Chapter 7

16Aristot. Metaph.E. p. 1027, b. 16, p. 1028, a. 6.

17Aristot. Metaph.Θ. 10, p. 1051, b. 2-15, with Schweglerâ€™s Comment, p. 186. This is the distinction drawn by Simplikius (Schol. ad Categ. p. 76, b. 47) between the Organon and the Metaphysica: Αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαὶ κατὰ μὲν τήν σημαντικὴν αὐτῶν λέξιν ἐν τῇ λογικῇ πραγματείᾳ δηλοῦνται, κατὰ δὲ τὰ σημαινόμενα ἐν τῇ Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικὰ οἰκείως.Τὰ ὄντα are equivalent to τὰ λεγόμενα, in this and the other logical treatises of Aristotle. Categ. p. 1, a. 16-20, b. 25; Analyt. Prior. i. p. 43, a. 25.This is the logical aspect of Ontology; that is, Entia are considered as Objects to be named, and to serve as Subjects or Predicates for propositions: every such term having a fixed denotation, and (with the exception of proper names) a fixed connotation, known to speakers and hearers.Τὰ λεγόμενα (or Entia considered in this aspect) are distinguished by Aristotle into two classes: 1. Τὰ λεγόμενακατὰ συμπλοκήν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθροπος νικᾷ. 2. Τὰ λεγόμεναἄνευ συμπλοκῆς(or κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκήν) οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.We are to observe here, that in Logic the Proposition or Enunciation is the Prius NaturÃ¢, which must be presupposed as known before we can understand what the separate terms are (Analytic. Prior. i. p. 24, a. 16): just as the right angle must be understood before we can explain what is an acute or an obtuse angle (to use an illustration of Aristotle; see Metaphys.Ζ.p. 1035, b. 7). We must understand the entire logical act, called Affirming or Denying, before we can understand the functions of the two factors or correlates with which that act is performed. Aristotle defines the Term by means of the Proposition, ὅρον δὲ καλῶ εἰ ὂν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις (Anal. Pr. i. 24, b. 16).Τὰ λεγόμενα, as here used by Aristotle, coincides in meaning with what the Stoics afterwards called Τὰ λεκτά â€” of two classes: 1.λεκτὰ αὐτοτελῆ, one branch of which, τὰ ἀξιώματα, are equivalent to the Aristotelian τὰ κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα. 2.λεκτὰ ἐλλιπῆ, equivalent to τὰ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λεγόμενα (Diogen. Laert. vii. 43, 44, 63, 64; Sext. Emp. adv. Mathemat. viii. 69, 70, 74): equivalent also, seemingly, to τὰ διανοητὰ in Aristotle: ὁ διανοητὸς Ἀριστομένης (Anal. Pr. I. p. 47, b. 22).Hobbes observes (Computation or Logic, part i. 2, 5): â€œNor is it at all necessary that every name should be the name of something. For as these,a man,a tree,a stone, are the names of the things themselves, so the images of a man, of a tree, of a stone, which are represented to men sleeping, have their names also, though they be not things, but only fictions and phantasms of things. For we can remember these; and therefore it is no less necessary that they have names to mark and signify them, than the things themselves. Also this wordfutureis a name; but no future thing has yet any being. Moreover, that which neither is, nor has been, nor ever shall or ever can be, has a name â€”impossible. To conclude, this wordnothingis a name, which yet cannot be name of any thing; for when we subtract two and three from five, and, so nothing remaining, we would call that subtraction to mind, this speechnothing remains, and in it the wordnothing, is not unuseful. And for the same reason we say truly,less than nothingremains, when we subtract more from less; for the mind feigns such remains as these for doctrineâ€™s sake, and desires, as often as is necessary, to call the same to memory. But seeing every name has some relation to that which is named, though that which we name be not always a thing that has a being in nature, yet it is lawful for doctrineâ€™s sake to apply the wordthingto whatsoever we name; as it were all one whether that thing truly existent, or be only feigned.â€�The Greek neuter gender (τὸ λεγόμενον or τὸ λεκτόν, τὰ λεγόμενα or τὰ λεκτά) covers all that Hobbes here includes under the wordthing. â€” Scholia ad Aristot. Physic. I. i. p. 323, a. 21, Brand.: ὀνομάζονται μὲν καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ὁρίζονται δὲ μόνα τὰ ὄντα.

