FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[1]Since this was written, M. Max is reported to have been released, and to be living in Switzerland.[2]These documents are as far as possible translated literally, any inelegancies of diction may probably be attributed to the German authors, whose syntax is often peculiar.—(Trans.)[3]Commandant de Place.—(Trans.)[4]We give examples of this censorship later (pp.256-60).[5]The English text was soon discontinued.

[1]Since this was written, M. Max is reported to have been released, and to be living in Switzerland.

[2]These documents are as far as possible translated literally, any inelegancies of diction may probably be attributed to the German authors, whose syntax is often peculiar.—(Trans.)

[3]Commandant de Place.—(Trans.)

[4]We give examples of this censorship later (pp.256-60).

[5]The English text was soon discontinued.

BELGIANS UNDER THE GERMAN EAGLE

We were too confiding.

With the exception of the military and a few statesmen, the Belgians were convinced that nations, just as individuals, were bound by their engagements, and that as long as we remained faithful to our international obligations, the signatories of the Treaty of London (19th April, 1839), which set forth the conditions of the neutrality, or rather of the neutralization, of Belgium (Belg. All., p. 3), would equally observe their obligations towards us.

However, in 1911, during the "Agadir crisis," our calm was a little shaken by a series of articles inLe Soir. According to this journal, all the German military writers held the invasion of Belgium to be inevitable in the event of a war between France and Germany.

The Belgians' Distrust of Germany lulled.

But our faith in international conventions—just a trifle ingenuous, it may be—very soon regained its comforting influence. Had not Wilhelm II, "theEmperor of Peace," assured the Belgian mission, which was sent to greet him at Aix-la-Chapelle, that Belgium had nothing to fear on the part of Germany (seeL'Étoile Belge, 19th October, 1911). In September 1912 the Emperor made a fresh reassuring statement. Being present at the Swiss manœuvres, he congratulated M. Forster, President of the Swiss Confederation, and told him how glad he was to find that the Swiss Army would effectually defend the integrity of her frontier against a French attack. "What a pity," he added, "that the Belgian Army is not as well prepared, and is incapable of resisting French aggression." This evidently meant that Belgium ran no risk from the side of Prussia.

It was not only the Emperor who assured us of his profound respect for international statutes. The German Ministers made similar declarations in the Reichstag (Belg. All., p. 7).

In Belgium itself the Germans profited by every occasion to celebrate their friendship for us and their respect for treaties. In 1905, at the time of the seventy-fifth anniversary of Belgian independence, Herr Graf von Wallwitz stated at an official reception: "And as for us Germans, the maintenance of the treaty of warranty concluded at the birth of modern Belgium is a sort of political axiom which, to our thinking, no one could violate without committing the gravest of faults" (seep. 185 of theAnnales parlementaires belges, Senate, 1906).

In 1913, at the time of the joyous entry of the King and Queen into Liége, General von Emmich, the same who was entrusted with the bombardment of the city in August 1914, came to salute our sovereigns in the name of the Emperor. He spokeincessantly of the German sympathies for the Belgians and their country.

In August 1913 Herr Erzberger gave his word of honour, as Catholic deputy to the Reichstag, that there had never been any question of invading Belgium, and that Belgium might always count on the party of the Centre to cause international engagements to be respected. This is the very party that is now heaping up manifest falsehoods in order to justify the aggression of Germany.

German Duplicity on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of August, 1914.

Let us consider the days immediately preceding the war. The German newspapers were announcing that the troops occupying, at normal times, the camps near the Belgian frontiers had been directed upon Alsace and Lorraine; and these articles, reproduced in Belgium, had succeeded in finally lulling our suspicions.

In the currents of thought which were then clashing in Belgium, it was confidence that carried the day. Many of us who were present on the 1st of August at a session of the Royal Academy of Belgium, were speaking, before the session was opened, of the serious events which were approaching, the war already declared between Austria and Serbia, and the conflict which appeared imminent between Germany, France, Russia, and England. Yet no one imagined that Belgium could be drawn into the conflagration. That very morning, it was related, France had officially renewed, through her Minister in Brussels, the assurance that she would faithfully abstain from violating the neutrality of Belgium (1stGrey Book, No. 15); and there wasno reason to doubt his words. A few days earlier the German Minister in Brussels had affirmed that his country had too much respect for international conventions to permit herself to transgress them; and we believed him too! Oh, simplicity! We still believed him, on the following day, when he repeated the same declaration (1stGrey Book, No. 19;Belg. All., p. 7). And on the evening of that Sunday, the 2nd of August, he presented to our Government the ultimatum of Germany (1stGrey Book, No. 20).

The Ultimatum.

The telegram of the 2nd of August, by which Herr von Jagow sent the ultimatum to the German Minister in Brussels, declared: "Please forward this Note to the Belgian Government, in a strictly official communication, at eight o'clock this evening, and demand therefrom a definite reply in the course of twelve hours, that is, at eight o'clock to-morrow morning" (Lüttich, p. 4). Never, since Belgium's birth, had a problem so breathless been placed before her Government. And Germany left her twelve hours to solve it: twelve hours of the night! She was not willing that our Government should have time to reflect at leisure; she hoped that in a crisis of distraction Belgium, taken at a disadvantage and forgetful of her dignity, would accept the inacceptable.

However, the German Minister in Brussels continued to offer us explanations which were as perfidious as they were confused and obscure, and to assure us up to the last of the friendly intentionsof his Government. The Germany fashioned by Bismarck has assuredly nothing about it to remind us of the Germany of Goethe and Fichte. We might have guessed as much, for that matter, when we saw the Germans glorifying the man whoboastedof having falsified the famous Ems telegram in order to make the war of 1870 inevitable, and who succeeded in making his countrymen accept, as a guiding principle, that "might comes before right."

