VI
CONTINUATION OF THE BIDDING
After the completion of the first round, the situation of the bidder becomes so complex that it is most difficult to apply general rules. Some principles, however, should be borne in mind.
Bidding one Spade, or passing, places a player with two tricks in a position to increase his partner's call; but when a bidder has already shown the full strength, or practically the full strength, of his hand, he should not, under any circumstances, advance either his own or his partner's declaration. The temptation to disregard this rule is at times exceedingly strong. For example, the dealer declares one Heart, holding King, Queen, at the top of five Hearts, and the Ace of Spades. The partner calls one No-trump, and the Fourth Hand, two Royals. In such case, the original Heart bidder frequently advances the No-trump to two, because he has the adverse suit stopped, without considering that his partner, in bidding one No-trump, counted upon him for either that Ace of Spades, or the equivalent strength, and, therefore, he should leave the question of the continuance of the No-trump to the player who knows its exact strength.
Another example of this proposition may be worthy of consideration. The dealer holds
He bids one Diamond; Second Hand, pass; Third Hand, one Heart; Fourth Hand, one Royal.
In this position a thoughtless player might call two Hearts, but such a declaration would greatly exaggerate the value of the hand. The dealer by his first bid has announced his ability to take at least three tricks if Diamonds be Trump, and at least two tricks if the deal be played without a Trump. His hand justifies such a call, but that is all; having declared his full strength, his lips must thereafter be sealed.
His partner is already counting upon him for two high-card tricks, which is the maximum his hand can possibly produce; should he call two Hearts on the basis of the Ace, the original Heart bidder would expect assistance to the extent of at least three tricks. He might receive only one.
If, however, the dealer's hand be
a very different proposition presents itself. While this combination, had No-trump been called, would not be stronger than the other and should not advance the bid, with Hearts Trump it is a most valuable assistant, and being worth at least three tricks, is fully warranted in calling at least two Hearts.
The fact that it contains four Hearts is one material element of strength and the singleton Spade is another, neither of which has been announced by the original call.
One of the most difficult tasks of the bidder is to accurately estimate the number of tricks the combined hands of his partnership can reasonably be expected to win. It sometimes occurs, especially in what are known as "freak" hands, that one pair can take most of the tricks with one suit declaration, while with another, their adversaries can be equally successful. This is most apt to happen in two-suit hands, or when length in Trumps is coupled with a cross-ruff. In the ordinary run of evenly divided hands, there is not such great difference in the trick-taking ability of two declarations. The player who, except with an extraordinary hand, commits his side to ten or eleven tricks, after the adversaries have shown that with another declaration they do not expect to lose more than two or three, is extremely venturesome, and apt to prove a dangerous partner. In normal deals, a change in the Trump suit does not produce a shift of seven or eight tricks.
WHEN TO ADVANCE THE BID
It is frequently most difficult for a bidder to determine whether he is justified in advancing his own or his partner's declaration, and when in doubt it is generally better to err on the side of conservatism.
The continuation of a No-trump without the adverse suit thoroughly guarded is most dangerous, and should be risked only when the Declarer is convinced beyond doubt that his holding justifies it, or when the partner has shown that he can stop the threatening suit.
When the partner, either as Dealer or Second Hand, has declared one No-trump, the bid has unquestionably been based upon the expectation of average assistance, and unless able to furnish more, a higher call should not be made. If, however, the partner bid twice, without aid, two tricks unquestionably justifies assisting once.
The minimum trick-taking ability with which an original suit declaration is made being appreciably greater than the number of tricks contained in a border-line No-trumper, the former should be assisted with less strength than is required to advance the latter. With two sure tricks the partner's suit call should be helped once by a player who has not declared, but whether a No-trump should be aided with just two tricks and no chance of more is a question depending upon the judgment of the bidder and upon whether one of the tricks is in the adverse suit. With two sure high-card tricks and a five-card suit, but without the adverse suit guarded, the five-card suit is generally the call, especially if two in it will be sufficient. Three Clubs, however, should not be declared without due consideration, as that declaration is recognized as demanding two No-trumps from the partner if he have the adverse suit stopped.
Being void or holding only a singleton of a suit, especially if it be the suit declared by the adversary, is to be considered in reckoning the trick-taking value of a hand which contemplates assisting a partner's Trump declaration. For example, four small Hearts, the Ace and three other Clubs, and five small Diamonds, when the partner has called one Heart, are worth three or four tricks, although the hand contains but one Ace and no face card. Holding such a combination, a partner's bid of one Heart should be advanced at least twice.
When a declaration by the dealer is followed by two passes and an overbid by the right-hand adversary, the dealer is frequently placed in a doubtful position as to whether he should advance his own bid. Some authorities contend that with less than six tricks he should wait for his partner, and while no inflexible rule can be made to cover all such cases, the follower of this proposition has probably adopted the safest guide.
