“A CENTAUR OF THE AIR.”
“A CENTAUR OF THE AIR.”
88TH SQUADRON—CAMP BORDEN.
88TH SQUADRON—CAMP BORDEN.
Herewith a few excerpts from an admirable syllabus issued by the Air Ministry in this connection. They are curt, valuable and saturated with experience:—
“Put the pupil in the pilot’s seat from the very beginning.
“Control your pupils in the air entirely by word of mouth through the speaking tube.
“When a pupil makes a mistake in the air let him first exhaust his own ideas of how to put things right if height permits.
“Make it a point of honour to allow pupils full control, except, of course, in cases of emergency.
“Your greatest duty is to inspire your pupils with confidence in themselves, in their machines and in you.
“If the weather is too bad for instruction, you should fly yourself for the sake of the spirit it produces.
“Every time a pupil does something in the air he has never done before he increases his confidence.
“Instructors are responsible for the crashes of their own pupils, and the saving of a crash compensates for any amount of additional dual control.
“Have all your machines rigged properly, and fly them frequently yourself to see that none get into a bad condition.
“The time available during training is ample for a pupil to be made a real pilot, provided he makes up his mind never to waste time in the air and is taught, not left, to teach himself.”
The progress of instruction is roughly indicated below, this sequence of manoeuvres having been developed in Canada to suit local conditions and the general type of pupil available:—
Demonstrate effect of the controls.Flying straight, level and climbing.Turns.Misuse of controls in turns.Difference in control with the engine off.Glide.Stalling.Slow flying.Gliding turns.Taking-off into wind.Landing into wind.Approach.Spinning, etc.
The pupil now goes solo.
Steeper turns, with and without engine.Climbing turns.Flatter glide.Side-slipping.Taking-off and landing across wind.Landing on a mark.Forced landings.Higher manoeuvring.
From the moment of introduction of the Armour Heights system, a modification of the training of instructors became necessary. The psychological phase of the new method demanded recognition, and steps were taken forthwith to analyze and increase the personnel of aerial tuition at all units. The School of Special Flying resolved itself into a station of five products, as indicated by the graph given herewith. The value of each class to the Royal Air Force, Can., has been inestimable.
The crashes resulting in fatalities showed, under the new Armour Heights system, a notable decrease as evidenced by the chart onpage 218. To realize the full significance of this chart, it is necessary to remember that the pilot who is an “Armour Heights graduate” has performed in the air every manoeuvre of which his machine is capable. He has solved all aerial problems. Whatever protective agencies human skill and experience could formulate were put into operation, and the record in respect of fatalities is so low as to be a tribute to the ceaseless care exercised.
“PEGASUS.”ACROBATICS.
“PEGASUS.”ACROBATICS.
R.A.F. Can.—Crash Comparison Showing Effect of Introduction of the Armour Heights System
R.A.F. Can.—Crash Comparison Showing Effect of Introduction of the Armour Heights System
And if it should be asked why those phases of the system which may be termed its humanities are of so recent development, the answer lies in the fact that what is termed “air sense” called for an investigation of personal phenomena in respect of which science had not a single landmark. Men watched the bird curving its wings to invisible gales, and hazarded numberless theories. Early machines were tricky compared to their successors. They lacked present efficiency, reliability and simplicity. The sum total of the powers of the pilot were busy meeting mechanical difficulties, and there was little opportunity for excursions into the psychology of the new art. The honour of service is equal, but the pilots sent overseas by the R.A.F., Can., in 1918, have in comparison with the pilots of 1914 a vastly superior technical and mental training. They have advanced step by step with the world’s knowledge of the air.
To reduce it to a sentence, the system of to-day turns out a pilot who is subdivided, so to speak, into two sections. One is subjective and does the flying. The other is objective, free for retreat or pursuit, defence or attack or any of the countless situations of aerial warfare which call for swift and fearless action.
The Armour Heights special course for instructors commenced on or about April 1st, 1918, with one squadron detailed for duty. As will be inferred, this was the direct outcome of the adoption and further development by the R.A.F., Canada, of the method of tuition known as the Gosport system, then in use in Great Britain.