Τὰ ὄντα are equivalent to τὰ λεγόμενα, in this and the other logical treatises of Aristotle. Categ. p. 1, a. 16-20, b. 25; Analyt. Prior. i. p. 43, a. 25.

This is the logical aspect of Ontology; that is, Entia are considered as Objects to be named, and to serve as Subjects or Predicates for propositions: every such term having a fixed denotation, and (with the exception of proper names) a fixed connotation, known to speakers and hearers.

Τὰ λεγόμενα (or Entia considered in this aspect) are distinguished by Aristotle into two classes: 1. Τὰ λεγόμενακατὰ συμπλοκήν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθροπος νικᾷ. 2. Τὰ λεγόμεναἄνευ συμπλοκῆς(or κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκήν) οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

We are to observe here, that in Logic the Proposition or Enunciation is the Prius NaturÃ¢, which must be presupposed as known before we can understand what the separate terms are (Analytic. Prior. i. p. 24, a. 16): just as the right angle must be understood before we can explain what is an acute or an obtuse angle (to use an illustration of Aristotle; see Metaphys.Ζ.p. 1035, b. 7). We must understand the entire logical act, called Affirming or Denying, before we can understand the functions of the two factors or correlates with which that act is performed. Aristotle defines the Term by means of the Proposition, ὅρον δὲ καλῶ εἰ ὂν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις (Anal. Pr. i. 24, b. 16).

Τὰ λεγόμενα, as here used by Aristotle, coincides in meaning with what the Stoics afterwards called Τὰ λεκτά â€” of two classes: 1.λεκτὰ αὐτοτελῆ, one branch of which, τὰ ἀξιώματα, are equivalent to the Aristotelian τὰ κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα. 2.λεκτὰ ἐλλιπῆ, equivalent to τὰ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λεγόμενα (Diogen. Laert. vii. 43, 44, 63, 64; Sext. Emp. adv. Mathemat. viii. 69, 70, 74): equivalent also, seemingly, to τὰ διανοητὰ in Aristotle: ὁ διανοητὸς Ἀριστομένης (Anal. Pr. I. p. 47, b. 22).

Hobbes observes (Computation or Logic, part i. 2, 5): â€œNor is it at all necessary that every name should be the name of something. For as these,a man,a tree,a stone, are the names of the things themselves, so the images of a man, of a tree, of a stone, which are represented to men sleeping, have their names also, though they be not things, but only fictions and phantasms of things. For we can remember these; and therefore it is no less necessary that they have names to mark and signify them, than the things themselves. Also this wordfutureis a name; but no future thing has yet any being. Moreover, that which neither is, nor has been, nor ever shall or ever can be, has a name â€”impossible. To conclude, this wordnothingis a name, which yet cannot be name of any thing; for when we subtract two and three from five, and, so nothing remaining, we would call that subtraction to mind, this speechnothing remains, and in it the wordnothing, is not unuseful. And for the same reason we say truly,less than nothingremains, when we subtract more from less; for the mind feigns such remains as these for doctrineâ€™s sake, and desires, as often as is necessary, to call the same to memory. But seeing every name has some relation to that which is named, though that which we name be not always a thing that has a being in nature, yet it is lawful for doctrineâ€™s sake to apply the wordthingto whatsoever we name; as it were all one whether that thing truly existent, or be only feigned.â€�

The Greek neuter gender (τὸ λεγόμενον or τὸ λεκτόν, τὰ λεγόμενα or τὰ λεκτά) covers all that Hobbes here includes under the wordthing. â€” Scholia ad Aristot. Physic. I. i. p. 323, a. 21, Brand.: ὀνομάζονται μὲν καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ὁρίζονται δὲ μόνα τὰ ὄντα.