When the original call has been one No-trump, it is the part of wisdom with less than six tricks, even if the adverse suit be stopped twice, to give the partner a chance. If he can furnish more than two tricks, he will declare, and the Dealer can then, if he so desire, continue the No-trump, but to bid without first hearing from the partner is obviously venturesome. If the Dealer have five tricks, that is enough to save game, but is three tricks short of making two No-trumps.
When the Dealer has declared a strong No-trump with one unprotected suit and his right-hand adversary calls two in that suit, it is manifestly unwise to continue the No-trump. Holding six sure tricks in a higher-valued suit or seven in a lower, it is probably wise to bid two or three, as the exigencies of the case may require, in that suit.
In close cases, when advancing or declining to advance the partner's bid, the personal equation should be a most important, if not the deciding, factor. Some players are noted for their reckless declaring; with such a partner the bidding must be ultra-conservative. Other players do not regard conventional rules in their early declarations. The bids of a partner of this kind should not be increased unless the hand contain at least one trick more than the number that normally would justify an advance.
When playing against a bidder who has the habit of overbidding, full advantage should be taken of his weakness, and whenever possible he should be forced to a high contract he may be unable to fulfil.
When a dealer who has opened with one Spade, or any other player who has passed the first round, subsequently enters the bidding, he gives unmistakable evidence of length but not strength. This is a secondary declaration, and the maker plainly announces, "I will take many more tricks with this suit Trump than any other; indeed, I may not win a trick with any other Trump."
Overbidding a partner's secondary declaration, or counting upon it for tricks when doubling an adversary who has overcalled it, shows inexcusable lack of understanding of the modern system of declaring.
WHEN TO OVERBID THE PARTNER
Overbidding a partner with a declaration which he has once taken out is only authorized by an honor count which is of material value, or a sure game. For example, if a player declare one Royal, holding four or five honors, and the partner overbid with a No-trump, the original declarer should bid two Royals; but without the big honor count it is wiser to let the No-trump stand, as the partner has announced weakness in Spades.
The same line of reasoning should be followed when the partner has called two of a suit over a No-trump. As a rule, under these conditions, it is most unwise for the original No-trump declarer to bid two No-trumps, but with four Aces, the value of the honors thoroughly warrants such a declaration, unless the partner's call has evidently been a "rescue."
The "rescue" or weakness take-out is a warning not to be disregarded. Two Clubs or Diamonds over a No-trump is the most self-evident example, and after such a call by the partner it takes a holding of eight sure tricks to justify two No-trumps. Of course, with four Aces, seven tricks would warrant the call, on the theory that at the worst the 100 for the Aces would set off the possible loss by the double, and more than equal the loss if a double be not made.
FLAG-FLYING
The practice generally called "flag-flying" consists in overbidding an adverse declaration, which will surely result in game and rubber, with a holding which is not of sufficient strength to carry out the contract.
While at times flag-flying is of great advantage, in inexperienced hands it is apt to prove a dangerous expedient. The argument in its favor is obvious. The bonus of 250 points for the rubber really makes 500 points the difference between winning and losing, and in addition there must be computed the points and honors which would be scored by the adversaries in the deal with which they go game, and the points and honors which may be scored by the flag-flyers in the succeeding deal which they hope will carry them to their goal. On this basis flag-flyers estimate that it makes a difference of 600 points whether their opponents go out on the current deal or the flag-flyers score game on the next, and they claim that any loss under 600 is a gain. The estimate is correct; the claim, ridiculous. Whenever the next deal furnishes the player who offers the gambit sufficient strength to capture the rubber, he gains, when his loss has been under 600, but at best it is not more than an even chance that he will win, and when the pendulum swings in the adverse direction, the only result of the performance with the flag is to increase the size of the adversaries' rubber by the amount of the sacrifice. This continued indefinitely is bound to produce Auction bankruptcy.
The player who figures that, on the doctrine of chances, he and his partner will hold the strong cards once in every two deals, should remember that the fickle goddess would never have deserved nor received her well-earned title had she been even approximately reliable.
A run of bad luck may continue for an indefinite period. It has pursued good players not only for a day or a week, but continuously for months and years. It does not sound warnings announcing its appearance or disappearance. To attempt to fight it by the flag-flying process as a rule only multiplies the loss many fold. And yet, it must not be understood that the flag-flyer should always be shunned and condemned. When his loss amounts to only 100 or 200, or when, not detecting his purpose, the adversaries fail to double, and the loss is, therefore, smaller, the odds favor his exhibition of nerve. Flag-flying, however, is like dynamite: in the hands of a child or of one unfamiliar with its characteristics, it is a danger, the extent of which none can foretell; but used with skill, it becomes a tool of exceptional value.
It is only during the rubber game that even the most enthusiastic and expert flyer of the flag should allow it to wave. With a game out, to make the play successful Dame Fortune must bestow her favors twice in succession. Before taking such a long chance, a player should realize that there are future rubbers which he has an even chance of winning, and that it is better to minimize the present loss than to allow it to become so great that, even if good fortune follow, it will be impossible to recoup. On the first game of the rubber, or with a game in, and the adversaries still without a game, it is plainly too early and the situation is not sufficiently desperate to resort to any real flag-flying. Except when playing the rubber game, a voluntary loss of over 100 should never be considered.