The Speech of the Chancellor in the Reichstag.

However, we may suppose that some slight scruples lingered in the recesses of the German conscience, since on the very day when the Chancellor of the Empire told the British Ambassador in Berlin that an international convention is merely "a scrap of paper,"[6]and that neutrality is only a word, he recognized, in his speech to the Reichstag, that the invasion of Belgium constituted an injustice; but he immediately excused this violation of the law of nations by strategic necessities.

"Strategic necessities!" said the German Chancellor. These necessities are expounded in the ultimatum, and may be summed up thus: "Germany knows that France is preparing to attack her through Belgium."

The first question which occurs to us is: Was France really preparing to cross our territory, and had she massed troops near our frontier? There is assuredly no one outside Germany who would admit this. Indeed, if important bodies of troops had been massed in the north of France they could effectually have opposed the advance of the Germans through Belgium. Now in all the battles which the French fought in our country their numbers were much too small to resist the Germans. Let us also remark that these attempts on the part of the French were made on the 15th August at Dinant, the 19th August at Perwez, and the 23rd August at Semois. How then can any one believe that the French were massed close to our frontier as early as 3rd August? Moreover, the map published in theN.R.C.of the 16th December, 1914, confirms the untruthfulness of the German allegations.

This "strategic reason" was again invoked by the Chancellor of the Empire on the 4th August. But owing to the irrefutable manner in which the tardiness of the French movements disproved this assertion the latter is no longer uttered, save in an evasive manner. The German no longer says: "France was ready to cross into Belgium," but "France would not have failed to enter Belgium, and we simply outstripped her." It is thus that Count Bernstoff, the German ambassador to Washington, expressed himself in the interview published byL'Indépendantin September 1914, while the same assertion is found in the manifesto of the ninety-three German "Intellectuals" and the letter addressed by Herr Max Bewer to M. Maeterlinck (in theD.G.A.of October 1914 and theSoldatenpostof the 14th October, 1914).

Let us now ask if Germany had such suspicions of France as amounted to a semi-certitude? In other words, was she sincere in declaring that she knew that France was on the point of invading Belgium? We do not hesitate to assert that she was lying: for if she had really believed that France was ready to violate our neutrality it would have been enormously to her advantage to wait until the violation was committed. For Belgium has always asserted that in case of war between France and Germany she would resist by arms the first invader and immediately join herself to the other Power. Now Germany, however profound her political perversity may be, had no reason to suspect the sincerity of Belgium; she knew then—and this time shedidknow—that by allowing the French to enter our country she would assure herself of the assistance of our army against her enemy. And scanty as was her esteem for the Belgian soldiers—perhaps she has since had occasion to change her mind!—it was none the less obviously to her interest to avoid having them as her adversaries.

For the rest, we may boldly assert that the very terms of the German ultimatum prove, without possible doubt, that she did not believe in the danger of a French irruption into Belgium. For if she had entertained this conviction she would have said to Belgium: "I warn you that if you do not take the necessary measures to resist the entrance of the French I shall be fully authorized to invade your territory in my turn, in order to defend myself." In acting thus she would have had the right on her side ... and the German diplomatists of the day are certainly capable of distinguishing justice from injustice in cases where the distinction is so easy.

We say, therefore, that the imminence of a French attack upon Belgium was only a pretext and a bugbear; a pretext to justify the violation of Belgium in the eyes of other nations; a bugbear to catch votes of credit in the Reichstag without previous discussion. "We were not able to wait for this session before commencing hostilities and invading Luxemburg, perhaps even Belgium," declared the Chancellor. Observe how clumsy is this "perhaps"; the German troops entered Belgium on the night of the 3rd of August (1stGrey Book, No. 35), and on the afternoon of the 4th, at the session of the Reichstag, the Chancellor had no knowledge of it! We thought the official telegraph service worked better than that in Germany!

What, then, were the real reasons for invading our country? They were strategic reasons, it is true, but not those which the Chancellor indicated in his speech! They had been known for a long time; the German staff had always regarded a sudden attack upon France as an unavoidable necessity, and for that it was necessary at all costs to cross Belgium. Moreover, on the very day when the Chancellor was still invoking the French preparations in the Reichstag, the Secretary of State, von Jagow, openly avowed the true motive for violating Belgium. The pamphlet of propaganda,Die Wahrheit über den Krieg, after invoking, without insisting on, the danger of a French attack, described at length the German plan of campaign; a sudden attack upon France, delivered by passing through Belgium; then, immediately after victory, a change of front, and the crushing of the Russian Army.The same idea is expounded in an infinity of articles and pamphlets.

There can, therefore, be no remaining doubt as to the determining motives of Germany: she wished to pass through Belgium in order to fall upon France before the latter was ready. Germany had been preparing for war for several days, for she knew that she had made the war inevitable, while France, deceived by her adversary's peaceful professions of faith, and, moreover, anxious to preserve the peace, which she still believed to be possible, had hardly commenced her mobilization. Let us recall the comparison drawn by Mr. Lloyd George in his speech at the City Temple on the 11th November, 1914. "Imagine," he said, "that your right-hand neighbour came and made you the following proposal: 'See, my friend, I've got to cut the throat of your left-hand neighbour. Only as his door is barred I can't catch him unawares, and so I shall lose my advantage over him. So you will do me a little service; nothing that isn't entirely reasonable, as you will see. You will just let me come through your garden; if I trample down your borders a little I'll have them raked and put in good order again; and if by ill-luck I damage or kill one of your children I promise you a nice little indemnity.'"