Of this mixed character, partly logical, partly ontological, is the first distinction set forth in the CategoriÃ¦ â€” the distinction between matterspredicated ofa Subject, and matters which areina Subject â€” the Subject itself being assumed as thefundamentumcorrelative to both of them. The definition given of that which isina Subject is ontological: viz., â€œIna Subject, I call that which is in anything, not as a part, yet so that it cannot exist separately from that in which it is.â€�18By these two negative characteristics, without any mark positive, does Aristotle define what is meant by beingina Subject. Modern logicians, and Hobbes among them, can find no better definition for an Accident; though Hobbes remarks truly, that Accident cannot be properly defined, but must be elucidated by examples.19

18Aristot. Categ. p. 1, a. 24.

19Hobbes, Computation or Logic, part i. 3, 3, i. 6, 2, ii. 8, 2-3.

The distinction here drawn by Aristotle between beingpredicated ofa Subject, and being in a Subject, coincides with that between essential and non-essential predication: all the predicates (including thedifferentia) which belong to the essence, fall under the first division;20all those which do not belong to the essence, under the latter. The Subjects â€” what Aristotle calls the First Essences or Substances, those which are essences or substances in the fullest and strictest meaning of the word â€” are concrete individual things or persons; such as Sokrates, this man, that horse or tree. These are never employed as predicates at all (except by a distorted and unnatural structure of the proposition, which Aristotle indicates as possible, but declines to take into account); they are always Subjects of different predicates, and are, in the last analysis, the Subjects of all predicates. But besides these First Essences, there are also Second Essences â€” Species and Genus, which stand to the first Essence in the relation of predicates to a Subject, and to the other Categories in the relation of Subjects to predicates.21These Second Essences are less of Essences than the First, which alone is an Essence in the fullest and most appropriate sense. Among the Second Essences, Species is more of an Essence than Genus, because it belongs more closely and specially to the First Essence; while Genus is farther removed from it. Aristotle thus recognizes a graduation ofmore or lessin Essence; the individual is more Essence, or more complete as an Essence, than the Species, the Species more than the Genus. As he recognizes a First Essence,i.e.an individual object (such as Sokrates, this horse, &c.), so he also recognizes an individual accident (this particular white colour, that particular grammatical knowledge) which isina Subject, but is notpredicated ofa Subject; this particular white colour existsinsome given body, but is notpredicable ofany body.22

20Aristot. Categ. p. 3, a. 20. It appears that Andronikus did not draw the line between these two classes of predicates in same manner as Aristotle: he included many non-essential predicates in τὰ καθâ€™ ὑποκειμένου. See Simplikius, ad Categorias, Basil. 1551, fol. 13, 21, B. Nor was either Alexander or Porphyry careful to observe the distinction between the two classes. See Schol. ad Metaphys. p. 701, b. 23, Br.; Schol. ad De Interpret. p. 106, a. 29, Br. And when Aristotle says, Analyt. Prior. i. p. 24, b. 26, τὸ δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ εἰναι ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι θατέρου θάτερον, ταὐτόν ἐστιν, he seems himself to forget the distinction entirely.

21Categor. p. 2, a. 15, seq. In Aristotle phraseology it is not said that Second Essences are contained in First Essences, but that First Essences are contained in Second Essences,i.e.in the species which Second Essences signify. See the Scholion to p. 3, a. 9, in Waitz, vol. i. p. 32.

22Arist. Categ. p. 1, a. 26; b. 7: Ἁπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ κατâ€™ οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ ἕνια οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναιÂ· ἡ γάρ τις γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν. Aristotle here recognizes an attribute as â€œindividual and as numerically one;â€� and various other logicians have followed him. But is it correct to say, that an attribute, when it cannot be farther divided specifically, and is thus the lowest in its own predicamental series, isUnum Numero? The attribute may belong to an indefinite number of different objects; and can we count it asOne, in the same sense in which we count each of these objects asOne? I doubt whetherUnum Numerobe applicable to attributes. Aristotle declares that the δευτέρα οὐσία is notUnum Numerolike the πρώτη οὐσία â€” οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζῷον (Categ. p. 3, b. 16). Upon the same principle, I think, he ought to declare that the attribute is notUnum Numero; for though it is not (in his language)predicable ofmany Subjects, yet it isinmany Subjects. It cannot correctly be calledUnum Numero, according to the explanation which he gives of that phrase in two passages of the Metaphysica,B. p. 999, b. 33;Δ. p. 1016, b. 32: ἀριθμῷ μὲν ὧν ἡ ὕλη μία, &c.