VII
DOUBLING
All doubles, except the double of one Spade by the Second Hand, which is really an informatory bid,[20]are made for the purpose of increasing the score of the doubler.
The old idea of informatory doubles has been abandoned. Now when a player doubles, he does not invite a No-trump by showing one or more tricks in the adversary's suit, but he practically says, "Partner, I am satisfied that we can defeat this declaration, and I desire to receive a bonus of 100 instead of 50 for each trick that our adversaries fall short of their contract. I do not wish you to overbid, unless your hand be of such a peculiar character that you have reason to believe the double will not be very profitable and feel sure that we can go game with your declaration."
Although doubles are made under widely divergent conditions, they may be subdivided into two classes:—
1. The double of a declaration which, if successful, will result in game, regardless of the double, such as four Hearts, with a love score.
2. The double which, if unsuccessful, puts the Declarer out, although if undoubled, he would not secure the game by fulfilling his contract, such as two or three Hearts, with a love score.
In the first instance, the doubler has nothing to lose except the difference in points which the Declarer may make as a result of the double. When, for example, a bid of four Hearts is doubled and the Declarer fulfils his contract, the double costs exactly 82 points. If the Declarer fall one trick short, the double gains 50 points. When, however, there is a redouble, the loss is increased 114 points, the gain 100 points. The doubler is, therefore, betting the Declarer 82 to 50 that he will not make his contract, and giving the Declarer the option of increasing the bet, so that the odds become 196 to 150. It is evident, therefore, that even when the Declarer will go out in any event, it is not a particularly advantageous proposition for the doubler to give odds of 8 to 5 or 20 to 15, if the chances be even. When the declaration is Royals or No-trumps, the odds against the double are increased. If four No-trumps be doubled, the figures are 90 to 50 with the option given to the Declarer to increase them to 220 to 150.
The explanatory remark so often heard after an unsuccessful double, "It could not cost anything, as they were out anyhow," is not an absolutely accurate statement. It may be worth while to consider one ordinary illustration of how many points may be lost by a foolish double of this character. A bid of four Hearts is doubled and redoubled. The Declarer takes eleven tricks, as he is able to ruff one or two high cards which the doubler hoped would prove winners. This is an every-day case, but the figures are rarely brought home. Without a double, the Declarer would have scored 40 points; with the redouble, he scores 160 points and 200 bonus, or 360, presented by an adversary, who hoped at most to gain 50 and thought his effort "could not cost anything."
A doubtful double should not be made when the partner has another bid, as, for example, when the adversary to the right has called four Hearts, over three Royals declared by the partner. Under these circumstances, the double, on the theory that the doubler expects to secure a large bonus, may properly deter the partner from a successful four Royals declaration. Even when the double is successful to the extent of 100, that is not a sufficient compensation for losing the opportunity to win the game.
The fact that a good player has declared an unusually large number of tricks, as, for example, five Hearts, is not in itself a reason for doubling. A player of experience, when he makes such a declaration, fully realizes the difficulty of the undertaking. He does not take the chance without giving it more consideration than he would a smaller bid, and it is only fair to assume that he has a reasonable expectation of success. Doubling, therefore, merely because the bid requires ten or even eleven tricks, is folly, pure and simple. This comment, however, does not apply when the bid is of the flag-flying character.[21]As to whether or not it comes within that category the doubler will have to determine. The Auction expert is always on the lookout for an opportunity to gather a large bonus at the expense of a flag-flyer, and as unduly sanguine players indulge in that practice more than others, their declarations should be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny.
The doubtful double, which, should it prove unsuccessful, will result in the Declarer scoring a game he would not otherwise obtain, is, as a rule, inexcusable. By this is not meant that a bid of two or three Hearts or Royals, or of three or four Clubs or Diamonds, should never be doubled. That would be absurd doctrine, but such a double should never be made with the chances even, or nearly even. An experienced bidder will not risk presenting the adversaries with the game and a bonus unless reasonably sure of defeating the declaration.
Another absurd notion is doubling because of the partner's general strength. The partner has an equal opportunity to double, and is much better posted in relation to his own cards. If the strength be his, he should decide whether or not to take the chance. When, however, one partner has some strength in the suit the adversaries have declared, and the other, high side cards, the double is more apt to confuse the Declarer if made by the player without the Trump strength.
The above refers to doubtful doubles only; when the indications are that the Declarer can be decisively defeated, the double is most important. It is worth 100 if the Declarer go down two; 150, if he lose three, etc. These additional points should not be allowed to escape.
Even the most venturesome doublers realize that, except in the unusual case, it is unwise to double a bid of one, whether it be in a suit or No-trump. Some players hesitate about doubling a bid of two, preferring to take the chance of forcing the bidder higher. No general rule covering the situation can be laid down, as it depends greatly upon the character of the doubler's hand whether the adversary is apt to advance his bid.
