II.

35Topic. I. iv. p. 101, b. 17-36.

36Ibid. b. 18: τὴν διαφορὰν ὡς οὖσαν γενικὴν ὁμοῦ τῷ γένει τακτέον.

The above four general heads include all the Predicables, which were distributed by subsequent logicians (from whom Porphyry borrowed) into five heads instead of four â€” Genus, Species, Differentia, Proprium, Accident; the Differentia being ranked as a separate item in the quintuple distribution, and the Species substituted in place of the Definition. It is under this quadruple classification that Aristotle intends to consider propositions and problems as matters for dialectic procedure: he will give argumentative suggestions applicable to each of the four successively. It might be practicable (he thinks) to range all the four under the single head of Definition; since arguments impugning Genus, Proprium, and Accident, are all of them good also against Definition. But such a simplification would be perplexing and unmanageable in regard to dialectic procedure.37

37Topic. I. vi. p. 102, b. 27-38. ἀλλâ€™ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο μίαν ἐπὶ πάντων καθόλου μέθοδον ζητητέονÂ· οὔτε γὰρ ῥᾴδιον εὑρεῖν τοῦτâ€™ ἐστίν, εἴ θâ€™ εὑρεθείη, παντελῶς ἀσαφὴς καὶ δύσχρηστος ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν προκειμένην πραγματείαν.

That the quadruple classification is exhaustive, and that every proposition or problem falls under one or other of the four heads, may be shown in two ways. First, by Induction: survey and analyse as many propositions as you will, all without exception will be found to belong to one of the four.38Secondly, by the following Deductive proof:â€” In every proposition the predicate is either co-extensive and reciprocating with the subject, or it is not. If it does reciprocate, it either declares the essence of the subject, or it does not: if the former, it is the Definition; if the latter, it is a Proprium. But, supposing the predicate notto reciprocate with the subject, it will either declare something contained in the Definition, or it will not. If it does contain a part of the Definition, that part must be either a Genus or a Differentia, since these are the constituents of the Definition. If it does not contain any such part, it must be an Accident.39Hence it appears that every proposition must belong to one or other of the four, and that the classification is exhaustive.

38Ibid. viii. p. 103, b. 3: μία μὲν πίστις ἡ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆςÂ· εἰ γάρ τις ἐπισκοποίη ἑκάστην τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τῶν προβλημάτων, φαίνοιτâ€™ ἂν ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅρου ἢ &c.

39Topic. I.viii.p. 103, b. 6-19: ἄλλη δὲ πίστις ἡ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ.It will be observed that Aristotle here resolves Definition into Genus and DifferentiÃ¦ â€” ἐπειδὴ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐκ γένους καὶ διαφορῶν ἐστίν. Moreover, though he does not recognize Species as a separate head, yet in his definition of Genus he implies Species as known â€” γένος ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶδιαφερόντων τῷ εἴδειἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον (p. 102, a. 31).It thus appears that the quintuple classification is the real and logical one; but the quadruple may perhaps be more suitable for the Topica, with a view to dialectic procedure, since debates turn upon the attack and defence of a Definition.

39Topic. I.viii.p. 103, b. 6-19: ἄλλη δὲ πίστις ἡ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ.

It will be observed that Aristotle here resolves Definition into Genus and DifferentiÃ¦ â€” ἐπειδὴ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐκ γένους καὶ διαφορῶν ἐστίν. Moreover, though he does not recognize Species as a separate head, yet in his definition of Genus he implies Species as known â€” γένος ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶδιαφερόντων τῷ εἴδειἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον (p. 102, a. 31).

It thus appears that the quintuple classification is the real and logical one; but the quadruple may perhaps be more suitable for the Topica, with a view to dialectic procedure, since debates turn upon the attack and defence of a Definition.

Moreover, each of the four Predicables must fall under one or other of the ten Categories or Predicaments. If the predicate be either of Genus or Definition, declaring the essence of the subject, it may fall under any one of the ten Categories; if of Proprium or Accident, not declaring essence, it cannot belong to the first Category (Οὐσία), but must fall under one of the remaining nine.40

40Ibid. ix. p. 103, b. 20-39.