Respecting the logical distinction, which Aristotle places inthe commencement of this treatise on the Categories â€” between predicates which areaffirmed ofa Subject, and predicates which areina Subject23â€” we may remark that it turns altogether upon the name by which you describe the predicate. Thus he tells us that the Species and Genus (man, animal), and the Differentia (rational), may bepredicated ofSokrates, but are notinSokrates; while knowledge isinSokrates, but cannot bepredicated ofSokrates; and may bepredicated ofgrammar, but is notingrammar. But if we look at this comparison, we shall see that in the last-mentioned example, the predicate is described by an abstract word (knowledge); while in the preceding examples it is described by a concrete word (man, animal, rational).24If, in place of these three last words, we substitute the abstract words corresponding to them â€” humanity, animality, rationality â€” we shall have to say that these areinSokrates, though they cannot (in their abstract form) bepredicated ofSokrates, but only in the form of their concrete paronyms, which Aristotle treats as a distinct predication. So if, instead of the abstract word knowledge, we employ the concrete word knowing or wise, we can no longer say that this isinSokrates, and that it may bepredicated ofgrammar. Abstract alone can bepredicated ofabstract; concrete alone can bepredicated ofconcrete; if we describe the relation between Abstract and Concrete, we must say, The Abstract isinthe Concrete â€” the Concrete contains or embodies the Abstract. Indeed we find Aristotle referring the same predicate, when described by the abstract name, to one Category; and when described by the concrete paronymous adjective, to another and different Category.25The names Concrete and Abstract were not in thephilosophical vocabulary of his day. In this passage of the CategoriÃ¦, he establishes a distinction between predicates essential and predicates non-essential; the latter he here declares to beinthe Subject, the former not to be in it, but to beco-efficients ofits essence. But we shall find that he does not adhere to this distinction even throughout the present treatise, still less in other works. It seems to be a point of difference between the CategoriÃ¦ on one side, and the Physica and Metaphysica on the other, that in the CategoriÃ¦ he is more disposed to found supposed real distinctions on verbal etiquette, and on precise adherence to the syntactical structure of a proposition.26

23The distinction is expressed by Ammonius (Schol. p. 51, b. 46) as follows:â€” αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι ὑποκεῦνται πᾶσιν, ἀλλâ€™ οὐχ ὁμοίωςÂ· τοῖς μὲν γὰρπρὸς ὕπαρξιν, τούτεστι τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, τοῖς δὲπρὸς κατηγορίαν, τούτεστι ταῖς καθόλου οὐσίαις.

24Ueberweg makes a remark similar to this. â€” System der Logik, sect. 56, note, p. 110, ed. second.

25The difference of opinion as to the proper mode of describing the Differentia â€” whether by the concrete word πεζὸν, or by the abstract πεζότης â€” gives occasion to an objection against Aristotleâ€™s view, and to a reply from Dexippus not very conclusive (Dexippus, book ii. s. 22, pp. 60, 61, ed. Spengel).

26Categor. p. 3, a. 3. In the Physica, iv. p. 210, a. 14-30, Aristotle enumerates nine different senses of the phrase ἕν τινι. His own use of the phrase is not always uniform or consistent. If we compare the Scholia on the CategoriÃ¦, pp. 44, 45, 53, 58, 59, Br., with the Scholia on the Physica, pp. 372, 373, Br., we shall see that the Commentators were somewhat embarrassed by his fluctuation. The doctrine of the CategoriÃ¦ was found especially difficult in its application to the Differentia.In Analyt. Post. i. p. 83, a. 30, Aristotle says, ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὐσίαν σημαίνει, δεῖ κατά τινος ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖσθαι, which is at variance with the language of the CategoriÃ¦, as the Scholiast remarks, p. 228, a. 33. The like may be said about Metaphys.B. p. 1001, b. 29;Δ. p. 1017, b. 13. See the Scholia of Alexander, p. 701, b. 25, Br.See also De Gener. et Corrupt. p. 319, b. 8; Physic. i. p. 185, a. 31: οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίανÂ· πάντα γὰρ καθâ€™ ὑποκειμένου τῆς οὐσίας λέγεται, where Simplikius remarks that the phrase is used ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (Schol. p. 328, b. 43).