A double of a No-trump is much safer than of a suit declaration. The doubler of the No-trump knows approximately what to expect from his long suit, what suits he has stopped, and if one be unguarded, can estimate how many tricks it may be possible for the declarer to run. The doubler of a suit declaration cannot figure with any such accuracy. He rarely has more than two winning Trumps, and therefore, as a rule, must depend upon side Aces and Kings for the balance of his tricks. It is always possible that the Declarer or his partner may be absolutely void of the suit or suits in which the doubler expects to win his tricks, so that sometimes a hand with which the most conservative player would double, goes to pieces before a cross-ruff. When one hand is evenly divided, the chances are that the others are of the same character, but it is not a certainty that they are. When one hand has a very long suit, and is either blank in some other suit, or has but a singleton of it, the other hands are apt to contain very long and very short suits. Therefore, if the doubler be without, or have but a singleton of, a suit, he should be more conservative, in doubling a suit declaration upon the expectation of making high side cards, than when he has an evenly divided hand.
Probably the most advantageous situation for a double is when the partner has declared No-trump, and the adversary to the right, two of a suit, of which the doubler, in addition to other strength, holds four cards, at least two of which are sure to take tricks. This comes nearer being an informatory double than any other in vogue in the game of to-day. The partner, however, should not take it out unless his No-trump consist of some such holding as a solid suit and an Ace.
A hand of this character may not prove formidable against a suit declaration, and it justifies the original Declarer, as he knows that the adverse suit is well stopped, in bidding two No-trumps. It is one of the few cases where it is not advisable to allow the double of a partner to stand.
It is generally conceded that the double, although a most powerful factor in the game, and the element which is productive of large rubbers, is used excessively, especially by inexperienced and rash players. If a record could be produced of all the points won and lost by doubling, there is little doubt that the "lost" column would lead by a ratio of at least two to one.
The double in the hands of a discreet player of sound judgment is, indeed, a powerful weapon greatly feared by the adversaries; when used by the unskilled, it becomes a boomerang of the most dangerous type.
A player cannot afford to have the reputation of never doubling, as that permits his adversaries to take undue liberties in bidding, but it is better to be ultra-conservative than a foolish doubler who continually presents his opponents with games of enormous proportions. A player should not double unless able to count with reasonable exactness in his own hand and announced by his partner a sufficient number of tricks to defeat the Declarer. It is not the place to take a chance or to rely upon a partner, who has not shown strength, for an average holding. It must also be remembered as an argument against a doubtful double that the Declarer is more apt to make his declaration when doubled, as he is then given more or less accurate information regarding the position of the adverse strength, and can finesse accordingly. A double frequently costs one trick—sometimes even more.
THE CHOICE BETWEEN A GAME AND A DOUBLE
A most interesting question arises when a player is placed in the gratifying position of having the opportunity of electing whether to go game or secure a bonus by doubling.
Which course he should take depends entirely upon the state of the rubber, and the size of the bonus that the double will probably produce. A game is always to be preferred to a double which is not apt to net more than 100. When 200 is sure and a greater bonus probable, the double should be made during either the first or second game of the rubber. During the rubber game, however, the doubler should be more conservative, and should "take in" his rubber unless satisfied that the double will produce 300, with a potential possibility of more.
The reason, which may not at first be apparent, for this difference in the situation, may be briefly explained as follows: Before a game has been won, the securing of a large bonus in the honor column places the fortunate doubler in a most advantageous position, as he starts the rubber insured against loss unless he suffer a similar penalty.
When the only game finished has been won by the adversaries, a large bonus should be preferred to game. As the adversaries already have a game, the next hand may give them the rubber, and should it do so, its amount will be most materially affected by the action of the player who has the chance either to score a bonus or win a game. If the first game be of normal size, a large bonus will nullify the result of the rubber, but if instead a game be taken in the adversaries will score an average rubber.
When the player considering a double has a game and the adversaries have not, he is in a most excellent position to double with the hope of a big winning. To secure the enlarged rubber, it is only necessary for him to obtain one game before the adversaries get two, and as the odds are greatly in his favor it is a chance worth taking.
When, however, each side has a game and the question is whether to obtain a bonus or score rubber, the bonus must be large and sure to justify giving up a rubber practically won for merely an equal chance of capturing a larger one. It has been elsewhere stated that when a player who has an opportunity to win a rubber fails to avail himself of it, and on the next hand the adversaries reach the goal, the loss may be roughly estimated at 600 points. The player who doubles during the third game knows that the next hand may see the adversaries score the rubber. Even if he obtain 400 points by doubling, and this happens, the adversaries gain to the extent of approximately 200 points by his action. On the other hand, he has an equal chance for the game, and if he win it, he will be the gainer by the amount secured by the double. When he has a sure 400 in sight, or even a sure 300, with a reasonable chance of more, the odds favor the double, but it is the height of folly to take an even chance of losing 600 unless 300 be the minimum return.