And it is because we would not help Germany in this task that she has spattered us with insults. The Germans cannot understand how we could have rejected her "well-intentioned" proposal, as the Emperor calls it in his declaration of war. Evidently they have ideas of honour which differ from ours. We can regard this proposal only as an insult to the Belgian people.

There is one circumstance which aggravates the evil deed which has soiled the German name. It is the insistence with which the Press and the politicians of Germany seek to cast the blame on Belgium herself. For if we are to believe them it was Belgium who began.

Necessity of influencing Neutrals.

When the German rulers discovered, to their utter stupefaction, real or feigned, that America and the other neutral States did not benevolently accept the strategical excuse for the violation of Belgian neutrality, their attitude underwent a sudden modification. Since the whole world, in a spontaneous impulse of indignation, branded the conduct of Germany, the traitor and perjurer, in assailing a nation which she was actually under an obligation to protect, the German Government adopted the classic procedure of evildoers, which consists in reversing the rôles, and posing as an innocent victim, driven into a corner by an adversary who does not abide by legitimate methods of defence. What was to be done in such a case? The German Government must seem to believe, and then claim to have proved, that Belgium had already violated her own neutrality before the German invasion; for then Germany could no longer be blamed for her attitude.

Absurdity of the first Accusations.

Immediately the German newspapers invented stories of French troops disentraining in Belgium from the 30th July, 1914, and of French officers teaching us how to handle Krupp guns!—of Frenchairmen flying over Belgium, of French and Belgian soldiers attacking the Landwehr at Aix-la-Chapelle on the 2nd August, 1914. These pitiful accusations were demolished by M. Waxweiler inLa Belge Neutre et Loyale. We will content ourselves with remarking that all these infractions of neutrality are anterior to the 4th of August. If they had really been committed the innumerable spies scattered about Belgium would have warned the German Minister in Brussels, who would have telegraphed to the Chancellor, and the latter would have taken good care to make them the basis of a serious complaint against Belgium in his speech to the Reichstag. What weight would not these revelations have lent to his arguments? If he did not do thus it was because he was not informed, and if he was not informed it was because the facts were non-existent. They were invented—very clumsily, moreover—after the event.

If now we cast a glance at the tales which the Germans have imagined to extenuate their crime against justice, we shall say, with a certain professor of Utrecht (K.Z., 4th November, first morning edition), that one might with difficulty have pardoned the German rulers for violating Belgian neutrality if it had been proved that imperious strategic necessities compelled them to it, but that they should have stuck to their original declarations, "for," he adds, "we have been painfully impressed by all the offences which have been alleged after the event to demonstrate that Germany had the right to act as she did."

To insult and calumniate an innocent person in order to excuse oneself is an attitude little worthy of a self-respecting nation.

A Change of Tactics. The Revelations of theN.A.Z.

Week by week the German journals add an item to the indictment of Belgium. One would say that their method of reasoning must be as follows: "Since we cannot bring forward a single convincing proof, let us accumulate as many as possible of any degree of value; we shall end by crushing Belgium with the weight of evidence." In order that we might judge of the efficacy of this procedure, Germany ought, of course, to tell us how many bad arguments are to her thinking worth one good one.

Yet it was extremely important that Germany should be able to bring forward proof of the crime of Belgium; for directly the neutrals, and in particular America, began to doubt our political honesty they would withdraw their sympathies and leave our executioners full liberty of action. At the same time Germany would be able to pretend that she knew of Belgium's intrigues, and that by invading our territory in spite of treaties she was not, properly speaking, committing a treacherous act.

There are reasons for supposing that Germany herself was conscious of the insufficiency of these accusations. Hence the change of tactics which we observe after the month of October 1914.

The Government itself entered into the lists. In its official organ, theNorddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, it commented upon the documents discovered in the Ministries of Brussels.

To judge of the relevance of this collection of documents we must keep in mind the two following points: (1) That England played the part of protector of Belgian neutrality; (2) the probability of a Germaninvasion in case of war between France and Germany. Let us rapidly examine these.

1.England as the Guarantor of Belgian Neutrality.—Every one knows that for centuries England has been interested, more than any other nation, in ensuring that Belgium should not be annexed either to France or to Prussia.

As far back as 1677, says Sorel (L'Europe et la Révolution française, vol. i. p. 338), a French agent in London wrote to Louvois: "It has been voted unanimously by the Lower Chamber that the English will sell their very shirts (this is the phrase they use) to make war on France for the preservation of the Low Countries." During the French Revolution, and later, under the Empire, the struggle between England and France was largely provoked by the desire to turn France out of Belgium.

The Treaty of London (1839) makes no distinction between the five guarantors of our neutrality: Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia; but it is none the less unanimously admitted that England has the most immediate interest in the preservation of our independence, as it matters greatly to England that Antwerp—that loaded pistol aimed at the heart of England, as Napoleon used to say—should become neither French nor German.

Therefore, as soon as Belgium was threatened by an armed invasion, the traditional policy of England was at once invoked.

It was in virtue of this policy that Great Britain, in 1870, demanded of France and Germany whether they engaged themselves to maintain the neutrality of Belgium. The two belligerents gave and kept their promise. France, driven up against theBelgium frontier at Sedan, did not even then consider that she had the right to break her word; she preferred to allow herself to be crushed. If ever there were "strategic reasons" which would excuse the breaking of a promise, it was then!