In Analyt. Post. i. p. 83, a. 30, Aristotle says, ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὐσίαν σημαίνει, δεῖ κατά τινος ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖσθαι, which is at variance with the language of the CategoriÃ¦, as the Scholiast remarks, p. 228, a. 33. The like may be said about Metaphys.B. p. 1001, b. 29;Δ. p. 1017, b. 13. See the Scholia of Alexander, p. 701, b. 25, Br.

See also De Gener. et Corrupt. p. 319, b. 8; Physic. i. p. 185, a. 31: οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίανÂ· πάντα γὰρ καθâ€™ ὑποκειμένου τῆς οὐσίας λέγεται, where Simplikius remarks that the phrase is used ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (Schol. p. 328, b. 43).

Lastly, Aristotle here makes one important observation respecting those predicates which he describes as (notin a Subjectbut)affirmedordenied ofa Subject â€”i.e.the essential predicates. In these (he says) whatever predicate can be truly affirmed or denied of the predicate, the same can be truly affirmed or denied of the Subject.27This observation deserves notice, because it is in fact a brief but distinct announcement of his main theory of the Syllogism; which theory he afterwards expands in the Analytica Priora, and traces into its varieties and ramifications.

27Categor. p. 1, b. 10-15.

After such preliminaries, Aristotle proceeds28to give the enumeration of his Ten Categories or Predicaments; under one or other of which, every subject or predicate, considered as capable of entering into a proposition, must belong: 1.EssenceorSubstance; such as, man, horse. 2.How muchorQuantity; such as, two cubits long, three cubits long. 3.What manner oforQuality; such as, white, erudite. 4.Ad aliquid â€” To somethingorRelation; such as, double, half, greater. 5.Where; such as, in the market-place, in the Lykeium. 6.When; such as,yesterday, last year. 7.In what posture; such as, he stands up, he is sitting down. 8.To have; such as, to be shod, to be armed. 9.Activity; such as, he is cutting, he is turning. 10.Passivity; such as, he is being cut, he is being burned.

28Ibid. p. 1, b. 25, seq.

Ensin its complete state â€” concrete, individual, determinate â€” includes an embodiment of all these ten Categories; the FirstEnsbeing the Subject of which the rest are predicates. Whatever question be asked respecting any individual Subject, the information given in the answer must fall, according to Aristotle, under one or more of these ten general heads; while the full outfit of the individual will comprise some predicate under each of them. Moreover, each of the ten is aGeneralissimum; having more or fewer species contained under it, but not being itself contained under any larger genus (Ensnot being a genus). So that Aristotle does not attempt to define or describe any one of the ten; his only way of explaining is by citing two or three illustrative examples of each. Some of the ten are even of wider extent thanSumma Genera; thus, Quality cannot be considered as a true genus, comprehending generically all the cases falling under it. It is aSummum Analogon, reaching beyond the comprehension of a genus; an analogous or multivocal name, applied to many cases vaguely and remotely akin to each other.29And again the same particular predicate may be ranked both under Quality and under Relation; it need not belong exclusively to either one of them.30Moreover, Good, likeEnsorUnum, is common to all the Categories, but is differently represented in each.31

29Aristot. Categor. p. 8, b. 26. ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων, &c.See the Scholia, p. 68, b. 69 a., Brandis. Ammonius gives the true explanation of this phrase, τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων (p. 69, b. 7). Alexander and Simplikius try to make out that it implies here a συνώνομον.

29Aristot. Categor. p. 8, b. 26. ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων, &c.

See the Scholia, p. 68, b. 69 a., Brandis. Ammonius gives the true explanation of this phrase, τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων (p. 69, b. 7). Alexander and Simplikius try to make out that it implies here a συνώνομον.

30Aristot. Categor. p. 11, a. 37. Compare the Scholion of Dexippus, p. 48, a. 28-37.

31Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 25; Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1217, b. 25.

Aristotle comments at considerable length upon the four first of the ten Categories. 1. Essence or Substance. 2. Quantity. 3. Quality. 4. Relation. As to the six last, he says little upon any of them; upon some, nothing at all.