Advice as to whether to double or go game is useful only for players who can with accuracy estimate the trick-taking value of their hands. To refuse a double which would net several hundred for the sake of going game and then fall a trick short of both the game and the declaration is most exasperating, while on the other hand to double for a big score, instead of taking in a sure game, only to have the double fail, is equally heart-breaking.
The player who takes either horn of this dilemma must be sure of his ground and must figure the chances with the greatest care.
WHEN TO REDOUBLE
The question of when to redouble is so intricate that it is hard to consider, except when the specific case arises. Some players frequently redouble, as a kind of bluff, when convinced their declaration will fail, the intent being to frighten either the doubler or his partner into another declaration. Against a very timid player, this is sometimes successful, but unless it catch its victim, it is expensive bait.
Nine out of ten redoubles, however, arebona fide, and made because the fulfilment of the contract seems assured. Even then, however, a player should not redouble unless practically positive that neither of his adversaries can get out of the redouble by making a higher bid.
The player who has been doubled and is sure of his contract is in a most enviable position; game and a handsome bonus both are his, and it would be most foolish for him to risk so much merely for the chance of the extra score. If, however, there be no escape for the doubler, the redouble is most valuable, and a real opportunity for it should never be overlooked.
WHAT TO DO WHEN THE PARTNER IS DOUBLED
The player who, whenever his partner's declaration is doubled, becomes frightened, concludes that the worst is sure to happen, and that it is his duty to come to the rescue by jumping headlong into some other declaration, even if it require an increased number of tricks, is a most dangerousvis-à-vis. A double does not justify the assumption that the Declarer is beaten, especially when the partner has any unannounced help. If the partner be weak, it is folly for him to go from bad to worse; if strong, he may enable the Declarer to make a large score. In any event, in nine cases out of ten, "standing pat" is his best policy.
VIII
LEADING
The selection of the correct lead in Auction is not attended with so many difficulties as in Whist, or even in Bridge. In Whist, the original leader is obliged to begin the play in the dark, the turn-up constituting his entire knowledge of the strength or weakness of the other players. In Bridge, the extent of his information is limited to the inferences that can be drawn from the declaration and the double, but in Auction every player has made at least one announcement which is more or less instructive.
When there has been considerable bidding it is frequently possible to accurately estimate the length and strength of the suit of each player and the trick-taking value of the balance of his hand. When only one or two declarations have been made, so much information may not be obtainable, but even then the leader, from the failure of certain players to bid, may be able to make deductions of considerable value.
The Auction leader, therefore, must remember the various declarations, draw both positive and negative inferences therefrom, and whenever it is not advisable to open his partner's suit or his own, should follow the old principle which, since the days of Pole, has been applicable to all games of the Whist family, and realize "'Tis seldom wrong to lead up to the weak and through the strong."
The original opening is materially varied by the character of the final declaration, the system of leading against a No-trump being quite different from that employed when a suit is Trump.
HOW TO LEAD AGAINST A NO-TRUMP
When the partner has not shown strength, the leader, against a No-trump, should open his own long suit. If he have two long suits, he should pick the stronger except when he has declared it, and has not received support from his partner, in which case it is generally wise to try the other. The possible exception to the lead of a long suit against a No-trump is when that suit has been declared, has not been helped by the partner, and the No-trump has been subsequently bid to the right. In this situation, with a tenace in the long suit, it is sometimes advisable to try, by leading another suit, to get the partner in, so that he may lead through the Declarer's strength in the suit called by the leader. This, however, is a dangerous expedient when the partner has not declared. Should a suit be guessed which the partner cannot win, one of his high cards is apt to be sacrificed, and not only nothing gained, but the advantage of the lead transferred to the adversary. If two high cards be missing from the tenace suit, as in the case when it is headed by Ace, Queen, Ten, or King, Knave, Ten, and the Declarer hold the missing honors and one small card, it will take two leads to establish the suit. It is not likely that a partner without sufficient strength to declare will be able to get in twice, and trying to put him in once is most apt to establish a suit for the Declarer. Therefore, as a general proposition, unless the partner have declared, the tenace suit should be led. When, however, the partner has shown a suit, opening it, in preference to a tenace, is elementary and compulsory.
When the partner has declared, the leader should open the suit named unless satisfied that his own affords a more potent weapon for the attack.
There are only three conditions which justify the leader in assuming this, viz.:—
(a) When the leader has called his suit and his partner has advanced the declaration.(b) When the leader's suit is headed by Ace, King, Queen, or King, Queen, Knave.(c) When the leader has only a singleton of his partner's suit and has several reëntries.
(a) When the leader has called his suit and his partner has advanced the declaration.
(b) When the leader's suit is headed by Ace, King, Queen, or King, Queen, Knave.
(c) When the leader has only a singleton of his partner's suit and has several reëntries.
Innumerable tricks, games, and rubbers have been thrown away by a leader who, considering solely his own hand, has started with his suit in preference to that of his partner. There is some peculiar characteristic in the composition of many players which magnifies the value of their own cards, so that they seem of greater importance and more desirable to establish than their partners'. Even experienced players have been known to commit such an Auction absurdity as opening a suit headed by a Knave, in preference to the suit named by the partner, which, of necessity, contains the strength requisite for a Trump declaration.