The notion of Sameness or Identity occurs so often in dialectic debate, that Aristotle discriminates its three distinct senses or grades: (1)Numero; (2)Specie; (3)Genere. Water from the same spring is onlyidem specie, though the resemblance between two cups of water from the same spring is far greater than that between water from different sources. EvenIdem Numerohas different significations: sometimes there are complete synonyms; sometimes an individual is called by its proprium, sometimes by its peculiar temporary accident.41

41Ibid. vii. p. 103, a. 6-39.

Having thus classified dialectic propositions, Aristotle proceeds to the combination of propositions, or dialectic discourse and argument. This is of two sorts, either Induction or Syllogism; of both which we have already heard in the Analytica. Induction is declared to be plainer, more persuasive, nearer to sensible experience, and more suitable to the many, than Syllogism; while this latter carries greater compulsion and is more irresistible against professed disputants.42A particular example is given to illustrate what Induction is. But we remark that though it is always mentioned as an argumentative procedure important and indispensable, yet neither here nor elsewhere does Aristotle go into any discriminative analysis of the conditionsunder which it is valid, as he does about Syllogism in the Analytica Priora.

42Ibid. xii. p. 105, a. 10-19: πόσα τῶν λόγων εἴδη τῶν διαλεκτικῶν, &c.

What helps are available to give to the dialectician a ready and abundant command of syllogisms? Four distinct helps may be named:43(1) He must make a large collection of Propositions; (2) He must study and discriminate the different senses in which the Terms of these propositions are used; (3) He must detect and note Differences; (4) He must investigate Resemblances.

43Topic. I. xiii. p. 105, a. 21: τὰ δâ€™ ὄργανα, διâ€™ ὧν εὐπορήσομεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἐστὶ τέτταρα, ἕν μὲν τὸ προτάσεις λαβεῖν, δεύτερον δὲ ποσαχῶς ἕκαστον λέγεται δύνασθαι διελεῖν, τρίτον τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν, τέταρτον δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέψις.The term ὄργανα, properly signifyinginstruments, appears here by a strained metaphor. It means simplyhelpsoraids, as may be seen by comparing Top. VIII. xiv. p. 163, b. 9. Waitz says truly (Prolegg. ad Analyt. Post. p. 294): â€œunde fit, ut ὄργανα dicat quÃ¦cunque ad aliquam rem faciendam adiumentum afferant.â€�

The term ὄργανα, properly signifyinginstruments, appears here by a strained metaphor. It means simplyhelpsoraids, as may be seen by comparing Top. VIII. xiv. p. 163, b. 9. Waitz says truly (Prolegg. ad Analyt. Post. p. 294): â€œunde fit, ut ὄργανα dicat quÃ¦cunque ad aliquam rem faciendam adiumentum afferant.â€�

1. About collecting Propositions, Aristotle has already indicated that those wanted are such as declareEndoxa, and other modes of thought cognate oranalogousto theEndoxa:44opinions of the many, and opinions of any small sections or individuals carrying authority. All such are to be collected (out of written treatises as well as from personal enquiry); nor are individual philosophers (like Empedokles) to be omitted, since a proposition is likely enough to be conceded when put upon the authority of an illustrious name.45If any proposition is currently admitted as true in general or in most cases, it must be tendered with confidence to the respondent as an universal principle; for he will probably grant it, not being at first aware of the exceptions.46All propositions must be registered in the most general terms possible, and must then be resolved into their subordinate constituent particulars, as far as the process of subdivision can be carried.47

44Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 4: ἐκλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὰς οὔσας ἐνδόξους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ὁμοίας ταύταις.

45Ibid. b. 17: θείη γὰρ ἄν τις τὸ ὑπό τινος εἰρημένον ἐνδόξου.

