ὅπως ἀκριβῶς αἰσθάνηται πάσας τὰς διαφορὰς τῆς κινήσεως. — p. 420, a. 14. οὐδ’ (ἀκούομεν) ἂν ἡ μήνιγξ κάμῃ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κόρῃ δέρμα ὅταν κάμῃ.
86Aristot. De Animâ, II. viii. p. 420, a. 9: ὁ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐγκατῳκοδόμηται πρὸς τὸ ἀκίνητος εἶναι, ὅπως ἀκριβῶς αἰσθάνηται πάσας τὰς διαφορὰς τῆς κινήσεως. — p. 420, a. 14. οὐδ’ (ἀκούομεν) ἂν ἡ μήνιγξ κάμῃ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κόρῃ δέρμα ὅταν κάμῃ.
Voice is a kind of sound peculiar to animated beings; yet not belonging to all of them, but only to those that inspire the air. Nature employs respiration for two purposes: the first, indispensable to animal life, — that of cooling and tempering the excessive heat of the heart and its adjacent parts; the second, not indispensable to life, yet most valuable to the higher faculties of man, — significant speech. The organ of respiration is the larynx; a man cannot speak either when inspiring or expiring, but only when retaining and using the breath within. The soul in those parts, when guided by some phantasm or thought, impels the air within against the walls of the trachea, and this shock causes vocal sounds.87
87Aristot. De Animâ, II. viii. p. 420, b. 5-p. 421, a. 6. ὥστε ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ζῴου ψόφος φωνή, καθάπερ εἴπομεν (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ ψοφεῖν καὶ ὡς οἱ βήττοντες) ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἔμψυχόν τε εἶναι τὸ τύπτον καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας τινός· σημαντικὸς γὰρ δή τις ψόφος ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή· καὶ οὐ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἡ βήξ, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τύπτει τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ πρὸς αὐτήν.
87Aristot. De Animâ, II. viii. p. 420, b. 5-p. 421, a. 6. ὥστε ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ζῴου ψόφος φωνή, καθάπερ εἴπομεν (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ ψοφεῖν καὶ ὡς οἱ βήττοντες) ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἔμψυχόν τε εἶναι τὸ τύπτον καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας τινός· σημαντικὸς γὰρ δή τις ψόφος ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή· καὶ οὐ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἡ βήξ, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τύπτει τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ πρὸς αὐτήν.
Aristotle seems to have been tolerably satisfied with the above explanation of sight and hearing; for, in approaching the sense of Smell with the olfacients, he begins by saying that it is less definable and explicable. Among the five senses, smell stands intermediate between the two (taste and touch) that operate bydirect contact, and the other two (sight and hearing) that operate through an external medium. Man is below other animals in this sense; he discriminates little in smells except the pleasurable and the painful.88His taste, though analogous in many points to smell, is far more accurate and discriminating, because taste is a variety of touch; and in respect to touch, man is the most discriminating of all animals. Hence his great superiority to them in practical wisdom. Indeed the marked difference of intelligence between one man and another, turns mainly upon the organ of touch: men of hard flesh (or skin) are by nature dull in intelligence, men of soft flesh are apt and clever.89The classifying names of different smells are borrowed from the names of the analogous tastes to which they are analogous — sweet, bitter, tart, dry, sharp, smooth, &c.90Smells take effect through air as well as through water; by means of a peculiar agency or accompaniment (mentioned above, called the Trans-Olfacient) pervading both one and the other. It is peculiar to man that he cannot smell except when inhaling air in the act of inspiration; any one may settle this for himself by making the trial.91But fishes and other aquatic animals, which never inhale air, can smell in the water; and this proves that the trans-olfacient agency is operative to transmit odours not less in water than in air.92We know that the sense of smell in these aquatic animals is the same as it is in man, because the same strong odours that are destructive to man are also destructive to them.93Smell is the parallel, and in a certain sense the antithesis of taste; smell is of the dry, taste is of the moist: the olfactory matter is a juicy or sapid dryness, extracted or washed out from both air and water by the trans-olfacient agency, and acting on the sensory potentialities of the nostrils.94This olfactory inhalation is warm as well as dry. Hence it is light, and rises easily to the brain, the moisture and coldness of which it contributes to temper; this is a very salutary process, for the brain is the wettest and coldest part of the body, requiring warm and dry influences as a corrective. It is with a view to this correction that Nature has placed the olfactory organ in such close proximity to the brain.95There are two kinds of olfactory impressions. One of them is akin to the sense of taste — odour and savour going together — an affection (to a great degree) of the nutritive soul; so that the same odour is agreeable when we are hungry, disagreeable when our hunger is fully satisfied. This first kind of impression is common to men with other animals; but there is a second, peculiar to man, and disconnected from the sense of taste, viz., the scent of flowers, unguents, &c., which are agreeable or disagreeable constantly andper se.96Nature has assigned this second kind of odours as a privilege to man, because his brain, being so large and moist, requires to be tempered by an additional stock of drying and warming olfactory influence.