His decuple partition ofEntiaorEnunciatais founded entirely upon a logical principle. He looks at them in their relation to Propositions; and his ten classes discriminate the relation which they bear to each other as parts or constituent elements of a proposition. Aristotle takes his departure, not from any results of scientific research, but from common speech; and from thedialectic, frequent in his time, which debated about matters of common life and talk, about received and current opinions.32We may presume him to have studied and compared a variety of current propositions, so as to discover what were the different relations in which Subjects and Predicates did stand or could stand to each other; also the various questions which might be put respecting any given subject, with the answers suitable to be returned.33

32Waitz, ad Aristot. Categor. p. 284: â€œId Categoriis non de ipsÃ¢ rerum natura et veritate exponit, sed res tales capit, quales apparent in communi vita homini philosophia non imbuto, unde fit, ut in Categoriis alia sit πρώτη οὐσία et in prima philosophia: illa enim partes habet, hÃ¦c vero non componitor ex partibus.â€�Compare Metaphys.Z. p. 1032, b. 2, and the ἀπορία inZ. p. 1029, a., p. 1037, a. 28.The different meaning of πρώτη οὐσία in the CategoriÃ¦ and in the Metaphysica, is connected with various difficulties and seeming discrepancies in the Aristotelian theory of cognition, which I shall advert to in a future chapter. See Zeller, Philos. der Griech. ii. 2, pp. 234, 262; Heyder, Aristotelische und Hegelsche Dialektik, p. 141, seq.

Compare Metaphys.Z. p. 1032, b. 2, and the ἀπορία inZ. p. 1029, a., p. 1037, a. 28.

The different meaning of πρώτη οὐσία in the CategoriÃ¦ and in the Metaphysica, is connected with various difficulties and seeming discrepancies in the Aristotelian theory of cognition, which I shall advert to in a future chapter. See Zeller, Philos. der Griech. ii. 2, pp. 234, 262; Heyder, Aristotelische und Hegelsche Dialektik, p. 141, seq.

33Thus he frequently supposes a question put, an answer given, and the proper mode of answering. Categor. p. 2, b. 8: ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τί ἐστι, γνωριμώτερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσει, &c.; also ibid. p. 2, b. 32; p. 3, a. 4, 20.

Aristotle ranks as his first and fundamental CategorySubstanceorEssenceâ€” Οὐσία; the abstract substantive word corresponding to Τὸ ὄν; which last is the vast aggregate, not generically One but only analogically One, destined to be distributed among the ten Categories asSumma Genera. The FirstEnsor First Essence â€” that which isEnsin the fullest sense â€” is theindividualconcrete person or thing in nature; Sokrates, Bukephalus, this man, that horse, that oak-tree, &c. This FirstEnsis indispensable as Subject orSubstratumfor all the other Categories, and even for predication generally. It is a Subject only; it never appears as a predicate of anything else. AsHic AliquisorHoc Aliquid, it lies at the bottom (either expressed or implied) of all the work of predication. It isEnsor Essence most of all,par excellence; and is so absolutely indispensable, that if all FirstEntiawere supposed to be removed, neither SecondEntianor any of the other Categories could exist.34

34Aristot. Categ. p. 2, a. 11, b. 6. Οὐσία ἡ κυριώτατα καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη â€” μὴ οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν, ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι.

The Species is recognized by Aristotle as a SecondEnsor Essence, in which these First Essences reside; it is less (has less completely the character) of Essence than the First, to which it serves as Predicate. The Genus is (strictly speaking) a Third Essence,35in which both the First and the SecondEssence are included; it is farther removed than the Species from the First Essence, and has therefore still less of the character of Essence. It stands as predicate both to the First and to the Second Essence. While the First Essence is more Essence than the Second, and the Second more than the Third, all the varieties of the First Essence are in this respect upon an equal footing with each other. This man, this horse, that tree, &c., are all Essence, equally and alike.36The First Essence admits of much variety, but does not admit graduation, or degrees of more or less.