46Ibid. b. 10: ὅσα ἐπὶ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων φαίνεται, ληπτέον ὡς ἀρχὴν καὶ δοκοῦσαν θέσινÂ· τιθέασι γὰρ οἱ μὴ συνορῶντες ἐπὶ τίνος οὐχ οὕτως.

47Ibid. b. 31-37: ληπτέον δâ€™ ὅτι μάλιστα καθόλου πάσας τὰς προτάσεις, καὶ τὴν μίαν πολλὰς ποιητέον â€” διαιρετέον, ἕως ἂν ἐνδέχηται διαιρεῖν, &c.

2. The propositions having been got together, they must be examined in order to find out Equivocation or double meaning of terms. There are various ways of going about this task. Sometimes the same predicate is applied to two different subjects, but in different senses; thus, courage and justice are both of them good, but in a different way. Sometimes the same predicate is applied to two different classes of subjects, each admitting of being defined; thus, health is good in itself, and exercise isgood as being among those things that promote health.48Sometimes the equivocal meaning of a term is perceived by considering its contrary; if we find that it has two or more distinct contraries, we know at once that it has different meanings. Sometimes, though there are not two distinct contraries, yet the mere conjunction of the same adjective with two substantives shows us at once that it cannot mean the same in both49(λευκὴ φωνή â€” λευκὸν χρῶμα). In one sense, the term may have an assignable contrary, while in another sense it may have no contrary; showing that the two senses are distinct: for example, the pleasure of drinking has for its contrary the pain of thirst; but the pleasure of scientifically contemplating that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with the side, has no contrary; hence, we see that pleasure is an equivocal term.50In one sense, there may be a term intermediate between the two contraries; in another sense, there may be none; or there may be two distinct intermediate terms for the two distinct senses; or there may be several intermediate terms in one of the senses, and only one or none in the other: in each of these ways the equivocation is revealed.51We must look also to the contradictory opposite (of a term), which may perhaps have an obvious equivocation of meaning; thus, μὴ βλέπειν means sometimes to be blind, sometimes not to be seeing actually, whence we discover that βλέπειν also has the same equivocation.52If a positive term is equivocal, we know that the privative term correlating with it must also be equivocal; thus, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι has a double sense, according as we speak with reference to mind or body; and this will be alike true of the correlating privative â€” τὸ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι.53Farther, an equivocal term will have its derivatives equivocal in the same manner; and conversely, if the derivative be equivocal, the radical will be so likewise.54The term must also be looked at in reference to the ten Categories: if its meanings fall under more than one Category, we know that it is equivocal.55If it comprehends two subjects which are not in the same genus, or in genera not subordinate one to the other, this too will show that it is equivocal.56The contrary, also, of the term must be looked at with a view to the same inference.57

48Topic. I. xv. p. 106, a. 1-8: τὸ δὲ ποσαχῶς, πραγματευτέον μὴ μόνον ὅσα λέγεται καθâ€™ ἕτερον τρόπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτων πειρατέον ἀποδιδόναι.

49Ibid. a. 9-35.

50Ibid. a. 36.

51Ibid. b. 4.

52Ibid. b. 13-20.

53Ibid. b. 21-28.

54Ibid. b. 28.

55Ibid. p. 107, a. 3-17.

56Ibid. a. 18.

57Ibid. a. 32-35.

Again, it will be useful to bring together the same term in twodifferent conjunctions, and to compare the definitions of the two. Define both of them, and then deduct what is peculiar to eachdefinitum: if the remainder be different, the term will be equivocal; if the remainder be the same, the term will be univocal. Thus, λευκὸν σῶμα will be defined, a body having such and such a colour: λευκὴ φωνή, a voice easily and distinctly heard: deduct σῶμα from the first definition, and φωνὴ from the second, the remainder will be totally disparate; therefore, the term λευκόν is equivocal.58Sometimes, also, the ambiguity may be found in definitions themselves, where the same term is used to explain subjects that are not the same; whether such use is admissible, has to be considered.59If the term be univocal, two conjunctions of it may always be compared as to greater or less, or in respect of likeness; whenever this cannot be, the term is equivocal.60If, again, the term is used as a differentia for two genera quite distinct and independent of each other, it must be equivocal; for genera that are unconnected and not subordinate one to the other, have their differentiÃ¦ also disparate.61And, conversely, if the term be such that the differentiÃ¦ applied to it are disparate, we may know it to be an equivocal term. The like, if the term be used as a species in some of its conjunctions, and as a differentia in others.62

58Topic. I. xv. p. 107, a. 36-b. 3.