All this being so, no one was surprised when in August 1914 the newspapers announced that England had put the usual question to France and Germany. This time again France made the reply inspired by her sense of honour; Germany refused to commit herself.

The historical facts which we have recalled suffice to show that the protective rôle of England was not invented for the needs of the moment, as Germany would have the world believe. The Chancellor cannot be ignorant of these facts; they are known to all. Why then does he persist in asserting that England would not have intervened had France been the country to violate our neutrality?

2.The danger of a German Invasion.—For several years German generals have been agreed in admitting the necessity of marching the German army across Belgium in case of war with France.[7]In military circles this was asecret de polichinelle, as theN.R.C.remarked on the 22nd December, 1914 (evening edition).

Moreover, the Germans themselves held that the Belgians could not have been ignorant of the threat of a German invasion; this idea is expounded, notably, in a booklet of official aspect, entitledLa part de la culpabilité de l'Angleterre dans la guerre mondiale.

Belgium therefore had serious reasons for expecting a German attack. There was evidently only one thing for her to do: to demand assistance of the country which had constituted itself the protector of her neutrality, and on which she had always been accustomed to rely with unshakable confidence.

Falsification of the Greindl Report.

On the 14th October, 1914, the German Government posted on the walls of Brussels a placard entitled:England and Belgium(Documents found at the headquarters of the Belgian Staff). A reproduction of this placard was distributed gratuitously, thousands of copies being issued the same day. This document contains, first, a rapid summary of a report on the relations which existed in 1906 between the Belgian Chief of Staff and the British military attaché. Then the placard reproduces, "word for word," a portion of a report made by M. Greindl, dated the 23rd December, 1911. In this report M. Greindl warns the Belgian Government of the possibility of a French attack.

Whosoever will attentively read the exhibited portion of this report will at once remark that its phrases lack connection and logical sequence. Thus, there is certainly a hiatus between the opening phrases and those that begin with: "When it became evident that we should not allow ourselves to be alarmed by the pretended danger of closing the Scheldt, the plan was not abandoned, butmodified, in the sense that the English army of assistance would not be disembarked on the Belgian coast, but in the nearer French ports." Now what is meant by this "pretended danger"? Pretended by whom? And then "we should not allow ourselves to be alarmed." Who is "we?" Remark that a few lines farther on the report speaks of the eventuality of a battle between the Belgian army and the British army; Belgium, which was just now the ally of the British, is now their adversary, although nothing indicates how she passed from the first attitude to the second. In the same sentence the closing of the Scheldt is spoken of with an English landing on theBelgian coast; yet we cannot imagine M. Greindl placing Antwerp on the Belgian coast. Can we doubt after this that phrases have been suppressed in this portion of the document? Evidently not; for it is radically impossible to realize the bearing and the meaning of the report by reading the portion published. What, then, is the conclusion forced upon us? It is that the German Government has "cooked" the text; omitting to copy certain passages which would not tally with the deductions which it wished to draw from it, and that it has perhaps even twisted the meaning of certain phrases.

The publication of the complete report was demanded by the Belgian Government (seeK.Z., 24th October, first morning edition). But Germany refused; the report was too long, it replied, by the medium of theN.A.Z.(25th November, 1914). All that could be obtained was the publication in facsimile, in the same issue of theN.A.Z., of the heading and the two first lines. Since the German Government did not publish the rest, we have theright to conclude that this was because it had subjected the document to falsifications such as were introduced in that we are now about to consider. In any case, the report as it was published means nothing. One feels that it was intentionally made confusing. By whom?

The falsifications inserted in these documents by the German diplomatists have already been lucidly exposed (for example, by E. Brunets,Calomnies Allemandes); so there would be no need to return to the subject, had not the German Government thought fit to attempt to use these documents in order to demoralize the Belgians.

At the end of December 1914, and in January 1915, Germany distributed hundreds of thousands of copies of a pamphlet containing several documents, among which were translations (into Flemish and French) and facsimiles of the Ducarne and Jungbluth reports. The famous words of the "reference" are replaced in their natural position in the middle of the fourth paragraph,[8]but—and this was a wholly unexpected discovery—they were also found in the commentary. According to the copy in the text, one reads: "The document bears on the margin: 'The entrance of the English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.'"

Disconcerting fecundity of Kultur! The Germans have reason to be proud of their chemical industry. Thanks to a special fertilizer prepared in the offices of Wilhelmstrasse, the famous phrase, which occurs only once in the original document, is promptly multiplied and is able to appear twice over.

The Attitude of the Belgians toward the German Falsifications.

Note that to give more weight to their explanations the Germans were careful to have them printed in Flemish and in French, on the paper and with the type habitually employed by theMoniteur belge. It is then, in the last resort, the Belgian public which has paid the cost of printing this falsification of a public document. Well, well! they have mistaken our psychology, for despite these "revelations" our conviction is unshaken. Not a Belgian has criticized the actions of his Government in respect of the defensive agreement with England. It would be like blaming a man whose house was destroyed by fire for having insured it with a reliable insurance company.

Confronted by the failure of their endeavours to discourage the Belgians and to embroil them with their legitimate Government, Germany returned to the charge. A placard dated 10th March, 1915, posted in Brussels, stated that the Belgian statesmen replied to the publication of the Ducarne and Jungbluth reports only after the lapse of three months. The placard evidently alludes to the Belgian Note of the 13th January, 1915 (seethe 2ndGrey Book, No. 101). Now the first sentence of this Note states that the Belgians had already replied on the 4th December, 1914. Germany could not have been unaware of this reply; let us addthat we ourselves knew of it on the 10th December, thanks to the issue for the 7th ofL'Indépendance Belge(appearing in London), which was smuggled into Brussels.