It might be well to explain that the Armour Heights course differs in important respects from the instruction given in England. Up till the present, it was not considered that the JN4 machine, as used, was capable of performing all higher manoeuvres, such as rolling, looping, etc. It had therefore been, so to speak, set aside by the British authorities for what might be called lower training. The higher and more difficult evolutions had been reserved until the pilot went overseas and was trained in the use of fast, service machines. With the Canadian JN4, however, all the higher manoeuvres were now performed by speed and not by engine power. This naturally necessitated considerable dexterity of manipulation.
By the first of July, ninety-five instructors were passed out of the School. On this date a second squadron was absorbed for the purpose of tuition and the School of Special Flying came into existence, with thirty-six machines and an average of twelve instructors.
At the beginning of October an output of sixty for the month was counted on. This was lowered to forty-two, owing to the severe epidemic of influenza then prevalent, which considerably reduced the number of serviceable instructors.
OFFICERS AND STAFF—SCHOOL OF SPECIAL FLYING.
OFFICERS AND STAFF—SCHOOL OF SPECIAL FLYING.
R.A.F. Can.—School of Special Flying—Output of PupilsGrand Total 257
R.A.F. Can.—School of Special Flying—Output of PupilsGrand Total 257
The primary aim of the tuition has been to obtain smooth and correct work and a light-handed method of flying, as it was found that when pilots used perforce only JN4 machines they were apt to develop a somewhat heavy touch, unless extreme care was exercised. Stunting and contour chasing were particularly encouraged amongst instructors and others with sufficient air experience, and since the duty of the School was to instruct instructors, the personality of the latter was always considered a determining factor entirely apart from ability as a pilot.
An important duty performed by the School, was the calling in of most of the instructors then in the brigade, in order to thoroughly acquaint them with the new methods involved in tuition as given in the Armour Heights course. This proved entirely justified.
It was found, also, that even in the case of most experienced pilots, who had been flying fast machines overseas, great advantage was secured by taking the course, since it was required that they depend to a much greater extent upon correct flying, far more skill being required to do higher manoeuvres on a low-powered machine.
The dual time put in by instructors who passed out for wing duty was reduced from fourteen hours to eight hours in the course of four or five months, as a result of better instruction at the wings, this being indirectly due to the fact that the instructors under whom they had flown in each squadron had themselves been through the Armour Heights course. It was found that three hours’ solo to one hour of dual instruction was most advantageous.
The above notes give very baldly an outline of the purpose of the School, and it will be found necessary to take them in conjunction with the chapter on theArmour Heights systemin order that the essential elements of this tuition may be fully realized.
The “crash” diagram is, after all, the most definite and conclusive record of the success or failure of any system of flying instruction. Its facts are incontrovertible.
During the earlier period of the history of the Corps in Canada, there was, of course, in use a constantly broadening system whereby the details of all aerial accidents were instantly forwarded to headquarters. It was not, however, until the Armour Heights method had been in definite operation for some months that it became possible to re-analyse the then existingprocedure in thelight of new knowledge, and evolve a form of records which completely reflected all the various instrumentalities which required diagnosis.
This statement carries no reflection on either the instructors or the methods of instruction pertaining to the first year’s operation of the unit. As in all its other activities, out of experience came knowledge, the application of which was instantly undertaken. We find, then, that during the summer of 1918 not only were the salient features of the crash carefully investigated, but also all those possibly contributory causes in some one of which will almost certainly be found some vitally important feature.
The first procedure was to classify the crash. The method adopted will be seen in the index of the graph onpage 229. Prior, however, to this classification, which of course is only established by means of close technical examination of the damaged machine, the unit to which the machine belonged sent to headquarters by telegraph or telephone, whichever was the faster, the following information:—
(1) Regimental number, rank and name of personnel concerned, stating which is pilot and which is passenger.(2) Injuries sustained and by whom.(3)Précisof accident.(4) Time and date.(5) Type and number of machine.(6) Number of hours solo and dual flown by casualty.(7) Whether next-of-kin has been notified.(8) Whether Canadian press (if necessary) has been notified.(9) Whether court of enquiry is being held.