88Aristot. De Animâ, II. ix. p. 421, a. 7. De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 445, a. 6; iv. p. 441, a. 1. De Partibus Animal. II. xii. p. 656, a. 31; p. 657, a. 9.
88Aristot. De Animâ, II. ix. p. 421, a. 7. De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 445, a. 6; iv. p. 441, a. 1. De Partibus Animal. II. xii. p. 656, a. 31; p. 657, a. 9.
89Aristot. De Animâ, II. ix. p. 421, a. 21: κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν πολλῷ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων διαφερόντως ἀκριβοῖ (ὁ ἄνθρωπος). διὸ καὶ φρονιμώτατόν ἐστι τῶν ζῴων. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρὰ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο εἶναι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἀφυεῖς,παρ’ ἄλλο δὲ μηδέν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς.
89Aristot. De Animâ, II. ix. p. 421, a. 21: κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν πολλῷ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων διαφερόντως ἀκριβοῖ (ὁ ἄνθρωπος). διὸ καὶ φρονιμώτατόν ἐστι τῶν ζῴων. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρὰ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο εἶναι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἀφυεῖς,παρ’ ἄλλο δὲ μηδέν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς.
90Ibid. a. 26.
90Ibid. a. 26.
91Ibid. b. 9-19. τὸ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαιἴδιονἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· δῆλον δὲ πειρωμένοις. He seems to think that this is not true of any animal other than man.
91Ibid. b. 9-19. τὸ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαιἴδιονἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· δῆλον δὲ πειρωμένοις. He seems to think that this is not true of any animal other than man.
92Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 443, a. 3-31; p. 444, b. 9.
92Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 443, a. 3-31; p. 444, b. 9.
93Aristot. De Animâ, II. ix. p. 421, b. 23. He instances brimstone, ἄσφαλτος, &c.
93Aristot. De Animâ, II. ix. p. 421, b. 23. He instances brimstone, ἄσφαλτος, &c.
94This is difficult to understand, but it seems to be what Aristotle here means. — De Animâ, II. ix. p. 422, a. 6: ἔστι δ’ ἡ ὀσμὴ τοὺ ξηροῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ χυμὸς τοῦ ὑγροῦ· τὸ δ’ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον δυνάμει τοιοῦτον. — De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 443, a. 1-9: ἔστι δ’ ὀσφραντὸν οὐχ ᾗ διαφανές, ἀλλ’ ᾖ πλυντικὸν ἢ ῥυπτικὸν ἐγχύμου ξηρότητος· — ἡ ἐν ὑγρῷ τοῦ ἐγχύμου ξηροῦ φύσις ὀσμή, καὶ ὀσφραντὸν τὸ πάθος, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἐχόντων καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων ὀσμήν, &c. Also p. 443, b. 3-7.In the treatise De Sensu et Sensili, there is one passage (ii. p. 438, b. 24), wherein Aristotle affirms that smell is καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις, ἐκ πυρός; but we also find a subsequent passage (v. p. 443, a. 21, seq.) where he cites that same doctrine as the opinion of others, but distinctly refutes it.
94This is difficult to understand, but it seems to be what Aristotle here means. — De Animâ, II. ix. p. 422, a. 6: ἔστι δ’ ἡ ὀσμὴ τοὺ ξηροῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ χυμὸς τοῦ ὑγροῦ· τὸ δ’ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον δυνάμει τοιοῦτον. — De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 443, a. 1-9: ἔστι δ’ ὀσφραντὸν οὐχ ᾗ διαφανές, ἀλλ’ ᾖ πλυντικὸν ἢ ῥυπτικὸν ἐγχύμου ξηρότητος· — ἡ ἐν ὑγρῷ τοῦ ἐγχύμου ξηροῦ φύσις ὀσμή, καὶ ὀσφραντὸν τὸ πάθος, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἐχόντων καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων ὀσμήν, &c. Also p. 443, b. 3-7.
In the treatise De Sensu et Sensili, there is one passage (ii. p. 438, b. 24), wherein Aristotle affirms that smell is καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις, ἐκ πυρός; but we also find a subsequent passage (v. p. 443, a. 21, seq.) where he cites that same doctrine as the opinion of others, but distinctly refutes it.
95Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 444, a. 10, 22, 24: ἡ γὰρ τῆς ὀσμῆς δύναμις θερμὴ τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν.
95Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 444, a. 10, 22, 24: ἡ γὰρ τῆς ὀσμῆς δύναμις θερμὴ τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν.
96Ibid. p. 443, b. 17; p. 444, a. 6. 15, 28: ἴδιον δὲ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσεώς ἐστι τὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς τῆς τοιαύτης γένος διὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐγκέφαλον καὶ ὑγρότατον ἔχειν τῶν ζῴων ὡς κατὰ μέγεθος.Plato also reckons the pleasures of smell among the pure and admissible pleasures (Philebus, p. 51, E.; Timæus, p. 65, A., p. 67, A.).