It is fair to estimate that ten tricks are lost by denying the partner's declaration to one that escapes the player who leads his partner's suit in preference to his own.
When the partner has declared, his suit can be counted upon for both length and strength, and unless it be practically solid, his hand contains at least one reëntry. The leader by his opening can attack only one-quarter of the No-trump fortification, and it is his duty to pick out the spot which promises to be most vulnerable. A No-trump call is very likely to spell game unless a suit can be established against it. In order to accomplish this it is generally necessary to start with the first card led. Therefore, making the right original opening is probably the only opportunity to save the game. When the leader selects his own suit in preference to his partner's, he should be able to say, "In spite of the strength you have declared, I am reasonably sure that we have a better chance to establish this suit than yours."
As a rule, however, the leader does not have sufficient strength to support such a statement, and, therefore, his lead generally says, "Partner, I know you have considerable strength, you may have declared expressly for the purpose of asking me to lead your suit, but I selfishly prefer to play my own hand rather than act for the benefit of the partnership."
It is but a puerile excuse for a leader who does not open his partner's suit to explain that the No-trump was called by the right-hand adversary after the partner's declaration, and that the bid, having been made with the anticipation that the suit named would be led, he should surprise the Declarer. It is true that the Declarer expects that suit, but it may be the only opening he fears. It is more than possible that the suit is stopped but once, and that leading it will save the game, even if it do not defeat the declaration. It is certainly a very short-sighted or unduly sanguine player who selects a suit of his own, which has not nearly the strength of his partner's, merely on the wild chance that his partner, rather than the No-trump bidder, has the missing high cards.
When the partner has declared two suits and the leader has length or strength in one of them, he should open it, but when he cannot assist either, he should open the suit named first, as it is probably the stronger.
As will be seen from the tables of leads against a No-trump declaration, in some cases whether the leader has a reëntry materially affects the manner in which he should open his long suit. By a reëntry in this connection is meant either an Ace or King, unless the suit containing the King have been bid by the adversary to the left of the leader. In that case the King cannot be expected to win unless accompanied by the Queen. A Queen, or even Queen, Knave, cannot be considered a reëntry, as the suit may not be led three times.
The reason for varying the lead, depending upon the presence of a reëntry, is that the sole thought of the leader against a No-trump is to establish the suit led, and to insure so doing he opens his suit exclusively with that end in view, regardless of whether it would otherwise be the opening most apt to prove trick-winning. He knows that the Declarer will, if possible, hold up a winning card until the Third Hand is unable to return the suit. Therefore, if he be without a reëntry, he must do all in his power to force the winning card from the adversary's hand as early in the play as possible. If he have a reëntry, he may play much more fearlessly. An example of this is a long suit, headed by Ace, Queen, Knave. The most advantageous lead from this combination is the Ace (as an adversary may hold an unguarded King), and that would be the lead with a reëntry; but the chances are that the partner does not hold more than three cards of the suit, and, if it be opened in the usual way, the King will be held up until the third round. The leader without a reëntry, therefore, is compelled to open with the Queen, so as to establish the suit, while the partner, who probably has a reëntry, still retains a card of it.
Another important convention which applies to the opening of the leader's suit against a No-trump declaration (but, of course, against a No-trump declaration only) is that the original lead of an Ace calls for the partner's highest card. An Ace, therefore, should be led from such a combination as a suit headed by Ace, King, Knave, Ten, since the drop of the Queen will permit the suit to be run without hesitation, and the failure of the partner to play the Queen will permit the leader to place its position positively, and to continue the suit or not, as his judgment and the balance of his hand dictate. This doctrine is extended to all cases of the original lead of an Ace against a No-trump declaration.
The Ace should not be led unless the partner's best card, regardless of its size, be desired, and the partner should play it unhesitatingly, be it King, Queen, or Knave, unless the Dummy convince him that meeting the demand of the lead will be trick-sacrificing, in which case the leader's command should be ignored.
In leading a partner's suit, the general rule of selecting the fourth best, when opening with a small card, is not followed. The object in leading that suit is to strengthen the partner, and it is more important to do that and also to tell him what is the leader's highest card than to post him regarding exact length. Holding either two, three, or four of a partner's suit, the top, therefore, should be led, followed on each succeeding trick by the next in order, the lowest being retained until the last. This is sometimes called the "down and out." The one exception to the lead of the top of the partner's suit is when it consists of three or more headed by Ace or King, and the right-hand adversary has called No-trump after the suit has been declared. In that case, it may be that the stopper which the Declarer thinks he has in the suit can be captured, and the lead, therefore, should be a low card.