(1) Regimental number, rank and name of personnel concerned, stating which is pilot and which is passenger.
(2) Injuries sustained and by whom.
(3)Précisof accident.
(4) Time and date.
(5) Type and number of machine.
(6) Number of hours solo and dual flown by casualty.
(7) Whether next-of-kin has been notified.
(8) Whether Canadian press (if necessary) has been notified.
(9) Whether court of enquiry is being held.
The next procedure was to further analyze the accident by establishing as quickly as possible all facts which might tend to elucidate information. Under the nine succeeding headings come also certain crashes from one or more contributory causes—the latter to be further classified in relative proportion, whether primary or secondary.
As some accidents will have one or more contributory causes, they will be shown under two headings:—
It will be seen at a glance that the bringing forth of this information involved reference to records already in existence, and which had been maintained with particular care in order they might be fully available when thus crucially needed. There was sent, furthermore, specified information with regard to certain possible contributory causes, such as “loss of head,” “brain fatigue” or “fear.” Under “loss of head,” for instance, it is pointed out that the pupil in his new occupation of flying, especially for the first time, has every mental faculty on the alert at extremely high tension, and that the sense of danger, although not asserting itself, is also subconsciously present. It follows, therefore, that under the strain of an emergency the power of synchronized decision and act may lapse—this lapse resulting in what is known as “loss of head.” When there is added to this the fact that in flying, not only seconds, but parts of a second count enormously, it will be clear that after an actual loss of head there is seldom time to correct an error.
“Brain fatigue” and “fear” are allied to “loss of head;” when the pupil reaches the stage in which he has neither the power to reason, decide or act. Then supervenes a state of mental inertia due to the swiftly repeated stream of impulses received in rapid succession by his brain. He begins to feel alone, and unable to assume control. Errors occur, and he becomes overwhelmed with the enormousness of the whole thing. Follows a state of brain fatigue and stupor, during which he awaits events and takes little part in the control of his machine. After such an accident, the pupil has generally no recollection of what has happened. His memory seems to be partially stunned. Under these circumstances, it seldom occurs that he resumes flying—his temperament as a general thing proving to be unsuitable.
TYPES OF CRASHES.
TYPES OF CRASHES.
A TEXAS CRASH.AT DESERONTO.AT DESERONTO.
A TEXAS CRASH.AT DESERONTO.AT DESERONTO.
R.A.F. Can.—Crashes According to CausesTotal Crashes 174
R.A.F. Can.—Crashes According to CausesTotal Crashes 174
It is important that “brain fatigue” should be sharply separated from “fear.” The latter is rarely experienced in the air on the first few solo flights, the pilot’s mind being far too much concerned with the details of flying, watching the various instruments, and in checking his position and direction in the air relative to the ground. Many confess to a lurking sense of danger, but all say that it rarely if ever asserts itself.
Turning again to the graph onpage 218, and now keeping in mind the classification of crashes, it is interesting to note that, owing to the introduction of the Armour Heights system, crashes in which the machine is totally wrecked were reduced from 53 in the month of June to 21 in part of the month of November. “B” and “C” crashes in which longerons are broken, were reduced from 43 in June to 12 in November. “D” crashes, which are those affecting only the undercarriage or planes, and are usually due to rough ground being insufficiently allowed for, or too late a pull back on the control ere the machine comes into contact with the earth, fell from 107 to 16. While the general reduction is most gratifying, the improvement in the acquirement of a delicate control necessary tomake workmanlikelandings is remarkable.
It will be observed that although training was continually being intensified, fatalities decreased from 1 in 1,760 hours’ flying in July 1918, to 1 in 5,300 hours’ flying in October, 1918, and this in spite of the fact that pilots were doing all aerial manoeuvres. Official data from other training centres, where work was done on varying types of machines, show 1 fatality for 1,170 hours’ flying.
R.A.F. Can.—Flying Fatalities
R.A.F. Can.—Flying Fatalities
LAKE WORTH.PART OF BENBROOK.
LAKE WORTH.PART OF BENBROOK.