35Aristotle here, in the CategoriÃ¦, ranks Genus and Species as being, both of them, δεύτεραι οὐσίαι. Yet since he admits Genus to be farther removed from πρώτη οὐσία than Species is, he ought rather to have called Genus a Third Essence. In the Metaphysica he recognizes a gradation or ordination of οὐσία into First, Second, and Third, founded upon a totally different principle: the Concrete, which in the CategoriÃ¦ ranks as πρώτη οὐσία, ranks as τρίτη οὐσία in the Metaphysica. See Metaphys.Η. p. 1043, a. 18-28.

36Aristot. Categ. p. 2, b. 20; p. 3, b. 35.

Nothing else except Genera and Species can be called Second Essences, or said to belong to the Category Essence; for they alone declare what the First Essence is. If you are asked respecting Sokrates,Whatheis? and if you answer by stating the Species or the Genus to which he belongs â€” that he is a man or an animal â€” your answer will be appropriate to the question; and it will be more fully understood if you state the Species than if you state the Genus. But if you answer by stating what belongs to any of the other Categories (viz., that he is white, that he is running), your answer will be inappropriate, and foreign to the question; it will not declarewhatSokratesis.37Accordingly, none of these other Categories can be called Essences. All of them rank as predicates both of First and of Second Essence; just as Second Essences rank as predicates of First Essences.38

37Ibid. p. 2, b. 29-37. εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονταιÂ· μόνα γὰρ δηλοῖ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατηγορουμένων. τὸν γάρ τινα ἄνθρωπον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστι, τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἢ τὸ γένος ἀποδιδοὺςοἰκείως ἀποδώσει, καὶ γνωριμώτερον ποιήσει ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον ἀποδιδούςÂ· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅ, τι ἂν ἀποδιδῷ τις,ἀλλοτρίως ἔσται ἀποδεδωκώς, οἷον λευκόν ἢ τρέχει ἢ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδιδούς. Ὥστε εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων ταῦτα μόνα οὐσίαι λέγονται.

38Ibid. p. 3, a. 2.

Essence or Substance is notina Subject; neither First nor Second Essence. The First Essence is neitherina Subject norpredicated ofa Subject; the Second Essences are notinthe First, but arepredicated ofthe First. Both the Second Essence, and the definition of the word describing it, may bepredicated ofthe First; that is, the predication is synonymous or univocal; whereas, of that which isina Subject, the name may often be predicated, but never the definition of the name. What is true of the Second Essence, is true also of the Differentia; that it is notina Subject, but that it may bepredicatedunivocallyofa Subject â€” not only its name, but also the definition of its name.39

39Ibid. p. 3, a. 7, 21, 34. κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι â€” οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ τῆς τοῦτο οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν â€” ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταὶς διαφοραῖς τὸ πάντα συνωνύμως ἀπâ€™ αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι.

All Essence or Substance seems to signifyHoc Aliquid Unum Numero. The First Essence really does so signify, but the Second Essence does not really so signify: it only seems to do so, because it is enunciated by a substantive name, like the First.40It signifies reallyTale Aliquid, answering to the enquiryQuale Quid? for it is said not merely of one thing numerically, but of many things each numerically one. Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn. The Second Essence does not (like the Accident, such as white) signifyTale Aliquidsimply and absolutely, or that and nothing more. It signifiesTalem Aliquam Essentiam; it declares what the Essence is, or marks off the characteristic feature of various First Essences, eachUnum Numero. The Genus marks off a greater number of such than the Species.41

40Aristot. Categ. p. 3, b. 10-16: Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσίαδοκεῖτόδε τι σημαίνειν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνειÂ· ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστινÂ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶνφαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον,οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει.

41Ibid. p. 3, b. 18-24.

Again, Essences have no contraries.42But this is not peculiar to Essences, forQuantaalso have no contraries; there is nothing contrary to ten, or to that which is two cubits long. Nor is any one of the varieties of First Essence more or less Essence than any other variety. An individual man is as much Essence as an individual horse, neither more nor less. Nor is he at one time more a man than he was at another time; though he may become more or less white, more or less handsome.43

42Ibid. b. 24-30.

43Ibid. b. 34, seq.