NUMBER-SHOWING LEADS
The lead in Auction is materially simplified by the fact that number-showing is not nearly so important as in Whist, and really only becomes of value when opening a small card against a No-trump declaration. In that case the lowest should always be led with four in the suit, because the partner, having the Dummy spread before him, being able to count his own hand, and being informed by the lead regarding the leader's length in the suit, can generally tell the exact number held by the Declarer, and can, therefore, accurately determine whether it is better to continue that suit or try some other. It happens more frequently than would be supposed that when a four-card suit is opened with a small card, the Dummy and Third Hand have only four cards of it between them. The Third Hand can then, if the leader have shown exactly four, mark it as the long suit of the Declarer, and make an advantageous shift. This is the only method of giving this warning. If the fourth-best lead be not adopted, the suit must, in most cases, necessarily be continued to the great benefit of the Declarer.
Number-showing by the lead of a small card (one of the rudiments of Whist) is doubtless thoroughly understood by most Auction players; it consists in leading the fourth best, when the suit is not of such a character as to demand a high card or intermediate sequence opening. This informs the partner that the leader has exactly three cards in that suit higher than the card led, and that he may or may not have any smaller card.
For example: the leader has Queen, 7, 6, and 4; the Dummy, a singleton (the 3); and the Third Hand, who wins the trick with the Ace, only two others (the 8 and 2). The Third Hand can place the Declarer with five, as the leader, having opened his lowest, can have had only four originally.
Number-showing leads in high cards, so advantageous in Whist, are absolutely unimportant in Auction, and only complicate the situation. They are not given in the table of leads appended at the end of this chapter, nor is their use permissible, even by the Whist-player of the old school who is thoroughly familiar with their meaning. He must realize that Auction is not a number-showing game, and must be content to limit his skill in that respect to the fourth best, which is advisable when it is not higher than the 7. The limitation of the fourth-best lead to a 7 or lower card is a useful modern innovation. When the 8 or a higher fourth best is led against a No-trump, the Declarer, with his twenty-six cards at his command, and with great strength in his own hand, is apt to receive information as to the exact high cards held by the leader which will prove of greater value to him than to the partner. Furthermore, the lead of an 8 or 9 as a fourth best is bound at times to conflict with the valuable lead known as the "top of an intermediate sequence."
The holdings from which the top of an intermediate sequence should be led are shown in the tables, and while some of the leads in such cases, which are absolutely conventional in Auction, may shock the Whist-player, they have, nevertheless, been found to be advisable in the present game. Trick-winning is far more important than giving numerical information, and the top of an intermediate sequence often succeeds in capturing a valuable card in the Dummy, does not give too much information to the Declarer, helps to establish the suit, and seldom interferes with the play of the partner.
Much has been written by those who contend that the fourth-best lead against a No-trump gives the Declarer too much information, and, therefore, should never be employed. The writers, however, do not consider that practically the only cases in which the lead is objectionable for the reason cited is when it is an 8 or higher card, while the great advantage of the lead is the warning above mentioned.
There are also instances in which the Third Hand is at some time in the play in doubt whether to return the original lead or try his own suit. The knowledge of whether his partner holds three or more of the suit first led may in such case be of the greatest value.
The idea of leading the fourth best only when it is a 7 or smaller card eliminates the objection, yet in practically every case affords the advantage.
A player who adopts this system may at times, as, for example, with such a holding as Ace, Queen, 10, 8, 2, be obliged to open the 8, but inasmuch as he would lead the same card from Ace, Queen, 8, 7, 2, the Declarer cannot bank upon the 8 of such a leader showing three higher cards of the suit in his hand, and, therefore, no harm is done.
If the leader have any such four-card combination as Ace, or any one face card, accompanied by 9, 8, 2, or 8, 7, 2, showing that the lead is from four only is more important than opening the top of a two-card intermediate sequence. When, however, the intermediate is headed by a Knave or 10, the opening of the top of it becomes advisable regardless of the length of the suit. Of course, the 2, in the examples just given, is used to represent any small card, and the fourth best should be led if it be a 3, 4, or 5.
THE LEAD AGAINST A SUIT DECLARATION
Against a suit declaration, the original lead of the longest suit is not in the least imperative. Strength is far more important than length. As the tables show, many high-card combinations are opened very differently, the theory being to win with honors, not to establish small cards. If the leader be a Whist-player, he must remember that Auction is a very different game. The Trump has not been selected by chance, but has been named because of his adversaries' great length and strength. The establishment of an adverse suit against a Trump declaration is, therefore, an almost unknown proceeding.
The object of the leader against a suit declaration is to get as many tricks as possible, and he should utilize the two best methods for so doing: namely, winning with his own and his partner's high cards, and ruffing with weak Trumps.
He should avoid opening a tenace suit, regardless of its length. A singleton, if he be short in Trumps, is probably his best lead; his second choice should be high cards in sequence. When his hand does not contain either of these advantageous openings, he should try his partner's suit.
It goes without saying that if the leader have both the Ace and King of a suit, it is always well to lead the King, not only for the purpose of giving information and taking a practically assured trick, but also in order to obtain a look at the Dummy, which will enable him to more advantageously size up the entire situation.