The third document contained in the pamphlet of the German Government related to themilitary geographical manuals.[9]It shows that a final collaboration (after the violation of her engagements by Germany) was carefully devised by the British and Belgian staffs. Truly it ill becomes the Germans, so proud of the introduction of their scientific method into the art of war, which leaves nothing unthought of, to reproach others for acting in the same way, and for making meticulous preparations at an opportune time! In two places the article insists on the fact that the preparations of these manuals was effected in "time of peace." But come! should the Belgians and the British have waited until the Germans were in Belgium before thinking of measures of defence?

Finally, the pamphlet containsFresh and Serious Proofs demonstrating the complicity of Belgium and England. Documents were found on the escritoire of the British Legation in Brussels relating to the Belgian mobilization, the defence of Antwerp, and the French mobilization. The accusation is this: these documents were found in the British Legation, a proof that the Belgian Government had no military secrets from the British Government, and that they had a close military understanding.

Once again: was Belgium, aware of the Germanic peril, to deliver herself bound hand and foot to the invader, who, not content with forgetting his international obligations, was about to run precisely counter to them? It would evidently have been more agreeable to Germany to have found in Belgium a lamb all ready to allow itself to be sacrificed on the altar ofKultur. Unhappily forKultur, Belgium behaved like an enraged ram, determined to sell its life dearly.

Whatever aspect of the question of Belgian neutrality we may consider, we always come back to this fact: Germany violated this neutrality on the 4th August, although Belgium had given her no plausible excuse for doing so. Since then the Germans have undertaken a campaign for the purpose of justifying their "injustice," as their Chancellor termed it. But none of the accusations invented after the event can in the slightest degree extenuate this injustice; their only effect has been to render still more execrable the treachery of the perjured protector.

Neutral Opinion.

It is pleasant, in this connection, to cite here the opinion of four writers belonging to countries which have not taken part in the war.

A Dutch writer published inDe Amsterdammeran interesting article which was translated into French, but of which the sale in Belgium was immediately prohibited by the Germans.

In a lecture which has achieved a very great celebrity, Herr Karl Spitteler, a well-known literary man of German-speaking Switzerland, also took thepart of Belgium. We know of this lecture only by the slashing which it received in theK.Z.on the 30th December, in the first morning edition.

Here is a passage which particularly infuriated the German paper:—

"I consider that to take the documents from the pockets of the gasping victim (Belgium) is, as to the spirit which inspired the act, a gross fault of taste. It would have been quite enough to throttle the victim; to blacken him afterwards is too much. As for Switzerland, if it associated itself with these calumnies against Belgium, it would commit not merely an infamy, but a mistake; for on the day when another Power grudges us our national existence, the same accusations might be employed against us: do not let us forget that malice is now counted among the munitions of war."

Another Swiss writer, M. Philippe Godet, expresses his opinions with no less energy in theJournal de Genève(8th September, 1914).

The Falsification of M. de l'Escaille's Letter.

In the preceding pages we have dealt only with matters relating to Belgium. Do not let our attitude be misunderstood. We have not the presumption to suppose that Belgium has ever occupied the foreground in the negotiations described; on the contrary, we are perfectly well aware of the diplomatic insignificance of our country in the discordant "Concert of Europe" which has ended in the present war. Our sole object is to show that Belgium has not played the unavowable rôle which the Germans attributed to her. As to the origin of this war, and the responsibility which the German rulers seek to foist upon Great Britain, in order thattheir own country, and, above all, their ally, Austria, may evade it, this is a discussion into which we do not wish to enter, for it lies outside the programme which we have set ourselves. We ought, however, to speak a word as to the placards which the German authorities had posted up in Belgium during the month of September 1914. The first is dated the 16th September; it gives the résumé of a letter written by M. B. de l'Escaille to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Ten days later a new placard appeared: this time the complete text of the letter was given, and it was explained how it came to fall into the hands of the Germans.

Let us leave this last point: it concerns the criminal law, not diplomacy. Let us examine only the summary which was published and the conclusions which the Germans drew from it.

Was the summary honest? To discover this let us take the essential sentence, printed in heavier type: "They possess even the definite assurance that England will come to the assistance of France"; and let us compare this with the corresponding passage of the text: "To-day they are strongly convinced in St. Petersburg, they even have the assurance, that England will support France." The term "assistance" (secouer) in the summary can apply only to military assistance, while the text speaks only of "support" (soutien), which means diplomatic action. So the second conclusion also is false—"that England did not intervene in the war on account of Belgium, but because she had promised France to give her assistance."

Let us now look at the first conclusion. It is "that Germany was actuated by pacific intentions,and sought by all means to avoid war." In reality the text, like the summary, states only that Germany sought to avoid a general conflict, which means that she wished to localize the war between Austria and Serbia; in other words, Germany wished Europe to give Austria a free hand to crush Serbia. Nowhere does the text say that Germany did anything to avoid "the war": the only war which was declared on the 30th July, that of Austria against Serbia. In short, this conclusion is falsified.

There remains the phrase which introduces the two conclusions: "By this report of the diplomatic representative of Belgium at the Court of St. Petersburg it is proved".... Was M. de l'Escaille really the diplomatic representative of Belgium in St. Petersburg? Open an administrative almanack, and you will see thattherepresentative was M. le Comte Conrad de Buisseret-Steenbecque de Blarenghien. As for M. de l'Escaille, he was Secretary of Legation.

The conclusions concluding here, there is no room for further falsifications.