96Ibid. p. 443, b. 17; p. 444, a. 6. 15, 28: ἴδιον δὲ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσεώς ἐστι τὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς τῆς τοιαύτης γένος διὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐγκέφαλον καὶ ὑγρότατον ἔχειν τῶν ζῴων ὡς κατὰ μέγεθος.
Plato also reckons the pleasures of smell among the pure and admissible pleasures (Philebus, p. 51, E.; Timæus, p. 65, A., p. 67, A.).
Taste is a variety of touch, and belongs to the lower or nutritive soul, as a guide to the animal in seeking or avoiding different sorts of food. The object of taste is essentially liquid, often strained and extracted from dry food by warmth and moisture. The primary manifestation of this sensory phenomenon is the contrast of drinkable and undrinkable.97The organ of taste, the tongue, is a mean between dryness and moisture; when either of these is in excess, the organ is disordered. Among the varieties of taste, there are two fundamental contraries (as in colour, sound, and the objects of the other senses except touch) from which the other contrasts are derived. These fundamentals in taste are sweet and bitter; corresponding to white and black, acute and grave, in colours and sounds. The sense of taste is potentially sweetor bitter; the gustable object is what makes it sweet or bitter in actuality.98
97Aristot. De Animâ, II. x. p. 422, a. 30-33. De Sensu et Sensili, i. p. 436, b. 15; iv. p. 441, b. 17: διὰ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ γεώδους διηθοῦσα (ἡ φύσις) καὶ κινοῦσα τῷ θερμῷ ποιόν τι τὸ ὑγρὸν παρασκευάζει. καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο χυμὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰρημένου ξηροῦ πάθος ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ. — Ib. b. 24: οὐ παντὸς ξηροῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ τροφίμου.
97Aristot. De Animâ, II. x. p. 422, a. 30-33. De Sensu et Sensili, i. p. 436, b. 15; iv. p. 441, b. 17: διὰ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ γεώδους διηθοῦσα (ἡ φύσις) καὶ κινοῦσα τῷ θερμῷ ποιόν τι τὸ ὑγρὸν παρασκευάζει. καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο χυμὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰρημένου ξηροῦ πάθος ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ. — Ib. b. 24: οὐ παντὸς ξηροῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ τροφίμου.
98Aristot. De Animâ, II. x. p. 422, b. 5-16; II. xi. p. 422, b. 23: πᾶσά τε γὰρ αἴσθησις μιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι δοκεῖ, &c.
98Aristot. De Animâ, II. x. p. 422, b. 5-16; II. xi. p. 422, b. 23: πᾶσά τε γὰρ αἴσθησις μιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι δοκεῖ, &c.
The sense of touch, in which man surpasses all other animals, differs from the other senses by not having any two fundamental contraries giving origin to the rest, but by having various contraries alike fundamental. It is thus hardly one sense, but an aggregate of several senses. It appreciates the elementary differences of bodyquâbody — hot, cold, dry, moist, hard, soft, &c. It is a mean between each of these two extremes; being potentially either one of them, and capable of being made to assimilate itself actually to either.99In this sense, the tangible object operates when in contact with the skin; and, as has been already said, much of the superiority of man depends upon his superior fineness and delicacy of skin.100Still Aristotle remarks that the true organ of touch is not the skin or flesh, but something interior to the flesh. This last serves only as a peculiar medium. The fact that the sensation arises when the object touches our skin, does not prove that the skin is the true organ; for, if there existed a thin exterior membrane surrounding our bodies, we should still feel the same sensation. Moreover, the body is not in real contact with our skin, though it appears to be so; there is a thin film of air between the two, though we do not perceive it; just as, when we touch an object under water, there is a film of water interposed between, as is seen by the wetness of the finger.101The skin is, therefore, not the true organ of touch, but a medium between the object and the organ; and this sense does in reality agree with the other senses in having a certain medium interposed between object and organ. But there is this difference: in touch the medium is close to and a part of ourselves; in sight and hearing it is exterior to ourselves, and may extend to some distance. In sight and hearing the object does not affect us directly; it affects the external medium, which again affects us. But in touch the object affects, at the same time and by the same influence, both the medium and the interior organ; like a spear that, with the same thrust, pierces the warrior’s shield and wounds the warrior himself.102Apparently, therefore, the true organ of touch is something interior, and skin and flesh is an interposed medium.103But what this interior organ is, Aristotle does not more particularly declare. He merely states it to be in close and intimate communication with the great central focus and principle of all sensation — the heart;104more closely connected with the heart (he appears to think) than any of the other organs of sense, though all of them are so connected more or less closely.
99Ibid. xi. p. 422, b. 17 seq.
99Ibid. xi. p. 422, b. 17 seq.