The entry of the United States into the war affected almost immediately the programme of the R.F.C. in Canada. There was now next door, instead of a neutral if friendly nation, a vast organization associated with us in the greatest of all undertakings, and when in April the O.C. was authorized to visit the War Department in Washington and discuss a reciprocal scheme for training pilots, he found the U.S. authorities animated by the keenest possible spirit. The idea of coöperation was attractive to both services. It would not only stimulate a most desirable comradeship between the two, but would be of direct assistance to the U.S. Signal Corps in training their tremendous reserves of admirable recruits, as well as possibly obviate the necessity of the R.F.C. forming a fourth wing in British Columbia, where the preparation of aerodromes was already under way.
The move was preceded by formal communications between the two governments, but the details of organization, equipment and training, on behalf of the British, rested with the O.C., R.F.C., Canada. Briefly they were as follows:—
(1) The R.F.C. was to train ten squadrons for the U.S. Signal Corps, comprising 300 pilots, 144 other flying officers, some 20 administrative and equipment officers and approximately 2,000 mechanics. This training was to be commenced immediately in Canada, and completed at Fort Worth, Texas. All training equipment, aerodromes, etc., in Canada to be provided by the R.F.C.
(2) The Aviation Section, United States Signal Corps was to provide in Texas, and equip with all the necessary buildings, water supply, etc., two aerodromes capable of accommodating 10 squadrons, and part ofa third for the Aerial Gunnery School; these areas to be occupied and under the control of the R.F.C.
(3) The Aviation Section, United States Signal Corps was to provide in Texas all aeroplanes, spares, running supplies (oil, gasoline, etc.), office and barrack fixtures and other camp equipment. The R.F.C. to supply gunnery, wireless and all other ground instructional equipment.
(4) Each service would provide its own pay, clothing and transportation, and draw rations on repayment during their stay in each other’s country.
(5) The R.F.C. to supply all medical services in Canada, and vice versa.
This general arrangement was found to be mutually acceptable, and it was agreed, in addition, that the invaluable assistance of the I.M.B. in Canada, should be continued in Texas by the establishment there of a section of their purchasing staff.
Such was the proposal noted on the back of an envelope by the chiefs of each service, and it was carried out by both to the letter.
The brigade was already acquainted with the splendid pilot material available in the U.S., as many had enlisted in Canada, hoping to reach France at the earliest possible moment. Their record lives, and some of the success of the Corps is due to the admirable progress they made in training. They came—studied hard, and got into the air at every opportunity, breathless to join those forerunners whose names were already written large.
CANADIAN WEATHER IN TEXAS.TOWED TARGET FOR AERIAL GUNNERY.
CANADIAN WEATHER IN TEXAS.TOWED TARGET FOR AERIAL GUNNERY.
EVERMAN, TEXAS.PORTION OF HICKS, TEXAS.
EVERMAN, TEXAS.PORTION OF HICKS, TEXAS.
Commencing early in July, 1917, the brigade received for training from the U.S.S.C., about 1,400 enlisted men and cadets. A colonel of the Signal Corps describes them as under-officered, unorganized, unpaid, without records, andthough one hesitates—practically without uniforms. The immediate result for the R.F.C. was administrative chaos, but, in due course, matters were smoothed out, and when they returned south in the fall, they were already assuming a semblance of entity as United States Aero Squadrons.
On September 24th, 1917, the advance party left for Texas, composed of 4 U.S. officers and 50 men and 4 R.F.C. officers and 34 men, constituting a wing headquarters and a fatigue party, who, arriving in Fort Worth on September 26th, immediately proceeded to their headquarters in that city. They found there were three fields located north, south and west of Fort Worth, named, locally, Hicks, Benbrook and Everman, but grouped under the Signal Corps title of Camp Taliaferro, Fields Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Construction had been delayed through various causes. Barracks and aerodromes were incomplete. At one field building had been barely started. Water and light supply and sewage disposal had not been finished. Thus, although every effort was made to complete construction, it was nearly three months before this was accomplished, entailing much delay, inconvenience and some hardship on the squadrons occupying camps and quarters not ready for them.