But that which is most peculiar to Essence, is, that while remainingUnum et Idem Numero, it is capable by change in itself of receiving alternately contrary Accidents. This is true of no other Category. For example, this particular colour, being one and the same in number, will never be now black, and then white; this particular action, being one and the same in number, will not be at one time virtuous, at another time vicious. The like is true respecting all the other Categories. But one and the same man will be now white, hot, virtuous; at another time, he will be black, cold, vicious. An objector may say that this is true, not merely of Essence, but also of Discourse and of Opinion; each of which (he will urge) remainsUnum Numero, but is nevertheless recipient of contrary attributes; for the proposition or assertion, Sokrates is sitting,may now be true and may presently become false. But this case is different, because there is no change in the proposition itself, but in the person or thing to which the proposition refers; while one and the same man, by new affections in himself, is now healthy, then sick; now hot, then cold.44

44Aristot. Categ. p. 4, a. 10-b. 20.

Here Aristotle concludes his first Category or Predicament â€” Essence or Substance. He proceeds to the other nine, and ranksQuantityfirst among them.45Quantumis either Continual or Discrete; it consists either of parts having position in reference to each other, or of parts not having position in reference to each other. DiscreteQuantaare Number and Speech; ContinualQuantaare Line, Surface, Body, and besides these, Time and Place. The parts of Number have no position in reference to each other; the parts of Line, Surface, Body, have position in reference to each other. These are calledQuanta, primarily; other things are calledQuantain a secondary way, κατὰ συμβεβηκός.46Thus we saymuch white, when the surface of white is large; we say,the action is long, because much time and movement have been consumed in it. If we are asked,how long the actionis? we must answer by specifying its length in time â€” a year or a month.

45Ibid. b. 21, seq.

46Ibid. p. 5, a. 38, seq.

ToQuantum(as to Essence or Substance) there exists no contrary.47There is nothing contrary to a length of three cubits or an area of four square feet. Great, little, long, short, are more properly terms of Relation than terms of Quantity; thus belonging to another Category. Nor isQuantumever more or lessQuantum; it does not admit of degree. TheQuantuma yard is neither more nor lessQuantumthan that called a foot. That which is peculiar toQuantais to be equal or unequal:48the relations of equality and inequality are not properly affirmed of anything else except ofQuanta.

47Ibid. b. 11, seq.

48Ibid. p. 6, a. 26-35.

From the Category of Quantity, Aristotle proceeds next to that ofRelation;49which he discusses in immediate sequence after Quantity, and before Quality, probably because in the course of his exposition about Quantity, he had been obliged to intimate how closely Quantity was implicated with Relation, and how essential it was that the distinction between the two should be made clear.

49Ibid. a. 36, seq.

Relata(τὰ πρός τι â€”ad Aliquid) are things such, that what they are, they are said to beof other things, or are said to in some other mannertowards something else(ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶνἑτέρωνεἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωστοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον). Thus, that which is greater, is said to be greaterthan another; that which is called double is called also doubleof another. Habit, disposition, perception, cognition, position, &c., are allRelata. Habit, is habitof something; perception and cognition, are alwaysof something; position, is positionof something. The Category of Relation admits contrariety in some cases, but not always; it also admits, in some cases, graduation, or the more or less in degree; things are more like or less like to each other.50AllRelataare so designated in virtue of their relation to otherCorrelata; the master is masterof a servantâ€” the servant is servantof a master. Sometimes theCorrelatumis mentioned not in the genitive case but in some other case; thus cognition is cognitionofthecognitum, butcognitumiscognitum bycognition; perception is perceptionoftheperceptum, but theperceptumisperceptum byperception.51The correlation indeed will not manifestly appear, unless the Correlate be designated by its appropriate term: thus, if the wing be declared to be wingof a bird, there is no apparent correlation; we ought to say, the wing is wingof the winged, and the winged is wingedthroughorbythe wing; for the wing belongs to the bird, notquÃ¢ bird, butquÃ¢ winged,52since there are many things winged, which are not birds. Sometimes there is no current term appropriate to the Correlate, so that we are under the necessity of coining one for the occasion: we must say, to speak with strict accuracy, ἡ κεφαλή, τοῦ κεφαλωτοῦ κεφαλή not ἡ κεφαλή, τοῦ ζῷου κεφαλή; τὸ πηδάλιον, τοῦ πηδαλιωτοῦ πηδάλιον, not τὸ πηδάλιον, πλοίου πηδάλιον.53

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