It is not our intention to make an exhaustive examination of the diplomatic documents relating to the war; the more so as this examination has been conducted in masterly fashion by MM. Dürckheim and Denis, by M. Waxweiler, and by the author ofJ'Accuse. It is enough for us to prove that Germany has intentionally falsified documents, since this simple proof disposes of all her attempts to befoul Belgium; for he who has a good argument at his disposal is not so foolish as to spoil it and deprive it of all real value by means of falsifications.

The three Successive Proposals of Wilhelm II to Belgium.

Under its dry, cold, diplomatic phrasing the reply to the ultimatum (1stGrey Book, No. 22) scarcely conceals the indignation which thrilled the heart of Belgium when Wilhelm II offered her the chance of associating herself with his crime against loyalty. But the German Government did not understand this indignation, neither was it conscious of its own infamy. Otherwise how could it have repeated the same offer a few days later—an offer at once contemptible and full of contempt, as was so well said by M. Jules Destrée before the meeting of the Federation of Advocates, on the 3rd August, 1914. Two remarks on the subject of this fresh proposal (1stGrey Book, No. 60). In the first place the United States Minister in Belgium, who was entrusted with the German interests, refused to transmit it; as for the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, he accepted the mission "without enthusiasm." In the second place, when the Emperor affirmed, on the 9th August, that the fortress of Liége had been taken by assault, he must have known that the fortress was still resisting; for although thecityof Liége was occupied by the Germans from the 7th, thefortswere intact. Let us remember that the first fort which fell was that of Barchon, on the 8th August, 1914; that of Évegnée fell on the 11th, that of Fléron on the 14th, that of Loncin, commanded by General Leman, fell only at 5 p.m. on the 15th: and several forts were at that time still holding out.

German diplomacy naturally received a fresh indignant refusal (1stGrey Book, No. 23).

Even then official Germany, dazzled by the brilliance of itsKultur, had not yet grasped the full baseness of its crime, since on the 10th September it posted up in Brussels its new proposal and Belgium's reply.

Could candour in perfidy go any farther? Yes! for the German Government, during the siege of Antwerp, made proposals of peace for the third time. This offer was secret. The terms have not been published; even the Germanic Press sought to deny that it had been made; but the avowal appeared in a Viennese newspaper, theNeue Freie Presse, and was reproduced by order of the German authorities inLa Belgique(Brussels, 13th January, 1915).

Hostilities preceding the Declaration of War.

So the Emperor Wilhelm II did not succeed in making us his accomplices. Needless to say, we did not tremble before the two bogies which are given so large a place in his harangues: his store of dry powder and his newly-whetted sabre.

And so the sovereign of the formidable German Empire declared war upon tiny Belgium. "He would find himself, to his keenest regret, obliged to execute, if need be by force of arms, the measures of security set forth as indispensable," as the declaration of war expressed it (1stGrey Book, No. 27). This declaration reached Brussels at 7 a.m. on the 4th of August. But, apparently unknown to the Emperor, the German troops, before the telegram had reached Belgium, had crossed the frontier during the night of the 3rd.

We have just seen that the declaration of war reached Brussels on the 4th August, at seven o'clock in the morning. This, at least, is what we learn from the official documents published by Belgium. What does official Germany say upon this point? Nothing. Nowhere is any mention made of the declaration of war, and it is this intentional vagueness which allows the Germans to declare, without blushing, that the German troops entered Belgium on the night of the 3rd August. They let it be supposed that the state of war existed from the moment when Belgium, on the 3rd, refused the German ultimatum. Thus theChronik des Deutschen Krieges(p. 33) gives the text of the ultimatum; then, in two lines, a summary of the reply. The first document which follows relating to Belgium is the proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Meuse (6th Report, I).

This is very vague as to the political relations between the two countries: are they at war, or are they not? No one could say. Of the declaration of war, which should have found a place here, not a word; there is no further question of Belgium before the telegrams of the 7th August (p.84).

When we say that the declaration of war is not mentioned in any German publication, we are going too far.Die Wahrheit über den Krieg("die Wahrheit!") speaks of the declaration of war; but only to say that Belgium declared war (p. 40):Belgiën antwortete darauf mit der Kriegserklärung.[10]

The same publication appends some documents; No. 41 (p. 160) is a reproduction of the ultimatum. One would naturally expect that No. 42 would be either Belgium's reply or the declaration of war. By no means; these two documents are not given. Any one who reads the text and hopes thereby to learn "die Wahrheit" concerning the war will be no better informed by the documents. Let us in passing remark that the German Government, in theWhite Bookpublished for the session of the Reichstag of the 4th August, had also, by its own admission, made a selection among the documents which it submitted to the members of Parliament. This procedure is no doubt a logical consequence ofKultur.

The Pacific Character of Belgium.

Nearly all the nations of Europe cherish national animosities, racial hatreds handed down from century to century, the heritage of conflicts never pacified, which a mere nothing suffices to renew; or the survival of oppressions and spoliations suffered of old by men's forbears, whose abhorred memory is transmitted like a sacred trust from generation to generation. And in all these countries, moreover, there is a chauvinist, a jingo party, which urges a "war of revenge against the hereditary enemy." In Belgium, as Mr. Asquith stated in his speech in Dublin, there was nothing of the kind. We had no spite against any one, and our people, laborious and peaceful, only asked to be allowed to live in friendship with its neighbours. Never had there been in Belgium any manifestation against a foreign country; never had a political party inscribed in its programme any sort of hostility towards another people. Who, then, will be persuaded that "the Belgian Government had for a long time been carefully preparing for this war,"[11]as the Emperor Wilhelm II asserted in his telegram to the President of the United States (in which he also stated that his heart was bleeding!)? No, there is no possible doubt on this point: Belgium brought into the conflict no racial enmity,[12]and if she has found herself thrown into the furnace, despite her constant love of peace, it is solely because her haughty neighbour confronted her with this dilemma: either peace with dishonour, or honour with war. The choice was not in doubt.