The first to arrive from Canada was the 17th Aero Squadron, U.S.S.C., which marched in to Hicks Field on October 17th. From that time on one squadron arrived weekly until November 17th when the 42nd and 43rd Wings R.F.C. and the balance of the Americans detrained, preceded only by a few days by advanced headquarters staff.
There were now in Texas two R.F.C. Wings, the 42nd at Everman and 43rd at Benbrook, the 17th, 22nd, 27th, 28th Aero Squadrons and the School of Aerial Gunnery at Hicks, advanced headquarters, R.F.C., headquarters U.S.S.C., Camp Taliaferro and the purchasing section of the I.M.B. in Fort Worth.
Transportation arrangements for these units from Canada to Texas were exceptionally good. The 42nd and 43rd Wings ceased flying on 14th November and recommenced in Texas on 17th November, a loss of only three days occasioned by a journey of approximately 1,600 miles.
It would not be amiss to mention the enormous amount of work thrown on A.O., A.E., and Q.M. branches through the novel situation that now existed. The U.S. owned the buildings, but the R.F.C. used and were responsible for those they occupied. There were R.F.C. squadrons and, beside them, American squadrons being trained by the R.F.C. but administered by their own authorities. Aeroplanes, engines, oil, gasoline, etc., were supplied by the U.S., but the R.F.C. directed flying, and repaired and rebuilt machines and engines, drawing the necessary spares from U.S. stores. The Aviation Department of the I.M.B. transacted R.F.C. affairs as though in Canada, and with equal facility. Cadets and men were being received continually for training, and as continually trained and returned to their own organizations. American railroads honoured transportation warrants redeemable in Ottawa. The R.F.C. medical officers quarantined the R.F.C., in which there were hundreds of Americans, against U.S. camps a few miles away. Weekly train-loads of Canadian-made engines and aeroplanes arrived, came under U.S. control and were immediately used by the R.F.C.
The situation was, in short, as though an area in Texas had been temporarily acquired by the British Empire, and in it members of an Imperial force conducted their affairs with the utmost freedom. There was friction of course—for no two great military systems can work together with all their national traditions, usages, procedures and regulations, without many minor and some major adjustments being necessary. It was, however, the friction of two keen and rival organizations pressing toward the same object. Difficulties arose only to be met and overcome by the spontaneous goodwill and friendship of both services.
BENBROOK, TEXAS.
BENBROOK, TEXAS.
A DIVE AT “HUNGRY LIZZIE.”SALVAGE.TEXAS CRASHES.
A DIVE AT “HUNGRY LIZZIE.”SALVAGE.TEXAS CRASHES.
THE LOOP.THE LOOP.
THE LOOP.THE LOOP.
CLASS INSTRUCTION.GUNNERY IN TEXAS.
CLASS INSTRUCTION.GUNNERY IN TEXAS.
Before moving to Texas many American cadets had nearly finished their training. Their first flights in their own country were over aerodromes situated amid open territory with no timber and comparatively flat. Excellent material these men, the best the U.S. could supply, most of them fresh from great American universities, young, keen and quick to learn. There were very few who did not turn out excellent pilots. The supply of machines was satisfactory, the standard of flying was good, and daily acrobatics took place. Formation flying was popular. On one occasion a formation of six machines, all piloted by newly graduated cadets, were seen to loop several times consecutively, retaining their formation, a most unusual performance at that time at any aerodrome in the United States.
A summing up of the work in Texas shows a total of 67,000 flying hours between November 17th and April 12th, spent in turning out 1,960 pilots trained and partly trained, both U.S. and R.F.C. Besides these, 69 non-flying officers and 4,150 men were trained in their respective duties. The flying fatalities were 1.88% of pilots trained—an excellent record. The medical percentage is equally good, showing 3% incapacitated from all causes.