When his partner has not shown strength, the leader need never hesitate about starting with a strengthening card of a short suit which has not been declared. He is also thoroughly justified, if weak in Trumps, in asking for a force by leading the top of a two-card suit. This, while not nearly so desirable an opening as a singleton, is better than leading from a tenace. When the leader is long in Trumps, he should open his own or his partner's strength.
The leader should bear in mind as a vital principal that, against a suit declaration, a suit containing an Ace should never be opened originally, unless the Ace (or King, if that card be also held) be led. The leader should observe this convention, regardless of the length of the suit. The knowledge that a leader can be relied upon not to have the Ace unless he lead it will be of material assistance to his partner in the play. It is sometimes very tempting to lead low with an Ace, hoping that a King may be found in the Second Hand, and that the partner's Queen may capture the first trick. This play will occasionally prove successful, but in the long run, it is a trick-loser, there being so many instances of singletons, even of single Kings, and also of two-card suits, where, unless the Ace be led, the Declarer will win the first trick and discard the other card.
The leader must observe the distinction between opening a long and a short suit which has always been in force in Whist, Bridge, and Auction—that is, when leading a suit headed by a Knave or smaller card, if long, open from the bottom; if short, from the top. For example, holding Knave, 9, 7, 2, the 2 should be led, but holding Knave, 7, 2, the Knave is the card to open.
One other conventional lead should be mentioned, which, as an original opening, is advisable against a Trump declaration only. It is the lead of a two-card suit consisting of Ace, King. The Ace first, and then King, signifies no more of the suit, and a desire to ruff. Of course, by analogy, the lead of the King before the Ace shows more of the suit.
HOW TO LEAD TO A DOUBLE
The question of what lead should be made when the partner has doubled is comparatively simple, although the answer depends materially upon whether the double has been of a No-trump or a suit declaration. When a No-trump has been doubled, the original lead should invariably be the suit the doubler has declared. When the doubler has not made any declaration, the suit the leader has called should be opened. When neither the doubler nor the leader has declared, a case that rarely occurs, the lead should be either the best Club or the highest card of the leader's shortest suit, depending upon which of these two conventions the doubler approves.
The theory of the advocates of the Club convention is that it is important for the doubler of a No-trump to know exactly what suit will be led, and that he is more apt to desire Clubs than any other, as the other suits, being of greater value, are more likely to be bid. The argument of the advocates of the high card of the short suit convention is that it enables a double to be made with any long suit.
The Club convention is much safer, and is used by most conservative players.
In the event of there being any doubt what the lead should be, if the leader be fortunate enough to hold an Ace, it is good policy for him to lead it for the purpose of taking a look. The contents of the Dummy will probably furnish the desired information.
When a suit declaration has been doubled, a singleton is always an advantageous opening. The lead of a high card is also advisable for the purpose of taking a look. If the leader be without either a singleton or high-card lead, his partner's suit is unquestionably his wisest opening.
THE TABLES
The tables which appear at the end of this chapter should be carefully examined by all who are not absolutely letter perfect in the conventional leads. The present tendency of players taking up Auction is to regard the leads as unimportant, and this often results disastrously. The quondam Whist-player realizes the necessity of having every lead at his fingers' ends, but for the benefit of those who have never participated in the older game, it may be said that the conventional leads have been determined upon only after years of experimentation; as a consequence of which it is known just which card, in the long run, will win the most tricks.
A leader who, on the spur of the moment, during the play, tries something else, is taking a course sure to deceive an intelligent partner, and one which will probably reduce the number of his tricks.
The one combination that seems to tempt some players to disregard the conventional, is the King, Queen, Ten, against a No-trump. With this holding the King is manifestly most advantageous, as if the Declarer hold Ace, Knave, it will either force the Ace and hold the tenace over the Knave or win the trick. Without the Ten, a small card should be led, but many players fail to recognize the important distinction.
Every one attempting to play the game should learn the conventional leads, and having once mastered this comparatively easy lesson, should never allow a childish impulse, such as "having a hunch," to induce an experiment with a lead not recognized as sound.
The various tables follow.
OPENING LEADS AGAINST A NO-TRUMP DECLARATION
In all the above cases in which the fourth best is given as the lead, should the hand contain an intermediate sequence, headed by an 8, or higher card, the top of such sequence should be led instead of the fourth best. For example, King, Knave, 9, 8, 2, lead the 9; King, Knave, 9, 7, 2, lead the 7.
In any case not mentioned, in which there is not an intermediate sequence, headed by an 8 or higher card, the fourth best should be opened.
The lead of the fourth best, when it is an 8 or higher card, should be avoided whenever possible. For example, Ace, Queen, 10, 8, 6, 2, lead the 6; but never lead the lowest when holding more than four, so from Ace, Queen, 10, 8, 2, lead the 8.
In all the Ace-King combinations in the above table, in which the Ace is the conventional lead, it is selected in preference to the King, because the highest card of the partner is desired; when the King is the lead, the suit is not of sufficient strength to make that play advisable.
OPENING LEADS AGAINST A TRUMP DECLARATION