German Espionage in Belgium.

It is idle to insist on the accusation of premeditation, for it is unhappily too certain that Belgium was is no way ready for war. But it is also incontestable that Germany had "for a long time carefully prepared for" the invasion of Belgium. We cannot as yet reveal in detail the facts as to German espionage, with its often odious methods, for in most cases these revelations would expose those who have informed us to reprisals. We must for the present be intentionally vague, reserving preciser details for a later date.

When the occupation comes to an end we shall report in detail the case of a German engineer, who, in returning to us with the rank of officer, presided over the systematic destruction by fire of the workshop which he had managed; and the case of another engineer, who commanded the gang ordered to set fire to the quarter adjoining the factory in which he had been employed. Thanks to his knowledge of the locality, he was able in a few seconds toset fire to the richest streets of the neighbourhood. We shall be able to mark on a map the foundations of reinforced concrete for the great German guns, constructed long in advance, in the localities most favourable to bombardment; we shall also point to the store of timber intended to serve for the construction of a bridge over the Scheldt, which was found in a factory established by Germans on the banks of the river. As for the store of Mauser rifles discovered at Liége, our newspapers spoke of that at the time.

Here is a fact which can be related without danger. A German officer dropped from his pocket—we shall state later on in what locality—a detailed plan of the town of Soignies, in which his troops had lodged a few days earlier. This plan gives, besides the details of streets, and even houses, information concerning the occupants of certain buildings: pharmacies, breweries, tanneries, the Communal treasury, the bank, and other establishments where the army might need to make requisitions. The large buildings are coloured blue. It was there that the troops were lodged. This plan, drawn in Chinese ink and coloured, dates from fifteen years back according to the indications which it contains. But it has quite recently been revised and completed, for the latest alterations in the town have been added in pencil; improvement of the Senne, creation of a public square, etc.

The case related by theN.R.C.of 19th August (evening) is particularly instructive. When the Germans occupied Liége and Seraing the Cockerill workshops naturally refused to work for them, since the Germans wished them to make munitions for them. The German Colonel Keppel then assumedthe direction of the works, promising the workers an increased salary of 50 per cent. And this officer did not blush to sign his proclamation: "Attaché of the German Government at the Liége Exposition." He had consequently profited by his privileged situation in Belgium in order to make himself familiar with the organization of the Cockerill works. But it must be supposed that matters were too difficult for him, for Herren Koester and Noske (Kriegsfahrten, p. 21) assert that he had to abandon the position.

The Mentality of the German Soldiers at the beginning of the Campaign.

Until the very last moment our enemies deluded themselves as to the loyalty of the Belgians: they still hoped that the latter would only resist as a matter of form. This idea is openly expressed in the Chancellor's speech of the 2nd December; it is also implicitly contained in the proclamation of General von Emmich (see6th Report, I). The officers and soldiers who crossed the frontier at the beginning of the war were quite bewildered by the unforeseen resistance of the Belgian Army; this is what the German prisoners interned at Bruges tell their relatives; they even go so far as to deplore having to fight a neutral country.

Letters from German Prisoners of War.

We hear from Belgium:—

The correspondence of the German prisoners of war (to the number of about two thousand) who, at the beginning of the war, were interned in the barracks of the Bruges Lancers, has passed almost entirely through our hands.

All say they are well treated. Some even hopethat the Belgian prisoners in Germany will be as well treated as they. One wounded soldier in a Bruges hospital relates that the Belgians treat the German wounded like brothers; another speaks only of his "Belgian comrades"! The good food served to them seems to make a great impression. Most of them say, "We have enough to eat"; or even, "We have food in abundance." Only one complains of "beer without flavour and bad wine"; but another says with much simplicity: "The people here are very kind to us, for we have enough to eat and drink." The wordforis amusing....

The letters of the officers are quite different. No more joy because their lives are safe. The war absorbs them entirely. They are warriors at heart and the struggle interests them passionately. They know nothing of what is happening, or rather they are not told what is happening, and they want to know ... to know, and it is painful to hear in each letter the same question: what news? The forced inactivity becomes a torture. Boredom presses on them: they are discouraged and greatly disillusioned; they had hoped to pass very rapidly across Belgium (it must be remembered that at this time the war was only beginning, that Brussels was not yet occupied, and that the letters date from this period).

The attack upon Belgium does not seem to please a great many of them. "We have attacked a neutral country," says a medical officer, "and we shall now have to suffer the eventual consequences."

"When we got out of the train," says another, "we received the order to fight against Belgium, a thing which is to me and to all highly antipathetic. But what is commanded has to be executed."

"The attack on Belgium was from the first a shameful thing."

"We violated Belgium before any declaration of war had been made"!

All the letters show how little the resistance of Liége was expected. Many say: "Of all our company, of our battalion, of our regiment, there are left only so many or so many men." One relates how in a few minutes his colonel, his major, the captains, and nearly all the lieutenants were mown down by the balls. "We are all mightily deluded," admits another; "we were too confident; we thought the Belgians were disheartened"! "The Belgians fight like lions," says another.

German Lies respecting the Occupation of Liége.