59Ibid. b. 8.

60Ibid. b. 13-18: ἔτι εἰ μὴ συμβλητὰ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ ὁμοίως, â€” τὸ γὰρ συνώνυμον πᾶν συμβλητόν.

61Ibid. b. 19-26.

62Ibid. b. 27-37.

3. Aristotle has thus indicated, at considerable length, the points to be looked for when we are examining whether a term is univocal or equivocal. He is more concise when he touches on the last two out of the four helps (ὄργανα) enumerated for supplying syllogisms when needed, â€” viz. the study of Differences and of Resemblances. In regard to the study of Differences, standing third, while he remarks that, where these are wide and numerous, they are sure without any precept to excite our attention, he advises that we should study the differences of subjects that are nearly allied, â€” those within the same genus, or comprehended in genera not much removed from one another, such as, the distinction between sensible perception and science. But he goes into no detail.63

63Ibid. xvi. p. 107, b. 39.

4. In regard to the study of Resemblances, he inverts the above precept, and directs us to note especially the points of resemblance between subjects of great apparent difference.64We must examine what is the quality common to all species of thesame genus â€” man, horse, dog, &c.; for it is in this that they are similar. We may also compare different genera with each other, in respect to the analogies that are to be found in each:e.g., as science is to the cognizable, so is perception to the perceivable; as sight is in the eye, so is intellection in the soul; as γαλήνη is in the sea, so is νηνεμία in the air.65

64Ibid. xvii. p. 108, a. 12: μάλιστα δâ€™ ἐν τοῖς πολὺ διεστῶσι γυμνάζεσθαι δεῖÂ· ῥᾷον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δυνησόμεθα τὰ ὅμοια συνορᾶν.

65Topic. I. xvii. p. 108, a. 7.

Such are the four distinct helps, towards facility of syllogizing, enumerated by Aristotle. It will be observed that the third and fourth (study of Resemblances and Differences) bear more upon matters of fact and less upon words; while the second (τὸ ποσαχῶς), though doubtless also bearing on matters of fact and deriving from thence its main real worth, yet takes its departure from terms and propositions, and proceeds by comparing multiplied varieties of these in regard to diversity of meaning. Upon this ground it is, apparently, that Aristotle has given so much fuller development to the second head than to the third and fourth; for, in the Topica, he is dealing with propositions and counter-propositions â€” with opinions and counter-opinions, not with science and truth.

He proceeds to indicate the different ways in which these three helps (the second, third, and fourth) further the purpose of the dialectician â€” respondent as well as assailant. Unless the different meanings of the term be discriminated, the respondent cannot know clearly what he admits or what he denies; he may be thinking of something different from what the assailant intends, and the syllogisms constructed may turn upon a term only, not upon any reality.66The respondent will be able to protect himself better against being driven into contradiction, if he can distinguish the various meanings of the same term; for he will thus know whether the syllogisms brought against him touch the real matter which he has admitted.67On the other hand, the assailant will have much facility in driving his opponent into contradiction, if he (the assailant) can distinguish the different meanings of the term, while the respondent cannot do so; in those cases at least where the proposition is true in one sense of the term and false in another.68This manner of proceeding, however, is hardly consistent with genuine Dialectic. No dialectician ought ever to found his interrogations and hisarguments upon a mere unanalysed term, unless he can find absolutely nothing else to say in the debate.69

66Ibid. xviii. p. 108, a. 22.