Flying conditions were found to differ somewhat from those in Canada. The atmosphere was much dryer and less buoyant. Calm air was the exception, despite the comparatively flat country. The temperature range was much wider, and on the arrival of a “norther,” the air became chilled with extraordinary rapidity, the thermometer dropping from 70 to 20 degrees Fah. in a couple of hours. This sudden drop was more trying to many than the colder but steadier temperature of higher latitudes. Texas, though presumed a dry state, departed this winter from itscustom, and suffered heavy rainfalls and even snow, which reduced the aerodromes at times to a drab plain surfaced with a sticky blanket of mud, from which undercarriages and propellers suffered grievously at times. No less than 40 propellers were broken in one morning, and the average for one month was 10 per day. So troublesome was the mud that finally the brigade was forced to adopt the use of wire mesh mud guards. No provision had been made for sub-draining any of the fields. These periods, however, were but occasional. For the rest, the winter was one of favorable weather with high, clear skies, dotted from daylight till dark with innumerable machines.
Much admirable work was done by the personnel of both services, of which perforce no record can be given. In one instance an American squadron allotted to Hicks Field marched into new and unfinished barracks. There was no camp equipment, no water or sewerage. The hangars were congested with machines in packing cases, and there were no tools, yet within eight days the packing cases had disappeared and all machines were serviceable and ready to fly. A remarkable performance for a unit of partially-trained men.
No account of the Texas experience would be complete without some record of the spontaneous hospitality and goodwill shown by the citizens of Fort Worth and the community in general. During Christmas time, pneumonia was rampant at Camp Bowie, some six miles from Fort Worth, where there were no less than 35,000 Texans, composing the Panther Division. As a result the Canadians were quarantined. This made no difference, however, to the all-hospitable Texan, who extended to officers, cadets and mechanics so many and lavish invitations that at the year’s end there was not a man who had not personally experienced the goodwill of the South. The interest created by the first arrival of the brigade in strange uniforms and caps seemed to continue throughout the winter. No Flying Corps man was allowed to walk, when every privately owned motor car was at his service. Liaison duties were most admirably discharged by the American officer who made it not only his particular duty but pleasure to see that all newcomers were welcomed under his kindly roof, and had every opportunity of meeting brother officers under the most delightful circumstances.
“THE ROLL”—HALF-OVER.THE “ROLL.”
“THE ROLL”—HALF-OVER.THE “ROLL.”
CALM SKIES.
CALM SKIES.
Fort Worth citizens subscribed the sum of $75,000 to provide funds for the local branch of the American War Service Board, and rented a large club room and dancing hall in the centre of the city, where comfortable accommodation was found for men of both the American and British services. This organization was under the management of a “Big Brother,” who seemed born to the work. Canteen and dancing halls were supervised by an organization, the Federated Ladies’ Clubs of Fort Worth, in which each of the latter endeavoured to excel in hospitality, and it fell on one memorable night that the Canadians were entertained by the daughter of the President of the United States.
The Country Club was at the disposal of visiting officers, who will long remember the evenings spent in the best of fellowship. The ever-present Y.M.C.A. saw to it that commodious huts and writing rooms were furnished in all Canadian flying camps. It is impossible, in short, to imagine any source of pleasure, interest or entertainment which was not provided during these notable months in the history of the brigade.
On the evening before the departure of the R.F.C. a smoking concert was given by U.S. officers to their comrades, an entertainment which was eloquent of the comradeship born of strenuous times of mutual work, and prophetic of that still closer brotherhood which would follow in the days of active service.