It is the truth, although the news is partly from a German source, that the Germans entered Belgium on the night of the 3rd of August; they crossed the frontier near Gemmenich at two o'clock in the morning, and the following night (of the 4th of August) they were already attempting an attack upon Liége. But the official telegrams from Berlin have never mentioned this date. To make it believed that the capture of Liége was extremely rapid and that the German army had met with no serious resistance, the staff pruned the siege of Liége at both ends; it made the operation commence on the 5th August instead of the 4th, and declared that it was already completed by the 7th August.

We could not give a more precise idea of the manner in which the Government and its "reptile Press" deceives public opinion than by reproducing two telegrams relating to the fall of Liége. On the 7th of August, having reported the entrance of thetroops into Belgium on the previous day, the telegrams announced the capture of the fortress of Liége.[13]Note this: the capture of thefortress(Festung). Now the Germans had merely occupied the town of Liége, a town absolutely open, without ramparts or defences of any kind. They themselves were forced to own, on the 10th, that the forts had not been captured; but they added that the guns were no longer firing, which was false (p.50).

Berlin,7th August.—Our advance guard entered Belgium the day before yesterday, along the whole frontier. A small division attempted, with great valour, a surprise attack upon Liége. A few cavalrymen pushed on into the city, and attempted to seize the commandant, who was only able to escape by flight. The surprise attack against the fortress, constructed according to modern principles, did not succeed. Our troops are before the fortress, in contact with the enemy. Naturally the whole enemy Press will describe this enterprise as a defeat; but it has no influence on the great operations; for us it is only an isolated fact in the history of the war, and a proof of the aggressive courage of our troops.(Kr. D. des K. Z., p. 9.)Berlin,7th August. Official. (Wolff Agency.)—The fortress of Liége is taken. After the divisions, which had attempted a surprise attack upon Liége, had been reinforced, the attack was pushed to a successful termination. This morning at 8 o'clock the fortress was in the power of Germany.(Kr. D. des K. Z., p. 11.)

(Kr. D. des K. Z., p. 9.)

Berlin,7th August. Official. (Wolff Agency.)—The fortress of Liége is taken. After the divisions, which had attempted a surprise attack upon Liége, had been reinforced, the attack was pushed to a successful termination. This morning at 8 o'clock the fortress was in the power of Germany.

(Kr. D. des K. Z., p. 11.)

However, it was necessary to prevent the bad effect which would be produced on the population by foreign communiqués announcing that the German army was continuing to besiege Liége after taking it. After the complete success announced on the 7th the task was, in fact, rather difficult. How was it to be effected?

(a) Discredit might be thrown on news coming from abroad, for example, by "demonstrating" its untruthfulness.Der Lügenfeldzuggives on p. 19 the announcement of the taking of Liége, and on thefollowingpage the Havas telegram stating that Liége is not taken. What will the superficial reader conclude if he does not take the trouble to dissect the telegrams? That the Allies are shameless liars, going to the length of denying the obvious. But examine the dates: Liége was taken, according to the Germans, on the 7th August, at 8 a.m., while the Allies declare that Liége is not taken—on the 6th! And to think that the book which perpetrates this trickery is entitledDer Lügenfeldzug unserer Feinde("Our Enemies' Campaign of Lies")! and that it undertakes the mission of calling attention to the lies and calumnies of the enemy in order to correct them!

(b) To establish confusion between the city and the fortress. As early as the 7th August the false newsmongers were rejoicing over the taking of the fortress, intentionally confusing the city and the fortified place, so that the reader of these communiqués no longer knows what to think, and naturally accepts the official news of his own country.

The sudden Attack upon France is checked.

To understand how completely it was in Germany's interest to create the belief that Liége was taken in two days by a small body of troops, we must remember that the object of the Germans wasto traverse Belgium as rapidly as possible, in order to crush the French and capture Paris. The author ofJ'accusereports the remark of old Marshal von Haeseler, who proposed to celebrate in Paris the anniversary of Sedan—on the 2nd September, 1914. We ourselves copied a charcoal inscription written on the front of a house burned down at Battice, making an appointment in Paris for the 2nd September with a certain regiment of artillery.

Now this sudden march was completely spoiled and the German plan of campaign undone by the unexpected resistance of the Belgians, first at Liége, then at Hesbays. This loss of a few days was fatal to Germany, and Germany bears us malice on that account.

The Disinterested Behaviour of Belgium.

One last point as to the violation of our neutrality.

The Germans now pretend to pity the poor Belgians, who allowed themselves to be fooled by England as much as by their King and Government, and who, by their credulity, brought the war upon themselves. But what am I saying?—the German Government assures the world that we ourselves desired the war. Official Germany has become incapable of conceiving that a people should remain faithful to its international obligations, and if need be sacrifice itself for them.

"Why," our adversaries ask us, "did you not accept the proposals of Germany? You would have profited by them." And indeed our eastern neighbours offered us £200,000 as the price of our complicity (F. Bettix,Der Krieg).

It would be very interesting to know on what data Germany calculates the value of a nation'shonour; in any case, we may assure her that no one in the world would be so simple as to offer so great a sum for hers.

For the rest, as far as we Belgians are concerned our interest has never entered into our calculations. It was not in order to profit by it that we resisted Germany; it was because we judged that such was our obligation as an honest nation. And yet, as the Minister, M. Carton de Wiart, remarked, at the Hotel de Ville in Paris, on the 20th December, 1914, we had, even then, the vision of our country ravaged by the Prussian hordes; but even to-day, after suffering such terrible atrocities, there is not a Belgian "who would change his poverty for the profits of a bandit."

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