67Ibid. a. 26: χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παραλογισθῆναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ παραλογίσασθαι. εἰδότες γὰρ ποσαχῶς λέγεται οὐ μὴ παραλογισθῶμεν, ἀλλâ€™ εἰδήσομεν ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τὸν λόγον ποιῆται ὁ ἐρωτῶν.

68Ibid. a. 29: αὐτοί τε ἐρωτῶντες δυνησόμεθα παραλογίσασθαι ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ εἰδὼς ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος ποσαχῶς λέγεταιÂ· τοῦτο δâ€™ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δυνατόν, ἀλλâ€™ ὅταν ᾖ τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων τὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ, τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ.

69Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, a. 34: διὸ παντελῶς εὐλαβητέον τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ τοιοῦντον, τὸ πρὸς τοὔνομα διαλέγεσθαι,ἐὰν μή τις ἄλλως ἐξαδυνατῇ περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου διαλέγεσθαι.

The third help (an acquaintance with Differences) will be of much avail on all occasions where we have to syllogize upon Same and Different, and where we wish to ascertain the essence or definition of any thing; for we ascertain this by exclusion of what is foreign thereunto, founded on the appropriate differences in each case.70

70Ibid. b. 2.

Lastly, the fourth help (the intelligent survey of Resemblances) serves us in different ways:â€” (1) Towards the construction of inductive arguments; (2) Towards syllogizing founded upon assumption; (3) Towards the declaration of definitions. As to the inductive argument, it is founded altogether on a repetition of similar particulars, whereby the universal is obtained.71As to the syllogizing from an assumption, the knowledge of resemblances is valuable, because we are entitled to assume, as anEndoxonor a doctrine conformable to common opinion, that what happens in any one of a string of similar cases will happen also in all the rest. We lay down this as the major proposition of a syllogism; and thus, if we can lay hold of any one similar case, we can draw inference from it to the matter actually in debate.72Again, as to the declaration of definitions, when we have once discovered what is the same in all particular cases, we shall have ascertained to what genus the subject before us belongs;73for that one of the common predicates which is most of the essence, will be the genus. Even where the two matters compared are more disparate than we can rank in the same genus, the knowledge of resemblances will enable us to discover useful analogies, and thus to obtain a definition at least approximative. Thus, as the point is in a line, so is the unit in numbers; each of them is aprincipium; this, therefore, is a common genus, which will serve as a tolerable definition. Indeed this is the definition of them commonly given by philosophers; who call the unitprincipiumof number, and the pointprincipiumof a line, thus putting one and the other into a genus common to both.74

71Ibid. b. 9.

72Ibid. b. 12: πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως συλλογσισμούς,διότι ἔνδοξόν ἐστιν, ὥς ποτε ἐφâ€™ ἑνὸς τῶν ὁμοίων ἔχει, οὕτως καὶ ἐὶ τῶν λοιπῶνÂ· ὥστε πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν εὐπορῶμεν διαλέγεσθαι,προδιομολογησόμεθα, ὥς ποτε ἐπὶ τούτων ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ προκειμένου ἔχειν. δείξαντες δὲ ἐκεῖνο καὶτὸπροκείμενονἐξ ὑποθέσεως δεδειχότες ἐσόμεθαÂ· ὑποθέμενοιγάρ, ὥς ποτε ἐπὶ τούτων ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ προκειμένου ἔχειν, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν πεποιήμεθα. For τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, compare Topic. III. vi. p. 119, b. 35.

73Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, b. 19.

74Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, b. 27: ὥστε τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάντων γένος ἀποδίδοντεςδόξομεν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ὁρίζεσθαι. It will be recollected that all the work of Dialectic (as Aristotle tells us often) has reference to δόξα and not to scientific truth. â€œWe shallseem to definenot in a manner departing from the reality of the subjectâ€� is, therefore, an appropriate dialectic artifice.