The appended copy of a letter from Major-General Kenly reveals his generous appreciation of the effort of the R.F.C. personnel:—
“War Department.“Office of the Chief Signal Officer,“Washington.“May 17, 1918.“Air Service DivisionTraining Section.“From:Chief of Air Service.“To:General Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force,Toronto, Canada.“Subject:Reciprocal Agreement.“1. The reciprocal agreement made last autumn by yourself and the Chief Signal Officer of the Army having successfully accomplished its purpose, I desire to express to you my appreciation of the manner in which the Royal Air Force, under your directions, has fulfilled its part of the arrangement.“2. By its faithful and efficient work in the training of our cadets and enlisted personnel, the Royal Air Forces has conferred a great and practical benefit on the United States Air Service.“3. Equally important is the imponderable but undoubted benefit which has accrued to our men from instruction by and association with officers and men who have had practical experience, at the front, with the conditions which we are preparing to meet. This contact, so desired by all our forces and so particularly influential in the training of a wholly new arm of the service, would, but for your assistance, have been denied to all the men training for the Air Service in this country.“4. The following is quoted from the report of our Commanding Officer, Taliaferro Fields. ‘I am of the opinion that the reciprocal agreement between the Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the General Officer Commanding, Royal Flying Corps, has proven an entire success, and that outside of the training actually given at the fields here, the influence of the Royal Flying Corps in Texas and our association with that Corps in Canada has had a far-reaching and decidedly beneficial effect on our flying fields, throughout the United States.’ With the sentiment herein expressed I am in complete accord, and can wish no better for the United States Air Service than that it may duplicate the high endeavor and equally high accomplishment which has distinguished the Royal Flying Corps, and now distinguishes, in no less abundant measure, the Royal Air Force.“W. L. KENLY,“Major-General N.A.,“Chief of the Air Service.”
“War Department.“Office of the Chief Signal Officer,“Washington.
“May 17, 1918.
“Air Service DivisionTraining Section.
“From:Chief of Air Service.
“To:General Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force,Toronto, Canada.
“Subject:Reciprocal Agreement.
“1. The reciprocal agreement made last autumn by yourself and the Chief Signal Officer of the Army having successfully accomplished its purpose, I desire to express to you my appreciation of the manner in which the Royal Air Force, under your directions, has fulfilled its part of the arrangement.
“2. By its faithful and efficient work in the training of our cadets and enlisted personnel, the Royal Air Forces has conferred a great and practical benefit on the United States Air Service.
“3. Equally important is the imponderable but undoubted benefit which has accrued to our men from instruction by and association with officers and men who have had practical experience, at the front, with the conditions which we are preparing to meet. This contact, so desired by all our forces and so particularly influential in the training of a wholly new arm of the service, would, but for your assistance, have been denied to all the men training for the Air Service in this country.
“4. The following is quoted from the report of our Commanding Officer, Taliaferro Fields. ‘I am of the opinion that the reciprocal agreement between the Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the General Officer Commanding, Royal Flying Corps, has proven an entire success, and that outside of the training actually given at the fields here, the influence of the Royal Flying Corps in Texas and our association with that Corps in Canada has had a far-reaching and decidedly beneficial effect on our flying fields, throughout the United States.’ With the sentiment herein expressed I am in complete accord, and can wish no better for the United States Air Service than that it may duplicate the high endeavor and equally high accomplishment which has distinguished the Royal Flying Corps, and now distinguishes, in no less abundant measure, the Royal Air Force.
“W. L. KENLY,“Major-General N.A.,“Chief of the Air Service.”
PART OF FORT WORTH, TEXAS.
PART OF FORT WORTH, TEXAS.
OFFICERS AND STAFF—ENGINE REPAIR PARK.
OFFICERS AND STAFF—ENGINE REPAIR PARK.
To the Engine Repair Park the brigade has looked for the main portion of that mechanical work on which so much has depended, and it has not looked in vain. The necessity for the establishment of this unit was apparent from the first, it being put into action about the time when flying might be said to have reached a permanent status. Some three months later, in August, 1917, the unit was enlarged by provision for aeroplane repair, and work of both types was done under one command. With the rapidly increasing flying hours put in by the Corps, there again appeared the necessity for still further enlargement, and the unit was finally subdivided into Engine and Aeroplane Repair. This system remained till the close of hostilities.
It is quite obvious that the mechanical condition of the power plant of an aeroplane is of paramount importance, and, in consequence, no expense or trouble was spared to put the Engine Repair Park on the best possible basis. The equipment, which in the winter of 1917, promised to be ample, soon proved insufficient, and in September, 1918, the Park moved into large and most completely fitted shops in rented premises on King Street. In this building four floors presented a scene of extreme activity, the work being so arranged as to be progressive, finishing with the final tests before shipment. During its life of some nineteen months, this Park completely overhauled no less than 1,325 engines, of which all but thirty-five were of the Curtiss 8-cylinder type. Records show that for a complete overhaul, such as was given, an average of 300 hours’ work was required. The total strength of the unit in November, 1918, was 125.