The First Book of the Topica, which we have thus gone through, was entitled by some ancient commentators τὰ πρὸ τῶν Τόπων â€” matters preliminary to theLoci. This is quite true, as a description of its contents; for Aristotle in the last words of the book, distinctly announces that he is about to enumerate theLocitowards which the four above-mentionedOrganawill be useful.75

75Ibid. p. 108, b. 32: οἱ δὲ τόποι πρὸς οὓς χρήσιμα τὰ λεχθέντα οἵδε εἰσίν.

Locus(τόπος) is a place in which many arguments pertinent to one and the same dialectical purpose, may be found â€”sedes argumentorum. In eachlocus, the arguments contained therein look at the thesis from the same point of view; and thelocusimplies nothing distinct from the arguments, except this manner of view common to them all. In fact, the metaphor is a convenient one for designating the relation of every Universal generally to its particulars: the Universal is not a new particular, nor any adjunct superimposed upon all its particulars, but simply aplacein which all known similar particulars may be found grouped together, and in which there is room for an indefinite number of new ones. If we wish to arm the student with a large command of dialectical artifices, we cannot do better than discriminate the various groups of arguments, indicating the point of view common to each group, and the circumstances in which it becomes applicable. By this means, whenever he is called upon to deal with a new debate, he will consider the thesis in reference to each one of these differentloci, and will be able to apply arguments out of each of them, according as the case may admit.

The fourHelps(ὄργανα) explained in the last book differ from theLociin being of wider and more undefined bearing: they are directions for preparatory study, rather than for dealing with any particular situation of a given problem; though it must be confessed that, when Aristotle proceeds to specify the manner in which the three last-mentioned helps are useful, he makes considerable approach towards the greater detail and particularizationof theLoci. In entering now upon these, he reverts to that quadruple classification of propositions and problems (according to the four Predicables), noted at the beginning of the treatise, in which the predicate is either Definition, Proprium, Genus, or Accident, of the subject. He makes a fourfold distribution ofLoci, according as they bear upon one or other of these four. In the Second and Third Books, we find those which bear upon propositions predicating Accident; in the Fourth Book, we pass to Genus; in the Fifth, to Proprium; in the Sixth and Seventh, to Definition.

The problem or thesis propounded for debate may have two faults on which it may be impugned: either it may be untrue; or it may be expressed in a way departing from the received phraseology.76It will be universal, or particular, or indefinite; and either affirmative or negative; but, in most cases, the respondent propounds for debate an affirmative universal, and not a negative or a particular.77Aristotle therefore begins with thoselocithat are useful for refuting an Affirmative Universal; though, in general, the same arguments are available for attack and defence both of the universal and of the particular; for if you can overthrow the particular, you will have overthrown the universal along with it, while if you can defend the universal, this will include the defence of the particular. As the thesis propounded is usually affirmative, the assailant undertakes the negative side or the work of refutation. And this indeed (as Eudemus, the pupil of Aristotle, remarked, after his master78) is the principal function and result of dialectic exercise; which refutes much and proves very little, according to the analogy of the Platonic Dialogues of Search.

76Topic. II. i. p. 109, a. 27: διορίσασθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς προβλήμασιν, ὅτι εἰσὶ διτταί, ἢ τῷ ψεύδεσθαι, ἢ τῷ παραβαίνειν τὴν κειμένην λέξιν.Alexander remarks (Schol. p. 264, b. 23, Br.) that πρόβλημα here means, not the interrogation, but τὸ ὡρισμένον ἤδη καὶ κείμενον â€” οὗ προΐσταταί τις, ὅν ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρεῖ.

76Topic. II. i. p. 109, a. 27: διορίσασθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς προβλήμασιν, ὅτι εἰσὶ διτταί, ἢ τῷ ψεύδεσθαι, ἢ τῷ παραβαίνειν τὴν κειμένην λέξιν.

Alexander remarks (Schol. p. 264, b. 23, Br.) that πρόβλημα here means, not the interrogation, but τὸ ὡρισμένον ἤδη καὶ κείμενον â€” οὗ προΐσταταί τις, ὅν ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρεῖ.

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