It is of interest to note that obligations covered the complete dissembling and assembling of engines, the repair sections, situated at the various wings, doing only a top overhaul, for which they were suitably equipped.
During 1918, it became apparent that considerable saving could be effected by carrying the work of the unit into the manufacture of engines as well as their repair, and, in consequence, much time and thought was given to the turning out of those integral parts which, assembled, made up the complete engine. To such a pitch was this carried that the point was reached at which only about twenty individual parts out of several hundred were purchased, the balance being the product of the Repair Park itself. It is estimated that in this way some $30,000 was saved on the manufacture of Curtiss engines, and some $20,000 additional when this economical system was applied to the manufacture of machine gun parts. These estimates of saving are probably low, owing to the fact that 50c. an hour was allowed for bench work and $1.00 an hour for machine work.
The rarity of any serious engine trouble reported by the flying wings, is a tribute not only to the admirably simple design of the Curtiss engine, but also to the excellent work done by the Engine Repair Park.
ENGINES MOUNTED FOR TEST.THE STARTING END.(NOTE PROTECTIVE SCREEN.)
ENGINES MOUNTED FOR TEST.THE STARTING END.(NOTE PROTECTIVE SCREEN.)
R.A.F. Can.—Monthly Strength of Engine Repair Park
R.A.F. Can.—Monthly Strength of Engine Repair Park
R.A.F. Can.—Engine Repair Park—Engines Overhauled and Shipped per Month
R.A.F. Can.—Engine Repair Park—Engines Overhauled and Shipped per Month
This unit commenced operations as a separate organization on the 23rd February, 1918, prior to which time both engine and aeroplane repairs were made under the same administration. The work consisted of not only rebuilding every machine which crashed, but also dismantling and reassembling every aeroplane which had completed its flying time at the various wings. The fact that 400 hours in the air was considered to necessitate complete rebuilding, will indicate the extreme care taken to ensure that no instructor or cadet took to the air in an aeroplane which was not in perfect mechanical condition.
Entire dismantling was accomplished in every case, and after every individual fitting and part had undergone various stages of repair and inspection, it was sent forthwith to the technical stores, whence it was reissued as required for construction of new machines. By this means it was found feasible to salve and re-use not less than sixty per cent. of the members and fittings of every machine received by the unit.
In the early summer of 1918, the output of the Aeroplane Repair Park (the quality of this output being always entirely satisfactory) reached such a point that the brigade found it unnecessary to continue the practice of buying complete machines from the Canadian Aeroplanes Limited, and the latter undertook to supply only such individual parts as the Repair Park was not equipped to make for itself. Thus this organization proved its constantly increasing importance.
A glance at the exterior of a machine gives no idea whatever of the number of integral parts which go to make up a structure seemingly so simple, and the fact that the parts are so numerous threw additionalwork on the stores section, which was required at all times to keep in stock an ample supply of members and fittings.
In addition to the work of salvaging machines, the unit had other duties to perform, such as the repair of instruments, tires, inner-tubes, radiators, metal fittings, wings, etc. The aeroplane when dismantled presents a vastly different appearance to that of the complete machine ready to take the air.
In all construction the progressive system was worked out, by which machines, commencing at the first stage, moved on from section to section, receiving at each point the necessary additional touches, till at the end they emerged mechanically complete. The work was, in fact exactly like that at the Canadian Aeroplanes Limited, with the exception that in addition to new construction this unit shouldered as well the system of salvaging, by which great economies were without question effected. Over and above this, there went out from the Repair Park a constantly increasing flow of wooden members, which were absorbed by various flying units in repairs made on wings and ailerons at these stations.
Two graphs, given herewith, show the fluctuation in the quantity of work done, this fluctuation corresponding with demands made. These will be found to synchronize closely with other data giving the record of crashes, etc.
In a retrospection of the general operations of the brigade it has been impossible to find a scene of operations better organized than this Repair Park, or one of which the output was more uniformly dependable and mechanically satisfactory.